42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit a supervisor’s favoritism toward a consensual romantic partner when the favoritism is not based on sex.

Briggs v. University of Detroit-Mercy · filed 2014-05-27(a)

The court sees no reason to deviate from the vast majority of courts’ conclusions that favoritism of a paramour does not violate Title VII.

Discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can support damages when it results in an actual or constructive discharge.

Volk v. Coler · filed 1988-05-02(a)(1)

Under Title VII, damages are only recoverable where discrimination "... result[s] in discharge." Bohen, supra, at 1184. Volk produced evidence establishing that she was being removed from her position at the Ottawa office prematurely and that she left her other position at a different DCFS office after being subjected to continued harassment based on her experience at Ottawa. Thus, Volk's charges could establish that she was actually as well as constructively discharged from her position in Ottawa, and constructively discharged later from her subsequent position at another DCFS office.

A Title VII constructive discharge requires working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign; unequal pay alone is insufficient.

Thompson v. John L. Williams Co., Inc. · filed 1988-05-09

After carefully considering these conditions both individually and collectively, this court determines that no constructive discharge has occurred. While evidence of unequal pay is relevant to the issue of whether a constructive discharge has occurred, “discrimination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge.”

Under Title VII, repeated discriminatory treatment and demeaning working conditions can support a constructive discharge claim when a reasonable employee could feel compelled to resign.

Thames v. Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 1988-05-13(a)

Moreover, a continuing pattern of discriminatory conduct can be enough to establish the aggravating circumstances justifying Thames’ resignation (Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1981)).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a proposed lateral transfer at the same pay does not establish constructive discharge merely because the employee fears poor prospects or future termination.

Bielert v. Northern Ohio Properties · filed 1988-11-25(a)

The only possible conclusion that a reasonable person could reach from a review of the record is that Bielert terminated his employment with NOP of his own volition and was not constructively discharged.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires intolerable working conditions to be attributable to discrimination for a constructive discharge claim.

McWilliams v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital · filed 1989-06-30(a)

We hold that a constructive discharge claim under Title VII does not arise when conditions of employment are intolerable and an individual resigns without more.

A religious discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot rest on constructive discharge when the employer seeks an accommodation and has not deliberately made working conditions intolerable.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1990-03-20(a)(1)

Given the attempts by the defendant to reach a compromise, even though Mrs. Doughty found their offers unacceptable as she understood them, this court cannot find that any deliberate act of the defendant’s made her working conditions so intolerable that plaintiff should have reasonably felt herself forced to quit.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race-based constructive discharge claimant to prove discrimination and working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to quit.

Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 1990-04-10(a)(1)

After reviewing all the evidence, arguments and memoranda of the parties, it is the decision of this Court that Plaintiff Kishaba has failed to establish either race discrimination or a continuous pattern of conduct that rendered her work environment so intolerable and discriminatory that a reasonable person in the same position would have felt forced to quit.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff alleging constructive discharge to show that the employer's discriminatory acts made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.

Acrey v. American Sheep Industry Ass'n · filed 1991-06-21(a)(1)

To establish a prima facia case of sex discrimination by constructive discharge, a determination must be made that the employer through illegal discriminatory acts made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.

A constructive discharge claim under § 2000e-2 requires evidence of intolerable working conditions; conclusory complaints about the workplace are insufficient.

Fraser v. New York · filed 1991-08-07

In the case at bar, the record does not contain a scintilla of evidence supporting plaintiff’s theory of constructive discharge. Plaintiff submitted his own affidavit in support of his claim contending that he was the subject of “misdirected policies” and that defendant did not provide him with an agreeable work environment. However, there was no evidence submitted, beyond these conclusory statements, to support the allegation of an intolerable work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based constructive discharge when working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Morgan v. Ford · filed 1993-11-09(a)(1)

We conclude that a material question of fact remains as to whether Morgan's employment conditions were "intolerable." Accordingly, the district court erred in granting the Department's motions for summary judgment on Morgan's claims for reinstatement with back pay and fringe benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a constructive discharge claimant to show intolerable working conditions and a deliberate effort by the employer to force the employee to quit; a demotion alone does not establish intolerable conditions.

Wilson v. Milliken & Company · filed 1993-12-08(a)(1)

Wilson responds that if Milliken is correct, he was constructively discharged in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). To prove constructive discharge, an employee must establish both intolerable working conditions and a deliberate effort by the employer to force the employee to quit. ... A demotion is certainly both disappointing and potentially embarrassing, but, standing alone, it does not amount to intolerable employment conditions.

A constructive discharge claim requires deliberate employer action that creates intolerable working conditions and forces the employee to resign.

Amaker v. Winn-Dixie, Greenville, Incorporated, and Kwik Check Supermarket, Incorporated · filed 1995-12-01(a)(1)

Constructive discharge occurs when the employer creates intolerable working conditions in a deliberate attempt to force the employee to quit. Carter, at 459. The plaintiff must show both (1) the deliberateness of the employer's actions, and (2) the intolerability of the working conditions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim based on constructive discharge when an employer intentionally makes working conditions intolerable and forces an employee to quit.

Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. · filed 1996-08-09(a)(1)

For similar reasons, we think summary judgment inappropriate with respect to the issue of constructive discharge. Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily.

Section 2000e-2 requires objectively intolerable working conditions to establish a discriminatory constructive discharge.

Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries · filed 1996-08-21

While there is evidence that Tidwell was discriminated against on the basis of his race, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to establish that a reasonable person would find the working conditions at Meyer's intolerable. Without this evidence, a finding of constructive discharge cannot be sustained.

Title VII constructive discharge requires working conditions that would compel a reasonable employee to resign.

Schroeder v. Sager Elec. · filed 1997-04-24(a)

When the evidence is viewed in toto, the court cannot find that a reasonable person in Schroeder's position would have felt compelled to resign rather than seeking judicial relief while remaining in her position.

A constructive discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires the employee to leave employment because of the alleged intolerable conditions.

Joseph v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 1997-08-29(a)(1)

Specifically, a successful claim for constructive discharge must contain an element of discharge. In other words, a Plaintiff must leave her employ.

An employee who resigns may satisfy the discriminatory discharge requirement by proving constructive discharge.

Ahsan Ahmad FARUKI; Ahmed R. Azeez; Zafar M. Agha, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PARSONS S.I.P., INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-09-29(a)(1)

Where, as here, an employee resigns, she may satisfy the discharge requirement by proving constructive discharge.

A resignation satisfies Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s discharge element when the employer would have terminated the employee had she not resigned.

Richardson v. Newburgh Enlarged City School District · filed 1997-11-12(a)(1)

In addition, even though Richardson ultimately resigned before the Board voted on Leahy’s recommendation to terminate her, she has satisfied the “discharge” prong of the prima facie case by demonstrating a “constructive discharge.” By all indications, the District would have terminated her had she not resigned.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a constructive discharge claim when intolerable discriminatory working conditions force an employee to leave work permanently, even if the employee never formally quits.

White v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 1998-04-20(a)

We believe it is sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that an employer deliberately rendered working conditions intolerable and thus forced the employee to permanently "leave" the employment; the employee need not prove that she technically "quit" in every case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a constructive discharge claim when discriminatory working conditions are so intolerable that they would compel a reasonable person to resign.

Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp. · filed 1998-05-04(a)(1)

To succeed on a theory of constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her working conditions were so intolerable in a discriminatory way that they would have compelled a reasonable person to resign. ... Nevertheless, even after drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the court finds, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs experiences were not intolerable.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a constructive discharge claim when an employer deliberately makes working conditions intolerable and thereby forces an employee to leave work permanently, even without a formal resignation.

Janice L. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HONEYWELL, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-05-29(a)

We believe it is sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that an employer deliberately rendered working conditions intolerable and thus forced the employee to permanently “leave” the employment; the employee need not prove that she technically “quit” in every case.

An employee who resigns without notifying the employer of supervisor harassment and giving it a chance to remedy the situation cannot establish constructive discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp. · filed 1998-09-21(a)(1)

Nevertheless, neither plaintiff was constructively discharged because they failed to give USAP notice of Brown’s behavior by utilizing USAP’s internal grievance procedure, or otherwise notify USAP. They thus deprived USAP of a chance to remedy the situation.

A race discrimination plaintiff must link alleged bias to the challenged employment decision to establish constructive discharge.

Jones v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 1998-10-07(a)(1)

As statements even by decisionmakers cannot constitute evidence if there is no evidence somehow linking that person to the actual employment decision, we find that insufficient evidence exists to support plaintiff’s claim of constructive discharge or that a prima facie case has been established.

A constructive discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a finding that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.

De Almeida v. Children's Museum · filed 1998-11-30(a)(1)

Under the constructive discharge standard stated above, and under the pleadings requirements as explained in Judge v. City of Lowell, supra, plaintiff must identify a factual premise, supportable by evidence, that would also support an evaluative determination that a reasonable person in plaintiffs position felt that she had no choice but to resign. I conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of pleading not conclusions but a basis in alleged historical facts that, if supported by admissible evidence that could be credited by a finder of fact would support the contention that defendant constructively discharged plaintiff.

Constructive discharge does not qualify as a tangible employment action that makes an employer strictly liable for a supervisor’s harassment.

Scott v. Ameritex Yarn · filed 1999-11-19(a)(1)

The court holds that a constructive discharge does not rise to the level of a tangible employment action in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

A constructive discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires resignation, which an attorney’s letter can establish.

Cooper v. Lederle · filed 2000-06-09(a)(1)

However, Attorney Greene’s January 23 letter clearly states that Plaintiff considers herself to have been constructively discharged as of that date, and Corrado’s January 31 response, in which he invites Plaintiff to arrange to pick up her personal property and turn in her company property, indicates that AHP viewed Plaintiff as having resigned. The fact that the “letter of resignation” was sent by an attorney rather than Plaintiff herself is of no moment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sex discrimination plaintiff alleging constructive discharge to show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Doherty v. Center for Assisted Reproduction, P.A. · filed 2000-07-13

Finally, even when these factors are seen in combination, they do not establish that Plaintiffs working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign. ... Because Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the Court expresses no opinion on other grounds raised by Defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to establish an adverse employment action by showing constructive discharge.

Logan v. Denny's, Inc. · filed 2001-08-07(a)(1)

Plaintiff may establish an adverse employment action by demonstrating that she was constructively discharged.

A resignation supports a religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) only when working conditions would make a reasonable person feel compelled to quit.

Lawson v. Washington · filed 2002-07-12(a)(1)

“A constructive discharge occurs when a person quits his job under circumstances in which a reasonable person would feel that the conditions of employment have become intolerable.” ... We therefore hold that there is not sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether Lawson was constructively discharged. We affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Lawson’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat a resignation to follow a spouse out of state as constructive discharge when the claim is not based on the employee’s own working conditions.

