42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Once an employer produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the Title VII plaintiff retains the burden to prove intentional discrimination, even if the factfinder rejects that reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks · filed 1993-06-25(a)(1)

[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff claiming national origin discrimination to prove intentional discrimination; the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.

Dhuria v. Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 1993-07-27(a)

Thus, despite the shifting burdens of production, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason may remove the presumption of discrimination without entitling it to summary judgment.

Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Marvin Runyon, John B. Waters, and William H. Kennoy · filed 1993-07-29(a)

The corrective action report and the deposition testimony of Mr. Cole and Ms. Tousek were sufficient to eliminate the presumption of discrimination, but we do not believe they were sufficient to entitle the defendants to judgment as a matter of law.

A request to vacate an office is not actionable under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence that it was discriminatory.

Kassaye v. Bryant College · filed 1993-08-03(a)(1)

However, nothing in this record suggests, directly or indirectly, that the request to move was discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of discriminatory motive; a white employee cannot establish race discrimination merely because Black decision makers voted against him.

Pilditch v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 1993-09-21(a)(1)

The only way to conclude based on this paltry record that the plaintiff was discriminated against because he was white is to make the illogical and insupportable assumption that every time a black council member votes against a white candidate, the decision is motivated by race. This is impermissible.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits assigning an employee different work because of sex.

Bartlett v. United States · filed 1993-10-14(a)(1)

The court finds, as a matter of law, that the filing assignment constituted disparate treatment, and Mr. Kimball testified his decision to assign the filing work to Plaintiff solely was because of gender, that she was less likely to refuse to do the task than her male colleagues.

A plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion on a claim of employment discrimination under Section 2000e-2.

Berry v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1993-11-30

The court also finds that none of the plaintiffs has met their burden of persuasion regarding discrimination claims against GM. The court grants judgment in favor of GM on all discrimination claims as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to decline to hire an applicant for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, such as lying on an application.

Davis v. George S. May International Company · filed 1993-11-30(a)(1)

GSMIC had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Davis because he lied on his application.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a challenge to a benefit limitation without an indication that the limitation is based on sex.

Jovanovich v. Sweeney · filed 1993-12-01(a)

Because there is absolutely no indication that the COLA limitation at issue is gender-based, Jovanovich may not rely on either the EPA or Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of intentional discrimination in a racial-discharge claim; decisionmakers cannot intentionally discriminate based on race without knowing the employees’ races.

Johnson v. Northwest Airlines · filed 1993-12-20(a)(1)

However, where a decision is putatively race based, it naturally follows that a Defendant accused of intentional racial discrimination would have to know the race of the Plaintiff, as well as that of other similarly situated employee[s].

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment decisions, and a plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Corwye v. The Boeing Company · filed 1993-12-21(a)(1)

Pursuant to Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race when making employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1); Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1993). ... We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that Corwye failed to produce any evidence, aside from her own conclusory statements, permitting an inference that Boeing's reasons for her discharge, failure to promote, and disparate treatment in training opportunities and work assignments were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination even if the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual.

Rosa v. National Westminster Bank · filed 1994-02-02(a)

Thus, even if the Bank’s reasons are found to be pretextual, the plaintiff must, nevertheless, prove that she was not promoted as a result of intentional discrimination or retaliation.

A disparate-treatment claim requires proof that the employer intentionally discriminated because of a protected characteristic.

Artis v. State of Indiana · filed 1994-02-28(a)(1)

Finding no clear error in the district court's findings of fact, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 12 F.3d 668, ---- (7th Cir.1993), and deferring to its credibility determinations, id. at ----, we agree that Artis failed to meet the ultimate burden of showing that he was the victim of intentional discrimination.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment on pretext merely by claiming to be better qualified for the job.

Cook v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company · filed 1994-02-17(a)(1)

Unlike the plaintiff in Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1438-39, who offered direct and specific evidence of the employer's discriminatory motive, Cook alleges, essentially, that he was better qualified. Such a challenge is insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.

Disproving an employer’s stated reasons for discharge does not, by itself, entitle a Title VII plaintiff to judgment.

Powell v. Bob Downes Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1994-04-15(a)(1)

Even assuming arguendo that defendant’s reasons for plaintiff’s discharge were incorrect, such a finding does not require entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, the employee must identify specific facts showing discriminatory motive or that the reason is not credible to avoid summary judgment.

Flores v. Ticor Title Insurance Company of California Chicago Title Company · filed 1994-05-27(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual on the basis of national origin when making employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Flores' allegations are essentially reduced to a restatement of his prima facie case, an intent to challenge the credibility of the Company's declarants, and his subjective personal judgment of his own competence. Such a challenge is insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion absent specific facts "evidencing discriminatory motive or showing that the employer's explanation is not credible." ... Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Company.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows evidence allegedly fabricated for an EEOC investigation to support a discrimination claim by showing that the employer’s reason for denying a promotion was pretextual.

Boyd v. Brookstone Corp. of New Hampshire, Inc. · filed 1994-07-18(a)

In the instant case, Boyd’s allegations of manufactured evidence would be relevant to whether Brookstone’s reasons for not promoting Boyd were pretextual, or false.

When an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision, a Title VII plaintiff must present specific facts showing discriminatory motive or pretext to survive summary judgment.

Hudson v. Stockton Unified School District Petrina K. Romo · filed 1994-08-09(a)(1)

Hudson's allegations are reduced to a restatement of her prima facie case and her subjective personal judgment of her own competence. Such a challenge is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment absent specific facts "evidencing discriminatory motive." See Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1438. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the District.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to prove racial motivation even after showing that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Evans v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1994-08-25(a)(1)

In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hicks, even though Plaintiff has succeeded in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the School District’s articulated non-discriminatory reasons for failing to renew his contract were pretextual, Plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the decision not to offer him a contract was racially motivated.

