42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A Title VII unequal pay claimant using a coworker as a comparator must show enough shared, material factors to permit a meaningful comparison.

Rehm v. Young Mens Christian Association of Greater Waukesha County Inc · filed 2024-12-26(a)(1)

The question is whether the plaintiff has shown that she and Mertens share enough common, material factors to allow for a meaningful comparison.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee alleging sex discrimination in pay to identify a more favorably paid, similarly situated comparator or other evidence connecting the pay difference to sex.

CRISCI v. BRIDGEVILLE RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC · filed 2025-08-06(a)(1)

Because Ms. Crisci has failed to point to a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably, and because she has not established a causal nexus between her pay and membership in a protected class, no reasonable juror could find an inference of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make an employer’s failure to keep national-origin records, by itself, discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.

Sklenar v. CENTRAL BD. OF ED. OF SCH. DIST., ETC. · filed 1980-09-11(a)

The lack of record keeping may be evidence that national origin was not a concern of defendant in its personnel policies but it is not itself discrimination as to the “terms and conditions of employment”. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

A tenure applicant may show a Title VII violation through procedural irregularities, evidence of bias, or significant faculty support for the applicant's qualifications.

Huang v. BD. OF TRUSTEES FOR STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES · filed 2000-12-22

A plaintiff may be able to prove a Title VII violation by a showing of facts such as (i) departures from procedural regularity, (ii) conventional evidence of bias on the part of individuals involved, or (iii) that the plaintiff is found to be qualified for tenure by some significant portion of the departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the particular field. ... Based upon the undisputed facts, the record reveals that Dr. Huang has not proven that there was discrimination on the basis of his national origin or ancestry.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a university tenure denial to be treated as both a discharge and a hiring decision in a sex discrimination claim.

Timper v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System · filed 1981-04-30(a)(1)

In my view, it is unnecessary to resolve this ambiguity or, perhaps better said, it is sufficient to treat the tenure decision as both a discharge and a hiring decision.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory rank and tenure at hiring to show that race caused the difference, including proof that the plaintiff was at least as qualified as the favored employees.

Jamerson v. The Board Of Trustees Of The University Of Alabama · filed 1981-11-23

On these facts then Jamerson must establish that because he is black, his appointment was as an Assistant Professor without tenure rather than an Associate Professor with tenure. Appellant's burden was further complicated since he was hired at a different time than the other CLEAR professors. Only one position was advertised as open and appellant was hired to fill it. The core of appellant's claim requires proof that he was at least as qualified as the white teachers, Goode and Davis. Without this proof, Jamerson's claim collapses.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require an employer to select the most qualified tenure candidate if its choice rests on neutral reasons rather than sex discrimination.

Zahorik v. Cornell University · filed 1983-03-24(a)

In this regard, Title VII does not mandate that an employer hire the best possible candidate for a position. Rather, the employer need only show that his choice was based on “neutral reasons” and that such reasons were not in reality a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to an employer’s denial of tenure.

Kumar v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF MASS. · filed 1983-07-01(a)

nonetheless, it is clear that Title VII applies to an employer’s denial of tenure.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to university tenure decisions alleged to be influenced by sex discrimination.

Zahorik v. Cornell University · filed 1984-02-22(a)

Tenure decisions are not exempt under Title VII, however, and plaintiffs seeking to show that forbidden purposes lurk in a tenure decision have available methods of challenging such decisions.

Section 2000e-2 applies to tenure decisions, with judicial review focused on whether a prohibited factor influenced the decision.

Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College Ass'n · filed 1991-06-14

While Title VII unquestionably applies to tenure decisions, judicial review of such decisions is limited to whether the tenure decision was based on a prohibited factor.

Section 2000e-2 applies to college tenure decisions, with judicial review limited to whether a prohibited factor influenced the decision.

Brousard-Norcross v. The Augustana College Association · filed 1991-08-09

While Title VII unquestionably applies to tenure decisions, judicial review of such decisions is limited to whether the tenure decision was based on a prohibited factor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a sex discrimination claim for denial of tenure when the evidence shows that the candidate was held to the same standards as other tenure-track faculty and does not reasonably show that gender motivated the decision.

Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 1999-01-14(a)(1)

Where, as here, an assistant professor has been treated equally and has been held to the same standards applied to every other tenure-track faculty member at the university, he may not seek refuge under Title VII simply because he is unable or unwilling to meet the minimum requirements for tenure.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff challenging a tenure denial under Title VII’s burden-shifting framework to show that the employer’s stated reason was false and discrimination was the real reason.

Larebo v. Clemson University · filed 1999-03-22

We hold that Larebo failed to show that Clemson's reason for not offering him tenure or reappointment was false. He also failed to offer any evidence that the real reason for the adverse employment decision was discriminatory.

A university may establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying tenure by showing that the candidate did not meet its academic standards.

Weinstock v. Columbia University · filed 2000-08-23(a)(1)

We conclude that when Provost Cole recommended to the President of Columbia that Weinstock's tenure be denied, the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that she was not academically qualified was established.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2) requires fair consideration in promotion and tenure decisions without sex discrimination.

Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-08-01(a)(1) and (2)

All the court can do is to determine whether reasonable good faith was shown and whether fair consideration was given to the matter by those having the right to decide so as to determine that sex (or race) discrimination was not actually a factor in arriving at the decision. If the criteria used and the procedures followed were reasonable and rationally related to the decision reached this is about as far as the court can go.

A promotion and tenure discrimination claim requires evidence that the applicant was qualified and rejected under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination; unsupported assertions do not suffice.

Rowe v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University · filed 2009-06-10(a)(1)

In sum, Rowe has not presented evidence, other than her own unsubstantiated assertions, that she was either qualified for promotion and tenure or that she was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of tenure under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that he was qualified for tenure to establish a prima facie case.

Lazarou v. Mississippi State University · filed 2014-01-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that Lazarou has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was qualified for tenure, a necessary component of his prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racial discrimination in tenure decisions; a plaintiff challenging the employer’s stated reason must show that it was pretextual.

Thrash v. Miami University · filed 2014-03-10(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race [or] color....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that Dr. Thrash has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the University’s tenure decision was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory tenure decisions; a claimant relying on circumstantial evidence must establish a prima facie case.

Chu v. Mississippi State University · filed 2014-11-17(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for a covered employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... In conclusion, we agree with the district court that Chu fails to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. We do not need to analyze the McDonnell Douglas framework’s second and third steps, and we affirm summary judgment on the Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to university tenure decisions without special academic deference.

