42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim requires a tangible employment action; speculation about harm to reputation or future opportunities is insufficient.

Crosson v. Caremark, Inc. · filed 2002-07-30(a)(1)

Without showing that she has suffered any harm, Crosson’s unsubstantiated speculation that her professional reputation and her future at Caremark have been damaged cannot establish that she suffered a tangible employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when an employer conditions tangible employment benefits on sexual favors.

Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., SC · filed 1994-01-07(a)(1)

Pieeh’s allegations fit the classic definition of quid pro quo sexual harassment — submission to sexual demands is alleged to have been a condition to receiving tangible employment benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a supervisor bases job decisions on an employee’s response to unwelcome sexual advances; actual economic loss is not required.

Karibian v. Columbia University, John Borden, Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees v. Mark Urban, Defendant-Cross · filed 1994-01-25(a)(1)

The relevant inquiry in a quid pro quo case is whether the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances. It is enough to show that the supervisor used the employee’s acceptance or rejection of his advances as the basis for a decision affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of the employee’s job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when alleged sexual misconduct is linked to the grant or denial of an employment benefit.

Johnson v. Indopco, Inc. · filed 1994-03-08(a)(1)

Wilkes’ allegations under the second amended Count III satisfies all of the necessary elements to state a cause of action against Unichema. Wilkes’ first amended Count III failed to state a cause of action under the quid pro quo theory, because Wilkes failed to allege facts to establish the link between the verbal misconduct of a sexual nature and Chambers’ decision to terminate her employment. The second amended Count III, however, alleges additional facts which demonstrate the nexus between Chambers’ verbal misconduct and his decision to discharge Wilkes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a supervisor from conditioning continued employment on submission to unwelcome sexual advances.

Wilson v. Wayne County · filed 1994-05-24(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Sheriff Nutt had made submission to his sexual advances the test for whether Ms. Wilson would stay on as a dispatcher. As such, he subjected her to the classic form of quid pro quo harassment by conditioning a job benefit on submission to unwelcome sexual advances.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a quid pro quo sexual harassment verdict to stand when sufficient evidence permits a reasonable jury to find the employer’s stated reasons pretextual.

Webb v. Hyman · filed 1994-11-05(a)

Because the District mischaracterizes the basis of the Plaintiffs ease, and because the Plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable jury of pretext, the Court must reject the District’s argument.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment when a supervisor links a request for sexual favors to actual or potential job benefits or detriments.

Terri L. NICHOLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General; U.S. Postal Service, Defendants-Appellant · filed 1994-12-13(a)(1)

In sum, we conclude that a supervisor’s intertwining of a request for the performance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires adverse job consequences from a supervisor’s sexual demands to establish quid pro quo harassment against an employer.

Gary v. Long · filed 1995-07-28(a)(1)

Under the circumstances alleged here, it takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quid pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claimant to show unwelcome sexual conduct and a connection between rejecting it and a tangible job detriment.

Kennedy v. DANAVOX · filed 1996-04-29(a)(1)

The court finds that Kennedy’s “discomfort”, uneommunicated to Ormsby, over her choice of the word “love” as a closing in thank you notes is insufficient to created a question of fact regarding the unwelcomeness of Ormsby’s conduct. ... Kennedy has also failed to present evidence sufficient to create a question of fact regarding whether his termination was based on his refusal to return Ormsby’s “affections.” ... Kennedy has failed to establish essential elements of his sexual harassment claim, thus, summary judgment in favor of Danavox is warranted.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers quid pro quo sexual harassment when refusal of sexual demands causes the loss of tangible employment benefits, which can include an academic title and committee assignments.

Bryson v. Chicago State University · filed 1996-09-18(a)

A sudden loss of all committee responsibilities and the stripping of a title one formerly held (when similar titles continued to be used throughout the university), if proven at trial, would be a loss of tangible employment benefits just as serious as moving an office to an undesirable location, relocating someone’s personal files, or isolating the employee from others — all actions courts have held to qualify under Title VII in other cases.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of sexual harassment.

Perkovich v. Roadway Express, Inc., Ron Andras and David Gamble · filed 1997-01-22(a)(1)

We would put it a bit more directly: Perkovich has completely failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment. Her case is utterly devoid of even the slightest hint of evidence of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim based on pressure to continue a previously consensual relationship.

Schrader v. E.G. & G. Inc. · filed 1997-02-07(a)(1)

As discussed, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue whether he was discharged because he would not continue his relationship with Wilson, and I conclude that his prior consensual relationship with Wilson does not change the analysis under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment plaintiff to show that her response to sexual demands affected a tangible term or condition of employment.

Durham v. Philippou · filed 1997-03-19(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the employee belongs to a protected group, (2) that the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex, and (4) that the employee’s reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of the employee’s compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers denial of a desired promotion because an employee rejected unwelcome sexual advances.

Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh · filed 1997-07-14(a)(1)

We believe that, in contrast to minor slights like "negative comments," receiving or being denied a desired promotion is sufficiently serious and tangible to constitute a change in the employee's "terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a supervisor demanded sexual favors; evidence of job detriments alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Kidwell v. Sheetz, Inc. · filed 1997-09-15(a)(1)

Missing from the record, however, is any evidence that Rinker or Campbell ever actually demanded sexual favors or asked Kidwell out for dates; the plaintiff concedes as much. ... While evidence of alleged job detriments may be relevant to the fourth prong of Spencer’s prima facie test, it does not satisfy the second such prong.

An employee can establish quid pro quo sexual harassment by showing that refusing a supervisor’s sexual advances caused adverse changes to the employee’s job conditions.

Mills v. Wex-Tex Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-09-25(a)(1)

In light of all of the evidence offered by Mills, a reasonable jury could conclude that the implicit and overt threatening statements were made, and the adverse employment actions suffered, because of Mills’ refusal to accede to Blackwell’s desire to pursue a romantic relationship. Accordingly, the court finds that Mills has met her burden of production under the fourth requirement articulated above.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim requires evidence that a supervisor conditioned employment benefits on submission to sexual demands.

Harris v. City of Harvey · filed 1998-02-17(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her supervisors conditioned her employment on submitting to sexual demands.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when an employee’s response to unwelcome sexual conduct affects the terms or conditions of employment.

