42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

For a religious discrimination claim based on a conflict with a work requirement, an employee must show a bona fide religious practice, notice to the employer, and adverse employment action based on the practice.

Kreilkamp v. Roundy's, Inc. · filed 2006-05-01(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination because he has failed to show a bona fide observance or practice of a religious nature that conflicted with an employment requirement, and he did not bring to defendant’s attention that he had a particular religious belief that conflicted with the store’s policy and because no actionable adverse employment action was taken based on a religious observance.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against religious discrimination, and evidence of Buddhist beliefs can create a triable issue on the religion element of a disparate treatment claim.

Murdick v. Catalina Marketing Corp. · filed 2007-07-11(a)

This Court finds that Murdiek has provided evidence and established that there is a genuine issue of material fact on this first point within element one, such that it should survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of religion, and an employee relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Waaser v. Streit's Inc. · filed 2007-11-06(a)(1)

Plaintiff bears the burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact that the reasons offered by Defendant for his termination were a pretext for religious discrimination. All of Plaintiffs explanations fail to show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered for his termination should not be believed. Thus, the Court agrees with the Magistrate that because Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s decision to terminate him was motivated by his religious beliefs, summary judgment must be granted.

A religious discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee admits that the employer fired her for a reason unrelated to her religion.

Steadman v. Urban Retail Properties Co. · filed 2008-06-24(a)(1)

And since Steadman did not dispute that the reason Urban fired Stead-man had nothing to do with her religion, the company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A religious-discrimination discharge claim fails when the plaintiff does not establish the fourth element of her prima facie case.

Wheeles v. Nelson's Electric Motor Services · filed 2008-06-06(a)(1)

As Wheeles made no argument relating to the fourth element of the prima facie case, the Court determines she fails to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination with regard to her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars favoring employees of one religion over another when granting leave for religious holidays; evidence of that practice can establish a prima facie discrimination claim.

Siddiqi v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2008-08-12(a)(1)

If proved, this is a form of discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment — an impermissible favoring of one religious group over another — and so is barred by Title VII. ... Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of this form of religious discrimination.

Title VII permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when the employee plausibly alleges that he told his employer about his religious belief and was disciplined because of it.

Toronka v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 2009-08-03(a)(1)

In construing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor and accepting all factual allegations pleaded as true, the Court finds that Toronka has asserted a claim for religious discrimination that is “plausible” on its face. Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs religious discrimination claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits adverse employment actions because of an employee’s religion; a disparate treatment claim requires evidence from which a jury could infer religious discrimination.

Prise v. Alderwoods Group, Inc. · filed 2009-09-21(a)

In light of the foregoing analysis, no reasonable jury could conclude that Aider-woods treated Prise adversely because she was Jewish. Accordingly, Alderwoods’ motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to Prise’s religion-based discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA to the extent that such claims are based on a “disparate treatment” theory.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee using the burden-shifting framework must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Cohen-Breen v. Gray Television Group, Inc. · filed 2009-09-30(a)(1)

No reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence before the court, that Defendant’s conduct was a mere pretext for discrimination.

A religious disparate treatment claim requires evidence that the employee was replaced by someone outside the protected class or treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside that class.

Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, GP · filed 2010-06-18(a)

The Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to make out his prima facie case as to his disparate treatment claim. More specifically, Plaintiff cannot show that he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or that he was treated less favorably than similarly-situated persons outside of his protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating in employment terms because of an employee’s religion.

Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc. · filed 2011-02-24(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee solely because of his or her religious beliefs.

A religious discrimination claim based on a denied promotion requires circumstances supporting an inference that religion influenced the decision.

Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington · filed 2011-04-06(a)

The district court did not err in concluding Adams failed to satisfy the fourth prong of establishing his prima facie case – that he was denied a promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a religious discrimination claim based on an employee’s belief about same-sex relationships when the alleged adverse treatment is because of that belief.

Gadling-Cole v. West Chester University · filed 2012-03-30(a)

While Plaintiffs claims for religious discrimination are based on the single religious belief that a man should not lay with another man, this does not make Plaintiffs claim any less cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of religion; a plaintiff relying on pretext must present evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was not genuine.

Martino v. Western & Southern Financial Group · filed 2013-04-25(a)(1)

In sum, none of Martino’s purported evidence of pretext is sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)’s causation element can be satisfied when an employee is fired for an absence taken to observe a religious practice, even if the employer cites its attendance policy.

Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC · filed 2013-07-31(a)

Adeyeye was absent to observe his religious practices, and he was fired as a result of that absence.

A religious discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must provide evidence that a successful applicant was outside her protected class.

Travis v. Triton College · filed 2013-12-10(a)(1)

Likewise, because she supplied no evidence about the beliefs of those hired for the open positions, the court correctly determined that she failed to establish that the successful candidates were outside her protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of religion.

St. Juste v. Metro Plus Health Plan · filed 2014-03-28(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s ... religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plausible connection between an adverse employment action and the employee’s religion; enforcement of a condition imposed on all employees alone does not establish religious discrimination.

Macon v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 2014-04-23(a)

Thus, this claim also fails, as Macon does not explain how her religious beliefs motivated the enforcement of this employment condition, or allege that she was treated differently than non-Christian employees who did not sign the forms.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the employer knew or reasonably should have known of the employee’s conflicting religious beliefs before discharge.

Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Ctr, et · filed 2014-08-07(a)(1)

If Nobach had presented any evidence that Woodland knew or reasonably should have known the cause for her refusing this task was her conflicting religious beliefs, the jury would certainly have been entitled to reject Woodland’s explanation for Nobach’s termination, but no such evidence was ever provided to the jury. We hold, therefore, that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Woodland intentionally discriminated against Nobach because of her religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employee’s religion motivated the employer’s discharge decision.

Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Ctr, et · filed 2015-08-20(a)(1)

To sum up, we hold that the district court erred by not granting Woodland’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law because Nobach failed to put forth evidence that, before her termination, Woodland knew or suspected that her religious belief needed an accommodation, which necessarily means that there was no evidence that Nobach’s religious belief was the motive for Woodland’s termination decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious-discrimination discharge claim to proceed when evidence could show that religion was a factor in the termination.

