42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a termination as sex discrimination to show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Randall v. Howard University · filed 1996-10-21(a)(1)

The plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proving that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex. More specifically, she cannot meet her burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that the non-discriminatory reason proffered for her termination was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based discrimination in compensation; a denied raise does not establish a violation without evidence that sex influenced the decision.

Winchester v. Galveston Yacht Basin · filed 1996-11-05(a)(1)

Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for disparate compensation based on gender. There is simply no evidence that gender was a significant factor in deciding not to award Plaintiff a raise for 1995.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit a national origin pay claim to survive summary judgment based solely on lower pay than three senior white employees when the plaintiff earned more than every other white salaried employee.

Peng v. Intl · filed 1997-03-03(a)(1)

The fact that Peng received a lower salary than three senior white American employees does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Peng was discriminated against on the basis of national origin in light of the evidence that he was paid more than every other white American salaried employee at Sinopac.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discrimination because of sex; mistreatment arising from a failed consensual relationship alone does not establish a claim.

Campbell v. Masten · filed 1997-03-11(a)(1)

Campbell’s status as a woman, however, is only the foundation on which her Title VII claim, if valid, would proceed. From that foundation, Campbell must offer some allegation that the terms and conditions of her employment were affected because of her status as a woman, not simply as a result of personal incompatibility and petty grudges.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of sex; a jury may infer intentional discrimination from a prima facie case and evidence discrediting the employer’s stated reasons.

Carole Kolstad, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. American Dental Association, Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1997-05-28(a)(1)

Because Kolstad introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude both that she had proven a prima facie case of discrimination and that ADA's proffered reasons were pretextual, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Kolstad proved intentional sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination, but a claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for its action and the employee offers no evidence of pretext.

Powers v. Runyon · filed 1997-07-18(a)

Based on the foregoing, namely the presence of a legitimate reason for the USPS’s action in terminating Powers, together with the absence of evidence suggesting that the reason was pretextual, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to Powers’ claim of discrimination against her based on her gender in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires supported facts to establish a prima facie claim of sex discrimination.

French v. Eagle Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1997-08-05(a)(1)

Simply put, French has not established a prima facie ease of harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender against any of the Defendants because she has not alleged a single supported fact to substantiate her Title VII or MHRA claims other than the dismissed unequal pay claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to reach trial when evidence supports an inference that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Davalos v. Jacobsen Division of Textron, Inc. · filed 1998-03-31(a)(1)

Add to this suspicious “fire now and justify it later” procedure the fact that Jensen, a man, was given a second chance while Davalos was not, and Davalos just barely gets herself to trial through the inference that her performance was not the real reason for her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in employment because of an employee’s sex; a sex discrimination claim must allege facts supporting an inference of such discrimination.

Godon v. NC Crime Control · filed 1998-04-23(a)(1)

Nor does her complaint state a claim of sex discrimination. To do so, an employee must show that the employer discriminated with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Godon's complaint does not aver that anyone at the Academy discriminated against Godon, nor does it mention any facts that might give rise to any inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits intentional sex discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Perdue v. City University of New York · filed 1998-06-17(a)

In any event, contrary to CUNY’s contention that Perdue “offered no evidence other than self-serving statements that she suffered discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment,” Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law at 27, the record is replete with support for the jury’s determination that CUNY intentionally discriminated against Perdue on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII.

A Title VII compensation discrimination claim fails when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay disparity and the employee fails to show they are pretextual.

Coates v. Abbeville County · filed 1998-08-04(a)

Coates failed to demon- strate that the County's proffered reasons for the disparity between her salary and her predecessor's salary, the denial of longevity pay, and the denial of the appointment of a full-time clerk were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make the denial of premium pay an adverse employment decision when the employee’s route is substantially shorter than the premium-paid route.

Monica Kindred v. Northome/indus. School District No. 363 · filed 1998-08-21(a)(1)

Kindred failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination because the District’s refusal to provide her premium pay does not constitute an adverse employment decision under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of sex.

O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Board of Education · filed 1998-08-26(a)(1)

Title VII and section 4112.02(A) of the Ohio Revised Code make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a worker claiming sex-based unequal pay to show an adverse employment decision; denial of premium pay for a materially shorter route did not meet that requirement.

