42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly connecting an adverse employment action to a protected characteristic.

Pell v. The Yonkers City School District · filed 2025-07-24(a)(1)

Thus, the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations that plausibly connect Plaintiff’s termination to her protected status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal connection between an employer’s discriminatory practice and the employee’s claimed injury.

Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1973-02-27(a)(1)

In other words, plaintiffs, in order to come within the protective ambit of Title VII, must demonstrate that it was the “no marriage” policy which was the force behind their resignations. ... The Court finds that the “no marriage” rule was not a substantial factor culminating in the resignations of plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-2 requires a discriminatory termination complaint to allege facts connecting the alleged discriminatory motive to the termination decision.

Margaret FISHER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Walter FLYNN, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1979-05-08

Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient nexus between her refusal to accede to the romantic overtures and her termination. She has not alleged that the department chairman had the authority to terminate her employment or effectively recommend the same and we cannot so assume.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discrimination to be a determinative factor in the employee’s injury.

Isadore GOLDMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1979-10-25(a)(1)

A basic element of a Title VII (and ADEA) claim is that the alleged discrimination be a “determinative factor” in the injury plaintiff suffered.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff challenging a tenure denial or termination to prove that race or national origin was a determinative factor in the decision.

Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College · filed 1980-06-30(a)

Plaintiff must prove that his race or national origin was a determinative factor in the decision not to grant him tenure (or in the decision to terminate him) in the sense that he would have been granted tenure (or would not have been terminated) but for his race or national origin.

A sex discrimination claim fails when the employer would have made the same hiring decision regardless of the applicant’s sex.

Dr. Marjorie Reiley Maguire v. Marquette University · filed 1987-03-20(a)(1)

Given the plaintiff’s controversial beliefs regarding abortion, Marquette would have reached the same decision even if she were a man. Because as a matter of undisputed fact the plaintiff cannot satisfy the “but for” standard of causation as articulated in Sherkow and subsequent decisions of this Court, her claim of sex discrimination under Title VII fails as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in promotion to show that sex discrimination caused the denial of promotion.

Berl v. County of Westchester · filed 1987-09-14(a)

Standing alone, in this case the policy does not establish that the County intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs in violation of Title VII because sergeant positions periodically were available in the Male Unit. Plaintiffs were interviewed and evaluated but not recommended for the Male Unit sergeantcies because of their then doubtful leadership abilities. Accordingly, defendant’s policy alone does not prove that plaintiffs were the victims of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof of discriminatory intent or motive to establish disparate treatment in a hiring decision.

Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1987-09-29(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s non-selection was not disparate treatment and did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he failed to show that his non-selection was based on any discriminatory intent or motive by the City.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a hiring discrimination plaintiff to show that discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the hiring decision.

McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Association Council, Donald E. Krahn, and Morris Andrews · filed 1987-10-16(a)

Under this “but for” standard of causation it is not enough for an employee to show that an employer harbored some discriminatory motivation. Rather, the employee must establish that the discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the challenged employment decision in that the employee would have received the job absent the discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a supervisor’s racial bias caused a discharge when other managers made the decision.

Wilson v. Stroh Companies, Inc. · filed 1992-01-06(a)(1)

Wilson was discharged by Roselli based on Holloway’s recommendation. Holloway had conducted an independent investigation of Wilson’s conduct. There is absolutely no support in the record for Wilson’s contention that Holloway and Roselli relied on a false record created by DeJaeghere to discharge him. The causal nexus necessary to support Wilson’s prima facie case is absent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal link between discriminatory animus and an adverse employment decision.

Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc. · filed 1998-12-28(a)(1)

We hold that Llampallas failed to prove that she was discriminated against "because of" her sex in violation of Title VII because she did not establish a causal link between Blanch's harassment and Kaylie's employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a causal link between discriminatory animus and an adverse employment decision; when the harasser did not make the decision, the plaintiff must prove that link.

Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits · filed 1998-12-28(a)(1)

Instead, Llampallas had the burden to prove at trial that Blanch's discriminatory animus caused Kaylie to terminate her employment with Mini-Circuits. We believe that she failed to do so.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a protected characteristic to be a but-for cause of an adverse employment action, but it need not be the sole cause.

Ponce v. Billington · filed 2012-05-18(a)(1)

We thus take this opportunity to clarify: nothing in Title VII requires a plaintiff to show that illegal discrimination was the sole cause of an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII disparate treatment or harassment plaintiff to show discrimination because of a protected classification.

Nurse v. Teleperformance Inc. · filed 2017-04-20(a)

Disparate treatment and harassment claims under both Title VII and the ADEA require a plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she suffered discrimination “because of” a protected classification.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discrimination claim when a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors contributed.

Casselle v. Chao · filed 2017-09-15(m)

Unlike the retaliation case, a showing of discrimination does not require that the plaintiff establish but-for causation. Rather, he need only show that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors” contributed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003).

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee lacks sufficient evidence that discrimination, rather than unmet performance expectations, caused the challenged discipline or termination.

Ibezim v. The GEO Group, Inc. · filed 2019-05-29(a)(1)

Ibezim only quarrels with the wisdom of his reprimands and termination, but has not cited to sufficient evidence to establish that discrimination, rather than unmet performance expectations, was the true reason for them.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an adverse employment action resulted from the employee’s membership in a protected class; adverse action alone is insufficient.

Johnson-Keys v. Bluffton Health System LLC · filed 2019-06-13(a)

But that is not the end of the inquiry, since material adverse employment actions are not, in and of themselves, actionable under Title VII or § 1981. Instead, a plaintiff can only prevail where the adverse employment action was the result of her membership in a protected class.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when sex was not a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Routen v. Suggs · filed 2019-06-24(a)(1)

There is also nothing clearly erroneous about the district court’s finding that Routen’s sex was not a reason for her pay cut or the reduction in the length of her contract.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a national origin discrimination claim when discriminatory motive contributed to an adverse employment action, even if lawful motives also contributed.