Samuels v. We've Only Just Begun Wedding Chapel, Inc. · filed 2015-12-15(a)(1)

However because there are triable issues as to whether Ms. Samuels was terminated, at least in part, because of a protected characteristic, I deny summary judgment on the portion of the Seventh Cause of Action that is based on her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects atheist employees from religious discrimination on the same terms as employees of other religions.

Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. · filed 2016-01-26(a)

Under Title VII, atheists are entitled to the exact same protection as members of other religions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of religion; a disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that could support a finding of discriminatory motive.

Tabura v. Kellogg USA, Inc. · filed 2016-07-07(a)(1)

To prevail on their claim, Mr. Tabura and Ms. Diaz must show that Kellogg fired them “because of’ their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... In all, the evidence Plaintiffs point to is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Mr. Tabura or Ms. Diaz. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to Kellogg for the disparate-treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff alleging religious discrimination to show that religion was a motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.

Serlin v. Alexander Dawson School · filed 2016-07-28(m)

Regarding Serlin’s religious discrimination claim, Serlin has failed to demonstrate that her religion (Judaism) was a “motivating factor” in Dawson’s decision not to renew her contract. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence linking discrimination to the employee’s own religious beliefs.

Equal Opprtunity Employment Commission v. United Health Programs of America, Inc. · filed 2016-09-30(a)(1)

For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the claimants (with the exception of Pennisi) were discriminated against on the basis of their personal religious beliefs.

A religious discrimination plaintiff can establish disparate treatment without comparator evidence when the circumstances of an adverse employment decision support an inference of discrimination.

Smith v. City of Phila. · filed 2018-01-19(a)(1)

Because I conclude that Plaintiff can prove disparate treatment without citing to comparators, and because there are issues of fact with respect to the role played by this religious disagreement in the hiring process, the City's motion must be denied.

A religious practice’s connection to religion alone does not establish that it is sincerely held for a Title VII religious discrimination claim.

Mial v. Foxhoven · filed 2018-04-04(a)(1)

The two issues are not strictly tied together. Thus, the fact that a practice or belief may be connected to religion does not compel the conclusion that it is not a personal preference, or that it is in fact sincerely held.

Religion can be a motivating factor in an unlawful employment practice even when other factors also motivated it.

Kennedy v. Berkel & Company Contractors, Inc. · filed 2018-07-24(m)

And while Bruce’s alleged conduct would have created a hostile work environment for anyone, religious or not, the complaint allows for the inference that Bruce’s behavior—accompanied by his mocking of Kennedy’s religious scruples—was motivated at least partly by Kennedy’s religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on religion; allegations of religious harassment followed by termination can state a plausible claim.

Teegarden v. Gold Crown Mgmt. LLC · filed 2018-11-05(a)(1)

Giving Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and the documents attached thereto the broadest reading possible, as this Court must, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII and disability discrimination under the ADA, as well as hostile work environment and retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits employees to bring religious discrimination claims based on disparate treatment or failure to accommodate.

Miller v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2018-11-13(a)

Under Title VII, employees may assert two different theories of religious discrimination: disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.

Religious discrimination claims under § 2000e-2 may proceed under disparate treatment or failure to accommodate theories.

Brennan v. Deluxe Corp. · filed 2019-01-18(a)(1)

Given the two available theories, I shall construe Count One as a religious discrimination claim under the disparate treatment theory. And, I shall construe Count Two as a failure to accommodate claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of religion.

Carter v. Transp. Workers Union of Am. Local 556 · filed 2019-02-01(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was connected to the employee’s religion.

Rightnour v. Tiffany & Co. · filed 2019-02-11(a)(1)

Additionally, the plaintiff has not established that she was treated differently from other employees because of her religion.

A religious discrimination claim may proceed when there is a genuine dispute over whether the employee was constructively discharged.

McIlmail v. Pennsylvania · filed 2019-05-14(a)(1)

As discussed supra, there is a material issue as to whether Plaintiff suffered a constructive discharge, an element of his prima facie religious discrimination case. Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim in Count V is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a religious discrimination claim to plausibly connect an adverse employment action or unequal terms of employment to the employee’s religion.

Bakra v. RST Marketing/et al · filed 2019-07-31(a)

Plaintiff does not allege facts on how he was treated differently because of his religion.

Section 2000e-2 permits a religious discrimination claim when an employer allegedly denies a qualified employee a position because he wears a turban as part of his religion.

(PS) Singh v. Target Corporation · filed 2019-09-04(a)(1)

Liberally construed, the complaint’s allegations, including those contained in the questionnaire, sufficiently state a religious discrimination claim based on the denial of plaintiff’s request to work as a cashier.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by religion to establish a prima facie religious-discrimination claim.

Wade v. Electric Boat Corp · filed 2019-09-30(a)

With no evidence that Dr. Hurley’s motivation in doing so was because of her religious beliefs, plaintiff cannot substantiate a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit an employer to treat employees differently because their workplace criticism stems from religious rather than secular convictions.

Hudson v. City of Highland Park · filed 2019-11-22(a)(1)

That reality does not permit differential treatment of them because they criticize behavior on moral grounds stemming from religious convictions as opposed to moral grounds stemming from secular convictions. “Let firemen be firemen” is not a cognizable defense to Title VII claims based on gender discrimination, race discrimination, or faith-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts connecting an adverse employment action to the employee’s religion to state a plausible religious discrimination claim.

Burrow-Threlkeld v. U.S. Vision · filed 2019-12-31(a)

Plaintiff does not plead any factual allegations in her Complaint to establish that her religion had anything to do with any adverse employment actions taken against her.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires factual allegations that plausibly connect an adverse employment action to religion; conclusory assertions of different treatment do not suffice.

Mejia v. White Plains Self Storage Corp · filed 2020-01-16(a)

Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege sufficient, non-conclusory facts to establish a prima facie case for discrimination on the basis of religion.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Basir v. Medical College of Wisconsin · filed 2020-01-28(a)(1)

Absent any such evidence, Dr. Basir cannot demonstrate that another similarly situated employee not in the protected class was treated more favorably than she was.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers religious discrimination when a qualified employee suffers an adverse employment action and different treatment because of religious beliefs.

