42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a gender discrimination claim to reach a jury when gender could have been a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if the employer had business reasons too.

Dickson v. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc. · filed 2020-01-06(m)

As such, a reasonable jury could find that a motivating factor in Dickson’s complete removal from Adams Outdoor was her gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence connecting a protected trait to the challenged employment decision to establish mixed-motive discrimination.

Sullivan v. Hanover Foods Corp. · filed 2020-01-14(m)

None of the evidence presented involves or relates to Plaintiff or an adverse employment action taken against her; thus, a reasonable factfinder could not find or infer that a racially biased attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in a decision regarding the terms, conditions, disciplines, or privileges of her employment, as her complaint alleges.

A plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive sex discrimination claim must allege a clear connection between discriminatory remarks and the challenged employment decision.

Whitehurst v. Bedford County School Board · filed 2020-02-03(m)

Without sufficient allegations of such a causal nexus, Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim under this theory of liability.

A mixed motive race discrimination claim requires evidence linking racial animus to the challenged employment decision.

Cade v. County of Bladen · filed 2020-02-11(m)

Plaintiff’s evidence does not raise a “very specific yet pervasive aversion” to plaintiff’s continued employment as a paramedic based on his race from which the court reasonably can infer discriminatory intent on the part of Carter or Howell. ... Therefore, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden under the mixed motive framework.

Race is a motivating factor under § 2000e-2(m) when it plays a part in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated the decision.

Mingo v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority · filed 2020-03-17(m)

Accordingly, even when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mingo’s claim that race was a motivating factor in his firing fails as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive claim without requiring statements of gender animus from the decisionmakers.

Collins v. Koch Foods Inc · filed 2020-04-10(m)

Nor did Quigg hold that the decisionmakers had to have made statements showing gender animus.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a sex discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Marquez v. Albuquerque Public Schools · filed 2020-04-08(m)

That said, however, in a sex discrimination claim, a plaintiff need only prove that sex was a motivating factor in the decision. In an abundance of caution, the court will deny summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim as it pertains to hiring given the apparent factual dispute as to her availability.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other reasons also played a role.

Brandt v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2020-04-22(m)

In such a "mixed-motive" case, the plaintiff can prove a violation if he shows that race was one "motivating factor" in the rejection, even if other reasons also played a role.

National origin discrimination can be proved by showing that national origin was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Cid v. City of Miramar, Florida · filed 2020-04-27(m)

That is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to infer that Cid’s national origin was a motivating factor in her demotion.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Smith v. Office of the Attorney General, State of Alabama · filed 2020-07-16(m)

Because Smith has failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that her gender was a motivating factor for her denial of a promotion, her mixed-motive claim is due to be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a discrimination claim when race or national origin was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated it.

Bailey v. DAS North America, Inc. · filed 2020-07-17(m)

A plaintiff “can succeed on a mixed-motive claim by showing that illegal bias,” such as bias based on race or national origin, “was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, ‘even though other factors also motivated’ the action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)). ... As a result, Bailey has failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that her race or national origin were a factor in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a sex discrimination claim when sex was one motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Smith v. Pelham, City of · filed 2020-07-28(m)

Thus, to survive summary judgment, she needs to present evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the City took an adverse employment action against her, and (2) her sex was at least one motivating factor for the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not apply to mixed-motive retaliation claims; the Price Waterhouse proof standard governs those claims.

Funai v. Brownlee · filed 2004-11-23(m)

However, as “unanimously” as courts have held that mixed-motive retaliation claims are actionable, they have also held that Section 2000e-2(m) does not apply to retaliation claims and that Price Water-house continues to provide the relevant standards of proof and persuasion for mixed-motive retaliation claims.

A Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff must show that sex was a motivating factor in the challenged employment action.

Jones v. Trane/Ingersoll Rand · filed 2020-08-28(a)(1)

However, under Title VII, the plaintiff must ultimately show that the suspect classification was merely a motivating factor in the employer’s challenged conduct.

Under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination must show that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Loren D. King, II v. Fawcett Memorial · filed 2020-09-24(m)

The plaintiff must prove that his sex was at least a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, even though other factors also may have motivated the decision. ... Here, no reasonable jury could conclude that King’s age, sex, or disability motivated the decision to terminate his employment.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII plaintiff to establish causation by showing that a protected status was a motivating factor in a failure to promote.

Azam v. Yale University · filed 2020-09-29(m)

But with respect to his Title VII claim, Azam may establish causation by proving that one of his protected statuses (i.e., his race, national origin, ancestry, ethnicity, or religion) was a motivating factor in the failure to promote.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits mixed-motive claims for the listed protected traits, which do not include age.

Gibson v. AHF, LLC · filed 2020-10-19(m)

Notably missing from the above list covered by § 2000e-2(m) is age.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race-discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, without requiring but-for causation.

