42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

An employee states a religious discrimination claim by alleging termination for displaying a religious sign while other employees may display religious signs without repercussions.

Walker · filed 2025-12-02(a)(1)

The Court finds these facts are sufficient to state a Title VII claim for religious discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a plaintiff relying on disparate treatment must show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.

Flores · filed 2025-12-19(a)(1)

To establish a Title VII violation based upon a theory of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) she met her employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably. ... Based upon this evidentiary record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff has met her burden that Sanitarian I was similarly situated to Plaintiff.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires circumstances supporting an inference that the employer acted because of the employee’s religion.

McNellis · filed 2025-12-22(a)(1)

Without more, the circumstances do not give rise to an inference that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of his religious beliefs.

An employee’s religion can be the basis for a termination when the employer fires the employee for conduct grounded in sincerely held religious beliefs, even if the employer had legitimate reasons to deny an accommodation.

McCormick · filed 2025-12-22(a)

Terminating an employee for an action that was based on the employee's sincerely held religious beliefs makes the employee's religion the "basis" for that firing, whether or not legitimate business reasons supported the employer's denial of an accommodation.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to state universities, which are not immune from liability under it by the Eleventh Amendment.

Jacobs v. College of William and Mary · filed 1980-07-29(a)

This provision is applicable to state universities, see Shawer v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 602 F.2d 1161 (3d Cir. 1979), and such institutions are not immunized from liability under this section by the Eleventh Amendment.

A Title VII wage discrimination claim incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s affirmative defenses, including a wage differential based on a factor other than sex.

Murphy v. Ohio State University · filed 2013-10-31(a)

While the district judge did not explain why he proceeded to deem Murphy’s Title VII claim abandoned after he ruled that claim lacked merit because OSU already had established the affirmative defense of a “factor other than sex,” OSU has carried its burden of proof and therefore we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four exceptions but does not require proof of equal work for an intentional sex-based wage discrimination claim.

Nos. 79-1893, 79-1894 · filed 1980-08-01(h)

Thus, we conclude that the plain language of the statute suggests that only the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act were incorporated as limitations on Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four wage differential exceptions without otherwise limiting Title VII’s coverage of sex discrimination.

International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1980-08-01(h)

In summary we conclude that the legislative history shows that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporated the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII without otherwise limiting Title VII’s coverage.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes Equal Pay Act defenses, including seniority, merit, and other valid factors unrelated to sex, available in Title VII pay discrimination claims.

Regina FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIRLOIN STOCKADE, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-08-21(h)

The purpose of the Title VII Amendment found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), the so-called Bennett Amendment, is to bring Title VII into accord with the Equal Pay Act. Thus, the exceptions provided in the Equal Pay Act, such as pay differentials due to a seniority or merit system, or other valid factors not based on sex, are also exceptions under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses, so an employer that proves a pay disparity rests on a factor other than sex is not liable under Title VII.

Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Service Board · filed 1980-12-31(h)

Title VII incorporates the Equal Pay ... Act defenses, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), therefore, defendants who prove one of these defenses cannot be held liable under either the Equal Pay Act or title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses, so an employer that proves a wage disparity rests on a factor other than sex is not liable under Title VII for that disparity.

Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Service Board · filed 1981-03-10(h)

Title VII incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), therefore, defendants who prove one of these defenses cannot be held liable under either the Equal Pay Act or title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII claims of unequal pay for equal work.

Frankie Odomes, Cross-Appellant v. Nucare, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1981-08-25(h)

The four exemptions enunciated by the Equal Pay Act are applicable to Title VII claims of unequal pay for equal work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b).

Section 2000e-2(h) excludes wage discrimination permitted by an Equal Pay Act exception from Title VII liability.

Grove v. Frostburg National Bank · filed 1982-04-22(h)

Title VII expressly excludes sex discrimination in wages that is authorized by one of the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). If an employer can successfully establish one of the affirmative defenses to the Equal Pay Act, when the burden remains with him, he will necessarily be able to defeat a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-2(h) requires an employer defending a Title VII equal pay for equal work claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wage difference falls within an Equal Pay Act defense.

Schulte v. Wilson Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-06-17(h)

Consequently, it stands to reason that in order for a defendant to establish non-liability for sex-based wage differentials, it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such differentials were the result of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production or any other factor other than sex.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s factor-other-than-sex defense into Title VII equal-pay claims, and the employer bears the burden of proving it.

Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 1982-10-29(h)

Accordingly, we have held that even under Title VII, the employer bears the burden of showing that the wage differential resulted from a factor other than sex.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes Equal Pay Act affirmative defenses available in Title VII sex-based salary discrimination claims.

Melani v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of City of New York · filed 1983-03-17(h)

The Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), makes applicable to a Title VII claim of sex-based salary discrimination the affirmative defenses to a case brought pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Section 2000e-2(h) applies Equal Pay Act standards to Title VII claims alleging unequal pay for equal work.

Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n of Portland · filed 1983-03-23(h)

The Amendment assures that courts will apply the same standards in evaluating claims of unequal pay for equal work in cases brought pursuant to Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, or both.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers sex-based pay discrimination, and statistical evidence may support an equal-pay claim under it.

Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, Etc. · filed 1983-09-06(a)

We reverse and remand Plemer’s classic equal pay claim, under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, with instructions that the district court consider, for whatever weight and persuasiveness it reasonably determines to be appropriate, the statistical evidence, and study more closely the OFCCP “findings” (“Proffer 1”) to determine their admissibility, and reconsider its findings and conclusions respecting this claim, in accordance with our opinion.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses available in Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims.

Miller v. Kansas Power & Light Co. · filed 1984-04-26(h)

The burden thus shifts to defendant to prove the existence of one of the four affirmative defenses under the Equal Pay Act, made applicable to Title VII by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).

Section 2000e-2(h) makes a valid Equal Pay Act exemption a defense to Title VII liability for the same pay differential.

Chang v. University of Rhode Island · filed 1985-04-04(h)

Thus, an employer who proves that a controverted salary differential is the product of a valid exemption to the Equal Pay Act absolves itself of liability therefor under Title VII as well.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses into Title VII pay claims, but not its elements or burdens of proof.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1986-01-31(h)

Therefore, following Gunther and other persuasive authority, the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, and the principle that statutes should be construed harmoniously, this court finds that the Bennett Amendment incorporates into Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act, but not the corresponding Equal Pay Act analysis regarding the elements and burdens of proof.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not require a plaintiff bringing a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim to work at the same establishment as the employees used for comparison.