Andrews v. AMERICAN RED CROSS BLOOD SERVICES · filed 2003-03-06(a)

The fact that Mary Andrews found it necessary to resign in order to follow her husband out of state, even assuming that her husband’s move was caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, does not satisfy the elements of a claim of constructive discharge of Mary Andrews under applicable federal law or state law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a constructive discharge claimant to show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Luciano v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2004-03-10(a)(1)

At a minimum, a reasonable person would have expected Luciano to await the results of the 360 review and the response of senior management to its findings before tendering her resignation. Consequently, the constructive discharge claim cannot survive as a matter of law.

A Title VII constructive discharge claim requires an adverse employment action; difficult or unpleasant working conditions alone do not establish constructive discharge.

Wright v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. · filed 2005-01-26(a)(1)

The constructive discharge standard is not met if the employee’s working conditions were simply difficult or unpleasant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a constructive discharge claim when discriminatory working conditions would compel a reasonable employee to resign.

Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island · filed 2005-04-25(a)(1)

Consequently, to determine whether Wellborn had been subject to constructive discharge, an actionable claim under Title VII, “the trier of fact must be satisfied that the new working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” ... This cannot be considered usual workplace stress, and would compel any employee in need of a regular income to seek other employment.

A constructive discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.

Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2007-05-21(a)

Because Plaintiff has not shown that her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign, Defendants’ motion is due to be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs constructive discharge claim.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), constructive discharge requires working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign.

Gilhooly v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC · filed 2011-02-14(a)(1)

This bare factual allegation does not give rise to a plausible inference that workplace conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resign.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not create an independent constructive discharge claim without unlawful discrimination.

Levesque v. Androscoggin County · filed 2012-10-04(a)(1)

We conclude that Levesque’s constructive discharge claim must fail as a matter of law because neither Maine nor federal law recognizes a separate cause of action for constructive discharge independent of proof of some form of unlawful conduct giving rise to the constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a voluntary resignation to count as an adverse employment action when the employer deliberately makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Singh v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance · filed 2012-11-29(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence presented on the summary judgment record in this case in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no rational juror could find that Mr. Van Wagnen, or anyone at NYSDOTF, deliberately made things so unpleasant for plaintiff that a- reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination claimant alleging constructive discharge to show intolerable working conditions intended to force resignation and a reasonable opportunity for the employer to resolve the problem.

Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2014-03-13(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... “To prove a constructive discharge, an employee must show that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing her to quit.” ... “In addition, an employee must give her employer a reasonable opportunity to resolve a problem before quitting.” ... We thus conclude that Ames has not met her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge.

A Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff claiming constructive discharge must show that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions to force her to quit and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the problem.

Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2014-06-26(a)(1)

By not attempting to return to Hallberg’s office to determine the availability of a wellness room or to contact human resources, Ames acted unreasonably and failed to provide Nationwide with the necessary opportunity to remedy the problem she was experiencing. We thus conclude that Ames has not met her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a constructive discharge to be based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; retaliation for protected activity falls outside its substantive provisions.

Tejada v. Travis Assn for the Blind · filed 2015-07-13(a)(1)

Tejada does not argue that she was subject to constructive discharge “because of” her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”; rather, she claims she was subject to a hostile work environment in retaliation for her protected activities that rose to such a high level that she was constructively discharged. Accordingly, Tejada cannot establish constructive discharge under Title VII’s substantive provisions.

A discriminatory threat of termination can satisfy the adverse employment action requirement when it would compel a reasonable employee to resign.

Ross v. United States Capitol Police · filed 2016-06-30(a)(1)

Thus, if a plaintiff alleges that he was the recipient of a discriminatory threat of termination and includes allegations of fact that make plausible the contention that a rational employee would have resigned or retired—i.e., facts demonstrating that, under the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable to “quit just ahead of the fall of the axe,” Kalinoski, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1998))—then he has alleged a situation in which a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign, thereby satisfying the adverse action requirement, and the only remaining question for Rule 12 purposes is whether the complaint states a claim under Title VII insofar as it contains sufficient allegations of discrimination by the defendant, inherent in the threat or otherwise.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim requires an adverse employment action; an employee who quits without giving the employer a reasonable chance to address the problem cannot establish constructive discharge on that basis.

Blake v. MJ Optical · filed 2017-08-31(a)(1)

Blake cannot prove constructive discharge, because “[w]e have consistently recognized that an employee is not constructively discharged if she ‘quits without giving [her] employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem.’”

A resignation can qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII when the employer makes working conditions intolerable and intended or reasonably foresaw that the employee would resign.

Gustafson v. Genesco, Inc. · filed 2018-06-08(a)(1)

But where an employer's actions or inactions make the employee's working conditions intolerable and the employer either intended the employee to resign or could have reasonably foreseen that the employee would resign, the employee is said to have been constructively discharged, and the employee's resignation is considered an adverse employment action.

A race discrimination claim based on constructive discharge requires evidence that discriminatory working conditions would compel a reasonable employee to resign.

Brown v. R.R. Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co. · filed 2018-11-02(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff has not provided evidence beyond his subjective perceptions that his altercation with Riggs was racially motivated, or that Defendant handled the aftermath of the altercation in a discriminatory way, and because Plaintiff never again worked with Riggs, there is insufficient evidence to show that Plaintiff faced the sort of outrageous, coercive and unconscionable environment required to demonstrate constructive discharge. This is also true even when considering Plaintiff's complaints regarding the drug testing, work-absence conversation, and the noose incident. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims relating to the fight, as well as his constructive discharge claim, fail to survive summary judgment.

