42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision; proof that the employer would have made the same decision limits remedies but does not erase liability.

Allen v. Barram · filed 2002-08-23(m)

Thus, under the statutory regime that supplanted the opinions in Price Water-house, the respondent who establishes that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor does not escape liability, but only certain forms of relief. The statute provides no support for the agency’s contention here.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not let an employer avoid liability by proving it would have made the same decision without the improper motive.

Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2002-08-28(m)

Section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), overruled Price Waterhouse to the extent that the case held a defendant's proof that it would have made the same decision absent the improper motive would allow the defendant to completely avoid liability.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected trait motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc. · filed 2002-09-30(m)

Having concluded that Mohr is entitled to the mixed motive analysis, our review turns to whether Dustrol has proven that absent consideration of any illegal criterion it would have taken the same employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when prohibited discrimination is a motivating factor, but that finding alone does not determine whether the employer would have made the same decision anyway.

Porter v. United States Agency for International Development · filed 2002-11-22(m)

In a post-1991 Act case, on the other hand, a jury’s finding of liability does not have the same effect, for “once a plaintiff proves discrimination to have been a motivating factor, liability is established.”

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes Title VII liability when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without discrimination.

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Incorporated · filed 2003-01-07(m)

If the fact-finder credits Hill’s evidence and determines that Hill’s sex played a role in her termination, then Lockheed is liable regardless of whether it would have made the same decision absent the discrimination: “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII mixed-motive claim without direct evidence of discriminatory motive.

Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2003-06-13(m)

By alleging that the City considered multiple illegitimate motives, Gonzalez pled a mixed-motive case. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, the case must be analyzed according to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and § 2000e-5(2)(B).

Section 2000e-2(m) applies to single-motive claims when a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-06-13(m)

While the final phrase may imply multiple motives, nothing in the statute’s language restricts its applicability to single-motive cases. Rather, the plain language of the statute allows a plaintiff to prevail if he or she can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a single, illegitimate motive was a motivating factor in an employment decision, without having to allege that other factors also motivated the decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII plaintiff to show intentional discrimination by proving that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, even if the employer had a legitimate reason too.

Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc. · filed 2003-10-07(m)

Thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm must only be modified in light of Desert Palace, § 2000e-2(m), and only in its final stage, so that it is framed in terms of whether the plaintiff can meet his or her “ultimate burden” to prove intentional discrimination, rather than in terms of whether the plaintiff can prove “pretext.”

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence creates a factual dispute over whether sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Louis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board · filed 2003-12-19(m)

Further, the School Board’s motion must be denied under a mixed-motives analysis because plaintiff has submitted evidence that creates a fact issue as to whether his sex was a motivating factor in the decision not to make him assistant principal of Southeast Middle School.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

White v. Verizon South, Inc. · filed 2003-12-29(m)

Thus, under these amendments, if the plaintiff shows merely that gender was a motivating factor, she has established liability and thus may be entitled to some relief.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment practice unlawful when race or sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Walker v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2004-01-07(m)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice when she demonstrates that her race or sex was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a race discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when direct or circumstantial evidence could let a reasonable jury find that race was a motivating factor, even if other reasons contributed.

Disher v. Weaver · filed 2004-02-26(m)

Under this framework, summary judgment cannot be granted if Plaintiff demonstrates, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that race may have been one motivating factor in Defendants’ decision to terminate her.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a plaintiff to prove that race motivated an adverse employment action, even in part, through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Rollins v. Missouri Department of Conservation · filed 2004-04-14(m)

A plaintiff need only show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that defendant has engaged in a forbidden employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor standard does not apply to retaliation claims.

Levias v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice · filed 2004-04-15(m)

This Court need not engage in a protracted analysis on this point, however, as the Court finds that the plain language of § 2000e-2(m) clearly does not encompass retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, but a subordinate’s alleged bias must be attributable to the employer’s decisionmaker.

Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 400 · filed 2004-06-09(m)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Murray has failed to pre- sent sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a pre- ponderance of the evidence, that Cash was motivated to remove Mur- ray based on race, or that Cash was the actual decisionmaker or the one principally responsible for his termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must show that discriminatory animus motivated an adverse employment decision.

Cuenca v. University of Kansas · filed 2004-06-15(m)

After the district court reached its decision in this case, however, the Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff may prove the mixed-motive analysis under § 107 of the 1991 Act by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. ... The specific incidents Cuenca details in his brief also do not provide circumstantial evidence demonstrating that unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the University of Kansas’s adverse employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a mixed-motive claim requires evidence that race motivated the employment decision.

Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp. · filed 2004-06-30(a)(1)

Although direct evidence of discrimination is no longer required to succeed on a mixed-motive theory, the plaintiff must still present "sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that he cannot succeed on a mixed-motive theory.

Sex discrimination can be established when sex plays a part in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Lee v. Curt Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2004-06-24(m)

Because plaintiff meets her burden of creating an implication that sex discrimination played a part in defendant’s decision to terminate her and not hire her for the senior buyer position, the burden shifts to defendant to show that it would have acted the same even in the absence of the discriminatory motive. ... Defendant fails- to meet its burden.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Roberson v. Alltel Information Services · filed 2004-06-30(m)

In order to withstand summary judgment, Title VII requires that Roberson, using direct or circumstantial evidence, “present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude . . . that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.’” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). ... In sum, Roberson has failed to present any evidence that forbidden characteristics played a role in Alltel’s reduction-in-force decisions.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if other reasons also motivated the employer.