Gallagher v. George J. Delaney, Robert A. Hansen, and Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. · filed 1998-03-19(a)(1)

Sufficient evidence was produced to present a triable issue on whether Gallagher’s complaints about Hansen’s conduct were used as the basis for decisions affecting her compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claimant to show that her response to harassment affected a tangible aspect of her employment.

Johnson v. Runyon · filed 1998-06-08(a)(1)

Even if Johnson presented enough evidence to support the first three requirements,8 Johnson failed to prove that she was "affected on tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Spencer at 658.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim to link an employment benefit or consequence to participation in sexual conduct.

Catledge v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 1998-06-10(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment decisions based on gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The theory of sexual harassment commonly referred to as "quid pro quo" requires proof of a link between the grant-or denial of an economic benefit and the victim's participation in conduct of a sexual nature. ... The jury was entitled to believe the substantial evidence offered by defendants that the assistant principal had no authority over, and was not responsible for, Catledge's displacement. Consequently, it would have to conclude that the adverse employment consequence asserted by Catledge, a constructive discharge, could not have resulted from the alleged sexual harassment by the assistant principal.

Unfulfilled threats of a tangible job detriment do not establish quid pro quo sexual harassment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Ponticelli v. Zurich American Insurance Group · filed 1998-09-03(a)(1)

Assuming arguendo that Callas did make sexual advances toward Ponticelli, a threat of a tangible job detriment is insufficient to constitute quid pro quo sexual harassment.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim requires evidence that the employee’s response to sexual advances was used as a basis for an employment decision.

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co. · filed 1998-10-05(a)(1)

Thus, the evidence is insufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that DeLong used Farrell’s response to his advances as a basis for the decision to fire her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers quid pro quo sexual harassment when an employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advance is linked to an adverse employment action.

O'Donnell v. Coulson · filed 1998-11-09(a)(1)

In this case, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiffs rejection of Defendant’s alleged sexual advance (assuming a jury finds that he engaged in sexual misconduct) was linked to an actual adverse action affecting the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiffs job: her discharge.

A plaintiff claiming quid pro quo sexual harassment based on a denied promotion must show that she was otherwise qualified for the position.

Francis v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COM'RS, BALTIMORE CITY · filed 1999-01-11(a)(1)

Because Francis can not demonstrate that she was “otherwise qualified” for the position she alleges she was deprived of (and indeed, she seems to concede the point), her prima facie case for quid pro quo sexual harassment fails.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers quid pro quo sexual harassment, and an employee’s resistance can support an inference that sexual advances were unwelcome.

Ruiz v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1999-06-09(a)(1)

The evidence demonstrating Ruiz’ unalterable resistance to all sexual advances is enough to support the Court finding that an inference could be drawn that the alleged advances were uninvited, offensive, and unwanted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to defend a quid pro quo harassment claim by showing either that it took no adverse employment action or that a legitimate business reason caused the termination.

Smith v. Cashland, Inc. · filed 1999-10-07(a)(1)

A defendant-employer may refute such a claim of quid pro quo harassment in either of two ways: with proof that no negative employment action was taken by the employer, i.e., that the employee resigned, for example; or by establishing that the decision to terminate was made for legitimate business reasons and not because the employee refused to submit to sexual demands.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a quid pro quo sexual harassment plaintiff to prove causation with circumstantial evidence and favorable inferences at summary judgment.

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Company Nabisco, Inc · filed 2000-03-03(a)

We conclude that the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has shown that a rejection of certain conduct was “used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual” should not be constrained; rather, the court can consider circumstantial evidence and draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party in reaching this determination on summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat a supervisor’s criticism as a tangible employment action supporting a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

Slay v. Glickman · filed 2001-04-02(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged criticism of Slay by Collier is not a tangible employment action for the purposes of a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible employment action; an employee’s decision to quit is not a company act.

May v. Autozone Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-12-14(a)(1)

Here, the court agrees with Autozone that May has not suffered- any tangible employment action, as that term is defined above. When an employee quits, even when under stressful or undesirable conditions, it simply is not a company act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claimant to show that refusing unwelcome sexual advances caused a tangible job detriment.

Loring v. Metropolitana · filed 2002-02-14(a)(1)

Quid pro quo sexual harassment requires, among other things, that plaintiffs refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors result in tangible job detriment. Therefore, a plaintiff must produce evidence showing that the harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers quid pro quo sexual harassment when rejecting sexual advances affects the terms or conditions of employment.

Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc. · filed 2003-02-13(a)(1)

Plaintiff has therefore established a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied.

An employer is strictly liable for a supervisor’s quid pro quo sexual harassment when the supervisor uses employer authority to alter employment terms.

Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2003-05-22(a)(1)

Under the “quid pro quo” theory, an employer is strictly liable for its supervising employee’s sexually harassing acts because the supervising employee wields the employer’s authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment.

Quid pro quo sexual harassment requires a tangible employment action following an employee’s refusal of a supervisor’s sexual demands.

Henthorn v. Capitol Com. · filed 2004-03-05(a)(1)

Sexual harassment is quid pro quo if a tangible employment action follows the employee’s refusals to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claimant to show that refusal of a supervisor’s sexual demands caused discriminatory changes in employment terms or conditions.

Carter v. New York · filed 2004-03-22(a)(1)

To establish a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that she experienced “explicit discriminatory alterations in the terms or conditions of [her] employment” because of her refusal to submit to a supervisor’s explicit sexual demands. ... Defendants are correct that Plaintiff has failed to point to any facts that would support a causal connection between Mr. Gaughan’s alleged demands for kisses and his alleged campaign of discipline and restrictions.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible job detriment, which a constructive discharge may satisfy if working conditions would compel a reasonable person to resign.

McFarland v. Henderson · filed 2004-04-07(a)(1)

McFarland also claims that her resignation from her position constituted a constructive discharge, which might also satisfy the tangible job detriment requirement. ... Even when examined in the light most favorable to her, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to show that her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a harasser gains and abuses authority after the employee rejects sexual advances.

