42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A Title VII plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of gender discrimination must prove the claim through indirect evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Patterson v. State of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development · filed 2022-07-26(a)(1)

Apparently conceding that she lacks direct evidence, Plaintiff can prevail, if at all, only under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applicable to indirect evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference that sex caused a hiring decision; a low number of women in the position alone is insufficient.

SPARKS v. WORMUTH · filed 2022-09-16(a)(1)

Although Ms. Sparks points out that there have only been two female Munitions Destroyers since 2010, that alone is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that she was not hired because of her sex or age.

Section 2000e-2 discrimination claims may be proved with direct evidence or with circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Parker v. Hankook Tire Manufacturing Tennessee, LP · filed 2022-09-28

A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of discrimination.

A plaintiff may prove Title VII discrimination through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Eady v. Big G Express · filed 2022-11-29

A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected status; a discrimination claim fails at summary judgment without evidence of discriminatory animus.

Bibawy v. DeJoy · filed 2022-11-30(a)

Furthermore, I agree with the Defendant that there is no evidence in the record suggesting discrimination on the basis of the Plaintiff’s protected status under Title VII. ... Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Bibawy’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated an employment decision; speculation alone cannot sustain a discrimination claim at summary judgment.

Wheeler v. Azar · filed 2022-12-29(a)(1)

Because no reasonable jury could find that Wheeler was issued a deficiency notice and temporarily denied promotion because of his sex, HHS is entitled to summary judgment on those claims as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action was pretextual.

Hoeun v. IHC Health Services · filed 2023-01-03(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s rationale for his suspension was pretextual.

A race or sex discrimination claim requires evidence that the employment action occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

MOSES v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2023-01-03(a)(1)

Thus, because there are no genuine issues of material fact that support Moses’ claims of racial and sex discrimination, they must be dismissed.

Selecting an applicant of another race for the same position does not, by itself, directly prove race discrimination under Title VII.

Watson v. City Of Prichard · filed 2023-01-20(a)(1)

While Plaintiff has identified an African-American candidate for the position for which he applied who was offered that same position, that is not direct evidence that Plaintiff was not hired for that position because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a claimant must present evidence connecting sex to the adverse employment action to survive summary judgment.

Alight Solutions, LLC v. Thomson · filed 2023-03-22(a)(1)

Under Title VII, an employer cannot discriminate against any individual with respect to her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Because Thomson has not met this burden, her employment discrimination claims do not survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employee to prove race discrimination through circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of discriminatory intent.

Bowens v. Escambia County Board of Education · filed 2023-06-23(a)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants’ stated reason for not renewing Plaintiff’s contract was pretextual: she cannot satisfy her burden of showing unlawful discrimination under a “convincing mosaic” theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim to be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence or under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Matney v. Harker · filed 2023-09-30(a)(1)

A plaintiff can establish a discrimination claim under Title VII in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff can establish the claim through direct or circumstantial evidence, Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1102 (2008), or, alternatively, can establish the claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits firing an employee because of race; a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must present facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

White v. Champion Home Builders, Inc. · filed 2024-01-18(a)

The Court finds there is no “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence from which it can infer Plaintiff was terminated based on his race. Too, he has not satisfied his burden under McDonnell Douglas. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence from which a jury could infer that an employment action was motivated by prohibited discrimination.

THEODORE v. NEWARK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND COMMUNITY WELLNESS · filed 2024-03-18(a)

First, Plaintiff has not presented any facts that create an inference that the March 2018 disciplinary proceeding and subsequent suspension were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus in violation of Title VII or NJLAD.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that race caused the employee's termination.

COX v. FCA US, LLC · filed 2024-04-01(a)(1)

This evidence would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the stated reason for Mr. Cox's termination is unworthy of credence and is instead pretext for racial discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination claimant may use a variety of circumstantial evidence to show intentional discrimination without satisfying the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Poer v. Jefferson County Commission · filed 2024-05-01(a)(1)

Thus, unlike the necessary three-part test that Poer had to satisfy to succeed under the McDonnell Douglas frame- work, she could have introduced a variety of evidence which, as a whole, strongly suggested that the Commission’s employment de- cisions were based on her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race caused an adverse employment decision; an unsupported belief of discrimination is insufficient to survive summary judgment.

Grigsby v. La Rabida Children's Hospita. · filed 2024-08-27(a)(1)

While these may have been negative interactions, Grigsby points to no relevant evidence to support her “gut feeling” that Meline’s behavior during these incidents was motivated by race discrimination. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Grigsby’s race-discrimination claims against Meline.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that discrimination played a part in the employer’s adverse action.

Fletcher v. JM Smucker Company · filed 2025-02-12(a)

But Fletcher’s claims fail under these theories for the same reason that they fail under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: She has not shown that discrimination played any part in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated the challenged employment decision; a claim fails when the plaintiff cannot rebut the employer’s stated reason.

Ingram v. The City of Jackson · filed 2025-05-15(a)(1)

For these reasons, Thomas has failed to show Davis blocked her from rejoining the SWAT team because she is a woman.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that an employer’s decision was motivated by sex discrimination.

Lockett v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 2025-05-23(a)(1)

The record does not contain evidence that Fletcher wanted to hire Kuku instead of Lockett because Kuku was a man.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) shifts the burden of production to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason after an employee establishes a prima facie discrimination case.

Y. Mayers v. United Independent School District · filed 2025-05-28(a)(1)

If the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that sex caused the adverse employment action.

Napier v. Orchard School Foundation · filed 2025-06-10(a)(1)

To assess Napier’s claim, we look at the direct and indirect evidence together as a whole and determine whether it would ... permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that his sex caused his termination.

A Title VII discrimination claim requires direct evidence or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Redus v. Revenue Cycle Service Center, LLC · filed 2025-08-11(a)(1)

A discrimination claim under Title VII must be supported by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that raises an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that race caused the challenged employment action.