Bleaken v. Apostolic Nunciature in the United States · filed 2020-06-10(a)(1)

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “facially plausib[le]” that 1) Plaintiff was a member of protected religious class; 2) he was harassed and then terminated, in what amounts to an “adverse employment action”; 3) he was otherwise qualified for his work as a technical engineering analyst; and 4) he was treated differently than “similarly situated employees” because of his religious beliefs.

A religious discrimination complaint can survive dismissal when it identifies the type of discrimination, who committed it, and when it occurred.

TURNER v. INDYGO · filed 2020-08-05(a)(1)

But Mr. Turner's complaint identifies the type of discrimination alleged (religious), by whom (his supervisor) and when (in connection with his 2018 termination). Dkt. 1 at 5. This is all he needed to allege.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars termination because of religion, but a claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate performance-based reason and the employee’s proposed pretext is unconnected to religion.

Rasheed v. Dc Public Schools · filed 2020-11-30(a)(1)

In this case, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim based on the termination of his employment. ... In arguing pretext, Plaintiff alleges two theories, neither of which is linked to any discrimination based on religion: (1) that Mr. Rasheed’s termination was predetermined; and (2) that it related to his accrual of leave.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer took adverse employment action because of an employee’s religion; conduct offensive to religious beliefs alone is insufficient.

Sorensson v. Harbor Freight Tools USA Inc. · filed 2020-12-18(a)(1)

On de novo review of plaintiff’s factual allegations, the court finds that she has not alleged sufficient facts for a reasonable inference to arise that any adverse employment action was taken against her because of her religion; rather, the complaint and plaintiff’s objections focus on how alleged actions were offensive to her religious beliefs.

A religious discrimination claim may proceed when an employee alleges a sincere religious belief conflicting with a job requirement, notice to the employer, and discipline for failing to comply with that requirement.

BONILLA v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-01-21(a)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged religious discrimination under Title VII. ... Third, plaintiff alleges that he was disciplined through “undesirable work assignments,” including an assignment to lift heavy motorcycles and ATVs, because of his religious beliefs. ... Based on these allegations, defendant’s motion is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of Count 1 of the Second Amended Complaint.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision and the employee fails to show pretext.

Flores v. City of Farmington · filed 2021-02-22(a)(1)

Moreover, for the same reasons as above, Plaintiff failed to rebut Defendants’ proffered reason as pretextual or otherwise inadequate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to show that more favorably treated applicants were outside the protected class.

Makar v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation · filed 2021-03-11(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the last factor of his prima facie case of disparate treatment religious discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts connecting an adverse employment action to the employee’s religion to state a religious discrimination claim.

Taylor v. Childrens Village · filed 2021-04-21(a)

Plaintiff fails to describe the nature of the “activities outside of work,” and she alleges no facts suggesting that she was treated differently because of her religion or that her religion as in any way related to her termination. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of religious discrimination for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of religion; a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence connecting the firing to religion.

TURNER v. INDYGO · filed 2021-05-14(a)(1)

Without evidence that IndyGo discriminated against Mr. Turner based on his religion—or even knew that he was religious—no reasonable jury could find that he was fired because of his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious discrimination by an employer; a complaint plausibly alleging termination because an employee could not work on the Sabbath states a claim.

Grooms v. Walden Security · filed 2021-06-03(a)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Walden Security engaged in religious discrimination prohibited by Title VII. This claim may proceed for factual development.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination, but a complaint must allege facts that plausibly support an inference of discrimination.

Hudson v. Square Inc. · filed 2021-08-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of his religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff merely states that he published a religious post on Facebook and that Defendant terminated him shortly thereafter.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats prolonged unpaid leave as an adverse employment action, but a religious discrimination claim also requires facts supporting a plausible inference that religion caused the action.

Billings v. State Of New York · filed 2021-09-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff alleges she was dismissed from her place of work with no pay for about seven months, which clearly constitutes a material change in her employment. ... In other words, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing a plausible inference of discrimination.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim survives dismissal when the complaint plausibly connects an adverse employment action to the employee’s religion.

Patalonis v. Outreach Development Corporation · filed 2021-10-27

The complaint describes the events that transpired leading up to Patalonis’s termination and demonstrates a connection between her religion and the adverse action that Outreach took sufficient to reach the liberal standard required to defeat a 12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, Defendant’s motion is denied with regard to count two.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on religion.

Adams v. Mass General Brigham Incorporated · filed 2021-11-10(a)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion, among other things. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

A religious disparate treatment claim requires evidence supporting an inference that an adverse employment action was motivated by religious discrimination.

Wilkerson v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2021-12-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s testimony thus contradicts any suggestion that John’s statement is itself evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory motivation, since Plaintiff testified that he has no reason to believe that John put out the directive being enforced—that people in construction flagging had to be clean shaven—“just to discriminate against Muslims.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of religion; a discrimination claim requires evidence that religion caused the discharge.

Trudeaux v. Paper Transport Inc · filed 2022-01-11(a)(1)

In all, Trudeaux has failed to present evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that his religion caused his termination. Consequently, PTI’s motion for summary judgment with regard to Trudeaux’s discrimination and disparate treatment claim is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious discrimination complaint to plausibly allege that the employer acted because of the employee’s religion.

Wehrly v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2022-02-01(a)(1)

Wehrly fails to meet even the low bar of Iqbal’s facial plausibility standard, as he fails to allege sufficient factual content from which the Court could draw the reasonable inference that Allstate discriminated against him because of his Christian faith.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious discrimination claim to proceed when alleged hostility to an employee’s religious practice, followed by increased scrutiny and termination, makes discrimination plausible.

Pineda v. Lerner Corporation · filed 2022-02-28(a)(1)

Even if it is improbable that Ms. Pineda will succeed on her claims, it is still plausible that Lerner discriminated against Ms. Pineda because of her religion. Accordingly, Lerner’s Motion is denied as to the religious discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination failure-to-hire claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly suggest that religious animus influenced the hiring decision.