Lawana Porter v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2004-09-10(a)(1)

That important policy would be thwarted if we were to find that liability could not attach simply because an alleged harasser was not in fact in a position to exact reprisals at the moment his advances were rebuffed — even where he was entrusted with and abused such authority subsequently.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim requires a tangible employment action by the harassing supervisor.

Ford v. Colson Caster Corp. · filed 2005-01-21

Ford has presented no evidence that she suffered a tangible employment action at the hands of her harassing supervisor — a requirement to establish quid pro quo harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexual harassment claim when an employee alleges she was fired for rejecting a supervisor’s sexual advances.

Briggs v. Waters · filed 2006-10-03(a)(1)

In other words, she alleges that she was discharged because she had rebuffed Waters’s sexual advances. Such allegations state a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible employment action for a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim; refusing to redress harassment or imposing conditions on that redress does not qualify.

Newland v. Stevinson Toyota East, Inc. · filed 2007-01-04(a)(1)

More importantly, even if Plaintiff could substantiate her contention, neither refusing to redress sexual harassment nor imposing conditions upon such redress suffices as a tangible employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible employment action to establish employer liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Craig v. M & O AGENCIES, INC. · filed 2007-08-09(a)(1)

Because Craig, who did not acquiesce to Byrd’s demands, was neither demoted nor fired, nor did she suffer any other “tangible employment action,” ... we agree with the district court that Craig has not made out a prima facie case for liability under Title VII on a theory of quid pro quo harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a supervisor conditioned a job or employment benefit on acceptance of sexual conduct to support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

De La Torre v. Merck Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2008-03-31(a)(1)

To prove actionable harassment under a quid pro quo or “tangible employment action” theory, Plaintiff must show that Hildebrand “ ‘explicitly or implicitly condition[ed] a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee’s acceptance of sexual conduct.’”

A supervisor’s sexual comments can qualify as unwelcome advances for a quid pro quo harassment claim when the employee neither solicited nor invited them.

Moberly v. MIDCONTINENT COMMUNICATION · filed 2010-05-07(a)(1)

The court finds that Powell’s comments fall within the meaning of “unwelcome harassment in the form of sexual advances” for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment in that Powell’s comments can be construed as sexual advances, and Moberly neither solicited nor invited them.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer vicariously liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment when the alleged harasser lacks supervisory authority.

Sandoval v. American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-12-21(a)(1)

The Court first addresses plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claims and concludes that the original plaintiffs’ alleged harassers did not have supervisory authority for the purposes of Title VII and the MHRA. Defendants therefore are not vicariously liable for the alleged harassers’ actions under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment plaintiff to show that refusing sexual advances caused a tangible job detriment.

Moling v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2011-01-13(a)(1)

As she has failed to show her refusal to succumb to Stonehouse’s alleged requests for sexual favors resulted in transfer and removal from the management track, her quid pro quo harassment claim cannot stand.

Quid pro quo sexual harassment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal relationship between an employee’s refusal of sexual advances and a tangible job detriment.

Palmer v. Caccioppo · filed 2011-06-28(a)(1)

Because she has failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between her refusal to submit to Cacioppo’s alleged sexual advances and her termination, Palmer’s claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment is without merit.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sexual harassment claim to reach a jury when the timing of a firing and weak alternative explanations support an inference that the employee was fired for rejecting a supervisor’s advances.

Okoli v. City of Baltimore · filed 2011-08-08(a)(1)

But it appears deeply suspicious that Stewart fired Okoli only hours after she culminated her rejection of him by complain- ing to the Mayor. There is little in the record to suggest Okoli would have been fired for the occasional typo, notwithstand- ing her "at-will" employment status.

Section 2000e-2 permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when an employee alleges that refusing a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances led to adverse treatment.

Sloth v. Constellation Brands, Inc. · filed 2012-06-08

In this case, Sloth has alleged that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances from Bognaski, and that as a result of her refusal to accede to Bognaski’s demands, she was threatened with termination of her employment and subjected to unfavorable treatment. She further alleges that as a result of the unfavorable treatment, she was suspended from work, and ultimately could not continue to work because of the continued fear of reprisals from Bognaski for failing to succumb to his unwanted sexual assaults. Such allegations state a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment claimant to show unwelcome sexual advances and that submitting to them was a condition of job benefits or refusing them caused a tangible job detriment.

Souther v. Posen Construction, Inc. · filed 2013-04-22(a)(1)

To succeed, a plaintiff must prove, as relevant here, that he or she “was subjected to unwelcome[] sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors” and that submitting to these demands or advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or that refusing to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment. ... Souther’s state and federal claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment lack merit, and therefore the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims was appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a de facto supervisor conditions rehiring on submission to sexual demands.

Figueroa v. RSquared NY, Inc. · filed 2015-03-03(a)(1)

However, in the Court’s view, the relevant “tangible employment action” is, for purposes of the Plaintiffs quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, Ain “Doe’s” conditioning the Plaintiffs rehiring on her assent to his sexual demands, not her initial termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo sexual harassment plaintiff to show that accepting or rejecting sexual advances affected a tangible aspect of employment.

Norman v. N.C. Dep't of Admin. · filed 2018-02-06(a)(1)

In order to satisfy the fourth element of her quid pro quo claim, plaintiff must show that her reaction to the harassmentthat is, her acceptance or rejection of Mr. Moore’s sexual advanceswas an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of a tangible job detriment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of a tangible employment action to support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC · filed 2019-01-09(a)(1)

The Court determines that the record also does not support Osborne’s quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment because she has proffered no evidence that she suffered a tangible employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal nexus between a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances and an adverse employment action for a quid pro quo harassment claim.

Scott v. Navarro College District · filed 2020-02-04(a)(1)

As to Scott’s quid pro quo harassment claim, she has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on the causal nexus between her refusal of Barnes alleged advances and Dr. Sanchez terminating Scott for insubordination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment when an employee’s response to a supervisor’s sexual demands affects tangible aspects of employment.

