42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex, including pregnancy.

YOUNG v. JOB SHERPA, LLC · filed 2022-05-10(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 210 (2015). ... By failing to answer or appear, Job Sherpa has conceded plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint and the discrimination she experienced from Shuster on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the PHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions motivated at least in part by an employee’s pregnancy.

McKenna v. Santander Investment Securities, Inc. · filed 2022-07-28(a)(1)

Because McKenna has identified no evidence to support a claim that her 2020 pregnancy played any role on Santander’s decision to terminate her employment, her claims based on her 2020 pregnancy must be dismissed.

In a pregnancy-accommodation claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a prima facie showing shifts the burden to the employer to justify denial with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. · filed 2022-08-16(a)(1)

If a plaintiff can make a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer at step two a “legitimate, nondiscrim- inatory” justification for denying the accommodation.

A pregnant employee establishes a prima facie Title VII discrimination case by showing that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was treated more favorably.

EDWARDS v. TACALA GEORGIA CORP · filed 2022-10-06(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court finds that Edwards established a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for firing her must show that reason was pretextual.

Owens v. State of Georgia, Governor's Office of Student Achievement · filed 2022-11-09

Here, even assuming Owens established a prima facie case of retaliation and pregnancy discrimination, both claims still fail because Owens has not shown that GOSA’s legitimate, non- retaliatory reasons for firing her—failing to return her reasonable accommodation paperwork or return to the office as requested— were pretextual.

A pregnancy discrimination claim may proceed when an employee is terminated months after giving birth if the evidence connects the termination to her pregnancy.

DONNELLY v. MyEyeDr · filed 2022-12-06(a)(1)

At the very least, a plaintiff who is terminated a few months after giving birth may be eligible for membership in the PDA’s protected class, depending on the facts of a case. ... While these facts are disputed, they are material facts which, construed in a light favorable to Donnelly, establish a nexus between her pregnancy and her termination.

A pregnant employee may establish discriminatory denial of accommodation by showing that she sought and was denied an accommodation given to employees with similar work limitations.

PEIFER v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE · filed 2023-01-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s claims similarly fall short here because Defendant did accommodate her based on her physician’s instructions and there is no evidence Defendant treated Ms. Peifer differently than any others with similar limitations.

An employer does not intentionally discriminate based on pregnancy when it decides to take an adverse employment action before learning of the pregnancy.

Daneshpajouh v. Sage Dental Group of Florida, PLLC · filed 2023-01-20(a)(1)

Sage Dental could not have intentionally discriminated against Daneshpajouh if it didn’t know she was pregnant when it made the decision to take an adverse employment action against her.

A pregnancy discrimination claim can plausibly allege a connection between pregnancy and termination through pregnancy-related reassignment and negative supervisor remarks, even when timing alone does not support an inference of discrimination.

SYMONS v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC. · filed 2023-06-08(a)(1)

Accordingly, Symons has sufficiently pled a claim of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but a discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence connecting the employee’s pregnancy to the decision.

Tucker v. Familia Dental Fort Wayne, PLLC · filed 2023-11-08(a)(1)

Tucker has not raised a genuine issue of fact that her pregnancy played any part in Familia’s decision-making.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex discrimination claim when allegations plausibly link adverse employment decisions to pregnancy and breastfeeding.

WEAVER v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC. · filed 2024-02-20(a)

Thus, construing the allegations of the First Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff plausibly alleges both (a) causal nexus between her membership in a protected class (here, pregnant and breastfeeding women) and GAT's adverse employment decisions and (b) a claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII and the PHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, and alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference of discriminatory termination can establish liability.

Curtis v. Best Care Senior Living at Port Richey, LLC · filed 2024-02-21(a)(1)

Under both the FCRA and Title VII, it is illegal for employers to discharge or otherwise discriminate against employees because of sex. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... These facts, on their own, are sufficient to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference of sex-based discrimination.

A two-week interval between disclosure of a pregnancy and termination can establish the causal nexus for a prima facie pregnancy discrimination claim.

Morris v. Plymouth Court SNF, LLC · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

At only two weeks, the temporal proximity is far shorter than the two months the court found sufficient in Asmo. The Court finds Plaintiff meets the fourth element and has successfully established a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a pregnancy-discrimination claim when pleaded facts plausibly suggest that pregnancy motivated an employee’s termination.

Ojeda v. Schrager · filed 2024-05-13(a)(1)

Taken together, these facts sufficiently allege that Ojeda’s termination was motivated at least in part by her pregnancy. Ojeda has therefore adequately pleaded a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when the alleged timing of an employee’s termination plausibly supports an inference of discrimination.

PRUITT v. T-MOBILE USA, INC. · filed 2024-05-16(a)(1)

At this stage, where the Court is to evaluate all facts alleged in a light most favorable to Pruitt, it finds that she has adequately pled a prima facie case of sex discrimination based on her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent to plead pregnancy discrimination; the timing of a denied accommodation alone is insufficient.

Devita v. Mount Sinai Hospital · filed 2024-06-18(a)(1)

That proximity alone, however, cannot transform her claim of discriminatory denial of relief from the COVID-19 vaccination requirement into a plausible one.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment; a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that pregnancy motivated the adverse action.

Holloway v. TelaGen, LLC · filed 2024-07-08(a)

And even if Miller’s asserted reason for firing her is false, Holloway has not shown that discrimination was the real reason she was fired. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515. The magistrate judge did not err by granting summary judgment on Holloway’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of sex, including pregnancy.

Hill v. Enchantment Hotels, Inc. · filed 2024-07-16(a)(1)

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Thus, Plaintiff has presented a valid pregnancy discrimination claim sufficient to enter default judgement.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination; a plaintiff must present evidence from which a jury could infer discriminatory intent.

GILLIAN v. DG DISTRIBUTION SOUTHEAST LLC · filed 2024-08-09(a)

Plaintiff brings her first claim under the PDA, alleging that Defendant discriminated against her because she was pregnant (Count I). [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 32–37]. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. However, even if she had, she nonetheless lacks insufficient evidence ... to permit a reasonable jury to infer discriminatory intent or find a convincing mosaic of discrimination because of her pregnancy. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s PDA claim (Count I).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that pregnancy motivated an adverse employment action.