Warren v. Terex Corp. · filed 2004-07-22(m)

In light of plaintiffs option of proving her case under a “mixed-motive” analysis, it no longer seems proper for the jury to be instructed that the plaintiff must prove that discrimination or retaliation was a “but for” cause of her termination, as has previously been held proper in this circuit. ... The court therefore declines to grant a “but for” causation instruction in this case.

Section 2000e-2(m) treats sex as a motivating factor when it is one reason for an adverse employment decision; evidence of harsher treatment than a similarly situated employee can raise a jury question.

Prindle v. TNT Logistics of North America · filed 2004-08-11(m)

As in the retaliation analysis under Title VII, a plaintiff establishes a discriminatory employment practice when she demonstrates that her sex was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s mixed-motive rule does not displace McDonnell Douglas burden shifting in non-mixed-motive discrimination cases.

Cooper v. Southern Company · filed 2004-11-10(m)

The plaintiffs read Desert Palace too broadly. While it is true that some courts have suggested that Desert Palace may spell the end of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, see, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-91 (D. Minn. 2003), the Desert Palace holding was expressly limited to the context of mixed-motive discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Race need only be a motivating factor in an employment decision; it need not be the catalyst for that decision.

Boyd, Moses v. IL State Police Dept · filed 2004-09-30(m)

The court’s supplemental instructions, which told the jury that race had to be “the catalyst” instead of “a motivating factor” in ISP’s salary decisions, were wrong because they placed a heavier burden on the Scientists than Title VII requires.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when race is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Rawlinson v. Whitney National Bank · filed 2005-01-10(m)

Under Title VII, as stated, the plaintiff need only show that race was ‘a’ motivating factor; the plaintiff need not show that race was ‘the’ motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when evidence supports finding that discrimination was a motivating factor, even if the employer had other legitimate motives.

DAVID GRIFFITH, PLAINTIFF—APPELLANT v. CITY OF DES MOINES, DEFENDANTS—APPELLEES · filed 2004-12-17(m)

At the summary judgment stage, the issue is whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in the defendant's adverse employment action. If so, the presence of additional legitimate motives will not entitle the defendant to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when a protected characteristic motivated an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc. · filed 2005-04-12(m)

Under the mixed-motive paradigm, a plaintiff need only show that the protected characteristic was a “motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

A mixed-motive race discrimination claim requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Harris v. Giant Eagle Inc. · filed 2005-05-27(m)

When bringing a mixed-motive claim, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, meet her burden of showing that race was a motivating factor in the termination decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence from which a jury could find that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Burks v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation · filed 2005-05-11(m)

Because plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations of racial discrimination, no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiffs race was a motivating factor in defendants’ decision to terminate her. I will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it relates to plaintiffs race discrimination claims under Title VII, § § 1981 and 1983.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff proceeding on a pretext theory to prove that the employer acted solely from unlawful motives.

Fogg v. Gonzales · filed 2005-07-25(a)(1)

Proving discrimination under a pretext theory, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer had only unlawful motives for his actions, with no lawful motive. ... Considering the parties and the trial court agreed previously that this case is a pretext case, the court will continue to treat it as such in accordance with the law of the case doctrine.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when an impermissible factor motivates an adverse employment action, even if it is not the sole factor.

Rovilma Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company · filed 2005-07-25(m)

Pursuant to the 1991 Act, the impermissible factor need not have been the sole factor. As long as it motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show an adverse effect on compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, even in a mixed-motive case.

Hernandez, Danielle v. HCH Miller Park Join · filed 2005-08-12(a)(1)

That is because even in a mixed-motive case, Title VII requires that the plaintiff prove that her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” were ad- versely affected, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows liability when a protected trait is a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Porter, Melvin v. Natsios, Andrew S. · filed 2005-07-01(m)

Having chosen to prove liability under the less onerous standard of § 2000e-2(m), Porter cannot now disavow that choice to avoid facing a “same-action” response to his request for equitable relief.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that race or national origin was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Garrott v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2005-08-16(m)

As in the retaliation context, a plaintiff establishes a discriminatory employment practice when she demonstrates that her race or national origin was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if a legitimate reason also influenced it.

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Department · filed 2005-09-14(m)

An employer may be held liable under Title VII even if it had a legitimate reason for its employment decision, as long as an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in the decision.

Section 2000e-2 permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim to rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must support a finding that forbidden bias contributed to the employment decision.

Burton v. Town of Littleton · filed 2005-10-14(a)(1)

This court, however, following the Supreme Court's command in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), has rejected the requirement that there be direct evidence in mixed-motive cases; any evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, may be amassed to show, by preponderance, discriminatory motive.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Jean-Gilles v. County of Rockland · filed 2005-09-30(m)

This is true, but of course a plaintiff must still make the initial showing that race was a motivating factor, which the jury properly concluded that Jean-Gilles had failed to do.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not require a protected trait to be the only factor motivating an adverse employment decision.

Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. · filed 2006-05-05(m)

The plaintiff need not show that age or race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions he suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a causal link between discriminatory animus and the challenged employment decision for a mixed-motive claim; stray remarks unrelated to the decision are insufficient.