Mawakana v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2019-06-14(a)(1)

Consistent with Penn’s suggestion, we believe that Ewing and the concept of academic freedom do not entitle a university to special deference in Title VII tenure cases.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a tenure denial was based on sex; a possibly mistaken assessment of scholarship does not itself establish discrimination.

Maras v. The Curators of the University · filed 2020-12-29(a)(1)

While the university's decision could have been wrong—a point on which we necessarily express no opinion—there is nothing here to indicate that it was based on Maras's sex in any way.

In a Title VII denial of tenure claim, failure to show qualification for tenure defeats the prima facie case.

Ibanez v. Texas A&M · filed 2024-10-08(a)

As such, Ibanez failed to make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination because he was not qualified for tenure, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to TAMUK.

Section 2000e-2(a) and (c)'s religious discrimination provisions are constitutional under the Establishment Clause.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1981-06-23(a), (c)

This appeal squarely poses the issue of the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (c) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). We hold that those provisions of Title VII are constitutional for the reasons expressed in our opinion in Tooley v. Martin Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), which was argued with this case, on the same date, before this panel.

Section 2000e-2 does not recognize comparable worth alone as an independent basis for a sex-based wage discrimination claim.

Power v. Barry County, Mich. · filed 1982-06-01

After thoroughly reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties and conducting independent research, I have reached the conclusion that comparable worth is not a viable legal theory under Title VII and thus cannot be utilized by Plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit market-based pay differences between dissimilar male- and female-dominated jobs merely because a study finds the jobs of comparable worth; a disparate treatment claim requires proof of discriminatory motive.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Washington · filed 1985-09-04(a)(1)

The State of Washington's initial reliance on a free market system in which employees in male-dominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than employees in dissimilar female-dominated jobs is not in and of itself a violation of Title VII, notwithstanding that the Willis study deemed the positions of comparable worth. Absent a showing of discriminatory motive, which has not been made here, the law does not permit the federal courts to interfere in the market-based system for the compensation of Washington's employees.

Section 2000e-2 does not make an employer’s failure to implement a comparable worth study actionable by itself.

American Nurses' Association v. State of Illinois · filed 1986-04-04

So if all that the plaintiffs in this case are complaining about is the State of Illinois’ failure to implement a comparable worth study, they have no case and it was properly dismissed.

In a comparable worth wage claim, Title VII requires proof of intentional sex discrimination; reliance on market wages alone does not establish liability.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. State of Michigan · filed 1989-11-29(h)

Without discriminatory motive, defendant’s reliance on the market to guide its classification and compensation system is not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in partnership consideration when that opportunity is a term, condition, or privilege of an associate’s employment, even without a contractual entitlement.

Hishon v. King & Spalding · filed 1984-05-22(a)(1)

Such a benefit, though not a contractual right of employment, may qualify as a "privileg[e]" of employment under Title VII. A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a shareholder preference plan when stock ownership determines employees’ wages, hours, and job assignments.

Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co. · filed 1982-11-09(a)(1)

Since the Company ties preferential wages, hours, and job assignments to ownership of its stock, the shareholder preference plan constitutes a condition of employment subject to the mandate of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a shareholder preference plan when stock ownership determines employees' wages, hours, and job assignments.

Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Company · filed 1983-02-17(a)(1)

Since the Company ties preferential wages, hours, and job assignments to ownership of its stock, the shareholder preference plan constitutes a condition of employment subject to the mandate of Title VII.

A successor employer may be liable for its predecessor’s discriminatory employment practices based on factors including notice of the charge, continuity of operations, and the predecessor’s ability to provide relief.

Trujillo v. Longhorn Manufacturing Company, Inc. · filed 1982-12-01(a)(1)

The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit is convincing and we endorse the application of the MacMillan factors in analyzing a successor corporation’s liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 makes an employer responsible for discriminatory employment decisions by its supervisors, even when personnel decisions are delegated to departments.

Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1985-10-30

The failure to exercise such power of review, or to establish neutral guidelines for promotion, discipline or pay raises, cannot absolve an employer of responsibility for Title VII violations under the guise of “departmentalization.” An employer is liable under Title VII for discriminatory acts committed by its supervisory personnel.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose vicarious liability merely because a supervisor initiates disciplinary charges when an independent body decides whether to discharge the employee.

Daugherty v. City of Danville, Ky. · filed 1988-09-01(a)

However, simply delegating a supervisor with authority to bring charges against an employee does not create vicarious liability, as such would be tantamount to absolute liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for racial discrimination by supervisors acting as its agents.

Karen FLANAGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON E. HENRY COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES CENTER, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants · filed 1989-07-13(a)(1)

Title VII liability is based on the actions of the employer. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). Richard and Booker are liable only as agents of their employer, the Center. ... Therefore, the Center's liability as principal under Title VII is clear.

Section 2000e-2 can make an employer liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when the acts fall within the scope of employment.

Hubbard v. City of Middletown · filed 1990-12-05

The relevant issue in determining whether an employer is liable for sexual harassment committed by its supervisors is whether the challenged acts were within the scope of the supervisor’s employment. ... In the case at bar, Hubbard was allegedly harassed at the police department during working hours by the chief of police. Further, there is some evidence that the city commissioners knew of and acquiesced in Dwyer’s actions. If these allegations are proven at trial, the City of Middletown will be liable under Title VII for Dwyer’s actions. Therefore, defendant City of Middletown’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII claim must be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a Title VII claim against an employer, and the claim may proceed against individuals who might be the employer’s agents.

Vesey v. Grover · filed 1992-01-07(a)

For purposes of this case, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), Title VII only authorizes lawsuits against employers. ... However, this Court cannot, on the record before it, hold that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his Title VII claims against Grover and Goldberg. Therefore, this Court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs Title VII claims against them.

Section 2000e-2 provides for employer liability under Title VII, including liability for an employee’s discriminatory acts under agency principles.

Donna Patterson Nicholas Brown, and Michael L. Adams v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corporation Mark Kennedy · filed 1996-09-11

Title VII, however, only provides for “employer” liability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Although individuals may not be held liable under Title VII unless they meet § 2000e(b) definition of “employer,” an individual employee’s actions may subject the employer to liability under agency principles.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a temporary worker to pursue discrimination claims against both a staffing agency and a worksite company if each qualifies as an employer and exercises substantial control over her employment.

Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co. · filed 1997-12-19(a)

A defendant may be held liable under Title VII if it (1) fits within the “employer” definition of Title VII and (2) “exercises substantial control over significant aspects of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiffs employment.”

Related companies may be treated as a single employer under § 2000e-2(a) based on their integrated operations, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership and management.