Hess v. Buchanan County Public Service Authority · filed 2021-06-09(a)(1)

In sum, the Complaint has plausibly alleged each element of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, including the fourth element that Hess’ “reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of [her] . . . employment.” Okoli, 648 F.3d at 222. She has stated claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an express or implied request for sexual favors tied to employment conditions for a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

Wolfe v. Carter's, Inc. · filed 2021-08-11(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual discrimination because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Lamek’s alleged conduct, from an objective perspective, did not carry “with it an express or implied request for sexual favors in return for some action affecting the plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment.’” Schmalz, 2012 WL 1813095, at *9.

A plaintiff can establish that sexual advances were unwelcome by showing that they occurred or continued after a consensual workplace relationship ended.

Nixon v. Kysela Pere Et Fils, LTD. · filed 2022-03-17(a)(1)

But a plaintiff can establish that the advances were unwelcome by showing that they occurred (or continued) following the termination of the consensual relationship.

Section 2000e-2 requires a causal connection between an employee’s response to sexual conduct and an employment decision for a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

NRA Group, LLC v. Durenleau · filed 2023-12-19(a)(1)

Here, there is no evidence showing a causal connection between the “joking” that Durenleau states as the basis for her claim and any later employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim to proceed when a reasonable jury could find that an employee was fired for rejecting unwanted sexual advances.

Nixon v. Kysela Pere Et Fils, LTD · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

This disputed issue bars summary judgment, as a reasonable jury could determine that Nixon was fired because of her rejection of Kysela’s unwanted sexual advances.

A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim requires the alleged harasser to be a supervisor with power to take a tangible employment action.

BAUTISTA v. SWBC PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER SERVICES I, LLC · filed 2024-11-01(a)(1)

But even assuming the “tangible employment action” could be taken by the non-harasser,16 Bautista’s quid pro quo claim fails because the harasser—Czerwein—was not her supervisor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a manager promises additional shifts in exchange for sexual acts and the employee complies, even if the shifts are never provided.

LEAVINES v. OLLIE'S BARGAIN OUTLET INC. · filed 2025-06-10(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff has also alleged that Duffey told her he would provide her additional shifts if she performed sexual acts on him and she did so. Whether he actually provided the shifts thereafter is irrelevant.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a tangible employment action to support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

O'REILLY, Ph.D. v. THE INSTITUTE FOR CANCER RESEARCH · filed 2025-10-02(a)

After viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dr. O’Reilly, the Court finds that Dr. O’Reilly has not established that she suffered a “tangible employment action” when she was denied a letter of support for her ReWARD grant application in March 2023.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes racial harassment actionable when it is severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment.

Yolanda Wade v. Automation Personnel Services · filed 2015-05-11(a)(1)

Although objectionable, Gross’s use of nicknames for Wade and Akins was not severe or pervasive enough to create an “abusive working environment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment that is both subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive.

Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting Service, Inc., D.B.A. Wenn Radio, and David Donnell · filed 2000-12-11(a)(1)

Harassment is severe or pervasive for Title VII purposes only if it is both subjectively and objectively severe and pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover sexual harassment inflicted on men and women alike because it requires discrimination based on sex.

Holman, Steven L. v. State of Indiana · filed 2000-05-01(a)(1)

Title VII does not cover the "equal opportunity" or "bisexual" harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim to proceed when evidence of more frequent and severe abuse of women, together with the employer’s knowledge, creates a triable issue.

Lee KOPP, Appellant, v. SAMARITAN HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., and Saadi Albaghdadi, Appellees · filed 1994-01-21(a)(1)

In sum, the evidence available to the District Court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. The evidence reveals that the instances of Albaghda-di’s abusive treatment of women were greater in number and severity than those involving men. The evidence also suggests that the hospital was aware of Albaghdadi’s treatment of Kopp and others.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits unwelcome sexual conduct that creates a hostile work environment by altering the conditions of employment.

Currie v. Kowalewski · filed 1994-01-28(a)(1)

The acts and advances were unwelcome and created an environment that was hostile to the plaintiff because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make added work caused by a supervisor’s consensual affair actionable sexual harassment by itself.

Herman v. Western Financial Corp. · filed 1994-03-04(a)(1)

We do not believe that an actionable Title VII claim may be made simply from allegations that female employees had to take up the slack for a male supervisor who was shirking his duties while involved in a consensual affair with another supervisor.

A hostile-work-environment sexual-harassment claim requires unwelcome harassment based on sex that affects employment conditions and that the employer knew or should have known about but failed to remedy.

Ott v. Perk Development Corp. · filed 1994-03-09(a)(1)

In order to defeat defendant’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on hostile environment by showing that:. (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was the subject of unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her sex, (4) the sexual harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits unwelcome, sex-based conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to interfere with work or create an abusive work environment.

James B. King, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. Phillip G. Hillen and Merit Systems Protection Board · filed 1994-04-13(a)(1)

Sexual harassment will lie if the offensive conduct is based on the employee’s sex, is unwelcome, and is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with the employee’s job performance or to create an abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.

Kidwai v. McDonald Corporation Bill Lowery Paul Van Sickle Lonnie Taylor Chris Searles Ken Evenson, and David N · filed 1994-04-18(a)(1)

Even when all of Evenson's allegedly harassing conduct is viewed in its totality and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we have concluded that, while Evenson's conduct may have offended Kidwai, and may even have been ungraceful to a "reasonable person," it was not severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Thus, defendants' conduct is beyond Title VII's purview.

A racially hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires specific evidence of severe or pervasive harassment.

Alvarado v. Health Net, Inc. Gretchen H. Gorman Michael Close · filed 1994-04-19(a)(1)

We find that Alvarado did not establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment. Alvarado did not produce any specific evidence that demonstrates that severe or pervasive harassment existed at Health Net.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits hostile environment sexual harassment claims, and the Paroline standard remains applicable after Harris.

Ward v. Johns Hopkins University · filed 1994-04-22(a)(1)

The Fourth Circuit’s and this Court’s prior decisions are consistent with Harris. ... Thus, this Court continues to be guided by Paroline.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexually hostile work environment claim without proof of blatant sexual misconduct.

Spain v. Gallegos · filed 1994-06-16(a)(1)

But an employee can demonstrate that there is a sexually hostile work environment without proving blatant sexual misconduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover a hostile work environment caused by rumors about a woman’s sexual relationship with her supervisor when a jury could find that she was treated differently because of her sex.

