42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, including that she was qualified for the position.

Mack v. Kent County Vocational & Technical School District · filed 1991-02-19(a)(1)

In this court, the issue is whether plaintiff has established her prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, the court holds plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from claiming that she was qualified for the reason that the issue before the court is different from that affirmed by the Superior Court.

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact case by showing that a specific employment practice causes a significantly disparate impact on a protected group.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc. · filed 1991-02-21(a)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory, Bradley and the EEOC must show a specific employment practice has caused a significantly disparate impact on black males.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory discharge when a racial minority employee was performing satisfactorily, was discharged despite that performance, and was replaced.

Porter v. State of Kan. · filed 1991-02-28(a)(1)

Specifically, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory discharge by showing that (1) she belongs to a racial minority; (2) she was performing in a satisfactory manner; (3) that she was discharged despite her satisfactory performance and (4) that someone was hired in her place after she was discharged.

For a discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), similar positions remaining open after termination can satisfy the open-position element of the prima facie case even if the employee's former position was filled earlier.

Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College · filed 1991-03-14(a)(1)

Although Alvarado cannot technically satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie test because the job opening was filled by Marshall before the College fired Alvarado, four positions did remain open to similarly qualified applicants in the four months following Alvarado's termination. We find that Alvarado presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the four elements of a prima facie wrongful discharge claim.

A prima facie sex discrimination case does not prevent a directed verdict when the full trial record could not support a reasonable finding for the employee.

Dragon v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals · filed 1991-06-19(a)

But, in the case where both sides submit evidence, and the evidence, taken as a whole, is so strong that (in a jury case) no reasonable person could find for plaintiff, the “prima facie” case rules pose no obstacle to a judge requiring a finding for the defense.

A prima facie claim of sex discrimination through termination requires evidence that the employee was terminated, along with protected status, acceptable job performance, and the employer’s search for a similarly qualified replacement.

White v. University of Massachusetts at Boston · filed 1991-07-03(a)(1)

The analysis of a discrimination claim is essentially the same under the State and Federal statutes. ... In order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination resulting in termination of employment, White must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she performed her job at an acceptable level; (3) she was terminated; and (4) her employer sought a replacement with similar qualifications. ... The facts of record do not permit the conclusion that White was terminated. Thus, she failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and summary judgment for the defendants was properly entered.

A sex discrimination plaintiff discharged during a work force reduction must offer direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to show that the employer singled her out for discharge for a discriminatory reason.

Ailor v. First State Bank of Maynardville · filed 1991-08-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination Ailor must offer direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that First State singled her out for discharge for impermissible reasons.

Once an employer produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, whether the employee established a prima facie case is no longer relevant.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Alfred Lee Downing v. Gilbert/robinson, Incorporated, T/a Darryl's · filed 1991-09-17(a)(1)

The district court correctly concluded that because Gilbert/Robinson produced evidence at trial which established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Downing's discharge, the question of whether Downing established a prima facie case was no longer relevant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory treatment in a layoff to show that a similarly situated person of another race or sex received different treatment.

Hedrick v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 1992-04-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence, however, to demonstrate that a similarly situated black or male received dissimilar treatment.

A plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in her discharge establishes a prima facie case by showing that she belonged to a protected class, was qualified, was terminated, and employees outside the class were retained.

Frey v. Pennsylvania Airlines · filed 1992-05-18(a)

Based on the foregoing, in the instant matter, each plaintiffs prima facie case consists of the following elements; 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for her position; 3) despite her qualifications, her employment was terminated; and 4) employees not within the protected class were retained. Plaintiffs have each met their pri-ma facie case.

A Title VII plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by showing she would have been offered another position had she been a man, even if no one filled her former job.

Dana N. THROGMORTON, Appellee, v. UNITED STATES FORGECRAFT CORPORATION, Appellant · filed 1992-06-01

We agree with the district court that Throgmorton proved a prima facie case of discrimination. The issue here is whether Throgmorton would have been offered another position at Forgecraft had she been a man, not whether someone else was hired to fill her exact position.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in an employment decision must offer evidence of discriminatory intent; a conclusory allegation does not establish a prima facie case.

Morris v. Indianapolis Public Schools · filed 1992-07-28(a)(1)

At the outset, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of policy, practice, custom or usage of discrimination. To do so, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant treated him differently than similarly situated white employees were treated. ... He cites no similarly situated non-black examples. His general conclusory allegation is not sufficient to make his prima facie case. Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's Count I and Count II claims of policy, practice, custom or usage of discrimination is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a sex discrimination plaintiff to show that a man replaced her to establish a prima facie case.

Adams v. West Publishing Co. · filed 1993-02-09(a)(1)

Adams does not automatically fail to raise a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she proffers no evidence that she was replaced by a male.

A prima facie claim of national-origin discrimination requires a protected-class employee to show satisfactory performance, discharge despite that performance, and different treatment of similarly situated employees outside the class.

McDuffie v. Nissei Sangyo America · filed 1993-03-19(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin, McDuffie must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class of persons; (2) that he satisfactorily performed his job; (3) that he was discharged from his job despite satisfactory performance; and (4) that similarly situated people outside of the protected class were treated differently. ... Our review of the record discloses that McDuffie has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of his national origin.

A Title VII plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must present evidence that the discharge raises an inference of discrimination.

Garrett v. The Child Guidance Center of Greater Cleveland · filed 1993-04-22

Moreover, once the Center discharged Garrett, it filled her position by hiring another black female. The evidence presented by Garrett simply does not create an inference of discrimination; therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Garrett's Title VII claim for racial discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming discrimination for not sharing supervisors’ religious beliefs must show adverse action, satisfactory job performance, and additional evidence of religious motive to establish a prima facie case under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory, and John Whetten · filed 1993-04-27(a)(1)

Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case in actions where the plaintiff claims that he was discriminated against because he did not share certain religious beliefs held by his supervisors, we hold that the plaintiff must show (1) that he was subjected to some adverse employment action; (2) that, at the time the employment action was taken, the employee’s job performance was satisfactory; ... and (3) some additional evidence to support the inference that the employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory motive based upon the employee’s failure to hold or follow his or her employer’s religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee alleging discriminatory demotion to show she was qualified for the position and that the employer's stated reasons were pretextual.