Brown v. Vitelcom, Inc. · filed 1999-04-26(a)

Following the weight of authority, this Court will apply the multi-pronged integrated enterprise test to determine whether ATN Inc. or VITELCO are proper defendants. To reiterate, the Court will examine three factors: (1) the degree to which Vitelcom's operations were integrated with ATN Inc. and VITELCO, (2) whether ATN Inc. exercised centralized control over Vitelcom's labor relations, and (3) whether ATN Inc., VITELCO, and Vitelcom were commonly owned and managed.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose individual liability on an employer’s agents.

Moss v. W & a CLEANERS · filed 2000-04-27(a)

Namely, as discussed in the preceding section, Title VII claims against an employer’s agents are inappropriate because agents are not “employers” within the meaning of Title VII.

A successor employer is not liable for a predecessor’s alleged discrimination when the buyer lacked notice of the claim and there is no evidence that the predecessor could not provide relief.

Jackson v. Lockie Corp. · filed 2000-08-25

I find, consistent with the decisions in Scott and Coleman, that the plaintiffs failure to come forward with any evidence that Port Rush had or reasonably should have had knowledge of the plaintiffs Title VII claims, in combination with the absence of any evidence tending to establish that Lockie Corporation could not provide relief if liability were established, precludes the plaintiff from going forward against Port Rush on her theory that Port Rush is liable as a successor employer for the allegedly unlawful acts of its predecessor, Lockie Corporation.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits successor liability for discriminatory hiring, but a successor that lacked notice of the claim before acquiring the employer is generally not liable absent exceptional circumstances.

Desporte-Bryan v. Bank of America · filed 2001-06-21(a)

Given the definitive evidence regarding the lack of notice of Plaintiffs claims to Nations-Bank prior to its purchase of Barnett Bank, even if it is assumed that Plaintiff can demonstrate that the other factors weigh in favor of imposing successor liability, she has made no showing of exceptional circumstances, and it would thus be fundamentally unfair in this case to impose liability on Bank of America.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose refusal-to-hire liability on an entity that was not the applicant’s potential employer.

Willey v. Ward · filed 2002-04-15(a)(1)

Because in Maryland Deputy Sheriffs are not county employees, Calvert County was not Willey’s potential employer and, thus, cannot be held liable under Title VII or the ADA.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits Title VII liability only against an employer.

Zuurbier v. MedStar Health, Inc. · filed 2004-02-06(a)

In addition, as relevant here, only an “employer” may be held liable for violations of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, or the DCHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a hostile work environment created by an indirect employer when that employer interferes with the terms or conditions of a worker’s direct employment.

Velez v. Roche · filed 2004-06-30(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits not only discriminatory discharges or refusals to hire but also discrimination with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... In short, nothing in the logic of Gomez, Anderson, or any other Ninth Circuit authority suggests that the indirect employer analysis should not extend to a hostile work environment claim where warranted by the evidence.

Section 2000e-2 can impose liability on a joint employer that controls aspects of a worker’s employment, even if it did not directly hire her.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2006-05-13

In this case, the Plaintiff argues that the Diocese may be liable to the Plaintiff even if it did not directly hire or employ her under the “joint employer” doctrine, if she can prove that the Diocese controlled certain aspects of her employment with the Church, including her compensation, privileges, terms, and conditions. The Court agrees.

A joint employer is liable for another employer’s discrimination only if it knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective measures within its control.

Lima v. Addeco · filed 2009-06-09(a)(1)

Accordingly, Adecco cannot be held liable as a joint employer for discriminatory conduct by Platform in violation of Title VII, because Lima has presented no evidence showing Adecco “knew or should have known of the [discriminatory] conduct and failed to take corrective measures within its control.”

Section 2000e-2 generally requires an employment relationship for employer liability under Title VII.

ANDELA v. University of Miami · filed 2010-03-08

Moreover, only an employer can be held liable under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. UNC was not Andela’s employer.

Section 2000e-2 limits Title VII discrimination liability to an employer; an affiliate is not liable without allegations that it employed the plaintiff or directed the employer to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Nieman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2010-04-08

Plaintiffs Title VII claim against Allied must fail. Plaintiff does not allege in the Complaint that Allied was his employer, nor does he allege that Allied directed and forced Nationwide to violate Plaintiffs Title VII rights.

A business may face liability under § 2000e-2 as a joint employer when it shares control over essential terms and conditions of employment.

Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor · filed 2011-12-05

One entity is the joint employer of another entity’s formal employees, and thus liable under federal and state anti-discrimination laws, if the two “share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make an employer liable merely for failing to prevent discrimination by an unrelated employer.

Masso v. City of Manchester, et al. · filed 2012-03-28(a)

For Masso to state a claim, she would have to allege that the School District itself discriminated against her in her pay or terms of employment or failed to adequately compensate her. The court has found no authority so much as suggesting that the statutes under which Masso seeks to recover might create liability for failing to prevent unlawful employment actions by unrelated parties, and Masso has cited no authority to that effect.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits liability against an indirect employer when its control over the worker establishes an employment relationship; directing an alleged discriminatory act alone is insufficient.

Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Incorporated · filed 2015-03-09(a)(1)

Second, evidence that a de facto employer “directed the discriminatory act” is not—without more—enough to estab- lish a de facto employer–employee relationship under Title VII.

A joint employer is not liable under Section 2000e-2(a) for discriminatory employment decisions in which it had no involvement.

Canon v. Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2015-09-22(a)

As there is no allegation or basis for an allegation that IHL had any involvement in the employment decisions at issue in this case, it can have no liability to plaintiff under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to be liable for a discriminatory hiring decision influenced by a biased investigator without requiring proof that the employer knew of the investigator’s bias.

Riley v. Massachusetts State Police · filed 2018-05-24

MSP contends that to survive summary judgment, Riley must also establish negligence requiring him to prove that MSP reasonably should have known of racial animus on the part of Lima. D. 167 at 2-3. This Court disagrees. Title VII prohibits employers or potential employers from engaging in discrimination in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

A Title VII discrimination claim can survive dismissal against a defendant other than the worker’s direct employer when the worker plausibly alleges that the defendant controls the workplace conditions underlying the claim.

Brown v. Cook County · filed 2018-06-26(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual," leaving open the possibility that an employer may be held liable for disparate treatment under Title VII by an individual with whom it is not in a direct employer-employee relationship. ... These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a) can support a race discrimination claim against an entity alleged to be an employer’s alter ego or to exercise delegated authority in hiring.

Vasquez v. Steiner Enterprises Inc · filed 2020-10-01(a)

These allegations might support a theory that Steiner has liability for discrimination because it was Mitchell Fabrics’ alter ego and/or because Steiner was delegated significant authority to interview job applicants (but with a foregone determination not to hire based on race), and because Steiner was involved in a scheme to segregate job applicants on the basis of race during the hiring process. ... Because Steiner fails to demonstrate beyond a doubt that Vasquez cannot prove facts that could support Steiner’s liability on Vasquez’s claims, Steiner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied.