Ellen v. Spain v. Tony E. Gallegos, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission United States of America · filed 1994-06-16(a)(1)

Because we are cognizant that these stereotypes may cause superiors and co-workers to treat women in the workplace differently from men, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that Spain suffered the effects she alleges because she was a woman.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an inference of intentional sex discrimination from sexually explicit workplace harassment.

Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp. · filed 1994-06-30(a)(1)

Because at least some of the conduct at issue was sexually explicit, it is fair to draw the conclusion that, by virtue of this conduct, plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers hostile work environment harassment based on sex even when the conduct is not sexual in nature.

Bilbrey v. Werts Novelty Co. · filed 1994-07-06(a)(1)

Sex discrimination, including harassment, can take many forms and is not limited to sexual behavior that is harassing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in personnel decisions and statements or conduct that create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work environment.

Holland v. Department of the Air Force · filed 1994-07-20(a)(1)

Further, as the Supreme Court has held, the language of the statute is not limited to “economic or tangible” discrimination such as “personnel actions,” but further prohibits statements or conduct that creates a “discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.”

Repeated, severe gender-based insults by a supervisor can create a hostile work environment even when they occur within one month.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. · filed 1994-08-02(a)(1)

With these factors as a guide, this Court concludes that the incidents alluded to above, in light of all the circumstances, together represent a sufficient quantum of harassment to constitute a hostile work environment vis-a-vis Borello.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions; an employer’s prompt, effective response to known harassment can defeat liability.

Fred v. Wackenhut Corp. · filed 1994-08-15(a)(1)

The Court therefore concludes that but for the cup incident on March 17, no other episodes of sexual harassment occurred at the Station. Consequently, the Court finds that the harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions’ of the workplace. Furthermore, the Court concludes that any sexual harassment was arrested by the prompt remedial action taken by OPPD and TWC through the March 25 meeting.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover an unpleasant workplace without discrimination based on race.

Terry Vore, Gerald Wray, Carol Shanafelt v. Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated · filed 1994-08-18(a)(1)

Our analysis, then, demonstrates that Title VII is not implicated by the nebulous claim that Indiana Bell discriminated against white employees by permitting an unpleasant black employee to work with them. Hence, we are left with an unpleasant working environment in which one lout, who happens to be black, greatly annoys his coworkers, who happen to be white. Without racial animus, there is no Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches a sexually hostile work environment when the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Emery v. Brown-Forman Corporation Lois Musselman Mateus Nancy McCoskey · filed 1994-08-23(a)(1)

Emery has alleged no actions either by Jett or any other employee of Brown-Forman which rise to the level of being "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment." Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 370.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a racially hostile work environment, and a claim may proceed when the evidence could establish harassment severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

Bernard v. Doskocil Companies, Inc. · filed 1994-08-26(a)(1)

Applying Harris and Meritor Savings to the present case, the court finds that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of a racially hostile work environment to overcome defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a racially hostile work environment, and evidence of repeated racial jokes can raise a genuine factual dispute about such a claim.

Bradford v. Washoe County, School District Robert Michell · filed 1994-09-21(a)(1)

This statement is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Bradford was subjected to a work environment hostile to blacks in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a hostile work environment created by sufficiently pervasive harassment based on national origin.

Park v. Howard University · filed 1994-09-23(a)(1)

The actions, noted in the Court’s opinion, clearly demonstrated that the conduct of Dr. Park’s supervisors was sufficiently pervasive to amount to harassment which created a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2 permits a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim when frequent sexist remarks by a supervisor plausibly create an abusive workplace and support employer liability.

Pittman v. Correctional Healthcare Solutions, Inc. · filed 1994-11-10

Plaintiffs complaint does make out a sufficient sexual harassment claim under Title VII on a “hostile work environment” theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that hostile workplace treatment was directed at an employee because of sex; the conduct need not have sexual content.

Walk v. Rubbermaid Inc. · filed 1994-11-15(a)(1)

Walk correctly noted in her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that the law does not require sexual content in an employer’s actions. She must, however, demonstrate facts which suggest that Lombardo’s actions were directed at her because she is a woman. Walk has failed to do so.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim based on pervasive or severe intentional sex discrimination that affects the employee and would affect a reasonable person.

Domm v. Jersey Printing Co., Inc. · filed 1994-11-16(a)(1)

“Under both Title VII and NJLAD, a hostile environment claim requires proof of pervasive or severe intentional discrimination that affected the plaintiff and would also affect a reasonable person.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a racially hostile work environment, but a single racial epithet followed by prompt and appropriate corrective action does not establish one.

Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply · filed 1994-11-23(a)(1)

This single racial epithet, with such prompt and proper action, cannot create a hostile working environment within the coverage of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.

Ballou v. University of Kansas Medical Center · filed 1994-12-05(a)(1)

Even if all of plaintiffs allegations in support of her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim are accepted as true, the court finds that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of her employment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits severe or pervasive sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment; the possibility that men would also find the conduct offensive does not defeat the claim.

66 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1275, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,421 Greta L. Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Inc., a · filed 1994-12-05(a)(1)

That conduct is egregious enough to offend the sensibilities of men as well as women cannot serve to immunize it for Title VII purposes.

A victim’s reaction to personally experiencing violent sexual misconduct can establish the subjective element of a hostile work environment claim even without prior knowledge of the offender’s conduct.

Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc. · filed 1994-12-21

This Court rejects that offensive notion, holding instead that Al-Dabbagh’s reaction to the actual experience — her natural reaction to being personally exposed to the offending employee’s violent sexual misconduct — establishes the requisite subjective prong even though she had not previously known of Mitchell’s proclivities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege hostility because of sex; offense at sexually explicit material alone is insufficient.