Presti v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security · filed 2020-02-20(a)

To prove a causal connection between a plaintiff’s national origin and an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff need only present evidence that “the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.” Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013).

A plaintiff alleging race or national origin discrimination must present evidence from which a jury could find that the protected trait caused the employment decision.

JONES v. VINCENNES UNIVERSITY · filed 2020-10-19(a)(1)

No reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Jones would have kept his job if he had a different ethnicity or national origin, and everything else had remained the same so there is no triable issue.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based employment decisions; a termination claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that sex motivated the decision.

Williams v. Housing Authority of Savannah, Inc. · filed 2020-10-29(a)(1)

For these reasons, and regardless of the theory or framework we apply, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in Williams’s favor on her discrimination claim. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, the record does not permit a reasonable inference that the termination decision was motivated by bias against her sex.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s lessened causation test does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims, which require but-for causation.

Ashley v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2023-03-17(m)

“Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”

Section 2000e-2(a) requires harassment to be connected to a protected trait.

Turner v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2023-08-14(a)

Plaintiff produces no evidence that race, sex, or disability motivated any harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible connection between adverse employment treatment and a protected characteristic.

Rypiak v. Southwest General Hospital · filed 2023-10-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege or set forth facts permitting a plausible inference that he was terminated from his internship or otherwise discriminated against with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a characteristic protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie claim of sex or religious discrimination.

Lauchle v. United Parcel Service · filed 2024-02-15(a)

There is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Lauchle was discriminated against.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires a sex-based employment practice to be deliberate rather than accidental, but does not require an intended violation.

Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp. · filed 1973-03-30(a)(2)

To violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against an employee because of sex, the employment practice must be shown to have been deliberate rather than accidental, but it is not necessary to show that any such violation was intentional.

Section 2000e-2 does not require proof of discriminatory intent; good-faith reliance on a state law does not excuse a discriminatory employment practice.

Williams v. General Foods Corp. · filed 1974-02-28

Unlike the criterion specified there, “intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice,” the standard of liability under Title VII is simply “engaging in unlawful employment practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Thus, it is only necessary for Williams to establish that the Corporation engaged in employment practices proscribed by Title VII; the Corporation’s intention is not pertinent.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires proof of a racial motive behind a discharge, even if disparate treatment is shown.

Verna L. BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. CATHERINE’S HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-09-20(a)

Further, assuming that “disparate treatment” was established by virtue of the personnel files, the law requires proof of a racial motive underlying a discharge decision in order to sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not require proof of discriminatory intent or pretext when a facially neutral employment practice burdens women’s employment opportunities.

Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1981-07-06(a)(2)

But when a facially neutral employment practice is challenged under § 703(a)(2), proof of pretext is unnecessary because sex-based intent is not an element of the prima-facie case.

A disparate treatment discharge claim requires proof that the employer intentionally discriminated because of race.

Graham v. Jacksonville Coach Co. · filed 1983-08-22(a)

In disparate treatment cases such as this, the ultimate factual inquiry is “whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”

Section 2000e-2 prohibits deliberate race discrimination in employment even if the employer acts in good faith.

Maryland National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Crawford · filed 1984-06-06(a)(1)

Here, Crawford proved that appellants’ discriminatory act with respect to her was deliberate and purposeful and not accidental or inadvertent. The fact that appellants may have acted in good faith is of no moment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment to prove that the employer acted because of the plaintiff’s race.

Bostic v. Wall · filed 1984-06-07(a)(1)

In Title VII cases, such as the instant action, in which disparate treatment is the basis of the Plaintiff’s claims, the Plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination. It must be shown by the Plaintiff that the action by the employer was taken because of the employee’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory intent to challenge a facially neutral rule for spousal benefits; disparate impact alone is insufficient.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1985-12-06(a)(1)

Thus, in order to prevail under § 703(a)(1), EEOC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a discriminatory intent or motive on the part of J.C. Penney in adopting the “head of household” requirement.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires intentional discrimination; disparate impact alone does not establish liability under it.

Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1986-05-30(a)(1)

A comparison of the language of Section 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) suggests that the former, unlike the latter, does possess an intent requirement and that the disparate impact approach is therefore inappropriate under it.

Section 2000e-2 requires a discharged employee to prove that discrimination more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's stated reason is not credible.

Lopez v. Current Director of Texas Economic Development Commission · filed 1987-01-08

In resolving this ultimate question, the court decides whether the plaintiff has succeeded in persuading the trier of fact that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or that the defendant's proferred explanation for the termination is not worthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory intent connected to an adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim.

Anthony v. TRW, INC. · filed 1989-05-08(a)(1)

Unless a plaintiff attempts to use statistics to show the racially-disparate impact of a policy, which was not undertaken in this case, Title VII requires a similar demonstration of racist intent and a connection between that racism and an adverse employment decision, action, or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, but a disparate treatment claim fails when the plaintiff does not prove that sex motivated the discharge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wendy's of Colorado Springs, Inc. · filed 1989-12-27(a)(1)

I conclude that the EEOC has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wendy’s violated Title VII by subjecting Guy Case to disparate treatment because he was a male.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires proof of intentional discrimination; unsupported allegations of discriminatory motive cannot defeat summary judgment.

Lewis v. City of Ft. Collins · filed 1990-05-14(a)

For Lewis to succeed with any of her statutory claims of age, race and sex discrimination and with her constitutional equal protection claim brought under Sec. 1983, she must ultimately prove the essential element of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires proof of discriminatory motive to prevail on a disparate treatment claim.