A sex discrimination plaintiff may establish an adverse employment action through constructive discharge by showing that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions to force resignation.

Niekamp v. Ohio Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors · filed 2019-09-03(a)(1)

A plaintiff may satisfy the element of an adverse employment action by demonstrating that she was constructively discharged. ... Even viewing these conditions in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, they fall short of demonstrating a constructive discharge.

A national origin discrimination claim requires an adverse employment action; a resignation qualifies as a constructive discharge only when working conditions would compel a reasonable person to resign.

MITCHELL v. KENSINGTON COMMUNITY CORPORATION FOR INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY · filed 2019-11-26(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s national origin-based discrimination claim fails at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework because he fails to demonstrate that KenCCID subjected him to an adverse employment action; that is, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he was subjected to a constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a constructive discharge as an adverse employment action when an employer deliberately makes working conditions intolerable to force an employee to resign.

Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich. · filed 2020-07-31(a)(1)

A constructive discharge is an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. ... “A constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.”

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a constructive-discharge claim by an applicant who never worked for the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 2020-08-20(a)

Any way one looks at it, the claim fails because Usher never actually worked at all for Defendant as discussed below.

Under Title VII, harassment alone does not establish constructive discharge; the employee must show aggravating factors that justify resignation.

Newman v. Kerr County, Texas · filed 2021-09-07(a)(1)

First, the hostile work environment incidents Jennifer describes do not establish the severity or pervasiveness necessary to support a finding of constructive discharge. To prove a constructive discharge claim, “[m]ere harassment, alone, is insufficient; rather, the plaintiff must show ‘aggravating factors’ to justify departure.” Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 331 (5th Cir. 2004).

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim based on constructive discharge requires plausible allegations that the employer intended to create intolerable working conditions and that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Pompey-Primus v. Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc. · filed 2022-02-17(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that she was constructively discharged.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires objectively intolerable working conditions for a constructive discharge claim; one denial of religious leave does not suffice.

Smith v. Mesa, City of · filed 2023-03-10(a)(1)

No reasonable person would objectively view one denial of a request for leave as intolerable working conditions.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action; a resignation qualifies as constructive discharge only when working conditions were objectively intolerable.

Rogers v. City of Chattanooga · filed 2023-10-17(a)

She has not otherwise alleged or cited to proof of an adverse employment action based on her sex, and therefore she has not met her burden of stating a prima facie case of sex-based discrimination under Title VII or the THRA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discriminatory discharge claim; voluntary retirement after a choice between retirement and termination does not establish one.

Hernandez v. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC · filed 2023-10-18(a)(1)

Returning to the second element, however, Dr. Hernandez did not suffer an adverse employment action when Sandia gave her the choice between retirement and termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim based on constructive discharge when the allegations plausibly show that the employee was forced to resign because of discrimination.

Salgado v. University of Connecticut Health Center · filed 2024-02-15(a)(1)

Because the Court must construe as true Plaintiff’s factual allegations and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court concludes at this juncture that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged constructive discharge under Second Circuit precedent. Although argued to the contrary by Defendants, it is also a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s placement on administrative leave and her constructive discharge were the result of race discrimination and in retaliation for her repeated complaints of harassment and discrimination.

A sex discrimination claim based on constructive discharge requires facts showing working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.

Zuniga v. City of Dallas, Texas · filed 2024-05-28(a)(1)

Zuniga has failed to plead a plausible claim that her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Because Zuniga has therefore failed to plausibly plead the essential constructive discharge element of her Count 3 and Count 4 claims, the City is entitled to dismissal of these claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a resignation as an adverse employment action when objectively intolerable working conditions would compel a reasonable employee to resign.

Stratton v. Bentley University · filed 2024-08-15(a)

These identified remarks may have been "insensitive, unfair, or unreasonable," Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2010), but they do not show that Stratton was compelled to leave an objectively intolerable workplace.

Section 2000e-2 permits a constructive discharge claim when discriminatory working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable employee would quit rather than remain and seek redress.

Wininger v. Forest River Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2024-08-26

As a result, Wininger has not established a genuine dispute of material fact that she suffered an adverse employment action in the form of constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat isolated workplace comments and disputes as constructive discharge when they do not make working conditions intolerable.

Lattimore v. Signature Healthcare of Bremen · filed 2025-06-26(a)(1)

She cannot establish for a reasonable jury a hostile work environment (one severe and pervasive) or an adverse action by way of constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment, but a single racial epithet by another employee does not, by itself, sufficiently alter employment conditions to violate Title VII.

Waithe v. Cardinal Cushing Centers, Inc. · filed 2025-09-08(a)(1)

The utterance of a single racial epithet by another employee does not, by itself, sufficiently alter the terms and conditions of employment to violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate-treatment claim based on constructive discharge when the alleged facts plausibly show that the employee was compelled to resign.

Appleton v. Orange County School Board · filed 2025-09-18(a)(1)

The facts alleged in the amended complaint plausibly support a constructive discharge claim under this framework.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an alleged constructive discharge occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of race discrimination.

Cruz · filed 2025-09-29(a)

Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim fails because she has not adduced evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she was compelled to resign due to race-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s employment discrimination protections do not apply to prisoners.