Nolan Richardson, Jr v. Sugg · filed 2006-05-26(m)

The required causal link renders stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers that are unrelated to the decisional process insufficient to require a mixed-motive analysis.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a mixed-motive plaintiff to present evidence that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

Wright v. Murray Guard Inc. · filed 2006-07-26(m)

Wright cannot overcome Murray Guard’s motion for summary judgment on his mixed-motive claim because he has not offered sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether his race or sex “‘was a motivating factor’” in Murray Guard’s decision to terminate him.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected status was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a part.

Suits v. Heil Co. · filed 2006-08-03(m)

Mixed-motive analysis cannot apply here because plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence from which a trier of fact could find that discrimination was even partly a motivation for her termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when discrimination is a motivating factor; it need not be the sole motivation.

Sizemore v. City of Dallas · filed 2006-08-09(m)

Title VII provides that an unlawful employment practice is established when discrimination is “a motivating factor” for any employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). It also states that is an unlawful employment practice to take an adverse employment action “because of’ race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. § 2000e-2(a). There is no requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate that discrimination is the sole motivation for an adverse employment action. Accordingly, this court concludes that the Findings and Recommendations erred in requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that the adverse employment actions occurred solely because of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not require a plaintiff to show that race or sex was the sole factor motivating an adverse employment action.

Thompkins v. Potter · filed 2006-09-01(m)

The plaintiff need not show that sex or race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that race was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Webb v. Merck & Co., Inc. · filed 2006-09-08(m)

Accordingly, as there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a motivating factor in his discharge, summary judgment will be entered in favor of Merck on the discriminatory discharge claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not require a plaintiff to prove that race or sex was the sole factor motivating an adverse employment action.

Longshore-Pizer v. Connecticut, Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services · filed 2006-09-12(m)

The plaintiff need not show that sex or race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not require race or sex to be the only factor motivating an adverse employment action.

Egbarin v. American Express Co. · filed 2006-09-14(m)

The plaintiff need not show that sex or race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not require a plaintiff to show that race or sex was the only factor motivating an adverse employment action.

Thompson v. Connecticut State University · filed 2006-12-14(m)

The plaintiff need not show that sex or race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows Title VII liability when an unlawful motive contributed to an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without that motive.

Burnett v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. · filed 2007-01-29(m)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Price Waterhouse to the extent that decision held that an employer could avoid liability under Title VII by proving it would have taken the same action absent the unlawful motive. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows plaintiffs to prove discrimination under a mixed-motive theory, but plaintiffs may choose a single-motive theory instead.

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2007-02-05(m)

Plaintiffs have the choice to proceed under a “single motive” theory or a “mixed motive” theory; Wal-Mart cannot force Plaintiffs to proceed under a “mixed motive” theory simply because it wishes to present a “same decision defense.”

Race need not be the sole factor motivating an adverse employment action to establish employment discrimination.

Joiner v. Chartwells and Compass Group North America · filed 2007-05-04(m)

The plaintiff need not show that race was the only factor motivating any adverse employment actions he suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 provides alternative ways to establish employment discrimination liability; the same-action showing limits damages only for a mixed-motive claim under subsection (m).

Fogg v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-29(a)(1), (m)

In sum, the district court properly concluded both that there are alternative ways of establishing liability under Title VII and that the “same action” showing is a defense to damage liability only under the mixed-motive theory of § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when direct evidence could show that sex motivated an employment decision.

Pospisil v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2007-10-05(m)

If a plaintiff presents direct evidence that an illegal criterion such as sex was used by an employer in a decision regarding his or her employment, then the Price Waterhouse mixed motive standard, as modified by § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) should be applied. ... Because Plaintiff has presented direct evidence of sex discrimination, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when pregnancy is a motivating factor in a discharge, even if other factors also motivated it.

Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Services · filed 2008-06-24(m)

Under the 1991 amendments to Title VII, an unlawful employment practice is established when a complaining party demonstrates that sex (including pregnancy) was “a motivating factor” for a discharge, even though other factors also motivated the discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected characteristic motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. · filed 2008-07-02(m)

Under § 2000e-2(m), “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when sex or pregnancy motivates an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without that factor.

Cooper v. Ambassador Personnel, Inc. · filed 2008-08-11(m)

If the plaintiff shows merely that gender was a motivating factor, she has still established liability, and whether the defendant has met its same-action burden of proof would go to the nature of the relief available.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive claim to survive summary judgment when evidence could show that a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action, without requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework.

White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2008-07-03(m)

We do so by holding that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims.

A mixed-motive discrimination plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case when unchallenged objective evidence shows that the plaintiff lacks the position’s minimum qualifications.

Makky v. Chertoff · filed 2008-08-07(m)

We hold today that a mixed-motive plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of a Title VII employment discrimination claim if there is unchallenged objective evidence that s/he did not possess the minimal qualifications for the position plaintiff sought to obtain or retain.

A mixed-motive Title VII plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie discrimination claim when unchallenged objective evidence shows that the plaintiff lacks the minimum qualifications for the job.

Makky v. Secretary Homeland · filed 2008-08-07(m)

We hold today that a mixed-motive plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of a Title VII employment discrimination claim if there is unchallenged objective evidence that s/he did not possess the minimal qualifications for the position plaintiff sought to obtain or retain.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive race discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to infer that race partly motivated the employer’s decision.

Graham v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. · filed 2008-10-22(m)

The burden to establish a mixed-motive discrimination claim is not onerous, but ultimately Graham has not “produced evidence from which a jury can logically infer” that Best Buy’s termination was motivated in part by race.

