42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) makes a union liable when its role in creating and maintaining a discriminatory seniority system causes an employer to discriminate.

Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1978-06-14(c)(3)

We conclude that the unions’ role in creating, maintaining, and otherwise ratifying the seniority system was at least as great as Santa Fe’s role, and that therefore liability is properly imposed upon the UTU under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) permits a union to be held liable when it acquiesces in an employer’s discriminatory practices and seniority is not a factor.

United States v. City of Buffalo · filed 1978-08-01(c)

Tacit union acquiescence in an employer’s discriminatory practices is sufficient to render it liable. ... I find that, although the record does not detail specific instances of discriminatory practice, the lack of any black BPBA delegates, the organization’s discriminatory reputation among black officers, and its acquiescence in the discriminatory practices of the Department establish BPBA liability.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires discriminatory conduct by the labor union itself; a reputation for discrimination alone does not create liability.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sheet Metal Workers, International Ass'n, Local No. 122 · filed 1978-11-24(c)

A local union must itself do something to violate Title VII; it does not violate Title VII because someone else thinks it has violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits racially segregated union locals that tend to deprive workers of employment opportunities, even without present discrimination.

Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n · filed 1979-02-14(c)(2)

The Court is of the opinion that it should so require the merger, either because these racially segregated unions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) in that they “tend” to deprive individuals of employment opportunities or because segregated locals are a per se violation of the Act under the language quoted above.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a union from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate because of race; a claim requires evidence supporting an inference that the union did so.

Green v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1979-08-29(c)(3)

Title VII forbids a union “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual” because of his or her race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3). ... There is not a scintilla of evidence on this record that the union has engaged in any discriminatory conduct with respect to hiring. Because of the plaintiff’s failure to point to any such evidence, the union defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claims.

Section 2000e-2(c) applies to labor organizations representing federal employees and prohibits discriminatory representation.

Vera L. JENNINGS, Appellant, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, Appellee · filed 1982-03-19(c)

In any event, we hold that such a union, like a labor organization representing nonfederal employees, is subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c).

Section 2000e-2 does not make a union liable for the effects of a discriminatory seniority system when it takes every reasonable step to oppose the system; those steps need not include a strike.

28 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1201, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,680 · filed 1982-05-03

The Fifth Circuit has recently held that a labor union is not liable for the effects of a seniority system if it has met the "legal requirement of taking every reasonable step to oppose a seniority system which operated primarily to discriminate against its own members." ... Terrell, although distinguishable in several aspects from the instant case, controls here. ... Terrell requires taking all reasonable steps. A strike is a drastic measure. Requiring such action could contravene the policies of the National Labor Relations Act and could be unreasonable.

A labor union that takes every reasonable step to oppose a discriminatory seniority system is not liable for its effects.

Waker v. Republic Steel Corp. · filed 1982-05-03

The Fifth Circuit has recently held that a labor union is not liable for the effects of a seniority system if it has met the “legal requirement of taking every reasonable step to oppose a seniority system which operated primarily to discriminate against its own members.” ... Terrell, although distinguishable in several aspects from the instant case, controls here. ... The trial judge properly found for the local on this issue in this case.

Section 2000e-2 defines an employer's and a union's discriminatory practices as separate wrongs.

Sears v. Atchison · filed 1984-12-10(a), (c)

Further, the wrong that the union committed was a separate wrong from that of the employer, defined by separate subsections of the statute.

Section 2000e-2 defines employer and union violations in separate subsections, making a union’s discriminatory conduct a separate wrong from the employer’s.

Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, Co. · filed 1984-12-10(a), (c)

Further, the wrong that the union committed was a separate wrong from that of the employer, defined by separate subsections of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c).

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a union from causing or attempting to cause employer discrimination, but gives a claim for that conduct to aggrieved employees, not the discriminating employer.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. City of New York · filed 1984-12-27(c)(3)

The statute’s proscription of a union’s causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate was enacted for the benefit of employees; the statute does not create a right of action in favor of the discriminating employer.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from deliberately refusing to process discrimination grievances when that refusal discriminates against members entitled to representation.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. · filed 1985-11-13(c)(1)

The deliberate choice not to process grievances also violated § 703(c)(1) of Title VII because it discriminated against the victims who were entitled to representation.

Section 2000e-2 permits a Title VII claim against a union when evidence of discriminatory referrals and participation in sex-segregated employment practices establishes a prima facie case.

Babrocky v. Jewel Food Company and Retail Meatcutters Union, Local 320, Defendants · filed 1985-12-12

These allegations are sufficient to establish a pri-ma facie case of Title VII discrimination against the Union and render summary judgment inappropriate.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from deliberately refusing to process discrimination grievances when that refusal discriminates against members entitled to representation.

Nos. 84-1478, 84-1509 · filed 1986-01-07(c)(1)

The deliberate choice not to process grievances also violated Sec. 703(c)(1) of Title VII because it discriminated against the victims who were entitled to representation.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) requires a union to make every reasonable effort to end an employer's promotion test that has a disparate impact on minority employees.

Howard v. International Molders & Allied Workers Union · filed 1986-01-14(c)(3)

Once the trial court found that the mechanical aptitude test had, during its entire period of operation, had a disparate impact on the minority class, it follows that it was the duty of the defendant unions under the Terrell standard to make every reasonable effort to see that these tests were brought to an end.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) requires a union to use all reasonable effort to end an employer’s discriminatory promotion tests.

Howard v. International Molders & Allied Workers Union · filed 1986-01-14(c)(3)

It is, therefore, clear that the unions in this case are liable, because they did not use all reasonable effort to cause the employer to put an end to the use of the non-validated tests for promotion.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discriminatory union membership and job referral practices based on race or sex.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 798 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen · filed 1986-09-05(a)

Local 798’s membership and referral practices are violative of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), in that Local 798 regularly and purposefully treats blacks and females less favorably than white males.