Section 2000e-2 permits a successor to be held liable for a predecessor’s employment discrimination even if the successor has fewer than fifteen employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Georgina's LLC · filed 2020-12-04

As such, the EEOC’s claim against Little G’s does not necessarily require that Little G’s meet the statutory definition of employer in Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not make a non-employer liable for negligence in providing hiring guidance to an employer.

Garland v. Kosciusko School District · filed 2021-01-21(a)

Because such negligence by a non-employer is not actionable under Title VII, the Court grants MDE’s motion and dismisses the claim against it with prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a Title VII claim against an employer or joint employer, but not an entity that is neither.

Lester v. Phillips · filed 2021-01-28(a)(1)

Since COP was not Lester’s employer or joint employer, it cannot be held liable for a sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits joint employer liability when an entity exercises sufficient formal or functional control over a worker.

Rivers v. International House of Pancakes · filed 2021-03-08(a)

Plaintiff alleges nothing from which the Court can infer that IHOP had control over, knew of, or had reason to know of Trihop’s employment actions with respect to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded that IHOP was a joint employer, and the claims against IHOP are dismissed accordingly.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose joint employer liability where the key factors concerning hiring, supervision, and workplace equipment weigh against joint employment.

Coffey v. Tyler Staffing Services, Inc. · filed 2021-03-24(a)

Because these factors weigh against joint employment, the court finds that Chase and ServiceMaster are not joint employers for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose employment discrimination liability on an entity that was not the employee’s employer.

Rivas v. Caesars Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2021-08-11(a)(1)

However, the Court agrees with CES that it cannot be liable for employment discrimination because it was not Rivas’s employer. Therefore, the claims against CES cannot survive and the Court will analyze the claims against Desert Palace only.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose joint employer liability on a franchisor whose involvement in a franchisee’s business does not give it sufficient control over the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.

Ries v. McDonald's USA, LLC · filed 2021-12-06(a)

As other courts have concluded, that level of involvement in a franchisee’s business does not suffice to give rise to employer liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible employment relationship; a contractor’s client does not become a joint employer merely by refusing a worker’s credentials, without facts showing significant control over the worker’s anticipated work.

Felder v. USTA · filed 2022-03-07(a)(1)

We therefore hold that Felder did not plausibly allege that the USTA was his employer merely by asserting that it refused to issue his credentials. Absent further allegations that the USTA would have significantly controlled the manner and means of Felder’s work as a security guard, the complaint does not cross the line from speculative to plausible on the essential Title VII requirement of an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows Title VII discrimination claims only against a plaintiff’s employer.

Chambers v. Padda · filed 2022-03-28(a)

Whether CDM and/or Lab Test knew of or should have known of the discrimination is immaterial, however, as both theories of liability fail for the same reason: Only an employer can be liable under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sexual orientation discrimination claim against an owner plausibly alleged to be the plaintiff’s employer.

Schellenberger v. Oakwood Ventures · filed 2022-04-27(a)

Title VII prohibits “an employer” from discriminating against an individual on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (extending Title VII protections to sexual orientation). ... Thus, rather than a mere employee in a supervisory role, Schellenberger’s complaint adequately alleges individual liability for Rosenblatt as an owner/employer. This is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose liability on an employer through an agent whose role did not encompass employment practices on the employer’s behalf.

Davis v. Parish of Caddo · filed 2022-07-26(a)

And because Mrs. Davis has failed to show that any putative agent’s role encompassed employment practices on Caddo’s behalf, we will not disturb the judgment of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a claim against a franchisor as a joint employer when the complaint plausibly alleges that it shares control over essential terms and conditions of employment.

Acuff v. Dy N Fly, LLC · filed 2023-05-05(a)

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Dy N Fly is a joint employer for purposes of Title VII and the ELCRA.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a county board liable for alleged discrimination by a commissioner when the board did not act and her conduct did not meaningfully influence it.

Blair v. Frenchko · filed 2023-06-28(a)

Plaintiff has not alleged that she has suffered any discrimination as the result of an act of the Board as a whole, nor has she alleged any conduct of Frenchko that has sufficiently influenced the Board in any meaningful manner.

Section 2000e-2(a) can reach an indirect employer with sufficient control over an employee’s work; allegations of that control can support a claim at the pleading stage.

James v. Cook County · filed 2023-10-26(a)

Construing these allegations liberally, as the Court must do at this stage, the Court can draw a reasonable inference that the CCSO had sufficient control over James’s employment such that it can be liable as an indirect employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a single employer theory only when the entities constituted one employer at the time of the alleged discriminatory acts.

Kalkey v. Euromodas, Inc. · filed 2023-12-11(a)(1)

Thus, for this test to apply, the two entities must constitute a single employer at the time of the alleged unlawful act(s). ... None of that is possible simply because at the time of the events underlying the Title VII action, Norte and Oeste did not exist. So, the claims against them must be dismissed.

A Title VII race discrimination claim can proceed when evidence suggests that a biased investigator played a meaningful role in the employer’s termination decision.

Cromartie v. Correction · filed 2024-03-29(a)

In short, it is enough for present purposes that there are genuine issues of fact to show that Papoosha had a meaningful role in the termination decisional process and also that he took into account Cromartie’s race when investigating and formulating his conclusions in the investigation report. Accordingly, I will deny DOC’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a race discrimination claim against a company to plausibly allege that the company was the plaintiff’s employer, including through a de facto employment relationship.

Etheridge v. Midland Paper Supplies and Packing Company · filed 2024-09-10(a)

Thus, even affording the complaint a liberal construction, it fails to plausibly allege that Midland could be considered a de facto employer under the Knight factors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship for employer liability; a joint employer must share significant control over the worker.

Pasha v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2024-09-19(a)(1)

To hold an employer liable for unlawful employment practices under Title VII or the NYSHRL, an employer-employee relationship must have existed between the parties at the time of the alleged unlawful conduct. ... Accordingly, Pasha has not alleged that the DEC shared significant control over him with ExecuSearch or the DOH, and thus joint employer liability is inapplicable.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a worker to bring a Title VII claim against a joint employer that shares significant control over the worker’s employment.

Torres v. Unibud Restoration Corp. · filed 2024-09-30(a)

This is particularly so with respect to factors such as Defendants’ power to direct Plaintiff’s daily work, and to train, and discipline workers, such that a jury “may properly conclude that a constructive employer-employee relationship exists” because Defendants “otherwise control the employee’s daily employment activities,” Felder, 27 F.4th at 844. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim withstands Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat someone as an employer’s agent when the employer neither employs nor supervises or controls that person.