Garza v. Philhaven · filed 2024-08-22(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff makes no allegations that would allow this Court to infer that her pregnancy, rather than her refusal to get vaccinated without a proper exemption, was the reason for her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts showing that a pregnant employee was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class to support a pregnancy discrimination claim.

(PS) Morris v. Solano County HSS Behavioral Health Divison · filed 2024-10-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated non-protected employee.

A pregnancy discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee does not produce substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Richmond v. Team One Contract Services, L.L.C. · filed 2024-11-19(a)(1)

Because Richmond has not produced substantial evidence of pretext, TeamOne is entitled to summary judgment.

A Title VII pregnancy discrimination complaint must allege facts supporting an inference of discrimination; a conclusory comparison with nonpregnant workers who had no work restrictions is insufficient.

Wiedel v. Brentwood Extended Care & Rehab, LLC · filed 2025-01-13(a)(1)

What is missing is any specific comparison between Ms. Wiedel and nonpregnant workers “similar in their ability or inability to work.” ... Thus, Ms. Wiedel fails to state a claim under Title VII and the PDA for discrimination based on sex and/or pregnancy, and the Court dismisses without prejudice Count 1.

Pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1), so a separate Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim is duplicative.

KONATE v. ACTALENT, INC. · filed 2025-01-24(a)(1)

Given that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII rather than an independent form of discrimination, the Court agrees with Defendants and concludes the proper vehicle for Plaintiff’s allegation of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII is her claim for sex discrimination (Count II).

Evidence that an employer hired candidates who lacked required qualifications can create a triable issue of pretext in a pregnancy discrimination failure-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Standridge v. Blount County Board Of Education · filed 2025-02-24(a)(1)

But for these positions, Ms. Standridge’s evidence that the candidates were not qualified under the written hiring policy suffices to create a dispute of material fact that a jury must resolve.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim when an employer refuses to hire a woman because she is trying to become pregnant.

Stokka v. Scottsdale Unified School District · filed 2025-02-27(a)(1)

As alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, she was terminated based on her gender-specific efforts and ability to become pregnant—which is a cognizable claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of timing and pretext creates a genuine dispute about the reason for termination.

BRENNAN v. FIVE BELOW, INC. · filed 2025-03-13(a)(1)

Because Brennan has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to her pregnancy discrimination and PHRA claims, summary judgment is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover discrimination against an employee based on a partner’s pregnancy status.

Nance v. New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Accordingly, the limited categories encompassed by Title VII do not include alleged discrimination and/or adverse employment actions based on someone else’s sex or pregnancy status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits pregnancy discrimination, but a complaint must allege facts linking pregnancy to the adverse employment decision.

Garza v. Philhaven · filed 2025-06-18(a)(1)

Rodriguez does not adequately allege that her pregnancy or disability was the cause of her termination, rather than Rodriguez’s refusal to get vaccinated without a proper exemption.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the complaint does not plausibly allege that the employee was qualified or that a similarly situated nonpregnant worker was treated more favorably.

Littles v. The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

Because the complaint does not allege that Ms. Littles was qualified or treated differently than similarly situated individuals, Ms. Littles has failed to state a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff must provide evidence that the employer knew of her pregnancy to establish a prima facie case when the pregnancy was neither apparent nor disclosed.

LaPolice v. FAM, LLC · filed 2025-08-18(a)(1)

Thus, if a pregnancy is not apparent and not disclosed by the plaintiff to her employer, she must allege their knowledge and provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer her employer’s knowledge of her pregnancy to establish a prima facie case.

A pregnancy discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when evidence permits a jury to find that an employer’s stated reason for a layoff was pretextual.

Bunnell v. Wm. Beaumont Hosp. · filed 2025-09-04(a)(1)

Thus, Bunnell has demonstrated a dispute of material fact regarding whether Beaumont honestly relied on objective data rather than choosing her for layoff because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment and constructive discharge to proceed when alleged routine breastfeeding harassment plausibly supports those claims.

Varney v. Health Carousel, LLC · filed 2025-09-09(a)(1)

In light of the alleged hostile work environment examined above, the Court finds it premature to dismiss plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a nursing mother to establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim based on discriminatory discipline or discharge connected to her need to express breast milk.

WEAVER v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC. · filed 2025-09-15(a)(1)

Accordingly the Court holds that Plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie burden with respect to discriminatory discipline and discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a) overrides a conflicting state law that limits women's work hours and requires equal overtime opportunities for female employees.

Garneau v. Raytheon Company · filed 1971-03-01(a)

With regard to plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, since all parties conceded at the oral argument of this matter that there exists a head-on and irreducible conflict between 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and Mass. G.L., ch. 149, sec. 56, it is obvious that the state law must yield to the federal law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits sex-based employee classifications that deny employment opportunities based on stereotypes.

Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Recio · filed 1974-07-16(a)(2)

Since Title 29, Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated, Section 458, on its face operates to deny females as a class, employment opportunities extended to men on the basis of general characteristics attributable to females, said statutory provision clearly conflicts with the provisions of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, which prohibit employers to deny employment opportunities to an individual on the basis of a stereotyped characterization of the sexes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory termination complaint to plausibly allege that the employee was fired because of race or another protected trait.

Smith v. Forman Mills · filed 2025-06-23(a)(1)

Although Plaintiff has alleged that he is a member of a protected class and that he was terminated, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he was terminated because of his race or other protected class membership.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a wrongful termination plaintiff to allege that the employer fired them because of race.

Duff v. Pristine Services, Inc. · filed 2021-02-19(a)(1)

As with other Title VII claims, a plaintiff alleging wrongful termination must allege that his employer terminated him “because of” his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a protected trait caused an adverse employment action; documented poor performance can provide a nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Khungar v. Access Community Health Networ · filed 2021-01-19(a)(1)

In sum, the evidence as a whole shows that Khungar’s per- formance was woefully deficient and that Access had nondis- criminatory and nonpretextual reasons to terminate her.