Section 2000e-2(m) omits retaliation, allowing an employer to defeat a mixed motive retaliation claim by showing it would have made the same decision anyway.

Smith v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2008-10-31(m)

It also follows that the omission of retaliation in subsection 2(m) does not preclude a Title VII mixed motive retaliation claim, but rather permits a “would have done it anyway” complete defense to such a claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) lets a plaintiff pursue a mixed motives discrimination claim as an alternative to a claim that discrimination was the cause of an employment decision.

Coe v. Northern Pipe Products, Inc. · filed 2008-12-02(m)

Thus, Desert Palace makes clear that a § 2000e-2(m) “mixed motives” claim is an alternative claim to a “because of’ claim under § 2000e-2(a)(l), not a defense that “defeats” all or part of a “because of’ claim.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive analysis does not govern a claim presented in the district court solely as a single-motive claim.

Hashem-Younes v. Danou Enterprises Incorporated · filed 2009-02-17(m)

Therefore, the district court did not err in applying the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, instead of mixed-motives analysis, to Younes’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a protected trait to be a motivating factor in an adverse employment action; proof of animosity is unnecessary.

Dock v. Des Moines Independent Community School District · filed 2009-02-11(m)

Title VII, however, does not require proof of animosity toward a person because of their protected status, only that race, color, religion, sex or national origin be a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

A mixed-motive discrimination claim requires evidence that the employee met the position’s minimum qualifications and that a protected trait was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Sosa v. Secretary of Departm · filed 2009-03-26(m)

For the reasons stated above, even applying a mixed-motive analysis, we find that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, not only because Sosa did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but also because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her race, national origin or gender was a motivating factor in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence permits a jury to find that sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chrysler LLC · filed 2009-03-27(m)

Given this evidence, a jury could infer that Steele had an animus that resulted in Grant’s work being given extra scrutiny on the basis of her gender, and that the subsequent discipline she received was motivated, at least in part, by her gender.

Sex bias can be a motivating factor in a hiring decision even when the employer also has a legitimate reason; sufficient evidence of that bias can defeat summary judgment.

Jimenez v. Dyncorp International, LLC · filed 2009-07-13(m)

However, the nature of the alleged comments may also lead a trier of fact to conclude that Dr. Andrasik regarded Plaintiffs status as a woman as requiring a heightened degree of competency than that of a man under similar circumstances. The Court concludes the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier of fact decide this issue.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish discrimination by showing that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other reasons also motivated it.

Hill v. New Alenco Windows, Ltd. · filed 2009-07-17(m)

The plaintiff may also show that the defendant’s articulated reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct and another motivating factor is the plaintiffs protected characteristic (“mixed motive alternative”).

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment practice unlawful when race or sex is a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivate it.

Pederson v. Mills · filed 2009-07-20(m)

Thus, even without a showing that defendant’s proffered legitimate reason is pretext, plaintiffs Title VII claims survive summary judgment because of the 1991 amendment to Title VII, which holds an employer liable under the act when “the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Angello v. Northern Marianas College · filed 2009-07-06(m)

The district court properly concluded that Angello offered insufficient evidence to show that sex was a motivating factor for termination of his employment as required to show a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when evidence shows that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Anglin v. PROGRESS ENERGY SERVICE CO. · filed 2009-08-10(m)

So too is defendant entitled to summary judgment under plaintiffs mixed-motive theory. ... As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which a jury could find that his termination was motivated in any way by race discrimination, either alone or in conjunction with any other motive.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish an unlawful employment practice when a protected trait motivated an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Perez v. New Jersey Transit Corp. · filed 2009-08-11(m)

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a mixed-motive plaintiff may establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating “that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... While the District Court determined that this statement was an “isolated incident,” we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that the statement demonstrates that Perez’s national origin was a motivating factor for Chief Bober’s decision to terminate him. Accordingly, the District Court erred when it did not apply a mixed-motive analysis to the national origin discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Lewis v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) · filed 2009-08-25(m)

Lewis’s claims would not survive summary judgment under even a mixed- motive framework. Specifically, Lewis has failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude his race was a motivating factor in the MARTA defendants’ decision to terminate him.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII discrimination claim when an improper consideration motivated an adverse employment action, even if other factors also prompted it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Profit Associates, Inc. · filed 2009-08-12(m)

Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently observed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) explicitly authorizes discrimination claims under Title VII where an improper consideration was “ ‘a motivating factor’ for an adverse employment action,” even though other, non-discriminatory factors may also have prompted the action.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor, even if another factor also motivated the employment practice.

Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc. · filed 2009-08-28(m)

Nevertheless, this does not vitiate the possibility that Prowel was also harassed for his failure to conform to gender stereotypes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). Because both scenarios are plausible, the case presents a question of fact for the jury and is not appropriate for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII plaintiff to show that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor even when the employer had another, legitimate reason.

Harris v. Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2009-09-28(m)

The plaintiff may also show that the defendant’s articulated reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiffs protected characteristic (“mixed motive alternative”).

Sex bias that motivates an adverse employment decision can support a Title VII claim despite the employer’s additional legitimate reasons.