Nancy MARCOUX, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. STATE OF MAINE, Et Al., Defendants, Appellants · filed 1986-07-30(h)

Plaintiffs did not have to satisfy the single establishment requirement of the Equal Pay Act provided they made out a valid case under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses into Title VII, but does not require an employer to raise women’s pension benefits to the previous level of men’s benefits to remedy a Title VII violation.

Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee For Tax Deferred Annuity And Deferred Compensation Plans · filed 1986-08-11(h)

Therefore, the Bennett Amendment, which only incorporates the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII, does not also incorporate the Proviso. Consequently, we hold that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII does not require the district court to remedy a Title VII violation by topping up the female employee's benefits in accordance with the Equal Pay Act Proviso.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes a wage differential based on a factor other than sex a defense to a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim.

Butler v. Sharp Manufacturing Company of America · filed 1987-03-18(h)

Congress, by enacting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(h), incorporated into Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims the four enumerated defenses found in the Fair Labor Standards Act, and quoted above. The district court found that facts existed to establish the fourth defense--a salary differential based upon any other factor other than sex. Accordingly, any error on the part of the district court in not specifically addressing the Title VII claim was harmless, since that same defense barred plaintiff's successfully prosecuting that claim.

In a Title VII sex-based wage claim, the plaintiff must first show lower pay for comparable work, after which the employer must prove an Equal Pay Act defense.

Denny v. Westfield State College · filed 1987-05-12(h)

In light of this conclusion, plaintiffs are required initially to establish that they received lower salaries than men for comparable work. Once this is established, defendants have the burden of persuading the Court, by a preponderance of evidence, that the wage disparity was the result of (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any further factor other than sex.

Equal pay for equal work claims under § 2000e-2(a) must satisfy the substantial equality test used for Equal Pay Act claims.

Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1988-02-08(a)

Equal pay claims asserted under Title VII must satisfy the same substantial equality test applied to claims asserted under the EPA. ... Forsberg's EPA claim could not survive summary judgment; therefore, her equal pay claim under Title VII also fails.

Section 2000e-2(h) requires an employer invoking the factor-other-than-sex defense to prove that it relied on the factor for a legitimate business reason.

Colby v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1989-01-31(h)

For an employer to claim the fourth defense of the Bennett Amendment in a Title VII case, the employer must prove that he or she relied on the factor for a legitimate business reason.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits wage differences based on factors other than sex.

Siegel v. Board of Educ. of City of New York · filed 1989-05-09(h)

The evidence supports the defendants’ claim that the wage differential is based upon factors other than sex. ... These differences legally justify the higher wages for high school as opposed to elementary school principals.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s defenses into Title VII without adopting its burden of proof scheme.

Fallon v. State of Illinois · filed 1989-08-15(h)

The Bennett Amendment incorporated the Equal Pay Act’s defenses into Title VII, not its burden of proof scheme.

Section 2000e-2(h) provides that a pay difference authorized by the Equal Pay Act does not violate Title VII.

Shamey v. Administrator, General Services Administration · filed 1990-01-23(h)

Title VII explicitly recognizes the overlay between the two laws by providing that any differential authorized by the Equal Pay Act shall not constitute a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a compensation differential authorized by the Equal Pay Act, including one based on a factor other than sex.

Colby v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc. · filed 1991-02-25(h)

In view of these uncontested reasons for its plan, there was no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for the Bennett Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)) provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice if the compensation differentiation upon the basis of sex is authorized by the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII sex-based wage claims without shifting the ultimate burden of persuasion from the plaintiff.

Churchill v. International Business MacHines, Inc., National Service Division · filed 1991-04-16(h)

This Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and holds that the incorporation of the Equal Pay Act standards into a Title VII claim for sex-based wage discrimination did not transform the allocation of burdens under Title VII into Equal Pay Act burdens.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes the factor other than sex defense available in Title VII gender-based wage discrimination claims.

Christiana v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1993-12-13(h)

The "factor other than sex” defense is available to employers in Title VII gender-based wage discrimination claims as well as under the Equal Pay Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), known as the "Bennett Amendment” because of its legislative origins.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits an employer to justify a pay disparity using defenses available under the Equal Pay Act, including merit and production.

Douglas v. Mitzelfeld's, Inc. · filed 1997-08-28(h)

Section 2000e-2(h) specifically provides that those affirmative defenses available in the Equal Pay Act can be used to justify a pay disparity in a Title VII action. ... Defendant has provided a legitimate business reason for the pay differential between Plaintiff and Saltsman, and Plaintiff has not shown that this reason is a pretext. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under both Elliott-Larsen and Title VII must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses into Title VII wage discrimination claims.

Garner v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 2000-04-27(h)

By legislation popularly known as the “Bennett Amendment,” Congress has expressly incorporated into Title VII the four affirmative Equal Pay Act defenses.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an unequal pay claim when a plaintiff shows that her job was similar to higher paying jobs held by men.

Becker v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. · filed 2001-05-22(a)

She need only show that "the job she occupied was similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males." Id.

An established Equal Pay Act affirmative defense also defeats a Title VII sex-based pay claim arising from the same facts.

Prewett v. Alabama Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2007-12-27(h)

Where, as here, Defendants have established as a matter of law one of the EPA affirmative defenses, that defense is also dispositive of any Title VII claims based upon the same underlying facts.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a sex-based pay difference under Title VII when an Equal Pay Act affirmative defense authorizes it.

Seldon v. TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES, INC. · filed 2009-08-06(h)

Because Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to their affirmative defense under the EPA, Plaintiffs gender-based wage discrimination claim also fails.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four pay differential defenses into the analysis of Title VII wage discrimination claims.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. First Metropolitan Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2020-03-27(h)

In the wage discrimination context, the Bennett Amendment merges the four affirmative defenses into the Title VII analysis.

The four Equal Pay Act defenses also apply to Title VII claims of discrimination in pay.

Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, Sangamon County, Cass County, and Richard Austin, Individually and in His O · filed 1985-08-07(h)

Since the four statutory defenses available under the Equal Pay Act also serve as .valid defenses to a claim based on Title VII, County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 167 (1981); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), however, and since we hold that defendants have successfully established a defense to the Equal Pay Act claim, there is no need to address the separate Title VII claim of discrimination in pay.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a difference in compensation based on a factor other than sex when the employer adopted that factor for a legitimate business reason.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1988-06-22(h)

We now hold that the legitimate business reason standard is the appropriate benchmark against which to measure the "factor other than sex" defense. We further hold that Penney has satisfied this standard in its reasons for adopting the head of household requirement for spousal medical insurance coverage.

