42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect employees from discrimination based on parental status.

Holloway v. Garland · filed 2025-01-01(a)(1)

The text of the statute, however, does not include parental status as a protected characteristic.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability discrimination.

Efezokhae v. Rocket Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-01-15(a)

In Count III, where Efezokhae asserts Title VII discrimination, he premises his legal theory entirely on alleged disability discrimination, which does not fall under Title VII’s protections.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; disability alone is not one of those classifications.

Greenlaw v. Su · filed 2025-01-27(a)

There is no indication that Ms. Greenlaw’s remaining claims arise under Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2 protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; workplace questions unrelated to those traits do not implicate its protections.

Gonzalez v. Optum Care Cancer Center · filed 2025-01-31

None of the questions implicated Title VII’s protections against discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, or sex; a complaint must allege discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Smith v. Kompassionate Care LLC · filed 2025-03-12

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Smith has not alleged discrimination on the basis of any of the protected characteristics in Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not military status.

Stewart III v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2025-03-18(a)(1)

The Complaint references discrimination based on military status, but Title VII only covers unlawful employment practices and retaliation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims for discrimination based on military status fall under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4311, which Stewart does not invoke.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover disability discrimination.

TAYLOR v. MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2025-03-19(a)

The Court construes the Complaint’s Title VII claim as raising age, race, and color discrimination, not disability discrimination, because disability discrimination is not covered under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Webb v. Sinai Chicago Hospital · filed 2025-03-20(a)

To state a Title VII discrimination claim, Webb must allege that Sinai discriminated against him be- cause of his “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Moranski v. General Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability discrimination.

Gill-Drayton v. New York State Education Department · filed 2025-03-20(a)

Accordingly, because an individual’s disability is not a protected activity under Title VII, see Shaham v. Vertrax, Inc., No. 21-CV-170, 2023 WL 2600207, at *13 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2023) (“Title VII . . . does not prohibit disability discrimination.”), Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex discrimination, including discrimination based on being a married woman, but does not separately protect marital status or disability.

Collings v. The State University of New York at Cortland · filed 2025-03-25(a)(1)

The only relevant protected characteristic at issue here for the Title VII claims is therefore sex, including a sex-plus consideration of her status as a married woman.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit discrimination based on disability.

Collins v. Alabama State University (MAG+) · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

The Magistrate Judge’s determination that disability is not a protected characteristic under Title VII is therefore not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employer discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not cover disability discrimination.

Holloway v. TTEC Healthcare Services · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Levine v. DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Holloway does not allege that defendants discriminated against her on any of these bases.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not union membership or steward status.

Mesa v. DeJoy · filed 2025-04-30(a)

But these statutes do not provide protections based on union membership or stewardship status. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (protected classes under Title VII include race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; socioeconomic status is not protected.

Ferdynand v. Customs and Border Protection · filed 2025-05-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of his “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To the extent Plaintiff states that he disclosed his “socioeconomic status,” this is not a protected status under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit employment discrimination based solely on disability.

Pena v. Atascosa County · filed 2025-05-21

Disability, however, is not a protected category under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint must allege facts showing discrimination on one of those grounds.

Alvarez v. Harder Mechanical Contractors · filed 2025-06-06(a)(1)

Plaintiff's amended complaint, like his original complaint, fails to allege any facts to show discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not cover disability discrimination.

Pillow v. McDonough · filed 2025-06-17(a)(1)

To the contrary, everything Plaintiff has filed has indicated that her complaint involves discrimination based upon a mental disability, which is not a protected characteristic under Title VII. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment discrimination claim to connect the alleged mistreatment to a protected characteristic.

Millington v. FedEx Express Corp. Division of Ground Headquarters · filed 2025-06-25(a)(1)

Yet the complaint never attributes any alleged mistreatment by Defendant Ellenberger, or any other Defendant, to Plaintiff's membership in any protected group. (See D.I. 2.) As such, Title VII employment discrimination claims against Defendants must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; disability alone is not one of its listed grounds.

REID v. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, PITTSBURGH, PA · filed 2025-06-30(a)(1)

Title VII prevents discrimination “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) covers sex discrimination in employment, but not age discrimination.

Garrett v. Arkansas Department of Human Services · filed 2025-07-02(a)

The Court notes, however, that Title VII does not protect against age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability discrimination.

Strumpf v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2025-07-11(a)(1)

Because Strumpf solely alleges disability discrimination and related retaliation, Title VII does not apply.

Section 2000e-2 covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age.

Men v. Inguran LLC · filed 2025-07-31

She never alleges discrimination or retaliation on the basis of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Thus, adding a citation to Title VII would confuse, not clarify, her claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires employment discrimination to be based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Gonzalez · filed 2025-09-04(a)

Although Plaintiff invokes Title VII, he does not allege any facts suggesting that he was discriminated against on the basis of a characteristic protected by that statute (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect employees from discrimination based on political ideology.

Arero v. Chao · filed 2025-09-16(a)(1)

As the text of Title VII makes clear, political ideology is not a protected ground under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability, medical condition, or age.