Guliford v. Beech Aircraft Corporation · filed 1993-05-11(a)(1)

The district court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination with regard to defendant's decisions to demote her from inspector positions in August 1988, February 1989, and August 1989, in that she did not prove she was qualified to hold those jobs. The district court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant's evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions on those three occasions was pretextual. ... After this review we are satisfied that the findings of fact are supported by the record, and that the district court properly analyzed the relevant issues and correctly applied the law.

Under Missouri pleading rules, a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) based on a denied transfer must allege facts showing the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought.

Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1993-06-08(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s qualification for the sought-after position is a fact essential to recovery under the alleged circumstances and, therefore, should have been pleaded. The petition failed to state any facts showing that plaintiff was qualified for the job to which she sought to be transferred. The trial court did not err in dismissing the second amended petition for failure to state a claim of sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or § 213.055 RSMo.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of a position must show that she applied for it or was inhibited from applying by the employer’s discriminatory practices.

Connolly v. Washington Gas Light Company · filed 1993-11-02

Although Connolly alleges that she was willing to accept a Senior Safety Specialist position, she failed to show by proper proof in response to the summary judgment motion that she had applied for the position or was inhibited from doing so due to WGL's alleged discriminatory practices. See Robinson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 823 F.2d 793, 796 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988). Consequently, summary judgment for WGL on this issue was appropriate.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in a failure to promote must show that she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case.

Peden v. Suwannee County School Board · filed 1993-11-18(a)(1)

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case that she was not promoted to Vocational Educational Director due to her sex, because Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she was qualified for this position.

A discriminatory-hiring claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the applicant makes no prima facie showing.

O'BRIEN v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1993-11-22(a)

Mr. O’Brien has not made the necessary prima facie showing to entitle him to relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and summary judgment must therefore be entered in favor of the defendants on that claim.

A discharged employee can establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim by showing replacement outside her protected class or better treatment of a comparable person outside that class.

McGee v. Genesco, Inc. Jim Hardin and Jim Hale · filed 1994-01-06(a)(1)

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of that employee's sex. ... Because McGee was replaced by a woman, she cannot satisfy the fourth element of her prima facie case. As an alternative, McGee could attempt to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that defendants treated a comparable non-protected person better for the same or similar conduct.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must show that she belonged to a protected class, was dismissed despite satisfactory job performance, and was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside that class.

Perry v. State of Indiana, Evansville State Hospital, and Bruce Miller · filed 1994-01-19(a)(1)

To meet this burden, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was satisfactorily performing her job but nevertheless was dismissed; and (3) she was treated differently in being dismissed than similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge under Title VII must support a prima facie case with evidence that he met his employer’s legitimate expectations or was treated differently from employees outside his protected class.

Cornelius v. Hondo, Inc. · filed 1994-01-27

Because we have eliminated all of the putative support for Cornelius’ claim that he met Hondo’s legitimate attendance expectations, or alternatively that he was treated differently than non-black employees, we find that he is unable to establish a prima facie ease of discrimination under Title VII.

For a discriminatory discharge claim arising from a reduction in force, the prima facie test requires the employee to have performed substantially as well as the lowest-performing retained employee and the employer to have retained a lower-performing employee outside the protected group.

Samuel J. Turner, Jr. v. Marriott Corporation · filed 1994-03-01

Because Turner's termination was the result of a RIF, however, the test should be modified to require a showing that (1) he was protected under the statute, (2) he was selected from the group or territory for termination, (3) he was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those retained in the group or territory and (4) the process of selection produced a residual work force of persons in the group or territory containing some unprotected persons who were performing at a level lower than that at which the plaintiff was performing.

Section 2000e-2 allows a pregnancy discrimination claim to survive dismissal when the complaint alleges that employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp. · filed 1994-04-28

Thus, while defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case of discrimination, we find that by looking at the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, would show that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably than plaintiff. While we state no opinion as to whether plaintiff will be able to prove this claim, at this point in time, plaintiffs claim survives a motion to dismiss.

Once a Title VII disparate-treatment case reaches judgment, the court must decide whether there was intentional discrimination and need not separately decide whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case.

Coleman v. United States of America Immigration & Naturalization Service U.S. Department of Justice · filed 1994-05-02(a)(1)

This case went to judgment. Thus, the issue was not whether a prima facie case was established but whether there was intentional discrimination. The district court addressed in its findings the discrimination and all the evidence presented. The district court did not err by failing to state specifically whether appellant presented a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show that rejection from an available position for which the plaintiff was qualified occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Estes v. City of Seattle · filed 1994-05-31(a)

For discrimination claims, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a), establishing a prima facie case means that "[t]he plaintiff must prove by a proponderance [sic] of the evidence that [h]e applied for an available position for which [h]e was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. ... However, Estes failed to produce evidence sufficient to generate a credible inference that his failure to obtain the positions he allegedly sought stemmed from an illegitimate reason.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a prima facie case against a proper defendant and must fall within the scope of the EEOC charge.

Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education · filed 1994-06-01(a)(1)

We will affirm the district court's decision to dismiss the discrimination and hostile work environment claims for the reasons set forth in its opinion. As the district court correctly held, Charlton's complaint named improper defendants under Title VII, exceeded the scope of her EEOC complaint and failed to make out a prima facie case on her discrimination claims against the remaining defendants.

A religious discrimination claim requires a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement, notice to the employer of that conflict, and discharge for refusing to comply with the requirement.

Wilson v. US West Communications, Inc. · filed 1994-06-06(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff has a bona fide religious belief or practice and that compliance with a requirement of employment is contrary to the plaintiff’s religious belief or practice; (2) that the plaintiff informed the employer about the conflict between the employer’s requirement and the plaintiffs belief or practice; and (3) that the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to comply with the employment requirement.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination under § 2000e-2 may use indirect proof but must present evidence supporting a prima facie case; bare allegations do not suffice.