Monica Kindred v. Northome/Indus Schl. · filed 1998-08-21(a)

Kindred failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination because the District’s refusal to provide her premium pay does not constitute an adverse employment decision under Title VII. The East Route, for which the district provided premium pay, substantially differed from the Wildwood-Mizpah Route.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in compensation to show that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Burns v. Republic Savings Bank · filed 1998-10-23(m)

Rather, she must demonstrate that her gender was a motivating factor in determining her salary and benefit package. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... In light of this standard and the findings of fact made above, this Court finds that Burns’ gender was not a motivating factor in determining the terms and conditions of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex; coworkers’ treatment in response to a harassment complaint does not, by itself, meet that requirement.

Hall v. Hebrank · filed 1999-01-19(a)(1)

Even more importantly, the co-workers’ treatment of Hall was not the product of sexual animus. Rather, the record demonstrates that, to the extent Hall was ignored and given the “cold shoulder,” those actions were in response to her complaint about Hebrank. Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer against any individual “because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer’s treatment was because of sex; disagreement with business decisions does not suffice.

Johnson v. E.A. Miller, Inc. · filed 1999-02-25(a)(1)

Ms. Johnson’s claim fails because she has not made a sufficient showing that the treatment she received by the defendants was because of her sex. Rather, it seems clear that the conflicts she experienced were the result of a serious difference in opinion over how health services were to be provided at E.A. Miller, Inc. The fact that Ms. Johnson both is female and disagrees with the wisdom of the company’s business decisions does not state a claim for sex discrimination.

A plaintiff may use direct evidence to prove sex discrimination under Title VII, but evidence of age or gender bias was absent here.

Manson v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1999-03-09(a)(1)

A plaintiff may also prove her case by presenting direct evidence of discrimination, but Manson has not presented any direct evidence of age or gender discrimination.

A plaintiff using comparative treatment to prove sex discrimination must show different treatment from similarly situated employees of another sex.

Bauer v. Albemarle Corp · filed 1999-03-29(a)(1)

However, to demonstrate gender discrimination, Mrs. Bauer must show that she was treated differently from male employees because of her gender under similar circumstances, not merely that she was treated differently from other female employees.

Under Title VII, evidence that men were hired or rehired while a woman was not, together with inconsistencies in the employer’s explanations, can defeat summary judgment on a sex discrimination claim.

McNulty v. New York City Department of Finance · filed 1999-04-05

Nonetheless, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to grant the Defendants’ Motion on the Title VII count in the light of the fact that six men were hired just before her termination, four of these men filled positions similar to Plaintiffs, all men fired along with Plaintiff were subsequently rehired, all of the relevant decisions were apparently made by men, and because the Defendants’ explanations for the treatment Plaintiff received appear inconsistent with available facts.

A prima facie claim of compensation discrimination requires a protected-class employee to show that she was paid less than someone outside the class for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

Lowery v. University of Houston-Clear Lake · filed 2000-02-08(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of compensation discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class, and (2) she was paid less than a nonmember for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision and the employee lacks sufficient evidence of pretext.

Clinger v. New Mexico Highlands University, Board of Regents · filed 2000-06-22(a)(1)

Even assuming plaintiff satisfied her Title VII prima facie case, defendants have come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their tenure decision, namely, her failure to obtain an M.F.A. or demonstrate equivalent experience. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the defendants’ proffered reason is pretext for sexual discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat a supervisor’s preference for a romantic partner as sex discrimination when the employee was not disadvantaged because of her sex.

Sullivan-Weaver v. New York Power Authority · filed 2000-09-18(a)(1)

There is no cognizable discrimination simply because the supervisor “preferred his paramour.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a failure-to-rehire claim requires evidence supporting an inference of sex discrimination.

Beck v. City of Haleyville, Ala. · filed 2001-01-29(a)(1)

The court finds no evidence of sex discrimination because the plaintiff has wholly failed to show that any other employee, female or male, who was employed under a grant, was not rehired at the expiration of the grant.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim requires evidence connecting the employer’s action to the plaintiff’s sex; suspicious timing alone is insufficient.

Demick v. City of Joliet · filed 2001-03-29(a)(1)

Specifically, Demick must show some type of connection between the City’s actions (her being removed from the eligibility list) and her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee in the conditions of employment because of gender.

Fitzgerald v. William Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service · filed 2001-05-31(a)

And we conclude that the record reveals genuine issues of fact to be tried with respect to Fitzgerald's claims of hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and constructive discharge. ... Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual with respect to conditions of employment, inter alia, on the basis of gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits treating men with an additional characteristic less favorably than women with the same characteristic.

Smith v. AVSC International, Inc. · filed 2001-06-26(a)

This doctrine recognizes that it is impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less favorably than women with the same additional characteristic.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects men and women alike from employment discrimination because of sex.