Section 2000e-2(h) makes a factor other than sex an affirmative defense to a Title VII pay discrimination claim.

Lindsley v. Omni Hotels · filed 2024-12-16(h)

The jury found that any pay disparity Lindsley incurred resulted from a factor other than sex (an affirmative defense to liability under both the EPA and Title VII), yet Omni owed $25 million for a Title VII violation.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for a pay difference, a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination plaintiff must show that reason is pretext for discrimination.

Dimino v. Georgia Department of Administrative Services · filed 2015-11-12(a)(1)

Dimino must show that DOAS’s reason for its salary decision is pretext for discrimination on the basis of her sex. Dimino again relies on Southern’s statements to meet her burden. But, as discussed above, these statements do not show gender bias.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based pay discrimination, but an employee must show that comparable employees of another race received higher pay.

Stone v. McGraw-Hill Global Education Holdings, LLC · filed 2015-08-26(a)(1)

In addition, his salary of $85,000 was more than or equal to three of the other five LSCs in the Central Region, all of whom were white. Plaintiff does not refute these facts. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to satisfy the requirements of a prima facie case of race-based wage discrimination.

A Title VII wage discrimination claim requires evidence that higher-paid employees outside the protected class were similarly situated in relevant respects; shared job skills alone may be insufficient.

Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc. · filed 2013-03-27(a)(1)

Plaintiff did testify that the same set of job skills were required of each General Manager, but this scant evidence does not demonstrate that plaintiff and his comparators were similarly situated under the prevailing standard.

A discriminatory pay claim fails if the employee cannot show that the employer’s explanation for the pay decision was pretextual, even when a prima facie case is assumed.

Martinez v. Grainger · filed 2011-12-22(a)(1)

Even assuming that he made out a prima facie case by showing that he was the only branch manager paid below the recommended salary range based on branch level, Martinez did not meet his burden of showing that Grainger's explanation for his compensation was pretextual.

A plaintiff may establish a Title VII wage discrimination claim by meeting the Equal Pay Act’s initial burden and discrediting the employer’s explanations for the pay difference.

Glunt v. GES Exposition Services, Inc. · filed 2000-12-11(a)(1)

Consequently, Plaintiff may establish her case for wage discrimination under Title VII by meeting her prima facie burden under the EPA and discrediting her employer’s proffered explanations for the pay differential.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII wage discrimination plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that she was paid less than a male employee for substantially equal work.

Rodriguez v. Beecham · filed 2000-08-16(a)

Appellant's Title VII wage discrimination claim fails for the same reason that her EPA wage discrimination contention failed -- she has not made a prima facie showing that she was paid less than a male employee for substantially equal work.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex-based wage discrimination, and Equal Pay Act liability establishes Title VII liability when both claims rest on the same conduct and evidence.

Kovacevich v. Kent State University · filed 2000-08-25(a)

We conclude that Kovacevich is entitled to judgment in her favor on the wage discrimination element of her Title VII claim. Title VII deems it an unlawful employment practice “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging wage discrimination to prove discriminatory intent.

Pospicil v. the Buying Office, Inc. · filed 1999-09-30(a)(1)

Title VII, among other things, prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation because of that individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). One of the significant differences between a wage-discrimination claim under Title VII and a claim under the EPA is that, under the former, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a wage discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer intended to pay less because of a protected trait.

Ghosh v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management · filed 1999-10-04(a)(1)

Because Ghosh is proceeding under Title VII rather than under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), he must show intent to discriminate, that is, he must establish that the pay disparity resulted from an actual desire on the part of IDEM to pay Ghosh less than Caucasian employees because of his national origin.

A Title VII unequal pay claim requires proof of discriminatory intent; inconsistent or pretextual explanations alone do not establish that intent.

Belfi v. Prendergast · filed 1999-09-13(a)(1)

But inconsistent and pretextual explanations do not constitute proof that the LIRR intended to discriminate against plaintiff because she was a woman. Absent that proof, a jury could not simply infer a discriminatory intent. As a consequence, the dismissal of plaintiffs Title VII claim must be affirmed.

In an unequal-pay-for-equal-work claim under § 2000e-2, general salary statistics may show pretext after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case using specific employees who performed substantially equal work.

Pollis v. New School for Social Research · filed 1996-01-03

Thus, since Pollis’s two equal pay claims are premised on the same theory of liability — namely, unequal pay for equal work — the ensuing analysis applies equally to both of them. ... However, Pollis cannot submit this statistical evidence in support of her prima facie case, since it does not purport to include only those professors who perform substantially similar jobs with the level of skill, effort and responsibility that Pollis performed hers. Accordingly, I admit plaintiffs statistical data for the limited purpose of demonstrating pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits unequal pay when race is one basis for the difference, even if differences in skill also contribute.

Andrew L. PITTMAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HATTIESBURG MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-05-13(a)(1)

While Pittman’s administrative and managerial skills could very well not be as great as Seaton’s, race was still one of the bases on which the defendant paid Pittman less money than it paid Seaton. This is sufficient to establish employer liability under section 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits sex-based pay differences justified under the Equal Pay Act; a reason that cannot justify sex-based pay discrimination likewise cannot justify race-based pay discrimination.

Fisher v. Dillard University · filed 1980-08-18(h)

On the other hand, if discrimination on the basis of sex is unjustifiable under the Equal Pay Act, and thus Title VII, for a particular asserted reason, such as “bargaining power”, it should be similarly unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of race given the same asserted reason.

Section 2000e-2(h)’s equal-pay limitation does not protect a salary increase that creates a pay differential based on sex.

Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Department · filed 1981-05-07(h)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the limitation contained in the equal pay requirement of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)) does not apply. Had Butler been “transferred” at his same rate of pay, which in itself was higher than that of Brooks, the situation might be different. Because his salary was increased, the Court finds, upon considering all of the evidence demonstrating that the better paying positions were held by male employees, that the pay differential was based on sex in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) allows an employer to rebut an unequal-pay claim by showing that the pay difference rests on job-related factors other than sex, including relevant education and experience.

Jacqueline R. PIVA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. XEROX CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-08-24(h)

Unlike Piva, many of the men whose salaries were compared to Piva’s had degrees in business or management. Others had substantially more business or sales experience than Piva. The district court did not err in determining that these factors are related to high-level sales positions at Xerox. The court’s determination that Xerox had rebutted Piva’s prima facie case of discrimination in compensation is thus not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based wage discrimination claim even when the same facts do not establish an Equal Pay Act violation.

McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Co., Inc. · filed 1983-05-26(a)(1)

The Court in Gunther held that a Title VII cause of action may be asserted on the basis of wage discrimination premised on sex even though the claim does not support an Equal Pay Act violation. ... Therefore, as McDonnell's counsel conceded at oral argument, McKee can assert claims under Title VII that are not barred by the judgment entered on the jury's verdict.

Section 2000e-2 uses a broader standard for comparing jobs in a salary discrimination claim than the Equal Pay Act, so unresolved job comparability can preclude summary judgment.

Howard v. Campbell Soup Co. · filed 1983-09-30

This being the case, Howard’s Title VII salary discrimination claims must also survive summary judgment. ... Title VII’s definition of “equality” for the purpose of comparing salaries, although uncertain, is broader than that of the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an inference of discriminatory intent when an employer learns of a racial wage disparity and refuses to correct it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Inland Marine Industries · filed 1984-04-05(a)(1)

By refusing to change his subjective wage-setting policies or to bring black wages in line with those of whites, Sutton ratified the existing disparities. His ratification constituted all the intent the court needed to find Inland Marine guilty on a disparate treatment theory.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging intentional wage discrimination and job segregation to show a lower-paid, sex-segregated job classification and a comparable classification occupied by men that involves similar work.

Beall v. Curtis · filed 1985-03-20(a)

To establish a prima facie case of intentional wage discrimination and job segregation under Title VII, plaintiffs must show that (1) they are members of a protected class (2) who occupy a sex-segregated job classification (3) that is paid less than (4) a sex-segregated job classification occupied by men and (5) that the two job classifications involve work that is similar in skill, effort, and responsibility. ... As a consequence, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie case of intentional wage or job-classification discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s affirmative defenses, allowing a wage difference based on a factor other than sex.

Hohe v. Midland Corp. · filed 1985-07-10(h)

The Bennett Amendment of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), incorporates the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981). Under the Equal Pay Act, a wage differential based on "any other factor other than sex" is not unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The Court concludes as a matter of law that the 1982 salary differential between plaintiff and Eugene Devine was based on factors other than sex and was not in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a claim for intentional sex based wage discrimination when women allege that they are confined to lower paid positions because of sex.

St. Louis Newspaper Guild v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. · filed 1985-10-11(a)

While this Court agrees with defendant that it is possible to read portions of plaintiffs' complaint as a comparable worth claim, for the reasons stated supra, this Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a violation of Title VII for intentional sex based wage discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.

A Title VII claim alleging unequal pay for substantially equal work is evaluated under Equal Pay Act standards.

Foster v. Arcata Associates, Inc. · filed 1985-10-25(a)

However, when a Title VII claimant contends that she has been denied equal pay for substantially equal work, as here, Equal Pay Act standards apply.

Section 2000e-2 makes each paycheck that perpetuates a racial pay disparity actionable once the employer is covered by Title VII, even if the disparity began earlier.

Bazemore v. Friday · filed 1986-07-01

Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require equal work to support a sex-based pay discrimination claim, but a pay difference alone need not establish intentional discrimination.

Dr. Janet I. Merrill v. Southern Methodist University · filed 1986-12-24(a)(1)

The Title VII plaintiff need not necessarily prove that she performed work equal to that of her better paid male colleague. ... Taken as a whole, Merrill’s statistical proof failed fully to account for these factors, and so, on this record, did not require the district court to find in her favor on her wage discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a pay difference caused by an employee’s time on the job rather than sex.

Seligson v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology · filed 1987-03-25(a)(1)

With respect to Mr. Blake, the regional director for the West Region, the court finds that the difference between his salary and that paid plaintiff resulted from his four years’ experience on the job rather than his sex. A pay differential which results from time on the job does not violate Title VII.

An employer’s reliance on prevailing market wages does not completely shield it from a claim of intentional sex discrimination in pay under § 2000e-2.

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES'ASS'N v. State of Cal. · filed 1987-12-21(a)(1)

Thus, the state cannot rely on a market rate defense to insulate it completely from a charge of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits an employer to defeat a sex-based wage discrimination claim by proving that the pay difference was based on factors other than sex.

Sowers v. Kemira, Inc. · filed 1988-02-17(h)

When a Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination is made, an employer may defeat the claim by establishing that the differentiation is based on any “factor other than sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act). Defendant has successfully proven that the discrepancy in pay between plaintiff and Scott Barfield was based on factors other than sex.

A prima facie claim of sex-based wage discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires comparison with employees in similar jobs.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Clay County Rural Telephone, Inc. · filed 1988-09-08(a)(1)

Accordingly, the EEOC must show that Linda Owens’ job is similar to the jobs to which her job is being compared in order to establish a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer to remedy racial salary disparities that persist from a discriminatory pay system established before Title VII applied.

Bazemore v. Friday · filed 1988-06-08

Thus, since the Extension Service, prior to 1965, admittedly maintained two separate, racially-segregated Extension Service branches for its employees and paid black employees less than their white counterparts, the Extension Service had an obligation to remedy any salary disparities that lingered on. This the Extension Service did not do, and accordingly its inaction constituted discrimination on account of race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats bonuses as compensation when assessing discrimination in pay.

Gallagher v. Kleinwort Benson Government Securities, Inc. · filed 1988-10-24(a)(1)

Consequently, this court will find that the traders’ bonuses are part of their compensation for the purposes of Title VII.

An Equal Pay Act jury verdict finding sex discrimination in pay binds the court on an overlapping Title VII compensation claim.

Korte v. Diemer · filed 1990-08-08(a)(1)

We find the distinction drawn by the district court between Equal Pay Act liability and Title VII liability overly technical. A finding of “sex discrimination in compensation” under one Act is tantamount to a finding of “pay discrimination on the basis of sex” under the other. Conduct that a jury finds to be “based on” sex, and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons, cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. We therefore hold that the jury’s verdict for Korte under the Equal Pay Act is binding on the district court as to her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging sex-based wage discrimination to prove that the pay disparity resulted from discriminatory intent.

Hatton v. Hunt · filed 1991-09-17(a)

The Title VII claim differs from the Equal Pay Act claim to the extent Title VII requires plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any wage disparity was the result of discriminatory intent. ... The court finds that the wage disparity is not shown to constitute a violation of Title VII.