Lewis v. City of Ft. Collins · filed 1990-05-14(a)

"Proof of discriminatory motive is critical” to prevailing in a disparate treatment action brought under § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Applicants and employees alleging sex-based classification of jobs under § 2000e-2(a)(2) must show discriminatory intent.

Tucker v. Union Underwear Co. · filed 1992-11-03(a)(2)

To be successful under subsection (a)(2), both applicants and employees must show discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires intentional race discrimination; an employer unaware of an employee’s race cannot discriminate against that employee because of race.

Moore v. Reese · filed 1993-03-30(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits intentional racial discrimination. It is impossible for an employer, who does not know the race of an employee, to discriminate against that employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from sex discrimination in employment, but a personal conflict with a supervisor alone does not establish discrimination.

Passonno v. State University of New York at Albany · filed 1995-07-06(a)(1)

No matter how distasteful Mr. Shane’s actions towards plaintiff were, it must be kept in mind that Title VII gives employees protection from job discrimination and not from mere personal conflicts between an employee and his or her supervisor.

Stray remarks by people who did not make the employment decision are insufficient to infer discrimination by the employer.

Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services · filed 1995-11-15(a)

The evidence before us more properly falls into the category of stray remarks by non-decision makers, which are inadequate to support an inference of discrimination by the employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of sex-based discrimination; an unfair discharge following a workplace dispute is insufficient without discriminatory animus.

Cardona v. Aramark Services of Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 1998-06-22(a)(1)

Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate-that the timely conduct was based on sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff bringing a sex discrimination claim to show intentional discrimination.

Washington v. Occidental Chemical Corp. · filed 1998-10-06(a)(1)

To be viable, Plaintiffs Title VII claim requires a showing of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits intentional discrimination against black applicants through hiring examinations.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2010-01-13(a)

holds that New York City’s use of these examinations constitutes a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against blacks, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and State and City Human Rights Laws.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover an employment complaint that alleges no discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Heily v. United States Department of Defense · filed 2012-10-09

However, the plaintiff does not allege discrimination based on membership in a protected class or retaliation for filing a claim of discrimination; rather, Counts II, III, and IV allege that the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for filing an appeal of his 2005 Performance Appraisal. ... Accordingly, this Court will not construe Counts II, III, and IV as alleging conduct that would be actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a discriminatory discharge or refusal of tenure that takes effect after the 1972 amendments, even if the employer made the decision before they took effect.

Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1973-06-04(a)(1)

We hold that the 1972 amendments cannot be rendered nugatory by making a decision before March 24, 1972, to become effective thereafter as a discriminatory discharge and refusal to grant tenure thereafter is as much a violation of the Act as any other sexual discrimination. It will be noted that it is an unlawful employment practice “to discriminate as to any individual because of sex”. The discharge and refusal of tenure on June 30, 1973, will, under the circumstances of this case, amount to such discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in compensation; a prima facie claim requires satisfactory job performance and less favorable treatment than a similarly situated male colleague.

Downes v. Illinois State University · filed 2023-03-10(a)(1)

A prima facie case under Title VII requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) she is performing her job satisfactorily; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, in that she was treated less favorably than at least one “similarly situated” male colleague.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows summary judgment on a sex-based unequal-pay claim when the employer gives nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay disparity and the employee does not show pretext.

Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, Inc. · filed 1997-08-05(a)(1)

The burden thus shifts back to Noel to show that these proffered reasons were pretextual. Noel fails to address the issue of pretext in the context of the unequal pay claim. Thus, Electromedies is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claim for unequal pay.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits wage differences attributable to differences in the work employees perform.

Elsie Mae HEYMANN, Appellant, v. TETRA PLASTICS CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1981-03-02(h)

Excluding the period of time beginning February, 1974, and ending July, 1975, appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case because she has not shown that the work she performed was substantially similar to that performed by Larkins. Any wage differential to which appellant was subjected was authorized by a disparity in the work being performed.

An employer’s violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a Title VII violation.

Futran v. Ring Radio Co. · filed 1980-09-25(h)

A violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not limit Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims to claims also actionable under the Equal Pay Act.

Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1980-09-15(h)

Nonetheless, the legislative history, the construction of the statute, more recent authority which this Court finds persuasive, and the policy considerations upon which Title VII was premised lead me to conclude that the recent decisions cited above correctly hold that the Bennett Amendment was not intended to limit Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims to only those claims which would also be cognizable under the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require proof of substantially equal work for a race-based wage discrimination claim.

Vuyanich v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas · filed 1980-10-22(a)(1)

Whatever the correct interpretation of the interrelationship between the two statutes for sex-based wage discrimination, the Equal Pay Act requirement of substantially equal work does not apply to race-based wage discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits paying female employees less than male employees for substantially the same work because of their sex.

Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp. · filed 1973-11-07(a)(1)

Thus, on occasions when female class B folders were doing substantially the same work as male general floor helpers, and were receiving less compensation, Tri-State was engaged in an unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars sex discrimination in pay, including lower salaries and pensions for women doing equal work.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1973-11-12(a)

4. Northwest Airlines, Inc. has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (hereinafter “Title VII”), by paying female stewardesses lower, salaries and pensions than male pursers for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment practices that discriminate against employees because of sex.

Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Company · filed 1973-12-28(a)

4. Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Section 703(a) of said Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) in discriminating against plaintiff and other members of the class because of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in pay to prove a sex-based wage difference for substantially equal work.

Elaine M. ORR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANK R. MacNEILL & SON, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1975-04-10(a)(1)

To establish a case under Title YII it must be proved that a wage differential was based upon sex and that there was the performance of equal work for unequal compensation.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits pay differences based on job duties and qualifications rather than sex; equal job titles alone do not require equal pay.