Longwell v. Omaha Performing Arts Society · filed 2009-10-14(m)

OPAS’s additional legitimate motives for the elimination of Longwell’s job do not entitle OPAS to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race or another protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Curry v. SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. · filed 2009-10-30(m)

The plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden under a mixed-motive theory. Curry and Banks were fired by Karen Bugeja. They have not provided any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Bugeja was motivated in any part by the plaintiffs’ race.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

O'Donnell v. Lrp Publications, Inc. · filed 2010-02-16(m)

For the reasons discussed above, O’Donnell has provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that sex was a motivating factor for HRE Magazine’s decision to terminate her employment. Thus, with respect to Count I, I will also allow O’Donnell to proceed using a mixed-motive approach.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action to support a mixed-motive claim.

Hicks v. CONCORDE CAREER COLLEGE · filed 2010-02-26(m)

As such, the Court finds that although the burden to establish a mixed-motive discrimination claim is not onerous, Plaintiff has not “produced evidence from which a jury could logically infer” that his termination was motivated in part by race. Defendant’s Motion as to this claim is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(m) expressly permits motivating-factor claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not expressly address retaliation.

Smith v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2010-03-24(m)

The text of § 2000e-2(m) states only that a plaintiff proves an unlawful employment practice by showing that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.” ... It does not state that retaliation may be shown to be a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when discrimination is a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the action.

Spadaro v. McKeon · filed 2010-03-15(m)

Importantly, when considering the circumstances underlying the adverse action, unlawful discrimination need not be found to be the only, or even the main reason for the adverse action; a violation occurs if such discrimination was in any way a motivating factor.

A mixed-motive race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(m) requires an actionable adverse employment action.

Perrea v. Cincinnati Public Schools · filed 2010-04-20(m)

Perrea correctly points out that under Title VII, an employer is liable if race was a “motivating factor” for the unlawful employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... The Court determined above that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the race discrimination claims arising from 42 U.S.C. § 1981-and Title VII because they did not commit an actionable adverse action against Perrea.

A pregnancy discrimination claim alleging mixed motives requires evidence that the employer took an adverse employment action and that pregnancy was a motivating factor.

Spees v. James Marine, Inc. · filed 2010-08-10(m)

In light of this notice, the district court’s failure to apply the White analytical framework was in error. To properly analyze Spees’s claims, we need determine only whether JMI took an adverse employment action against Spees and whether her pregnancy was a motivating factor for the adverse action.

A mixed-motive claim under § 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Francis v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-08-18(m)

Assuming arguendo that his complaint adequately pleads a mixed-motive claim, the District is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment for the reasons stated above. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that race was even a motivating factor in the District’s decision to terminate Francis.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII plaintiff to establish discrimination by showing that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Howard v. Blalock Electric Service, Inc. · filed 2010-09-21(m)

In light of the statutory amendment, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff can establish the existence of "discrimination” by showing that his or her race was a "motivating factor” in the challenged employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when race was one motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other reasons also contributed.

Alexander v. Monsanto Company · filed 2010-09-28(m)

She only had to convince the jury that racial discrimination was one motivating factor in her dismissal.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a gender discrimination claim when gender was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without considering gender.

Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, NC · filed 2011-01-11(m)

Thus, at a minimum, the jury could reasonably conclude from Camby’s statement that Pitrolo’s gender was a motivating factor in Buncombe County’s decision not to hire her.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in the employment decision; the selection of female candidates alone did not establish that it was.

Tyler v. University of Arkansas Board of Trustees · filed 2011-01-06(m)

Discrimination “because of” sex occurs when sex is “a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Far from supplying the evidence that his gender was a “motivating” factor in the University’s decisionmaking, Tyler does not produce a shred of evidence that would tip the scales in favor of finding gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employer liable when sex is a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Weightman v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. · filed 2011-02-17(m)

Under the modified Price Waterhouse standard, an employer is liable for discrimination upon proof that a forbidden criterion “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that a protected factor motivated an employment decision before a court applies a mixed motive analysis.

Evans v. Port Authority · filed 2011-07-21(m)

A mixed motive case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that race was a motivating factor. ... Without an inference that a protected factor played a part in an employer’s action, there is no basis for a district court to apply a mixed motive analysis.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated it.

Weatherby v. Federal Express · filed 2012-01-05(m)

While it is clear that Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to meet the first prong of the inquiry into mixed-motive discrimination—she was terminated by Defendant, which constitutes an adverse employment action, see Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)—Plaintiff fails to show that her protected status was a motivating factor for her termination. Her claim must therefore fail.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a race discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also contributed.

Bobo v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-01-09(m)

Under that statute, Bobo can proceed on a mixed-motive claim by demonstrating that race was a motivating factor in his termination, even though other factors also motivated his discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action to support a mixed-motive discrimination claim.

Schroder v. Pleasant Valley School District · filed 2012-01-18(m)

Under such a theory, a plaintiff need only show that her race, gender or national origin was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). ... As Schroder has not introduced any evidence that her race, gender or national origin played any part in her alleged adverse employment action, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in the School District’s favor.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive claim when sex was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Greenawalt v. Clarion Cty · filed 2012-01-30(m)

Under Title VII, a mixed-motive plaintiff may establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating ―that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... As our discussion above makes clear, Greenawalt presents no direct or circumstantial evidence that his gender was a motivating factor in his termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when membership in a protected class was one of multiple factors motivating an employer’s decision.

Navedo v. Nalco Chemical, Inc. · filed 2012-01-30(m)

Under Title VII, mixed motive claims are cognizable, and the plaintiff may thus prevail by showing that membership in a protected class was one of multiple factors motivating the employer’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) treats an unlawful motive as a motivating factor even when the employer also had a lawful reason for its action.