A sex-based pay discrimination claim under Title VII requires similar jobs, not substantially equal jobs.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Carolyn Smith, Intervenor v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1993-04-26(a)(1)

The district court failed to consider that Title VII has a relaxed standard for proving the similarity of positions and as a result, abused his discretion in finding the claim to be frivolous and groundless.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in pay and promotion, which may be shown through disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1993-11-19(a)(1)

Thus, statistically, Cosgrove failed to demonstrate gender discrimination through either ‘disparate treatment’ or ‘disparate impact’ with regard to pay increases and promotions, since all but one of the similarly situated employees compared with her during the trial, both male and female, were promoted faster than Cosgrove, and received correspondingly higher salaries.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of intentional discrimination in a claim of unequal pay based on sex; an Equal Pay Act verdict alone does not establish liability.

Meeks v. Computer Associates International, a Foreign Corporation · filed 1994-03-07(a)(1)

Under Title VII, however, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had a discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a prima facie pay discrimination claim when a woman shows that men received higher pay for substantially similar jobs, without requiring them to work in the same establishment.

Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., Figgie International, Inc. · filed 1994-04-22(a)(1)

The absence of an establishment requirement permits the plaintiff to make a Title VII prima facie case on a showing that she is female and her job was substantially similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males.

Discriminatory salary disparities can constitute unequal terms, conditions, and privileges of employment under Title VII.

Fisher v. Vassar College · filed 1994-06-30(a)(1)

Upon reconsideration, this court concludes that disparity in salary is a denial of "equal terms, conditions and privileges of employment" under Title VII. Therefore, plaintiff's salary discrimination claim was properly before the administrative body and consequently subject to trial.

In a Title VII unequal-pay claim, the plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual and that discriminatory intent motivated the pay decision.

Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Incorporated, Sharon D. Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Incorporated · filed 1994-09-26(a)(1)

Once the defendant offers a nondiscriminatory justification for the wage differential, the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered explanation is pretextual and that the defendant was actually motivated by discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars intentional sex-based pay discrimination, and a plaintiff may reach trial with evidence that casts doubt on the employer’s stated reasons for lower pay.

Knight v. G.W. Plastics, Inc. · filed 1995-10-05(a)(1)

However, as discussed supra, she has presented facts which suggest that the defendant’s explanations may be unworthy of credence. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claim must likewise be denied.

A plaintiff challenging wage discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive summary judgment by showing that a reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reasons pretextual and infer discrimination.

Randle v. City of Aurora · filed 1995-10-26(a)(1)

We conclude that Randle’s four arguments and the evidence supporting them cast sufficient doubt on the City’s proffered reasons for the wage differential so as to allow a reasonable jury to find that these explanations were pretextual—and thus, a reasonable jury might ultimately infer that these explanations were a pretext for racial discrimination.

A prima facie claim of sex-based wage discrimination under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the plaintiff was paid less than a similarly situated male.

Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire · filed 1995-11-15(a)(1)

In the wage discrimination context, neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has established a definitive standard, but we have held that a prima facie case does require a plaintiff such as Johnson to produce evidence that she was paid less than a similarly-situated male or males.

For a sex-based unequal pay claim based on substantially equal work, the employee must show that her job is substantially similar to higher paid employees’ jobs.

Walden v. James D. Watkins, Secretary of United States Department of Energy · filed 1996-08-21(a)(1)

Thus, Walden failed to establish an essential element of her prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination (i.e., that her job was substantially similar to higher paid males).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-based wage discrimination plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s explanation for a pay disparity is pretextual and that discriminatory intent motivated the employer.

Salmons v. Dollar General Corp. · filed 1996-09-30(a)(1)

In the present case, Salmons has demonstrated neither that some discriminatory. reason more likely motivated Dollar General to compensate Robinson at a higher rate, nor that the numerous factors which caused Dollar General to compensate Robinson at a higher rate are incredible. ... The defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a wage discrimination plaintiff to show that the challenged pay distinction was based on race or national origin.

Credo v. Zema Systems Corp. · filed 1996-11-12(a)(1)

Because the group of employees who received overtime pay includes members of plaintiffs own classification, he is unable to prove that the distinction was based on race or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a Title VII wage discrimination claimant to prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

Lenihan v. Boeing Co. · filed 1998-01-14(a)(1)

Unlike an EPA claim, however, to prevail on a wage discrimination claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory pay through circumstantial evidence must show less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Sharma v. Ohio State University · filed 2001-11-28(a)(1)

Furthermore, Sharma does nothing to prove that he was treated differently than similarly situated professors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging unequal pay based on sex to show different wages for substantially equal work requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility.

Rallins v. Ohio State University · filed 2002-01-25(a)(1)

In establishing a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that different wages were paid to male employees who performed substantially equal work requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a pay difference was because of race; differences based on qualifications and experience do not establish a violation.

Buntyn v. Horseshoe Entrtnmt · filed 2001-12-27(a)(1)

We believe it is sufficient to note that there is no evidence in the record to support a claim that Buntyn was being paid less than other employees because of her race.

A Title VII claim alleging only unequal pay for equal work is governed by the Equal Pay Act's standards.

Taylor v. White · filed 2003-03-04(a)(1)

Taylor alleges gender-based discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). Because her allegations of discrimination relate solely to unequal pay for equal work, her claim is governed by the standards of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (EPA).

A plaintiff claiming sex-based pay discrimination under Title VII must show that she holds a job similar to one held by a higher-paid male employee.

Block v. Kwal-Howells, Inc. · filed 2004-02-17(a)(2)

Ms. Block must establish a prima facie case of sex-based pay discrimination “by showing that she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males.”

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in pay; a claimant challenging an employer’s stated reasons for a pay disparity must offer evidence that those reasons are pretextual.

Harrison-Pepper v. Miami University · filed 2004-06-25

Thus, because Harrison-Pepper presented no evidence contradicting the University’s proffered reasons for the amounts of her raises, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on Harrison-Pepper’s Title VII claim.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim based on pay requires evidence that the plaintiff was paid less than a similarly situated man.

Tiedeman v. State of Nebraska Department of Corrections · filed 2005-07-20(a)(1)

Ms. Tiedeman's similar Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), alleging that she was discriminated against in her pay rate, which is based on the same facts as her Equal Pay Act claim, must fail for essentially the same reason. Ms. Tiedeman did not make out a prima facie case because she produced no evidence that she was paid less than a similarly-situated man.

A Title VII pay discrimination claim fails without evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory intent or impact.