Kohli v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO · filed 2025-10-06(a)(1)

Similarly, in this case, Kohli’s allegations reference potential discrimination based on disability, medical condition, or age—none of which falls within Title VII’s protections.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; mental health and weight are not listed protected characteristics.

Cassel v. Truss Communications · filed 2025-10-09(a)(1)

Cassel’s complaint fails to show that he was discriminated against based on his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover discrimination based on a medical condition.

Denson-Henry v. The Permanente Medical Group · filed 2025-10-09(a)

To the extent the Complaint asserts claims under Title VII based on harassment, discrimination, and/or retaliation on the basis of an "underlying medical condition" (see Compl. ¶¶ 4.d, 5.e), the Complaint is subject to dismissal, for the reason that Title VII does not protect against conduct occurring because of a medical condition, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employer from discriminating against employee "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), or conduct occurring because an employee has opposed employer practices pertaining to medical conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (prohibiting employer from retaliating against [Title VIl]").

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a Title VII discrimination claim to allege treatment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Sullivan · filed 2025-11-10(a)(1)

WHEREAS, assuming, without finding, Plaintiff's allegations regarding the falsified SF-50 form to be true, without more, these allegations do not suggest that Plaintiff was discharged, or otherwise discriminated against, because of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), as is required to state a Title VII claim; ... It is FURTHER ORDERED that the third amended complaint (D.I. 24) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which this Court may grant relief; and It is FINALLY ORDERED this the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination claim to allege discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Velasquez · filed 2025-11-14(a)(1)

But Plaintiff has made no such allegations: he does not identify his race or age, any disability, or any other protected classification, nor does he make any complaint about discrimination or harassment.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Smith-Davis · filed 2025-12-16

With regard to Plaintiff’s alleged grievances and reports on disability discrimination, these activities do not constitute protected activity under Title VII because disability is not a protected category under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (listing “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).

Section 2000e-2(a) covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Baughn · filed 2025-12-17(a)

However, claims under Title VII only apply to individuals subject to unlawful discrimination "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Accordingly, because plaintiff is alleging retaliation for conduct related to his status as an individual with a disability, and not because of any of the protected categories covered by Title VII, plaintiff's retaliation claim is only properly brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 2000e-2 permits liability when discrimination is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if it is not a but-for cause.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chris the Crazy Trader, Inc. · filed 2025-03-31

More importantly, “but-for causation” is no longer the “exclusive[] path to relief under Title VII,” because Congress has provided for liability even when discrimination is merely a “motivating factor” rather than a necessary, but-for cause of a challenged employment action.

A Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment by showing that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse action, even if the employer’s stated reason was true.

Bart v. Golub Corp. · filed 2024-03-26(m)

In sum, we reaffirm: To satisfy the third-stage burden under McDonnell Douglas and survive summary judgment in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff may, but need not, show that the employer’s stated reason was false, and merely a pretext for discrimination; a plaintiff may also satisfy this burden by producing other evidence indicating that the employer’s adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(m) treats sex as a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivated the practice.

Marin County Chapter of National Organization for Women v. County of Marin · filed 2023-02-17(m)

First, the 1991 amendments to Title VII prohibit consideration of sex as a factor in an employment decision. Specifically, “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows liability for race discrimination when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other considerations also played a part.

Rorie v. Board of Education of Charles County · filed 2023-01-31(m)

Finally, the Court notes that for a claim of race discrimination, it is not necessary that Rorie establish that race was the sole reason or even a but-for cause of her termination; rather it is sufficient to establish liability that it was a “motivating factor” in the decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes race discrimination unlawful when race is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Fort v. Grant Garrett Excavating Inc · filed 2023-02-06(m)

Ms. Fort’s race was not a factor at all in her termination.

An employment practice is unlawful when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated it.

Gray v. Imperial Pacific International (CNMI), LLC · filed 2022-03-30(m)

Even under Gray’s Title VII status-based discrimination claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, “‘an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.’” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348-49 (2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment practice unlawful when race or national origin is a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivate it.

Thomas v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2022-02-09(m)

Mr. Thomas’s race and national origin were not motivating factors for Mr. Robinson’s decision not to interview Mr. Thomas for the Position and not to hire Mr. Thomas for the Position.

Race is a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivate the decision.

Adenji v. New York State · filed 2021-08-31(m)

Under Title VIL, a plaintiff establishes “an unlawful employment practice... when [he] demonstrates that ... race was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine issue over whether discriminatory intent motivated a promotion decision.

Salerno v. Douglas County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-08-24(m)

On this record, Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether her employer’s intent to discriminate was a motivating factor in making the decision to hire Mr. Cross as Communications Manager.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim when sex motivated a termination, even if other factors also motivated it.

Whitley v. SecTek, Inc. · filed 2021-08-13(m)

When read in the light most favorable to Whitley, the pleadings raise Whitley’s claim of sex discrimination above a speculative level. Whitley has adequately pleaded that his sex was motivating factor for his termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision to support a mixed-motive race discrimination claim.