Chatonda v. Chicago Public Schools · filed 2025-08-25(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Chatonda cannot establish race-based discrimination and that no reasonable fact-finder could find otherwise.

Section 2000e-2(a) discrimination claims may be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at summary judgment.

Batiste-Waddell v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 2025-09-30(a)

Plaintiff has chosen to make her argument regarding her sex and race discrimination claims through the lens of McDonnell Douglas, as does Defendant. The Court will employ that framework as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to conduct a formal medical examination before refusing to hire an applicant whose physical impairment legitimately disqualifies him from the job.

Dorcus v. WESTVACO CORPORATION · filed 1972-06-14(a)(1)

The mere fact that Dr. Bowles reached his conclusion upon an informal examination rather than upon a medical examination under the company’s auspices does not violate plaintiff’s rights under the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence linking an adverse employment action to discrimination or showing different treatment of a similarly situated employee to establish a prima facie discrimination claim.

Beltran v. Lockheed Martin Corporation · filed 2025-06-20(a)

Accordingly, Beltran has failed to show that discrimination played any role in the relevant adverse employment actions or that he was treated differently than another similarly situated employee of a different race, ethnicity, or national origin. Consequently, the Court holds that Beltran has failed to satisfy the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework and, thus, Lockheed is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination based on termination must show satisfactory job performance at the time of termination to establish a prima facie case.

Thomas v. City of Annapolis, Maryland · filed 2021-03-12(a)

We also agree with the district court that Thomas failed to show satisfactory job performance and thus failed to show that his termination, the sole adverse employment action linked to job performance, was discriminatory.

A Title VII race or gender discrimination claim requires the employee to show satisfactory job performance as part of a prima facie case.

Smith v. Virginia Housing Development Authority (VHDA) · filed 2020-02-04(a)(1)

Although Smith satisfies the first element of a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination, she has failed to show that she satisfies the second element—that her job ... performance was satisfactory. Therefore, VHDA is entitled to summary judgment on these counts.

A Title VII race-discrimination plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework must offer evidence that he met his employer’s legitimate job expectations to survive summary judgment.

Ford v. Rockford Board of Education · filed 2019-10-23

To survive summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which both parties use, Ford had to furnish evidence that, among other things, he was meeting his employer’s legitimate job expectations. ... The undisputed facts show that by disobeying a supervisor’s order, Ford thus failed to meet his employer’s legitimate expectations.

A Title VII discrimination claim must plausibly allege satisfactory job performance; a vague assertion that the employee performed all duties is insufficient when the complaint also describes performance problems.

Clements v. Town of Sharpsburg · filed 2019-10-10(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiff fails to allege her job performance met defendant’s legitimate expectations.

A discriminatory termination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination based on a protected trait.

Alijaj v. Wells Fargo · filed 2019-09-30(a)(1)

I find that because Plaintiff does not identify any circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of national origin, religion, or age, he fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discriminatory termination claims under Title VII and the ADEA is granted.

When a Title VII race discrimination claim lacks direct evidence, the court evaluates circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Hicks v. District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General · filed 2018-03-30(a)(1)

Because there is no direct evidence in support of Plaintiff’s age and race discrimination claims, the Court shall turn to circumstantial evidence. That inquiry invites the burden-shifting analysis under McDonnell Douglas.

Under the indirect method, a Title VII discrimination claim fails if the employee cannot show that he met his employer’s legitimate expectations and that similarly situated employees outside his protected class received better treatment.

Nehan v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. · filed 2015-09-01(a)(1)

But as to the third element, the record clearly shows Nehan was not meeting Tootsie Roll’s legitimate expectations. ... Nehan also fails to establish the fourth element, that similarly situated employees outside of his protected class were treated differently. Because Nehan failed to establish the third and fourth elements of his prima facie case, summary judgment in favor of Tootsie Roll was properly entered.

A plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove sex discrimination must produce evidence that she met her employer’s legitimate job expectations when terminated.

Alexander v. Carolina Fire Control Inc. · filed 2015-06-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not produced any evidence whatsoever as to the work Plaintiff was producing prior to her termi-pation, whether the quality was satisfactory, or any other evidence tending to show Plaintiff was meeting her employer’s expectations.

Poor interview performance can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire an applicant.

Thompson v. Bridgeton Board of Education · filed 2015-05-29(a)(1)

Because poor interview performance is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for refusal to hire, we agree with the District Court that Appellees met their burden at this step.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must first establish a prima facie case under the Title VII burden-shifting framework.

Ellis v. Century 21 Department Stores · filed 2013-09-28(a)(1)

Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

A Title VII discriminatory termination claim under the indirect method fails when the employee cannot show that she met legitimate job expectations or that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Johnson v. Koppers, Inc. · filed 2013-08-08(a)(1)

However, Johnson’s claim fails because she cannot prove that she met Koppers’ legitimate job expectations, or that Koppers’ non-discriminatory reason for termination was pretextual.

In a discriminatory discharge claim, hiring and continued employment can establish the job qualification element of a prima facie case despite disputed performance complaints.

Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC · filed 2013-08-07(a)(1)

Rather, the court may infer from Equity’s mere decision to hire Ms. Parris and to maintain her in its employ for the time that it did (approximately ten months) that Ms. Parris was “qualified for [her] position” for the purposes of a prima facie case in a discriminatory discharge case such as this one.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff alleging race or sex discrimination to prove the claim through the indirect method of proof.

Felice v. Republic Airlines, Inc. · filed 2013-06-17(a)(1)

Felice proceeds under both methods here; however, because Felice prevails under the indirect method there is no need to analyze the facts under the direct method.