Tankesly v. TN Department of Corrections (PSLC1) · filed 2024-03-20(a)(1)

However, Title VII’s protections do not apply to a prisoner, like Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(d) may cover race discrimination in a prison work assignment that provides employment training.

Leydell Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center · filed 1988-10-12(d)

Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race in apprenticeships and “other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs_” The district court specifically recognized that work assignments such as the library aide position are “in the nature of rehabilitation and employment training rather than in the nature of commercial employment.” (Emphasis added.) It is not beyond doubt that no claim could be proved in this situation.

Section 2000e-2 permits a limited gender-based prison staffing restriction when it does not deprive female employees of employment opportunities.

Timm v. Gunter · filed 1990-10-26(a)

The District Court found that gender is not a bona fide occupational qualification for staff positions at NSP, but also found that a minimal restriction such as the Unit 5 gender-based staffing restriction does not deprive female employees of any employment opportunities. That finding is not clearly erroneous. Thus, as the District Court held, the Unit 5 staffing restriction does not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a prison employer’s reasonable gender-based job assignment policy when it serves inmate privacy and imposes only a minimal restriction on other employees.

Ray H. Tharp Robert B. Morck v. Iowa Department of Corrections State of Iowa · filed 1995-11-15(a)

On the other side of the balance scale, even if the RAs’ shift assignments are a “privilege[] of employment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), the undisputed facts demonstrate that the policy of same-sex assignments to the Facility’s women’s unit was a “minimal restriction” on plaintiffs’ employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race-based assignments to less desirable work and denials of more desirable positions.

Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 1996-07-30(a)(1)

Assigning an employee to a less desirable job or denying him the opportunity for a more desirable position, based on the employee’s race, are adverse employment decisions affecting the terms and conditions of his employment, and can support Title VII liability.

Employers may assign work among equally qualified employees so long as the decision is not based on unlawful criteria.

Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, A/K/A Katten Muchin Zavis & Weitzman, F/d/b/a Katten Muchin Zavis & Dombrof · filed 1997-07-08(a)

An employer has discretion to assign work to equally qualified employees so long as “the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1097. The jury had no basis for thinking the Chicago attorneys who staffed the one matter Mungin identified were any less qualified than he, or that race played a factor in the firm’s decision to staff the Chicago bankruptcy matter with attorneys in Chicago.

A prison’s gender-based assignment policy does not violate Title VII when it is reasonable and imposes only a minimal restriction on an employee.

Tipler v. Douglas County, NE · filed 2007-04-12(a)

Where the employer is a prison, a bona fide occupational qualification analysis is unnecessary if (1) the policy requiring female-only supervision of female inmates is reasonable, and (2) such a policy imposes only a "minimal restriction" on the employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits assigning an employee extra work because of sex; the employee must prove that sex caused the unequal assignments.

Taylor v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago · filed 2024-08-21(a)(1)

On the basis of the record as a whole, the Court finds that Taylor has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that she received unfair work assignments on the basis of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects undocumented workers from employment discrimination when applying Title VII does not conflict with immigration law.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local Union 638 · filed 1988-11-03(a)(1)

We find such awards to be consistent with Sure-Tan’s holding that the protections of the NLRA—and by analogy, Title VII— must apply to undocumented workers, at least to the extent that those protections do not conflict with immigration laws.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects undocumented workers from employment discrimination to the extent that its protections do not conflict with immigration laws.

Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local Union 638 · filed 1988-12-01(a)(1)

We find such awards to be consistent with Sure-Tan 's holding that the protections of the NLRA--and by analogy, Title VII--must apply to undocumented workers, at least to the extent that those protections do not conflict with immigration laws.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects undocumented workers employed in the United States from prohibited employment discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tortilleria "La Mejor" · filed 1991-02-20(a)(1)

Consequently, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that the protections of Title VII were intended by Congress to run to aliens, whether documented or not, who are employed within the United States.

Title VII disparate impact liability cannot be imposed on a foreign employer for exercising its treaty right to employ its own nationals as managers.

Thomas v. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines · filed 1988-12-21

For this reason, we conclude that disparate impact liability under Title VII and the ADEA for a foreign employer based on its practice of engaging its own nationals as managers cannot be reconciled with Article VIII(l). Accordingly, we hold that such liability may not be imposed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a U.S. subsidiary to favor Japanese citizens in employment when it exercises its Japanese parent’s rights under the FCN Treaty.

Papaila v. Uniden America Corp. · filed 1994-01-10(a)(1)

The court concludes that Uniden is entitled to assert the FCN Treaty rights of its parent corporation and that such treaty rights include the right to discriminate in favor of Japanese citizens. Therefore, Uniden is entitled to summary judgment as to Papaila’s claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII.

After-acquired evidence of employee misconduct does not bar liability for a Title VII discrimination claim, but may affect relief if the employer proves how it would have legitimately altered the employment relationship.

Becky Wallace, Annette Neil v. Dunn Construction Company, Inc. · filed 1992-08-17(a)(1)

The employer bears the burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence whether and in what manner after-acquired evidence would have legitimately altered the employment relationship and hence should affect Title VII relief under the approach prescribed herein.

After-acquired evidence of employee misconduct does not bar a Title VII discriminatory-discharge claim, but may preclude front pay and reinstatement if the employer proves it would have made the same decision.

Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino · filed 1993-07-30

This court holds that an employee’s federal discriminatory discharge claim will not be barred by after acquired evidence of that employee’s misconduct. Such evidence, however, may preclude the award of front-pay and reinstatement.