For a disparate treatment failure to promote claim, a possible violation of the Indian Preference Act does not establish a Title VII violation without proof of wrongful discrimination.

Lena R. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna W. SHALALA, Secretary, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-09-08(a)

Johnson failed to prove that any of the Secretary's actions, including those that might have violated the Indian Preference Act, were motivated by wrongful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected characteristic.

Luxemburg v. Texas a & M University System · filed 1994-09-19(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff is unable to show that either his religion or his racial origin forms the basis for this report, because even in the absence of Slotta’s comments on the Saturday seminar there is no reason to believe the faculty service evaluation would have been anything other than negative.

An employee's testimony about explicit sex discrimination can provide sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to send a claim to a jury.

Portis v. First Nat. Bank of New Albany, Miss. · filed 1994-10-07(a)(1)

We therefore hold that Portis has adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to require presentation to a jury, and that the district court erred in granting FNB's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2 allows a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to infer that an employer favored male employees in eliminating a woman's position.

McFadden-Peel v. Staten Island Cable · filed 1994-12-29(a)(1)

From this evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could infer that McFadden was disadvantaged in favor of younger, male employees, and thus made a victim of discrimination. ... After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this court cannot hold as a matter of law that it would be unreasonable for a jury to find in plaintiffs favor.

Clearly superior qualifications can support a finding that an employer discriminated against an applicant in violation of Title VII.

Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, a Delaware Corporation, AKA Westin Hotels · filed 1995-04-28(a)(1)

A district court’s finding that a Title VII plaintiffs qualifications were clearly superior to the qualifications of the applicant selected is a proper basis for a finding of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer treated one gender differently because of sex, rather than personal dislike or differences of opinion.

Wagner v. NutraSweet Co. · filed 1995-08-29(a)(1)

Gender discrimination, although often manifested by stereotypical attitudes, must be proven by evidence which clearly treats one gender differently than the other based on the characteristic of sex, rather than on other bases, such as mere dislike, differences of opinion, or other undefinable attributes.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must prove intentional discrimination, which may be shown through direct or inferential evidence.

Ziegler v. K-Mart Corporation · filed 1996-01-10(a)(1)

While a Title VII plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination, “she can do so with either direct or inferential proof.”

A Title VII sex discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case or rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Geary v. Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and Hospital · filed 1996-04-25

Geary failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. ... Moreover, she failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason Defendants proffered to support their termination of Geary.

A race or sex discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the employer’s stated reason for firing her concealed discrimination.

Shivers v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 1996-05-28(a)(1)

Shivers has not provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Honeywell’s alleged reasons for firing her were a subterfuge for race, gender and age discrimination. Accordingly, the court must grant Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment.

A Title VII race discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in an employment decision.

LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc. · filed 1996-06-27(a)(1)

Therefore, we find that the summary judgment evidence in LaPierre's case is sufficient to create a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in the decisions of Benson Nissan not to promote LaPierre to Director of Parts and Service and to demote LaPierre to mechanic. Accordingly, we find that a jury issue exists as to whether Benson Nissan intentionally discriminated against LaPierre on the basis of race, and we hold that the district court erred in granting Benson Nissan's motion for summary judgment.

An employer’s knowledge of an applicant’s protected class, by itself, does not show that its stated reason for denying a promotion was a pretext for discrimination.

Rabinovitz v. Honorable Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation, United States Department of Transportation · filed 1996-07-17(a)(1)

An employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class is obviously not enough to cast doubt on that employer’s proffered reason for rejecting a candidate; otherwise, plaintiffs alleging gender and racial discrimination, for example, would always clear the pretext hurdle-assuming their gender and race are conspicuous.

A Title VII race discrimination claimant must present evidence that race motivated the challenged employment decision; arbitrary or unfair treatment alone is insufficient.

Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1996-07-29(a)(1)

In order to make a case suitable for trial under Title VII or Section 1981, a claimant must offer more than just evidence of arbitrary or irrational decision-making; he must provide some evidence that race was the motivating factor for the decision. The Plaintiff has failed to do so in this case.

In a circumstantial refusal-to-hire claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), unsupported allegations and subjective impressions are insufficient to show pretext and survive summary judgment.

Terry v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. · filed 1996-09-10(a)(1)

This Court holds that Terry’s unsupported allegations of discrimination, Moore’s written notes, and the dispute over the content of the telephone conversation are insufficient for Terry to survive summary judgment on either the Title VII or the Chapter 151B claim.

A pregnancy discrimination claimant must show that discrimination motivated the dismissal; an isolated, ambiguous remark alone is insufficient.

Gonzalez v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1996-09-27

As a matter of law, one isolated, ambiguous remark by itself is insufficient to support a claim of discrimination under Title VII.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), discriminatory remarks can support an inference of pretext on their own, depending on their context and connection to the employment decision.

Brown v. City of Aurora · filed 1996-09-30(a)(1)

The Court does not believe that there can be a bright-line rule as to whether discriminatory remarks, by themselves, are sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that the employer’s legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason is pretextual. Rather, each case must be analyzed on its own facts. The inquiry should focus on the type and frequency of the remark, the context in which the remark was stated, the period of time between the remark and the adverse employment action, whether the remark was uttered by the decision maker, and any other relevant factors.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a challenged employment decision, after which the employee must show that reason was pretextual.

Pridemore v. Usair, Incorporated · filed 1996-10-08(a)(1)

Because USAir presented a legitimate, non discriminatory reason for its employment actions, the burden shifted back to Pridemore to show that the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was, in reality, a pretext for a discriminatory motive. ... Accordingly, we find that Pridemore has not shown a genuine issue of race or age discrimination and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a race or gender discrimination claim when the employer applies its leave policy uniformly and there is no evidence of discriminatory pretext.

Gaither v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual · filed 1996-12-17

The evidence presented before this Court shows that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of either discrimination (on the basis of race or gender) or retaliation. The evidence presented before this Court shows that Defendant merely applied its leave policy to Plaintiff in a manner similar to that of every other employee.