An employee using the indirect method to prove discriminatory discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show, among other things, satisfactory job performance and less favorable treatment than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Outlaw v. Regis Corp. · filed 2013-05-30(a)(1)

First, concerning racial discrimination, she failed to establish a prima facie case under the indirect method, which requires showing (among other things) that the employee was performing her job satisfactorily and was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected class.

A discrimination claim requires the employee to show that she met her employer’s legitimate performance expectations when the adverse action occurred, including expectations about professional conduct.

Conyers v. Virginia Housing Development Authority · filed 2013-02-26(a)(1)

In this case, while Plaintiff was technically proficient, the record evidence demonstrates that she did not meet VHDA’s legitimate expectations regarding professionalism at the times that she was placed on probation, suspended, placed on extended probation, and terminated.

In a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer meets its second-stage burden of production by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Lopez-Cruz v. FPV & Galindez, PSC · filed 2013-02-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff concedes that this reason is sufficient to meet the burden at the second stage. Therefore, the Court turns to the third stage of the burden-shifting test.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer facing a discrimination claim to meet its burden of production by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision.

Harp v. Department of Human Services, Colorado Mental Health Institute · filed 2013-03-18(a)(1)

Even if the court assumes Ms. Harp can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show an adverse employment action because of a protected trait.

Bright v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2011-12-09(a)(1)

The “two essential elements” of a discrimination claim under this section are “that (1) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (2) because of the plaintiff's race… [or] sex.”

In a Title VII race discrimination case submitted for a verdict, the plaintiff’s burdens to produce a prima facie case and evidence of pretext drop out.

Bowen v. Celotex Corp. · filed 2002-06-03(a)(1)

A factfinder’s Title VII verdict cannot be based upon a plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence of a prima facie case or pretext because these burdens of production “drop out” when a case is submitted for a verdict.

A Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination through direct or indirect evidence.

Gant v. Sabine Pilots · filed 2002-05-21

The Fifth Circuit allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case under Title VII by either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie sex discrimination case even if her replacement is also a woman.

Crumpacker v. Kansas Department of Human Resources · filed 2002-05-16(a)(1)

The defendant initially argues that plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination because she was replaced by a woman. We must disagree. A plaintiff need not show that the person hired to replace her was outside her protected class.

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to prove employment discrimination must first establish a prima facie case.

Hall v. State Farm Ins. · filed 2001-01-12(a)(1)

As a result of these cases, a Title VII cause of action based on circumstantial evidence involves three stages of proof. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff who presents no direct evidence must use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method of proof.

Nash v. Belk · filed 2000-09-27

Because Nash provided no direct evidence of race dis- crimination, she was required to rely on the burden-shifting method of proof announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using the indirect method to show satisfactory job performance at the time of the challenged employment action.

Accurso v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2000-08-23(a)(1)

However, her performance must have been satisfactory at the time of her alleged termination — not just at some time during her employment. ... Thus, Accurso has failed to establish that her performance was satisfactory at the time of her alleged termination. By not establishing element two of the prima facie case, Accurso has failed to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 sex discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids · filed 2000-07-19

Both the state and the federal sex discrimination claims are analyzed according to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm.

In a Title VII failure-to-hire claim, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving race discrimination after the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason.

Majeed v. Columbus Cnty Bd Ed · filed 2000-05-02(a)(1)

If the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's stated reason for refusing to hire the plaintiff was a pretext and that the real reason was based on the plaintiff's race. ... The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.

A plaintiff proving intentional sex discrimination through circumstantial evidence under § 2000e-2(a)(1) is subject to the three-part burden-shifting framework.

Blalock v. Dale County Board of Education · filed 1999-12-15(a)(1)

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to prove intentional discrimination through circumstantial evidence of the employer’s intent, the court applies the three-part, burden-shifting analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine.

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Bickerstaff v. Vassar College · filed 1999-12-22(a)

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

A plaintiff alleging religious discrimination must establish a prima facie case before the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Kohn v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1999-06-21(a)(1)

Consequently, WPC and AT & T need not come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment.

A failure-to-hire plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case must produce significantly probative evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Lewis-Calhoun v. City of Jackson · filed 1997-09-16(a)(1)

Since the Defendants have articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, the presumption created by Plaintiffs prima facie case is eliminated and the burden of persuasion shifts back to Plaintiff to show, by significantly probative evidence, that Defendants’ reasons are only a pretext for discrimination.

After an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for a discharge, a Title VII plaintiff must point to evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Jetton v. Douglas · filed 1997-08-13(a)(1)

It was then up to Ms. Jetton to offer or point to evidence which would rebut the company's nondiscriminatory rationale for her discharge and to show that the nondiscriminatory rationale was merely a pretext for discrimination.

An employer meets its burden of production on a discriminatory discharge claim by giving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, such as a violation of company policies.

Robertson v. Home Depot (U.S.A.), Inc. · filed 1997-08-13(a)(1)

The reason offered by Home Depot for its termination of Mr. Robertson was violation of company policies and procedures. ... These are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Mr. Robertson’s termination. Home Depot has met its burden of production.

Section 2000e-2 permits summary judgment on a race discrimination claim when the employee fails to show that the employer’s stated reason for demotion was pretext for discrimination.

Parrish v. United Steelworkers · filed 1997-06-27

In light of the fact that Parrish has presented no evidence of age or race discrimination, and that he has failed to show that USWA's prof- fered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual and a cover for a true discriminatory motive, Hicks at 575, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, notwithstanding the misplaced reliance on this Court's opinion in O'Connor.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employer may articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination even while disputing whether it terminated the employee.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OUR LADY OF THE RESURRECTION MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant- · filed 1996-02-20(a)

The Center may articulate what it contends to be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination regardless of the circumstances of termination.

A claim under Section 2000e-2 proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when it is neither a mixed-motive nor a disparate-impact claim.