A candidate’s performance after being hired is irrelevant to a Title VII hiring discrimination claim because it could not have influenced the hiring decision.

Ballard v. University of Vermont & State Agricultural College · filed 1997-03-26

The quality of Twardy’s performance after he was hired is irrelevant to the Title VII and FEPA claims because it could not have influenced UVM’s hiring decision.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires the alleged employment discrimination to be because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Perry v. Clement · filed 2025-09-08(a)

As a result, any claim under Title VII requires some showing that the unlawful employment practice taken by the employer was because of a protected characteristic.

A Title VII discrimination claim must allege facts supporting the employee’s membership in a protected class.

(PS) Habibi v. Orange County, Social Services Agency · filed 2025-06-09(a)(1)

The plaintiff’s allegations that she speaks Farsi and was unable to purchase gifts for her supervisor do not demonstrate that she is a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Baggett v. City Of Cincinnati · filed 2022-03-28(a)

Title VII provides that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer…to discriminate against any individual…because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Koppar v. Orange Regional Medical Center · filed 2022-02-03(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Swint v. International Paper Company · filed 2021-09-13(a)(1)

Mr. Swint’s complaint does not contain any allegations plausibly establishing that he was subjected to employment discrimination on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not a prior criminal record.

Williams v. Northeast Ohio Educational Service Center · filed 2021-06-02(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). It does not prevent discrimination on the basis of prior criminal record.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not list ethnicity as an independent ground of discrimination, so ethnicity cannot support a standalone claim.

Hernandez v. Mobile Link (N.C.) LLC · filed 2021-05-21(a)(1)

In addition, although “ethnicity” may be recognized by some courts as interchangeable with “national origin” under Title VII (see id. at 162-63 (citing Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987) (Brennan, J. concurring))), ethnicity on its own appears nowhere in the statute as a basis of discrimination and may not be alleged as a stand- alone claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on transgender status or identity as sex discrimination.

Toomey v. Arizona, State of · filed 2019-12-23(a)(1)

Discrimination based on transgender status or identity is discrimination based on sex because, but for the individual’s sex, the employer’s treatment of the individual would be different.

Section 2000e-2 requires a Title VII complaint to allege facts concerning a protected classification.

Witherspoon v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-08-22

Moreover, upon review of the complaint, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts concerning any classification protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; EEO activity participation alone is not a protected class.

Ranger v. Colvin · filed 2013-11-05

Therefore, Ranger cannot establish that she has been discriminated against as an EEO activity participant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or other terms and conditions of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Seale v. Cnty · filed 2013-03-07(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from “diseriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of,” inter alia, “such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover discrimination on the basis of disability.

Davis v. Team Electric Co. · filed 2008-03-28(a)

Both the magistrate judge and Appellees are mistaken: Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of disability.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from discrimination based on race or national origin, including Caucasian-American employees.

Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc. · filed 2008-03-14(a)

Thus, contrary to Defendant’s assertion otherwise, despite being Caucasian-American, Plaintiffs are in fact members of a protected class under Title VII.

A Title VII complaint that alleges no discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin fails to state a claim.

McManus v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-12-31

Similarly, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim pursuant to Section 2000e, et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), which governs equal employment opportunities, because they do not allege that they are members of any of the classes protected by that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (listing race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).

Title VII does not prohibit differences in employment terms based solely on work location.

Sharma v. City of Detroit · filed 2002-05-15

However, work location is not one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination identified in Title VII, § 1981, and the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect criminal history as a status, though it prohibits treating employees with criminal histories differently because of race or another protected characteristic.

Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges · filed 2001-03-02(a)(1)

Title VII, however, does not list criminal history as a class or status entitled to protection from employment discrimination.

A sex stereotyping claim against a labor organization requires evidence that it represented employees of another sex differently.

Martin v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2000-06-30(c)(1)

Synthesizing the above cases, the Court holds that, to prevail on his claims, Plaintiff must show that female DOCS employees were not subjected to the same manner of representation by Defendant as he was. Plaintiff does not do this.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects white employees from race discrimination in employment.

Bates v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 2000-01-21(a)(1)

First, she is white. A race constitutes a protected class under Title VII, and Ms. Bates is a member of a race (white) that she asserts was the subject of the discrimination at issue.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover disability discrimination.

Silva v. Hit or Miss · filed 1999-08-23(a)

Title VII does not cover the only claim that she preserved-disability discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claim alleging only disability discrimination does not state a claim under it.

Horner v. Income Producing · filed 1999-04-15(a)(1)

However, Title VII prevents discrimination only on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts related to any of these prohibited bases for discrimination, he has not stated a claim pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Houck v. City of Prairie Village, Kan. · filed 1996-01-16(a)

However, Title VII does not provide a right against discrimination on the basis of disability.

Section 2000e-2 covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age.

Bornholdt v. Brady · filed 1989-02-16

Title VII plainly does not apply, since that statute governs complaints relating only to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and not discrimination on the basis of age. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits recovery for employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Avila v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 1989-10-02(a)

Thus, to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff must show unlawful discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat marriage to a union member as a protected status for a disparate treatment claim.

McConnell v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. · filed 1990-04-17(a)

Even if this were the sole reason plaintiff was fired, being the spouse of a union person is not a "protected" group contemplated by Title VII. Thus, plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII claim on this basis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity, and a plaintiff must prove membership in a protected class to establish a prima facie claim.