Section 2000e-2 requires a wrongful-termination plaintiff to show protected status, qualifications, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Amaya v. Ballyshear LLC · filed 2018-03-14

To establish a prima facie claim of wrongful termination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that race caused the employee’s termination.

Ballard v. Illinois Central Railroad · filed 2017-01-18(a)(1)

She sues her employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and also sues Clermont individually under the latter. ... Because I agree that the record as a whole does not reasonably support plaintiffs discrimination claims, I grant defendants’ motion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory termination plaintiff to show protected-class membership, job qualifications, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Tillman v. Luray's Travel · filed 2015-09-30(a)(1)

To make out the prima facie case of discriminatory termination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified to perform the job in question; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge- occurred under circumstances giving rise to an. inference of discrimination based on membership in that protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that a termination was based on race or national origin.

Greywoode v. Science Applications International Corp. · filed 2013-05-09(a)(1)

In the Court’s opinion, this evidence is simply insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer that Greywoode’s termination was based on his race or national origin.

An employer may not hide a discriminatory termination in a layoff.

Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hospital, Inc. · filed 2002-03-12

Weston-Smith is correct that an employer may not try to shield a discriminatory or retaliatory termination by hiding it in a layoff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory termination claim to proceed when inconsistencies in the employer’s stated reasons create a genuine dispute about pretext.

Dais v. Lane Bryant, Inc. · filed 2001-04-12(a)(1)

The parties’ threshold burdens having been fulfilled, the remaining question is whether, given the evidence proffered by the defendant, plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim of discriminatory termination. The Court finds that he has. It is well established that a plaintiff may establish pretext for discrimination and thereby successfully oppose summary judgment by demonstrating inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for its action.

In a reduction in force, a Title VII plaintiff alleging race discrimination must present additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that the employer selected her for discharge for a discriminatory reason.

Brown v. EG & G Mound Applied Technologies, Inc. · filed 2000-10-24(a)(1)

To make a prima facie age or race discrimination claim in a reduction in force situation, the plaintiff must put forward, in addition to the respective first three elements, “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment on a circumstantial discrimination claim after the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Wavde v. Digital Equipment Corp. · filed 1997-04-28(a)(1)

In reply, plaintiff asserts that the language requirement was a pretext. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence in support of this assertion.

An employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for discharge as pretext must show that the decisionmakers did not honestly act on that reason; a mistaken business judgment is insufficient.

Dharam v. BAHL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY and Royal Insurance Company of America, Defendants-Appel · filed 1997-05-28(a)(1)

Moreover, it is important to remember that, when we consider whether an employer’s justification for dismissing its employee is pretextual, the inquiry is not whether the reason for the firing was a correct business judgment but whether the decisionmakers honestly acted on that reason.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that unlawful discrimination caused the employee's termination.

Ghoshtagore v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1997-03-11(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence presented would not permit a rational factfinder to determine that except for illegal employment discrimination against Ghoshtagore, he would not have been terminated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat discharge based on jealousy over an employee’s perceived sexual relationship as discrimination because of sex.

Bush v. Raymond Corp., Inc. · filed 1997-02-21(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim fails insofar as it asserts that plaintiff was discharged because of Rusnak’s perception that plaintiff and Sawyer had a sexual relationship.

Unequal pay alone does not establish constructive discharge under Title VII; an employee who resigns on that basis cannot extend the back pay period by treating the resignation as a discharge.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1191, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,891 Claudette T. Bourque, Cross v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing · filed 1980-05-28

We think that unequal pay alone does not constitute such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign. Unequal pay is not a sufficient justification to relieve Ms. Bourque of her duty to mitigate damages by remaining on the job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; an employee discharged for refusing a work assignment has not shown a race-based discharge when that refusal was the reason for the firing.

James F. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF BARBER EXAMINERS, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-04-17(a)(1)

First, he argues that he was fired because of his race, a discharge based on a forbidden criterion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). However, the district judge found that Miller was fired because he refused to go to Houston, as instructed by his supervisor, not because he is black. This finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld.

An employer violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) when racially discriminatory conduct makes an employee’s working conditions intolerable and forces the employee to resign.

Hayden v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1980-02-22(a)(1)

This court concludes, on the basis of the facts found and law outlined above, that defendant has unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) for plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s practices constituting unlawful employment practices; and has discriminated against plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), by conduct constituting a constructive discharge because of his race, as well as for -his seeking to enforce his rights.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharge motivated by racial discrimination; the employee must prove that motive by a preponderance of the evidence.

Barnes v. Lerner Shops of Texas, Inc. · filed 1971-03-08(a)

In weighing the evidence in this matter, it is important to note that an employer may discharge an employee for any reason except discrimination or because of practices made unlawful under Title VII. The testimony and evidence before the Court fails to establish by its greater weight, or preponderance, that plaintiff was discharged for racial prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; the employee must prove that discrimination caused the discharge.

Christian v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1972-04-25(a)(1)

The court finds from the evidence that plaintiff failed to show that defendant either discharged plaintiff because of his race or because of his complaints against defendant's alleged discriminatory practices. In fact, he has shown no discrimination against him. Plaintiff has shown no violation of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a) or 2000e-3(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides a remedy when a person in authority at a lower level of management discharges an employee because of race.

Mildred L. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. METHODIST EVANGELICAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1972-07-12(a)(1)

However, where a discharge by a person in authority at a lower level of management is racially motivated, Title VII provides the aggrieved employee with a remedy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a finding that race did not cause the discharge defeats the claim.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1191, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8653 Alvin Turner v. Drug Fair Community Drug Company, Inc. · filed 1973-06-07(a)(1)

Alvin Turner appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint alleging that his discharge by appellee Drug Fair was racially motivated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). ... We conclude that the district court's finding that Turner was not discharged on account of race was not clearly erroneous and therefore affirm.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2) prohibit employment discrimination based on race or sex; a discharge without discriminatory motive does not violate them.