Calage v. University of Tennessee · filed 1975-04-21(h)

The Court is of the opinion that the applicable Acts and their case law construction reject plaintiff’s rigid theory that equal title demands equal pay. The law is not so inflexible or unrealistic. ... Job content and not title are thus determinative.

Section 2000e-2 permits relief when a spouse-transfer policy discriminates based on sex, but the employee must prove that the policy caused the alleged injury.

Meier v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. · filed 1975-12-18(a)

This Court is not free to uphold an employer’s neutral transfer policy if that policy operates to sexually discriminate against the female partner of a marriage. Relief can be provided to an aggrieved party under Title VII, however, only upon proper proof that a discriminatory policy actually caused the injury alleged in the complaint.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits sex-based differences in compensation when the Equal Pay Act authorizes them.

Howard v. Ward County · filed 1976-07-30(h)

So, differentiations permitted by the Equal Pay Act are approved, by reference, in Title VII cases.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits paying a woman less than a man for the same or essentially similar work because of sex.

Davis v. Jobs for Progress, Inc. · filed 1976-11-16

That the failure to pay the plaintiff wages that were equal to those paid to DAVID SPANGLER, the male Instructor, for doing the same or essentially similar duties, involving the same or essentially similar skill, effort, qualifications and responsibility as an Instructor II and under similar working conditions, is a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Section 2000e-2(h) does not excuse a wage differential as based on another factor if sex played any part in setting the employee’s pay.

Bullock v. Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 1977-03-30(h)

It is also clear that an employer cannot claim that his wage differential is based on “any other factor other than sex” if the plaintiff’s sex is wholly or partially a motivating factor. Only if sex plays no part in the plaintiff’s salary does the differential fall beyond the reach of the law.

Section 2000e-2 does not require an employer to ignore market wages when setting pay for genuinely different work classifications.

Christensen v. State of Iowa · filed 1977-09-14(a)(1)

We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits paying an employee less because of sex for substantially equal work.

Cynthia DI SALVO, Appellee, v. the CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF GREATER KANSAS CITY, Appellant · filed 1978-01-12(a)(1)

We conclude that the trial court’s determination that Di Salvo had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Chamber discriminated against her in salary because of her sex is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 2000e-2 does not require proof of emotional injury, employer willfulness, or a causal link between willfulness and injury to establish a sex discrimination claim.

Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1978-04-04

The state claims for punitive or exemplary damages would raise issues as to most of the plaintiffs’ emotional states before and after the defendant’s alleged discriminatory acts, the willfulness of defendant’s alleged discrimination, and the proximate cause between defendant’s willfulness, if any, and the injuries alleged. These elements of proof are not required in order to establish a claim under the Civil Rights Act and proof of willfulness is necessary under plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act claim only with respect to those few remaining plaintiffs who satisfy the terms of the statute.

Title VII’s rule on sex discrimination in compensation is read with the Equal Pay Act: substantially equal jobs requiring the same effort, skill, and responsibility require equal pay.

United States v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1977-12-12(h)

The provisions of Title VII regarding discrimination in compensation based on sex are to be construed in pari materia with the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). ... Jobs are substantially equal and require equal pay if they require the same effort, skill, and responsibility.

Section 2000e-2(h) limits recovery of the full pay difference between sex-segregated jobs unless the jobs require substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, or discrimination denied the employee a higher-paying position.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1978-04-17(h)

An employer who violates Title VII by segregating job classifications by sex is not liable for the entire difference between the wages for the higher paid male jobs and the lower paid female jobs to each female who was thus denied a job opportunity unless the two jobs being compared were substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment against men as well as women.

Vick v. Pioneer Oil Co., Western Division · filed 1978-07-31(a)(1)

Thus, Article 5172a, by favoring one sex in employment practices, is clearly inconsistent with both the Texas constitution and the federal legislation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a compensation discrimination claim only when the employer discriminates against the individual because of that individual’s sex.

Lazarus v. Maryland · filed 1978-08-02(a)(1)

However, the language of Title VII creates a claim for relief only when the employer discriminates “against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 703(a)(2) requires a disadvantage to employees of one sex relative to employees of the opposite sex; a marriage rule applied to an all-female job category did not discriminate against women on the basis of gender.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1978-08-10(a)(2)

The gravamen of a charge of unlawful sexual discrimination is the disadvantaging of one employee or a group of employees of one sex relative to employees of the opposite sex on the basis of gender. Because classifying women serving in a job which Delta permitted only women to hold could not have disadvantaged women relative to men, Stroud establishes that the policy did not unlawfully discriminate against women on the basis of gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from barring female flight attendants from flight duty when they become mothers while allowing male attendants who become fathers to remain.

In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases · filed 1978-08-24(a)

TWA's no-motherhood policy in our opinion provides a clear example of sex discrimination prohibited by § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex-based disparate treatment in employment unless the employer establishes business necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification.

Marie v. Eastern R. Ass'n · filed 1978-10-16(a)

Disparate treatment of male and female employees can be sustained against a Title VII challenge only if the employer can establish business necessity justifying the disparity, or a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the business operation.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from denying an employee pay and promotion opportunities because of her sex.

Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1978-10-30(a)

Finally, the Court, having considered Kyriazi’s individual case, finds that she was underrated, underpaid, and denied promotional opportunities by Western because of her sex; that she was harassed by her male co-workers; and that she was terminated on account of her sex and in retaliation for having lodged a complaint of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits paying a woman less than men for substantially the same work because of her sex.