Bennun v. Rutgers State University · filed 1991-08-21(a)(1)

One element of that prima facie case is proof of membership in a class the statute protects. ... Rutgers' argument that Bennun has not shown he has an ethnic basis for his Title VII claim, as a Hispanic, nevertheless fails in this case.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Klein v. Boeing Co. · filed 1994-01-27(a)

Title VII does not provide protection against discrimination on the basis of disability but rather is limited to issues of discrimination based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit employment discrimination based on handicap.

Brand v. Florida Power Corp. · filed 1994-03-07

No reference is made in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to any proscribed employment discrimination on account of a person's handicap.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Daniels v. Allied Electrical Contractors Inc. · filed 1994-03-11(a)

Nevertheless, by its terms, Title VII forbids employment practices which improperly discriminate among individuals only on account of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; age alone is not a protected status under this provision.

Leidig v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 1994-05-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of his or her "race, color, religion, sex, or national original.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Leidig has not alleged discrimination on the basis of any of these protected statuses. Therefore, the Court will not address such a claim.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on protected classifications; an allegation of termination without such a classification does not invoke its protections.

Roberts v. Las Vegas Valley Water District · filed 1994-04-18

Title VII deals with invidious barriers to employment that result from racial or other impermissible classifications. Roberts does not allege that he was fired because of any classification recognized and protected in Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit employment discrimination based on disability.

President v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1994-09-20(a)

President’s Complaint charges both Illinois Bell and Union with race and “handicap” discrimination in violation of Title VII. But the latter is plainly not actionable under Title VII — as Jamil v. Secretary, Dep’t of Defense, 910 F.2d 1203, 1207 (4th Cir.1990) says: ... That means that President’s “handicap” claim is dispatched as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment but does not prohibit disability discrimination as such.

Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp. · filed 1995-04-07(a)(1)

The defendants correctly note that while Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, it does not prohibit disability discrimination. Thus, such claims are not cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a complaint to allege facts showing unfair treatment by an employer because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Horsfall v. Polyflex Flex Technologies, Inc. Angele Ladrach · filed 1995-06-22(a)

Horsfall's complaint is deficient in that it alleges no facts which would provide a basis for relief under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a) (1994). As the district court noted, nowhere in his complaint does Horsfall suggest or allude to any facts that he was treated unfairly by his employer because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Without these operative facts, Horsfall has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination but does not protect employees against disability discrimination.

Lewis v. Zilog, Inc. · filed 1995-09-05

Title VII does not proscribe disability discrimination, nor does it give protected status to disabled persons. Therefore, the Court addresses only Plaintiff's gender discrimination claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not age.

Taylor v. Brown · filed 1995-12-08(a)(1)

Title VII is limited to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Age is not an appropriate basis of discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover discrimination based solely on HIV status.

Cortes v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1996-04-08(a)

Consequently, because plaintiffs complaint cites only “his disability of being HIV positive” as the motivating factor behind the defendants’ allegedly discriminatory actions, and because the plain language of Title VII does not include HIV as a situation to which the statute applies, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; allegations of age or handicap discrimination alone do not state a claim under it.

Csoka v. United States Government · filed 1996-09-19

Moreover, the complaint does not allege any sort of discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" that Title VII seeks to prohibit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claim alleging none of those grounds cannot proceed.

Hinch v. Duncan · filed 1996-10-04

Because plaintiff has not alleged, even by the most liberal reading of his complaint, any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, he has no Title VII claim against defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to allege wrongful employment treatment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

King v. Wilmington Transit Co. · filed 1997-03-17(a)(1)

To state a claim for relief under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that he has been treated wrongly because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability.

Rivera v. Heyman · filed 1997-10-07(a)(1)

At the outset, the Court notes that Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice” for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Quite simply, the complaint alleged discrimination only on the basis of disability, which is not covered at all by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not perceived disability.

Metzenbaum v. John Carroll University · filed 1997-10-22(a)

Count 4 alleges that the action of Defendant in terminating and failing to reinstate Plaintiff was retaliatory in nature and was based on Plaintiff's perceived disability in violation of Title VII and Ohio Rev. Statute § 4112.02(A) and (I). Title VII, which applies to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), is not applicable in this action.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Mills v. Kansas, Eighth Judicial District · filed 1998-02-25(a)

In this case, plaintiffs, have not alleged that they have been discriminated against based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As stated above, Title VII only prohibits employment discrimination based upon these grounds.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Williamson v. Hartmann Luggage Co. · filed 1998-03-26(a)

Finally, the Court finds that the plaintiffs claim of being discharged on the basis of his disability is not a cognizable claim under Title VII, as Title VII only covers claims alleging discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and not disability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claim alleging none of those grounds fails to state a Title VII claim.

Heckman v. University of North Carolina · filed 1998-08-11(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” ... Nevertheless, to the extent that Plaintiff's citation of § 2000e might be read as an attempt to assert a Title VII claim, the Court finds that, based upon Plaintiff's failure to allege any facts concerning any of the Title VII factors, such claim can be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on marital status.

Cleaves v. City of Chicago · filed 1998-10-09(a)(1)

Marital status is not a protected classification under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

Buckley v. City of Syracuse · filed 1998-12-01(a)(1)

Because Title VII does not apply to age-related discrimination, the City’s motion is granted, and plaintiffs Title VII action is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Jarrett v. Sprint/United Management Co. · filed 1999-01-15(a)

Title VII affords legal protection only to those individuals who have been discriminated against because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability discrimination.