Maitland v. University of Minnesota · filed 2001-08-15(a)

Inasmuch as Title VII does not differentiate between men and women, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "against any individual . . . because of . . . sex"), we believe our holding in Okruhlik that Title VII was enacted and amended in accord with the strictures of Section 5 must apply equally to men as it does to women.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex played a role in an adverse employment action; workplace conflicts alone do not establish sex discrimination.

Campana v. City of Greenfield · filed 2001-09-28(a)(1)

In addition, Campana offers absolutely no evidence that her sex was a factor. She points to disagreements with Vandermeuse and Seider, Vandermeuse’s staring at her, walking behind the cash registers and telling her how to run her department. However, she has not shown that these incidents had anything to do with her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers an employer’s discriminatory denial of a pay increase.

Fierros v. Texas Department of Health · filed 2001-11-21(a)(1)

This language clearly contemplates that the denial of a pay increase can be an act of “discrimination” against an employee.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie Title VII wage discrimination claim when some male comparators earn more, even if others earn the same amount.

Hennick v. Schwans Sales Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-10-03(a)(1)

This suffices to generate a prima facie case of wage discrimination, even if two potential comparators — Hel-mer and Leeper — were paid the same as Hennick.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim requires evidence that gender played a role in the employer’s decision.

Adams v. Corporate Realty Services, Inc. · filed 2002-03-12(a)(1)

Since Adams’s motion does not provide the Court with sufficient competent evidence to establish that gender played a role in defendant’s decision to dismiss her, the Court grants defendants’ summary judgment motion on the Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits gender-based assignments to correctional officer positions when sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification.

Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2002-07-11(a)

For the reasons set forth in the Decision entered this date, finding in favor of plaintiffs on their request for declaratory relief, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that gender-based assignments to the Corrections Officer positions and Resident Unit Officer positions at the Scott Correctional Facility, Western Wayne Facility, and Camp Brighton Facility constitute gender based discrimination in violation of Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and Section 207 of Michigan’s EllioU-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2202.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based wage discrimination claim without an equal-work comparator if other evidence shows that sex affected the employee’s pay.

Conti v. Universal Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2002-09-20(a)(1)

Pursuant to Gunther, plaintiffs failure to produce evidence to show that she was paid less than male employees who performed equal work does not preclude her from establishing her claim of gender-based wage discrimination under Title VII. Plaintiff must, however, produce some other evidence which shows that Enterprises discriminated against her in terms of her salary because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated a challenged employment action for a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Clements v. North American Stainless · filed 2003-08-14(a)(1)

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NAS because it found that Clements had failed to present any evidence that her gender was a motivating factor in any of the employment actions about which she complained. ... Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its opinion and order entered September 11, 2001.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits intentional sex discrimination in compensation; lower paychecks reflecting a discriminatory raise can establish a prima facie disparate pay claim.

Hildebrandt, Reinee v. IL Dept Natural · filed 2003-10-30(a)(1)

Our examination of the record reveals that Dr. Hildebrandt has established a prima facie case that the 1997 raise, reflected in each of her paychecks received after July 10, 1997, constituted intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a prima facie sex discrimination claim when an employee receives paychecks reflecting a lower raise than similarly situated male employees.

Hildebrandt v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources and Richard Little · filed 2003-10-30(a)(1)

Our examination of the record reveals that Dr. Hildebrandt has established a prima facie case that the 1997 raise, reflected in each of her paychecks received after July 10, 1997, constituted intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make a tenure denial unlawful sex discrimination when the employer relied on legitimate, nondiscriminatory teaching and evaluation concerns.

Byerly v. Ithaca College · filed 2003-11-10(a)(1)

Based upon this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failure to achieve highly effective teaching, coupled with her average or below-average accomplishments in the other areas of evaluation, support the conclusion that Defendant’s decision to deny her tenure was based upon legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

Evidence that an employer enforced a workplace policy against a man but not a similarly situated woman can support a sex discrimination claim despite the employer’s stated reason for discharge.

McCaskill v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. · filed 2003-12-22(a)(1)

The Plaintiff in his prima facie case makes a showing that ConAgra’s drug and alcohol policy is applied to terminate male employees, but not similarly situated female employees. Thus, what could be a legitimate non-discriminatory reason does not appear, under the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff, to be truly non-discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require sex to be the sole or primary reason for harassment.

Kissell v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, District Council 84 · filed 2004-01-26(a)

Title VII jurisprudence does not require a plaintiff’s sex to be the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for the harassment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex”) (emphasis added); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 593-594 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Congress, by using the phrase ‘because of,’ did not mean ‘solely because of.’”).