Cook v. IPC International Corp. · filed 2012-03-08(m)

If the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s reasons for firing her included an unlawful rea- son—proves in other words that an unlawful intent was a “motivating factor” in the decision to fire or take other adverse action against her—but the defendant in turn proves that it would have fired her anyway, for a lawful reason, then she has not been hurt by the illicit motive and cannot recover damages, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)(ii); Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2007); Bobo v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 757 (6th Cir. 2012), though an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or an award of attorneys’ fees is permissible.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive instruction when evidence would let a reasonable jury find that race or sex was a motivating factor in an employment action.

Westmoreland v. Prince George's County · filed 2012-06-26(m)

It requires no leap in logic to conclude that evidence sufficient to establish that an impermissible characteristic was “the” motivation for the employer’s adverse action equally suffices to show that an impermissible characteristic was “a” motivation for the same. Thus, Westmoreland is eligible for a mixed-motive instruction.

Race is a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivated the decision; a biased supervisor’s involvement does not establish that factor without evidence that the bias influenced the decision maker.

Hampton v. Vilsack · filed 2012-07-13(m)

Given Henwood’s authority to reduce Miller’s proposed sanction and the absence of any evidence suggesting that Henwood’s termination decision was pretextual or that Henwood “[was] not insulated from [Miller’s] influence,” Griffin, 142 F.3d at 1312, we believe that Hampton failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was terminated because of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision to support a mixed-motive discrimination claim.

Lam v. Sephora USA Inc. · filed 2012-07-18(m)

When a plaintiff alleges that both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated an adverse employment action, we apply the “mixed-motive” framework set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Because we determine that Lam has not made the threshold showing that his religion or his national origin “was in fact a ‘motivating’ or ‘substantial’ factor” in his termination, Raskin, 125 F.3d at 60 (other internal quotation marks omitted), we need not address Lam’s contention that the district court erred in failing specifically to analyze his claims under a “mixed-motive” framework.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when protected status was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also contributed.

Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC · filed 2012-08-08(m)

Under § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, Ondricko can proceed on a mixed-motive claim by demonstrating that her ... protected status was a motivating factor in her termination, even though other factors also motivated her discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a race-discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence could show that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Perlean Griffin v. Finkbeiner · filed 2012-08-20(m)

Alternatively, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Daugherty’s race-discrimination claim because Daugherty has also presented sufficient evidence to proceed under a mixed-motive theory. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a national origin claim to proceed when evidence could show that national origin was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Speck v. Agrex, Inc. · filed 2012-08-30(m)

Instead, Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence — either direct or circumstantial — for a jury to conclude that: (1) Agrex took an adverse employment action against him; and (2) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for its action. ... Fukuchi’s statements create a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs termination was, at least in part, motivated by his discriminatory belief that a Japanese national would be superior to Plaintiff. Therefore Plaintiffs national origin claims — though not his ADEA claims— survive under a mixed-motive analysis.

A mixed-motive claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Copeland v. Regent Electric, Inc. · filed 2012-09-06(m)

To prevail on a mixed-motive claim, Copeland must produce “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race . . . was a motivating factor for’” Copeland’s termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits mixed-motive claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not extend that standard to retaliation claims.

Jones v. Alpha Rae Personnel, Inc. · filed 2012-10-18(m)

I think the better view is the first one ... These cases hold that Congress implicitly rejected a “mixed motive” approach to retaliation claims when it amended Title VII in 1991.

Section 2000e-2(m) prohibits an adverse employment action when race was a motivating factor, even if legitimate factors also motivated the decision.

Tibbs v. Calvary United Methodist Church · filed 2012-11-20(m)

Title VII prohibits adverse employment actions if the employee’s race was a motivating factor, even if other legitimate factors also motivated the employer’s decision. ... Tibbs’s proofs do not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Calvary considered her race a motivating factor in its decision to discharge her for insubordination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive race-discrimination claim to show that race motivated the employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Lewis v. Eufaula City Board of Education · filed 2012-12-04(m)

If Lewis’s claim rests on a theory of mixed motives, that is, that Principal Tibbs’s decision to end Lewis’s employment was driven both by both nepotistic and racist purposes, Lewis must still show that her race was a “motivating factor for [her non-renewal], even though other factors also motivated the [decision].”

Race is a motivating factor under Section 2000e-2(m) even when other factors also motivate the employment practice.

Taunton v. Noland Health Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-07(m)

To prevail on her claims under Title VII, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that her race “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII discrimination claim to proceed under a mixed-motive theory at summary judgment.

Butt v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners · filed 2013-01-31(m)

Although the District Court applied a pretext analysis pursuant to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), we see no reason why the Appellants could not have proceeded at this stage under a mixed-motive discrimination theory pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive standard does not cover retaliation claims.

Carter v. Luminant Power Services Co. · filed 2013-04-15(m)

From this omission, we infer that Congress did not intend for § 2000e-2(m) to reach retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Reed v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. · filed 2013-05-10(m)

Even though Plaintiffs burden is not onerous, the Court holds that none of the evidence cited establishes that race was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to promote Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a part.

Megivern v. Glacier Hills Incorporated · filed 2013-05-16(m)

Despite the lenient summary judgment standard for mixed-motive claims, Megivern has not provided evidence that her termination was based in part on her pregnancy. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed motive claim when gender was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role; circumstantial evidence can establish that factor.