A union's referral of lower-ranked men instead of a qualified woman can establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(c)(2).

Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union · filed 1986-09-23(c)(2)

Under Title VII, a labor organization may not fail to refer an individual for employment because of her sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2). ... These facts constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) prohibits a union from purposely obstructing an employer’s reasonable religious accommodation, but does not require the union to waive seniority rights to provide one.

Killebrew v. Local Union 1683 of the American Federation of State · filed 1986-10-20(c)(3)

The law makes it clear that the Union may be held liable for religious discrimination if it purposely acts or refuses to act in a manner that prevents or obstructs a reasonable accommodation by the employer of the religious beliefs of the employee and causes the employer to discriminate. ... The weight of the evidence in the instant case leads the Court to the conclusion that the Union did not purposely act or refuse to act so as to prevent or obstruct the Water Company from reaching an accommodation. We do not believe that the Union should have varied its collective bargaining agreement with the Company to allow the Plaintiff to assert bumping privileges that ordinarily would not have been available and which would have resulted in some detriment to Union members affected by the bump.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a union from deliberately refusing to pursue workers’ racial discrimination grievances because the claims allege racial bias.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. · filed 1987-06-19(c)(1)

Both courts below found that the Unions had indeed discriminated on the basis of race by the way in which they represented the workers, and the Court of Appeals expressly held that "[t]he deliberate choice not to process grievances also violated § 703(c)(1) of Title VII." 777 F. 2d, at 127. The plain language of the statute supports this conclusion.

A factual dispute over whether an alleged discriminator acted as a union officer can preclude summary judgment for the union on a racial discrimination claim.

Wilson v. Myers · filed 1987-07-14(c)(1)

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in this case because there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning Myers’ status in the Union in December 1981.

A union facing a racial discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(c)(1) is not entitled to summary judgment when evidence conflicts about whether the alleged wrongdoer was acting as its president.

Wilson v. Myers · filed 1987-10-15(c)(1)

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in this case because there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning Myers' status in the Union in December 1981.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a union from racially discriminating in job referrals and union membership.

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers International Union of North America · filed 1991-12-10(c)

26. In view of the Findings and Conclusions, plaintiffs have sustained the required burden of proof in establishing that Local 496 and Floyd Conrad have engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination which constitutes an unlawful employment practice in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (c), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

A union cannot defeat a prima facie disparate-treatment claim by treating failure to pass its challenged admission exam as proof that the applicant was unqualified.

Myree v. Local 41, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1992-03-06(c)(1)

Therefore, this Court rejects Local 41’s position that the plaintiff could not demonstrate his qualification for admission based on his failure to pass the Journeyman’s examination and that the plaintiff has failed to establish that element of his prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits intentional sex discrimination by a union during collective bargaining; evidence of such bias can create a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment.

Annabelle Carter Deanne Dahl Paula Rust Ellen Seidel Florence Thurmer Lorraine Tyler v. United Food and Commercial Worke · filed 1992-06-12(c)

The plaintiffs have established that a dispute exists on a genuine issue of material fact: whether the union’s conduct of its affairs was discriminatory, in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) can make a union liable for failing to oppose an employer’s discrimination, but does not make the union automatically liable for the employer’s conduct.

Anspach v. Tomkins Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-03-26(c)

It is breach of that duty which gives rise to union’s liability; the union is responsible'for its own actions, not for those of the employer.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits labor organizations from discriminating based on race or national origin; a claim fails without evidence of discriminatory motive.

Saini v. Bloomsburg University Faculty · filed 1993-06-30(c)(1)

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice” for a labor organization “to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Undisputed facts indicate that decisions regarding the 1991 election were made without regard to plaintiffs race or nationality and were made in a good faith effort to adhere to union by-laws. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a union member claiming discriminatory refusal to arbitrate a grievance to show that the union acted out of racial animus.

Sanders v. Ogden Allied Leisure Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Culinary Workers' Local Union 226 · filed 1993-09-13(c)

Sanders pursues a Title VII disparate treatment theory against the Union pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(c). He must show the Union refused to pursue his grievance to arbitration out of racial animus.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) permits a claim that a union caused or attempted to cause employer discrimination without requiring an allegation that the union treated male members more favorably.

Marquart v. Lodge 837, International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers · filed 1994-06-13(c)(3)

More importantly, as we stated in the background section of this opinion, Marquart need not have alleged that male union members received more favorable treatment for Marquart to establish a prima facie case. Instead, under Title VII, Marq-uart need only have alleged that the Union “cause[d] or attempted] to cause an employer to discriminate against [her].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3).

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits unions from discriminating based on gender, and a union’s failure to address pervasive sexual harassment can violate that duty.

Durko v. Oi-Neg TV Products, Inc. · filed 1994-09-16(c)

By statute, the Union has a duty to treat its members equally, without differentiation on the basis of gender, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(l), and cannot, with impunity, "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate” on the basis of gender. ... Failure to take action to protect a member from a pervasive pattern of sexual harassment can indeed violate these statutory and contractual duties.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claim against a union as a labor organization to concern discrimination against the plaintiff as a union member, rather than solely as an employee.

Yerdon v. Teamsters Local 1149 · filed 1995-05-12(c)

The court agrees with the reasoning of those courts and finds that in order to hold Local 1149 liable in its capacity as labor organization under Title VII, plaintiff must allege that she was discriminated against in her capacity as union member as opposed to employee.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) makes a union liable when it fails to pursue a member’s colorable sex discrimination grievance to accommodate its members’ sexist prejudice.

EEOC v. Regency Architectural Metals Corp. · filed 1995-08-08(c)(1)

We thus conclude that Seravalli's desire to cater to the prejudices of the members of Local 832 was a motivating factor in his failure to adequately assert Hodge's claim against Regency.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) can hold a union responsible for causing employer discrimination against individuals who are not union members.