Fenton v. St. Lawrence County · filed 2007-01-18(h)

Further, in the absence of any evidence giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent or impact, plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 fails (see 42 USC § 2000e-2 [h]; Burniche v General Elec. Automation Servs., Inc., 306 F Supp 2d 233, 241-242 [ND NY 2004]), as do their claims under the Human Rights Law, the Civil Rights Law and 42 USC § 1983 (see Executive Law § 291 [1]; Civil Rights Law § 40-c [2]; Williams v Anderson, 562 F2d 1081, 1086 [8th Cir 1977]; see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race-based wage discrimination; a wage claim requires evidence of different pay for equal work by employees of different races.

Viola Fair v. Norris · filed 2007-03-27(a)(1)

While Title VII does prohibit race-based wage discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, a plaintiff who pursues such a claim must show that her employer “paid different wages to employees of different races for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” Tademe v. St. Cloud State Univ., 328 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a wage discrimination claimant to show that employees outside her protected class performed substantially similar work.

Nagle v. RMA, the Risk Management Ass'n · filed 2007-05-15(a)

In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that her work at RMA required the same skill or qualifications, or that she was required to perform the same duties, as either of the two males she has alleged were similarly situated. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not set forth a prima facie case of wage discrimination and the Court will grant summary judgment on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discriminatory intent for discrete compensation decisions, as it does for other discrete employment actions.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. · filed 2007-05-29(a)(1)

Nor do we see reasonable ambiguity in the statute itself, which makes no distinction between compensation and other sorts of claims and which clearly requires that discrete employment actions alleged to be unlawful be motivated “because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race-based pay discrimination; a claimant must show that similarly situated employees of other races received higher pay or raises.

Taher v. Wichita State University · filed 2007-12-07(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact whether defendant gave higher pay raises to similarly situated employees of other races. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs discriminatory pay claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based pay discrimination claim to proceed when a woman is paid less than a male predecessor in the same position and the employer offers no nondiscriminatory reason for the difference.

Acosta v. Harbor Holdings & Operations, Inc. · filed 2009-12-21(a)(1)

We find that plaintiff has met her prima facie burden to establish wage disparity. She was a female and was paid less than her predecessor while occupying the same position. Other than denying any such promises were made and arguing that the purported agreement was a misunderstanding on plaintiffs part, defendants have not proffered any non-discriminatory reasons to account for the difference in pay.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based compensation discrimination; a plaintiff using a coworker to show pretext must show that the coworker is similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Lockridge v. the University of Maine System · filed 2010-03-09(a)(1)

Ultimately, given the material difference between Kivatisky and Lockridge, and the lack of any other evidence suggesting that the University's proffered reason was pretextual, Lockridge's gender discrimination claim (to the extent it is premised on differential treatment) fails as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff comparing her pay with a higher paid male employee’s to show that they held similar jobs.

Lewis v. D.R. Horton, Inc. · filed 2010-03-24

In a Title VII pay discrimination claim, “a prima facie showing of discrimination consists of evidence that a female employee occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males.” ... For the same reasons as discussed above, we conclude that Lewis has not met her prima facie showing that she and Anderson occupied similar jobs.

Title VII pay discrimination claims may proceed when the evidence raises a factual dispute about whether sex motivated a pay difference.

Wojciechowski v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P. · filed 2011-01-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff has also met her burden under Title VII to raise an issue of fact as to whether “a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the employer] to pay her less.”

An employer is entitled to summary judgment on a Title VII disparate pay claim when it establishes that the pay differences were based on factors other than sex.

Teninty v. Geren · filed 2011-03-03(a)(1)

By establishing that the pay disparities are based on factors other than sex, the Army has met its affirmative burden under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII to demonstrate a legitimate business reason for its decision and thus is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Equal Pay Act and disparate pay claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a jury to find unlawful sex discrimination in pay when evidence supports an inference that an employer intentionally continued a pay disparity.

Kendra Hall v. Siemens VDO Automotive · filed 2012-06-21(a)(1)

Among other evidence in the record, the evidence about the PIP -- including evidence about the motivation for the PIP -- combined with the conflicting evidence about the effective date of Siemens’s raise policies, the length of time it took Siemens to remedy the pay differential, and Siemens’s having hired or internally promoted several male quality planners at higher salaries than Plaintiff’s during 2005 and 2006 is sufficient to allow a jury determination that Siemens acted with discriminatory intent.

A Title VII salary discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for the pay disparity is pretext for discrimination.

Dr. Leonard Chukwualuka Onyiah v. St. Cloud State University · filed 2012-07-02(a)(1)

Even assuming that Onyiah made a prima facie case of salary discrimination based on his race and national origin by identifying professors outside of those classes who receive a higher salary, he did not meet his burden of showing that the University’s explanation for his compensation was pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability for a wage difference attributable to non-gender factors such as experience and education.

Foco v. Freudenberg-Nok General Partnership · filed 2012-08-31(a)(1)

Lastly, because defendants have presented evidence — and plaintiff has failed to come forward with facts demonstrating a question of fact exists — that the difference in pay was due to non-gender factors such as experience and education, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII and ELCRA claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pay-discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received higher pay.

Melba J. Gray v. City of Jacksonville, Florida · filed 2012-10-09(a)(1)

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of pay discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she received low wages; (3) similarly situated employees outside the protected class received higher pay; and (4) she was qualified to receive the higher pay.

A disparate pay claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the plaintiff cannot show that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class received better pay.

Coleman v. Alabama State University · filed 2012-10-24(a)(1)

Summary judgment is appropriate, therefore, on Mr. Coleman’s disparate pay claim because he cannot establish that ASU treated similarly situated employees outside of his class more favorably in terms of pay.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence supports finding that a woman received less pay than similarly situated men and the employer’s explanation was pretextual.

Kienzle v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2012-10-29(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence most favorably to her, a jury could conclude that the plaintiff, a woman, was required to work the same hours as her similarly-situated male counterparts from July 2009 to January 2010, but she made less money because of her part-time status, which surely is adverse employment action.

A race-based pay discrimination claim fails when the employee does not show that the employer’s stated reasons for the pay difference were false and that race was the true reason.

Moten v. Broward County Medical Examiner and Trauma Services · filed 2012-11-05(a)(1)

Assuming Moten established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination, she did not show that Broward County’s proffered reasons were false and that racial discrimination was the true reason for hiring Karr at a higher hourly wage.

A Title VII pay discrimination plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that she was paid less than men in similar jobs.

Riser v. QEP Energy · filed 2015-01-27(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII, Ms. Riser must show she “occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from paying an employee less because of race than similarly situated employees performing substantially the same work.