Cynthia J. Fisher, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Vassar College, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1995-12-14(a)(1)

Thus, Fisher’s only chance of prevailing on her Title VII claim was by using the three-tiered burden-shifting framework enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

In a race discrimination claim, an employer must produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

Delois MARTIN, Appellant, v. the ARKANSAS ARTS CENTER, Appellee · filed 1980-08-18(a)(1)

The Center must meet its burden of producing evidence that demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the Center’s “employment decision [was based] on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race” and must “ ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s’ ” treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) leaves the burden of persuasion with the employee; after a prima facie showing, the employer need only produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Jackson v. U.S. Steel Corp. · filed 1980-06-09(a)(1)

In Title VII cases the burden of persuasion never shifts to the defendant. ... The burden imposed on the employer, after the complainant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, is only the burden of producing evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory refusal to recall to show that she was qualified for the position.

Lacy v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1980-03-31(a)(1)

In the opinion of this Court, plaintiff has not made out a prima facie showing of disparate treatment. Without regard to defendant’s justifications for its employment decision, plaintiff has not shown that she was qualified to fill the position of switchboard operator-receptionist.

A qualified Black applicant denied an open job makes a prima facie case of racial discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1), shifting the burden to the employer to relate its stated reason to the job’s requirements.

Percy H. GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-06-28(a)(1)

When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, we think he presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the burden passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a racial hiring discrimination claimant to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the claimant must have an opportunity to show pretext.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · filed 1973-05-14(a)(1)

The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. ... The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. ... On remand, respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner’s stated reason for respondent’s rejection was in fact pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits hiring statistics to establish a prima facie discrimination case, shifting the burden to the employer to explain the disparity.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1974-02-20(a)

In accordance with these decisions and under the doctrine of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 [1973], once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by setting forth statistics of this kind the burden is on the employer to sufficiently explain the disparity in hiring; conclusory statements that the employer never discriminated in hiring is insufficient to satisfy this burden.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee alleging sex discrimination to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer discriminated because of sex.

Causey v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1974-04-05(a)

In order to prevail against Ford under § 2000e-2 of 42 U.S.C., the plaintiff has the burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that Ford discriminated against her on account of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits statistical evidence of a sex imbalance in hiring to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Peltier v. City of Fargo · filed 1975-06-25(a)

As a matter of law, these statistics are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) shifts the burden to an employer to show a nondiscriminatory reason for denying promotion once an applicant makes a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tufts Institution of Learning · filed 1975-07-28(a)(1)

In making out a prima facie case here, however, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that the subcommittee on the evidence before it could have reached a decision favorable to White. This the plaintiff has done. The burden then must shift to the defendant to show some nondiscriminatory reason why White was denied promotion.

Section 2000e-2 requires a rejected applicant to show that he was qualified for the job to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.

Adams v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co. · filed 1975-09-10

Nonetheless, we concur in our Circuit Court’s recent observation that one’s qualification for a position he has been denied is a “necessary element to a finding of job discrimination.”

An employer relying on an applicant’s work history to rebut a prima facie sex discrimination hiring claim must provide comparable evidence about the people it hired.

Cora Lee EAST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROMINE, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-09-02(a)

Once the alleged discriminatee has made out a prima facie case the employer must come forward with comparable factual data relating to those he hired to support his claim that he was correct in rejecting the proffered application.

Selecting a qualified man over a qualified woman for a promotion does not, by itself, establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Betty J. OLSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PHILCO-FORD, Contractor for Guthrie Job Corps Center for Women, Respondent-Appe · filed 1976-02-27(a)(1)

To make a prima facie case in a situation such as that before us something more is needed than proof that a qualified male was chosen over a qualified female.

A refusal-to-hire complaint under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must allege that the position remained open and the employer continued seeking applicants after rejecting the plaintiff.

Solin v. State University of New York · filed 1976-06-28(a)(1)

SUNY contends that to allege a violation of the statute the complaint must at least assert (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a minority group, (2) applied for a position for which she was qualified, (3) was rejected for the position, and (4) after the rejection the position remained open and the defendant continued to seek applicants. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Although Solin alleges the first three facts, she does not include the fourth. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed unless within twenty days Solin amends her complaint to include the allegations required by McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a class to show economic harm to establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory job assignment.

13 Fair empl.prac.cas. 604, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,177 Louis Swint v. Pullman-Standard, Clyde Humphrey, Intervenor · filed 1976-08-30(a)(1) and (2)

Title VII contains neither requirement nor implication that economic harm must be shown before a class can be found to have made out a prima facie case of racially discriminatory job assignment. Indeed, the statutory prohibitions of the enactment are explicitly broader than economic harm.

Section 2000e-2 allows a substantial racial disparity in promotions to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to show nondiscriminatory causes.

13 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1035, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,260 Joe Stewart, Cross-Appellants v. General Motors Corporation, C · filed 1976-10-04

Where statistical evidence demonstrates a discrepancy between the racial composition of those promoted to a given job and the pool of eligible applicants which is too great to reasonably be the product of random distribution, the burden should be placed on the employer to show that this disparity is the product of nondiscriminatory factors.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against sex discrimination in employment; a complaint must allege different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute · filed 1977-06-23(a)

For a Title VII claim, the factual allegations must show that plaintiff is a member of a class entitled to protection under the Act and that she was treated differently in her employment from persons otherwise similarly situated who are not members of the class. ... Sex is a protected classification under § 703(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

In an individual race discrimination claim, once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must prove its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderance of the evidence; the employee must then prove pretext by a preponderance.

William F. TURNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1977-07-15(a)(1)

To resolve this confusion, we hold that the employer bears the burden of proving the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions by a preponderance of the evidence. Upon proper proof of a legitimate reason for the employer’s decision, the plaintiff then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason is a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a faculty member to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory tenure denial by showing minority status, irregular procedures, qualifications comparable to successful candidates, and denial of tenure.