EEOC v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1998-02-04(c)(3)

The Court finds, however, that the language of section 703(c)(3) does not limit the union's responsibility for discrimination to actions against its membership, referring instead to "individuals."

Section 2000e-2(c) does not impose an affirmative duty on a union to investigate and remedy an employer’s discrimination.

Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005 · filed 2002-11-15(c)

Though the Unions were prohibited from causing or assisting unlawful discrimination by Thorn’s employer, nowhere in either statute do we find language imposing upon unions an affirmative duty to investigate and take steps to remedy employer discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c) requires a claim that a union discriminated in representing a member to show a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation and discriminatory motive.

Oparaji v. United Federation of Teachers · filed 2006-02-24(c)

To establish a Title VII claim concerning representation by a union of its member’s interests, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation to the member.

Section 2000e-2(c) does not make a union liable for members’ workplace sexual harassment unless the union instigates or actively supports it.

Burden v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1410 · filed 2007-04-30(c)

Here, however, it is uncontroverted that the Union advised the plaintiff to bring her complaint to CSA’s attention, that it promptly provided her a grievance form, and that it cooperated fully in the employer’s ensuing investigation. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law the Union did not actively support workplace harassment of the plaintiff.

A prima facie discrimination claim against a union requires protected status, a grievance the union failed to pursue, and some indication of discriminatory animus.

Casamento v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2008-05-08(c)(1)

By analogy to cases against an employer, a prima facie case against a union requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, 2) the union failed to pursue a grievance filed by the plaintiff and 3) there is some indication that the union’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus.

A labor union’s passive acquiescence in an employer’s discrimination does not establish liability for causing the employer to discriminate.

Wrobbel v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 17 · filed 2009-07-28(c)(3)

Plaintiff Wrobbel, however, has failed to come forward with evidence showing that Local 17 “caused or attempted to cause” Asplundh not to hire her because she is a female. At best, the evidence presented by Plaintiff evidence shows passive acquiescence on the part of the Union.

A Title VII claim against a union concerning its representation of a member requires evidence that the union breached its duty of fair representation through discrimination.

McIntyre v. LONGWOOD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2009-09-30(c)(1)

Any claim against MIAA under Title VII or the ADEA must arise from its duty of fair representation.

Section 2000e-2(c) makes a union liable for an employer’s discrimination only if the union takes an active role in it.

Martinez v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 2009-11-19(c)

The District Court properly found that the Union cannot be held liable for WTXF29’s alleged discrimination against Martinez unless the Union took an active role in the discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) permits a claim against a union for a single discriminatory decision not to process a member’s grievance; a discriminatory policy is not required.

Hubbell v. World Kitchen, LLC · filed 2010-06-09(c)(1)

Because a Title VII claim may be raised when there is a single act of discrimination, a deliberate choice by a union not to process a grievance may give rise to a claim against it.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a union from failing to refer someone for employment because of sex.

Stuart v. Local 727, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 2014-11-14(c)(2)

The judge’s belief that “failure to refer” cannot violate Ti- tle VII contradicts the statute, which states that it is unlawful for a union to “fail or refuse to refer for employment any in- dividual” because of the individual’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) prohibits a labor union from handling a member’s grievance differently because of race; under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the member must show that a similarly situated person of another race received better treatment.

Buford v. Laborers International Union Local 269 · filed 2019-01-14(c)(1)

Although Buford (by his own description) is black and thus a member of a protected class, the record reflects no instance in which Defendants pursued a grievance to challenge any termination by an employer bound by the type of “no just cause required” CBA that governed I.W. & G union employees, and Buford cannot identify any Local 269 or Local 4 member of another race who was terminated under similar circumstances but who received better union representation.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a labor union from causing race discrimination by an employer or depriving a person of employment opportunities through discriminatory union actions.

Zimmerman v. International Longshoreman's Association Local 1694 · filed 2024-06-24(c)(2), (c)(3)

Plaintiff’s assertion that Local 1694, a union whose membership is approximately 90% to 95% African American, was involved in GT Wilmington’s decision to reinstate only African American employees regardless of their seniority and experience supports an inference that Local 1694 caused GT Wilmington to discriminate against Plaintiff based on his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3). The allegations that Local 1694 withdrew Plaintiff’s grievance from arbitration, refused to reinstate the grievance, and wrongfully expelled Plaintiff from Local 1694 support an inference that Local 1694’s actions resulted in Plaintiff being deprived of employment opportunities at the Port, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2).

Section 2000e-2(a) protects equal employment opportunity; equal or substantial pay does not by itself rule out race discrimination.

United States v. Hayes International Corp. · filed 1969-08-19(a)

Moreover, this Court will not be misled by the “equal pay” or “substantial pay” test as indicating the absence of a violation of Title VII, for Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not an equal pay provision but an equal opportunity to the full enjoyment of employment rights.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment assignments and compensation; different shift pay rates do not violate it when the applicable rate is paid regardless of sex.

Cook v. Dixie Cup Division of American Can Co. · filed 1967-08-02(a)

Under the facts as established by the affidavit of M. A. Reinhard, Manager of defendant, together with the exhibit attached thereto, the plaintiffs have not been and are not now being discriminated against because of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to racially discriminatory railroad job classifications despite existing craft classifications under the Railway Labor Act.

Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1969-07-16(a)

While we view the Railroad as in the middle of disputes of this type, we do not think the Railroad can violate the plain provisions set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and use as a defense the historic class or craft classifications and the requirements of the Railway Labor Act. The Railroad is not exempt from the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(c) does not apply to claims arising before Title VII took effect on July 2, 1965.

Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, Afl-Cio v. National Labor Relations Boar · filed 1966-11-09(c)

Since the claims before us arose fully three years prior to the effective date of Title VII, its pertinent provisions are clearly inapplicable in this controversy.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires promotional systems to be applied evenhandedly so employees are not disadvantaged because of race.

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation · filed 1970-11-06(a)

What is required, however, is that any promotional system must be applied evenhandedly so as not to disadvantage any employee on grounds of race. The system maintained by the defendants, which gives unskilled white employees greater promotional opportunities than unskilled black employees, for reasons directly traceable to prior segregation and not founded in any objective business considerations violates this provision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a policy that denies women employment privileges, including seniority and bidding rights, without a business justification.

Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · filed 1971-11-17(a)(1)

A “policy” to limit company privileges to only one class of employees and to exclude others cannot survive in the name of “company policy” alone if the net effect of that policy is to exclude all women. Phillips has given no business justification for excluding its clerical employees from these rights. ... And when the policy which does so limit the privileges results in sex discrimination, it violates Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits sex-based employee classifications that deny employment opportunities; stereotypes about women's abilities do not justify such classifications.

Ridinger v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1971-03-24(a)(2)

While Sections 4107.43 and 4107.46 were originally enacted in the late nineteenth century for the laudable purpose of protecting females, these statutes compel an employer to make a prohibited classification of employees on the basis of a stereotyped characterization of the sexes in violation of Section 2000e-2, Title 42 U.S.C. and thus must yield to the overriding federal policy requiring that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capabilities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributable to the group.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) covers a sex-based workplace rule that classifies employees and deprives an employee of employment opportunities.

Roberts v. General Mills, Inc. · filed 1971-09-21(a)(2)

It appears then that the defendant has classified its employees, by its rule that men wear hats and women wear hairnets, in such a way that plaintiff has been deprived of his employment opportunities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pension plans that give employees different retirement terms or benefits solely because of sex.

Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company · filed 1971-05-24(a)(1)

The Pension Plan, as it existed prior to May 1, 1967, and those parts of the amended Plan, as noted above, therefore, are in conflict with the language and spirit of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits employer retirement plans that set different retirement ages for men and women.

Bartmess v. Drewrys · filed 1971-07-07(a)(2)

A plain reading of the statute indicates that retirement plans which treat men and women differently with respect to their ages of retirement are prohibited.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from applying a no-marriage rule to women but not men, even when the rule affects only one job category.

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-07-16(a)(1)

Viewing the class of United's married employees, it is clear that United has contravened Section 703(a) (1) by applying one standard for men and one for women.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment.

Glus v. GC Murphy Company · filed 1971-07-29(a)

It is clear from the face of the Complaint that what is alleged is discrimination based on sex. It is equally clear that such discrimination, if proved, would constitute an unlawful employment practice under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) and (e).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a claim based on allegations that a pension plan denies annuity benefits because of an employee’s sex, if those allegations are proved.

Mixson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1971-12-01(a)

Plaintiff in this Title VII case alleges that defendants have maintained an employment practice which violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). More specifically, she says that defendants have denied her an annuity benefit on the basis of provisions in their pension plan which discriminate against her spouse and male employees as a class because of their sex. ... It is abundantly clear in the instant case that the allegations of the complaint, if proven, state a claim upon which this court could grant relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2 covers discrimination against an employee in patient assignments because of the employee's race or national origin.

Dr. N. Jay ROGERS Et Al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant · filed 1972-01-31(a)

Thus read, and independently of the assertion of discriminatory discharge, the claim refers to unlawful employment practices consisting, under Sec. 2000e-2(a) (1), of discrimination against Mrs. Chavez because of her race, color (etc), and, under Sec. 2000e-2(a) (2), of classification of her because of her race, color (etc.).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits racial discrimination in employment transfer and promotion practices.

Jake ROWE Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-03-02

This appeal is taken from a judgment rendered for the defendant, General Motors Corporation, in a suit alleging racial discrimination in employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. ... The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, determined that Employees individually, and the class represented in this suit had not in fact been the victims of racial discrimination. We reverse the Trial Court’s decision.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits denying an employee equal employment opportunities because of race.

Francis v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-05-03

This Court has considered the separate incidents of alleged racial discrimination and all of the evidence as a whole and has concluded therefrom that plaintiff has not established that she was denied equal employment opportunities by the defendant because of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) may cover pension plans as part of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Ugiansky v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1972-02-05(a)(1)

This court believes that pension plans, absent a specific exclusion in the Act, are or may be part of the “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges” of employment and therefore covered by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from applying a hair-length retention standard to men but not women.

Donohue v. Shoe Corporation of America · filed 1972-02-18(a)

The application of a hiring or retention standard to one sex but not to the other violates the Act. ... The Court concludes, therefore, that the complaint herein alleges a prima facie violation of § 703(a).

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit different grooming standards for men and women when both sexes must meet reasonable standards and neither is denied equal employment opportunities.

Willingham v. MacOn Telegraph Publishing Co. · filed 1972-04-11

As previously stated, this court interprets Title VII as prohibiting discrimination in employment opportunities and conditions of employment motivated by sexual considerations. The application of different grooming standards between the sexes does not, without more, constitute a denial of equal employment between the sexes. Further, such practice is not the application of unequal conditions of employment, unless, that is, the employer exacted grooming standards from one sex but allowed the other free rein.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer paying women a state-mandated overtime premium to pay men the same premium to avoid sex discrimination in compensation.

Hays v. Potlatch Forests · filed 1972-07-20(a)(1)

Insofar as the Arkansas statute results in discrimination against men, 3 we also agree with the trial court that conflict with Title VII can be avoided by requiring Potlatch to pay its male employees the same premium overtime rate which it is compelled to pay its female employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to provide male employees the same premium overtime pay that state law requires it to provide female employees.

Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc. · filed 1972-07-20(a)(1)

Insofar as the Arkansas statute results in discrimination against men, ... we also agree with the trial court that conflict with Title VII can be avoided by requiring Potlatch to pay its male employees the same premium overtime rate which it is compelled to pay its female employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits promotion policies that discriminate against women.

Fogg v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. · filed 1972-08-14(a)

I find that as of May and June of 1970 the Company did discriminate against women in its promotion policy from CCS to CC1.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a dress or grooming code that sets different permissible hair lengths for men and women as sex discrimination.

Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation · filed 1972-08-23(a)

This court holds, therefore, that an employee dress and grooming code, whether written or unwritten, wherein the allowable length of hair is different for male and female employees is discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Section 703(a) of the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit firing male employees for refusing to remove beards or moustaches.

Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. · filed 1972-09-18(a)(1)

For the reasons detailed in my May 25, 1972 order, which is attached as an appendix to this opinion, I again hold that dismissal of male employees based upon their refusal to remove beards and moustaches is not sex-based discrimination proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits promotion practices that tend to deprive employees of opportunities because of race, even without proof of actual deprivation.

Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corporation · filed 1972-10-06(a)(2)

In the absence of satisfactory proof of discrimination within the class, the Court does not find that the employer’s promotion practices have, in fact, deprived the class within the prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)- — only that such practices tend to deprive the class of employment opportunities within the statutory prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2 does not invalidate a rule requiring waitresses to cover their breasts while serving alcohol when the rule does not prevent them from working as waitresses.

Locker v. Kirby · filed 1973-04-10

It does not prevent petitioner Harmon from working as a waitress, nor indeed does it prevent her from doing so in topless dress so long as no alcoholic beverage license is involved on the premises in question. For the same reasons petitioners’ attacks on rule 143.2 based upon the 1964 Civil Rights Act ... must fall.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in retirement benefits.

Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. · filed 1973-03-08(a)(1)

We hold, therefore, that Sec. 703(a)(1) of the Act prohibits discrimination with respect to retirement benefits on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer’s failure to comply with a conflicting state law requiring overtime premiums only for women an unlawful employment practice.

Homemakers, Inc., Los Angeles v. Division of Indus. Welf. · filed 1973-04-02(a)(1)

Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the basis of sex “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... It is hereby further ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiff’s failure to comply with § 1350 and § 1350.5 of the California Labor Code does not give rise to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim based on a job reclassification to proceed when evidence raises a question about its discriminatory effect and the employer's economic justification.

Mary Jeanne ROSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIDGEPORT BRASS COMPANY Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1973-10-26(a)

This surely raises the possibility that the job reclassification had a discriminatory effect. ... Given these allegations-which at least impugn the justification of the Company-we would be loath to hold that no doubt exists as to whether the job reclassification was motivated purely by economic considerations. The summary judgment on this portion of the complaint is accordingly reversed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; back pay may not adequately remedy that harm.

Leisner v. New York Telephone Company · filed 1973-03-02(a)(1)

While back pay might offer some relief, the relief would obviously be inadequate since Title VII prohibits discrimination not only with respect to compensation but also with respect to “. . . terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . .,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employment may be difficult, if not impossible, to compensate with money damages.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a hiring rule applied differently to married women and married men as sex discrimination.

Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co. · filed 1973-04-17(a)(1)

Employment practices which vary in their applicability to married females and married males constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, the only distinguishing characteristic being the sex of the married persons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats discrimination against married women as sex discrimination when an employer applies a different marital-status standard to women and men.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 925, 6 Fair empl.prac.cas. 292, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8567, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8843 · filed 1973-06-25(a)(1)

Discrimination against married women constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex only if a different standard, i. e., the marital status of the person, has been applied to men and women. Absent proof of the standard applied to men, obviously the plaintiffs have not established that such standard differs from the one applied to women.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racially segregated departments and job classifications.

Johnnie A. REED, Appellant, v. ARLINGTON HOTEL COMPANY, INC., Appellee · filed 1973-04-26(a)(1)

The statistics which show segregated departments ' and job classifications establish a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits refusing to consider a woman for promotion because of her sex, even if a better-qualified man ultimately gets the job.

Nancy A. GILLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL PAPER BOARD COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1973-05-11(a)

Having had some familiarity with and experience in most if not all the facets of the position, the refusal of Varsho to consider her because she was a woman, is clearly a mischief which the statute was designed to prevent. We hold therefore that the court below was in error in not considering this point and in assuming that Sweezey’s superior qualifications presumably cured the previous act of discrimination. In sum we find no wrong in hiring Sweezey instead of Gillin but we hold that Federal did transgress by failing to consider Gillin not simply because she was not qualified but also because she was a woman.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees in job transfers because of race or national origin.

Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc. · filed 1973-07-17(a)(1)

This court finds that members of the class and plaintiff Ramirez have been discriminated against in transferring to road positions with Western Gillette. This conclusion is based upon direct evidence of overt discrimination by Western Gillette as well as by statistical evidence.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) prohibits a union from steering Black members into a less desirable job classification because of race.

United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & · filed 1973-08-20(c)(2)

Although the statistical sample may be too small in itself to be significant, the combination of the following factors comprises sufficient proof that blacks were discriminated against by way of exclusion from a more desirable job classification to constitute a violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2): (1) a disproportionate number of blacks accepted directly into the union were steered into the maintenance category; (2) the first four blacks were steered there while there existed more than three times as many construction electricians than maintenance electricians; and (3) substantial barriers to direct black admission into the union existed in the first instance.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment even when the conduct is neither a refusal to hire nor a discharge.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1331, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,294 Selene Weise v. Syracuse University, Jo Davis Mortenson v. Syr · filed 1975-07-14(a)(1)

While this was, strictly speaking, neither a refusal to hire nor a discharge, Title VII is not so narrowly limited, but applies equally to other discrimination with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2 protects against discrimination in workplace discipline and assignments of work and equipment as terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Gray v. Greyhound Lines · filed 1976-10-13(a)(1)

Indeed, if matters such as discipline and assignment of work and equipment were not considered "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," it would be difficult to give that language any meaning at all.