Baker v. American Juice, Inc. · filed 1994-07-06

Baker also arguably states a claim under Title VII on this basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (“Unlawful employment practices”). ... To make out a prima facie case here, Baker would have to prove that he was meeting American Juice’s legitimate expectations, was in fact not promoted and/or fired, and that American Juice promoted others in his position and/or replaced him with others of a different race. ... Baker’s complaint’s bare allegation of discriminatory treatment is insufficient: it was Baker’s duty to come up with evidence of a discriminatory employment decision. See Kizer v. Children’s Learning Center, 962 F.2d 608, 612 (7th Cir.1992). He did not do so. Accordingly, American Juice is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this final claim as well.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination must produce evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, including adequate job performance when challenging a termination.

Stonum v. Cch Computax Inc. · filed 1994-08-12

Because he failed to establish this essential element of his prima facie case and produced no evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Computax.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to allege facts supporting an inference that an employment decision was based on a protected trait.

Alie v. Nynex Corp. · filed 1994-08-05(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits the discrimination against any individual with respect to the “terms and conditions of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and according her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to plead that plaintiff was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

An employer cannot rebut a prima facie discriminatory hiring claim with a reason it did not know when it rejected the applicant.

Turnes v. Amsouth Bank, Na · filed 1994-10-27(a)(1)

AmSouth’s proffered reason is insufficient to meet its burden of production. AmSouth came forward with no explanation of why it rejected Turnes based on what it knew when it rejected him.

A race or national-origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 may survive summary judgment when evidence of racial prejudice in the discharge exists, even if the replacement employee belongs to a protected class.

Johnson v. Fleet Mortgage Corp. · filed 1995-03-06

With this in mind, the Court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate under Byrd even though an African-American woman replaced Falgoust.

Once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision, the employee bears the burden of proving that the reason is a pretext for discrimination.

D. Tammy COUTU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Robert H. Oldland, Defendants-Appel · filed 1995-03-16(a)(1)

Once the employer satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff then has the burden of persuading the court that the proffered reason is a pretext for the true discriminatory reason.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employee must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for its decision was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Pattison v. Meijer, Inc. · filed 1995-06-26(a)

The Court finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. Accordingly, the Court will grant Meijer’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

A plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reasons for an employment decision must present evidence that creates a factual issue about whether those reasons were pretextual.

Barkley E. SAMPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALDI INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-08-18(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment, Sample was required to produce evidence that created an issue of fact as to whether these nondiseriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Racial remarks alone do not create a triable disparate treatment claim when the evidence strongly supports the employer's stated, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Casworth Jok-Ef, AKA Jok-Ef Casworth v. Columbia Basin Clg., Defendant-Apellee · filed 1995-09-07(a)(1)

While such remarks are disturbing, they are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment in the face of the weight of evidence supporting CBC's assertion that Jok-ef's contract was not renewed because he lacked the requisite instructional skills.

A plaintiff can survive summary judgment on a Title VII discrimination claim by presenting evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false, without separately proving discriminatory motive at that stage.

Perdomo v. Browner · filed 1995-10-06(a)(1)

Although this accurately restates the proof required at trial, a plaintiff need not prove that the real reason for an employer’s action was discriminatory in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.

A race discrimination plaintiff can survive summary judgment by raising a genuine dispute about the truthfulness of the employer's stated reason for its decision.

Perdomo v. Browner · filed 1995-10-06(a)(1)

Because a fact-finder may infer intentional discrimination from an employer's untruthfulness, evidence that calls truthfulness into question precludes a summary judgment.

Under § 2000e-2, an employee must offer evidence that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

Stoll v. Missouri Osteopathic Foundation, Inc. Servicemaster Company · filed 1995-10-06

At issue is whether plaintiff, after the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, must then offer evidence of pretext to avoid summary judgment. We hold that she does.

After an employee establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory demotion, the employer must clearly articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the demotion.

Gnadt v. Castro · filed 1996-03-12(a)(1)

We agree with Gnadt that the district court erroneously concluded that Tino's met its burden of production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting her from bartender to waitress. The testimony cited by Tino's, which was relied upon by the district court, is, standing by itself, insufficient to clearly set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Tino's adverse personnel action.

Title VII requires a discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must give a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and the plaintiff must raise a genuine factual issue about pretext.

Phill Sanders, Jr. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc. · filed 1996-09-26

The plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination thereby creating a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The plaintiff is then required to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer's stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII bears the burden of proving intentional discrimination.

Mullenix v. Forsyth Dental Infirmary for Children · filed 1996-11-13(a)

Furthermore, it is well established that in Title VII cases the plaintiff carries the burden of proof that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff at all times.

A Title VII plaintiff need only prove that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not its sole cause.

Sheridan v. de Nemours · filed 1996-11-14

If there were a new trial, Sheridan would not have to prove that discrimination was the sole cause of DuPont's action but only that discrimination was a motivating factor in its decision.

In a Title VII failure-to-hire claim, an employer’s statement that it does not know why applicants were excluded does not rebut a prima facie showing of national origin discrimination.

Prudencio v. Runyon · filed 1997-11-25(a)(1)

Because, even after Hicks, “no reason” cannot be a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,” the Prudencios’ prima facie case of discrimination remains unrebutted entitling them to judgment as a matter of law.

Employment discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(a) have the same prima facie elements and allocation of burdens as claims under § 1981.

Harris v. Delchamps, Inc. · filed 1998-05-26(a)

The allocation of burdens and elements of a prima facie case are the same for employment claims stemming from Title VII and § 1981.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) race and gender discrimination claims follow the McDonnell Douglas order of proof.

Beaird v. Seagate Technology, Inc. · filed 1998-05-28(a)(1)

Five of the plaintiffs—Beaird, Bobo, Bush, Clark and Johnson—also argue that their inclusion within the RIF was the product of intentional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In addition, Beaird asserts that her discharge constituted gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. All these claims are assessed under the same McDonnell Douglas order of proof.

When an employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason for an employment action, the court may proceed to whether the employee can prove pretext without deciding whether he established a prima facie case.

Butler v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1998-08-13(a)(1)

Therefore, as is the ease here, once the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, the prima facie case becomes inconsequential and the Court must examine whether the plaintiff can meet his burden in proving pretext.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a discharge removes the presumption of sex discrimination, leaving the employee to prove pretext.

Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., Beardsley Piper Division, 1 James Hall, and Morris Wells · filed 1998-08-19(a)(1)

Because Pettibone has proffered a legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason for Cianci’s discharge, any presumption of discrimination falls away.