A plaintiff challenging a promotion decision as race discrimination must offer evidence supporting an inference of racial animus to show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Grimes v. Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Richmond State School · filed 1996-12-13(a)

However, evidence of mere dislike is not enough to prove pretext under Title VII; Grimes must present evidence which would support an inference of racial or retaliatory animus in order to meet her evidentiary burden under a Title VII discrimination or retaliation claim.

An employee challenging a discharge as race discrimination must produce evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Company · filed 1996-12-20(a)(1)

In this case, Mayfield had to produce evidence that Patterson's reasons for his discharge were a pretext for discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment on an employee’s subjective belief of bias alone when the employer has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Steele v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. · filed 1997-04-15(a)

Thus, Steele has failed to make the necessary showing of racial animus. Without additional support, an employee’s subjective belief that discrimination is the basis of an employment decision is not sufficient to survive summary judgment following an employer’s adequate showing of a non-discriminatory reason for the action.

A sex discrimination verdict may stand when conflicting evidence supports the jury's finding that the employer's stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Jordan v. Shaw Industries Inc · filed 1997-11-26(a)(1)

In short, the parties presented ample conflicting evidence to the jury for resolution of the ultimate question in discrimination cases--whether a discriminatory motive or a legitimate non-discriminatory reason accounted for the adverse employment decision at issue.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that gender played a role in work assignments; assigning traditional secretarial tasks to a female secretary alone does not establish sex discrimination.

Marilyn GALDIERI-AMBROSINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-02-04(a)

But proof that an employer has assigned to a secretary tasks that are traditionally secretarial tasks — even if related to the employer’s personal business— does not suffice to support a verdict of gender discrimination under Title VII.

When an employer offers legitimate reasons for its actions, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination must show that those reasons are pretextual.

Cochrane v. Houston Light and Power Co. · filed 1998-02-24(a)(1)

A plaintiff establishes this circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination by demonstrating that Defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory rationale is pretextual. ... Although the burden rests here with Plaintiff, she fails to persuade the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated Defendant or that Defendant’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits subjective performance evaluations, but objective evidence may show that an evaluation masks discrimination.

Wamiq SATTAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOTOROLA, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1998-03-12(a)(1)

Nevertheless, nothing in Title VII bans outright the use of subjective evaluation criteria. It is true that an employer’s use of subjective criteria may leave it more vulnerable to a finding of discrimination, when a plaintiff can point to some objective evidence indicating that the subjective evaluation is a mask for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to choose employees using its own criteria, provided those criteria do not discriminate on a prohibited basis.

Gillo v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Illinois, Whitney Young High School, Powhatan Collins · filed 1998-05-22(a)(1)

For the reasons given in the district court's opinion, which is attached as an appendix hereto, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed. ... Consistent with Title VII, an employer may choose its employees according to its own criteria, so long as such criteria does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a tenure discrimination claim to proceed when a jury could find that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment because of national origin or religion.

Amini v. Case Western Reserve University · filed 1998-06-04(a)

A material factual issue exists as to whether or not these comparable individuals were treated in a manner more favorable than Amini because of national origin and religion. The Court finds that a material issue of fact is presented upon which a jury could, in construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Dr. Amini, find that he was treated differently than those who were “similarly situated.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; circumstantial evidence of pretext and discriminatory motive can support a finding of unlawful discharge.

Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital, Michael D. Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital · filed 1998-10-23(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful, inter alia, to discharge any individual because of his sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that deficiencies in Carey's handling of financial controls were not the real reason for his discharge but instead covered an action stemming from gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on race or sex; conclusory statements alone do not establish that connection.

Ceasar v. North Star Steel Texas, Inc. · filed 1999-03-08(a)(1)

Both of plaintiffs discrimination claims fail at this juncture because she provides no summary judgment evidence, except eonclusory statements made by affidavit and during her deposition, that demonstrate her disciplinary probation or transfer to another department was based on discriminatory reasons or that defendant’s conduct was due to gender or racial animus.

Under Section 2000e-2(a), a claimant using indirect proof of race discrimination in the denial of an employment benefit must show that similarly situated employees of another race received the benefit.

Horton v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 1999-03-08(a)

In addition, Horton cannot establish the fourth element without evidence that similarly situated white employees received the Productivity Fund Buyout.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employment decision was motivated by sex or national origin.

Mohankumar v. Kansas State University · filed 1999-05-13(a)(1)

Even so, this claim fails because plaintiff cites no evidence to reasonably suggest the denial of a continued stipend was due to her national origin or gender. Under Title VII, the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose liability for an adverse employment action without evidence connecting it to the employee's sex.

Snyder v. Saberliner Corp. · filed 1999-12-14(a)

However, Title VII is not a strict liability statute and, like anyone else, a person who falls within its scope is still subject to adverse employment actions when he/she cannot adequately perform his/her job. It requires more than plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class and an unrelated adverse employment action to establish liability on the part of defendant. Plaintiff must show a nexus between the complained of acts and her sex and that defendant's explanations were a pretext for intentional discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming intentional discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) may prove it through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Sweeney v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board · filed 2000-04-17(a)(1)

Under Title VII and the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate through either direct or circumstantial evidence that the ABC Board’s actions were the result of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence of religious discrimination; workplace remarks that do not show religious bias cannot support a claim.

Ahmed v. Gelfand · filed 2001-03-05(a)

The Court finds that a jury could not determine, under even the most liberal of readings, that either of these statements constitute direct or circumstantial evidence of religious discrimination.

A plaintiff’s belief that an employer discriminated because of race is insufficient to prove a claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) without supporting evidence.

Williams v. Simmons Co. · filed 2001-05-22(a)(1)

The mere fact that a plaintiff believes his employer discriminated against him is insufficient to prove discrimination. ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ assertions of the same are irrelevant without supporting evidence.