A sex-discrimination plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge must still present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of pretext or discriminatory intent.

Burniche v. General Electric Automation Services, Inc. · filed 2004-02-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff has therefore failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant’s proffered explanation for terminating her was pretext for genr der discrimination, and has-failed to otherwise produce evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment when she offers no evidence that the employer’s legitimate reason was pretextual.

Hoyt v. Department of Children and Families · filed 2004-03-17(a)(1)

The court concludes that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to her, Hoyt has not met her burden of producing evidence sufficient to raise an issue of material fact that DCF discriminated against her based on her sex in denying her a lateral transfer.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence of different treatment because of sex to support a sex-discrimination claim.

Fouladi v. City of Tucson · filed 2004-03-23

Finally, Fouladi has presented no evidence that she was treated differently because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination against a subgroup defined by sex plus another characteristic.

Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless · filed 2004-07-07(a)(1)

Title VII also prohibits so-called “gender plus” or “sex plus” discrimination, by which an employer discriminates, not against the class of men or women as a whole, but against a subclass of men or women so designated by their sex plus another characteristic.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee offers no supporting evidence and does not oppose the employer’s challenge.

Martin v. Town of Westport · filed 2004-08-04(a)(1)

As Defendants observe, Mr. Martin has submitted not a scintilla of evidence in support of his gender discrimination claim. ... The Court concludes that Mr. Martin has effectively abandoned any gender discrimination claim he might have had. Accordingly, the Court grants the Town summary judgment on Mr. Martin’s gender discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of adverse treatment and pretext creates a factual dispute over discriminatory motive.

Van Cleve v. Society of St. Vincent De Paul · filed 2004-12-30(a)(1)

The court finds that the plaintiff has presented a submissible case of gender discrimination. The factual disputes are for the jury to decide.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex; a plaintiff must offer evidence of sex-based treatment to prove a violation.

Schultze v. White · filed 2005-02-18(a)(1)

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Her undeveloped arguments fall far short of Ms. Schultze’s burden to prove discrimination under either the direct or the indirect method. Thus, we must conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ms. Schultze’s sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2 allows a male employee to establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim through harsher discipline than a female employee, but requires him to show pretext after the employer gives a legitimate reason.

Corbett v. Sealy, Inc. · filed 2005-03-17(a)(1)

Corbett established a prima facie case of discrimination, but Sealy presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him. Corbett did not present evidence that Sealy’s reason was pretextual. While Sealy’s treatment of Corbett may have been harsh, it was not illegal sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows a sex discrimination claim to reach trial when a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Murray, Lucy v. Gilmore, David · filed 2005-05-06

In sum, Gilmore offers no reason, nor can we think of one, that would necessarily prevent a reasonable jury from inferring sex discrimination as to Murray if it found his proffered reason for abolishing her position pretextual. Murray’s Title VII sex discrimination claim thus survives summary judgment.

A sex discrimination claim over a denied promotion requires evidence connecting discriminatory intent to the promotion decision.

Ren v. University of Central Florida Board of Trustees · filed 2005-07-05(a)(1)

The Court must conclude that the evidence against Nashed falls short of inferring discriminatory animus and that even if sufficient, there is no hint of Nashed's taint on the seven-tiered promotional process.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that alleged sex discrimination or harassment occurred because of sex.

True v. Allstate Ins. · filed 2005-12-23(a)(1)

True failed to create a triable issue of fact that the alleged harassment and discrimination occurred because of his sex, age, and/or disability.

A gender-based wage discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) is evaluated using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Prewett v. STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS · filed 2006-03-03(a)(1)

When an employee seeks to prove a claim of gender-based wage discrimination, the test to be applied is the familiar burden-shifting analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits pay differences based on a system that measures quantity or quality of production or on a factor other than sex.

McDougal-Wilson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. · filed 2006-03-31(h)

Specifically, Goodyear’s compensation system measures earnings based on quantity or quality of production or some “factor other than sex.”

In an indirect-evidence sex-discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretextual and that sex was a determinative factor.

Atkinson v. Lafayette College · filed 2006-08-21

Faced with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Lafayette College’s actions, the burden of proof rested with Atkinson to demonstrate that the reasons proffered were pretextual and that gender was a determinative factor in the decisions.

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show an adverse employment action or create a genuine dispute that the employer’s explanation was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Darke v. Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Co., LLP · filed 2008-02-07(a)(1)

Darke’s sex-discrimination claims fail for three reasons. First, to the extent that her claims are based on pay discrimination, they are untimely. Second, with respect to much of the conduct that Darke challenges, no reasonable jury could find that the conduct amounted to adverse employment action. Third, even if Darke suffered adverse employment action, she has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Lurie Besikofs explanation for its treatment of her is a pretext for sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a pay difference justified by additional duties when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.