A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Truax v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2001-06-18(a)(1)

Once the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, who can rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits summary judgment on a discrimination claim when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and the plaintiff offers no evidence beyond unsupported conclusory statements to rebut them.

Farias v. Instructional Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-08-01(a)(1) and (a)(2)

As Judge Wood concluded, even if plaintiffs presented a prima facie case, ISI presented legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds to defeat the presumption of discrimination. Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence, other than conclusory statements unsupported by the record, to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by ISI, let alone evidence that could reasonably support a verdict in their favor.

Section 2000e-2 shifts the burden to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason once a failure-to-hire plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.

Gonzalez-Lord v. Thompson · filed 2003-03-21

If Gonzalez-Lord establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination; a proposed comparator with materially different qualifications does not establish that inference.

Loucar v. Boston Market Corp. · filed 2003-12-03(a)(1)

As plaintiff is unable to raise an inference of discrimination, he cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under a McDonnell Douglas inquiry.

In a Title VII discrimination claim, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Taylor v. County Bancshares, Inc. · filed 2004-07-14(a)(1)

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate — but not prove — a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment through strong evidence of an illegal motive, or through a prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext under McDonnell Douglas.

Griffith v. City of Des Moines · filed 2004-10-15

A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But if the plaintiff lacks evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext.

Section 2000e-2 gender discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary judgment.

Van Arkel v. Warren County · filed 2005-04-12

The Eight Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a claim of employment discrimination whether brought under Title VII, the ADEA, or section 1983 as a violation of the- Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, the summary judgment standard is identical for each of these discrimination claims.

A sex discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the employment action.

Moser v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2005-05-05(a)(1)

However, critical to our inquiry is Ms. Moser’s performance at the time of the employment action.

An employer’s initial attempt to replace a woman with a man can support an inference of sex discrimination, even if women ultimately fill the position.

Giannone v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. · filed 2005-09-21(a)(1)

Although Danzig later required Estes to select two women for the Fixed Income Business Manager position (Luci Aff. ¶ 5), the fact that Estes initially tried to replace Giannone with a man reflects a preference for a person outside Plaintiffs protect class and suffices to support an inference of discrimination.

A plaintiff using circumstantial evidence to prove sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Zisumbo v. McCleodusa Telecommunications Services, Inc. · filed 2005-11-23(a)(1)

Because Zisumbo relies on circumstantial evidence to establish unlawful discrimination, this court applies the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny.

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1), the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action.

Conway v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2006-02-14(a)(1)

The establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of discriminatory animus, and the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiseriminatory business rationale to justify its adverse employment action.

In a Title VII sex discrimination claim, an employer meets its burden of production by presenting evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory hiring reason.

Menta v. Community College of Beaver County · filed 2006-03-31(a)

That assertion is supported by evidence in the record and certainly satisfies defendant’s burden of production under McDonnell Douglas.

A plaintiff may prove race or national-origin employment discrimination under § 2000e-2 through the McDonnell Douglas indirect method, beginning with a prima facie case.

Keri, Gabe v. Bd Trustees Purdue · filed 2006-08-14(a)(1)

The Plaintiff has chosen the McDonnell Douglas indirect method to show that the Defendant’s decision to not renew a teaching offer was motivated by a prohibited animus. Under this approach, he must first establish a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination.

An employer cannot use the result of an allegedly discriminatory certification exam to show that a Title VII plaintiff was unqualified at the prima facie stage.

Thanongsinh, Linh v. Bd Educ District U46 · filed 2006-09-13(a)(1)

We do not think that the defendants can rely on the certification test to establish that the plaintiff lacks the ... requisite qualifications to be a Group V Head Custodian.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie racial discrimination case under § 2000e-2(a)(1), the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.

Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein · filed 2006-11-09(a)(1)

If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden of production (but not persuasion) shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action.

A plaintiff can establish an initial inference of sex discrimination by showing that someone outside her protected class assumed her duties.

Henderson v. General Electric Co. · filed 2006-12-08(a)(1)

Therefore, Henderson’s offer of proof that Kehdi assumed her duties is sufficient to give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent at this stage in the analysis.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination must show that she was qualified for her position to establish a prima facie case.

Santiago v. THE NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2007-04-05(a)(1)

In order to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must, inter alia, establish that she was qualified for her position. A person who cannot type is not qualified to be a typist.

Evidence of discriminatory discipline can cause the legitimate-expectations element of a Title VII prima facie case to merge with the comparison to employees outside the protected class.

Lamb v. VISION CARE HOLDINGS, LLC · filed 2007-07-02(a)(1)

Because Lamb offers evidence to support an inference of discriminatory discipline, as discussed below, the second element of the prima facie case essentially drops out or merges into the fourth element, so that the plaintiff must show that she was treated less favorably than other persons not in the protected class who committed similar violations.

A discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show she was qualified for the job; failure to report to work can defeat that showing.

Comeaux-Bisor v. YMCA of Greater Houston · filed 2008-08-22(a)(1)

Comeaux’s failure to report to work rendered her unqualified for her position, and accordingly unable to meet her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.

In a discriminatory hiring claim, the applicant must make a prima facie case; the employer must offer a nondiscriminatory reason; and the applicant must show that reason was pretextual.

Donlin v. Philips Lighting North America Corp. · filed 2009-04-23

Donlin first had to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. ... The burden then shifted to Philips to present a nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire her. ... Donlin then had to demonstrate that the reasons claimed by Philips were pretextual.

Title VII discrimination claims follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Pandey v. Bio-Medical Applications of Minnesota, Inc. · filed 2009-08-10

Once again, the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to Title VII and § 1981 claims.

A plaintiff challenging a discriminatory refusal to hire must make a prima facie case, after which the employer must give a nondiscriminatory reason and the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual.

Donlin v. Philips Lighting North America Corp. · filed 2009-09-09

Donlin first had to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. ... The burden then shifted to Philips to present a nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire her. ... Donlin then had to demonstrate that the reasons claimed by Philips were pretextual.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee whose theft violated the employer’s legitimate expectations cannot establish a prima facie race discrimination claim through the indirect method.