Lavigne v. Cajun Deep Foundations, LLC · filed 2015-02-04(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... In sum, the Court concludes that La-vigne has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was paid less than similarly situated non-African American employees for substantially the- same job responsibilities. Accordingly, judgment in his favor as to this claim is warranted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging pay discrimination through circumstantial evidence to show that a comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Blackman v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation · filed 2015-02-19(a)

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the DBPR on Ms. Blackman’s Title VII claims with respect to Messrs. Baxley, Kogan, and Karr. As discussed above with respect to her EPA claims, Ms. Blackman failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the similarity of her job and the jobs held by Messrs. Baxley, Kogan, and Karr, even under Title VIPs relaxed standard of similarity, because she introduced insufficient evidence concerning the actual content of the jobs held by these individuals.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit paying employees more when material differences in their experience or qualifications explain the disparity.

Brown v. Board of Trustees of the Univ · filed 2016-12-21(a)(1)

His pay-disparity claim also fails. He has no direct evidence of discrimination, and the three co-workers to which he compares himself are not similar enough with respect to salary qualifications. Unlike Brown, two of them had held managerial or supervisory positions, and the third maintained certifications as a professional engineer and energy manager—neither of which Brown held. Compensating these three more highly because of these material differences is not unlawful.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that employees are similarly situated before their pay can support a discrimination claim based on a pay disparity.

Sims v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-02-07(a)

Sims was a branch manager and Hannan was a business banking specialist. Sims produces no evidence she and Hannan were similarly situated. ... Without any such evidence, Sims does not have a claim for discrimination based on the pay disparity, if any, between them.

For a Title VII pay discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must show that a worker outside her protected class was paid more for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. · filed 2018-04-04(a)(1)

One of the requirements under the McDonnell Douglas framework for Herster’s gender discrimination in pay claim is that Herster must show that she was paid less than a proffered comparator, not in her protected class, for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using pay comparators to show that their jobs are sufficiently similar; broad descriptions of shared tasks do not suffice.

Spencer v. Virginia State University · filed 2019-03-18(a)(1)

While Title VII’s “similarity” requirement demands less of plaintiffs than the Equal Pay Act’s “equality” requirement, it is not toothless: the plaintiff must provide evidence that the proposed comparators are not just similar in some respects, but “similarly-situated in all respects.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). For the same reasons we discussed above, Spencer’s broad generalizations cannot even show sufficient similarity to meet her burden under Title VII.

A Title VII pay discrimination claim based on comparators requires evidence that their jobs are sufficiently similar; broad similarities in duties do not suffice.

Spencer v. Virginia State University · filed 2019-03-26(a)(1)

While Title VII’s “similarity” requirement demands less of plaintiffs than the Equal Pay Act’s “equality” requirement, it is not toothless: the plaintiff must provide evidence that the proposed comparators are not just similar in some respects, but “similarly-situated in all respects.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a pay discrimination plaintiff to identify a better-paid employee outside the protected class whose circumstances are nearly identical; a shared job title alone does not establish a valid comparator.

Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-12-02(a)(1)

In failing to meet the prima facie standards for the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Texas Labor Code, Lindsley cannot include Pollard and Walker as pay comparators for her pay discrimination claims.

A Title VII pay discrimination claim based on a comparator requires a sufficiently similar job and circumstances suggesting a discriminatory motive.

Young v. Tri-County Technical College · filed 2020-02-19(a)(1)

It is clear from the evidence in the record, that Plaintiff and Swords did not perform sufficiently similar jobs in that she did not manage the QuickJobs training centers and did not teach any classes. ... Most significantly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant’s decision regarding compensation for her position was related to her gender.

A Title VII disparate pay claim requires a comparator sufficiently similar in all material respects to support an inference of gender discrimination.

Etheridge v. Board of Trustees of the Univeristy of West Alabama, The · filed 2020-07-24(a)(1)

Here, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a valid comparator, and, as such, has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference of sex discrimination to state a disparate pay claim; bare assertions about male coworkers are insufficient.

Hernandez v. Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC · filed 2020-07-13(a)(1)

But without additional facts, these two blanket statements about male Sales Reps at PMF are insufficient to satisfy even her “minimal burden.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based pay discrimination without requiring a plaintiff to show equal work for unequal pay.

Xanthakos v. City University of New York · filed 2020-08-24(a)(1)

Unlike the EPA, however, Title VII does not require a Plaintiff to establish that she “performed equal work for unequal pay.” Lenzi, 944 F.3d at 110. That is merely one way to demonstrate discrimination; Title VII prohibits any form of sex-based compensation discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based pay discrimination; allegations of lower pay than a similarly situated male employee can support a claim at the pleading stage.

Torre v. Charter Communications, Inc. · filed 2020-10-08(a)(1)

Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, meanwhile, “make[] actionable any form of sex-based compensation discrimination.” ... Accordingly, Charter’s motion to dismiss Torre’s disparate-pay claims is denied.

A Title VII unequal pay plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for a pay difference is pretextual.

Melgoza v. Rush University Medical Center · filed 2020-11-09(a)(1)

But for her Title VII claim, Melgoza has the burden to show pretext to rebut Rush’s justification.

A race-based disparate pay claim requires a comparator similarly situated in all material respects; a shared job title alone is insufficient.

Coleman v. Morris-Shea Bridge Company Inc · filed 2020-11-23(a)(1)

Without more, Larry cannot establish a valid comparator, thus he has not made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment in compensation.

An employer’s statement that a woman needs less starting pay because her husband works can cast doubt on its nondiscriminatory explanations for her pay under Title VII.

Kellogg v. Ball State University · filed 2021-01-05(a)(1)

We hold that they are because the Academy blatantly dis- criminated against Kellogg by telling her that, because her husband worked, she did not need any more starting pay. Such clear discrimination calls the sincerity of the Academy’s rationales into question.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie sex based pay discrimination case by showing lower pay than opposite sex employees for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

Lindsley v. TRT Holdings · filed 2021-01-07(a)(1)

Under both Title VII and the Texas Labor Code, a plaintiff must show that she was paid less than members of the opposite sex for “work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” ... It is undisputed that Lindsley was paid less than her three immediate predecessors as food and beverage director of Omni Corpus Christi. As a result, she has established a prima facie case of pay discrimination, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based pay discrimination; a claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for the pay disparity and no reasonable factfinder could find them pretextual.

Nazinitsky v. Integris Baptist Medical · filed 2021-04-21(a)(1)

Accordingly, assuming arguendo that Dr. Nazinitsky has made a prima facie Title VII case (as the district court did), we find that Integris has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the pay disparity. And, for the reasons above, no reasonable factfinder would find them pretextual.