Henderson v. MBTA · filed 2020-10-09(m)

Henderson's complaint did not allege under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) that race was a "motivating factor" in the MBTA's decision, which would allow Henderson to succeed without showing but-for causation.

Section 2000e-2(m) prohibits an employment decision motivated by sex even when other factors also motivated it.

Jones v. Wolf · filed 2020-12-21(m)

Congress expanded the Civil Rights Act in 1991, making it unlawful to use sex as “a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Plaintiff fails to bring a triable claim under a mixed-motive theory.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a mixed-motive plaintiff to show that a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated it.

Nealy v. SunTrust Bank · filed 2021-03-23(m)

A plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim must show that illegal bias “was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, even though other factors also motivated the action.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(m)).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race-discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence could show that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Rodriguez v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2021-08-23(m)

Under that framework, as Rodriguez has done enough to defeat summary judgment on his but-for discrimination claim, he has also “necessarily” made the requisite showing with regard to his mixed-motive claim. See Ponce, 679 F.3d at 845.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race discrimination claim when race motivated an employment decision in part, even if other factors also motivated it.

Baker v. Ferris State University · filed 2021-09-02(m)

Count I fails to the extent it is based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) but survives to the extent it is based on a mixed-motive theory of liability, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

A Title VII plaintiff who neither pleads nor gives notice of a mixed-motive theory proceeds under the single-motive McDonnell Douglas framework.

Robinson v. Alexander City · filed 2021-09-10(a)

The Court concludes that, based on the record before it, the Plaintiff neither pleaded a mixed-motive claim in his complaint nor put the Defendants on notice in discovery or otherwise that he was making a claim under that theory. Accordingly, the Court applies the single-motive framework set out in McDonnell Douglas to the Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive standard does not apply merely because an employer offers a legitimate reason for its action.

Stevenson v. City of Sunrise · filed 2021-10-15(m)

A single-motive case is not transformed into a mixed-motive case merely because an employer satisfies its burden of proof.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive race discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Burrell v. United Parcel Service Inc · filed 2021-10-20(m)

Burrell has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was terminated in part because he is African American.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Golston v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-09-30(m)

Thus, no reasonable jury could find causation under either Section 1981’s and the ADEA’s “but-for” requirement or Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a national origin discrimination claim when a supervisor’s bias influences an employment decision and makes national origin a motivating factor.

Tsur v. Intel Corporation · filed 2021-10-08(m)

Tsur has therefore sufficiently alleged that, due to Jones’s imputed discriminatory animus, national origin was a motivating factor of Tsur’s layoff and permanent termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a Title VII plaintiff to prove that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.

HEREDIA-CAINES v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC. · filed 2022-01-18(m)

A plaintiff must prove that discriminatory intent was a “motivating factor” for its employer’s adverse actions for claims brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Martin v. Baptist Health Richmond · filed 2022-04-25(m)

Ultimately, because the burden of producing evidence in favor of a mixed-motive claim is “not onerous” the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Martin’s race was a motivating factor in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also contributed.

Nesbit v. Mississippi Department of Transportation · filed 2022-05-02(m)

In this vein, it should be noted that, as modified in 1991, Title VII permits plaintiffs to survive summary judgment if they can demonstrate, either directly or circumstantially, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). ... In light of the availability of the “mixed motive” option in Title VII discrimination cases, it is entirely possible that a jury could conclude that both racial animus and concerns regarding plaintiff’s job performance were motivating factors in Brooks’ decision to fire him and return a plaintiff’s verdict on the basis of this conclusion.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, but a conclusory assertion does not sustain that theory.

Denning v. Topre America Corporation · filed 2022-06-16(m)

That conclusory statement will not, alone, sustain a mixed-motive theory of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive discrimination claim to succeed when a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action, even if the employer had other reasons.

Hickman v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2022-08-16(m)

A mixed-motive claim, on the other hand, can ... succeed based solely on the employer’s reliance on a forbidden consideration.

Race discrimination is an unlawful employment practice when race motivates the decision, even if other factors also motivate it.

Mercer v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2022-08-31(m)

An employee establishes “an unlawful employment prac- tice” if he demonstrates that race “was a motivating factor” for the employment practice, “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a disparate treatment claim when race or sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if another reason also motivated it.

Handley v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2022-08-26(m)

So, even if De Sousa was motivated in part by Handley’s rejection of his son’s application, as long Handley’s race or sex also was a motivating factor, Handley has a viable disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) makes an employer liable when national origin motivates an employment practice, even if other factors also motivate it.

BONDARUK v. PNC BANK · filed 2022-09-09(m)

Under the modified Price Waterhouse standard, an employer is liable for discrimination upon proof that a forbidden criterion “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Because Plaintiff has not presented direct evidence of discrimination, his national origin discrimination claim fails under the modified Price Waterhouse analysis.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Rojo v. Tucson Unified School District · filed 2022-09-28(m)

Plaintiff need only show that there is a triable issue ... as to whether national origin was “a motivating factor,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added), and he can do so with “very little evidence,” Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 691 (quoting ... Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1410). He has cleared that threshold here.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plausible connection between a protected characteristic and the challenged employment conduct when that characteristic is alleged to be a motivating factor.