Durham v. Lindus Construction/Midwest Leafguard, Inc. · filed 2009-12-18(a)(1)

First, the undisputed facts establish that his job performance was not meeting defendant’s legitimate expectations and no reasonable jury could find otherwise. It is undisputed that plaintiff was expected not to steal from defendant. There is no question that this was a legitimate expectation. Nonetheless, for a year plaintiff stole materials totaling $33,000 from defendant. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to satisfy the job performance requirement of his prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Jackson v. Sara Lee Bakery Group · filed 2010-01-18(a)

Where, as here, discrimination claims are premised on circumstantial evidence, we use the three-step burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-08 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a) uses a burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims based on indirect evidence: the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer gives a legitimate reason, and the employee shows pretext and actual discrimination.

Russell v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-02-18(a)

Under McDonnell Douglas and its innumerable progeny, (1) a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; if the employer does so, the McDonnell Douglas framework and its presumptions and burdens disappears, leaving the sole remaining issue of “discrimination vel non,” and thus (3) the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason is merely pretextual and that discrimination was an actual reason for the adverse employment action.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Walder v. White Plains Board of Education · filed 2010-09-24(a)(1)

Once a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff claiming sex or national origin discrimination to show an adverse employment action caused by that discrimination.

Evans v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-12-09(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The “two essential elements” of a discrimination claim under this section are “that (I) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiffs ... sex [or] national origin.”

A Title VII sex discrimination claim under the indirect method requires evidence that the employee met reasonable job expectations and that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Sawyer v. Columbia College · filed 2012-03-19(a)(1)

Plaintiffs Title VII sex discrimination claim fails because he did not present evidence that he performed reasonably at Youth Communication or that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

A Title VII race discrimination claimant who establishes a prima facie case shifts the burden to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; the claimant must then raise a triable issue of pretext.

Baptiste v. LIDS · filed 2014-02-05(a)

If he succeeds, the burden shifts to Hat World to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If Hat World successfully carries that burden, the ultimate burden shifts to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reasons for the adverse action are a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.

In a gender-based failure-to-promote claim under Section 2000e-2(a), the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.

Murray v. Town of Stratford · filed 2014-02-11(a)

At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

A plaintiff’s initial showing of gender discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires membership in a protected group and denial of an employment opportunity for which the plaintiff was qualified.

Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2014-03-07(a)(1)

To prove gender discrimination under either statute, Dr. Shervin must show that “she is a member of a protected group who has been denied an employment opportunity for which she was otherwise qualified.”

An employer cannot rebut a failure-to-hire claim by citing the selected applicant’s superior qualifications when the decision-maker did not compare the applicants.

Mosley v. Alabama Unified Judicial System, Administrative Office of Courts · filed 2014-04-07(a)(1)

Given this lack of comparison between the two candidates, Judge Naman’s conclusion that Battiste ... had relatively superior qualifications cannot serve as the Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to rebut Mosley’s prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Title VII employment discrimination claims under subsection (a) use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Hall v. North Bellmore School District · filed 2014-09-26(a)

The manner of proving employment discrimination claims, pursuant to both the ADEA and Title VII, is governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 86 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (Powell, J.).

A plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination under Title VII must present enough evidence for a jury to rule in her favor to survive summary judgment.

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2019-03-21(a)(1)

In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.

A Title VII plaintiff can meet the legitimate job expectations element of a prima facie discrimination case with her own evidence of satisfactory performance, even when the employer presents contrary evidence.

Victor v. ELA Area Public Library District · filed 2019-07-19

This is true even in the face of the Library’s evidence—which was plentiful—suggesting that Victor was not meeting their expectations; Victor has produced some evidence, and that evidence is enough for now.

Section 2000e-2 requires a Title VII discrimination claimant to plausibly allege that a qualified member of a protected class suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

BASS v. HOWARD · filed 2020-03-23

To allege a Title VII prima facie claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to the plaintiff's to fill the position.

After trial, a defendant cannot overturn a Section 2000e-2(a)(1) discrimination verdict merely by challenging the plaintiff’s comparators or prima facie case.

Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice · filed 2023-12-12(a)(1)

After a full trial on the merits, a defendant cannot successfully challenge the jury’s verdict by arguing only that the plaintiff’s comparators were inadequate or that the prima facie case was otherwise insufficient.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to employees; alleged discrimination after a worker becomes an independent contractor falls outside its protection.

Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1995-12-14(a)(1)

For purposes of its Title VII analysis, the court concludes that the facts in the instant action, taken as a whole, establish that plaintiff ceased being defendants’ employee on the day he became an independent contractor— March 1, 1993. The court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs allegations of Title VII discriminatory conduct that occurred after that date.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers individuals even if they are not employees of the defendant.

Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co. · filed 1972-11-20(a)

On its face the contention is frivolous inasmuch as Section 703(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides coverage for “any individual.’’ It does not limit itself to employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a covered employer that discriminates in access to employment with another employer, even without a direct employment relationship with the affected person.

Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson · filed 1973-11-29(a)(1)

The fact that the Act purports to provide remedies for a class broader than direct employees is a strong indication that the proscriptions contemplated by Section 703(a)(1) reach beyond the immediate employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) can cover discrimination by an employer that controls access to a person's job market, even without a direct employment relationship.

Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission · filed 1974-05-17(a)

Plaintiff has alleged discriminatory actions which fall within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and I cannot say that these alleged actions fall completely without the scope of activities sought to be prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover discrimination against an independent contractor by a company that neither employs her nor controls her access to employment.

Smith v. Dutra Trucking Company · filed 1976-04-02(a)

Applying the facts alleged to the common-law standard, plaintiff is clearly an independent contractor with respect to Dutra, and as such is not covered by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not apply to a state bar examination administered by a licensing board.

Woodard v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners · filed 1976-09-09

The Court has concluded that Title VII does not apply to the bar examination by its own terms.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a covered employer's discriminatory interference with a person's employment opportunities with another employer, even without a direct employment relationship.