Ismail v. Honeywell International Inc. · filed 2022-03-17(a)(1)

Construing Ismail’s allegations as true, Ismail alleges sufficient facts to infer that he was not hired due to religious discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires allegations connecting religious animus to an adverse employment action to support a religious discrimination claim.

Slover v. University of Colorado · filed 2022-03-20(a)(1)

With respect to her discrimination claim, Plaintiff’s allegations do not connect any religious animus to her adverse employment action.

A job applicant can establish a prima facie religious discrimination claim based on an employer’s mistaken perception of the applicant’s religion.

QUDUS v. WASHINGTON COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE · filed 2022-03-31(a)(1)

Qudus acknowledges that he is not Muslim but contends that he experienced discrimination because he was perceived to be Muslim. ... I find this sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on religion, contrary to the College’s argument.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim must plausibly allege that the employer took an adverse employment action because of the employee’s religious practices.

Milteer v. Navarro County Texas · filed 2022-05-03(a)(1)

Accordingly, because the allegations of the complaint do not enable the court to draw the reasonable inference that Milteer was terminated or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action “due to his religious practices,” P. Br. 11, the court grants Navarro County’s motion to dismiss Milteer’s Title VII and TCHRA religious discrimination claims.

A religious discrimination plaintiff who relies on another employee’s better treatment to show pretext must provide evidence that the employees had comparable disciplinary issues.

Pegler v. Autoplex · filed 2022-06-16(a)(1)

Pegler’s failure to show the other employee had similar disciplinary issues, coupled with his reliance on mere conjecture to rule out any explanation for differential treatment, prevents him from establishing a fact issue as to pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts connecting an employee’s religious beliefs to the employer’s discriminatory conduct.

ADDISON v. AMAZON.COM, INC. · filed 2022-07-19(a)(1)

First, Plaintiff does not offer any facts to suggest that Amazon acted with religious animus toward Plaintiff, nor does she specify the type of discriminatory acts she faced as a result of her beliefs.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a prima facie claim requires a religious practice that conflicts with an employment requirement and leads to an adverse employment decision.

LOWE v. MILLS · filed 2022-08-18

Thus, for purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Plaintiffs have set forth a prima facie case of religious discrimination in violation of Title VII, and the motions turn on the undue hardship affirmative defense.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment complaint to plausibly allege different treatment of similarly situated employees or other facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Norgren v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2023-01-04(a)(1)

Here, the Complaint fails to plead facts to plausibly support the fifth element of a disparate treatment religious discrimination claim---that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that there is other evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

A religious-discrimination claim can survive dismissal when an employee plausibly alleges that his employer refused to let him wear religious garments at work and later fired him for that practice.

Milteer v. Navarro County Texas · filed 2023-01-25(a)(1)

Milteer has satisfactorily addressed this pleading defect in his amended complaint. ... When accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Milteer, these allegations are sufficient to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court therefore denies Navarro County’s motion in this respect.

A religious disparate treatment plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must identify an employee outside the protected class who is similarly situated in all material respects.

Williams v. Lesaffre Yeast Corporation · filed 2023-03-01(a)(1)

The Court finds that Foster is not a valid comparator to Williams because he was not “similarly situated in all material respects.”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious discrimination in employment, but describing a medical judgment about vaccine safety in religious terms does not make it a protected religious belief.

Passarella, Megan v. Aspirus, Inc. · filed 2023-03-10(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and job applicants based on their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... The court concludes that Dottenwhy and Passarella refused the vaccine based on their personal judgments about vaccine safety and not for religious reasons. They couched their requests in religious terms, claiming that their decisions had been ratified by prayer. But the use of religious vocabulary does not elevate a personal medical judgment to a matter of protected religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows religious discrimination claims based on disparate treatment and disparate impact to proceed when the allegations plausibly support both theories.

Welcome v. Amplity Inc. · filed 2023-03-16(a)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged at this early stage in litigation a Title VII religious discrimination claim in both Count II (disparate treatment) and Count V (disparate impact) sufficient to withstand Amplity’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

A religious discrimination claim under Title VII survives dismissal when the alleged facts plausibly suggest that the employer terminated the employee because of religion.

Robbins v. Florida Cancer Specialists & Research Institute, LLC · filed 2023-03-20(a)(1)

Viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the alleged facts are adequate to raise Plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level. This is all that was required at the pleading stage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious discrimination complaint to plausibly allege a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement.

Troulliet v. Gray Media Group, Inc. · filed 2023-04-11(a)(1)

The Court finds that Troulliet’s Complaint, as presently plead, fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for religious discrimination. She has failed to allege with any particularity that she held a bona fide religious belief, much less one that conflicted with a requirement of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of religion; an objection based on medical concerns or bodily autonomy does not support a religious discrimination claim.

ULRICH v. LANCASTER GENERAL HEALTH · filed 2023-04-13(a)(1)

Because Ulrich has not alleged discrimination on the basis of a religious belief, she has not set forth a sufficient case of religious discrimination under Title VII or PHRA.

A religious discrimination claim requires facts identifying a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement.

MCKINLEY v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · filed 2023-04-28(a)(1)

Without Plaintiff providing facts showing what sincerely held religious belief she holds that prevented her from complying with the COVID-19 Policies, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a cognizable claim for religious discrimination, therefore, Defendant’s motion is granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of Counts I and III.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer took an adverse employment action because of an employee’s religion.

SPROUL v. SUNPRO SOLAR · filed 2023-05-18(a)

Sproul has failed to plead any fact that creates an inference that an employment action occurred against Sproul by Defendant based on his religion.

Section 2000e-2 treats religion as a basis for unlawful employment discrimination when it motivates a decision, even if other factors also play a role.

Kaczmarek v. D'Youville College · filed 2023-06-26(m)

Issue of fact remain for potential trial on whether Defendants discriminated against Sister Kaczmarek in terminating her part-time position as archivist because of religion.