Steele v. Blinken · filed 2022-10-19(m)

For the purposes of this element and the allegations in the -35 Complaint, the Court examines whether Plaintiff pleads facts to support that his sex or the reporting of his personal information to his employer were motivating factors in Defendant’s conduct, and specifically if that factual support raises the allegation above a speculative level. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). Considering the relevant facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the allegations in the -35 Complaint are conclusory and outright fail to link Plaintiff’s sex or any other protected characteristic under Title VII to the alleged hostile treatment in his workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when a jury could find that discrimination was a motivating factor in the firing, even if job performance also played a role.

De Souza v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. · filed 2023-03-29(a)(1)

Defendants’ motion is denied because, for many reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s job performance was not the only reason for her firing and discrimination was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to establish that sex was at least a motivating factor in an employment decision before mixed-motive analysis applies.

Grastorf v. Community Bank, N.A · filed 2023-05-19(m)

These allegations alone are insufficient to establish discrimination as a motivating factor to then require the Bank’s response to be an affirmative defense.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires facts supporting an inference that race was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Weatherford v. Salvation Army · filed 2023-04-27(m)

Absent facts from which the court could infer that his race was a factor in the decision to fire him, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim of race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive discrimination claim when race or sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Denham v. Alabama State University (CONSENT) · filed 2023-06-28(m)

An employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim by showing―via direct or circumstantial evidence―that illegal bias, such as bias based on race or sex, “was a motivating factor for” an adverse employment action, “even though other factors also motivated” the action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m). ... As such, for the reasons discussed previously, the Court finds that Dr. Denham has not created a triable issue of fact as to her discrimination claims under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a religious discrimination claim when religious bias was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated it.

Campbell v. Circustrix LLC · filed 2023-09-28(m)

By contrast, the mixed-motive standard requires a plaintiff to prove only that religious bias “‘was a motivating factor for’ an adverse employment action, ‘even though other factors also motivated’ the action.”

Section 2000e-2(m) permits liability when prohibited discrimination partly motivated an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Lewis v. Louisiana State University · filed 2023-12-01(m)

Moreover, even if the Board can prove other, legitimate factors motivated the adverse employment action, if Plaintiff can establish that the decision was in-part motivated by prohibited discrimination, the Board still will be liable.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a mixed-motive race discrimination claim to reach a jury when the evidence would permit a finding that race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Phillips v. Legacy Cabinet · filed 2023-12-08(m)

Instead, she can survive summary judgment simply by producing “evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff and; (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” ... Therefore, the district court erred in granting Legacy’s motion for summary judgment on Phillips’s mixed-motive theory of discrimination.

Sex is a motivating factor under § 2000e-2(m) if it plays a part in an employment decision, even when other factors also motivate the decision.

Newbury v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 2023-11-13(m)

In this case, nothing in DalPorto’s decision-making would cause a reasonable juror to infer that gender was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in a challenged promotion decision, including when the plaintiff advances a sex-plus theory.

CUNNINGHAM v. AUSTIN · filed 2023-12-01(m)

Notwithstanding the viability of a sex-plus discrimination claim, a plaintiff alleging any version of sex discrimination must proffer evidence that sex was a motivating factor in her non-selection for a promotion.

Section 2000e-2(m) treats sex as a motivating factor even when other factors also motivate an employment practice.

Brimager v. City of Moscow Mills · filed 2023-12-13(m)

Further, under Title VII, discrimination occurs when sex “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Chief Foster’s treatment was motivated, at least in part, by their gender. The fact that Chief Foster’s treatment may have also been motivated by Plaintiffs’ involvement in reporting the ticketing scheme does not preclude a claim of gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected trait was a motivating factor in the challenged employment practice.

Bradley v. Swedish Health Services · filed 2023-12-22(m)

This “more forgiving” causation standard is supported by the amendment of Title VII “to allow a plaintiff to prevail merely by showing that a protected trait like sex was a ‘motivating factor’ in a defendant's challenged employment practice.” See id. at 1739–40 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)). ... There is a dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s disability and/or sexual orientation were a factor or a motivating factor in Sculfield’s alleged decision to terminate him. Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment and WLAD discrimination claims will remain for trial.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if it was not the exclusive reason.

Chenn v. MTA-New York City Transit Authority · filed 2023-12-26(m)

These statutes require a plaintiff to establish that an improper consideration was a “motivating factor” for the adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 568 F. Supp. 3d 314, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (the NYSHRL’s motivating factor standard “appears to be ‘equivalent to’ the standard” for the NYCHRL).