Huang v. College of the Holy Cross · filed 1977-07-18(a)(1)

Thus, in adapting the McDonnell Douglas guidelines to the present action, the Court holds that the burden on the plaintiff is to prove: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that the procedure followed by the College in his case was irregular; (iii) that he was at least as qualified in accordance with the College’s own standards as other candidates who did receive tenure that same year; and (iv) that he was a candidate for tenure and despite his qualifications he was denied it.

Section 2000e-2 allows a professor to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in a tenure denial through evidence of comparative qualifications and irregular review procedures.

Perham v. Ladd · filed 1977-07-28

On the basis of these facts it is clear that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Evidence of discriminatory animus can complete an applicant's prima facie case of sex discrimination.

King v. New Hampshire Department of Resources & Economic Development · filed 1977-09-01

We also agree with the district court that this showing of discriminatory animus completed plaintiff's prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to offer evidence supporting an inference of employment discrimination before the employer must give a legitimate reason for its decision.

Citron v. Jackson State University · filed 1977-10-07(a)(1)

Viewing the plaintiff’s allegations in this context, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prima facie showing of discrimination which would shift the burden to the defendants to show a legitimate purpose for the failure to promote the plaintiff, the denial of tenure, and the terminal contract.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a qualified applicant to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in hiring through evidence of different treatment and discriminatory intent.

Meyer v. Missouri State Highway Commission · filed 1977-12-14(a)(1)

This evidence not only indicates differences in treatment, it also raises a strong inference of discriminatory intent. For that reason, we hold as a matter of law that plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of sex discrimination with respect to hiring for the position of maintenanceman.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination before the burden shifts to the employer to explain its decision.

Reed v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word of Louisiana, Inc. · filed 1978-03-09(a)

Here there was no burden to shift to defendant because plaintiffs totally failed to prove a case. We find not only no pattern or practice of discrimination but no iota of evidence of a single act of discrimination which would be actionable.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to rebut a prima facie discrimination case with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, which the employee may show is a pretext for discrimination.

Leiman v. Fashion Institute of Technology · filed 1977-12-13

The employer may rebut such a prima facie showing by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory ground for its action with respect to the plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff may avoid the effect of the employer’s rebuttal by showing that the asserted justification for the conduct in question is merely a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to be applied to this sex discrimination failure-to-promote claim.

Blizard v. Fielding · filed 1978-03-20(a)

But we do not feel free in this case to say that the McDonnell Douglas approach can be dispensed with; so to hold, when there is evidence of past discrimination and the nondiscriminatory basis for not promoting plaintiff involves evaluations of her ability and subjective plans for doing away with the position she sought, would substantially demean the analytic framework detailed by the Supreme Court.

In a failure-to-promote claim, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing protected-class membership, qualification, rejection, and that the position remained open.

Blizard v. Fielding · filed 1978-03-20(a)

Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must prove four things to establish a prima facie case: (1) that plaintiff was a member of the protected class; (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the position sought; (3) that plaintiff was rejected; and (4) that the position remained open following the rejection.

An employee alleging sex discrimination must establish a prima facie case before the employer must show valid reasons for its actions.

Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation · filed 1978-08-11

It is the plaintiff’s burden, in a Title VII case, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show valid reasons for its actions.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race-based differences in employment; when an employer establishes legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the employee must show those reasons were pretextual.

Slotkin v. Human Development Corp. of Metropolitan · filed 1978-06-30

The Court therefore finds that as to the charges of disparate treatment in regard to the waiver, across-the-board pay increase, workload, and constructive firing, plaintiff made out a prima facie case. Defendant met its burden as to each of these claims, clearly establishing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the delays in obtaining the waiver and pay increase, and decisively rebutting plaintiff's claim of unequal caseload and constructive discharge. ... Plaintiff failed to establish that these reasons were pretextual in nature; therefore, the Court enters judgment for the defendants on each of plaintiff's claims discussed thus far.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a layoff made in reverse order of seniority does not establish disparate treatment without evidence that employees were treated differently because of race.

Hines v. Olinkraft, Inc. · filed 1978-07-11(a)(1)

It is an unlawful employment practice for any employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race. ... There is a total lack of evidence that Hines was laid off in a manner dissimilar from any other employee. The record unmistakably shows that employees were dismissed in reverse order of seniority. There is not the slightest indication that lay-offs on this basis had any impermissibly adverse impact on blacks. ... Accordingly, we find and hold that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment with respect to his April 26 layoff from Plant No. 40.

A prima facie case of racial discrimination shifts the burden to the employer to refute it by a preponderance of evidence showing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc. · filed 1978-08-09

Plainly Calcóte made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and the burden shifted to the Foundation to refute it by a preponderance of evidence showing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

Section 703(a) prohibits an employer from using a legitimate reason for discharge as a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1978-10-04(a)

An employer, however, may not use a legitimate reason for discharge as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Consistent with this rule, plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to properly plead a claim grounded upon Section 703(a).

A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination retains the overall burden of proving discrimination after the employer offers legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.

James v. Newspaper Agency Corporation · filed 1979-03-02

Thereafter the defendant presented its evidence tending to show legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. And James' rebuttal testimony was only minimal. ... It is obvious to us that in the instant case the trial judge by his findings held that James had failed to carry her overall burden of proof.

In a Title VII sex discrimination claim, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case; the employer must then state a legitimate reason for its decision, and the plaintiff must show that reason was a pretext.

Lieberman v. Gant · filed 1979-08-02

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff must show that the stated reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.

Statistics may be used to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Laborde v. Regents of the University of California · filed 1980-05-19(a)(1)

It is well settled that statistics may be used to establish a prima facie case.