A plaintiff without direct evidence of race discrimination must satisfy the indirect burden-shifting analysis to survive summary judgment under Title VII.

Johnson-Carter v. B.D.O. Seidman, LLP · filed 2001-11-05(a)(1)

Because Johnson-Carter concedes that she has no direct evidence of discrimination, her discrimination claims must satisfy the burden-shifting analysis in order to survive summary judgment.

Under § 2000e-2(a), once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a staffing decision, the employee must show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Bilow, Sharon v. Much Shelist Freed · filed 2001-11-07(a)

Once the firm articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the staffing decision, the burden shifted to Bilow to show that the given reason was a pretext for discrimination.

An employee must show that sex motivated the employer’s decision; a dispute involving a pregnant spouse’s insurance claim alone does not establish sex discrimination.

Kruger v. Pacific Benefits Group Northwest, LLC. · filed 2001-12-18(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kruger, he has failed to produce direct and substantial evidence that he was treated differently because he was a man or because he was the husband of a pregnant woman. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact exists; therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Kruger’s sexual discrimination claim under Title VII is granted.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee offers no evidence of pretext or different treatment of similarly situated employees.

Watts v. Dalton · filed 2002-01-17(a)(1)

Even assuming the cards were forged, as Watts contends, Watts’s claim must fail. She has not provided any evidence that the Navy’s reliance on these refusal cards in denying her pension claim was a pretext for racial discrimination or that the Navy treated any similarly situated employee differently.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination to prove that sex motivated the employment decision.

Craine v. Trinity College · filed 2002-03-12(a)

In the present case, we conclude that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination but failed to carry her ultimate burden of proving that the denial of tenure was motivated by illegal sex discrimination.

A race-discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee lacks evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that changes to her duties were caused by race.

Colbert v. Chao · filed 2002-12-16

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to satisfy her “burden of showing that a reasonable jury could conclude that” her authority or duties were changed on account of her race or age.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for a layoff was false or a pretext for sex discrimination.

Arce v. Aramark Corp. · filed 2003-01-10(a)(1)

The plaintiffs have not shown that ARAMARK’s reason was false or a pretext for sex discrimination. Tirado’s failure to create a triable issue of fact concerning his sex discrimination claim warrants the dismissal of said cause of action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to prove race or sex discrimination through the indirect method by showing a prima facie case and that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Randall v. Unitech Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-02-06(a)(1)

In sum, Randall has failed to establish elements two and four of her prima facie case and has failed to show that Unitech’s proffered reasons were pretextual. Therefore, the court grants Unitech’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim can be established through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory treatment.

Johnson v. The Kroger Company · filed 2003-02-19

In order to establish a Title VII employment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must either present direct evidence of discrimination or introduce circumstantial evidence that would allow an inference of discriminatory treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer’s adverse treatment was motivated by sex discrimination; differential treatment alone does not suffice.

Read v. BT Alex Brown Inc. · filed 2003-07-30(a)(1)

It is therefore clear that none of Read's evidence, taken individually or as a whole, concerning the five examples of discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, is sufficient to establish that Brown treated Read differently because of her age or sex.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race discrimination in employment; a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer discriminatory motive or pretext.

Crowe v. School District of Webster · filed 2003-10-01

Because plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that defendants were motivated to deny plaintiff entry into the union or terminate her because of her race or that defendants’ stated reasons had no basis in fact, I will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated an employment decision; an employee’s unsubstantiated belief alone cannot establish discrimination.

Payne v. MTA New York City Transit Authority · filed 2004-12-21(a)(1)

Under McDonnell Douglas, Payne bears the ultimate burden of proving that his reassignment was the result of racial discrimination. The only admissible evidence that he has submitted is his own unsubstantiated, subjective belief, embodied in his deposition testimony, that white and black colleagues at the NYCTA conspired to humiliate him and remove him from his position because of his race. No reasonable jury could conclude, based on that evidence alone, that he has carried his burden. Accordingly, the NYCTA’s motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to this claim.

At summary judgment, Title VII’s motivating-factor provision leaves the Eighth Circuit’s direct- and indirect-evidence frameworks in place.

Klyuch v. Freightmasters, Inc. · filed 2005-01-10(m)

Thus, how the Court analyzes Klyueh’s claims depends on whether Klyuch has presented direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-discrimination claim over a promotion to proceed when evidence could show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Kahn v. Fairfield University · filed 2005-02-17(a)(1)

Given the imprecise nature of the University’s purported legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the evidence provided by Kahn to support a factual finding of pretext is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

A national origin discrimination claim can reach a jury when the evidence permits it to find the employer’s stated reason for denying a promotion pretextual and infer discrimination.

Salazar v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2005-03-22

Under Reeves, then, we believe a jury might infer discrimination if it concluded that WMATA’s proffered reason was pretextual.

An employer's mistaken investigation does not establish discriminatory discharge without evidence that race motivated the decision.

Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc. · filed 2005-07-13(a)(1)

While the prudent action may have been to discuss the event with Bryant and obtain his side of the story before terminating him, evidence that the employer's investigation merely came to an incorrect conclusion does not establish a racial motivation behind an adverse employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of discrimination to show that a similarly situated person outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Chang v. University of Toledo · filed 2007-03-28(a)(1)

Further, Plaintiff can neither establish a prima facie case, nor rebut Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for reducing his pay. Plaintiffs prima facie case falters at the fourth prong; he cannot show that a similarly-situated individual outside of the protected class was treated more favorable than he.

Section 2000e-2(m) covers an employment decision motivated by racial bias when the final decision maker acts as a conduit for a biased supervisor.

Tucker v. Housing Authority of the Birmingham District · filed 2007-04-05(m)

After reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Ruggs was a conduit by which Truman made an employment decision motivated by her discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

Thomas v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. · filed 2007-05-17(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie claim of discriminatory termination; unrelated stray remarks do not suffice.