Fox v. Sierra Development Co. · filed 1995-01-30(a)(1)

That an otherwise reasonable man might be highly offended by homosexual depictions is not enough. He must reasonably feel the homosexual depictions strike at his gender or attack him because of his gender. There is no allegation from which the Court can conclude that the homosexual writings, drawings, and discussions intimidated, ridiculed or insulted men or masculinity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that workplace harassment was racially motivated and sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

James L. Bolden, Jr. v. Prc Inc., Formerly Known as Planning Research Corporation, and Robert Carver · filed 1995-01-31(a)(1)

Thus, we conclude Mr. Bolden’s claim of racial harassment fails because he has not shown he was singled out for abuse and has not shown the ridicule he faced stemmed from racial animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a hostile work environment based on sex or national origin.

Soon Y. Park v. Howard University · filed 1995-02-23(a)(1)

Based on the record in its entirety and the authorities which have been cited, the Court concludes that, but for the violation by the defendant of the plaintiffs rights under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which reads as follows, “(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for employer — (1) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] ... sex, or national origin;” these incidents would not have occurred.

A racially hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostility stemming from racial animus.

Arzate v. City of Topeka · filed 1995-03-01(a)(1)

Nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the hostile work environment stemmed from racial animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment sufficiently pervasive to alter working conditions and create an abusive environment; sporadic incidents are insufficient.

Goeffert v. Beech Aircraft Corporation · filed 1995-03-29(a)(1)

Applying this standard, we agree with the district court that Ms. Goeffert has not identified facts sufficient to support a sexual harassment claim for purposes of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The few incidents she relies upon are sporadic, and thus insufficient to make out a claim of a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a racially hostile work environment when discriminatory conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Williams v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey · filed 1995-03-31(a)(1)

A careful examination of all the circumstances attending plaintiffs employment with the Port Authority between 1985 and 1987 leads the Court to conclude that although JFKIA was hardly a model of racial harmony during this time period, the pervasiveness of racial epithets, and overall racial animosity, was not sufficiently extensive to warrant a finding of a hostile work environment for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment to show that the conduct made the workplace objectively abusive and hostile.

Edwards v. Wallace Community College · filed 1995-04-19(a)(1)

To succeed at trial with her hostile environment claim Edwards must demonstrate that the actions of the defendants altered the condition of the workplace, creating an objectively abusive and hostile atmosphere.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers gender based harassment that alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Gross v. Burggraf Construction Company · filed 1995-04-25(a)(1)

Therefore, after considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Gross has failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact to establish gender based harassment that was pervasive and severe enough to alter the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment before it is actionable.

Gearhart v. Eye Care Centers of America, Inc. · filed 1995-05-30(a)(1)

While Donahue’s and Davis’ conduct may have been inappropriate and “boorish,” under current law, it does not rise to the level of an actionable claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers racial harassment when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Woods v. Bentsen · filed 1995-06-14(a)

To be cognizable under Title VII, racial harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiffs employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based hostile work environment harassment even when the conduct is not explicitly sexual.

Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd. · filed 1995-06-30(a)(1)

In order to establish a claim of hostile environment, however, it is not necessary that the offending conduct be explicitly sexual in nature. ... Here, Humphreys has adduced sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether the abusive treatment she allegedly received was because of her sex.

The alleged sexual nature of work does not, by itself, create a presumption that an employer discriminated because of sex.

Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc. · filed 1995-07-20(a)(1)

Plakio here cannot successfully rely on either circumstance to prove discriminatory intent. Plakio’s statement of facts and attached exhibits do not match up with her allegations on the first circumstance. The law does not recognize the second circumstance as presumptively supporting in every case a reasonable inference of discrimination on the basis of gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover unpleasant working conditions unless the mistreatment is based on a protected status such as sex.

Robertson v. ALA. DEPT. OF ECON. & COMM. AFFAIRS · filed 1995-07-31(a)(1)

Title VII does not create a cause of action for unpleasant working conditions caused by something other than a protected status, in this case gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover unpleasant working conditions unless they are caused by discrimination based on a protected status such as sex.

Robertson v. Alabama Department of Economic & Community Affairs · filed 1995-07-31(a)(1)

It was wholly unrelated to her status as a female. Title VII does not create a cause of action for unpleasant working conditions caused by something other than a protected status, in this case gender.

Section 2000e-2 covers same-sex sexual harassment when the employee’s sex is the basis of the harassment; the harasser’s gender is irrelevant.

Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1995-06-13(a)(1)

It is clear, moreover, from the plain language of Title VII, that same-sex harassment is an unlawful employment practice. Title VII expressly prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of the employee’s sex (or race, etc.). Defendants’ gender is irrelevant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex sexual harassment when a supervisor singles out employees of one sex.

Raney v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-07-05(a)(1)

If, however, the supervisor singles out one sex, then the protections of Title VII are invoked.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment only when it discriminates because of the employee’s sex; male-to-male harassment without discriminatory treatment is not actionable.

Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc. · filed 1995-08-04(a)(1)

This type of harassment, however, is not covered by Title VII because it was not discriminatory sexual harassment, that is, it was not done because of Quick’s gender. Male-to-male harassment without any discriminatory treatment is not prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment directed at a woman because of her sex even when her sexual orientation also motivates the harasser.

Valadez v. Uncle Julio's of Illinois, Inc. · filed 1995-08-09(a)(1)

Further, based on plaintiffs uncontested testimony and the corroborating testimony of Waitress A and Waitress C, the court finds that Conger’s conduct towards plaintiff was gender based and as such, constitutes actionable sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment when the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Wenner v. CG Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc. · filed 1995-09-06(a)(1)

The undisputed facts do not indicate that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment as proscribed by Title VII. First, plaintiff has not put forth evidence to show that the harassment was severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment.

Sex-based harassment alone does not establish a hostile work environment claim under section 2000e-2; the plaintiff must establish the remaining required elements.

Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co. · filed 1995-09-15(a)(1)

Further, the harassment of which she complains, in particular, the tube of vaginal cream, was based upon her sex; it would not have been placed at her work station but for the fact that she is a female. Balletti, however, has failed to establish the remaining elements of her claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment.

McCrackin v. LabOne, Inc. · filed 1995-09-26(a)(1)

Accepting plaintiffs contention that Bratcher squeezed and rubbed her shoulders (as opposed to tapping them to gain her attention), this still does not rise to the level of severity required by Title VII. Plaintiff alleges that Bratcher touched her shoulder at most three or four times and her back once. Over a four-month time frame, this could hardly be said to be pervasive conduct, such that a hostile or abusive work environment arose.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats even a single sexual assault as sufficient to create an abusive work environment.