After an applicant establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory promotion, § 2000e-2(a)(1) places a burden of production, but not persuasion, on the employer to give a permissible reason for its decision.

Helen OLAFSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1981-07-24(a)(1)

Mrs. Olafson proved a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. ... At that point a burden of production — not persuasion — shifted to the defendants. Assuming the credibility of Mrs. Olafson’s evidence, an adverse decision could be avoided only if the defendants could “clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the [permissible] reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of different treatment from similarly situated employees to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination in recall from layoff.

Burris v. Davidson Transfer & Storage Co. · filed 1981-08-20(a)(1)

Given the lack of evidence that Davidson treated Burris and the white drivers on layoff differently in recalling them for temporary work, plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires adequate evidence of discriminatory hiring to establish a prima facie class claim before the burden shifts to the employer.

26 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1556, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,167 Magdalena Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Cente · filed 1981-09-30

Since plaintiffs here did not make an adequate showing of either statistical or direct evidence, they failed to make out a prima facie case and so the district court correctly found that plaintiffs failed to prove any of their class allegations.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a female plaintiff to establish a prima facie sex discrimination case by showing less favorable treatment than men suggesting a gender-based motive, or a facially neutral practice that falls more harshly on women.

Rose Schwabenbauer v. Board Of Education Of The City School District Of The City Of Olean · filed 1981-12-17(a)

To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under § 703(a) a female plaintiff may show that she was treated less favorably than men in circumstances from which a gender-based motive could be inferred (a "disparate-treatment" claim), or she may show that an employment practice that is facially neutral in its treatment of men and women in fact falls more harshly on women than on men (a "disparate-impact" claim).

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination in employment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bears the burden of proving it.

Edgar L. BURNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICKASAW AREA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-11-24(a)(1)

The burden of proof was upon Burnett to prove racial discrimination, but this he failed to do as found by the District Judge and we agree.

In a racial discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2, the employer need only rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case; the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.

Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination of Massachusetts · filed 1982-02-17

The burden on the defendant is only to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case; the burden of persuasion rests at all times with the plaintiff.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of a position under § 2000e-2 must show that an opening existed and that the plaintiff applied for it.

Robert JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUMBERJACK MEATS, INC., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-07-06

Among the elements Jones must establish in making out a prima facie case showing such a discriminatory act is the existence of an open position as a ham boner for which he applied. ... The evidence shows no position as a ham boner open within the 180 days prior to his filing charges with the EEOC. His claim must, therefore, fail.

Section 2000e-2(b) allows an applicant rejected by an employment agency before it considers her qualifications to establish a prima facie discrimination case without proving she met the job qualifications.

Ostroff v. Employment Exchange · filed 1982-07-26(b)

The issue is whether this element of the McDonnell Douglas test is invariably required to make out a prima facie case under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981), established that it is not. ... When an employer summarily rejects an applicant without considering his or her qualifications, those qualifications are irrelevant to whether the Title VII plaintiff has raised a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

Statistical evidence of a sex disparity in hiring or promotion is relevant to a prima facie disparate treatment claim, but the plaintiff must also show objective qualifications.

Laborde v. The Regents of the University of California · filed 1982-09-03(a)(1)

Statistical evidence of a sex-based disparity in hiring or promotion is a relevant, though not necessarily sufficient fact in establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. ... The plaintiff also must prove that she was objectively qualified for the position or promotion.

An employee’s refusal to take a lawfully requested employment-related polygraph examination may be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for dissimilar treatment that rebuts a prima facie discrimination claim.

Brown v. State of Tennessee · filed 1982-11-18

We hold that, at least when polygraph testing is a lawful method for determining employment-related questions, as it was in Tennessee, the failure to submit to an examination on the employer's permissible request may be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for dissimilar treatment, which rebuts the prima facie case of plaintiff.

A discharged employee may establish a prima facie racial discrimination case by showing that the employer filled the position with someone of comparable or lesser qualifications outside the protected class.

Jones v. Public Defender Service · filed 1983-01-12(a)(1)

For the fourth and last element of establishing a prima facie case it would have been sufficient for Jones to show that the available position was filled by an individual with comparable, or lesser, qualifications who was not a member of the protected class. ... Plaintiff has not carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to prove discriminatory intent after the employer articulates a legitimate reason for its action.

Perryman v. Johnson Products Company · filed 1983-02-22(a)

The defendant has certainly met the minimal burden of articulation set forth by the Supreme Court in Burdine. In these circumstances, the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs either to prove that these articulated reasons were a mere pretext or to show by direct evidence that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.

In a Title VII sex discrimination claim, the employer’s burden to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is one of production, not persuasion.

Sweeney v. The Research Foundation of the State University of New York · filed 1983-06-29(a)(1)

The district judge’s assessment of this evidence led him to conclude that the appellee had come forward with “a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for [its] actions.” We cannot say that this finding constituted clear error, especially since the defendant’s burden is one of production and not persuasion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to rebut a prima facie sex discrimination claim by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Kristen NELLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BROWN COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-12-14(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that in light of the United States Supreme Court’s language in Burdine, Brown County produced more than ample evidence to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for denying Nellis’ reclassification.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by offering evidence that supports an inference that a protected characteristic caused the denial of an employment opportunity.

Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond · filed 1984-06-25(a)

A plaintiff bringing a civil action for a violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a), has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that his employer discriminated against him on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A plaintiff meets this initial burden by offering evidence adequate to create an inference that he was denied an employment opportunity on the basis of a discriminatory criterion enumerated in Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) uses a flexible prima facie test for discrimination claims involving teacher reappointment and tenure decisions by local school boards.