A religious discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts showing a religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Cagle v. Weill Cornell Medicine · filed 2023-06-30(a)(1)

Bald allegations that a plaintiff has a religious belief and that those religious beliefs conflict with an employment requirement are insufficient to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII.

A religious discrimination claim based on a vaccine requirement requires an allegation that a sincerely held religious belief motivated the employee’s objection.

ALIANO v. TOWNSHIP OF MAPLEWOOD · filed 2023-07-07(a)(1)

To begin, as an element of each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action, Plaintiffs must allege that they had a sincerely held religious belief, and that their objection to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine was based on that belief.

A religious discrimination claim requires facts showing a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement.

Reichert v. Infusion Partners, LLC · filed 2023-07-21(a)(1)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that she has a bona fide religious belief, let alone that this religious belief conflicted with Defendants’ vaccine policy.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits disparate treatment and failure to accommodate as alternative theories of religious discrimination.

STERLE v. ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS CORPORATION · filed 2023-07-31(a)

Sterle brings a claim that Roche discriminated against him because of his religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (making it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against an[] individual . . . because of such individual's . . . religion."). Two alternative theories support that cause of action: "Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his sincerely held religious beliefs by subjecting him to disparate treatment" and "Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his sincerely held religious beliefs by failing to engage in the interactive process in good faith and denying his reasonable accommodations."

An employer’s inability to grant a requested religious exemption does not foreclose a claim that it terminated an employee because of religion.

Kinowski v. The Home for Elderly Women of Montgomery County, Inc. · filed 2023-07-31(a)(1)

Here, as an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claims are necessarily foreclosed by the We the Patriots decisions.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim requires facts supporting an inference that the employer treated the employee differently because of religion.

Blumstein-Torrella v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-08-09(a)(1)

These allegations do not support an inference that Plaintiff was discriminated against because of her religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plausible inference that an adverse employment action was motivated by religion; objections to a workplace mask requirement alone do not establish religious discrimination.

Vanwyckhouse v. Tessy Plastics · filed 2023-08-24(a)

Herein, the Court finds that the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiff's employer discriminated against him on the basis of religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges termination under circumstances minimally suggesting discrimination.

Walker v. Communication Services for the Deaf, Captel, Sprint, etc. · filed 2023-08-24(a)

Herein, Plaintiff has alleged that he is a member of a protected class; that he was qualified to work as a captioning assistant; and that he was terminated under circumstances minimally suggestive of discrimination. ... As such, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII religion discrimination claim must be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a religious discrimination claim based on objections to a job requirement that are not religious in nature.

BLACKWELL v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2023-09-07(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff again fails to plausibly plead the first prong of her prima facie religious discrimination claim because, under the Third Circuit’s test established in Africa v. Commw. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), Plaintiff’s objections to biweekly COVID-19 testing by way of a nasal swab on the grounds that such testing is a violation of her sincerely held religious beliefs against “being subjected to invasive COVID-19 testing via nasal swab,” and pursuant to her beliefs that such testing is “ineffective” are not religious beliefs under law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of religious beliefs, but objections based on a vaccine’s safety and efficacy do not establish religious discrimination.

Bube, Christine v. Aspirus Hospital, Inc. · filed 2023-09-15(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee’s religion, which includes the employee’s religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and § 2000e(j); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771–72 (2015). ... These are objections about personal autonomy, as well as the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. They are not religious objections.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious-discrimination claim when a complaint plausibly alleges that an employer discharged an employee because of her religion.

Ciavardone v. Raytheon Technologies, LLC · filed 2023-10-11(a)(1)

While there are other extraneous allegations in Count One, the Court finds that the allegations in Count One plausibly allege a claim under the portion of Title VII which makes it an unlawful employment practice “to discharge any individual. . . because of such individual's . . . religion . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and nothing more.

A Title VII religious discrimination complaint must describe with factual specificity how the employee’s religious beliefs conflict with an employment requirement.

Gamon v. Shriners Hospitals for Children · filed 2023-10-25(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must do more than state that her religious beliefs conflict with Defendant’s policy. Her Complaint must describe the conflict with factual specificity, which it failed to do.

A religious disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference of discrimination; identifying other employees without showing they were similarly situated is insufficient.

Moore v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 2023-11-03(a)(1)

�e Court finds that Moore has not alleged any facts that give rise to an inference that she was discriminated against because of her religious beliefs. As a preliminary matter, one of her comparators was vaccinated, and thus is in no way similarly situated to her. As regards her second comparator, Moore does not identify what his religious denomination was, how his treatment compared to her own, or any details regarding whether he was otherwise “similarly situated” to her.

An employee plausibly alleges religious discrimination by claiming that he notified his employer of a religious objection to a workplace requirement and was discharged for violating it.

Snyder v. Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) · filed 2023-11-06(a)(1)

Thus, Snyder states a Title VII claim for religious discrimination because he alerted his employer to his religious objection to the vaccination requirement and the employer discharged him for violation of the requirement; that is enough to plausibly suggest that his religious beliefs were the basis of the discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employee to request a religious exemption, but a claim must plausibly allege that religion motivated the employer’s decision.

Alexa v. Ann Arbor, City of · filed 2023-11-08(a)(1)

Boggs did not have to submit a religious exemption form for his religion to have motivated the City’s termination decision. ... Nevertheless, neither assertion cures the fact that Plaintiffs’ pleading is devoid of allegations suggesting that the decision to terminate Boggs was motivated by his religion.

A religious disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference of discriminatory motive; a uniformly applied vaccination policy and differing exemption outcomes alone do not establish that motive.

Weiss v. The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2023-12-04(a)(1)

Nor has Weiss demonstrated her termination from employment was other than the application of a uniform vaccination policy. Her argument that Okoh and two thirds of the religious applicants were treated better than she was similarly does not reflect that TPMG acted with a discriminatory motive in terminating her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when an employee plausibly alleges a sincere religious objection to a job requirement and gives the employer fair notice of the conflict.