Courtney v. Louisiana Department of Highways · filed 1973-12-14(a)(1) and (2)

Additionally, we find appellant's contention that her discharge violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1) and (2) to be without merit. The provisions of that statute are essentially the same as the test of discrimination set forth by Civil Service Rule 1.14.1. In view of our determination that appellant's dismissal was not based upon any discriminatory motive under Rule 1.14.1, it is equally clear that the appointing authority did not violate the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2) in dismissing appellant from her position with the Kenner Unit.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race.

Newman v. Avco Corporation-Aerospace Structures Division · filed 1973-12-18(a)(1)

The court holds that the discharge of Raymond L. Dennis was racially discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat an employee’s termination as sex discrimination when her employer closes its business and dismisses all employees.

Juanita Watts Aldred v. Frank S. Duling, Chief of Police, City of Richmond · filed 1976-08-09(a)(1)

It cannot be seriously contended that Bo-Jac has discriminated against its masseuses when it released all of the employees, including its only male employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to discharge an employee for legitimate business reasons applied without discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1976-10-26(a)(1)

Title VII does not guarantee everyone a job. It leaves employers free to make reasonable business decisions as long as those decisions are made pursuant to policies and practices that are neutral with respect to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. In this case, the defendant’s conduct has been found to be based on justifiable and necessary business judgment and devoid of unlawful discrimination, both in purpose and effect. The defendant is therefore entitled to judgment in its favor.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer’s credited reasons for discharge rebut a sex discrimination claim when the employee fails to prove those reasons were a pretext.

15 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1783, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7758 Marian Barnes, Cross-Appellee v. Callaghan & Company, Cross-Appe · filed 1977-07-29(a)(1)

Since plaintiff failed to prove that she was terminated by defendant on a mere pretext, defendant’s credited reasons for discharging her (breaches of the chain of command and general insubordination) effectively serve to rebut any prima facie case of plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of religion; a discharge for violating company conduct rules does not violate that prohibition when it is not motivated by religious animus.

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Curtis L. MANN, Trustee in Bankruptcy of William H. Blakely, Appellee · filed 1977-09-14(a)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of religion. ... Blakely’s discharge was caused by his violation of company rules of conduct. It was not the result of antagonism by Chrysler to his religious beliefs and did not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit an employer from discharging an employee based on a mistaken but good-faith belief that the employee violated workplace policy.

Corley v. Jackson Police Department · filed 1978-01-30(a)

This is not a correct statement of law under Title VII. We have recently held that where an employer wrongly believes that an employee has violated company policy, it does not discriminate in violation of Title VII if it acts on this belief.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race-based pay decisions and working conditions that become so intolerable that an employee is constructively discharged.

Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation · filed 1978-08-09(a)(1)

The facts adequately support the inferences drawn by the trial court that the Foundation was racially motivated in setting Calcote's original salary and in setting the amount of his merit pay increase and that Calcote's working conditions were made intolerable by these discriminations in pay and the harassment inflicted upon him by supervisor Dancy on racial grounds, so that Calcote was constructively discharged.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of race, including singling out an employee for discharge while similarly situated employees of another race are retained.

White v. Ed Miller & Sons, Inc. · filed 1978-09-20(a)(1)

From the state of this record and taking into account these distinguishing characteristics, the court concludes that the determination to fire plaintiff the day of the breakdown cannot be explained on any basis other than race since no action was taken or even considered against any other employee.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit discharging an employee for a valid business reason unrelated to national origin.

Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1978-10-19(a)(1)

Management determined that he was not fit for service and instead presented a very high risk of danger to himself and to other individuals working for the Company. This was a valid business judgment based upon a valid business policy and was in no way related to plaintiff’s national origin or any filing of complaints or charges.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment even when the employer replaces a woman with another woman.

Hul v. City of Dell Rapids · filed 1978-12-20

The defendant has also suggested that since the plaintiff’s replacement, Mrs. Goodale, was a woman, there could be no sex discrimination against the plaintiff. ... To follow such a purpose, this Court finds that the relevance of defendant’s hiring a female replacement is minimal.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of sex.

Boedeker v. Audrey Oil Co. · filed 1979-02-23(a)

Since this Court has found that plaintiff’s discharge was the result of discrimination on account of sex, defendant has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

A claim of racially discriminatory discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the discharge was unrelated to the employee’s race.

Settles v. Pinkerton, Inc. · filed 1979-11-12(a)(1)

Since defendant’s actions were in no way motivated on the basis of plaintiff’s race, it is clear that this court finds it proper to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging a woman because of her sex while retaining and promoting a man.

Joyce Ann BURDINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-12-17(a)(1)

We do find that defendant discriminated against plaintiff on account of her sex when it terminated her and retained and promoted Allen Walz.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing a qualified employee because of race or sex merely because coworkers refuse to work with that employee.

Furr v. Goodwill Industries Rehabilitation Center · filed 1981-03-31(a)(1)

It would set an invidious precedent for this Court to hold that an employer has a defense to treating applicants or employees in a discriminatory manner in contravention of Title VII merely because employees of a different race or sex do not want to work with persons of another race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of sex; an employer’s pretextual reasons do not justify such a discharge.

Trudy UNGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Counter-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, Counter-Appe · filed 1981-08-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff met and carried her burden of establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination and of proving that Sirena’s proffered reasons were pretextual. The district court properly concluded that Sirena had violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(a) by discharging plaintiff from the Midwest territory on the basis of her sex.

Section 2000e-2 permits a prima facie discriminatory discharge claim when employees involved in the same offense receive different discipline, even if their jobs differ.

Linda L. (Shodrock) ROHDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. K. O. STEEL CASTINGS, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1981-06-30(a)(1)

While analysis of differential treatment concerning pay scales is reasonably and logically tied to a consideration of substantial equality in skill, effort, and responsibility, those considerations are largely irrelevant to the establishment of a prima facie disparate treatment by discharge case. What is relevant is that two employees are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of race-based discrimination to establish a discriminatory discharge; the employee’s race and the supervisor’s different race alone are insufficient.

Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard · filed 1982-06-10(a)(1)

Finally, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff Donnie Sealie's Title VII and § 1981 claims. ... The trial court held that Sealie's reliance upon the fact that he was black and his foreman was white was insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination, and we agree. Sealie's actions demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with management. No racial discrimination was proved; consequently, we affirm.