Section 2000e-2’s protection against discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment includes workplace discipline and work or equipment assignments.

Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East · filed 1976-10-13(a)(1)

Insofar as plaintiffs complain that Greyhound’s hiring practices have resulted in their own subjection to discriminatory treatment in the workplace, they are asserting interests clearly within the scope of Title VII’s protection against discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits racial segregation of workplace restrooms that adversely affects employees’ status.

Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co. · filed 1976-11-18(a)(2)

In terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), they were adversely affected in their status as employees by the segregation according to race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from suspending an otherwise qualified woman under a name-change rule that applies only to women.

Allen v. Lovejoy · filed 1977-04-21(a)(1)

A rule which applies only to women, with no counterpart applicable to men, may not be the basis for depriving a female employee who is otherwise qualified of her right to continued employment.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits an employment agency from discriminating based on race; allegations that an agency helped leave a position vacant to avoid hiring a Black applicant can state a claim.

Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, Alabama · filed 1980-03-03(b)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1976), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency, which the Personnel Board is under § 2000e(c), ... to “fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or natural origin . . ..” ... we think that dismissal of Appellant’s Title VII claim against the Personnel Board was improper in this case.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation and other employment terms, and classifications that adversely affect employment opportunities.

Thompson v. Boyle · filed 1980-07-08(a)

As a unit of the legislative branch having positions in the competitive service, the defendant is subject to the Title VII prohibition against discrimination by an employer against “any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s sex,” as well as the prohibition against employee classification in any manner which would tend to deprive any individual of “employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age alone.

Espenshade v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 1983-01-28

Although the complaint also cites 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (referring to § 2000e, et seq.), that statute addresses discriminatory employer practices based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, matters clearly not contemplated in the present complaint.

Summary judgment under § 2000e-2(a)(2) is improper without undisputed facts showing that the alleged segregation would deprive employees of opportunities or adversely affect their employment status.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. May & Co. · filed 1983-09-26(a)(2)

There are no undisputed facts which indicate that any segregation in any way would deprive any black of employment opportunities or adversely affect his or her status as an employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment even without economic or tangible harm.

Smith v. Texas Department of Water Resources · filed 1987-06-03(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the foregoing provision is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. It strikes at "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women."

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employee awards even when the awards do not affect career advancement.

Palmer v. Shultz · filed 1987-07-02(a)

27. Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), forbids employers to limit employees in any way that would “adversely affect [any individual’s] status as an employee” because of the employee’s sex. Thus Title VII forbids discrimination against women in awards. ... Discrimination in awards violates Title VII regardless of whether awards have any effect on officers’ career advancement.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover the opportunity to purchase employer stock when that opportunity is not a feature of employment.

Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co. · filed 1987-12-28(a)(1)

But the court concludes that the opportunity to purchase stock is not in this case within the purview of Title VII, either as a cause of action or as a remedy for other employment discriminations.

Section 2000e-2 covers discriminatory decisions about a physician’s hospital staff privileges when those privileges are a contractual benefit.

Ross v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 1988-01-15(a)(1)

Thus, any determination of such privilege or benefits are subject to the restrictions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory interference with a person’s employment opportunities with another employer, even when the person is not employed by the defendant.

Dr. S.B. PARDAZI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CULLMAN MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-02-29(a)(1)

If Dr. Pardazi can prove his claim that the hospital’s discrimination against him interfered with his employment opportunities with the professional corporation, we hold that Title VII would encompass such a claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches an employer that discriminatorily interferes with a person’s employment with another employer.

Esmat Zaklama, M.D. v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, Esmat Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center of Greater Miami · filed 1988-04-12(a)(1)

It is clear from the language of the statute that Congress intended that the rights and obligations it created under Title VII would extend beyond the immediate employer-employee relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment even without direct economic harm.

Powers v. Alabama Department Of Education · filed 1988-09-14(a)(1)

It seems rather clear to us from this statement that the district court thought that discrimination claims were not cognizable under Title VII unless they alleged some direct economic detriment. This conclusion was incorrect: Title VII prohibits discrimination not only in compensation, but in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982); see also James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d at 333; Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 93 (5th Cir.1976).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from withholding supervisory responsibilities because of race when those responsibilities are a benefit of employment.

Edward JUDIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darrell HAMILTON, M.D.; Donald Bodenhamer; Marvin Hart; Brenda Woodward, Defendant · filed 1989-04-18(a)

Judie presented evidence that he has been denied the benefit of exercising supervisory responsibilities, and that Bodenhamer, who did not allow him these responsibilities, possesses racial animus against him. We hold, therefore, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination has been the cause of Judie’s limited supervisory responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not require those decisions to be impeccable.

Edith E. McNAIRN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1991-05-06(a)(1)

Title VII does not require that employment decisions be impeccable. It only frowns on employment decisions that are based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers an employer that denies a person access to employment opportunities on prohibited grounds, even if that person is not its employee.

LeMasters v. Christ Hospital · filed 1991-07-13(a)(1)

Guided by the implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Christopher, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 applies where an employer controls an individual’s access to employment opportunities and denies that access based on unlawful criteria even though the individual is not an employee of that employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex.

Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1997-05-23(a)

Liability for the Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment violations against Newton and for the Title VII violations against Davis and Threatt rests with the members of the Alabama State Board of Education and with the college presidents, in their official capacities.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits employment agencies from discriminating because of sex in relation to job referrals.