Lemons v. US Air Group, Inc. · filed 1999-01-19(a)(1)

Only discrimination based on Title VII’s enumerated categories will support a claim under that statute.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment but does not cover discrimination based on marital status, physical handicap, or union activity.

Christopher v. Billington · filed 1999-04-14(a)(1)

Because Title VII does not provide protection from discrimination based upon any of the asserted bases of discrimination except gender, the Court treats plaintiffs complaint as presenting only claims of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover discrimination based on HIV status or association with people who have HIV/AIDS.

Dollinger v. State Insurance Fund · filed 1999-04-19(a)(1)

In the present case, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII because he is not a member of any protected class under the statute.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a coworker’s comment about weight actionable harassment because weight is not a protected trait.

Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. · filed 2001-03-28(a)

And it is not actionable harassment, though it may be impolite, to call a co-worker “thunder thighs”; Title VII outlaws discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), but it is silent as to weight.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a claim must allege discrimination based on one of those characteristics.

Siaca v. Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico · filed 2001-07-31(a)

In addition, nowhere in the complaint or plaintiff's opposition is there any averment from the part of plaintiff that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin—the practices outlawed by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Russell v. Hug · filed 2002-01-04(a)

Title VII prohibits employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (describing unlawful employment practices in general); 2000e-16(a) (describing prohibited discriminatory practices in employment by the federal government). Even if it is assumed that an employment practice is involved, Russell has not alleged discrimination on any of these bases.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Ames v. Cartier, Inc. · filed 2002-03-29(a)(1)

The court notes that the language of Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the bases of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on disability.

Orell v. UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2002-04-29(a)(1)

Because Title VII applies only to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, Count II of plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and will, accordingly, be dismissed as to all defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not cover age or disability discrimination.

Waters v. Collins & Aikman Products Co. · filed 2002-07-01(a)(1)

In asserting his claims for discrimination based on age and for retaliation based on opposing age and disability discrimination, plaintiff has attempted to invoke the protections of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In this particular case, the only protections that plaintiff may assert are found in the ADEA and in the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), not Title VII. While courts adopt schemes of proof developed in Title VII, claims for substantive violations and retaliation for age and disability discrimination are found exclusively in the ADEA and ADA, respectively.

Section 2000e-2 covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but not disability.

Nance v. Potter · filed 2002-09-24

However, Title VII permits discrimination claims only on the basis of an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Thus, regardless of the type of Title VII discrimination to which Plaintiff believes he has been subjected, such discrimination would exceed the scope of his EEOC complaints, which allege discrimination solely on the basis of disability and retaliation for filing complaints due to disability discrimination. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges Title VII discrimination in his complaint, that claim will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on disability.

Crow v. McElroy Coal Co. · filed 2003-06-24(a)(1)

Crow has alleged that he was discriminated against because of his disability. Since disability is not a protected class under Title VII, the magistrate judge found that Crow failed to state a claim to which relief can be granted. This Court finds that the proposed findings regarding his Title VII are not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; it does not cover disability discrimination.

Tallerday v. City of Tucson · filed 2003-08-19(a)

The district court properly dismissed Tallerday’s claim under Title VII for disability discrimination because she did not allege that she was a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

Bates v. University of Texas Medical Branch · filed 2003-12-18

Neither statute provides a cause of action for age-based discrimination. Title VII outlaws discrimination in employment based on an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover disability discrimination.

Mitchell v. Chapman · filed 2003-12-23(a)

Title VII does not address disability discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit age discrimination.

Grey v. City of Norwalk Board of Education · filed 2004-02-04(a)(1)

Next, the court agrees with the defendants that age discrimination is not within the scope of Title VII. That statute makes it “an unlawful employment practice” for an employer to “discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion; sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit employment discrimination based on marital status.

Holdmeyer v. Veneman · filed 2004-06-09(a)(1)

Title VII does not, however, apply to discrimination on the basis of one’s marital status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a Title VII discrimination claim to allege discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Sheaffer v. County of Chatham · filed 2004-09-17(a)(1)

The court also notes that nothing in Plaintiff's complaint indicates that she was discriminated against on the basis of her "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” as required to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin but does not protect political beliefs.

Lopez v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois · filed 2004-11-12(a)(1)

Professor Lopez’s argument focuses on his political views of Cuba, not the fact that he is Cuban or a Cuban exile. Title VII does not protect a person’s political beliefs.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover employment discrimination based solely on physical disability.

Alicea v. Consortium of Mayaguez/Las Marias · filed 2005-03-16(a)(1)

Nowhere in the Complaint nor the record are any allegations of discrimination based on race, religion, gender, or national origin made. The only allegations of discrimination in this lawsuit are based on Plaintiff Vargas Segarra’s physical disability, and the appropriate federal statutory mechanisms for adjudicating those claims are the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. As such, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Title VI and Title VII claims and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Title VI and Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2 requires facts showing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin to state an unlawful employment practice claim.

Weissleader v. Lerner · filed 2005-04-11

Her unlawful employment practice claim failed because she did not allege facts showing discrimination on the basis of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but does not cover age discrimination.

Blankenship v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2005-06-01(a)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiffs complaint does not allege that he was discriminated or retaliated against on the basis of the protected characteristics delineated in Title VII. Plaintiff only alleges that he was discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of age. Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim under Title VII.