Section 2000e-2(m) prohibits an employment decision motivated by race or national origin, even when other factors also motivate it; the plaintiff must offer evidence connecting discriminatory animus to the decision.

Vargas v. Board of the Metropolitan Park District of the Toledo Area · filed 2024-02-13(m)

Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to use race or national origin as a “motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... A “reasonable jury viewing the evidence as a whole” could not reach the conclusion that discriminatory animus was a motive for Vargas’s termination.

Race need only be a motivating factor in an employment decision; the employer’s other reasons need not be false.

Weaver v. Bloomberg, L.P. · filed 2024-02-20(m)

Liability under Title VII instead attaches if race was a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor” in the employment decision at issue.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a finding that race motivated an employment decision even when the employer would have made the same decision without considering race.

Phillips v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2024-03-20(m)

In a Title VII race discrimination case, even if the plaintiff provides evidence that the defendant, in making an adverse employment decision, was motivated in part by an impermissible consideration, such as race, the defendant can prevail if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the discriminatory consideration. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Pullman v. Tallapoosa Cnty. Jail, 185 F.3d 1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1999).

A mixed-motive Title VII claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action.

Choate v. Atlanta Radio, LLC · filed 2024-03-22(m)

In mixed-motive cases, at summary judgment, a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive claim “need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defend- ant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the de- fendant’s adverse employment action.” Id. at 1232-33 (quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stat- ing “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”).

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision to support a mixed-motive claim.

Elizabeth F. Warner, Plaintiff v. Louise DeJoy1, Postmaster General, on behalf of the United States Postal Service, Defe · filed 2024-03-26(m)

Hayes’s comment about the (apparently correct) historical lack of a female postmaster in Somersworth is not evidence of that sort; it does not “demonstrate” (or even raise a plausible inference) that gender was a “motivating factor” for the USPS’s decision to promote candidates other than Warner, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), nor does it show that the USPS placed “substantial reliance” on gender in making those hiring decisions.

A plaintiff needs evidence that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision to receive mixed-motive analysis.

Warner v. US Postal Service, Postmaster General · filed 2024-03-26(m)

Given the absence of evidence sufficient to demonstrate, by a preponderance, that Warner’s gender was a motivating factor in the decision not to award her either of the two promotions she sought, the appropriate framework within which to analyze her Title VII claim is that established by McDonnell Douglas.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits at least some recovery when race discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Howell v. Northwest Mississippi Community College · filed 2024-04-15(m)

This is because while the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that a “but for” standard of causation applies to ADEA claims, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the plain language of Title VII permits a plaintiff to obtain at least some recovery (such as attorneys’ fees) in cases where he is able to prove that race discrimination was at least one “motivating factor” behind his termination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII plaintiff to prove discrimination by showing that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Ajoloko v. Jamas Technology · filed 2024-04-25(m)

One such distinction is that Title VII allows plaintiffs to prove discrimination by showing that the protected characteristic was a “motivating factor” for an adverse employment action. ... Ajoloko has not made even a passing reference to the motivating factor standard (Doc. 21), and thus has not sufficiently raised the issue.

A mixed-motive plaintiff must present evidence that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision to survive summary judgment.

Denham v. Alabama State University · filed 2024-05-16(m)

We reject these arguments because, as discussed above, Denham has not provided evidence sufficient to show that her race or sex was a motivating factor in ASU’s decision to hire Treadwell.

Section 2000e-2(m) establishes an unlawful employment practice when a protected trait is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Hittle v. City of Stockton · filed 2024-05-17(m)

Under Title VII, the plaintiff need only “demonstrate[] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the [unlawful employment] practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e-2(m)’s motivating-factor rule applies to mixed-motive discrimination claims, not hostile work environment claims.

PIETY FOLEY v. DREXEL UNIVERSITY · filed 2024-07-25(m)

However, the provision applies only to “mixed- motive” discrimination cases, Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2000), and is not implicated in hostile work environment claims.

A mixed-motive discrimination claim requires evidence that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Stanford v. PDW-Birmingham · filed 2024-08-05(m)

Ms. Stanford’s non-discharge discrimination claims cannot survive summary judgment under a mixed-motive theory either because she offers no evidence to support her claims that race was a motivating factor in her alleged mistreatment.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Adeyanju v. Foot and Ankle Associates of Maine, P.A. · filed 2024-08-20(m)

Under a mixed-motive analysis, the question is whether “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m). The same material facts that raise genuine issues as to pretext also raise genuine issues as to mixed motive and likewise preclude summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff to show that sex was at least one motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Esperance v. Vilsack · filed 2024-09-03(m)

Rather, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that gender was at least one of the motivating factors for the decision.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows Title VII liability when both legitimate and discriminatory reasons motivate an adverse employment action.

McCreight v. Auburn Bank · filed 2024-09-19(m)

What’s more, McCreight misunderstands the nature of a mixed-motive theory, which allows for Title VII liability when an adverse employment action is motivated by some combination of legitimate and illegitimate reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a race discrimination claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it; the employee must present enough evidence to create a genuine factual dispute on that issue.