Corley v. Mercedes Benz US International Inc · filed 2021-05-21(m)

Corley has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was terminated in part because he is Caucasian.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show that race was a motivating factor in the employer’s treatment of the employee.

Sorrell v. Paige Industrial Services, Inc. · filed 2021-05-27(m)

The plaintiff in a disparate treatment case must show that race was “a motivating factor” in an employer’s treatment of the employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... For all the above reasons, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sorrell, no reasonable jury could infer that Paige’s proffered, legitimate reason for compensating Sorrell as it did was pretextual or that the actual reason was discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII race or national origin discrimination claim when that characteristic motivated an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

EDWARDS v. ALBERT EINSTEIN MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2021-04-07(m)

Title VII plaintiffs can establish race or national origin discrimination by showing that those characteristics were “a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).

Race can establish Title VII employment discrimination when it was a motivating factor in the employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

WHITMORE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION · filed 2020-12-30(m)

Title VII plaintiffs can establish race discrimination by showing that race “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).

Race is a motivating factor under § 2000e-2(m) when it contributes to an employment decision, even if other factors also contribute.

Mackey v. Enventives, L.L.C. · filed 2020-03-02(m)

Nothing in the record suggests that Perez, Mackey’s immediate supervisor, played a role in deciding to implement the layoff or in deciding the order in which employees would be let go. Under these facts, we hold that a reasonable jury would not conclude that Mackey’s race was a motivating factor in Enventives’s decision to terminate him.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a protected characteristic to motivate an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District · filed 2020-03-05(m)

There is no evidence that Kennedy’s religion itself, rather than the unconstitutional time and manner he expressed it, motivated the District’s actions.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits Title VII liability when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Collins v. Koch Foods Inc · filed 2019-09-23(m)

a reasonable jury could find that under the mixed motive test, Ms. Collins’ sex was at least one motivating reason behind the 2017 failure to promote her.

Sex discrimination is actionable when sex motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Exel, Inc. · filed 2018-03-16(m)

A plaintiff can prove sex discrimination under Title VII by showing that her sex “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m). ... The evidence at trial therefore was sufficient for the jury reasonably to conclude that Travis suffered discrimination because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes unlawful discrimination when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if it is not the determinative cause.

Banks v. Perdue · filed 2018-02-22(m)

Under this theory of discrimination, also known as the "mixed-motive" standard, a plaintiff need not prove that unlawful discrimination was the determinative factor, or but-for cause, of the adverse employment action; rather, she can prevail on a lesser showing that discriminatory animus was merely a motivating factor for the adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that race was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Lovelle Banks v. John Deere and Company · filed 2016-07-14(m)

Even if we assume Banks ultimately suffered an adverse employment action—a point closely contested below—Banks has not adduced any evidence race “was a motivating factor” in Deere’s decision to discipline Banks for running scrap.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff can establish sex discrimination by showing that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Reynolds v. Sovran Acquisitions, L.P. · filed 2016-05-24(m)

For a Title VII claim, in contrast, the plaintiff need demonstrate only that sex was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish unlawful employment discrimination by showing that a protected trait was a motivating factor in the employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Dezmond Emeson, V Dept. Of Corrections · filed 2016-05-03(m)

Federal law explicitly allows a plaintiff to establish liability by showing that the employer’s discriminatory motive was “a motivating factor” for the adverse employment decision; whereas, Washington law requires a showing that the discriminatory motive was “a substantial factor motivating the employer’s actions.” Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) with Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 445.

A plaintiff challenging a discharge must present evidence from which a jury could find that race was a motivating factor.

Prince Johnson v. Perez · filed 2016-05-20(m)

In the posture in which this case comes to us, our focus is on whether a jury, looking at the record evidence and drawing all inferences in Johnson’s favor, could conclude that Johnson’s race was “a motivating factor” for the discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment practice unlawful when race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated it.

Gentry v. East West Partners Club Management Co. · filed 2016-03-04(m)

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) cannot be read as somehow excising § 2000e-2(m)’s causation standard from its limited application to claims of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination and applying it to claims under the ADA.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex discrimination claim when gender bias was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if legitimate factors also motivated it.

Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC · filed 2016-01-14(m)

Under § 2000e-2(m), Plaintiff Chavez may prevail if she proves that her sex was a “motivating factor” behind her termination, even if there were other, even legitimate, factors motivating that decision as well.

Race or national origin need only be a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Palmer v. McDonald · filed 2015-08-21(m)

An employment practice is unlawful if race or national origin was a motivating factor for the employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... In this case, Palmer has failed to state a claim of race or national origin discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) covers a decision not to promote an employee when a protected trait was a motivating factor.

Hargrave v. University of Washington · filed 2015-07-01(m)

In general, an employer is liable under Title VII if a plaintiffs race, religion, sex, or national origin was either the sole reason or motivating factor for the employer’s decision not to promote the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a Title VII plaintiff alleging race discrimination to show that race was a motivating factor in the employment action.