Williams v. Caruso · filed 1997-06-06(b)

Giving Williams the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there are no allegations that Western discriminated against Williams based on her sex in relation to referrals. In fact, Williams conceded she was offered at least one other placement after her release from Law Access. Therefore, Western’s motion for summary judgment on Williams’ Title VII claims of sex discrimination will be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination on specified grounds; a complaint about the sale of train tickets does not allege employment discrimination.

Marbly v. Amtrak · filed 2002-08-01(a)

Title VII generally prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff, however, did not allege employment discrimination in his complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint alleging no employment discrimination does not state a claim under it.

Miller v. City of Columbus · filed 2002-12-05(a)

Title VII generally prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Miller, however, did not allege employment discrimination in her complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a) limits substantive discrimination claims to actions that affect employment or alter workplace conditions.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White · filed 2006-06-22(a)

The italicized words in the substantive provision—“hire,” “discharge,” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” “employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee”—explicitly limit the scope of that provision to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on protected traits, not discrimination against citizens outside employment.

Bolduc v. Town of Webster · filed 2009-05-22

Neither plaintiff's corroboration of the Colonial Club incident nor his subsequent MCAD complaint actually involve employment discrimination based on a prohibited classification. Plaintiff has not been discriminated against in his employment on the basis of race nor has anyone else as far as can be determined from the record. The alleged discriminatory acts were by Barnes against various citizens, and (arguably) by Bergeron for supporting Barnes. Those actions may be wrongful or tortious, but they do not violate any right granted to plaintiff under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires a claim of discrimination in employment.

Roberts v. Napolitano · filed 2011-06-20

The plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against in his employment. He has therefore failed to state a valid claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in hiring, firing, or employment terms because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Dudley v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2013-02-20(a)(1)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Sethi v. Narod · filed 2014-04-02(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(b) can permit a discrimination claim against an employment agency even when the agency did not refer the claimant for employment.

Axness v. Aqreva LLC · filed 2015-07-27(b)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the “or otherwise to discriminate clause” of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) may form the basis of Axness’s claim for relief.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim must allege an adverse employment decision based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Johnson v. Walrus Corp. · filed 2015-09-08(a)

Title VII prohibits private employers from discriminating with respect to the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... Plaintiff does not allege facts establishing (1) that he suffered an adverse employment decision, or (2) that any such decision was based on at least one of Title Vll‘s protected classifications.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Mitchell v. SUNY Upstate Medical University · filed 2017-03-17(a)(1)

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or employment terms on the basis of race or gender.

Collins v. Kimberly-Clark Pennsylvania, LLC · filed 2017-03-28(a)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits adverse employment actions because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Craig v. Mnuchin · filed 2017-09-29(a)

To establish employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits adverse employment actions because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Vasser v. Shinseki · filed 2017-11-22(a)

To establish employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination must show an adverse employment action because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Norris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. · filed 2018-10-19(a)

To prevail on an employment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses employment discrimination and does not cover disputes over child-support payments.

Eugene Arnold, III v. Circuit Court of Cook County · filed 2018-11-02(a)

But Arnold cannot maintain an action under Title VII because his claims have nothing to do with employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), 3(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to plausibly allege an adverse employment action motivated by a protected characteristic.

Colon v. St. John's Riverside Hospital · filed 2019-10-15(a)(1)

But he does not allege sufficient facts, either in his complaint or in its supplements, to suggest that SJRH took any adverse employment action against him for which his race was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to plead facts supporting an inference that an adverse employment action was motivated by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Thomas v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp. · filed 2020-02-03(a)

Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions of discrimination and retaliation are insufficient to state plausible claims under Title VII or the ADEA because she fails to allege any facts suggesting that Defendants took any adverse employment actions against her because of her race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or age.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination claim to allege different treatment because of a protected characteristic; a pay complaint based only on relative skill is insufficient.

MITCHELL v. BENSON'S BAKERY INC · filed 2020-02-26(a)(1)

Plaintiff not only fails to identify what protected class he falls under Title VII, he also fails to state whether his coworkers were of a different protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination complaint to allege facts connecting an adverse employment action to a protected characteristic.

Postell v. Wells · filed 2020-06-25(a)

Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that his employer discriminated against him based on his race, color, sex, national origin, or on account of a disability.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination to allege an employment relationship with the defendant and discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Peterec-Tolino v. Ace American Insurance Co. · filed 2020-08-28(a)

Plaintiff invokes Title VII but does not allege that he was an employee of any defendant or that he suffered discrimination because of his protected characteristics. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment dispute to state a claim for employment discrimination.

Campbell v. Navient Corporation · filed 2020-09-10(a)

The Amended Complaint does not involve employment. It therefore fails to plead any of the elements of a Title VII claim against Navient Corp. The Title VII claim simply is not cognizable based upon the facts as pled.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII discrimination claim to concern employment.

Mann v. City of Chula Vista · filed 2020-09-28(a)

Plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against in his employment or in the making or enforcement of any contract. The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of Title VII or § 1981.

Section 2000e-2 concerns employment practices; a claim requires allegations involving an employment or job application relationship and the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Greene v. Sampson · filed 2021-02-02

Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to invoke protections under Title VII, Plaintiff does not allege that she was an employee of the Town of East Fishkill, the County of Dutchess, the East Fishkill Police Department, or the Wappingers Falls Central School District, nor that she was an unsuccessful applicant for employment with any of the foregoing. Moreover, the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint do not concern “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employment discrimination claim to proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges an adverse action under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Golden v. Syracuse Regional Airport Authority · filed 2021-02-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Title VII employment discrimination based on wrongful termination.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses employment discrimination and does not provide a claim for housing discrimination.

Farris v. Allen · filed 2021-06-09(a)

Because Plaintiff is not bringing an action for employment discrimination, she cannot bring a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires a claim of employment discrimination to allege employment by the defendant and discrimination because of a protected characteristic.