Abraham v. Trident Vantage Systems, LLC · filed 2024-10-28(a)

Where the record establishes that Hassouneh was neither an employee of Trident nor under the supervision and control of Trident, he cannot be deemed to be an agent of Trident for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) imposes liability only on an employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Interventional Pain Management Associates, PLLC · filed 2025-01-29(a)

Of course, this means that—standing alone—IPMA cannot be held liable for retaliation as an employer under Title VII. See 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (imposing liability only on an “employer”); id. at § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as having “fifteen or more employees” during a certain period).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim against a joint employer that shares control over the terms and conditions of employment.

Bolt v. Planned Parenthood of Central and Western New York · filed 2025-02-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a plausible inference that Bivona was her joint employer.

A joint employer may be liable for discrimination when it knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take prompt corrective measures within its control.

Rose v. Air Liquide USA LLC · filed 2025-02-14(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Guidant knew of the alleged discriminatory acts and failed to redress them, such that it may be held liable as a joint employer.

Section 2000e-2 imposes liability on employers; harassment evidence from a period when the defendant is not shown to be the plaintiff’s employer or joint employer is irrelevant.

Norris v. Frito-Lay, Inc. · filed 2025-05-16

Plaintiff has not provided evidence or argued that at that time, defendant was her employer or a joint employer with CorTech. Absent such evidence, plaintiff’s evidence relating to Gordon is irrelevant. See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996) (statutory liability only borne by employers); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

A separate company may be liable for an employer’s discrimination when facts support treating them as an integrated enterprise or joint employers.

Aityahia v. Envoy Air Incorporated · filed 2025-06-02(a)

Under Title VII, an entity can be held liable for discrimination if it is an “employer” of the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). A separate corporate entity may be held liable for the discriminatory acts of an employing entity only under limited circumstances. ... The Complaint thus fails to allege facts that would allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that American could be held liable for Envoy’s alleged discriminatory conduct under an “integrated enterprise” or joint-employment theory.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not give a court judicial immunity for a discriminatory employment transfer made under its administrative powers.

Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County · filed 1982-12-30(a)

Having found that the Circuit Court is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and that the Circuit Court was exercising its inherent administrative power when it transferred Goodwin, the Court concludes that the Circuit Court is not shrouded with judicial immunity in this instance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits pay differences under a merit system, but written job descriptions do not establish one without a system of advancement or reward for merit.

Morgado v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Civil Defense Corps · filed 1983-08-25(h)

Both the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 206(d)(l)(ii), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(h), provide an exception to an employer’s liability for discrimination in pay, if the differential is made pursuant to a merit system. ... It is a reasonable conclusion that a written set of job descriptions, regularly evaluated, is not a “merit system,” if it has been found that the set of positions described present no means or order — “system”—of advancement or reward for merit.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not shield a discriminatory employment test from challenge merely because an employer uses it as part of a merit system.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-04-23(h)

The district court, therefore, properly rejected the defendants’ claim to “merit system exemption,” on the grounds that unlike a seniority system “which indisputably measures seniority, an invalid test cannot measure merit.”

Section 2000e-2(h) does not exempt discriminatory, non-job-related employment tests merely because they are part of a merit system.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-05-18(h)

The district court, therefore, properly rejected the defendants' claim to "merit system exemption," on the grounds that unlike a seniority system "which indisputably measures seniority, an invalid test cannot measure merit." Walls, supra, 542 F.Supp. at 311.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a bona fide, facially neutral seniority or merit pay system absent intentional discrimination.

Klimek v. Village of Broadview · filed 1989-11-27(h)

Timeliness aside, in the alternative, defendant is entitled to summary judgment because it is an undisputed fact that the pay system challenged is a bona fide facially neutral seniority or merit system.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits an employer to apply different employment terms under a bona fide seniority or merit system.

Zezulewicz v. Port Authority of Allegheny County · filed 2003-11-13(h)

An employer may “apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system” without violating Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The system put in place pursuant to the CBA was applied equally to all members of the bargaining unit. Accordingly, we find that any action taken by the defendant pursuant to the collective bargaining process, even if it had a detrimental impact on the plaintiff, was not retaliatory and did not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not protect a purported merit or production system when a complaint plausibly alleges that it fails to measure what it claims to measure.

Calibuso v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2012-09-27(h)

Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, where the Court must take the allegations in the third amended complaint as true, and draw every reasonable inference in plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the compensation and account distribution systems are not merit or production based systems protected by Section 703(h) of Title VII.

A voluntary settlement of equivalent state employment discrimination rights can bar a claim for discriminatory refusal to hire under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Perez Ex Rel. Estate of Perez v. Maine · filed 1984-05-03(a)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added). These two statutes are obviously virtually alike in substance as well as in language. ... Hence, the claims now asserted under Title VII were also validly disposed of by the compromise settlement contemplated by the conciliation agreement in the Maine proceedings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a remedy for discrimination based on family responsibilities alone, though a claim based on a sexist remark may fall within it.

Lamont v. Rogers · filed 1984-08-21(a)(1)

Arguably, petitioner’s family responsibilities claim would fall within section 2000e-2(a)(l), based as it is on a patently sexist remark which the Controller, Alphonse G. Hill, allegedly made to petitioner. However, Title VII does not provide a remedy for discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities per se.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; family-care responsibilities alone do not establish sex discrimination.

Gingras v. Milwaukee County · filed 2015-08-31(a)(1)

While the evidence may allow a jury to infer that the plaintiff was terminated in part because of her family responsibilities, there is simply nothing in the record that suggests that she was fired because she was female — and, as described below, this is not a distinction without a difference.

Section 2000e-2(g) recognizes the validity of national security clearance requirements; their special effect on applicants with ties to particular foreign countries alone is not evidence of discrimination.

Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1984-11-30(g)

In any case, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) specifically acknowledges the general validity of national security clearance requirements, and we hold as a matter of law that the mere fact that such requirements impose special disabilities on the basis of connection with particular foreign countries is not alone evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(g) permits termination when an employee fails to meet a national security requirement; a court cannot adjudicate a discrimination claim that requires reviewing the merits of a security clearance decision.

Cruz-Packer v. Chertoff · filed 2009-05-06(g)

Because this court lacks jurisdiction over claims implicating the merits of a decision to deny a security clearance, and over defamation claims against the federal government, TSA’s motion to dismiss will be granted.

When employees of different ranks receive different discipline, Section 2000e-2(a)(1) calls for examining whether the employer applied the same employment policies to them.