19 Fair empl.prac.cas. 177, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8987 Anna Marie Taylor, Cross-Appellant v. Philips Industries, Inc., C · filed 1979-02-26

We believe that this makes out a prima facie case of sex-discrimination under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2. It appears quite clear to us that Ms. Taylor was paid a wage lower than that paid to males performing work of substantially the same skill, effort and responsibility. Since Philips offers no justification for this wage differential, it was entirely proper for the district court to conclude that it was motivated by impermissible considerations.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits termination because of sex; abolishing a position under uniformly applied staffing criteria with no disparate effect on women does not violate it.

Downey v. J. C. Penney Co. · filed 1979-02-27(a)

Plaintiff’s position was not abolished, nor was the plaintiff terminated by the defendant, because of her sex or because of the application of any criteria which had a sexually disparate effect upon females. Therefore, defendant did not unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiff in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As to those positions which had “volume staffing criteria”, the Court finds that the promulgation and application of these criteria were uniform throughout defendant’s stores and there is no evidence of any disparate effect with respect to female employees regarding the promulgation and application of “volume staffing criteria”.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses into Title VII but does not limit discriminatory compensation claims to equal-work claims.

Gunther v. County of Washington · filed 1979-08-16(h)

In summary, we hold that, although decisions interpreting the Equal Pay Act are authoritative where plaintiffs suing under Title VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation practices unless the practices are authorized under one of the four affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act and incorporated into Title VII by § 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation, including the payment of household allowances.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n · filed 1979-12-28(a)(1)

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under § 703(a)(1) as to the payment of household allowances. Defendant has failed to produce a nondiscriminatory reason justifying the different pay practices.

Section 2000e-2 permits claims of sex discrimination in compensation even when the jobs are not substantially equal, subject to the Equal Pay Act’s four affirmative defenses.

Gunther v. County of Washington · filed 1980-05-01(h)

In summary, we hold that, although decisions interpreting the Equal Pay Act are authoritative where plaintiffs suing under Title VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation practices unless the practices are authorized under one of the four affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act and incorporated into Title VII by § 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(a) bars sex-based job assignments that deny equal employment opportunities when inmate privacy can be adequately protected by other measures.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1587, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,935 · filed 1980-05-08(a)

We simply conclude that in the circumstances of this case the remedy proposed by the State will accord adequate protection to the privacy interests of the inmates by means that will avoid any denial of the guards' rights to equal employment opportunities. Since that is so, it is important for the employment opportunities of both sexes that the portion of the District Court's remedy requiring unjustified gender-based discrimination be set aside.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit a pay difference explained by substantial differences in employees’ qualifications and job responsibilities.

Johnson v. Nordstrom-Larpenteur Agency, Inc. · filed 1980-07-17(a)

The third issue raised on appeal is the district court’s failing to find that appellant was discriminated against from June 19, 1972, until November 1, 1974, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appellant argues that during this period her job duties were substantially similar to Wolfe’s and that they actually performed the same work. The district court found that between June of 1972 and November of 1974 the responsibilities imposed upon and performed by appellant were substantially less than those of Wolfe and that he was paid a greater salary because his experience, training, education and job responsibilities far exceeded hers. The court’s findings concerning the substantial disparity of job qualifications and responsibilities are not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2 requires equal treatment of men and women in employment unless a bona fide occupational qualification supports different treatment.

California Manufacturers Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare Commision · filed 1980-07-24

This was necessarily so because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2) requires equal treatment of men and women. ... Difference in treatment between men and women, including protective legislation of the type here in issue, not based upon bona fide occupational qualifications constitutes unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from applying a workplace rule differently to men and women without justification.

O'Connell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1980-09-25(a)(1)

By applying its law school rule differently to men and women without justification, the defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from discharging an employee at least in part because of her sex.

Smith v. Flesh Co., Inc. · filed 1981-04-03(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 by discharging plaintiff at least in part because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-discrimination compensation claim involving comparable but not substantially equal work, or a unique position.

Orahood v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas and Robert Ross · filed 1981-04-10

Title VII may properly be invoked in situations of discrimination involving inadequate compensation where the plaintiff’s work is comparable (but not substantially equal) work or where the position held by the plaintiff is unique.

An employer can rebut a prima facie claim of sex discrimination in compensation by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the difference; the employee may then try to prove that reason is pretextual.

Harold C. BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MADISON COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1981-07-31(a)(1)

We therefore find that defendant successfully rebutted plaintiff’s prima facie case of sex discrimination, and that plaintiff was unable to show that defendant’s business purpose was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(h) places the burden on the employer to prove an Equal Pay Act defense to a Title VII claim for unequal pay for equal work.

Kouba v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1981-09-18(h)

Consistent with the statutory language then, plaintiff establishes her liability case by proffering evidence and persuading the trier of fact that she is paid less than men doing the same work. Once the plaintiff has done so, defendant must then shoulder its burden of proffering evidence and persuading the trier of fact that the unequal pay is an “authorized differentiation”, that is one permitted by the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not bar a sex-based wage discrimination claim merely because the claimant does not perform work equal to that of a higher-paid man.

County of Washington v. Gunther · filed 1981-06-08(h)

It is sufficient to note that respondents' claims of discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by § 703 (h) of Title VII merely because respondents do not perform work equal to that of male jail guards.

Section 2000e-2 requires an injury to result from discrimination because of sex; harm caused by personal dislike unrelated to gender does not suffice.

Dillenschneider v. Samuelson · filed 1981-11-23

It is not enough; the injury must have resulted from discrimination. It is true that in some cases the result itself shows the discrimination without the need of separate proof of intent, but the mere fact that it is a woman that is hurt does not show discrimination on its face. In the present case a woman was injured, and deliberately, but not because she was a woman.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex; a plaintiff must prove discrimination to obtain relief.