Garges v. The People's Light & Theatre · filed 2013-06-28(m)

A “mixed motive” claim is made out where a plaintiff shows that gender was a motivating factor in her termination, even though other factors also motivated the termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m). The plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to proceed; circumstantial evidence is sufficient. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003). Here, Garges offered no direct or circumstantial evidence that her gender was a motivating factor in her termination.

A mixed-motive claim under Section 2000e-2(m) requires an adverse employment action.

Cunningham v. Tennessee Cancer Specialists, PLLC · filed 2013-07-12(m)

Plaintiff fairs no better under a mixed-motive analysis since she must still demonstrate an adverse employment action. As discussed above, the court finds that plaintiff has not shown that she experienced an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) is incorporated into the third step of the modified McDonnell Douglas framework for mixed-motive discrimination claims.

Lazarou v. Mississippi State University · filed 2013-12-17(m)

This circuit has adopted a “modified McDonnell Douglas approach” in mixed-motive cases, incorporating § 2000e-2(m) into McDonnell Douglas’s third step, as accurately recited in Burrell.

A mixed-motive race claim requires evidence that race motivated the employment decision; concern about an employee’s conduct alone does not suffice.

DeCarolis v. Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System · filed 2014-01-27(m)

Similarly, Presbyterian decisionmakers and other employees were upset by the content of the e-mail DeCarolis circulated, this discord led to her termination, and there is no evidence to suggest that the focus of their comments or actions was related to DeCarolis’s race as opposed to her conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of race; a mixed-motive claim requires evidence that race motivated the decision.

Lopez v. American Family Insurance · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

The court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of demonstrating that race was a motivating factor in the termination of her employment with Defendants.

Race can be a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision even if the employer offers other reasons for its action.

Jones v. National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States of America · filed 2014-06-18(m)

Whether these or other explanations are sufficient to demonstrate that Hite would have chosen Jones’ position for elimination, even if race played no role in the decision, is ultimately for the finder of fact. ... Accordingly, Jones’ claim survives summary judgment under the direct method of proof.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive standard does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims.

Hawkins v. Center for Spinal Surgery · filed 2014-07-29(m)

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nassar, the 'Court found that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims. ... Therefore, without further analysis, Hawkins’ argument that her Title VII retaliation claims may proceed as “mixed-motive” claims is a non-starter.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a religious discrimination claim when religion motivated an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Westbrook v. North Carolina A & T State University · filed 2014-09-11(m)

Pursuant to § 2000e-2(m) “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... religion ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” ... After reviewing the evidence in this action concerning Plaintiffs discharge, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish that his discharge was in part motivated by his religion.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish sex discrimination by showing that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales · filed 2014-09-12(m)

In addition, where there is evidence that both legitimate and discriminatory reasons motivated the decision at issue, a plaintiff may seek to prove, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that sex discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to show that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Carroll v. Office Depot, Inc. · filed 2014-10-17(m)

To prevail on a claim for race discrimination, a plaintiff must show that his race “was a motivating factor” for an employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). As noted on the record at the hearing in this matter, Mr. Carroll has not provided evidence that Office Depot’s decision not to promote him was motivated by race. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on Mr. Carroll’s Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims.

A protected trait need only be one motivating factor in an employment decision, even if the employer also had a lawful reason.

Peralta v. Roros 940, Inc. · filed 2014-12-10(m)

Importantly, at this final step “the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating factors.”

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate-treatment claim when sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, even if other factors also motivated the employer.

Smith v. City of New Smyrna Beach · filed 2014-10-23(m)

A plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII disparate-treatment claim by demonstrating that her sex was “a motivating factor” for a particular adverse employment decision, even if the employer was also motivated by other, even legitimate, factors. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a discrimination claim when a prohibited factor was one of the motivating factors in an employment decision, even if other reasons also played a role.

Placide-Eugene v. Visiting Nurse Service · filed 2015-01-02(m)

Importantly, at this final step “the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating factors.”

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected characteristic motivated the challenged employment decision.

McDonald v. School District No. 1 · filed 2015-03-17(m)

Thus, the Court will consider whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether race, sex, and/or age was a “motivating factor,” see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), or had a “determinative influence” in the decision to terminate plaintiffs employment. ... Thus, plaintiff fails to provide evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that the School Board’s decision to terminate his employment was motivated by unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Cazeau v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-06-10(m)

Cazeau’s claim would not have survived summary judgment under a mixed-motive framework. Cazeau has not presented evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that his national origin or sex was a motivating factor for the adverse actions.

A mixed-motive race-discrimination claim survives summary judgment if a jury could find that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Lopez v. American Family Insurance Co. · filed 2015-06-26(a)(1)

Lopez’s claim survives summary judgment if she produces evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) American Family took an adverse employment action against her; and (2) race was a motivating factor for American Family’s adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Guerrero v. Vilsack · filed 2015-09-30(m)

Or second, she can claim that any of those qualities “was a motivating factor for [the] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) treats an employment practice as discriminatory when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated it.

Carney v. City of Dothan · filed 2016-01-28(m)

But the same-decision defense is only relevant in mixed-motives cases, where the plaintiff demonstrates that race (or some other protected characteristic) was a motivating factor in the challenged employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). ... In this case, there has been no finding— and there is insufficient evidence to support a finding — that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the employment actions at issue. Accordingly, this is not a mixed-motives case, and the implications of the same-decision defense have no bearing on the outcome of the City of Dothan’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment if a jury could find that a protected characteristic motivated the adverse employment action.