Smith v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2011-06-30(a)(1)

This is because the relevant inquiry is whether the employer subjected differently ranked employees to the same or different employment policies.

A race discrimination claim based on disparate discipline requires proof that the employee is a racial minority, was disciplined, and was disciplined under circumstances supporting an inference of racial discrimination.

Jones v. Denver Post Corp. · filed 2000-02-10(a)(1)

A prima facie case of disparate discipline may be established if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the plaintiff is a racial minority, (2) the plaintiff was disciplined by the employer, and (3) the employer imposed the discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employee disciplined for a work-rule violation to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that white employees who committed similar violations received lighter discipline.

Rochon v. Exxon Corporation · filed 1999-11-24(a)

In work-rule violation cases, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing “either he did not violate the rule or that, if he did, white employees who engaged in similar acts were not punished similarly.” Mayberry, 55 F.3d at 1090. Since Rochon admits that he violated a work-rule, to establish a prima facie case he must show that white employees were treated differently under circumstances “nearly identical” to his.

A disparate-discipline plaintiff may survive summary judgment by showing that employees outside the protected class received lighter discipline for misconduct of comparable severity.

Lobeck v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 1997-06-11(a)(1)

Thus, Lobeck may withstand summary judgment by demonstrating that the City disciplined him for conduct of the same severity as the conduct of black officers, whom the City did not discipline (or disciplined less severely).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires employees claiming discriminatory enforcement of a workplace rule to show comparable misconduct by employees outside their protected class and more severe enforcement against them.

Luz A. Long Sylvia E. Velez Mayela D. Salvador Lilian P. Baeza v. First Union Corporation of Virginia, D/B/A First Union · filed 1996-05-29(a)

A prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement of an employer's rules is (1) plaintiffs' membership in a protected class, (2) comparable misconduct by the plaintiffs and employees outside the protected class, and (3) more severe enforcement against the plaintiffs than the other employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discriminatory-enforcement claim when protected employees commit misconduct comparable to employees outside the protected class but face more severe enforcement.

Long v. First Union Corp VA · filed 1996-05-29(a)

A prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement of an employer's rules is (1) plaintiffs' membership in a protected class, (2) comparable miscon- duct by the plaintiffs and employees outside the protected class, and (3) more severe enforcement against the plaintiffs than the other employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate discipline plaintiff to show membership in a protected class, comparable misconduct by employees outside that class, and more severe discipline than those employees received.

Frank Wilson, Jr. v. Circuit City Stores, Incorporated · filed 1996-04-01(a)

To state a claim based on disparate discipline, Wilson had to show (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that employees outside the protected class engaged in comparable misconduct; and (3) that the disciplinary measures enforced against Wilson were more severe than those enforced against the other employees who engaged in comparable misconduct.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline based on evidence that an employee received a more severe sanction than a person of another race who committed similar misconduct.

Jack K. MOORE, Appellee, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, NC, Appellant, and Charlotte Police Department, Defendant · filed 1985-01-28(a)

These failures together rendered meaningless the requirement of dissimilar sanctions for similar offenses that constitutes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a Title VII disciplinary case.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race and sex discrimination in employment; a discriminatory-discipline claim requires proof that the employer imposed more severe discipline than it imposed on a comparable employee of another race or sex.

Crawford v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education · filed 1986-08-08(a)

(9) Under either the McDonnell-Douglas or the Moore proof of scheme, Crawford has not established a prima facie case because he has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite his qualifications, he was discriminated against by the Board’s disciplinary measures or that he engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of another race or sex but the disciplinary measures enforced against Crawford were more severe than enforced against the other person.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discriminatory-discipline plaintiff to show similar prohibited conduct by a person of another protected class and more severe discipline for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.

Walker v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1988-04-05(a)

The decisive issue in this Title VII suit is whether the defendant's disciplinary actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a). ... In discriminatory discipline cases, this Court has held that a prima facie case is made out by showing "(1) that plaintiff engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2) that the disciplinary measures enforced against the plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against the other person." Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).

A discriminatory discipline claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) survives summary judgment when the evidence could allow a factfinder to conclude that race was a determinative factor in the discipline.

Cuffy v. Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. · filed 1988-04-07(a)(1)

Mr. Cuffy has met his burden of production of evidence in response to this motion for summary judgment. He is required only to produce evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that discrimination was a determinative factor in Texaco’s disciplinary action against him. ... Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to plaintiff’s discriminatory discipline claim under Title VII and Section 1981 arising out of the fire watch incident on May 4, 1984.

Section 2000e-2 covers sex discrimination through the discriminatory enforcement of work rules.

Zentiska v. Cardinal Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-09-30

Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 “applies not only to the more blatant forms of discrimination, but also to subtler forms, such as discriminatory enforcement of work rules.”

Section 2000e-2 covers sex discrimination through discriminatory enforcement of workplace rules.

Zentiska v. Pooler Motel, Ltd. · filed 1988-11-21

Plaintiff states a cause of action because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 “applies not only to more blatant forms of discrimination, but also to subtler forms, such as discriminatory enforcement of work rules.”

In a racial discrimination claim based on discipline for violating work rules, an employee must show either that he did not violate the rule or that someone outside his protected class committed similar misconduct and received less severe discipline.

Jones v. Gerwens · filed 1989-06-13(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that, in cases involving alleged racial bias in the application of discipline for violation of work rules, the plaintiff, in addition to being a member of a protected class, must show either (a) that he did not violate the work rule, or (b) that he engaged in misconduct similar to that of a person outside the protected class, and that the disciplinary measures enforced against him were more severe than those enforced against the other persons who engaged in similar misconduct.

Performance evidence can support rejection of an alleged racially discriminatory demotion under § 2000e-2(a).

Miles v. Stone Container Corporation · filed 1991-11-25(a)

We cannot and do not conclude that the judge's factual determinations were clearly erroneous. Stone Container provided evidence which, if believed by the district court, supports a conclusion that Miles' performance as supervisor was, indeed, inadequate.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discipline must show that employees of another race who engaged in similar misconduct were disciplined less severely.

Moorer v. Ris Paper Company · filed 1998-01-20(a)(1)

First, the court concluded that Moorer had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination because he could not show that white employees who had engaged in misconduct similar to his own were disciplined less severely. ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discipline, and an employer’s stated reason for discipline may be shown to be a pretext for racial discrimination.

Reynolds v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 1998-04-13(a)(1)

Applying the above principles, the court concludes that the evidence is overwhelming that the Transportation Department’s first reason for suspending Reym-olds — that Reynolds had made false statements involving racial slurs which created a disruption in the office — is a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging sex-based discriminatory discipline to show comparable misconduct by an employee outside the protected class who received less severe discipline.