Carlile v. South Routt School District Re-3j in the County of Routt, State of Colorado · filed 1984-08-02(a)

Rather, consistent with the purposes of Title VII and the rationale of cases like McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community Affairs, these elements are flexible enough to be applied to employment decisions regarding the initial hiring, tenure, reappointment, or promotion by local school boards of teachers similar to Ms. Carlile who fall within the class of persons protected by Title VII.

The McDonnell Douglas prima facie framework applies, with appropriate changes, to race discrimination claims involving employment practices beyond hiring.

Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital · filed 1984-08-20(a)(1)

Since this model was formulated in the context of a discriminatory hiring case, it must be applied mutatis mutandis to other instances of alleged race discrimination "with respect to ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).

In a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2, the employee retains the burden of persuasion after the employer offers legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision.

Ford v. Nicks · filed 1984-08-23

The Court held that where the Fifth Circuit had required an employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence such legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, it had impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion to the employer. In the case at bar, the district judge committed just this error in determining that Lani Ford had been the victim of sex discrimination.

In a sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2, a prima facie showing shifts the burden of production to the employer, while the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.

Ford v. Nicks · filed 1984-09-20

By requiring MTSU to prove by a preponderance of the evidence legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Lani Ford, it contends, the district judge impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion from Lani Ford to MTSU. We agree.

A gender discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the employee does not establish a prima facie case.

Eldridge v. Paul N. Carlin, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service · filed 1985-03-27(a)

Once again, we agree with the district court. Eldridge has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge need not show that someone outside the protected class replaced her; an unfilled position may weaken but does not eliminate the inference of discrimination.

Meiri v. Dacon · filed 1985-04-02(a)(1)

We believe the appropriate inquiry should be whether the employer continued to seek applicants to fill the position. ... When examined against these conceptual underpinnings, we believe the fact that Meiri was not replaced by a non-Jew--indeed, she was never replaced--may weaken, but certainly does not eliminate, the inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to meet its burden of production with a clear and specific reason for discharge even if the employer had not announced its decisionmaking standard.

Marietta Lee CONNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORT GORDON BUS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-05-30

The unpublicized nature of a decisionmaking standard does not affect its clarity or specificity at trial. If an employer articulates at trial a clear and specific reason for discharging an employee, the purposes of the employer's burden of production have been met.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a discharge as religious discrimination to offer concrete evidence of pretext when the employer gives a legitimate reason for the discharge.

Meiri v. Dacon · filed 1985-04-02(a)(1)

To allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment by offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars, would necessitate a trial in all Title YII cases. Given the ease with which these suits may be brought and the energy and expense required to defend such actions, we believe the trial judge properly granted summary judgment.

In a promotion discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), the plaintiff's prima facie showing of qualification requires evidence of relative objective qualifications.

Rajapakse A. JAYASINGHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-04-12(a)(1)

Applying the relativity principle of Holder to the case at bar, we hold that the prima facie showing of "qualification" for the job requires evidence of relative objective qualifications.

In a disparate treatment promotion case, once the employer states a legitimate reason, the fact finder decides whether discrimination occurred based on the entire record.

Annie Laura KIMBROUGH, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF the UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, Defendant/Appellant · filed 1985-06-28(a)(1)

Thus, after plaintiff’s prima facie case and defendant’s “articulation,” the trier of fact decides the question of discrimination based on the entire case.

A Title VII plaintiff must show that she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie employment discrimination case.

Ruth Y. MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Samuel PIERCE, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Et Al., De · filed 1985-10-09

Under McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to the protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) the employer sought to replace her. ... Plaintiff, however, cannot prevail with respect to Counts I, II and III because the record does not show that she was qualified for the position as an accounting technician.

In a disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer meets its burden of production by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Tulloss v. Near North Montessori School, Inc. · filed 1985-10-29(a)(1)

Thus, by a clear showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, defendant met its burden of production.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employer genuinely believed poor performance warranted demotion and its stated reason was not a pretext for discrimination.

Fair v. Amp Inc. · filed 1986-04-08(a)(1)

This Court does not need to judge the correctness of AMP’s assessment of Fair’s abilities; it need only determine that AMP believed in good faith that Fair’s performance was unsatisfactory and that the asserted reason for the demotion decision was not a mere pretext for discrimination.

A racial employment discrimination claimant must establish a prima facie case, including that she was rejected from a job for which she was qualified.

Houston v. Reeves Bros. · filed 1986-12-29(a)

Under either the McDonnell-Douglas or the Fumco Constmction proof scheme, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case because she has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for a job for which she was qualified and for which she was rejected.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must show satisfactory job performance and different treatment from a similarly situated white employee.

Jackson-Colley v. Department of Army Corps of Engineers · filed 1987-01-07(a)(1)

Although she clearly qualifies as a racial minority, the Court finds that Jackson had not performed her job in accordance with its requirements and, further, that she was not treated differently than similarly situated white employees.

An applicant must be qualified for the position sought to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory hiring.

Eshun v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 1987-01-22(a)(1)

The second element is not as easily satisfied, and Mr. Eshun does not meet it. Although Mr. Eshun applied for a Management Specialist Trainee position, he was not qualified for the position because he had (1) failed the June 19,1982 Administration option of the Professional Careers Test, which is required for the position, and (2) previously been terminated during probation as a New York State Tax Compliance Agent. Further, he lacked the requisite experience for the Project Assistant position.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination to establish a prima facie disparate-treatment claim.

Andrew G. YARTZOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lee M. THOMAS, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Defendan · filed 1987-02-06(a)

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must offer evidence that “give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”

After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate treatment case under § 2000e-2(a), the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its failure to promote.

EEOC v. West Brothers Department Store · filed 1986-10-23(a)

In a disparate treatment case, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant; it must articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its failure to promote.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate treatment case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. West Bros. Department Store of Mansfield, Louisiana, Inc. · filed 1986-10-23(a)

In a disparate treatment case, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant; it must articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its failure to promote.