Section 2000e-2 allows an inference of discriminatory discharge despite unsatisfactory performance when similarly situated employees of another race were treated differently.

Menefee v. General Electric Co. · filed 1982-10-01

Nonetheless Menefee might still raise the requisite first-level inference of discrimination if the evidence suggested similarly situated white employees were treated differently under similar circumstances.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the employer shows a legitimate reason for discharge and the employee offers no evidence that the reason was pretextual.

Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc. · filed 1982-12-01(a)(1)

In the instant case, the defendant has presented overwhelming evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory business needs fully justifying its conduct toward Ms. Hosemann. Conversely, the plaintiff has presented nothing of substance to impugn the defendant’s proffered explanation. On the present record, no reasonable person could conclude that the plaintiff was the victim of sex discrimination or any other prohibited practices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because of race.

Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1982-12-22(a)(1)

Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) in terminating plaintiff because of his race.

An employer can satisfy its burden to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge by identifying the employee’s belligerence, refusal to perform assigned tasks, and lack of cooperation.

Soria v. Ozinga Bros., Inc. · filed 1983-04-07(a)(1)

This contention is plainly without merit. Indeed, it would be hard to conceive of reasons more facially supportive of a proper discharge than the plaintiff’s belligerent and insolent conduct toward the company’s management, his repeated refusal to deliver loads at required times, and his indifference to repeated attempts to discuss and improve upon his failings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from removing an employee from a position because of Mexican-American ancestry, whether the action is called a discharge or a demotion.

Whatley v. Skaggs Companies · filed 1983-05-09(a)(1)

For purposes of Title VII liability, the proper characterization is immaterial. Be it dismissal or be it demotion, if defendant's action in relieving plaintiff of his status as a lobby manager was motivated by plaintiff's Mexican-American ancestry, defendant's action was unlawful.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge based on national origin to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.

Morvay v. Maghielse Tool and Die Company, Inc., a Michigan Corporation · filed 1983-05-27

Because Morvay did not make out a prima facie case, we again conclude that the district court acted properly in dismissing the Title VII national origin discrimination claim.

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails at summary judgment when the employee lacks evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

MacK v. WR Grace & Co. · filed 1983-10-13(a)(1)

Because Mr. Mack has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to his discharge, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for the Defendants and DENIES summary judgment for Mr. Mack on his Title VII, § 1981 and § 1985(3) claims of discriminatory discharge, retaliatory discharge, and unlawful ... conspiracy to effect his discharge.

A discriminatory discharge claim based on an employee’s resignation requires proof that the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable to force the employee to quit.

Dewey v. R.L. Polk & Co. · filed 1984-01-31(a)

There was no credible evidence presented at trial indicating that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race, or that the defendant acted with the intention of creating intolerable working conditions in order to force the plaintiff to quit. Accordingly, this Court concludes that plaintiff has not established a constructive discharge and has, therefore, failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for discriminatory discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a constructive discharge claim when alleged racial harassment could make an employee’s decision to leave reasonable.

Bailey v. Binyon · filed 1984-03-30(a)(1)

On the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not confronted with an “aggravated situation,” and thus acted unreasonably, when he allegedly walked out of Defendant’s restaurant on November 16, 1982. We find that the question of whether Plaintiff was constructively discharged by Defendants, in violation of Title VII and § 1981, must be left to the trier of fact.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based discharge, but employees fail to establish a claim when they do not show that they met their employer’s legitimate expectations or that race was a determining factor in their discharge.

Turner v. Barber-Scotia College · filed 1985-03-12(a)

Thus, the Court is unable to conclude that, at the time they were fired, Turner and Goetzman were fulfilling the legitimate expectations of BSC, and is unable to infer from the evidence that race was a determining factor in the decision to discharge them. Therefore, it is concluded that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. ... Defendants did not discriminate against plaintiffs Turner and Goetzman because of their race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment, but a claim that an employer discharged an employee to avoid promoting him requires support in the record.

Ivery v. Kent State University · filed 1985-03-29(a)

Section 703(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee's race, and section 704(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a) makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee for filing a charge under Title VII. ... Plaintiff's claim that defendant discharged him to avoid promoting his is not supported by the record. Therefore, he fails to make out a case under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, supra.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing a woman because of her sex; comparable misconduct by retained male employees can establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.

Wise v. Mead Corp. · filed 1985-08-06(a)(1)

Therefore, in the present case, plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by establishing that she was fired but men were retained for nearly identical conduct.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in discharge, and a claim may proceed when material facts about the employer’s stated reason remain disputed.

Bradford v. General Telephone Co. of Michigan · filed 1985-09-26

With these standards in mind, I have carefully searched the record in this case and find that there exist genuine issues as to material facts regarding Plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory treatment, particularly with regard to Defendant’s alleged legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for Plaintiff’s discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming discriminatory discharge to prove that the employer fired them because of race.

Tate v. Dravo Corp. · filed 1985-12-12(a)(1)

In § 1981 suits and Title VII cases of disparate treatment, such as the instant action, the Plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination. It must be shown by the Plaintiff that the employer discharged him because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race, but permits discharge for other reasons even if the employer’s decision was mistaken.

Harris v. Southern Railway Co. · filed 1986-04-23(a)(1)

The law is clear that an employer’s reason for his action may be a good reason, a bad reason, a mistaken reason, or no reason at all so long as the decision was not based on race or other unlawful discriminatory criteria.

An employee’s unsupported assumption that race caused her discharge is insufficient to establish a claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Logan v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center · filed 1986-05-20(a)(1)

Such an unsupported assumption that discrimination was the reason for her discharge is insufficient to establish a Title VII, Section 1981 or ADEA claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a discriminatory discharge claim when the employer dismissed the employee for perceived poor performance rather than for a reason tied to unlawful discrimination.

Olin v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1986-07-29(a)

The district court could reasonably find that Scales' belief that Olin showed poor ability in managing his employees led Scales to dismiss Olin. That finding is sufficient to make any conduct related to legally impermissible discrimination irrelevant to the discharge, defeating Olin's claim.