Cohen v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1999-04-27(a)

She cannot establish a prima facie case, because she has not presented any evi- dence of a similarly situated male whose misconduct was comparable to hers, yet who received less severe discipline.

An employee’s evidence of selective discipline and pretext can allow a Title VII race or gender discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Russell v. City of Kansas City · filed 2005-07-12(a)

When combined with Russell’s other evidence casting doubt on the bona fides of the City’s decision, particularly the above-described testimony of Hernandez and Recar, we conclude that the showing of pretext was more than enough to defeat the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require employers to follow transparent disciplinary procedures; a flawed process violates the section only if it is discriminatory.

Pate v. West Publishing Corp. · filed 2006-01-03(a)(1)

Rocke’s investigation and West’s decision to terminate Pate may not have adhered to transparent guidelines, but they are not required by either Title VII or § 1981 to do so.

A Title VII disparate discipline claim requires evidence that a similarly situated employee outside the protected group committed comparable misconduct but received less severe discipline.

Ferguson v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2006-04-14(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of disparate discipline, Plaintiff must show that he (1) was a member of a protected group, (2) engaged — either disputedly or admittedly — in misconduct similar to persons outside the protected group, and (3) was disciplined more severely for that misconduct than similarly situated persons outside the protected group. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of disparate discipline. Accordingly, Defendant GDOC is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of disparate discipline under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Hegger v. Visteon Automotive Systems, Inc. · filed 2006-06-02(a)(1)

In order to survive the entry of a summary judgment in a Title VII claim through the use of circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must show that he (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) was qualified, and (4) was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class. ... Despite having claimed that white co-workers were treated differently from him, he has been unable to identify any white fellow employee who, though similarly situated, was treated differently.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline or raise a genuine issue about the employer’s stated reason for the discipline.

Villareal v. Duke Energy Corp. · filed 2007-01-04

After careful review of the briefs and the record, we agree with the district court that Villareal has failed to present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, or raise a genuine issue that she was forced to resign for a reason other than her violation of Defendant’s Code of Business Ethics.

A disparate-discipline claim fails without proof of its prima facie elements.

Jenks v. City of Greensboro · filed 2007-07-02(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established the elements of a pri-ma facie case of disparate discipline based on gender.

In a sex discrimination claim based on discipline, an employee relying on indirect proof must show harsher punishment than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 2008-07-24(a)(1)

Accordingly, the analysis of the employer’s expectations falls by the wayside, and a “plaintiff must establish that [s]he received dissimilar — and more harsh — punishment than that received by a similarly situated employee who was outside the protected class.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee claiming discriminatory discipline to show that a comparator engaged in nearly identical misconduct but received less severe discipline.

Bennett v. Chatham County Sheriff Dept. · filed 2008-11-04(a)(1)

Thus, Bennett and Williams were not nearly identical in all relevant aspects of their behavior during the incident, and Williams was not a sufficient comparator for Bennett. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Bennett failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and in granting summary judgment to defendants on these claims.

A disparate-discipline claim requires evidence that employees outside the protected class committed comparably serious misconduct but received less severe discipline.

Mahomes v. Potter · filed 2008-11-20(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to her disparate discipline claim, Plaintiff must show the following: 1) that she is a member of a class protected by Title VII; 2) that the prohibited conduct in which she engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class; 3) and that the disciplinary measures enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against those other employees.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discipline under § 2000e-2(a) must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who engaged in nearly identical misconduct but received more favorable treatment.

Miller-Goodwin v. City of Panama City · filed 2010-07-08(a)

Having viewed the evidence in Goodwin’s favor, we find she has failed to identify any similarly situated male employee who engaged in misconduct nearly identical to hers, but who received less severe disciplinary sanctions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a racial disparate discipline plaintiff to show comparably serious misconduct by employees outside the protected class and more severe discipline.

Tabor v. Freightliner of Cleveland, LLC · filed 2010-07-20(a)(1)

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find that Tabor has failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, Tabor has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating that his misconduct was comparable in seriousness to actions of employees outside his class or that he was disciplined more severely than employees whose actions were comparable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit an employer to discipline employees differently because of race based on a social norm about who may use a racial slur.

Burlington v. NEWS CORPORATION · filed 2010-12-28(a)(1)

Nevertheless, we are unable to conclude that this is a justifiable reason for permitting the Station to draw race-based distinctions between employees. It is no answer to say that we are interpreting Title VII in accord with prevailing social norms. Title VII was enacted to counter social norms that supported widespread discrimination against African Americans.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars an employer from disciplining an employee more severely because of race, even if the employee performed poorly or misbehaved.

Luster v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2011-07-19(a)(1)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer cannot intentionally discipline poor employees more severely on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim concerning a written reprimand to proceed when evidence of a supervisor’s racial slur could permit a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination.

Davis v. JOSEPH J. MAGNOLIA, INC. · filed 2011-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has therefore identified sufficient, albeit circumstantial, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Forsythe’s decision to issue plaintiff a written reprimand was the result of intentional discrimination. Accordingly, with respect to the November 2005 incident, the Court DENIES summary judgment on plaintiffs discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race discrimination claim based on an employer’s initial disciplinary decision without requiring proof that discriminatory animus caused a later administrative appeal decision.

Turner v. Kansas City Southern Railway · filed 2012-03-23(a)

Therefore, we do not agree with KCSR that the plaintiffs need to show that the alleged discriminatory animus motivating the disciplinary decisions at issue in this case “caused” later decisions that are not at issue.

A claim of sex-based disparate discipline requires a comparison with an employee similarly situated in all relevant respects; differences in duties and on-duty status can defeat that comparison.

Croft v. City of Roanoke · filed 2012-03-22(a)(1)

In contrast, Van Ness was not assigned to Station No. 4 and was off duty at the time of the incident, having already completed her shift as a part-time EMT. The court agrees with the City that the differences in their positions make the purported comparison in this case far “too loose” to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discipline must show that comparable employees were treated differently because of race.

Tinsley v. Astrue · filed 2012-12-27(a)(1)

Tinsley cannot show that any comparable employee was treated differently based on race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discipline to present evidence of a similarly situated comparator or other circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Lewis v. The City of Kennesaw, Georgia · filed 2013-01-28(a)(1)

In sum, in the absence of either a similarly situated comparator or sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference of discrimination, the court properly found that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

A discriminatory-discipline claim requires evidence that an employee outside the protected class engaged in comparable misconduct; substantially more serious misconduct does not show pretext.

Hamilton v. Coffee Health Group · filed 2013-06-06(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not established that she was subjected to discriminatory discipline because the gravity of plaintiffs misconduct far exceeds Lindsey Gardner’s in “quantity and quality.”