In a sex-based wage discrimination claim, Title VII permits an employer to meet its burden of production by articulating nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay difference without showing how seniority affected each salary.

Feazell v. Tropicana Products, Inc. · filed 1987-06-22

It is not for this court to insert new standards into Title VII. Tropicana articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the wage differentials, and the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Tropicana thus satisfied its burden of production.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects individuals from race discrimination regardless of whether they belong to a racial minority.

Legrand v. Trustees Of University Of Arkansas At Pine Bluff · filed 1987-06-16(a)(1)

Thus, we think it clear that it is not an essential element to the establishment of a prima facie case that a plaintiff prove he is within a minority group.

Assuming an abortion-related discharge is actionable, a plaintiff must show that the employer knew of her abortion and acted from animus toward abortions before the burden shifts to the employer.

Doe v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago · filed 1987-06-30(a)(1)

This is what distinguishes this type of case from other Title VII cases, and it is because of this distinction that it becomes important, and I so find, that it is necessary that a Title VII plaintiff in an abortion case, before shifting any burden to the defendant employer, allege and show that his conduct toward her would have been different but for his animus toward the having of abortions, and his having come into possession of the knowledge that his employee had one.

A job applicant does not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by expressing interest in a job without submitting an application during a neutrally applied application period.

Bobby E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HEVI-DUTY ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1987-07-07(a)

The employer elected to limit the applications it would accept to those submitted during a relatively short period of time, but there was no showing that this was a device to discriminate on racial grounds; Mr. Williams' application was not rejected, it simply was not timely filed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Ohemeng v. Delaware State College · filed 1988-01-05(a)(1)

Given that material issues of fact persist as to whether the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons” for Ohemeng’s discharge, offered by the College, are “pretext for discrimination,” summary judgment is inappropriate, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claim must be denied.

An employee alleging race discrimination retains the burden of proof; the employer must produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, and the employee must prove that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Juanita REEDER-BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellee. v. LINCOLN NATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1988-01-21(a)(1)

The plaintiff retains the burden of proof throughout. She must first establish a prima facie case by raising an inference that the employer discriminated against her on the basis of her race. The employer must then come forward to rebut this inference with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason which explains its actions. If the employer meets this burden of production, the employee must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's articulated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows a disparate-treatment claim to proceed when allegations of denied positions give the employer adequate notice of the discrimination claim.

Brown v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1988-04-20(a)(1)

She identifies several particular requests which the department allegedly denied, including applications to the Juvenile Division, the Marine Patrol, a Spanish Language School and a Women’s Officer Survival School. These allegations are sufficient to place defendants on notice as to the nature of her claims of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. Thereupon, the city’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II be, and the same is, hereby DENIED.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not establish race or sex discrimination when employees of other races and sexes received similar discipline for the same infraction.

Carlen Barnes Walker v. Muskegon Correctional Facility Michigan Department of Corrections State of Michigan · filed 1988-08-15(a)

The district court held that all the male and white female employees who had committed the same infraction were subject to similar discipline. ... After an examination of the record, we agree with the conclusions of the district court.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to defend against a sex discrimination claim over a denied promotion by showing that the employees promoted had substantially more experience.

Cargile v. St. Vincent Hospital & Medical Center James Merriweather, Defendants · filed 1988-08-08

The defendants presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to promote the plaintiff because the men it promoted to the positions had substantially more experience than the plaintiff. This legitimate business reason provides an adequate defense to both sex and age discrimination claims.

A Title VII plaintiff bears the burden of showing pretext in a pay discrimination claim.

Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc. · filed 1988-11-23(a)(1)

It was not error for the trial court to place the burden on the appellant to show pretext under Title VII and under the EPA for purposes of rebuttal.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must offer admissible evidence of pretext to overcome an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation at summary judgment.

Ritzie v. City University of New York · filed 1989-01-05(a)(1)

Confronted with these legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged mistreatment, it became plaintiff’s duty to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reasons for its conduct were pretextual. ... Plaintiff’s responsive papers are limited to speculation and conjecture. They do not contain that admissible evidence necessary to resist summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to meet its intermediate burden of production by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, even if that reason is untrue; the employee may then prove pretext.

Adella D. Gray v. University of Arkansas at Fayetteville and the Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas · filed 1989-11-07(a)(1)

An employer may meet its intermediate burden of production by articulating even an untrue reason for terminating a member of a protected class.

After a plaintiff establishes a Title VII hiring discrimination case, the employer must produce a clear, reasonably specific, nondiscriminatory reason for each challenged hiring decision.

Davis v. City of Dallas · filed 1990-06-14(a)

Applying this standard of proof, the City of Dallas currently bears the burden of producing a clear, reasonably specific, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for each of its challenged hiring decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a state employer to give a specific nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse hiring decision once an applicant establishes a prima facie discrimination claim; state-law hiring discretion alone is insufficient.

Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health · filed 1990-05-25(a)

To rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII it is not enough for a state agency simply to rely on the broad discretion granted it under state law to make hiring decisions.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination under Title VII must establish a prima facie case.

Solitaire Dipasalgne v. Orient Correctional Institution · filed 1990-11-15(a)

The plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

A sex discrimination plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; the employer may then offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, which the plaintiff may prove is a pretext.

Cobb v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. · filed 1990-10-24(a)(1)

The plaintiff in a Title VII case bears the initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Once the plaintiff meets her burden, the employer can rebut plaintiff's prima facie case by coming forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons that the employer has articulated are, in fact, a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

A prima facie inference of discrimination alone does not make a Title VII claim a mixed-motive case.

Schleiniger v. Des Moines Water Works · filed 1991-02-12(a)

Simply because a discriminatory reason might be inferred from a prima facie case does not mean that a mixed motive case exists.