WILLIAMS v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY GA · filed 2024-10-01(m)

An unlawful employment practice is established under Title VII “when the complaining party demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff to show that race was a motivating factor in the employer's decision; a procedural error alone does not establish that connection.

Morris v. VA · filed 2024-10-10(m)

But she must demonstrate a causal connection between her protected characteristic and the employer's decision, specifically, that Morris's race "was a motivating factor" for CAVHS's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). On this record, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could find that such a causal connection exists, and we think the district court was making the same point, though in language less precise.

Race can establish an unlawful employment practice when it motivates an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Hudson v. Northwest Mississippi Community College · filed 2024-12-17(m)

“An unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m). ... While Mr. Casey’s actions, such as disregarding Ms. Hudson’s emails and excluding her from meetings, may not explicitly qualify as unlawful employment practices, when considered collectively, this Court is of the opinion that Mr. Casey’s improper work behavior reasonably constitutes intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when evidence could show that race was a motivating factor in a denied promotion.

Webb v. City of Homewood Alabama · filed 2025-01-24(m)

The second prong is a closer call because the court must determine whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his race was a motivating factor in the decision not to promote him to the rank of Battalion Chief in fall 2020. The court finds that Plaintiff has met this burden.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a plaintiff to show sex discrimination without proving that the employer’s stated reason was entirely false, so long as sex was a motivating factor in the decision.

John v. Brooklyn Eye Center · filed 2025-01-28(m)

At this stage, Plaintiff may show that “the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was nothing but a pretext for discrimination;” but it is not required.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires proof that race or sex was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Prairie Chicken v. Becerra · filed 2025-02-12(m)

To succeed on his Title VII claim, Prairie Chicken must prove that his race or sex was a motivating factor for the agency’s decision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(m), but to succeed on his ADEA claim he must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when a protected characteristic motivated an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Happy Johnson v. Spalding County, Georgia · filed 2025-07-10(m)

Here, the district court properly found that Johnson did not present a viable mixed-motive claim because she did not provide any admissible evidence that showed that her gender was a moti- vating factor in the decision not to promote her.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when evidence allows a reasonable jury to infer that race was a motivating factor in an employment decision.

Gray v. City of Evergreen, Alabama · filed 2025-07-18(m)

Here, Gray offers no additional evidence in support of his contention that “racial animus” was “a motivating factor.” ... Accordingly, Gray’s discrimination claims cannot survive under a mixed-motive theory.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Williams v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County GA · filed 2025-09-02(m)

Instead, courts must ask whether a plaintiff has offered evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the ... defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also played a role.

Guerrero v. Albany Med Health System · filed 2025-09-15(m)

Unlike claims arising under the ADA, Title VII discrimination claims do not require a showing of but-for causation. Rather, a plaintiff's claim can survive if she pleads facts suggesting that her membership in a protected class was simply a motivating factor behind the alleged discriminatory conduct.

Sex can be a motivating factor in an employment decision even when the employer also gives another reason for it.

Ridenour · filed 2025-10-15(m)

The insubordination rationale does not exclude sex as a motivating factor for the termination decision, and that is all Title VII requires. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360. The complaint states a claim for sex discrimination.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) remains subject to summary judgment when applying the mixed-motive framework does not change the result.

Stancil · filed 2025-10-29(a)(1)

Moreover, the Court concludes that applying the mixed-motive framework to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim does not alter the conclusion that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a Title VII discrimination claim when protected status was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, without requiring but-for causation.

Nelson v. BOCES · filed 2025-12-23(m)

Importantly, "Title VII discrimination claims do not require a showing of but-for causation. Rather, a plaintiff's claim can survive if [he] pleads facts suggesting that [his] membership in a protected class was simply a motivating factor behind the alleged discriminatory conduct." Guerrero, 2025 WL 2645540, at *8 (citing Vega, 801 F.3d at 85-86; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). ... Thus, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Lovric that nothing in the complaint supports an inference that Plaintiff's sex motivated his reassignment to less favorable tasks, changes in his hours, or other adverse actions against him in any way. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII discrimination claim, and this cause of action is dismissed.

A transfer may be an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) if it materially worsens the terms or conditions of employment, even without reducing pay or benefits.

De Jesus-Hall v. New York State Unified Court System · filed 2021-04-06(a)(1)

We have long recognized that a transfer that “alters the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment in a materially negative way” may be an adverse employment action even if it does not result in a reduction in pay or benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a sex-based reassignment that significantly changes an employee’s work or employment benefits.

Berger v. NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities · filed 2019-09-30(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff’s pleading alleges a significant change in the nature of her work due to the Church Avenue reassignment, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to the Title VII disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory-transfer claim to proceed when a jury could find the employer’s stated reason for denying the transfer pretextual.