Linda Jean Quigg, Ed.D. v. Thomas County School District · filed 2016-02-22(m)

In sum, we hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not applicable to mixed-motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence; instead, the mixed-motive framework set forth in White is the appropriate framework for examining these claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that national origin was at least a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

Cerezo-Martin v. Agroman · filed 2016-10-04(m)

Thus, even when viewing the record in the light most favorable to him, the Court finds that Cerezo has adduced insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his Spanish nationality was a motivating factor behind Ferrovial’s termination decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when there is evidence that a protected characteristic played a role in an adverse employment decision.

Shoemaker v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. · filed 2016-11-09(m)

The “motivating factor” language comes from the mixed-motive theory of discrimination claims, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), where a plaintiff can demonstrate that “an illegitimate discriminatory animus factored into the defendant’s decision.” ... More importantly, however, plaintiff has presented no evidence that her gender played any role in ConAgra’s decision to terminate her. Accordingly, to the extent that such a theory has been presented, the Court finds that it also falls short.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish an unlawful employment practice by showing that sex or national origin was a motivating factor, even when other factors also motivated the practice.

Polanco v. UPS Freight Services, Inc. · filed 2016-11-10(m)

In this way, it allows a plaintiff to establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected characteristic motivated an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Burford v. Yellen · filed 2017-03-31(m)

A mixed-motive is one in which the employee’s protected class (race, color, sex, etc.) “was a motivating factor for [the] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).

A mixed-motive race discrimination claim requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

McIntosh v. White Horse Village, Inc. · filed 2017-04-07(m)

Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence that her race was a motivating factor in her change in employment status, and therefore summary judgment in favor of Defendant will be entered on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that a protected trait motivated an adverse employment practice, even if other factors also contributed.

Jenkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-11-21(m)

In doing so, the plaintiff must show that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor” for the adverse employment practice, even if other factors contributed.

Race need only be a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Branch v. Transplace Freight Services, LLC · filed 2017-11-21(m)

Instead, Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, provides that an unlawful employment practice is established when a plaintiff “demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when a jury could find that sex was a motivating factor in unequal pay.

Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc. · filed 2018-02-21(m)

Second, a jury could conclude that Bowen is entitled to relief under Title VII because the evidence supports a finding that her sex “was a motivating factor for” the pay disparity between her and her male predecessor.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a Title VII violation when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if it is not the determinative cause.

Banks v. Conner · filed 2018-02-22(m)

Under this theory of discrimination, also known as the “mixed-motive” standard, a plaintiff need not prove that unlawful discrimination was the determinative factor, or but-for cause, of the adverse employment action; rather, she can prevail on a lesser showing that discriminatory animus was merely a motivating factor for the adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Forkwa v. Symbral Foundation for Community Services Inc. · filed 2018-03-12(m)

A mixed motive is one in which the employee’s protected class (race, color, sex, etc.) “was a motivating factor for [the] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a sex discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Wallace v. Desoto Cnty. Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-03-21(m)

As this court previously noted in its discussion of the facts, the obvious similarities between the circumstances of the release of the nude photographs involving plaintiff and those involving Rivera, and the very different reaction by the school district to those releases, makes it quite difficult for defendant to contend that no genuine fact issues exist regarding whether plaintiff's sex was at least a motivating factor in his termination.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that race or sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision to support a mixed-motive discrimination claim.

Williams v. Florida Atlantic University · filed 2018-03-30(m)

The district court did not err in rejecting Williams’s mixed-motive claims because she never showed that any impermissible factor played a role in her firing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race and sex discrimination; a mixed-motives claim requires evidence that race or sex motivated an adverse employment decision.

Harrison v. Belk, Inc. · filed 2018-09-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate that his race or sex was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate his employment.

Sex is a motivating factor under Section 2000e-2(m) even when other factors also motivated the employment practice.

Pribyl v. County of Wright · filed 2018-11-19(m)

A plaintiff may establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that sex was a “motivating factor” for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action to support a mixed-motive discrimination claim.

Sykes v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama · filed 2019-10-21(m)

As stated above, Sykes falls far short of presenting sufficient evidence that race was a motivating factor in Chief Purcell’s decision to discipline him or in any of the procedures that followed. Accordingly, even under a mixed-motive analysis, Sykes has not created a genuine issue of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Warren v. Coosa Board of Education · filed 2019-10-29(m)

Title VII expressly permits a plaintiff to establish liability by “demonstrat[ing] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239–40.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor test applies to mixed-motive discrimination claims; an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation alone does not make a claim mixed motive.

Smith v. Vestavia Hills Board of Education · filed 2019-11-05(m)

The 1991 amendments to Title VII did not do away with the single / mixed motive distinction as Ms. Smith claims and we reject her argument that the “motivating factor test” is the proper analytical framework.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff bringing a mixed-motive race discrimination claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the employer.

Thomas v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2019-11-20(m)

To establish a claim for unlawful discrimination under a mixed-motive theory -- as in this case -- a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race “was a motivating factor for [the complained-of] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” See id. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). ... The district court also instructed the jury ... correctly that it should consider Home Depot’s affirmative defenses -- including whether Plaintiff had been truthful on his job application -- only after the jury found that Plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a motivating factor in Home Depot’s decision to rescind Plaintiff’s job offer.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if lawful motives also contributed.

Kirkland v. Duke · filed 2019-12-23(m)

Instead, “[i]t suffices . . . to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).