Yahweh v. City of Phoenix · filed 2013-11-14(m)

An ACRA plaintiff may be required to rebut the affirmative defense that the defendant would have made the same employment decision even if the plaintiff’s race had not been taken into account, see Timmons v. City of Tucson, 830 P.2d 871, 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), while a Title VII plaintiff alleging race discrimination needs only to demonstrate that race was a motivating factor in discriminatory employment action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m); see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a plaintiff to establish sex discrimination by showing that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carroll's, LLC · filed 2013-10-01(m)

The district court erred by refusing to consider the argument of the Commission that Carroll’s acted with mixed motives. The Commission was entitled to offer evidence that Carroll’s had mixed motives when it committed “an unlawful employment practice,” in violation of Title VII, by “discharg[ing] [Holliday] . . . because of her sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 2000e-2 provides that one way in which “an unlawful employment practice is established [is] when [a plaintiff] demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m). The Commission was not required to identify its method of proof in its complaint.

Section 2000e-2(m) treats sex as a basis for an unlawful employment practice when it motivates the practice, even if other factors also motivate it.

Potash v. Florida Union Free School District · filed 2013-09-18(m)

A plaintiff can. establish an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that sex was “a motivating factor for an[] employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that would lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants’ proffered reason for her termination is pretextual or that Defendants discriminated against her.

A Title VII racial discrimination claim requires proof that race was at least a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.

Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Central School District · filed 2013-09-24(m)

For a racial discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that race was at least “a motivating factor” for the adverse employment action.

A supervisor’s discriminatory comments can create a genuine issue of material fact about whether protected status motivated an employment decision.

Nguyen v. Qualcomm, Inc. · filed 2012-12-24(m)

Stanton’s comments to Nguyen create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Nguyen’s gender and Vietnamese national origin were “motivating factor[s]” in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected trait motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Piatt v. City of Austin · filed 2011-08-05(m)

Under Title VII, an unlawful employment practice is established when the plaintiff demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) applies the motivating factor standard to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not to retaliation.

Vialpando v. Johanns · filed 2008-02-12(m)

Whether it be by Congressional design or imprecise draftsmanship, it is readily apparent that § 2000e-2(m) does not purport to apply to retaliation cases under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that sex was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Cobetto v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals · filed 2007-10-15(m)

In light of the evidence presently before the Court concerning Cobetto’s conceded violations of Wyeth’s company policies, it is apparent that no reasonable jury could conclude that Cobetto’s age was a determinative factor in Wyeth’s decision to discharge him, or that his gender was a “motivating factor” in Wyeth’s termination decision for purposes of § 2000e-2(m).

Gender need not be the sole factor motivating an adverse employment action to establish employment discrimination.

Maglietti v. Nicholson · filed 2007-09-29(m)

The plaintiff need not show that gender was the only factor motivating any adverse employment action she suffered in order to make a showing of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires race to be a motivating factor in an employment decision; it need not be the only factor, but it must have made a difference.

Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 2002-09-25(m)

Although it would be better practice for the trial court to use the statutory term, we think that the “motivating factor” language of the statute requires at least as much proof as the district court’s specification of “deternfining factor.”

Section 2000e-2(m) supports a mixed motive instruction when the evidence permits a finding of both forbidden and permissible motives.

Meier v. Rubin · filed 2000-06-06(m)

Defendant did not attempt to present facts tending to show that it intended that plaintiffs take disability retirement for legitimate reasons. Therefore, no mixed motive instruction was warranted.

A mixed-motive burden shift requires evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor; without such evidence, the court applies the pretext framework.

Ralkin v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1999-08-24(a)(1)

Here, there are no policy documents, statements, or actions that directly reflect an alleged discriminatory attitude. Accordingly, there is no basis for a Price Waterhouse burden shift, and the pretext analysis is the proper one.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor rule does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims.

Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services · filed 1999-06-07(m)

Each relied on the absence of the term "retaliation” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) for its holding. We find their logic persuasive, and therefore, join them in holding that § 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to retaliation claims.

National origin bias can be a motivating factor in a termination when it affects an examination result necessary to the termination, even if later examinations also contribute.

Afzal v. Atlantic Coast Air · filed 1999-04-15(m)

Plainly, then, if Afzal in truth performed adequately on the first oral exam -- failing it only because of Gwinn's prejudice -- animus on account of Afzal's national origin played an actual role in the termination decision, and Afzal should prevail on his claim.

Race can be a motivating factor in an employment decision even when other factors also motivated it; the plaintiff need not prove the employer’s other reasons false.

Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C. · filed 1997-07-02(m)

This proposition also reflects the 1991 Amendments to the Act, which modified Title VII to require a showing that “race ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor rule applies to discrimination claims but not retaliation claims.

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1997-05-06(m)

Section 107 on its face does not apply to retaliation claims. It amends only 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which prohibits discrimination “based on race, religion, or national origin,” and does not mention § 2000e-3, the retaliation provision.

Section 2000e-2(m) lets a Title VII plaintiff establish discrimination by proving that an impermissible factor motivated an employment decision, even if the employer also had a legitimate reason.

Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1997-05-23(m)

Since Congress confirmed the pre-1991 understanding of Title VII that race (or other impermissible factors) need not be the sole motivation for adverse employment action, it necessarily follows that a Title VII plaintiff can prevail by proving that an impermissible factor was “a motivating factor,” without proving that the employer’s proffered explanation was not some part of the employer’s motivation.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows direct evidence that sex motivated a discharge to establish discrimination even when other factors also motivated the decision.

Rice v. Golf Enterprises, Inc. (In re McElhanon) · filed 1997-03-17(m)

The trustee has clearly met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. One method of establishing a prima facie ease for discrimination is through direct evidence, ie., proof that the motive for discharge was the individual’s sex, even though other factors also motivated the decision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Subsection (m) establishes liability when sex is a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Hearn v. General Electric Co. · filed 1996-06-03(m)

Thus, under these amendments, if the employee shows merely that gender was a motivating factor, she has established liability and thus may be entitled to some relief.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when race is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Salter v. Douglas MacArthur State Technical College · filed 1996-06-11(m)

Thus, under these amendments, if the employee shows merely that race was a motivating factor, she has established liability and thus may be entitled to some relief.

Race need only be one motivating factor in an unlawful firing; it need not be the sole factor.

Gwin v. Chesrown Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(m)

Title VII and § 1981 do not require that race be the sole motivating factor in a firing. Race need only be one of multiple factors contributing to an employee’s discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful practice when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, with remedies limited if the employer proves it would have made the same decision.

Green v. Clarendon County School District Three · filed 1996-04-30(m)

When the complaining party demonstrates that race was a motivating factor for any employment practice, the party has established an unlawful employment practice and is entitled to partial attorneys’ fees and prospective injunctive relief.

The court dismissed a sex-discrimination hiring claim where a neutral statutory age bar made the applicant ineligible for the job.

Gausmann v. City of Ashland · filed 1996-04-15(a)

Specifically, even if Gausmann can show defendants had a discriminatory animus toward her based on her gender, defendants would necessarily have made the same decision not to hire Gausmann even absent this impermissible motivation.

Under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff pursuing a motivating-factor claim must make a prima facie showing and, if the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason, show that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor.

Rivera v. National Westminster Bank USA · filed 1992-08-05(m)

Specifically, he must demonstrate that “race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992). ... In this case, plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when sex is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Hicks v. Dothan City Board of Education · filed 1993-02-18(m)

Title VII therefore provides that, if an employee shows that race or sex or some other impermissible factor was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, the employer may still be liable for discrimination and subject to partial relief even though the employer can prove that the same action would have been taken in the absence of any such motive. ... Hicks’s sex thus played, at least, a motivating role in the school board’s rejection of her.

Section 2000e-2 permits a mixed motives discrimination claim when race played a part in a firing, even if the employer also had a legitimate reason for it.

Elvis TOLEFREE, Appellant, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, Appellee · filed 1993-02-25

Even though the Board found a legitimate reason for Tolefree’s dismissal, its opinion does not foreclose the possibility that the City’s action was in part racially motivated. Under Price Waterhouse, Tolefree need only show that race was a motivating factor in his termination and that, absent discrimination, he would not have been fired.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s mixed motive rule does not apply when the employer fails to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.

Hill v. The Board of Supervisors of Stafford County, Virginia · filed 1993-06-22(m)

Section 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the Price Waterhouse standard by providing for declaratory and injunctive relief in mixed motive cases. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993). ... Here, the district judge found that Stafford County did not establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Thus, a mixed motive case was not presented, and neither Price Waterhouse nor § 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has any application.

Under Section 2000e-2(m), a mixed-motive racial discrimination claim requires direct or circumstantial evidence that race played a motivating role in the employment decision.

Allison v. Gulf Employees Credit Union · filed 1993-07-29(m)

Under a “mixed-motive” theory of racial discrimination, ... the plaintiff must make a prima facie case by direct or circumstantial evidence that race played a “motivating” or “substantial” role in the employer’s decision to terminate.

A plaintiff invoking mixed motive analysis must first show that an unlawful discriminatory reason played a part in the employment decision.

Armstrong v. Lance, Incorporated, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae · filed 1994-05-09

However, to invoke a "mixed motive" analysis, the plaintiff must first show that an unlawful discriminatory reason played a part in the employment decision, which Armstrong failed to do.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a Title VII violation when sex is a motivating factor in an employee’s termination.

Johnson v. El Paso Pathology Group, P.A. · filed 1994-06-27(m)

Since Johnson demonstrated that her sex was a motivating factor for her termination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the Court is of the opinion that she should receive the judgment of this Court in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected characteristic motivates an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without it.

Preston v. Commonwealth Of Virginia · filed 1994-08-03(m)

This language permits a finding that an employer has committed an unlawful employment practice whenever an improper consideration is a motivating factor in an employment decision, irrespective of whether the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of the improper consideration.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a sex discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks · filed 1994-09-06(m)

That instruction explained that to succeed on her discrimination claim plaintiff had to prove defendants intentionally discriminated against her, that is that sex was “a motivating factor” in the decision to terminate her. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence at trial that sex or pregnancy was a motivating factor in defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment decision based on both lawful and unlawful motives a violation even if the employer would have made the same decision for lawful reasons.

Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc. · filed 1994-12-01(m)

The amendments do not eliminate the “same decision test” but rather eliminate the complete defense component of that test. Under the amendments, if both proper and improper motivations exist for the employment decision, the court must find a violation of the act.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected characteristic motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc. · filed 1994-12-19(m)

The 1991 Act provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In other words, an employer has violated Title VII if any of the prohibited criteria played any role at all in the disputed employment decision.

Racial remarks by an employee with no shown role in a termination decision are insufficient to establish a mixed motives claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Clark v. Hess Trucking Co. · filed 1995-01-05(a)(1)

Although Harner’s title, “Vice President of Finance,” suggests that she may have had some type of decisionmaking authority at Hess Trucking, Clark has failed to produce any evidence that the she was connected in any way to the decision to fire Clark. The statements made by Harner during the September 9 telephone call are thus insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact under the Price Waterhouse mixed motives framework.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when sex motivates a hiring decision, even if legitimate criteria alone would have led to the same decision.

Hannon v. Chater · filed 1995-05-26(m)

As noted above, an employer violates Title VII by taking gender into account in making a hiring decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision on the basis of wholly legitimate criteria alone. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Because OHA is unable to take safe harbor in its Affirmative Action Plan, Hannon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employer liable when an applicant’s gender motivates a hiring decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Hannon v. Chater · filed 1995-09-12(m)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Court DECLARES that in 1993, in selecting a female candidate, Anita Shapiro, instead of plaintiff T. Patrick Hannon for the position of administrative law judge in Los Angeles, namely position 12, and in taking Ms. Shapiro’s gender into consideration as a factor in her favor, even though other factors also played a substantial part in the decision and even though Ms. Shapiro would have be chosen notwithstanding consideration of her gender, defendant Shirley Chater, as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, unlawfully deprived Hannon of his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender in the terms and conditions of prospective employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a Title VII violation when discrimination is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Incorporated and Richard Burns · filed 1995-11-13(m)

A violation of Title VII is established if a plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability in a mixed-motive case when discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Dennis v. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company, a Foreign Corporation, (Two Cases) · filed 1996-03-26(m)

Since Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, liability in mixed-motive cases is deemed established once the employee shows that a discriminatory criterion was a motivating factor in the employer's decision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); the only issue raised by the employer's evidence of an additional, legal motive is what the employee's remedy will be.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when race is a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

LaFleur v. Wallace State Community College · filed 1996-06-18(m)

Pursuant to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, if the plaintiff shows that race played a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment action, liability is established. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employment decision unlawful if an illegal motive played any part in it.

Paape v. Wall Data, Inc. · filed 1996-07-08(m)

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)), which applies to this case, an employment decision is illegal “if it was motivated at all by an illegal motive” (Pilditch v. Board of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113, 1118 n. 2 (7th Cir.1993)). Here that is surely a matter for resolution by a factfinder rather than by a court as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a mixed motive claimant to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Dungee v. Northeast Foods, Inc. · filed 1996-10-03(m)

To establish a mixed motives case, plaintiffs must demonstrate that discrimination was a motivating a factor in the employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a motivating factor through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Allen v. City of Athens · filed 1996-09-03(m)

The language of § 2000e-2(m) speaks in plain, unambiguous terms, and makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. All that is required to trigger liability under § 2000e-2(m) is that the plaintiff “demonstrate” that discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the challenged employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) applies when a plaintiff proves that an impermissible factor motivated the employer's action at least in part.

Frederick v. City of Portland · filed 1996-10-10(m)

The Act's provision becomes relevant only after plaintiff proves that an employer's actions were motivated, at least in part, by impermissible factors.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes a Title VII violation when race is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 1996-11-20(m)

Under this section, the plaintiff in a Title VII action prevails whenever he or she proves that one of the delineated characteristics was a "motivating factor" behind a particular employment decision, even if there were other, even legitimate, factors motivating that decision as well.

Under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case need only prove that race or sex was a factor in the employment decision.

Burtnick v. McLean · filed 1997-01-29(m)

In so-called “mixed motive” cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the plaintiff need only prove that race and/or sex was a factor in the employment decision.

In a mixed motive gender discrimination claim, once the employee shows that an illegitimate criterion motivated the employment decision, the employer bears the burden of showing it would have made the same decision anyway.

Brekke v. City of Blackduck · filed 1997-03-28(a)

Once the Plaintiff has made this threshold showing, “the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove that it would have terminated the employee even without the illegitimate criterion.” Id.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive claim to show that a protected characteristic motivated the employment decision.