Des-Ogugua v. Pennsylvania Department of Community & Economic Development · filed 2007-07-13

At best, these statements are the type of stray remarks that are insufficient to establish a discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in employment based on race or national origin; a claim fails when the employee lacks direct evidence of discrimination and sufficient evidence of pretext.

Fuentes v. Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service · filed 2008-01-07(a)(1)

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... As Fuentes neither provides direct evidence of discrimination, nor sufficient evidence of pretext, we uphold the dismissal of this claim.

A race discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was treated more favorably.

Winsley v. Cook County · filed 2008-04-29(a)(1)

In light of plaintiffs testimony, plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of a similarly situated employee. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case under the indirect method of proof.

Under § 2000e-2’s indirect method of proof, a race discrimination plaintiff must show that a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably.

Ellis v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2008-04-29

Ellis’s failure to establish that any other similarly situated manager in an intraracial relationship was treated more favorably dooms his discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employment action was based on sex; a dispute over management authority alone does not establish discrimination.

Hervey v. County of Koochiching · filed 2008-06-09(a)(1)

Whether or not Mastin should have been supervising Hervey, she has no claim under Title VII unless the actions of Mastin or Nelson were based on sex.

A plaintiff pursuing a single-motive race discrimination claim must show that the employer’s stated reasons for the adverse action were pretexts.

Ginger v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-10(a)(1)

A plaintiff may pursue a “single-motive case,” in which he argues race (or another prohibited criterion) was the sole ... reason for an adverse employment action and the employer’s seemingly legitimate justifications are in fact pretextual. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... In sum, the officers never contended this was a mixed-motive case, and no reasonable jury could conclude the District’s justifications were pretextual, leaving race as the sole motivation for reorganizing the Unit; therefore, the district court properly entered summary judgment for the District.

A Title VII discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff does not make a prima facie case or rebut the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons.

Clark v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. · filed 2008-07-25(a)

Applying a de novo standard of review, as we must, Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc), and having reviewed thoroughly the briefs, record, and legal precedent, we agree with the district court that Clark failed to make out a prima facie case and/or failed to rebut Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of Clark’s claims.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must offer evidence that an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual or other evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Weber v. Battista · filed 2009-03-30(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Thus, for all of the above reasons, Weber has failed to establish the Board’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual and has offered no additional evidence of discrimination. Therefore, this Court grants the Board’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex and national origin discrimination in employment; an employee must present evidence that an employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination.

Weber v. Hurgten · filed 2009-03-30(a)(1)

Thus, for all of the above reasons, Weber has failed to establish the Board's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual and has offered no additional evidence of discrimination. Therefore, this Court grants the Board's motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that different treatment occurred because of a protected characteristic.

Reeves v. DSI Security Services · filed 2009-06-03(a)

In addition, even if DSI treated its security guards differently than other employees, Reeves cannot obtain relief because he never showed DSI did so because of one of the protected grounds.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination to link the challenged employment treatment to sex.

Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Department · filed 2009-08-20(a)(1)

In short, Coffman has failed to link her treatment—through either circumstantial or direct evidence—with the fact that she is female. Summary judgment was thus appropriate on Coffman’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Discrimination claims under § 2000e-2, including hostile work environment claims, use the same standards of proof and analytical framework as claims under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981.

Bryant v. CEO DeKalb Co. · filed 2009-07-31

We pause to note that discrimination claims, including hostile work environment claims, brought under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, are subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find race discrimination when an employer offers a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action.

Jackson v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-11-05(a)(1)

Ms. Jackson has failed to show that a reasonable jury could conclude from all of the evidence that she was demoted because of her race.

A plaintiff may establish a sex discrimination claim through evidence of sex stereotyping without showing that similarly situated men were treated differently.

Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C. · filed 2010-01-21(a)(1)

The district court’s error was in requiring Lewis to offer evidence that similarly situated men were treated differently.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that a pay disparity was based on race; a plaintiff’s subjective belief alone is insufficient.

Wallace v. Louisiana Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College · filed 2010-02-05(a)(1)

Wallace fails to show that any disparity in pay was based on his race, and his claim is supported by only his own subjective belief.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for its action and the plaintiff cannot show pretext.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Southwestern Furniture of Wisconsin, LLC · filed 2010-03-30(a)

Plaintiffs first cause of action alleges that Defendant violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), by transferring Vanderploeg to the Chandler store because of Vanderploeg’s sex. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show pretext either directly or indirectly such that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s proffered reasons are pretextual.

A sex discrimination plaintiff can survive summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence of satisfactory performance, more favorable treatment of similarly situated men, and pretext.

Coburn v. Pn II, Inc. · filed 2010-03-31(a)

Viewing the totality of Coburn’s evidence, we hold that district court erred in granting summary judgment to Pulte on Coburn’s discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows failure-to-hire discrimination claims to reach a jury when the applicants establish a prima facie case and present sufficient evidence of pretext.

Torgerson v. City of Rochester · filed 2010-05-21(a)(1)

We hold that Torgerson and Mundell created the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination under a McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext, and therefore may present their claims to a jury.

A plaintiff using indirect evidence to prove race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present evidence of intentional discrimination at summary judgment.

Rayford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2010-11-08(a)(1)

Contrary to Rayford’s assertion at oral argument, evidence of intentional discrimination is required at the summary judgment stage even when the plaintiff seeks to prove discriminatory intent through indirect evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to establish a prima facie case and, when the employer gives a legitimate reason for termination, to show that the reason was a pretext.

Roberts v. Unitrin Specialty Lines Ins, et a · filed 2010-12-21(a)(1)

Roberts’s remaining Title VII discrimination claims are without merit because she has failed to set forth a prima face case of discrimination with respect to all conduct other than her termination, and with respect to her termination, she has failed to show that defendants’ reason for her discharge, her failure to return to work after her short-term leave expired, was a pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must offer specific and substantial evidence of pretext.