Sherman v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc. · filed 1989-11-28(a)(1)

In light of these reasons and the evidence submitted in support thereof, I conclude that a jury could find that defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiffs transfer from the Philadelphia office to the Reading office is pretextual. Therefore, plaintiffs claim of employment discrimination is not ripe for disposition by summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers a job transfer motivated by race even when the employee’s pay and grade stay the same.

Day v. Derwinski · filed 1991-07-17(a)

Title VII and ADEA protect employees from employment decisions motivated by discriminatory actions affecting “terms, conditions or privileges” of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 633(a). If an employee’s transfer to a different job is motivated by race or age considerations, it is obviously a discriminatory action affecting terms or conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employment transfer because of race, but does not prohibit a transfer made for business reasons.

Johnson v. Kroger Co. · filed 2001-03-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has also not presented evidence that the transfer was based on his race. Rather, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the choice to transfer plaintiff was a business decision based upon potential problems occurring between Kirkbride and one of his subordinates.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an inference of race discrimination in transfers when similarly situated employees of another race receive training and advantageous transfers that the plaintiffs are denied.

Alexander v. Vesta Insurance Group, Inc. · filed 2001-06-18(a)(1)

The Court concludes that such evidence, if unrebutted, is clearly enough to permit an inference that the failure to train and transfer Plaintiffs was racially discriminatory. Thus, it is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging a discriminatory denial of transfer to show that he was qualified for the position.

Smith v. Alabama · filed 2003-03-19(a)(1)

Accordingly, this court concludes that Plaintiff has not established a prima-facie case of discrimination for the State’s failure to transfer him to the PM III position because he failed to establish that he was qualified to transfer to that position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits transfers and denials of transfer requests based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Chambers v. DC (EN BANC) · filed 2022-06-03(a)(1)

We hold that an employer that transfers an employee or denies an employee’s transfer request because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory-transfer claim to reach trial when evidence could allow a jury to find that the employer transferred an employee because of race or sex.

Woodberry v. Berry · filed 2023-09-01(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Woodberry, a reasonable juror could conclude—based on the Director’s explicit remark tying Woodberry’s transfer to race and sex, the inconsistencies in the Director’s justifications for Woodberry’s transfer, and the favorable treatment of a comparator of a different gender—that the Director’s reason for transferring Woodberry was pretextual and thus the agency unlawfully discriminated against Woodberry.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a discriminatory transfer to show some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but the harm need not be significant.

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis · filed 2024-04-17(a)(1)

The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her signifcantly so.

A plaintiff challenging a denied transfer as sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the denial was motivated by sex.

Chambers v. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2024-08-12(a)(1)

Therefore, for the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant’s action was motivated by discriminatory intent.

A discriminatory transfer can violate § 2000e-2(a)(1) when it leaves an employee worse off with respect to a term or condition of employment; the harm need not be significant.

Dept. of Health v. Best · filed 2024-12-30(a)(1)

Therefore, because Best presented legally sufficient evidence by which a reasonable juror could find that her transfer from Perkins to Spring Grove left her worse off—because it changed the terms and conditions of her employment—she demonstrated an adverse employment action.

A discriminatory transfer claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the employer denied the transfer because of a protected characteristic such as national origin.

McArdle v. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2025-04-22(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to [their] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The Court concludes that ... no reasonable jury could conclude that McArdle was not transferred to SOD because of any protected characteristic.

A transfer that adds an hour to an employee’s commute can qualify as an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Terranova · filed 2025-11-20(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits a transfer based on race. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he has suffered economic damages in that he now has to commute another hour to the workplace. The court finds under Muldrow that this is sufficient to show an adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a failure to promote because of sexual orientation when the alleged facts plausibly connect that bias to the decision.

Futrell v. North Carolina State University · filed 2021-08-10(a)(1)

The foregoing facts give rise to a plausible inference that plaintiff was not selected as a finalist, and not selected for the position, because of his sexual orientation. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.

As construed in this 1998 opinion, § 2000e-2 did not cover workplace harassment motivated solely by animus toward a person’s sexual orientation.

Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. · filed 1998-10-14

In its current form, Title VII does not provide a remedy to persons who have experienced harassment motivated solely by animus toward the plaintiffs sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a) was read to exclude actual and perceived sexual orientation from its protected classes.

Mims v. Carrier Corp. · filed 2000-03-24(a)

The Court agrees with the defendant that the instant case does not give rise to an actionable Title VII discrimination claim and should therefore be dismissed. Neither sexual orientation nor perceived sexual orientation constitute protected classes under the Civil Rights Act. Therefore, lacking membership in a protected class, the plaintiffs claim must fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.

Philpott v. New York · filed 2017-05-03(a)(1)

For these reasons, and in light of the evolving state of the law on this question, I hold that plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim is cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.

Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. · filed 2018-02-26(a)(1)

In the context of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination "because of ... sex" and sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because they are gay, which is sex discrimination.

Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Management · filed 2020-07-06(a)(1)

In its decision, the Court held that it “defies” Title VII for “an employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender,” because to do so, it “must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.” Bostock, 590 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 12, 33. In light of this holding, our contrary conclusion in Williamson is no longer good law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination against an employee for being homosexual or transgender as discrimination because of sex.

Bostock v. Clayton County · filed 2020-08-27(a)(1)

The Supreme Court held that, under the “plain terms” of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer intentionally, necessarily, and illegally discriminates against an individual because of such individual’s sex when the employer discriminates against an employee for being homosexual or transgender. ... For the reasons stated in the Supreme Court’s decision, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Bostock’s Title VII claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with that decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination based on sexual orientation; a claim can proceed without a similarly situated comparator when the alleged circumstances support an inference of discrimination.

Guirkin, Jr., M.D. v. CMH Physicians, LLC · filed 2020-11-20(a)(1)

Following Bostock, Title VII captures allegations of discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation. ... As to the fourth element, that Dr. Guirkin was subjected to “different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class,” read favorably, Guirkin states facts showing unlawful discrimination based on the totality of the circumstances sufficient to overcome the need to demonstrate a similarly situated comparator.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims based on sexual orientation.

Kilpatrick v. HCA Human Resources · filed 2020-12-17(a)(1)

Kilpatrick’s sex-based discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims relating to his sexual orientation are ... thus cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employee to pursue discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation.

Panarello v. Bernhardt · filed 2021-01-11(a)(1)

The Court thus construes Panarello to be pursuing discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation.

An employee claiming sexual orientation discrimination must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the employer acted because of the employee’s sexual orientation.

Fry v. Ascension Health Ministry Services · filed 2021-05-03(a)(1)

Fry has failed to submit any evidence whatsoever from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Columbia fired him because of his sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination, without making sexual orientation a separate protected class.

Stollings v. Texas Tech University · filed 2021-08-25(a)(1)

As a result, the Court concludes that Stollings is protected on the basis of sex, which includes sexual orientation in light of Bostock, but sexual orientation does not constitute a distinct class as Stollings asserts.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge and discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment because of sexual orientation.

Davis v. Port Angeles School District · filed 2022-03-01(a)(1)

Both Title VII and WLAD prohibit discharge or discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment because of sexual orientation.

Title VII covers discrimination based on sexual orientation, but a claimant must plead facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Emerson v. STERN & EISENBERG PC · filed 2022-10-17(a)(2)

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts necessary to establish a prima facie claim of sexual discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discrimination claim to proceed when a complaint plausibly alleges adverse treatment based on race or sexual orientation.

Smith v. Lowes Companies, Inc · filed 2022-11-01(a)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual because of such individual’s “race, color, religion, sex or national origin….” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Accepting the Plaintiff’s allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he has stated a claim for Title VII discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats discrimination based on sexual orientation as sex discrimination.

Defrancesco v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2023-01-19(a)(1)

Discrimination based on sexual orientation amounts to discrimination based on sex under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sexual orientation discrimination to plead facts supporting a reasonable inference that the employer acted because of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.

Oliver v. Military Department, State of Louisiana · filed 2023-03-29(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that would permit a reasonable inference that she was discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination and discharge because of sex, including sexual orientation.

Pharr v. Willow Ridge Memory Care · filed 2023-07-24(a)(1)

Here, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she was discriminated against, and ultimately fired, because she is gay. These claims will be allowed to pass initial review.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation; a plaintiff must present evidence that sexual orientation caused the adverse employment action.

Higgs v. Repay · filed 2024-02-14(a)(1)

In short, there’s not even a whiff that Higgs’ sexual orientation had anything to do with Fech’s decision to recommend his termination, let alone the Commissioners who made the ultimate call based on that recommendation. ... Higgs’ Title VII claim will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual orientation discrimination, but a plaintiff must plead facts supporting a plausible inference of discriminatory intent.

Cheong v. The Bank of East Asia, Ltd · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

Even taking Cheong’s claims as true, Cheong has not sufficiently pled a plausible claim for an inference of sexual orientation discrimination at this stage pursuant to Title VII.

For a sexual-orientation discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, an employee must establish a prima facie case and show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Christensen v. Denver Health and Hospital Authority · filed 2024-07-12(a)(1)

The Court finds Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case or show that Defendant’s stated reasons for firing him are pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination based on sexual orientation as sex discrimination.

Meckeler v. Cornell University · filed 2024-07-25(a)(1)

Title VII encompasses sex discrimination claims based on an individual's sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of sexual orientation; evidence of discriminatory bias and pretext can require a jury to decide the claim.