Bey v. Pocono Medical Center · filed 2023-12-12(a)(1)

Bey does not seek a blanket privilege from all employer requirements or even all Covid-19 safety protocols and gave LVHN as much notice as it requested of the conflict between his religious beliefs and its vaccine requirement. The mere fact that unlike LVHN’s Christian employees, Bey is a member of a less well-known religion does not make him any less entitled to the protections of Title VII. Since Bey has alleged sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of his claim, LVHN’s motion to dismiss this count will be denied.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim must allege an actual conflict between a religious belief and an employment requirement; a secular objection to vaccine safety does not establish that conflict.

Craven v. Shriners Hospitals for Children · filed 2024-01-02(a)(1)

For the reasons below, this Court holds that Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks sufficient factual content regarding the conflict between his religious beliefs and a COVID-19 vaccine mandate to survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Further, amendment would be futile because, as shown in Plaintiff’s exemption request, Plaintiff’s objection to the COVID-19 vaccine was secular, not religious.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a union from deliberately declining to pursue a member’s grievance because of the member’s religion.

Asing v. Hawaii Government Employees Association, Local 152, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employee · filed 2024-01-12(c)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), a labor organization or union violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if it deliberately declines to pursue a member’s grievance claim because of the member’s religion.

A religious discrimination claim survives dismissal when the complaint plausibly alleges that an employee’s religious beliefs conflicted with an employment requirement and caused an adverse employment action.

Leaver v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. · filed 2024-01-19(a)

However, making all plausible inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the amended complaint adequately alleges the elements of a Title VII religious discrimination claim, at least as to Mr. Leaver and Ms. Gillen-Brown.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim may proceed when job performance is disputed and a supervisor’s remarks near termination could support an inference of discriminatory intent.

Gandhi v. NYS Unified Court System · filed 2024-01-31(a)(1)

Given this clear discordance among the parties, the Court cannot find that there is no genuine factual dispute as to the second element of a Title VII claim. ... Thus, the question of whether there is an inference of discriminatory intent is best left to be answered by a jury and not this Court.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when an employee plausibly alleges a personal religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement.

Gamon v. Shriners Hospitals for Children · filed 2024-02-15(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... In sum, Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff has failed to allege a prima facie case under Title VII must fail under current Ninth Circuit case law. The First Amended Complaint therefore survives Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer terminated an employee because of religion; a connection to the religious accommodation process alone is insufficient.

Gunkel v. OU Medical Inc · filed 2024-02-26(a)

But that mere relationship does not raise an inference of discrimination on the basis of religious belief. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that connect the dots between his religious beliefs and his termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious discrimination plaintiff to plead facts supporting an inference that the employer acted because of religion.

Adamowicz v. Northwell Health Systems · filed 2024-03-12(a)(1)

Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead a religious discrimination claim because they fail to plead an inference of discrimination.

A single comment about an employee’s religious practices does not qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Nofal v. IMCMV Times Square LLC · filed 2024-03-15(a)(1)

However, one comment regarding Plaintiff’s religious practices is insufficient to qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII.

A Title VII religious discrimination complaint must identify the plaintiff’s religion or explain how the objection follows from specific religious beliefs or practices.

Shigley v. Tydings & Rosenberg LLP · filed 2024-03-18(a)

But the Complaint must at a minimum identify a plaintiff's religion or explain how a plaintiff's objections are informed by a specific set of religious beliefs or practices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer acted because of the employee’s religion.

Rosser v. Ferndale School District No 502 · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

In the absence of a claim for a religious exemption or any facts suggesting that plaintiff’s supervisor understood or suspected that plaintiff’s failure to wear a face covering was a manifestation of a religious belief or practice, it would be illogical to infer that the employer was motivated by plaintiff’s religion.

A religious discrimination complaint must describe how the plaintiff’s religious belief conflicts with an employment duty; a conclusory assertion of conflict is insufficient.

Prakash v. Oregon Health and Science University · filed 2024-04-04(a)(1)

Because the Complaint here likewise fails to explain how Plaintiff’s Hindu beliefs conflict with a vaccine mandate, it must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a union from refusing to pursue a member’s grievance because of the member’s religion; a religious discrimination claim must plausibly allege that the union treated the member less favorably on that basis.

Asing v. Hawaii Government Employees Association, Local 152, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employee · filed 2024-04-15(c)

The First Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to plausibly state a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim against Defendant HGEA Union Local 152 based on the McDonnell Douglas test.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a religious discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege a sincere religious belief and that religion was the reason for the adverse employment action.

Robert v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation · filed 2024-04-25(a)

Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim is independently subject to dismissal because he fails plausibly to make out a prima facie case that his religion was the reason for his termination.

A Title VII religious discrimination complaint must explain how the employee’s religious beliefs conflict with an employment requirement; a conclusory assertion of conflict is insufficient.

Niemeyer v. Permanente · filed 2024-05-06(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Because the Complaint here likewise fails to explain how Plaintiff’s Christian beliefs conflict with a vaccine mandate, it must be dismissed.

A religious discrimination claim may proceed when the employee plausibly alleges a sincere religious belief requiring leave that conflicts with a work requirement.

Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District · filed 2024-05-07(a)(1)

Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly pled that she held a sincere religious belief requiring her to take leave during the Days of Awe.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious employment discrimination, but a claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for termination and the evidence does not support a finding of pretext.

Smith v. St. Joseph's Medical Center · filed 2024-05-07(a)

Assuming, without deciding, plaintiff has met her de minimis burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court finds defendants have proffered a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination—her failure to comply with the vaccination mandate—and plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants’ proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a religious discrimination plaintiff to separately plead that her religious belief is sincere.

Gortemiller v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2024-05-15(a)(1)

There is no separate requirement that she allege facts showing that she sincerely believes the alleged religious principle in her heart of hearts.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious belief, practice, or observance to be a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Nelson-Godfrey v. Cook County Health and Hospital Systems · filed 2024-05-28(a)(1)

For an employer’s decision to be “because of” an employee’s religion, the religion must be “a motivating factor” in the decision.

A religious discrimination claim is plausible when an employee alleges that her religious practice conflicted with a work requirement, her employer knew of the practice, and she was terminated for observing it.