ALLFREY v. Mabus · filed 2011-01-27(a)(1)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence is not sufficiently specific and substantial to show that there was some discriminatory animus based on gender, or to show pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin; a claim based on circumstantial evidence fails without a valid comparator or evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Hossain v. Steadman · filed 2012-01-25(a)(1)

This court need not address the dispute between Hossain and the defendants regarding dismissal of the counts against the trustees (Doc. 25-3, p. 30 and Doc. 39, p. 35) because Hossain has failed to establish a prima facie case against any of the defendants under § 1981, § 1983, or Title VII, and because he has failed to prove that the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not granting tenure were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a plaintiff proving discrimination must show protected-class membership, job qualifications, an adverse employment action, and replacement by someone outside the protected class.

Joseph v. Napolitano · filed 2012-03-15(a)(1)

In order to prove discrimination, the plaintiff must show (1) that he was a member of a protected class, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside the relevant protected class.

A Title VII discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the record supports no inference that race or sex played any role in the employment decision or that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Perry v. Shinseki · filed 2012-05-18(m)

We need not consider this legal argument, however, because nothing in the record suggests that Perry’s age, race, or sex played any role whatsoever—whether as a but-for cause or as a motivating factor—in VA’s decision. Moreover, as the district court correctly determined, nothing in the record could support a reasonable inference that VA’s stated reasons for Murphy’s selection were pretextual. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment to VA.

A Title VII plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to show that sex or gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in a challenged discharge.

Lamay v. State · filed 2012-06-14

Plaintiff’s difficulty here is that her evidence, whether characterized as direct or circumstantial, was insufficient to support a finding that gender or gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in her termination.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the evidence does not support an inference that the employer treated employees of another race more favorably.

Watkins v. Kid One Transport · filed 2013-02-28(a)(1)

Kid One was entitled to summary judgment on Watkins’s claim of race discrimination,1 because the undisputed evidence does not support the inference that Kid One treated non-black employees more favorably than it treated Watkins, who is black.

Section 2000e-2 supports a sex discrimination verdict when the evidence permits a jury to find that an employer terminated an employee because of her sex.

Hudson v. United Systems of Arkansas · filed 2013-03-07

Hudson's evidence met her burden of "persuad[ing] the jury, from all the facts and circumstances," that her termination was "based upon intentional discrimination." Ryther, 108 F.3d at 837–38 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 n.4). United Systems was thus not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A discrimination claimant using the indirect method must produce evidence that a similarly situated coworker received more favorable treatment.

Galinato v. Donovan · filed 2013-04-10

He proceeds under the indirect method but, as the district court correctly concluded, has not produced evidence that any similarly situated eoworker was treated more favorably.

A religious discrimination claim can survive summary judgment if a reasonable jury could find that religion played a role in an adverse employment action.

Weber v. City of New York · filed 2013-09-29(m)

To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that religious discrimination played a role in the adverse actions taken against Plaintiff.

A Title VII race or sex discrimination claim requires more than general, conclusory allegations when the employer has given legitimate reasons for its action.

Haskins v. Nicholson · filed 2013-10-10(a)(1)

He does not address the district court’s findings that he failed to identify a comparable employee who was treated favorably or that the defendants provided legitimate, non-pretextual reasons in connection with his race discrimination claim. Because he makes only general, conclusory allegations in connection with his race and sex discrimination claims, he has not shown that the district court erred in dismissing these claims.

A Title VII racial-discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employer gives legitimate reasons for termination and the employee offers no evidence of pretext or race as a motivating factor.

Brown v. Mississippi State Senate · filed 2014-01-20(a)(1)

In short, Brown has not presented sufficient evidence to refute any of the Senate’s proffered reasons for making the decision to terminate her during the RIF, so she has failed to show that the stated reasons were merely pretextual. ... Moreover, Brown has not presented any evidence that racial discrimination was even a “motivating factor” behind her termination.

A race discrimination plaintiff who lacks direct evidence or statistical proof must prove the claim through circumstantial evidence.

Knight v. Fourteen D Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2014-02-03(a)(1)

Knight does not present, nor argue the existence of, direct evidence or statistical proof of discrimination by FDE. “Lacking direct evidence, [Knight] must prove her discrimination claim circumstantially.”

A Title VII discrimination claim requires evidence linking the employee’s protected status to an adverse employment action; an unsupported belief that mistreatment was discriminatory is insufficient.

Hoosier v. Greenwood Hospitality Management LLC · filed 2014-03-26(a)

Although Hoosier may sincerely believe that Harmon’s comments and conduct constitute unlawful discrimination against her because of her race or age, a plaintiffs bare or conclusory assertion that an employer mistreated her because of her protected status is not sufficient to establish a link between the an employee’s protected status and the treatment she received.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to prove employment discrimination through circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework when direct evidence is unavailable.

Finder v. John Marshall Law School, LLC · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

Where the plaintiff cannot present direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing circumstantial evidence of discrimination sufficient to pass the burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

A Title VII intentional discrimination claim fails under the McDonnell Douglas framework when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual or that discriminatory animus motivated the action.

Milione v. City University of New York · filed 2014-05-21(m)

Milione fails to provide evidence that Tamburri’s plan to alter his job title, originally articulated in March 2006, was motivated by discriminatory animus. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Milione’s Title VII claims.

A race discrimination claim requires evidence linking alleged racial animus to the challenged employment decision.

Luqmaan v. Volvo Group North America, LLC · filed 2015-03-26(a)(1)

Moreover, even if certain Volvo managers did harbor racial animus, Luqmaan points to no evidence suggesting that this animus influenced Sutphin’s decision to reassign him.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim pursued through the indirect method requires evidence supporting a prima facie case and showing that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Packer v. Trustees of Indiana University School of Medicine · filed 2015-08-28

Beyond reciting the elements of the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Packer cited no evidence satisfying the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination, nor evidence that the University’s gender-neutral reasons for the adverse actions it took against her were pretextual.