Carter v. Pena · filed 1997-10-23(m)

The 1991 Act clarified the issue that had closely divided the Court in Price Water-house, specifying that a plaintiff need only establish that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim when pregnancy was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Sheehan v. Donlen Corp. · filed 1997-10-07(m)

Because Sheehan raises an issue from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Donlen fired her, at least in part, due to her pregnancy, Donlen’s summary judgment argument fails.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when the employee proves that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Wolff v. Brown · filed 1997-11-04(m)

The court's first instruction explained Wolff's burden to prove unlawful discrimination under § 2000e-2(m): ... Your verdict must be for the Plaintiff . . . on Plaintiff's sex discrimination claim if all the following elements have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence: first, Defendant discharged Plaintiff; and second, Plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision. ... That instruction is consistent with our recent decision that the district court "must tell the jury to resolve the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination [but] is not 'constrained to' instruct how discrimination can be proved."

Section 2000e-2(m) treats sex as an unlawful motivating factor in an employment decision even when the employer would have made the same decision for other reasons.

Forrest v. Stinson Seafood Co. · filed 1998-01-05(m)

The jury found that - Plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in Stinson’s decision not to offer her a position on one of its boats. The jury also found that Stinson would not have offered Plaintiff the job in any event because she lacked the requisite skill or experience to perform the job. ... A thorough review of the record in this ease, .in conjunction with the jury finding, convinces the Court that Stinson discriminated against Plaintiff.

Race need only be a motivating factor in a discharge, not the decisive factor, to support a Title VII discrimination claim.

Porter v. STATE OF ILL., DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES · filed 1997-12-16(m)

To overcome a motion for summary judgment on a claim of intentional discrimination under Title VII, plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to raise an inference that race was a motivating' — but not necessarily a decisive — factor in his discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when sex motivates an employment decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without considering sex.

Stevens v. Gravette Medical Center Hospital · filed 1998-02-23(m)

After the amendments, an employer may no longer avoid liability by showing it would have made the same decision but may limit the remedies available. Section 2000e-2(m) now provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”

A plaintiff alleging religious or national-origin discrimination must show that the protected trait motivated the employment decision; evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual is insufficient by itself.

Rubinstein v. Administrators of Tulane · filed 1998-03-06(m)

Thus, in addition to presenting ... evidence that defendants’ proffered expía-nations for their action are pretextual, plaintiff must also present evidence, that his religion or national origin were a motivating factor in the decision to take action.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when race motivates an adverse employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Browning v. President Riverboat · filed 1998-03-20(m)

Under the mixed motive analysis of Price Waterhouse, as modified by § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), an unlawful employment practice is established when an individual demonstrates that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, even though other factors also motivated the action. ... Because the mixed-motive analysis was appropriate in this case, we need not address the sufficiency of the proof under the pretext analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(m) applies its mixed-motive standard to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not retaliation.

McNutt v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 1998-04-02(m)

Discrimination based on retaliation—prohibited separately by § 2000e-3(a)—is conspicuously absent from the list of protected categories in § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when national origin is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Etefia v. East Baltimore Community Corp. · filed 1998-03-25(m)

In order to prevail, the plaintiff need not necessarily disprove the defendant’s reason, but must demonstrate that unlawful discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the employment action in dispute.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when race motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Scholz v. RDV Sports, Inc. · filed 1998-03-27(m)

Importantly, as noted above, it was not necessary for Scholz to prove that race was the sole reason for his termination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 (11th Cir.1996). Rather, he was only required to submit evidence indicating that race was a motivating factor in making the decision.

Section 2000e-2 permits a religious discrimination claim under a mixed motives analysis when religion motivates an employment decision, even if other reasons also play a part.

Cowan v. Strafford R-VI School District · filed 1998-04-07(a)(1)

A plaintiff in a discrimination case under Title VII can proceed under the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), mixed motives analysis if an employee first establishes that religion was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Then the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, who must show that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the illegal criteria.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race discrimination claim when race motivated a termination, even if the employer also had a legitimate reason to fire the employee.

Echols v. Select Beverages, Inc. · filed 1998-08-21(m)

If the reason for termination is legitimate, or right, there can still be discrimination if the employer terminated the employee because of his race, and used the legitimate reason as a crutch to stand on.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when discrimination is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. · filed 1998-09-29(m)

Section 107 of the 1991 Act overturned Price Waterhouse on this point by amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to make clear that an employer is liable for a violation of Title VII upon proof that an impermissible motive played a role in the challenged action.

Section 2000e-2(m) prohibits an employer from considering race as a motivating factor in a promotion decision, even if the employer would have made the same decision without considering race.

Peoples v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 1998-09-30(m)

It is a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), part of Title VII, for an employer to consider race as a motivating factor in connection with any employment practice, including a promotion.

Religion may be a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivated the employer.

Hernandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc. · filed 1998-10-13(m)

The court’s instruction, fairly read, does not imply that Hernández was required to prove that religious discrimination constituted the sole motivation for defendants’ conduct.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employer liable when sex discrimination motivates an employment practice, even if other factors also motivate it.