Ramos v. Envoy Air Inc · filed 2024-05-29(a)(1)

Ramos clearly pled facts on all four elements of a prima facie case of religious discrimination, and therefore, plausibly alleged a religious discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a refusal-to-hire claim based on a religious objection to vaccination when the applicant pleads facts connecting that objection to her beliefs.

Najean Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C. · filed 2024-06-12(a)(1)

No further “enhancement” was necessary: Lucky’s allegations were almost self-evidently enough to establish, at the pleadings stage, that her refusal to receive the vaccine was an “aspect” of her religious observance or belief.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination in employment, and a claim may proceed when the alleged facts plausibly connect an employee’s religious beliefs to an adverse employment action.

Larson v. Walz · filed 2024-06-12(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Mr. Larson alleges facts plausibly showing a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible allegation that an employer treated an employee differently because of religion; enforcing a neutral vaccination policy alone does not establish disparate treatment.

Tyiease v. Permanente · filed 2024-06-24(a)(1)

Chinnery has not plausibly alleged that she faced disparate treatment “because of” her religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of religion; a religious discrimination claim fails when the evidence does not support an inference of discrimination.

Mafuta v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2024-07-03(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discharging an individual, or discriminating against someone, because of their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Mafuta has failed to establish a prima facie case because, as a matter of law, these circumstances do not give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference of religious discrimination; an employer’s compliance with a mandatory vaccination rule does not alone support that inference.

Rowe v. Brookdale University Hospital · filed 2024-07-17(a)(1)

The Complaint – which, notably, fails to contend in any way with the State Mandate – alleges no facts to support an inference that the hospital acted with discriminatory intent, as opposed to having simply acted in compliance with its obligations under the State Mandate.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits religious discrimination, but a religious-discrimination claim fails when the employer terminates an employee for a nondiscriminatory reason.

Rosario-Velazquez v. Corporacion Educativa Ramon Barquin · filed 2024-07-24

Title VII and Law 100 bar employers from discriminating against employees because of their religion or religious beliefs. ... The present case fits that mold, for based on the allegations, AMA terminated plaintiff’s employment for not complying with the “minister or ecclesiastical leader” signature requirement to support the religion-based exemption request to mandatory vaccination under the Administrative Order.

A religiously biased comment must be linked to an adverse employment action to support an inference of religious discrimination.

Wallace v. Wesleyan University · filed 2024-08-02(a)(1)

But, despite all of that, Mr. Wallace does not allege Rabbi Teva’s involvement in his termination, which is necessary to link Rabbi Teva’s alleged comment to his termination.

A religious discrimination claim is plausible when an employee alleges that, at the meeting where he was fired, his employer told him he could not discuss his Christian faith at work.

Farlow v. L3 Communications Integrated Systems LP · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

Being told he was not allowed to discuss “his Christian faith under any circumstances” at the same meeting where L3Harris terminated him renders plausible the inference that Farlow was fired because of his religion.

Section 2000e-2 protects employees from discrimination for refusing to share or follow an employer’s religious beliefs.

Amos v. Lampo Group, LLC · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

While the text of Title VII prescribes that the discrimination must have been “because of such [employee’s] . . . religion,” see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2), it is appropriate to use the employee’s refusal to share or comply with the employer’s religious belief of religious work requirement as a proxy for the employee’s religion and to show the causal nexus between the discriminatory act and its religious motivation.

A religious discrimination claim can survive dismissal when the alleged circumstances support a reasonable inference of discrimination.

McNellis v. Douglas County School District · filed 2024-09-10(a)(1)

But we conclude Mr. McNellis has alleged facts that, from circumstantial evidence, “give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination” based on his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim against an alleged joint employer when the complaint alleges that it terminated employees because of their religion.

Sanchez v. Rock Island County Health Department · filed 2024-09-20(a)(1)

This is more than sufficient to put the County on notice that Plaintiffs are alleging that it terminated them because of their religions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when employees plausibly allege adverse employment action based on their religion; they need not identify a similarly situated comparator in the complaint.

HALCZENKO v. ASCENSION HEALTH, INC. · filed 2024-09-25(a)(1)

That is sufficient to allege a Title VII discrimination claim.

A religious discrimination claim can proceed when an employee plausibly alleges a religious belief conflicting with a work requirement, notice to the employer, and discipline for noncompliance; the employer then bears the burden of showing undue hardship from accommodation.

Hewitt-Simmons v. Mayor Eric Adams · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

In the absence of such contrary authority, the Court concludes Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a prima facie case of religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII. The burden thus shifts to Defendants to show they could not accommodate Plaintiff’s beliefs without undue hardship.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious disparate treatment claim to proceed without allegations about similarly situated employees when other facts plausibly support an inference of discrimination.

Littlejohn v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Washington · filed 2024-10-09(a)(1)

A plaintiff is not required to plead (or pursue) a comparator evidence theory of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a claim fails when the employee cannot show that religion motivated the challenged decision.

Gandhi v. NYS Unified Court System · filed 2024-10-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden to establish that Defendant’s stated reasons for partially approving her annual leave or for terminating her are pretextual, nor that religious discrimination was a motive in either decision.

A religious discrimination claim survives a motion to dismiss when the employee alleges an adverse employment action because of religion.

Pumariega v. Basis Technologies, Inc. · filed 2024-10-21(a)(1)

For his claims to survive a motion to dismiss, all Pumariega must allege is that he was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious-discrimination plaintiff to plead that religion motivated the adverse employment action.

Famiglietti v. New York City Department of Sanitation · filed 2024-10-28(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff fails to plead that his termination was motivated by discrimination, his Title VII claim for religious discrimination is dismissed.

An employee’s advocacy for another religious community does not state a religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without allegations that the employer discriminated against the employee because of his own religion.

Wallace v. Wesleyan University · filed 2025-01-31(a)(1)

To the extent Mr. Wallace alleges his termination was partially due to his advocacy on behalf of the Muslim community, he has failed to state a claim that he experienced discrimination due to his own religion.