Gillespie v. BD. OF ED. OF N. LITTLE ROCK, ETC. · filed 1981-12-08(a)(1)

In the case at bar, I do not believe that plaintiff has made even a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), which prohibits employers from discriminating “because of . . . sex.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to rehire someone because of sex when the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Toombs v. Greer-Smyrna, Inc. · filed 1982-01-08(a)(1)

Defendant’s reasons for not rehiring plaintiff were pretextual. Consequently, this Court concludes that plaintiff was illegally discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a sex-based wage differential under Title VII only if an Equal Pay Act exception applies.

Melanson v. Rantoul · filed 1982-03-17(h)

Indeed Title VII itself, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) refers specifically to the Equal Pay Act and states that a sex-predicated wage differential is immune from attack under Title VII only if it comes within one of the four enumerated exceptions to the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee claiming unequal pay for higher-paying duties to show that the employer at least acquiesced in her performance of those duties.

Neale v. Dillon · filed 1982-03-25(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot establish wage discrimination under Title VII without a showing that defendant Dillon at least acquiesced in her performance of the duties of the higher paying position.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits evidence of wages paid to men at other establishments to support a sex-based wage discrimination claim.

Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America · filed 1983-02-08(a)

We hold that the evidence of the salaries of male directors at other Berlitz schools, which supports plaintiffs' sex-based wage discrimination claims, may be introduced to support a claim under Title VII even though it would not support an Equal Pay Act claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex; an employee must prove that the challenged conduct was motivated by sex.

Sherman v. City of Lee's Summit · filed 1983-12-19(a)

We find that the directions given plaintiff at the February 2, 1982 meeting must be viewed in the context of the circumstances which prompted the meeting to be held and that neither the conduct of the meeting nor the directions given plaintiff at that meeting can be said to reflect any discriminatory action on defendant’s part that was in any way motivated by the fact plaintiff was a female employee. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof under the greater weight of the credible evidence in regard to her Title VII claim alleged in Count I of her complaint. ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee on the basis of her/his sex or to take retaliation action against an employee who has asserted her/his rights under the Act. 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(a) and 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not prohibit a salary policy when the employer establishes legitimate reasons for pay differences and employees fail to show sex discrimination.

Derouin v. Division · filed 1984-09-06(a)(2)

The plaintiffs have not met this burden of proof. The evidence of salary differentials they submitted proves their prima facie case, but they have not refuted defendant’s proof that the reasons for the policy are legitimate. ... The Court finds that Policy IR-2 is not a sex-based plan of discrimination and that plaintiffs do not have a claim under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.

A wage difference between jobs that are only similar does not, by itself, establish an inference of intentional sex discrimination under Title VII.

Margaret Spaulding, and James Bush, Intervenors-Appellants v. University of Washington · filed 1984-11-26(a)

We will not, therefore, infer intent merely from the existence of wage differences between jobs that are only similar.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sex discrimination claim based on unequal compensation for similarly situated employees even when their jobs are not substantially equal under the Equal Pay Act.

Crockwell v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc. · filed 1985-04-12(a)

She has demonstrated that she is a member of a protected class and that she received compensation at a rate less than that of similarly situated male employees. Although the work performed by household cleaners and cleaning technicians was not “substantially equal” within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act, cleaning technicians were situated similarly to plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits denying an employee a promotion or constructively discharging her because of her sex.

Thomas v. Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-01-31(a)

Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) by discriminating against plaintiff on account of her sex when they refused to promote her to employee relations manager at the Plumb plant in Monroe, North Carolina, effective April 1, 1983, and when they constructively discharged her on October 14, 1983.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim based on demotion may survive summary judgment when material facts remain about whether similarly performing male managers received different treatment.

Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc. · filed 1986-02-03(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court rejects the defendant’s contention that Ms. Brownlee was not qualified for her position as a matter of law. There exist issues of material fact as to whether she was treated in the same way as male managers who also failed to meet the company’s performance goals.

Section 2000e-2 protects black women as a subclass of women under a sex-plus theory of discrimination.

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club · filed 1986-02-11(a)

This Court adopts the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit which treats black females as a subclass of women and analogizes the combination to a "sex plus” theory of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment decisions based on sex, and a sex discrimination claim survives summary judgment when genuine factual disputes remain about the employer’s motive.

Bakken v. North American Coal Corp. · filed 1986-06-16

To ultimately prevail on her Title VII claim, Bakken must first present evidence that an employment decision was based on sex. ... Given the varied allegations and Bakken’s supporting affidavits, this court cannot conclude that Bakken will be unable to establish a prima facie case of violation of Title VII. Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for NACC on the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit different overtime policies for male and female employee groups when distinct job requirements provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the difference.

Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Consolidated School District No. 146 · filed 1986-07-21(a)(1)

We think these two distinct sorts of job requirements could call for different responses from management, which would have been based on legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons. At least, we think the trier of fact could find the reasons to be legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonpretextual and we may not conclude that his determination is clearly erroneous. Thus the treatment of custodians vis-a-vis secretaries may not have been good personnel management--or even entirely fair--but we think the district court could find that it did not implicate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits paying an employee less because of sex; after a prima facie showing, the employer must show that the disparity rests on another factor.

Reaves v. Marsh · filed 1987-04-09(a)(1)

The Court holds that defendant has failed to establish that the disparity was based on some factor other than sex. Assuming, however, that defendant demonstrated a basis other than sex for the differential in pay, the Court holds that Reaves has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted reason is a pretext to conceal intentional sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sufficient facts for a jury to find that sex played a role in an employee’s discharge.

Long v. FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERV., INC. OF GA. · filed 1987-11-19(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not established sufficient facts which would allow a jury to find that sex played a role in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to reappoint an employee because of sex.