For a prima facie sex based pay discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), a woman need only show that her job was similar to a higher paid man’s job.

Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2021-09-10(a)(1)

To meet her burden under this first step of the McDonnell Douglas frame, Plaintiff need only show that her job was similar to that of a higher paid male.

A prima facie Equal Pay Act disparate-pay claim also satisfies the initial showing for a Title VII disparate-pay claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University Of Miami · filed 2021-09-29(a)(1)

Because the EEOC has established its disparate pay claim under the more rigorous analysis of the Equal Pay Act, the Court finds that it has met its initial burden of showing its prima facie case under Title VII.

Unequal pay can be an adverse employment action in a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Barnett v. Roanoke County School Board · filed 2021-11-30(a)(1)

In this case, the School Board does not dispute that Barnett can satisfy the first three elements of her prima facie case, nor can it. It is undisputed (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that her job performance was satisfactory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging unequal pay to show that race caused a disparity in compensation.

Paul Palmer, Jr. v. Indiana University · filed 2022-04-14(a)(1)

When pursuing an unequal pay claim, the plaintiff must show that the protected grounds—here, race—caused the dis- parity in compensation.

A Title VII pay discrimination claim requires proof that the pay difference resulted from intentional discrimination based on sex.

Calicchio v. Oasis Outsourcing Group Holdings, L.P. · filed 2022-07-15(a)(1)

Even if she met her burden of establishing a prima facie case under the more lenient Title VII standard, Calicchio cannot show that any difference in her pay is the result of intentional discrimination.

A sex-based pay discrimination claim fails when the employer proves the pay difference resulted from factors other than sex.

Niekamp v. State of Missouri · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds the pay difference was based on a factor other than sex.

Title VII sexual orientation disparate pay claims without direct evidence use the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.

FENNELL v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2022-09-16(a)(1)

Nevertheless, and in light of Fennell’s lack of direct evidence of discrimination, it is clearly appropriate to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to this context.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory pay; a disparate pay plaintiff must show substantially equal comparator work and, when the employer gives a legitimate reason for the difference, evidence of pretext.

Johnson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2022-09-29(a)(1)

Johnson fails to make out a prima facie case because, as discussed earlier, the record establishes that her Financial Officer position was not substantially equal to Papapetrou’s Project Coordinator position. Additionally, WMATA has supplied a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the pay disparity—namely, that it set Papapetrou’s Project Coordinator salary based on its promotion policy—which Johnson has not rebutted with any evidence that WMATA’s stated reason is pretext for intentional discrimination based on either sex or race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based pay discrimination; a pay difference attributable to different job duties and a position’s classification does not establish a violation.

Holt v. Secretary of the Veterans Administration Robert Wilkie · filed 2022-09-30(a)(1)

Accordingly, the record is clear that Plaintiff’s assignment to a GS-11-rated position was due to reasons other than sex. As a result, her claim for disparate pay under Title VII must fail.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a pay difference based on prior pay and relevant industry experience unless the employee shows those reasons are a pretext for sex discrimination.

Smith v. IVM Solutions L.L.C. · filed 2022-11-03(a)

As with the EPA claim, IVM has established that Craig considered Smith’s and Farmer’s prior pay and experience within the herbicide manufacturing industry (in Smith’s case, none) in determining their rates of pay as parts managers. These are sufficient legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the pay disparity.

Title VII unequal pay claims are assessed using all the evidence to determine whether race or sex caused a compensation disparity.

Hardiman v. Lipnic · filed 2023-03-15(a)(1)

In assessing Title VII claims based upon evidence of disparate pay, the Court considers all the evidence in the record, “eschewing any framework or formula.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based pay discrimination; a claimant must show unequal pay for the same work compared with coworkers outside the protected class.

Knoten-Hickerson v. FerrellGas Inc. · filed 2023-03-30(a)(1)

In this context, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race-based pay discrimination by showing “proof of unequal pay between the [plaintiff] and co-workers outside the protected class doing the same work.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1181. ... However, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence—such as payroll documents or personal pay stubs—to present “proof of unequal pay between the [plaintiff] and co-workers.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1181; see Baca, 398 F.3d at 1216 (“Mere allegations unsupported by further evidence ... are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.”).

An employer’s job classifications alone do not establish that another employee is a comparator for a Title VII pay discrimination claim.

Muslow v. LA State Univ & Agri · filed 2023-08-24(a)(1)

Of course, a court should not ignore the employer’s rating of jobs, see Victoria Bank, 493 F.2d at 899, but such classifications are not enough, on their own, to demonstrate that another employee is a comparator under Title VII.

A pay discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employer gives a legitimate, race-neutral explanation for the disparity and the employee offers no evidence of pretext.

Guillory v. Dwight · filed 2024-01-29(a)(1)

Plaintiff has produced nothing to call into question defendant’s credibility or otherwise undermine his race-neutral and legitimate explanations for the salary discrepancy. Because he has not met his burden, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim based on unequal pay fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons for the pay difference are pretextual or that intentional discrimination occurred.

Jackson v. City of Cape Coral · filed 2024-02-01(a)(1)

They do not create a genuine issue of material fact that could establish that the City’s justifications are pretextual and much less that intentional discrimination occurred.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex caused a pay disparity; comparable work and unequal pay alone do not establish intentional discrimination.

Hopkins v. Stericycle · filed 2024-03-13(a)(1)

But this is not enough to support an inference of intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs must show that the protected characteristic—their sex—was the real reason why defendant paid them less.

A plaintiff can plead an unequal pay claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by alleging facts supporting a reasonable inference that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were paid more.

Nunez-Renck v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2024-04-05(a)(1)

Although these allegations are only borderline adequate, the court holds that, taken as true, they are sufficient to enable the court to draw the reasonable inference that she was paid less than similarly ... situated individuals outside the protected class.

For a disparate-pay claim, a part-time employee can serve as a comparator to a full-time employee only if they differ solely in hours worked and are materially similar in all other respects.

Tondalaya Gamble v. County of Cook · filed 2024-07-02(a)(1)

And only where a part-time employee and a full-time employee differ solely in hours worked and are materially similar in all other respects can they serve as relevant comparators.

A Title VII unequal-pay claim requires a male comparator whose job is similar in all material respects; a material difference in duties defeats the comparison.

St. Louis v. City of Cape Coral · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

Given that Ms. St. Louis and her comparator did not share this material job function before January 2020, it cannot be said they shared only “minor differences in job function.”