A Title VII discrimination claim fails when there is no evidence that an employer adopted or applied a challenged policy because of a protected characteristic.

Farzan v. Genesis 10, Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2015-10-13(a)

Farzan failed to submit any evidence that the policy was 7 adopted, or applied to him, because of his race, national origin, religion, gender, or age.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a discrimination plaintiff to identify a virtually identical employee who was treated more favorably.

Saunders v. Mills · filed 2016-03-24(a)

The similarly-situated analysis does not require evidence of a virtually identical employee who was treated more favorably.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that race motivated the employment decision or that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Christian v. South Carolina Department of Labor Licensing & Regulation · filed 2016-06-01

Accordingly, we conclude that Christian has failed to present evidence that LLR acted with discriminatory intent when it awarded the management positions to Ido, Dorman, and Cook instead of him, or that LLR’s reasons for choosing those individuals were a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a plaintiff to present a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence to prove employment discrimination.

Memon v. Western Technical College · filed 2016-12-12(a)

This phrase, often used by this court but intended merely as a metaphor to supplement unhelpful direct and indirect methods of proof, has been misunderstood and misapplied, and we recently reiterated that it is not to be treated as a legal requirement.

A discriminatory termination claim requires enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason for firing was not its actual reason and that discrimination motivated the firing.

Diaz v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2017-03-22(a)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating him.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails at summary judgment when the plaintiff offers no evidence of disparate treatment or pretext.

Artiste v. Broward College · filed 2017-04-17(a)(1)

Also, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the discrimination claims. ... Artiste alleged he was discriminated against but put forth ... no evidence that he was treated differently than similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class. ... Further, Artiste failed to offer any evidence that Broward’s proffered reasons for terminating him—a harassment complaint, violating college policy by obtaining a loan from a subordinate, and using work computers for personal purposes—were pretext.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that sex caused an employee’s discharge.

Mourning v. Ternes Packaging, Indiana, Inc · filed 2017-08-18

Mourning has not carried that burden for her Title VII claim, as she has not presented evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that she was fired because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that could permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that an employer took adverse action because of an employee’s sex.

Johnson v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2017-10-24(a)(1)

Even if Johnson was meeting the CTA’s expectations, and even though he suffered adverse actions (suspension and job loss), he loses because he failed to supply evidence that anti-male bias motivated those actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; unfair treatment without evidence of that connection does not establish a claim.

Herron-Williams v. Ala. State Univ. · filed 2018-02-06(a)(1)

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, treating someone unfairly for no clear reason is not inherently a form of unlawful discrimination, and she has otherwise failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about her claims that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race and/or gender in violation of Title VII (Counts Two and Six).

A sex discrimination claim fails when the employee offers no evidence that discrimination, rather than the employer's stated reason, caused her termination.

Robinson-Douglas v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc. · filed 2018-02-20(a)(1)

In the final analysis, then, plaintiff has failed to support an inference that sex discrimination, rather than Coastal's "asserted non-discriminatory reason," was the "actual reason" for her termination. ... Her sex discrimination claims therefore fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits termination because of sex; evidence that an employer’s stated reason was false must also permit a reasonable jury to find sex discrimination.

Mitchell v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-03-30(a)(1)

With just this evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that the District terminated Mitchell because of her gender. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment on Mitchell’s Title VII termination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer’s refusal to rehire was motivated by race or sex discrimination.

Young v. Brennan · filed 2018-05-09(a)(1)

Here, plaintiff has provided no evidence whatsoever, direct or indirect, that racial animus was the motivating factor behind the decision not to rehire her. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the race-based discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a race-discrimination plaintiff to identify a specific date for each alleged denial of overtime to establish a prima facie case.

Rogers v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2018-07-06(a)

There is no rule that requires a plaintiff to give a specific single date of discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

A Title VII discrimination claim survives summary judgment when the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that a protected characteristic caused the discharge.

Daza v. State · filed 2018-08-31(a)(1)

"To survive summary judgment on a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge."

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated an adverse employment action; evidence of a dishonest explanation alone is insufficient.

Sams v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-09-28(a)(1)

Although a reasonable jury could find that Hemmerling and Ladner were dishonest, there is not enough evidence to support a conclusion that their dishonesty was motivated by an intent to discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of race.

Section 2000e-2 allows a sex discrimination claim to reach trial when the evidence could show that sex was one motive for an employer’s disciplinary decision.

Dotson v. City of Syracuse · filed 2019-02-27

In short, the Defendants’ sexist comments and behavior, when viewed alongside Dotson’s other evidence of discrimination, create a triable issue of fact as to whether Dotson’s suspension was motivated in part by sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by sex; unreasonable hostility toward an employee’s conduct does not establish sex discrimination.

Heisler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2019-07-30

Hostile treatment by a manager based on employee conduct and not motivated by any protected characteristic or conduct, even if unreasonable, does not amount to a legally actionable type of discrimination.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff claiming race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations and that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received better treatment.

JOHNSON v. JUSTUS AT WOODLAND TERRACE LLC · filed 2019-12-31(a)

Johnson cannot show that she was meeting Woodland Terrace’s legitimate expec- tations or that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably than she. Therefore, Woodland Terrace is entitled to summary judg- ment on Johnson’s race discrimination claims.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when there is no direct evidence of discrimination.

Bagwell v. Downtown Partnership of Baltimore, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15(a)(1)

Alternatively, where, as here, there is no evidence of direct discrimination, the plaintiff may utilize the burden-shifting approach first articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

A plaintiff without direct evidence of sex discrimination may use the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to prove a claim under this section.