Anderson v. Perez · filed 2021-07-12

He doesn’t allege that he was employed by the named defendants. Nor did Anderson allege that he was a member of a protected class or that he was discriminated against because of his membership in a protected class. Without these allegations, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Anderson’s complaint was frivolous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Green v. Nielsen · filed 2021-11-29(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex, and a plausible claim may proceed past statutory screening.

COX v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2022-01-12(a)

Cox has stated plausible discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims against UPS under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employer discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin; allegations about neighbors unrelated to employment do not state a claim under it.

HARVEY v. FASHANDI · filed 2022-12-21

First, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against someone because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2), which does not appear to have any relevance to the description of Plaintiff’s cause of action set forth on the Civil Cover Sheet.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or other terms of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Bassi v. New York Medical College · filed 2023-03-02(a)(1)

Title VII, meanwhile, prohibits any employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a discrimination claim based solely on a former employer’s conduct after employment ends.

Pearson v. Prince William County School Board · filed 2023-03-14(a)

Under the plain language of Title VII, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for post-employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires alleged discrimination to relate to employment to support a Title VII claim.

Kilayko-Gullas v. Doe · filed 2023-10-03(a)

Because the allegedly discriminatory conduct did not relate to Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment discrimination complaint to plausibly allege that a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action.

Jagnanan v. Moey, Inc. · filed 2023-10-10(a)

Plaintiff does not allege any facts giving rise to a plausible inference that her sex, race, color, religion, or national origin motivated or was the but-for cause of any adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected traits, and a claim must plausibly allege that a protected trait caused the adverse employment action.

Baron v. Staff Benefits Management Inc. · filed 2023-11-28(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Plaintiff has failed to set forth factual allegations which allege that his employment would not have been terminated but for the grounds protected by Title VII. Accordingly, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2 requires facts connecting an adverse employment action to a protected status to sustain an employment discrimination claim.

Burnett v. Aldi, Inc. Maryland · filed 2024-01-04

Accordingly, because there are no allegations that Defendant took an adverse action based on Plaintiff’s protected status, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII claim against Defendant for discrimination based on termination of employment and/or unequal terms and conditions of his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint must allege facts connecting an adverse employment action to protected-class membership.

PRILLMAN v. ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY · filed 2024-03-01(a)

Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 12112). ... Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Prillman was subjected to discrimination based on her membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics; a discrimination claim requires facts connecting the employer’s conduct to one of those characteristics.

WINGO v. EDUCATIONAL DATA SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2024-03-21(a)

Wingo has failed to state plausible claims for employment discrimination and harassment. Notably, nothing in the Complaint suggests that Wingo was subjected to discrimination or harassment based on her membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

ROSS-TIGGETT v. REED SMITH, LLP · filed 2024-04-30(a)(1)

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . , because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed at initial screening when the allegations plausibly show that a qualified employee was fired and treated differently from a white employee; a sexual orientation claim needs allegations of different treatment.

Bailey v. KC Whiskey River, LLC · filed 2024-06-17(a)(1)

As a threshold matter, the complaint does not state a colorable claim based on sexual orientation because the plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently from similarly- situated heterosexuals. ... The plaintiff has, however, stated a colorable claim for discrimination based on racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits an employment agency from denying or classifying a job referral because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

VALENTIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. · filed 2024-07-26(b)

It appears then, that Valentin’s claim is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which provides that an “employment agency” may be liable under Title VII if it fails or refuses to refer an individual for employment or classifies that individual in a referral on the basis of his race, color or other immutable characteristics. ... However, the SAC contains no non-conclusory allegations detailing how DOL through the Career Link Office discriminated against Valentin in a referral for employment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Moore, II v. New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners · filed 2024-09-05

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employers, employment agencies and labor organizations from discriminating against individuals because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... There are no allegations in the Complaint showing that Defendants were Plaintiff’s employer, an employment agency or a labor organization, that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, or that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination claim to plausibly link adverse employment treatment to a protected characteristic.

GONZALEZ v. STANFORD-ADAMS · filed 2025-03-03(a)

He also has not tied his treatment at work, including his termination, to his national origin, sex, or any other protected class, as is necessary to state an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Sanders v. Federal Express · filed 2025-03-04(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against “any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2025).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race or another protected characteristic.

Ahuruonye v. Department of the Interior · filed 2025-03-05(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires alleged discrimination connected to hiring or employment.

Fan v. The 18th Police Precinct · filed 2025-03-06(a)

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII because she does not allege that she was ever employed by any of the defendants or that she was discriminated against by any of the defendants in connection with employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Alcy v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2025-03-14(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits employment agencies from discriminating in referrals because of race or national origin; a complaint must allege facts supporting an inference that the agency acted for one of those reasons.

Valentin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor a · filed 2025-03-17(b)

As the District Court more fully explained, the allegations in the complaint are vague and conclusory, and, even taken as true and viewed with the exhibits, are insufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that PA DOL, or its initiative CareerLink, is liable for misconduct under § 2000e-2(b) or the PHRA.

A claim under Section 2000e-2(a) must plausibly allege an adverse employment action motivated by a protected characteristic.

Tejada v. Social Security Administration · filed 2025-06-16(a)

Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff was employed by one of the defendants, he alleges no facts suggesting that he was subjected to an adverse employment action or that any such adverse employment action was motivated by his race, sex, or any other protected characteristic. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s federal employment discrimination claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts plausibly connecting a challenged employment action to the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Johnson v. Protech Solutions · filed 2025-06-24(a)

With respect to the failure to select Ms. Johnson for the two internal positions to which she applied while working on the ADWS team, there’s nothing to make it plausible that she was rejected because she was not Indian.