Ford v. Nicks · filed 1988-02-09(a)(1)

The Court FINDS that MTSU’s failure to reappoint Lani Ford at the end of the 1972-73 school year was the result of sex discrimination practiced against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a prima facie claim of sex discrimination in compensation to show less favorable treatment because of sex and discriminatory intent.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kettler Brothers Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kettler Bro · filed 1988-04-27(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie Title VII claim, EEOC must show that Kettler treated the women sales managers less favorably than men with respect to compensation because of their sex and that Kettler acted with discriminatory intent.

A Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim requires evidence that the employee’s work is similar in skill, effort, and responsibility to the work of higher-paid male employees.

Manuel v. WSBT, INC. · filed 1988-06-02(a)(1)

Under either the Briggs or Crockwell definition of a prima fade case of sex-based wage discrimination, a plaintiff must prove a similarity of skill, effort, and responsibility between her position and those held by male employees working for the defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits paying a woman less than a male predecessor for substantially equal work unless the employer legally justifies the disparity.

Parker v. Burnley · filed 1988-07-12(a)(1)

An employer which pays a female less than a male predecessor for performing substantially equal work violates the Equal Pay Act and Title VII unless the employer can legally justify the pay disparity.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof of intentional sex discrimination in a disparate treatment claim.

Peggy CRUTCHFIELD, Appellant, v. MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1988-08-16

The ultimate issue of fact in cases such as this is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based pay discrimination; a plaintiff alleging unequal pay must show that a male employee earned more for substantially equal work.

Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1988-05-19(a)(1)

To successfully raise an inference of salary discrimination based on sex, the plaintiff must establish she was paid a lesser salary than a male for work substantially equal in the degree of skill, effort, and responsibility required, and which was performed under similar working conditions. ... The Court finds no evidence of salary discrimination and, therefore, plaintiff’s claim of disparate treatment with regard to salary is dismissed in its entirety.

Section 2000e-2 does not make an unfair or mistaken discharge actionable without evidence that the decision was based on sex.

Lamson v. The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company · filed 1988-11-04

As we stated earlier, the question is not whether Firestone's investigation resulted in the correct decision being reached, but whether the decision reached was a product of discrimination based on sex. Finding the record to be devoid of evidence supporting this proposition, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects male employees from discriminatory discharge, which may be proved through disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Brooks v. Hilton Casinos, Inc. · filed 1989-03-17(a)(1)

In light of the above analyses, this court finds that, under both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Defendant Hilton violated 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) when it discharged plaintiffs based upon their sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover an employee’s firing over a supervisor’s sexual interest in the employee’s spouse, who does not work for the employer.

Cairo v. OH Material Corp. · filed 1989-04-04(a)(1)

There is no authority or legislative history to support extending the meaning of discrimination “because of sex” to include sexual liaisons with and sexual attractions to third parties not employed by the defendant employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based wage discrimination; an Equal Pay Act violation also violates Title VII when both laws’ jurisdictional requirements are met.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. White and Son Enterprises, a Corporation · filed 1989-08-24(a)(1)

Because we conclude that plaintiff proved discrimination under the EPA, a violation of Title VII is established a fortiori.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a compensation discrimination claim when a protected employee is paid less than a comparable employee for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

Payne v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1990-02-14(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination respecting compensation, a plaintiff must prove that he is a member of a protected class and that he was paid less than a nonmember for work requiring substantially the same responsibility. ... After carefully reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we believe he has established a prima facie case of employment discrimination with regard to compensation.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination on account of sex.

Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith · filed 1990-03-30(a)

In conclusion, the Court finds that defendant did not discriminate against plaintiff on account of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from denying promotions because of an employee’s sex.

Willis v. Watson Chapel School District · filed 1990-04-02

We affirm the district court’s decision that the School intentionally discriminated against Willis because of her sex, but we reverse the court’s ruling denying Willis back pay and front pay.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in employment terms because of sex; poor treatment for other reasons does not violate it.

Walker v. Sullair Corp. · filed 1990-04-19(a)(1)

The plaintiff’s “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), were not adversely affected by the conduct of Sullair Corporation on account of discrimination because of the plaintiff’s sex.

A sex discrimination plaintiff must produce evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for discharge was pretextual.

Samuelson v. Durkee/French/Airwick · filed 1991-02-08(a)(1)

With respect to gender discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 renders it unlawful for an employer to discharge any individual because of the individual’s sex. ... The court cannot, however, agree that any of the points she makes, individually or in concert, satisfy her burden of coming forth with evidence of pretext sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict or involuntary dismissal on her sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation, but an employee must show pretext when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for a pay cut.

Woodward v. Heritage Imports · filed 1991-09-25(a)(1)

These undisputed facts provide a sufficiently legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis for the actions of the defendants in reducing the plaintiff’s compensation. The burden of showing that these proffered justifications are merely a pretext for sex discrimination therefore shifted to the plaintiff. Because Woodward has introduced no evidence tending to negate the veracity of these reasons or to prove that they were merely a pretext for discriminatory intent, the claim must be rejected.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that an employer or its agent discriminated against an employee because of sex.

Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department · filed 1992-01-07(a)(1)

Nor, with respect to the Title VII claim, did plaintiff show that any agent of defendant discriminated against her based on her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a discriminatory termination claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence supporting an inference of discrimination or pretext.

Pegg v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1992-02-10(a)(1)

On these facts, no reasonable jury or judge could find that the plaintiff had been a victim of age or sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex-based wage discrimination to prove that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for the pay difference is pretextual.

Hassman v. Valley Motors, Inc. · filed 1992-04-24(a)(1)

In a Title YII case, once a defendant has established a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the wage differential, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered excuse is pre-textual.