Tomka v. The Seiler Corporation, Daniel Lucey, David Polonsky and Timothy Conroy · filed 1995-09-27(a)(1)

Accepting, as we must, that these assaults occurred, we agree with the district court that even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof that an employer had actual or constructive notice of a racially hostile work environment before it can be held liable for that environment.

Nelson v. Watergate at Landmark · filed 1995-09-29

Examining the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court nevertheless concludes that the plaintiff has not proven that her employer had notice of a racially hostile environment and that therefore she cannot recover under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a man's hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment directed at female coworkers when he was not harassed because of his sex.

Lyman v. Nabil's Inc. · filed 1995-10-10

The Act generally defines unlawful employment practices as actions taken against an individual employee due to that employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Males simply do not fall within the protected class and thus have no standing to assert a claim such as Lyman’s.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers actionable sex discrimination arising from a supervisor’s unwanted sexual conduct and adverse treatment after an employee resists.

Talada v. International Service System, Inc. · filed 1995-10-10(a)(1)

Both Ingraham and Talada possess actionable discrimination claims, and thus satisfy the first prong of the Kotcher test. Each was subjected to unwanted sexual language and physical contact by an immediate supervisor. Each was offered benefit in some form for her consent or cooperation. Each resisted and complained. Each suffered a virtual counterattack by supervisory personnel, and eventual termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment even when the harasser and the victim are the same sex.

King v. M.R. Brown, Inc. · filed 1995-09-22(a)(1)

This Court finds that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers hostile work environments caused by gender-based harassment even when the conduct is not sexual in nature.

Curde v. Xytel Corp. · filed 1995-10-24(a)(1)

However, Defendant’s major premise—that only conduct of a sexual nature can implicate Title VII—is incorrect. Rather, so long as the plaintiffs “working conditions have been discriminatorily altered” because of her gender, Title VII is implicated.

Section 2000e-2 can prohibit a hostile work environment even when women participate in or condone the harassment.

Bartholomew v. Delahaye · filed 1995-11-08

That some women participate in or condone sexual harassment does not shield that conduct from the sanctions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat hostile workplace conduct as sexual harassment when the conduct is unrelated to the employee’s sex.

Ripberger v. Western Ohio Pizza, Inc. · filed 1995-11-16(a)(1)

There is nothing in the record to indicate that Maberly’s inappropriate and aggressive actions toward Ripberger in early January, 1994 were at all related to her sex. This alone precludes it from being considered sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers unwelcome harassment based on sex when it is severe or pervasive enough to interfere with work or create an abusive work environment.

Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co. · filed 1995-11-29(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... A claim for sexual harassment will lie where the offensive conduct is based on the employee’s sex, is unwelcome and is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with the employee’s job performance or to create an abusive work environment.

Sexually explicit cartoons that do not concern national origin do not support a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on national origin.

Flores v. Melvin Coley, Melvin Ray, Robert Remillard, Monika Villegas, County of Tulare · filed 1995-12-08

While the cartoons are undoubtedly in poor taste and offensive, they do not refer to or involve race or national origin. Further, although Flores argues that the cartoons are relevant to demonstrate a hostile work environment, he has not demonstrated that the sexually explicit cartoons created an environment which discriminated against Mexican-Americans on the basis of national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not presume that sexual or gender-oriented conduct between people of the same gender is discriminatory.

Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. · filed 1995-10-12(a)(1)

In a same-gender sexual harassment case, however, conduct of a sexual or gender-oriented nature can not be presumed to be discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexual harassment claim when an employee is harassed because of sex, even if the harasser is the same sex.

Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd. · filed 1995-11-07(a)(1)

For these reasons, the Court holds that same sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment may state an actionable claim under Title VII and that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out such a claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment to be sufficiently abusive and connected to discrimination based on a protected trait.

Aramburu v. Boeing Co. · filed 1995-12-21(a)(1)

Although Aramburu’s work environment may not have been ideal, there is not an adequate showing that the defendants’ conduct unreasonably interfered with Aramburu’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostde, or offensive working environment. Although it might be fair to say that Whitesell may not have liked Aramburu on a personal level and may have even “picked” on Aramburu on some occasions, there is no showing that his conduct stemmed from ancestral animus or another impermissible basis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostile work environment conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of employment.

Walker v. Social Health Association of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. · filed 1995-12-21(a)(1)

These few comments did not legally alter the terms of Walker's employment as required for a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sex-based harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment; three offensive comments were insufficient here.

Penny Lynn Walk v. Rubbermaid Incorporated · filed 1996-02-08(a)(1)

Under the Harris test, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to show how these comments, while humiliating and thoroughly offensive, rise to such a level as to create a hostile work environment claim.

A hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive workplace.

Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. · filed 1996-03-05(a)(1)

After carefully considering the entire record before us, however, we are convinced that the conduct of which Hopkins com- plains was neither sufficiently severe nor sufficiently pervasive to create an environment that a reasonable man would find hostile or abusive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer with notice of race- or gender-based conduct that creates a hostile work environment to take prompt, appropriate action reasonably calculated to end it, even when the conduct is not explicitly racial or sexual.

Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. · filed 1996-03-11(a)(1)

We conclude that if an employee is subjected to discriminatory conduct on the basis of race or gender, and the discriminatory treatment creates a hostile work environment and the employer has notice, a duty exists on the part of the employer to take prompt and appropriate remedial action, reasonably calculated to terminate the harassment.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-based harassment claim to reach a jury when evidence could show severe conduct.

Beach v. Ingram & Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-05-16

The Court finds ample evidence of conduct explicitly based upon sex with which to allow that question to go to the jury. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the Court must do, it would be disingenuous to even suggest that the conduct complained of in this case is not severe. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED on the issue of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment when severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct alters the conditions of employment.

Espaillat v. Breli Originals, Inc. · filed 1996-05-21(a)(1)

A "hostile work environment” exists, for purposes of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-2 [a] [1]), when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment (Harris v Forklift Sys., 510 US 17). ... Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that, if true, could render the corporate defendant liable under a "hostile work environment” theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require harassment to interfere with work performance to establish a hostile work environment; interference is one factor in assessing severity and pervasiveness.

Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance · filed 1996-05-28(a)(1)

This allegation, however, is not required to establish severe and pervasive behavior, but merely one factor to be considered.

A hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive summary judgment when repeated sexual harassment creates a genuine factual dispute about whether the conduct was severe or pervasive.

DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc. · filed 1996-05-29(a)(1)

These allegations are sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Dove subjected DiLaurenzio to a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose hostile work environment liability for an isolated offensive incident that does not create an abusive work environment.

Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp. · filed 1996-06-03

We therefore hold that it was unreasonable, on the evidence presented, for the jury to find that Hollingshead's conduct created a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based hostile work environment claim when conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and the employer fails to respond adequately after learning of it.

Harley v. McCoach · filed 1996-06-12(a)(1)

Thus, there is reasonable grounds for dispute as to whether PECO took prompt and effective remedial measures once it became aware of the allegedly hostile work environment. Accordingly, we must deny PECO’s motion to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to Ms. Harley’s gender-based Title VII and PHRA hostile work environment claims.

An employer that takes prompt remedial action after learning of harassment does not meet the employer liability element of a hostile work environment claim.

Waymire v. Harris County, Texas · filed 1996-06-14

Because we conclude as a matter of law that the county, upon learning of the drawing, took prompt remedial action, Waymire has failed to establish an essential element of her hostile work environment cause of action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees of either sex from sex-based workplace harassment without requiring membership in a disadvantaged group.

Quick v. Donaldson Co. · filed 1996-07-29(a)(1)

Protection under Title VII is not limited to only disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sexual harassment claim to reach a jury when the alleged conduct, viewed as a whole, could be severe or pervasive enough to alter the employee’s work environment.

Hernandez v. Wangen · filed 1996-08-01(a)(1)

Instead, by looking at the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the frequency of the alleged conduct, (2) the increasing severity of the alleged conduct, (3) the increasing physical severity of the alleged conduct, and (4) the extent to which it may have interfered with Plaintiffs work performance, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether the supervisor’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Plaintiffs work performance or work environment.

An employer avoids liability for a hostile work environment when it takes prompt remedial action after learning of sexual harassment.

Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. · filed 1996-08-20(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dees, the non-movant, the Court concludes that World Services not only took prompt, but immediate remedial action to resolve Dees’ sexual harassment complaint. Summary judgment for World Services will be GRANTED on Dees’ Title VII sexual harassment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based hostile work environment harassment that affects employment conditions when the employer knows of the harassment and fails to take appropriate action.

Collins v. Mallinckrodt Chemical, Inc. · filed 1996-09-16(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Based on the foregoing analysis of the factors required to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment, the Court finds that a factual dispute exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive work environment.

Crabtree v. BHK of America · filed 1996-09-17(a)(1)

The alleged harassment consisted of a single, isolated incident in which a male co-worker related to Mr. Crabtree an off-color joke of a sexual nature. Because Mr. Crabtree has failed to show that this incident interfered in any way with his ability to perform his work, summary judgment must be granted with regard to thé sexual harassment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to alter employment conditions and create an abusive workplace to support a hostile work environment claim.

Garcia v. ANR Freight System, Inc. · filed 1996-09-23(a)(1)

Plaintiffs workplace, I conclude, was not so permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult so as to “alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment” and “create an abusive working environment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits sex discrimination claims based on a hostile work environment and constructive discharge when the complaint adequately alleges discriminatory treatment and a resulting resignation.

Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp. · filed 1996-09-27(a)(1)

Given these allegations, this court finds plaintiffs complaint to be sufficient to have put Foothill on notice of plaintiffs Title VII claims based on the theories of hostile working environment and constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions for a hostile work environment claim.

Huddleston v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1996-09-28(a)(1)

In considering the totality of the circumstances, and accepting all of plaintiffs allegations in support of her hostile work environment claim as true, the court determines that Muse’s conduct was not sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim against an employer that knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Quarles v. McDuffie County · filed 1996-10-01(a)(1)

Thus, to prevail against the County on the claim of hostile environment sexual harassment, Quarles must prove that the County knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose hostile work environment liability for isolated racial slurs that do not make the workplace objectively hostile.

Grant v. UOP, Inc. · filed 1996-10-04(a)(1)

This conduct was not pervasive so as to create an objectively hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects male employees from sex-based hostile work environment harassment without requiring proof of an anti-male or predominantly female workplace.

Quick v. Donaldson Company, Inc. · filed 1996-09-23(a)(1)

Protection under Title VII is not limited to only disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. It extends to all employees and prohibits disparate treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that person's sex. ... The district court therefore erred in requiring Quick to show evidence of an anti-male or predominantly female work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sexual harassment claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine factual dispute over whether the conduct made the workplace hostile and abusive.

Feltner v. Partyka · filed 1996-10-08(a)(1)

The court agrees that Ms. Feltner has raised a genuine issue regarding whether Mr. Partyka created a hostile and abusive work environment that adversely affected the conditions of her employment.

Sporadic offensive comments do not establish a hostile work environment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) when the workplace could not reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive.

Mastio v. Wausau Service Corp. · filed 1996-10-15(a)(1)

Although plaintiff attributes the onset of her mental problems to the comments made in the May 28, 1992, the court concludes that plaintiff's working environment could not reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and create a hostile work environment.

Liccio v. Topakas (In Re Topakas) · filed 1996-11-20(a)(1)

A plaintiff can establish that a violation of Title VTI has occurred by showing that discrimination or harassment based on gender occurred which was so severe or pervasive that it had the effect of altering the conditions of employment and creating an offensive or hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a hostile work environment based on race or sex when discriminatory conduct alters the conditions of employment.

Washington v. City of Cleveland · filed 1996-12-16(a)(1)

Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff there remains a genuine issue to be resolved by the trier of fact whether Plaintiff’s workplace was so permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult so as to “alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment” and “create an abusive working environment.” Therefore, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the actions complained of amounted to Plaintiff being subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of race and sex.