Brooks v. Scripps Media Inc. · filed 2024-07-29(a)(1)

The statute prohibits any employer from discharging an employee “because of” that individual’s sex or, by exten- sion, his or her sexual orientation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Bostock v. Clayton Co., 590 U.S. 644, 662 (2020).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and a claim may survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to find the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Ayers v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2024-09-13(a)(1)

As with his disability claim, the arguable inconsistencies in the reasons given for terminating Ayers, the inconsistent enforcement of policies, previous tense encounters with Poe, and other employees’ testimony could lead a rational juror to conclude that Walmart’s stated reasons for terminating Ayers were pretext to mask an unlawful motive. Accordingly, the court will deny Walmart’s motion for summary judgment on Ayers’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, including sexual orientation.

LUGARDO v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County · filed 2025-02-25(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, (including gender identity and sexual orientation), and national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects gay employees from sex-based employment discrimination.

McConkey v. The Churchill School and Center · filed 2025-07-23(a)(1)

Title VII makes actionable certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, among other protected characteristics.

Section 2000e-2(n) preserves a nonparty’s ability to seek intervention under Rule 24 in the proceeding that produced a consent decree, even after receiving notice and an opportunity to object.

Edwards v. City of Houston · filed 1996-04-01(n)(2)(A)

Thus, nonparties seeking to intervene in the proceeding that gives rise to the challenged consent decree are not precluded from doing so because they were afforded notice of their right to object to the decree and the opportunity to do so at a fairness hearing prior to the district court’s acceptance of the decree as set forth in § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B)(i).

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) does not bar a consent decree challenge when neither its notice nor adequate representation condition is satisfied.

Bennett v. Arrington · filed 1992-08-14(n)(1)(B)

Section 108 amends 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to provide that employment decisions made pursuant to a valid consent decree which is entered under claims of public employment discrimination may not be challenged on a constitutional basis (i) by a person who, prior to the entry of decree, had actual notice of the decree sufficient to advise him that it could adversely affect him and that he could challenge it, and an opportunity to object, or (ii) “by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the [decree] on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact.” It is unnecessary to step into the mire of possible retroactive application of this section, since neither of the conditions was satisfied.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) does not require court-appointed counsel for nonparties to have a reasonable opportunity to object to an employment discrimination consent decree.

Reynolds v. Roberts · filed 1994-02-09(n)(1)

This section in no way indicates that the opportunity to present objections is reasonable only when the objectors are represented by court-appointed counsel.

Section 2000e-2(n)(2) preserves the rights of parties who successfully intervened in a consent decree proceeding.

Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels · filed 1994-05-04(n)(2)

We do not believe that it does, because section 2000e-2(n)(2) specifically provides that "[njothing in this subsection shall be construed to ... apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened ... in the proceeding in which the parties intervened.”

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) precludes challenges to an employment discrimination consent judgment by nonclass members who had actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object.

Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1994-03-15(n)(1)(B)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes challenges to a consent judgment resolving employment discrimination claims from those non-class members who had actual notice of the proposed decree and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B). The notices and fairness hearings were sufficient under the 1991 Act.

Section 2000e-2(n)(2) preserves the rights of parties who successfully intervened in the proceeding that produced a consent decree.

Branch v. Seibels · filed 1994-08-25(n)(2)

We do not believe that it does, because section 2000e-2(n)(2) specifically provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to ... apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened ... in the proceeding in which the parties intervened."

Section 2000e-2(n) can preclude a later challenge to a Title VII consent decree when a party is denied the opportunity to intervene in the original action.

Edwards v. City of Houston · filed 1994-11-10(n)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n), if Appellants were denied entirely the right to intervene in this action, they would be precluded from raising any challenge to the consent decree.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) bars later challenges to an employment discrimination settlement by people who had actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object before entry of the decree.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1995-07-03(n)(1)(B)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes later challenges to a settlement resolving employment discrimination claims from those persons who, though not members of the class whose attorneys signed off on the settlement, still had actual notice of the proposed decree and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B). The notices and fairness hearings were sufficient under the 1991 Act.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) precludes a nonclass member from challenging an employment discrimination consent judgment after receiving actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object.

Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1995-08-11(n)(1)(B)

Further, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes challenges to a consent judgment resolving employment discrimination claims from those non-class members who had actual notice of the proposed decree and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B) (West 1994). ... In sum, the notice and fairness hearings were sufficient under both Rule 23(e) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Section 2000e-2(n) prevents further litigation over matters covered by a Title VII consent decree.

Edmonds v. Operating Engineers Local 139 · filed 2010-03-03(n)

What is more, Title VII has its own rule of preclusion, which prevents further litigation about matters covered by consent decrees. 42 U.S.C. §2000e– 2(n).

A supervisor’s denial of a raise because an employee refused sexual favors can be a tangible employment action under Title VII.

Atwell v. Smart Alabama, LLC · filed 2008-02-25(a)(1)

The denial of a raise can be a tangible employment action. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs tangible employment action claim based on the denial of a raise is due to survive summary judgment.