Gomez v. Alexian Brothers Hospital of San Jose · filed 1983-02-09(a)(1)

This language has been interpreted to encompass situations in which "a defendant subject to Title VII interferes with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer." ... The fact that plaintiff continues as an employee of AES does not mean the employment relationship between AES and plaintiff has not been interfered with. The conditions of plaintiff's employment are different than they would have been had he not been discriminated against.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a covered employer’s discrimination that interferes with a person’s employment opportunities with another employer.

Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hospital of San Jose · filed 1983-02-09(a)(1)

The fact that plaintiff continues as an employee of AES does not mean the employment relationship between AES and plaintiff has not been interfered with. The conditions of plaintiff’s employment are different than they would have been had he not been discriminated against.

Section 2000e-2 does not exclude a manufacturer's representative from employee protection solely because of that job label; coverage depends on the economic realities of the relationship.

Armbruster v. Quinn · filed 1983-08-19

In determining the meaning of "employee" as applied to the manufacturer's representative, we shall consider this term as used in the jurisdictional provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and as it relates to the unlawful practices provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and e-3. ... Rather, one must examine the economic realities underlying the relationship between the individual and the so-called principal in an effort to determine whether that individual is likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to eliminate.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a claimant to be an employee or applicant for employment; a deputy sheriff whose duties were primarily clerical was not excluded as the sheriff’s personal staff.

Curl v. Reavis · filed 1984-08-01(a)

Both sections of Title VII on which plaintiff relies require that a claimant be an employee or applicant for employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), and thus employee status is an element of a substantive Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a city’s denial of a dance hall license to an independent business operator because the city neither hires the operator nor affects a term of employment.

Harry DARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1984-10-10(a)(1)

The District Court correctly granted summary judgment for the city on Darks’ Title VII claim on the ground that Title VII does not apply to the city’s licensing of dance halls.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover a law school with no employment relationship with the plaintiff and insufficient control over his access to potential employers.

Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University · filed 1985-12-23

Plaintiff alleges that D.L.S.’s actions also violated Title 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. However, plaintiff has not alleged any existing or prospective employer-employee relationship with D.L.S.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can protect an individual from discriminatory interference with employment opportunities even if the individual is not the defendant's employee.

B. Doe, M.D., on Behalf of B. Doe and B. Doe's Patients v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Fort Wayne · filed 1986-04-02(a)(1)

Section 2000e-2(a) does not use the term "employee" but rather refers to "any individual." ... There are no indications that "any individual" should be read to mean only an employee of an employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires an employment relationship between the claimant and the defendant.

Jones on Behalf of Michele v. Board of Educ. · filed 1986-04-11(a)(2)

Plaintiffs here are parents of girls enrolled at a school run by defendants. “Since there [is no] employment relationship between these plaintiffs and the defendants, there is no basis for a claim of employment discrimination.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can protect an individual from a racially discriminatory discharge even if the defendant is not that individual's employer under common law agency rules.

Mitchell v. Tenney · filed 1986-12-24(a)(1)

There are no indications that “any individual” should be read to mean only an employee of an employer, as those terms are used in the law of agency.

Section 2000e-2(a) can protect individuals who do not count as employees toward Title VII’s employer coverage threshold.

Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1989-03-14(a)

Whereas, the antidiscriminatory provision refers by its terms not only to employees but additionally makes it unlawful to discriminate against “any individual.” ... Thus, it is possible for some individuals to be protected by the act despite the fact they could not be counted for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)'s reference to “any individual” remains subject to Title VII's definition of “employee,” including the personal staff exclusion.

Starrett v. Wadley · filed 1989-05-22(a)(1)

Although not raised by the parties in this case, the "personal staff" exemption found in Title VII's definition of "employee" arguably does not apply here under a literal reading of the statute. The section of Title VII upon which plaintiff's claims are based makes it illegal to "discriminate against any individual," rather than any "employee." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). However, we agree with the Eighth Circuit's comment, construing an identical definition of "employee" from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, that "it was clearly the intent of Congress that the term 'employee' ... should apply to any person who has a right to bring an action under the Act, including an applicant for employment."

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employment discrimination; a worker qualifies as an employee only if the employer pays and controls the worker.

Tadros v. Coleman · filed 1989-08-15(a)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff is only an “employee” if the defendant both pays him and controls his work.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not provide a sex-discrimination claim to a person excluded from Title VII’s definition of employee as an elected official’s personal staff, even if a previous officeholder hired that person.

Rose Walton and John Walton v. State of Michigan, State Judicial Council, and Judge Adam A. Shakoor · filed 1990-11-23(a)(1)

In excluding from the coverage of Title VII a staff person chosen by an elected official, the statute makes no exception for the situation where there happens to have been a change in the identity of the individual holding the elective office. The statute excepts one chosen for a personal staff job by "any" elected officer, without qualification; this cannot mean that a staff member automatically comes within the protection of Title VII whenever the appointing officeholder is replaced. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, we conclude that the Title VII claim would fail even if Mrs. Walton could show that she was discharged because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a physician’s discrimination claim to survive dismissal when the allegations could establish an employment relationship with the hospital.

Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital · filed 1991-05-22(a)(1)

In these circumstances, the allegations of the complaint clearly do not preclude the possibility that Vakharia and the Hospital shared an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to be employed by the defendant to state a claim.

King v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1993-02-05(a)(1)

To the extent Chrysler seeks dismissal because King's complaint does not aver an employment relationship with Chrysler, the Court concludes that such an assertion is not necessary to state a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

For a volunteer member claiming discriminatory suspension, § 2000e-2(a) applies only if she was an employee of a covered employer when the alleged discrimination occurred.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-02-10(a)

A plain reading of subsections 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a) indicates that an individual in Ms. Haavistola's position is afforded the protection of Title VII only if she is an employee of a covered employer at the time the allegedly discriminatory action occurs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a defendant who discriminatorily controls access to employment with a third party, even without a direct employment relationship with the applicant.

Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP · filed 1993-03-04(a)(1)

Although courts have held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “contemplates some employment relationship,” this relationship need not necessarily be solely between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, despite the fact that Pelech was not directly employed by Crescent or Finkel, in certain circumstances, they still may be held liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim against an employer that substantially controls a person’s employment opportunities with another employer, even without a direct employment relationship.