Bayles v. Fidelity Bank · filed 1998-12-18(m)

Instead, an employer remains liable wherever unlawful discrimination “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Accordingly, unlike cases involving isolated ambiguous remarks, Bayles has presented sufficient evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment with respect to her claim that Fidelity terminated her because of her sex.

Race or color can establish a Title VII violation when it motivates an adverse employment action, even if the employer has other reasons for its decision.

Porter v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services · filed 1998-11-23(m)

If an employee's race or color is a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, the employee can prevail under Title VII regardless of other justifications the employer may have had for its decision or how it treated other employees.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not set the evidentiary threshold for a mixed motive jury instruction.

Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. · filed 1999-01-05(m)

Furthermore, the Act does not address what type of evidence is required to meet this standard and so warrant a mixed motive instruction. Consequently, we agree with defendant that Price Waterhouse continues to control when a mixed motive instruction is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits relief when discrimination is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it. A discriminatory termination process can support back pay even when the final decision was made for a legitimate reason.

Bosley v. Excel Corp. · filed 1999-01-19(m)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), an employee is entitled to relief if he or she proves that impermissible discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the employment decision, “even though other factors also motivated” ... the employer’s decision. ... The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to find that the termination process was tainted by sex discrimination even if the actual decision to terminate was not.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when discrimination is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Excel Corp. v. Bosley · filed 1999-01-19(m)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), an employee is entitled to relief if he or she proves that impermissible discrimination was a "motivating factor" in the employment decision, "even though other factors also motivated" the employer's decision. ... The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to find that the termination process was tainted by sex discrimination even if the actual decision to terminate was not.

A plaintiff must persuade the jury that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision; direct evidence receives no special treatment at trial.

McClurg v. Santa Rosa Golf & Beach Club, Inc. · filed 1999-03-15(m)

Second, the issue of whether the plaintiffs gender was a motivating factor in terminating the plaintiff is an issue to be determined by the jury and upon which the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion. Direct evidence, however defined, will not be treated differently from other evidence in the trial.

Section 2000e-2(m) covers employment practices motivated by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not apply to retaliation claims.

Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n · filed 1999-06-10(m)

On its face, § 107(a) establishes as unlawful an employment practice that is motivated by discrimination based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” even if other reasons also motivated the practice. Section 107(a) simply does not speak to retaliation based upon activity that is protected under Title VII, such as filing either an EEOC charge or a discrimination lawsuit.

Section 2000e-2(m) addresses discrimination, not retaliation.

Behne v. Microtouch Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-07-15(m)

Section 2000e-2(m) addresses discrimination; not retaliation. Retaliation claims are addressed in Section 2000e-3(a).

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes employer liability when race is a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivate it.

Hankins v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-08-18(m)

Under the modified Price Waterhouse standard, a defendant is liable for discrimination upon proof that a forbidden criterion (e.g., race) "was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though ... other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability when race is a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

No. 98-1327 · filed 1999-08-18(m)

Under the modified Price Waterhouse standard, a defendant is liable for discrimination upon proof that a forbidden criterion (e.g., race) "was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Although this standard is a stringent one, we agree with Hankins that Dr. Ross's statement, if made, would constitute direct evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive claim to show that race or sex was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Rayl v. Fort Wayne Community Schools · filed 2000-02-10(m)

For a viable claim under the “mixed motives” inquiry as articulated in Price Waterhouse and as modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (hereafter “CRA 1991”), Rayl must present direct evidence that FWCS used race or gender as motivating factors in its decision not to hire him.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor standard applies to mixed-motive claims; pretext claims require the impermissible factor to be determinative.

Jacqueline Watson, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Septa"), Appellee/cr · filed 2000-03-20(m)

This choice of language is understandable if, as we hold, Section 107(a) applies only to Price Waterhouse “mixed-motive” cases, but there would be no apparent reason for this language if Section 107(a) applied to all disparate treatment cases against employers.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s mixed-motive rule covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover retaliation claims.

Speedy, Robert D. v. Rexnord Corporation · filed 2001-03-16(m)

The Act rolled back the Price Waterhouse holding in certain types of discrimination cases by providing that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(m). However, as we noted in McNutt, absent from that provision is a reference to retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive discrimination claim in some circumstances even without direct evidence of discrimination or a finding that the employee was qualified.

Smith v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2001-05-07(m)

In addition, even when there is no direct evidence of discrimination available and the plaintiff is not found qualified, in certain circumstances the plaintiff may still prevail under a mixed-motive analysis.

Pregnancy discrimination is established when pregnancy was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Meier v. Noble Hospitality, Inc. · filed 2001-12-31(m)

It appears to the Court that there is direct evidence of discrimination in this case, thus simply requiring Ms. Meier to prove that her demotion was in part motivated by her pregnancy.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires no heightened evidentiary showing when a protected characteristic is one of multiple motives for an employment decision.

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., Dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino · filed 2002-08-02(m)

Rather, based on the language of the statute — which requires proof of only "a motivating factor" and does not set out any special proof burdens — we conclude that Congress did not impose a special or heightened evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in a Title VII case in which discriminatory animus may have constituted one of two or more reasons for the employer's challenged actions.