A sex-based wage discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of disparate impact or intentional discrimination.

Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District and Cattaraugus County Civil Service Commission · filed 1992-05-05(a)(1)

Without evidence of a disparate impact on women from use of the civil service examination and classification system or intentional discrimination, Aldrich's Title VII claim cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment to prove that their employer treated them differently because of sex.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Nassau · filed 1992-08-24(a)

Thus, Title VII plainly prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of an employee’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based wage discrimination claim without requiring proof that the compared jobs are substantially equal.

Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., Karen Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc. · filed 1992-10-28(a)(1)

As we noted above, Title VII incorporates a more relaxed standard of similarity between male and female-occupied jobs, thus plaintiff is not required to meet the exacting standard of substantial equality of positions set forth in the Equal Pay Act.

A Title VII unequal-pay claim fails when the compared employees do not perform substantially similar jobs.

Cherrey v. Thompson Steel Co., Inc. · filed 1992-11-05(h)

The Resolution of Grievance together with the arbitration opinion make clear that Plaintiff and the males in the sales department were not doing substantially similar jobs. As such, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff is unable to establish her prima facie case for the unequal pay under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers sex discrimination against women over forty as a subclass, even though age discrimination alone is outside Title VII.

Arnett v. Aspin · filed 1994-03-29(a)

And, although I have uncovered no other case that recognizes a “sex-plus-age” discrimination claim under Title VII, it is clear that age is an immutable characteristic. For purposes of determining whether the defendants’ discriminated against Arnett in violation of Title VII, I find she is a member of a discrete subclass of “women over forty.”

Section 2000e-2(h) permits compensation differences based on production or a factor other than sex when pay is determined by performance-based or other objectively verifiable criteria.

Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-04-28(h)

A compensation system qualifies for the affirmative defenses of quantity/quality of production or factor other than sex if the employer determines bonuses, commissions, or salaries according to performance-based or other objectively verifiable criteria.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits compensation discrimination based on an employee’s own sex, but does not cover pay differences based on the sex of people the employee supervises.

Deli v. University of Minnesota · filed 1994-07-18(a)(1)

The clear terms of the statute prohibit discrimination in compensation based on the sex of the recipient. The statute does not proscribe salary discrimination based on the sex of other persons over whom the employee has supervision or oversight responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2 requires a wage discrimination plaintiff to allege that her job was similar to a higher-paid male coworker’s job, but does not require substantially equal work.

Baumgardner v. ROA General, Inc. · filed 1994-08-05(a)(1)

In view of the above standards, the court is of the opinion plaintiffs must first, at least, plead and prove their positions and those of higher-paid male eoworkers were similar. However, for the reasons explained above, the court concludes the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint do not even meet a more relaxed standard of similarity.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires discrimination because of sex; an allegedly false accusation of sexual harassment alone does not establish a claim.

Balazs v. Liebenthal · filed 1994-08-19(a)

Nowhere in any of the several charges filed by plaintiff with the EEOC or in his complaint is it alleged that he was treated differently from any other employee, male or female, because of his sex. An allegation that he was falsely accused of conduct which, if true, might have given rise to a claim of employment discrimination based on sex by someone else in no way states a cause of action that plaintiff himself was a victim of discrimination based on his sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat preferential treatment based on a consensual relationship between a supervisor and an employee as sex discrimination.

Thomson v. Olson · filed 1994-09-19(a)(1)

Therefore, this court joins in the chorus of reviewing courts in finding that preferential treatment on the basis of a consensual relationship between a supervisor and an employee is not a cognizable sex discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of sex.

Tate v. Insituform Mid-America, Inc. · filed 1994-10-20(a)(1)

The Court concludes that the plaintiff was not treated as well as male salespeople, that the explanations offered by the defendants are pretextual, and that she was discharged because the Company desired to put a man in that position, which in fact it did. The plaintiff has proven her case under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a discharge as sex discrimination to raise a triable issue that gender determined the employer’s decision when the employer offers a legitimate reason.

Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. · filed 1995-02-06(a)(1)

In light of Bell’s showing of a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason, the evidence set forth by Prizevoits fails to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether gender was the determining factor in Bell’s decision to terminate Prizevoits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a discharge motivated by an employee's knowledge of a supervisor's affair when the decision does not depend on the employee's sex.

Ellert v. University of Texas, at Dallas · filed 1995-05-18(a)(1)

Even if her knowledge of the affair was the true animus behind the discharge decision, it was a motivation that did not rely upon her gender and, as such, it was not within the ambit of Title VII's protections.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion, layoff, and rehiring decisions.

Eldred v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware · filed 1995-08-31(a)(1)

To state it differently, but for her gender, plaintiff would have been promoted, would never have been laid off, and, if laid off, would have been promptly rehired..

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to prove sex discrimination in a tenure decision through the burden-shifting approach when direct evidence is absent.

Schneider v. Northwestern University · filed 1996-05-13(a)(1)

There is no direct evidence that defendant discriminated against plaintiff because of her sex when it denied her tenure and promotion to associate professor. Therefore, plaintiff has used the burden-shifting approach in her attempt to prove her sex discrimination claim.

A sex-plus-parenting claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that the employer treated mothers differently from fathers.

Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc. · filed 1996-05-15(a)

Even in the so-called “sex plus” discrimination analysis, Plaintiff must first show that she was treated differently from men.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits using sex-based hiring or promotion quotas to deny an employee an individual opportunity.

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago · filed 1996-09-12(a)

In addition to suggesting the statement was never made, Coca-Cola argued the reference was to sales quotas rather than hiring or promotional quotas. Because we must view this contested evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, McNabola v. CTA, 10 F.3d at 515, we must view the statement as referring to the latter, which in itself constitutes sex discrimination prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.