A sex discrimination discharge claim fails when the employee offers no persuasive evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Breneman v. Kennecott Corp. · filed 1986-08-19(a)(1)

Even assuming, however, that Breneman was replaced by a man, she offered no persuasive evidence that the reason offered by Kennecott for her discharge — that Quinn thought she had lied to him, and decided he could no longer trust her — was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; an employer can respond to a discriminatory discharge claim by producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.

Chavis v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1986-08-29(a)(1)

The burden then shifted to Whitehall to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge, which it has done — her abysmal record of excessive absences from work.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming discriminatory discharge to prove that the employer terminated her because of her race or sex.

Grier v. Casey · filed 1986-09-10(a)(1)

In light of the above principles and after weighing the evidence the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff was because of her race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats an employer’s action as a discharge when the realities of the employee’s situation show that employment has ended, regardless of the employer’s label for the action.

Schneider v. Jax Shack · filed 1986-06-30(a)(1)

We hold only that in the proper case, the realities of the employee's situation, as well as the employer's label for its job action, should be taken into account in determining whether a discharge has in essence occurred. We find this to be a proper case for such consideration, and we conclude from the district court's findings of fact that the Jax Shack in essence explicitly terminated Schneider's employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of her sex, including when the employer’s sexual conduct causes her termination.

Gilardi v. Schroeder · filed 1986-09-19(a)(1)

Cynthia is entitled to recover under Title VII, which makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer— ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a discharge for nondiscriminatory reasons does not violate it.

Matthews v. North Slope Borough · filed 1986-12-31(a)(1)

Powell and the Borough did not discharge Matthews because of Matthews’ race. Powell discharged Matthews for nondiscriminatory reasons.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge can establish a prima facie case without showing that the employer tried to fill the vacated position if other evidence raises an inference of disparate treatment.

Kiran K. SHAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-04-20(a)

As earlier noted, plaintiff’s failure to show that GE attempted to fill his vacated position is not fatal if he can establish other evidence raising an inference of disparate treatment.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision and the employee does not show that reason was a pretext.

Graham v. Texasgulf, Inc. · filed 1987-06-18

Assuming arguendo that Graham established a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, the Court hereby finds that there was sufficient rebuttal of that evidence with no persuasive evidence of pretext. Accordingly, the first cause of action is DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of racial discrimination to support a discriminatory discharge claim; an employer’s good-faith belief that an employee violated its theft policy can provide a nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Causey v. K & B INC. · filed 1987-09-08(a)(1)

Applying these principles of law to this case, the Court concludes plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. There was no suggestion in this case that K & B’s strict policies concerning theft would be or have been, applied differently to whites and blacks. There is no evidence that K & B’s actions were motivated by racial intent.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit an employer from terminating an employee for documented misconduct when the employee fails to show that the stated reasons are a pretext for race or sex discrimination.

Cheairs v. Western Mental Health Institute and Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation · filed 1987-11-24(a)

The lower court looked at these events and concluded that all actions taken by Western were well documented and not based upon any type of discrimination. Thus, the lower court found that Western had articulated legitimate reasons for Cheairs' termination (continued abuse of the telephone and habitual tardiness). This determination is well documented by the record and is not an erroneous finding.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of sex, including firing her as a result of the employer's sexual assault.

Gilardi v. Gary Schroeder, D/B/A Gary Schroeder Trucking · filed 1987-11-04(a)(1)

When an employer rapes his employee and then, at the insistence of his wife, discharges the employee as a result, it is obvious that the discharged employee was discriminated against "because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must show that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Baker v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1987-12-04(a)(1)

In order to prevail on a claim brought pursuant to Title VII, a complainant must show that (1) He. is a member of a protected group (e.g. racial minority); and, (2) That race — or some other unlawful criteria — was a motivating factor in the employment decision or practice which was applied to him (i.e. an intent to discriminate).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual or that sex motivated the discharge.

Jane ANDRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the BENDIX CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-03-02(a)(1)

Because the court properly found that Andre did not present enough evidence to successfully respond to Bendix’s proffered non-diseriminatory explanation for her discharge, the district court correctly held that Andre failed to meet her burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence either that Bendix’s proffered explanation for her discharge was pretextual or that her treatment and discharge were based on her sex.

An employee claiming discriminatory discharge must show that he was qualified for the job to establish a prima facie case under Section 2000e-2(a).

Norman W. OLIVER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1988-05-13(a)

Proving that he was qualified for the job was an essential element of Oliver’s prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge to be because of a protected characteristic.

Jane DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1989-01-12(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin_” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Assuming without having to decide that discrimination on account of abortion is actionable under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), the district judge did not commit clear error in finding that Jane Doe was not fired because she had an abortion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; a plaintiff may show discriminatory discharge through evidence of disparate treatment.

Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department · filed 1989-01-17(a)(1)

In order to establish prima facie that a termination is discriminatory, the plaintiff must prove that she was a member of a protected class, that she was discharged, and that there is evidence of disparate treatment from which the court may infer that discrimination caused the discharge.

A discriminatory discharge claimant must present evidence supporting an inference of race discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

Scott v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York · filed 1989-01-13(a)(1)

No other evidence to support an inference of discrimination has been adduced. Thus, Scott cannot establish a prima facie case, and the New York Fed’s motion for summary judgment must be granted.

A sex-based discriminatory discharge claim under Section 2000e-2 requires evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory motive when the claimant relies on indirect proof.

McCormick v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1989-05-04

There is no evidence or even an offer of evidence which would support an inference that plaintiff was discharged because she is female. Thus, it appears plaintiff could not even establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Indirect evidence that an employer’s stated reason for firing is unworthy of credence can create a triable issue of discriminatory discharge under section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Kolb v. Ohio, Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, Cleveland Developmental Center · filed 1989-07-10(a)(1)

The court finds that Kolb has successfully challenged the defendants’ legitimate business purpose with indirect evidence of pretext tending to show that Darling’s proffered explanations are unworthy of credence. The plaintiff has thus presented evidence which shows that there is a genuine issue of discriminatory discharge for trial.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows discharge for unsatisfactory job performance when that reason is genuine rather than a pretext for discrimination.