Diana v. Schlosser · filed 1998-09-14(a)(1)

As the Sibley court pointed out, the broad language of § 2000e-2(a)(l) provides protection to “any individual,” not just an employer’s employees. ... Accordingly, because Diana has presented sufficient evidence that WCCC substantially controlled her employment opportunities with Traffic Net, WCCC’s motion for summary judgment as to the first and second counts is denied.

Section 2000e-2 covers discrimination by employers against current or potential employees, not harassment of a customer outside an employment relationship.

Kunzler v. Canon, USA, Inc. · filed 2003-05-21

More specifically, by prohibiting acts of employers, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (stating that it is unlawful for “an employer” to engage in discriminatory practices), the statute covers current or potential “employees.”

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII claim.

Pisharodi v. Valley Baptist Medical Center · filed 2005-10-13(a)

The statute itself, by the plain meaning of its terms, requires an employer-employee relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits applying weight standards to one sex but not the other.

Marks v. National Communications Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1999-10-26(a)(1)

There is nothing to suggest that discrimination based on weight, when practiced against one sex but not the other, should not constitute a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can reach a no-beard policy that has a disparate impact based on religion or is applied differently based on race.

Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp. · filed 1980-12-19(a)(1)

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff is ALLOWED thirty (30) days to amend his complaint to clarify his allegations of a violation by Butler’s of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), based upon race, religion or both, if he so chooses. ... Based upon the foregoing, Butler’s motion to dismiss on the ground that its no-beard policy could not as a matter of law violate Title VII is DENIED.

Section 2000e-2 permits a reasonable grooming code for public-contact employees as a bona fide occupational qualification.

Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1972-12-04(e)(1)

Safeway’s grooming code is not arbitrary, and for its public-contact employees, serving as its only sales force, such a reasonable code is a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to enforce a reasonable hair-length rule for male employees when it does not deny employment opportunities because of sex.

Fagan v. National Cash Register Company · filed 1973-08-21(a)

More remotely is it to be discerned as discrimination because of sex, when employees’ hair length fails to conform to an employer’s reasonable requirements, designed to further the company’s legitimate interests.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit sex-specific grooming rules that have no significant effect on employment opportunities for one sex compared with the other.

Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc · filed 1973-11-26(a)

The line must be drawn somewhere between these two extremes, and we draw the line to exclude Giant’s hair-length regulations from the ambit of Title VII. We do not believe that Title VII was intended to invalidate grooming regulations which have no significant effect upon the employment opportunities afforded one sex in favor of the other.

Section 703 does not prohibit a male hair-length rule solely because it differs from the rule for women; the rule must hinder men from getting, enjoying or keeping jobs.

Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1974-11-07(a)

A male hair-length regulation, while specially defined for men and different than for women, does not discriminate on the basis of sex without a further showing that it is used to hinder men from getting, enjoying or keeping jobs.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits private employers to set different dress and grooming standards for male and female employees.

Robert E. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA LAND TITLE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1974-12-04(a)

We agree with the district court that a private employer may require male employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat a hair-length rule for male employees as sex discrimination merely because the employer has no similar rule for female employees.

Morris v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company · filed 1975-01-24(a)(1)

Thus, we now conclude that (1) regulations of an employer pertaining to the length at which the hair of a male employee must be worn do not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex as contemplated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even though the employer does not have similar regulations pertaining to its female employees, and (2) since it is concluded that there has been no discrimination based on sex in this case, the Court need not reach the question of whether or not a specific hair length for male employees is a bona fide occupational qualification in this instance.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit different grooming standards for men and women based on mutable traits such as hair length.

Willingham v. MacOn Telegraph Publishing Company · filed 1975-02-12(a)

Private employers are prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and women only when the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics or legally protected rights.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to set reasonable dress and grooming standards that differ for male and female employees.

Wamsganz v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1975-02-26(a)

This Court is firmly in agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that: . . . a private employer may require male employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a).

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit an employer’s grooming rule based on hair length or facial hair when the rule is applied without sex or race discrimination.

Thomas v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company · filed 1975-04-17(a)

Distinctions in the application of employment practices to different classes of employees on the basis of something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit either employment opportunity or equal rights. Neither facial hair nor hair length is an immutable or protected characteristic of either males or Black males and in the situation of employer vis-a-vis employee (Black or white) neither enjoys constitutional protection.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a private employer to impose different dress and grooming requirements on male and female employees without that difference alone constituting unlawful sex discrimination.

Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1975-02-11(a)

After careful consideration of the issues presented to us, this Court is in agreement with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that: . . . a private employer may require male employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharging an employee under different hair length standards for men and women based on sex stereotypes.

Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co. · filed 1975-10-22(a)

In summary, plaintiff has alleged that defendant applies different hair length standards to its male and female employees, and that he was discharged for not conforming to the male standard. This standard is based on sex stereotypes concerning proper male and female hair lengths. We hold that this is sex-based discrimination within the meaning of § 703(a) of the Act, and that plaintiff has stated a claim under this statute.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit minor differences in grooming rules for men and women that reflect customary modes of appearance.

Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1975-12-30(a)(1)

In summary, we conclude that minor differences in personal appearance regulations that reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit reasonable differences in hair grooming standards for men and women when the employer applies its grooming code evenly.

Miller v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. · filed 1976-04-12

Defendant’s hair grooming standards for male employees only do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit a sex-differentiated hair length rule unless it is used as a pretext to exclude either sex from employment.

Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines · filed 1976-08-25(a)(1)

Employing this analysis, we hold that a sex-differentiated hair length regulation that is not utilized as a pretext to exclude either sex from employment does not constitute an unlawful employment practice as defined by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit an employer’s grooming code merely because it requires different hair lengths for men and women.

William BARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAFT BROADCASTING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-02-11(a)(1)

The prohibition of sex discrimination must be interpreted in light of the purpose and intent of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Employer grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such a negligible relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude they were a target of the Act.

Section 2000e-2 permits different weight standards for male and female employees when the differences are reasonable and do not disparately limit employment opportunities.

Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-03-03

In summary, Eastern’s weight control program is imposed upon both male and female flight attendants. The difference between the standards for men and women are not unreasonable in terms of medical considerations and ability to comply. The differing standards have not had a disparate impact on the employment opportunities of women. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the weight program is an illegal employment practice under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory impact or pretext to establish that an employer’s weight requirements discriminate based on sex.

Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc. · filed 1977-04-26(a)(1)

It was incumbent upon plaintiff to demonstrate that National’s policy caused a discriminatory impact upon the class or that defendant’s justification was but a pretext.

Section 2000e-2 does not make it sex discrimination to enforce a grooming code against only some male employees or to set different hair-length standards for male and female drivers.

Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · filed 1977-07-20

First, plaintiffs suggest that the grooming code was enforced only against a minority of the male employees. No citation of authority is needed to demonstrate that this cannot amount to sex discrimination. Second, plaintiffs suggest that female drivers hired after the promulgation of the grooming code “were not required to meet the same standards of hair ‘length and/or bulk’ required of male drivers.” This theory must fail in light of Knott, where the discrepancy in hair length restrictions was held not to constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. ... Accordingly, this Court is constrained to hold that plaintiffs’ first claim does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits requiring female employees to wear identifiable uniforms while comparable male employees may wear ordinary business attire.

Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n · filed 1979-08-21(a)(1)

By this rule defendant discriminated against plaintiff with respect to her "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of her sex although such conduct is proscribed by the literal terms of that Section.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from requiring women to wear identifiable uniforms while allowing similarly situated men to wear ordinary business attire when the difference cannot be justified by business necessity.

Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1979-08-21(a)(1)

However, the situation is different where, as here, two sets of employees performing the same functions are subjected on the basis of sex to two entirely separate dress codes — one including a variety of normal business attire and the other requiring a clearly identifiable uniform. This different treatment in the conditions of employment for female employees cannot be justified by business necessity, since, as already described, the employer had a variety of non-discriminatory alternative means of assuring good grooming.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits weight requirements imposed only on an exclusively female job category when they constitute discriminatory treatment based on sex.

Gerdom v. Continental Airlines · filed 1982-11-15(a)(1)

We hold that Continental's policy of requiring an exclusively female category of flight attendants, and no other employees, to adhere to the weight restrictions at issue here constitutes discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits reasonable appearance and grooming standards, but they may be unlawful if applied discriminatorily.

Craft v. Metromedia, Inc. · filed 1983-10-31(a)

This court recognizes that otherwise permissible appearance and grooming standards could be unlawful if invidiously applied.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a grooming policy permitting braids without beads or trim unlawful based on allegations that black female employees are more likely to wear braids.

Cooper v. American Airlines · filed 1998-05-26(a)

The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), rea- soning that Cooper's challenge to the grooming policy in effect prior to August 1993 was moot; that the grooming policy adopted in August 1993 did not constitute an unlawful employment practice; and that Cooper had failed to allege a cognizable claim for disparate treat- ment. ... After reviewing the parties' briefs and the applicable law, and hav- ing had the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Cooper's complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a no-beard policy applied to all paramedics as sex discrimination based solely on its effect on men who choose to wear beards.

Barrett v. American Medical Response, N.W., Inc. · filed 2001-03-28(a)(1)

In sum, AMR’s “no beard” policy is a valid exercise of its discretion over its employees mode of appearance.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits different appearance standards for men and women when they impose equal burdens on both sexes.

Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. · filed 2002-11-27(a)(1)

Defendant’s sex-differentiated appearance standards impose equal burdens on each sex, and, therefore, do not constitute disparate treatment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a grooming code that bars men but not women from wearing earrings or ear studs when the code has only a de minimis effect on employment opportunities.

Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-12-17(a)(1)

Applying these principles to Fareway’s unwritten personal grooming code, we conclude this grooming code did not constitute discrimination based on sex within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA.

Section 703 does not prohibit different hair-length standards for male and female employees when the distinction concerns grooming rather than sex.

McConnell v. Mercantile National Bank at Dallas · filed 1975-02-14(a)

The Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion was issued on February 12, 1975, and in accordance with that opinion I am rendering judgment for the defendant Mercantile National Bank. The en bane opinion holds that an employee’s grooming; code, requiring different hair lengths for male and female employees, constituted discrimination on the basis of grooming standards, not on the basis of sex and was, therefore, outside the proscription of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-differentiated appearance standards that impose unequal burdens on men and women; an employee must produce evidence of those unequal burdens.

Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc. · filed 2004-12-28(a)(1)

We hold that under the "unequal burdens" test, which is this Circuit's test for evaluating whether an employer's sex-differentiated appearance standards constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, Jespersen failed to introduce evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether Harrah's "Personal Best" policy imposes unequal burdens on male and female employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex stereotyping claim based on a grooming policy, but an employee’s subjective objection to the policy alone does not establish one.

Jespersen v. Harrah's · filed 2006-04-13(a)(1)

We cannot agree, however, that her objection to the makeup ... requirement, without more, can give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make a uniformly applied pants-only policy sex discrimination without evidence of discriminatory treatment or sex stereotyping.

Finnie v. Lee County · filed 2012-01-17(a)(1)

Here, however, Plaintiff simply produces no evidence that would allow a factfinder to conclude that the uniform policy is impermissible gender discrimination or proscribed sex stereotyping.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits different hair-length requirements for men and women, but a claim that an employer selectively enforces its hair policy against men can proceed as sex discrimination.

Viscecchia v. Alrose Allegria LLC · filed 2015-07-30(a)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds: (1) the gender discrimination claim based upon the theory that gender-differentiated hair length requirements are inherently discriminatory fails as a matter of federal and state law; (2) the gender discrimination claim based upon the theory that the hair policy is selectively enforced by the Hotel in a manner that discriminates against male employees (because male employees are disciplined for long hair while females are not disciplined for other violations of the hair policy, such as having “streaked hair”) states a plausible claim under federal and state law; and (3) a claim of retaliation based upon alleged complaints about selective enforcement of various aspects of the hair policy is plausible under federal and state law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to plead facts suggesting that racial animus was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Brock v. Mental Health and Addiction Services · filed 2025-08-22(a)(1)

Brock is not required to allege that racial animus was the “but-for” cause of the alleged adverse employment actions. But she must at least allege facts suggesting that racial animus was a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action to be caused by the employee’s membership in a protected class.

Blowe v. Jewell · filed 2025-08-18(a)(1)

That is because Title VII contains a causation requirement: to be held liable, the employer must have taken the adverse action “because of” the employee’s membership in a protected class.