Theidon v. Harvard University · filed 2020-01-31(a)(1)

But for plaintiffs like Theidon, who have not proffered direct evidence of discrimination, we invoke the three-step burden-shifting scheme outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to assess whether we can infer discrimination from the undisputed material facts.

A race-discrimination claim requires evidence that, considered as a whole, permits a reasonable inference that race caused the employer to treat the employee differently.

Nwoke v. The University of Chicago Medical Center · filed 2020-03-13(a)(1)

The Court must consider the evidence as a whole to determine whether the full evidentiary picture permits a reasonable inference that plaintiff’s race caused defendant to treat plaintiff differently.

A gender discrimination claim requires evidence supporting an inference that sex was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.

Winslow v. Pulaski Academy and Central School District · filed 2020-03-20(m)

Thus, for this and all of the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established the fourth element of her claim, i.e., that the relevant circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination; and, accordingly, she has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits adverse employment action because of race; a plaintiff without direct evidence may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Henry v. Vaughn Industries, LLC · filed 2020-03-31(a)(1)

A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation in two ways. ... Thus, Henry does not have direct evidence of race discrimination.

A plaintiff with no direct evidence of discrimination may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to prove a Title VII discrimination claim.

Rodgers v. Eagle Alliance · filed 2020-04-03(a)(1)

Because there is no direct evidence of discrimination in this case, I turn to review the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for an adverse action, an employee must offer evidence from which a jury could find that reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination.

Gulley v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-07-15(a)(1)

Finally, as to Gulley’s exhausted claims, he has not shown that the District’s stated reasons for disciplining and terminating him were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that race caused an adverse employment action for a race-discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Robertson v. McCarthy · filed 2020-07-23

But to survive summary judgment, Robertson had to present sufficient evidence that race caused an adverse employment action, see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016), and she presented no evidence that her suspension had anything to do with her race.

A Title VII discrimination claim based on comparator evidence requires similarly situated employees, but circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent can also support the claim.

James v. City of Montgomery · filed 2020-08-04(a)(1)

We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the City as to James’s discrimination claims—both because James has failed to make out a prima facie case for discrimination and because her claims fail under a convincing-mosaic theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of intentional discrimination in a disparate treatment claim; disbelief of the employer’s stated reason alone is insufficient.

Noble v. Intl · filed 2004-12-03(a)(1)

Reeves did not, however, abrogate the Court’s ... holding in Hicks that mere disbelief of an employer’s proffered reason is insufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in compensation because of race or sex, and a plaintiff may prove a claim with direct or circumstantial evidence.

Coleman v. Exxon Chemical Corp. · filed 2001-08-02(a)(1)

Title YII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may prove a claim through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.

A Title VII race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent or pretext.

Allison v. Birmingham, City of, The · filed 2021-01-08(m)

Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence of discriminatory intent or pretext and thus have not presented evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find in their favor. Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT summary judgment in favor of the City and against Plaintiffs on their Title VII claim of race discrimination.

A statement that may have either a discriminatory or a benign meaning is not direct evidence of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Dickerson v. Board of Trustees of Metropolitan State University of Denver · filed 2021-02-10(a)(1)

“A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two different ways—one discriminatory and the other benign— does not directly reflect illegal animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence.”

A race discrimination claim supported only by circumstantial evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Odie Gray v. Deloitte LLP · filed 2021-03-11(a)

The district court did not err in applying the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework because Gray relied solely on circumstantial evidence in support of his discrimination claims.

Under the indirect method of proving discrimination, a plaintiff must show at summary judgment that she met her employer’s performance expectations.

BELL v. ARDAGH GROUP S.A. · filed 2021-03-19(a)(1)

In addition, though Bell maintains that she "is not required to demonstrate she met company expectations to file a claim" under Title VII (Filing No. 61 at 16), the burden is on Bell to prove this element at this summary judgment stage—and she has not.

Section 2000e-2(a) discrimination claims proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when the plaintiff presents no direct evidence of discrimination.

Santos v. Baton Rouge Water Works Company · filed 2021-03-31(a)

Here, Plaintiff has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court shall employ the familiar burden-shifting framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an employer treated an employee unfairly because of race or national origin.

Rockefeller F. Cooper, II v. Jefferson County Coroner and Medical Examiner Office · filed 2021-06-10(a)

Because Cooper did not present any evidence that he was treated unfairly based on his race or national origin, and the record does not contain a dispute over any material fact, ... we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to JCCMEO as to Cooper’s discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that could support an inference of race or national origin discrimination for a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Chen v. KPMG LLP · filed 2021-09-29(a)

On the summary judgment record, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances in question supported an inference of unlawful discrimination based on race or national origin, as required for Chen’s discrimination claim.

A workplace diversity initiative does not establish sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence connecting it to the adverse employment decision.

MULLEN v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-09-29(a)(1)

Mullen has not demonstrated that Wells Fargo’s diversity initiatives constituted a discriminatory policy that in effect required a certain demographic representation and specifically resulted in Mullen’s termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that race or national origin caused an adverse employment action.

Kotoklo v. Karpinski · filed 2021-09-30(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 566, Kotoklo has not identified evidence sufficient to create a fact issue on her race and national origin discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race or sex caused an adverse employment action; a discrimination claim fails when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Graham v. Coca-Cola Consolidated · filed 2021-10-27(a)(1)

Ms. Graham hasn’t submitted any evidence to show that CCCI’s explanation for her termination is pretextual. For that reason, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that her race, sex, or age caused her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment, and a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Brooks, III v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2021-12-03(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Based on the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the Title VII racial discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an adverse employment decision was made because of race; different treatment of people of different races alone does not establish discrimination.

Hudson v. American Federation of Government Employees · filed 2022-04-20(a)

There is no evidence that these results was in fact based on race, as opposed to myriad other possible reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a) (Title VII provision explaining that it is an “unlawful employment practice” to “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race”) (emphasis added).