Woodard v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 1989-08-21(a)

Even if Woodard had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial court properly concluded that appellees had come forth with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Woodard--a reason which was not shown to be a pretext for intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory discharge; an employee must show that discrimination motivated the discharge or that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Sousa v. Hunter · filed 1990-06-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff has simply failed to persuade the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated his employer or that his employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory nonrenewal of an employment contract based on national origin.

Budd v. City University of New York, Baruch College · filed 1990-10-15(a)(1)

Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin in regards to the non-renewal of her contract.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discriminatory failures to promote and discriminatory discharge.

Weaver v. Gallardo · filed 1991-02-01(a)

For the reasons stated, we: 62 1. AFFIRM the judgment of liability under Title VII for both of Weaver's failure to promote claims and for his claim of retaliatory and discriminatory discharge; ... The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit a demotion during a reduction in force merely because the employer gives little weight to seniority; the employee must show discrimination.

Glover v. Lockheed Corp. · filed 1991-07-16(a)

That procedure did not place a great emphasis on seniority. Although this might appear to be an unfair decision, it is a business decision which does not violate the provisions of Title VII.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge based on sex or national origin must show satisfactory job performance or evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

Archuleta v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1991-09-13(a)(1)

She submitted no evidence to show that the Agency's reason for terminating her was a pretext for discrimination. She did not present any material question of fact regarding her deficient job performance or her conclusory allegation of discrimination based upon age, sex, or national origin. In short, Archuleta was fired because she did not do her job rather than for any discriminatory reason, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment on that basis.

A discriminatory discharge claim requires a plaintiff to show that inadequate job performance does not explain the firing.

Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226 · filed 1992-02-11(a)(1)

Using that framework in the discriminatory discharge context, a plaintiff must show (i) that he was within the protected class; (ii) that he was doing the job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job performance; and (iii) that his employer sought a replacement with qualifications similar to his own, thus demonstrating a continued need for the same services or skills.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employee cannot rule out inadequate job performance as the reason for discharge.

Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226 · filed 1992-04-29(a)(1)

Sanders cannot negate the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job performance. Because he has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case — on which he had the burden of proof — Ogden is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.

A Title VII plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must present evidence that racial bias caused the termination; a supervisor’s bias alone is insufficient without a link to the decision.

Wilson v. Stroh Companies · filed 1992-02-21(a)(1)

The determinative question is whether Wilson has submitted evidence that DeJaeghere's racial animus was a cause of the termination. When the question is so framed, it becomes clear that Wilson has failed to submit evidence supporting a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff to show that she was qualified for and satisfactorily performing her job to establish a prima facie case.

Kizer v. Children's Learning Center · filed 1992-04-29(a)(1)

In sum, we hold that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII because she is unable to demonstrate that despite her violation of CLC's call-in procedure, she was doing the job well enough to meet her employer's legitimate expectations and, nonetheless, she was discharged.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a discriminatory discharge claim requires evidence that race affected the employer's decision.

Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1993-02-23(a)(1)

This evidence in our opinion is overwhelming that Murphy was terminated, as were all the other employees caught falsifying records, without regard for his race or color.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits discharge for refusing to work when that reason is not a pretext for race discrimination.

Thompson v. Price Broadcasting Co. · filed 1993-03-12(a)(1)

A refusal to work is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit terminating an employee for failure to obtain a license required for the job when the termination has no discriminatory purpose.

Bush v. Virginia International Terminals, Incorporated · filed 1993-04-22

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit because Bush was terminated for failure to obtain a journeyman's license, a requirement of his job, rather than for any discriminatory or retaliatory purpose.

A discriminatory discharge claim can survive summary judgment when indirect evidence casts doubt on the employer’s stated reason for termination.

Ted JOSEY, Appellant, v. JOHN R. HOLLINGSWORTH CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1993-06-21(a)(1)

The indirect evidence of discrimination presented by Josey is sufficient to allow his claim to survive summary judgment. The total circumstances surrounding his termination challenge the credibility of Hollings-worth’s proffered reason for his dismissal.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a discharge based on allegedly false sexual harassment accusations without discrimination because of sex.

Robert Albert, and Cross v. The Edward J. Debartolo Corporation, D/B/A Southern Park Mall, Martin J. Plocica, Jack Petru · filed 1993-07-20(a)(1)

Plaintiff's true complaint is that he was wrongfully discharged because of false accusations of sexual harassment, a claim that is not cognizable under Title VII.

A wrongful-discharge sex-discrimination claim requires the employee to show that his job performance met the employer’s legitimate expectations.

Petitti v. Massachusetts Department of Mental Health · filed 1993-11-12(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in a wrongful discharge case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was in a protected group; that he was performing his job at a level that met his employer’s legitimate expectations; and that he was replaced by someone with roughly similar qualifications. ... Summary judgment is therefore appropriate on plaintiffs discrimination claims based on age and sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge or refusal to hire; an alleged discharge followed by a return to work does not establish a prima facie claim on that event.

Edwards v. Interboro Institute · filed 1994-01-07(a)(1)

In either case, the two activities prohibited by the statute (termination and refusal to rehire) are not implicated and hence there is no prima facie case of discrimination.

A discriminatory-discharge plaintiff must offer evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

Lenoir v. Roll Coater · filed 1994-01-12(a)(1)

Once Defendant has presented a reasonable explanation for Plaintiff's treatment, if Plaintiff cannot then show any evidence of pretext, then Defendant may properly be granted summary judgment. That is exactly what has happened to Plaintiff here.

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for termination and the employee does not prove those reasons were pretextual.

James v. Runyon · filed 1994-01-18(a)(1)

With respect to plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim, the court concludes that although plaintiff was successful in demonstrating her prima facie case, the reasons offered by the defendant for terminating plaintiff were legitimate non-diseriminatory reasons, and ultimately, plaintiff failed to offer evidence to prove that the reasons articulated by defendant’s employees were pretextual in nature.

An employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for discharge does not defeat a § 2000e-2(a)(1) claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff raises a genuine factual dispute about pretext.