A discriminatory discipline claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a proposed comparator’s misconduct to be nearly identical to the plaintiff’s misconduct.

Dejarnett v. Willis · filed 2013-10-04(a)(1)

In short, Vreeland’s failed random drug screen and Dejarnett’s abusive behavior toward customers are not “nearly identical” such that Vreeland could be considered a sufficiently similar comparator to Dejarnett.

A discriminatory discipline claim requires evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were not similarly disciplined.

Grice v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District · filed 2013-11-05(a)(1)

With only the fourth element in contention, Grice bears the burden of producing evidence “that white employees, ‘similar in all of the relevant aspects’ of employment, were not similarly disciplined.”

Disparate disciplinary treatment that could permit an inference of gender bias can sustain a Title VII discrimination claim at summary judgment.

Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Medical Center · filed 2013-08-14(a)(1)

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented disputed issues of fact such that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was subjected to disparate disciplinary treatment by Defendant on the basis of his gender. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs gender discrimination claims is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; a disparate discipline claim requires plausible facts showing that employees outside the protected class committed comparably serious misconduct but received less severe discipline.

Brown v. Goodwill Indus. of E. N.C., Inc. · filed 2019-01-02(a)(1)

Brown has failed to plausibly allege that Keisha's alleged misconduct is similarly severe as compared to Brown's alleged conduct. Brown alleges that Keisha assisted Cunningham "in stealing time on the clock," knew that "Cunningham was mixing prescription drugs and alcohol and was running around partying with her," lied to the district manager, and had "a history of setting people up and costing people their jobs." [D.E. 21] 2; [D.E. 32] 4. Brown fails to allege how Keisha's alleged misconduct is similarly severe to his alleged misconduct.

Section 2000e-2 can prohibit denying an employee access to an informal disciplinary process available to similarly situated employees because of race.

Morris v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2020-08-11(a)(1)

We have recognized before that the refusal to provide an employee access to progressive dis- cipline (here, an informal channel of discipline) available to other workers can be a form of discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination claim based on unequal discipline can proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges that a similarly situated employee of another race received more favorable treatment.

Rorie v. Board of Education of Charles County · filed 2021-09-21(a)

Thus, where the Amended Complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to Rorie, presents a scenario where a younger, white Principal was faced with incidents of sexual abuse at his school that appear to have been far more serious and extensive and that generated a comparable public outcry, yet received no formal discipline from the same decisionmakers who demoted Rorie, Rorie has identified a similarly situated comparator so as to successfully allege a prima facie case of race and age discrimination at the pleading stage.

A discriminatory discipline claim requires evidence that an employee outside the protected class engaged in similar conduct but received less severe discipline.

Bauknight v. Prince George's County Public Schools · filed 2023-09-12(a)

Where Bauknight has not identified any suitable comparators, he has not provided sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory discipline under § 2000e-2(a) must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who received better treatment.

Loggins · filed 2025-10-23(a)

Prong four of the prima facie case of discriminatory discipline requires the plaintiff to identify some comparator, an individual to demonstrate that the plaintiff “was treated differently than similarly-situated, non-protected employees.”

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on a state for interference with employment when the state acts through its regulatory licensing authority.

Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California · filed 1999-07-12(a)(1)

The clear principle behind the licensing exception is that a State will not be liable under Title VII for "interference" with an employment relationship if the alleged interference is an exercise of its regulatory responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2 does not apply to a public agency’s licensing decisions made under a state’s police powers.

George v. New Jersey Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 1986-06-27

We need only add that Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.1985), involving the licensing of dentists by the State of California, and Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.1984), involving the licensing of dance halls by the City of Cincinnati, are in accord with our view that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is not applicable to the licensing functions of a public agency exercised under the police powers of a state.

Section 2000e-2 does not apply to a public agency’s professional licensing functions exercised under a state’s police powers.

George v. New Jersey Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 1986-07-29

We need only add that Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.1985), involving the licensing of dentists by the State of California, and Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.1984), involving the licensing of dance halls by the City of Cincinnati, are in accord with our view that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is not applicable to the licensing functions of a public agency exercised under the police powers of a state.

A refusal to hire is a discrete unlawful employment practice, so the limitations period begins on the date of the adverse hiring decision.

Rodriguez v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-12-16(a)(1)

A refusal to hire is a “discrete act[]” that “constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice,’” such that the applicable statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the adverse hiring decision.

Section 2000e-2 includes individual discriminatory employment decisions among the unlawful employment practices it prohibits.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan · filed 2002-06-10

This argument is unavailing, however, given that 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2 explains in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as “[u]nlawful employment practices” and includes among such practices numerous discrete acts.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a pleaded hostile work environment claim to encompass related conduct outside the filing period when at least one related act occurred within it.

Gonzalzles v. Ferrara Candy Company, Inc. · filed 2024-02-15(a)

This argument is supported by the continuing violation doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to recover under Title VII for untimely conduct that is "part of a single, ongoing unlawful employment practice if at least one related act occurs during the limitations period." Barrett, 803 F.3d at 898. ... As such, the factual allegations in Ms. Gonzalzles's claims qualify as a continuing violation, at least for pleading purposes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on gender, but favoritism toward a supervisor's sexual partner based on their relationship is not actionable sex discrimination.

Byrd v. Quantum Health Resources · filed 1997-07-16(a)(1)

Hayes's preferential treatment of his paramour, Poirier, discriminated against Byrd based on her sexual affiliation rather than her gender, and is therefore not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit favoritism based on a voluntary romantic relationship when employees are disadvantaged because of that relationship rather than their sex.

DeCINTIO v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER · filed 1986-12-15(a)(1)

In sum, we hold that voluntary, romantic relationships cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination suit under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat preferential promotion of a supervisor’s romantic partner, by itself, as sex discrimination.

Handley v. Phillips · filed 1989-06-09

First, the specific allegation as to dissimilar treatment resulting from Defendant Sinca-vage’s alleged desire to promote another female to whom he is romantically linked is not the basis for a Title YII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on gender; favoring an employee because of a consensual romantic relationship does not violate it.

Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Commission · filed 1997-10-01(a)(1)

Therefore, we hold that Title VII’s reference to “sex” means a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual affiliations.

A supervisor’s affair and related favoritism, without more, are not actionable sex discrimination under Section 2000e-2.

Anderson v. Oklahoma State University Board of Regents · filed 2009-08-17

The plaintiffs in Taken also alleged adverse employment actions, but the dispositive issue here, as in Taken, is that the supervisor’s affair and related favoritism are not, without more, actionable under Title VII.