A religious discrimination claim can survive dismissal when particular allegations connect an employee’s conduct to religious beliefs, even if the employee also gives secular reasons.

Prida v. Option Care Enters., Inc. · filed 2025-02-11(a)(1)

But Sturgill clarified that, where a plaintiff pleads both religious and secular concerns, particularized allegations of religious beliefs in the complaint are sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage. ... Based on now-governing precedent, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Prida’s religious discrimination and failure to accommodate claims under Title VII and remand for further proceedings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming religious discrimination in a termination to allege facts connecting the termination to religion.

MASON v. THE COMPASS GROUP · filed 2025-02-28(a)(1)

Yet, Plaintiff has not stated anywhere in the Amended Complaint that his termination was “because of” his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious discrimination claim to proceed when alleged events surrounding a termination plausibly support an inference of discrimination.

Chowdhury v. Department of Housing Preservation and Development, NYC · filed 2025-03-06(a)(1)

Chowdhury’s allegations concerning the sequence of events leading up to his termination, including Laufer’s comments and the lack of negative performance reviews, are sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination, crossing the line from possibility to plausibility.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discharge because of religion; a religious disparate treatment claim requires evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory motive.

Stafford v. Acadia Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2025-03-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff fails to identify a relevant comparator and provides no evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was treated more harshly than others similarly situated based on religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because the employee does not conform to the employer’s religious beliefs.

Maas v. JTM Provisions Company Inc. · filed 2025-03-13(a)(1)

This Court holds that Joe has plausibly alleged that JTM discriminated against him on account of his nonconformity with Defendants’ religious convictions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer acted because of an employee’s religion; termination for violating a vaccination rule applied to all employees does not itself show religious discrimination.

Fugelsang v. The Department of Education of New York City · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for religious discrimination.

A religious disparate-treatment claim based on termination fails when the employee alleges neither discriminatory animus nor different treatment of similarly situated employees.

Huber v. TIAA · filed 2025-04-17(a)(1)

Because the amended complaint contains no allegations of disparate treatment, the court will grant TIAA’s motion to dismiss Huber’s wrongful termination claim.

A religious discrimination claim must plausibly identify a religious belief or observance connected to the employee’s refusal of a workplace requirement.

HERTOG v. 1002 SISTER BARBARA WAY PROPERTY, LLC · filed 2025-04-23(a)(1)

However, Ms. Hertog's allegation that she "is a person of faith and holds strong religious beliefs," by contrast, fails to identify any religious belief or observance whatsoever and fails to show that Ms. Hertog's refusal to receive the COVID vaccine is based, even in part, on any such belief or observance.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to plausibly allege discrimination based on religion.

Gibbons v. Disney Parks, Experiences and Products, Inc. · filed 2025-07-02(a)(1)

We disagree that the employees pleaded a disparate treatment claim under the traditional theory. Nowhere in their complaints do the employees suggest that they were discriminated against for their religious beliefs.

A religious disparate treatment claim fails at summary judgment when the evidence does not support an inference that religion played a role in the employer’s decision.

Savel v. MetroHealth System · filed 2025-07-02(a)

Without such evidence, a jury could not infer that religion—rather than the health concerns the hospital articulated—played a role in the hospital’s decision. So Savel’s disparate treatment claim also fails.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a claim challenging a testing requirement must connect the requirement to a sincerely held religious belief.

Smith v. Kohler Company · filed 2025-07-30(a)

Because the plaintiff has not pled the existence of a sincerely held religious belief that would be violated by taking a weekly COVID test, the court will grant Kohler’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of religion, and a genuine dispute about the sincerity of an employee’s religious beliefs precludes summary judgment on that issue.

Richardson v. The National Basketball Association · filed 2025-08-18(a)(1)

Title VII makes it illegal for employers to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). ... This dispute regarding the sincerity of Richardson’s religious beliefs is not susceptible to summary judgment. It is for the jury to resolve.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sincerely held religious belief; a genuine factual dispute about sincerity precludes summary judgment.

Harvey v. The Mitre Corporation · filed 2025-08-19(a)(1)

Thus, neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether Plaintiff had sincerely held religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts that plausibly support a claim of religious discrimination; conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent are insufficient.

Waggoner v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. · filed 2025-08-27(a)(1)

Mr. Waggoner alleges no facts from which it may be plausibly inferred that AMR held any religiously discriminatory animus against either Mr. Waggoner or his religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious discrimination claim to proceed when an employee sufficiently alleges that a religious belief conflicts with an employer’s vaccine mandate.

Besser v. Legacy Health · filed 2025-08-28(a)(1)

This allegation, while brief, explains the connection between Wray’s religious beliefs and his refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Accordingly, it satisfies the “minimal” standard needed to allege a conflict with a religious belief. At the motion to dismiss stage, Wray sufficiently has alleged a religious belief that conflicts with the vaccine mandate.

A religious disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee offered as a comparator is not legitimately comparable.

Mason v. Cook County Health and Hosp. System · filed 2025-09-05(a)(1)

As discussed, it is undisputed that Ms. Mason worked at Stroger Hospital and that Sanitarian I did not. This alone is sufficient to defeat a claim of disparate treatment; the two are not legitimately comparable. CCH is thus entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Mason's claim to the extent it relies on a disparate treatment theory.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim is plausible when the alleged circumstances support an inference that religious beliefs motivated an adverse employment action.

Pagan · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination based on her religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of religion; a claim may proceed when a reasonable factfinder could find the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext for discrimination.

BOODOO v. AMP HOME CARE LLC · filed 2025-10-07(a)(1)

Taking the record as a whole and construing all facts and inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could infer that Defendant’s proffered reason for Plaintiff’s termination was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that religion caused an adverse employment action; evidence suggesting another reason for termination does not suffice.

Mahran · filed 2025-10-27(a)(1)

Taking the emails in the light most favorable to Mahran, they may suggest that he was terminated for some reason other than his falsified job application and his attempts to interfere with the OIIG’s investigation. But they cannot be read to ... suggest he was terminated because of his religion. Cook County is thus entitled to summary judgment on Mahran’s religious discrimination claim.