Lopez v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-01-31(a)(1)

Although the defendant has established a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiffs employment, the plaintiff has established genuine issues of fact regarding pretext that preclude the entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

A reduction in the number of female employees alone does not establish discriminatory intent in a sex discrimination discharge claim.

Bartz v. Agway, Inc. · filed 1994-02-15(a)(1)

Unfortunately, however, disparate impact on the number of female employees alone is not evidence of discriminatory intent. More is needed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming racial discrimination in compensation or discharge to prove intentional discrimination; the claim fails when the evidence shows neither less favorable treatment than similarly situated white employees nor a discriminatory reason for discharge.

Williams v. Lincoln-Mercury · filed 1994-04-07(a)(1)

Plaintiff Williams’ claim of disparate treatment and for wrongful discriminatory discharge against the Defendant Krug-Lincoln-Mercury under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII is DISMISSED, as Plaintiff has not made out a case of disparate treatment, intentional discrimination or wrongful discriminatory discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a claim to proceed when a complaint alleges that an employer discharged a person because of race, sex, or national origin.

Etemad v. State of California Department of Water Resources Control Board · filed 1994-04-11(a)(1)

Because she alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her membership in groups protected by Title VII, her complaint does state a claim for relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a claim that an employee’s discharge was motivated by national origin or another protected characteristic; alleging Pakistani origin alone is insufficient.

Abbasi v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C. · filed 1994-09-07(a)(1)

Other than stating that he is a Pakistani native, plaintiff does not allege that his discharge was motivated by his national origin or any other basis prohibited under the Act. Thus, due to his failure to state sufficient facts to support his claim that his discharge violated Title VII, it too must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when the employee makes a prima facie showing of sex discrimination and raises a genuine factual dispute over the employer’s stated reason for firing her.

Davies v. Philip Morris, USA · filed 1994-10-17(a)(1)

To defeat the present motion for summary judgment, Davies must establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and, because Defendants assert a facially nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, she must also present evidence that creates a genuine question as to whether this reason is pretext.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge can defeat summary judgment by showing a genuine factual dispute over whether sex was a factor in the employer’s decision.

Sava v. General Electric Co. · filed 1995-01-06(a)(1)

Viewed together, these circumstances create a genuine factual issue as to whether GE’s stated reason for terminating plaintiff was pretextual and whether sex was a factor in GE’s decision to terminate plaintiff. Summary judgment is, therefore, inappropriate.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee alleging a racially discriminatory discharge to prove that the employer's stated reason was pretextual and that the discharge was intentionally discriminatory.

Simmons v. Mallinckrodt, Inc. · filed 1995-02-14(a)(1)

We agree with the district court that Simmons failed to prove Mallinckrodt's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him, i.e., insubordination, was pretextual and that Simmons failed to prove the ultimate issue of intentional racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of race; a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that race motivated the firing.

Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1995-03-17(a)(1)

The issue is not who was the better employee, Hatch or Carson, but rather whether the decision to fire Carson was based on her race. Carson has wholly failed to adduce evidence suggesting that Bethlehem fired her because she is white.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge complaint to allege circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen · filed 1995-05-18(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that he was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge because of sex or pregnancy must prove that discrimination caused the termination.

Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. · filed 1995-06-05(a)(1)

In view of these findings, I conclude that plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that sex and/or pregnancy discrimination caused her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racially discriminatory discharge; treating similarly situated employees alike defeats a disparate-treatment claim.

Baker v. Exxon Chem Americas · filed 1995-08-29(a)(1)

Because Exxon treated Baker and Gauthier identically, Baker's claim of disparate treatment fails.

A race-based discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when there is no evidence that race, rather than the employer’s stated reason, caused the discharge.

Pollard v. Azcon Corp. · filed 1995-10-03(a)(1)

Simply put, no facts exist to show that Azcon terminated Davis because of his race or because of his age rather than because of sleeping.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; documented performance problems can support a finding that a discharge was not racially motivated.

Jones v. Jesse Brown, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 1996-01-19(a)(1)

Considering Jones' performance deficiencies as both an RN and an LPN, the VA's repeated counseling of Jones, its good faith efforts to correct her performance problems, coupled with the lack of any direct evidence of racial discrimination or retaliation, the district court's finding that the VA's decision to discharge Jones as an RN without reinstatement as an LPN was not motivated by discrimination or retaliation was not in error.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race or national origin; the employee must prove discriminatory motivation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Parikh v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. · filed 1996-02-15(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, this court holds that Parikh has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his race or Indian heritage was a motivating factor in United Artists’ decision to terminate his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race, and an employee must present evidence of intentional discrimination when the employer offers a legitimate reason for its decision.

Duran v. Technol · filed 1996-02-26(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Thus, Duran has presented no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the ultimate issue of whether Schlumberger intentionally discriminated against Duran on the basis of his age or race.

For a race-based discharge claim involving a work-rule violation, an employee must show that he did not violate the rule or that white employees who committed similar violations were treated more favorably.

Lee v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1996-03-12(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of race-based disparate treatment in the work-rule violation context, plaintiff must show “either that he did not violate the rule or that, if he did, white employees who engaged in similar acts were not punished similarly.”

A Title VII employee challenging a layoff as sex discrimination must present evidence that the employer’s stated reason was false and that discrimination was the more likely reason for the discharge.

Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1996-04-16(a)(1)

However, even if Kotlowski could establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII and the ADEA, she has not adequately rebutted Kodak’s evidence that she was laid off for legitimate reasons: performance inadequacies. Kotlow-ski has failed to produce any compelling evidence that Kodak’s proffered explanation is false, and that the reason for her discharge was more likely than not discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race or sex; a discharge for misconduct does not violate it when the employer would have treated a similarly situated employee outside the protected group the same way.

Francis v. Runyon · filed 1996-04-25(a)(1)

We find that Francis failed to prove that the reason for the termination of her employment was discriminatory. She failed to prove that the defendant’s reason for terminating her, i.e., misrepresentation of her physical restrictions, was pretextual. We further find that had Francis been a white male suffering the same physical impairments, he would have been terminated had he misrepresented his ability to report for work.