Duncan v. Madison County · filed 2008-04-09(a)(1)

Duncan failed to present any evidence that the reason proffered by Madison County was pretextual. Duncan instead admitted that Anglin performed additional duties and was entitled to increased compensation for that work. The district court correctly entered summary judgment against Duncan’s complaint of pay disparity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; evidence that sex motivated a demotion or termination can allow the claim to survive summary judgment.

White v. Golden · filed 2008-04-30(a)(1)

Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for "an employer . . . to discriminate against [any employee] with respect to . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... A jury could have determined that sex discrimination was the true motive of Infusion's decision to demote and later terminate plaintiff. Thus, it is possible that plaintiff could have prevailed on her sex discrimination claim, thus, there is a material issue of genuine fact and summary judgment is precluded.

Evidence of a supervisor’s sexist remarks and preferential treatment of men can create a triable issue on a sex discrimination claim.

Hochhalter v. Stephens Group, Inc. · filed 2008-05-02(a)(1)

There were also material issues of fact with respect to the plaintiffs Title VII claims. There was evidence that the supervisor who transferred Hochhalter made sexist remarks, excluded her from male-only outings and meetings, and referred new clients only to male employees. ... The record reflects there are triable issues of material fact as to the FMLA claim and the Title VII disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on sex; a dispute over management decisions alone does not establish sex discrimination.

Hervey v. Cty. of Koochiching · filed 2008-06-09(a)(1)

Whether or not Mastin should have been supervising Hervey, she has no claim under Title VII unless the actions of Mastin or Nelson were based on sex. We see nothing about the alleged lack of authority to change the management structure that supports an inference that subsequent actions taken by the new management team were based on sex.

An employee alleging sex discrimination through circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretextual.

Cecil v. Louisville Water Company · filed 2008-11-24(a)(1)

Cecil cannot demonstrate that LWC’s legitimate reasons for its actions were in fact only a pretext for intentional discrimination.

Favorable treatment of another woman does not by itself defeat a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Strickland v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2009-02-24(a)(1)

A sex discrimination claim does not fail simply because an employer does not discriminate against every member of the plaintiff’s sex.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a sex discrimination claim when isolated remarks fail to discredit the employer’s supported reason for an employment decision or establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment.

Torres-Santiago v. Alcaraz-Emmanuelli · filed 2009-05-22

These comments are not sufficient to show that Alcaraz-Emmanuelli’s request for Torres-Santiago’s resignation was more likely motivated by sex-based discrimination than by his proffered legitimate rationale. ... The Court accepts Torres-Santiago’s suggestion that the comments by Alcaraz-Emmanuelli qualify as an advance, a sexual joke, and as derogatory, but even then they do not reach the threshold of treatment so severe or pervasive as to alter Torres-Santiago’s working conditions. ... Nonetheless, because the analysis of the equal protection claim carried out above is identical to a Title VII analysis, the Court hereby dismisses plaintiffs Title VII claim in addition to her section 1983 claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination claim to allege facts suggesting that the challenged conduct occurred because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Soliman v. George Washington University · filed 2009-09-29(a)(1)

Solimán has thus failed to plead in Count Two that she was discriminated against because of her sex, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from suspending an employee because of her sex.

Hubbell v. World Kitchen, LLC · filed 2010-02-24(a)(1)

World Kitchen’s motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to Hub-bell’s sex-based discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA stemming from her June 2006 suspension.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination, including hostile work environment harassment; retaliation for reporting harassment is a separate Title VII claim.

Burkhart v. American Railcar Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-05-10(a)

Retaliation is a cause of action under Title VII separate and distinct from sex discrimination. Compare 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting sex discrimination) with id. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation); see also Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) relief applicable to Title VII discrimination claims does not extend to retaliation claims).

A Title VII compensation claim requires evidence that a pay difference resulted from discrimination.

Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc. · filed 2010-09-03(a)(1)

The same deficiency that defeats her Equal Pay Act argu- ment also defeats her Title VII claim—she has offered insufficient evidence of a discriminatory pay differential.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex-based pay discrimination claim to proceed when a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reasons for the pay difference were pretextual.

Kennedy v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. · filed 2011-02-07(a)(1)

Because a reasonably jury could potentially find Virginia Tech liable for Title VII violations, summary judgment must be denied.

A sex discrimination claim under the direct method requires evidence that the decisionmaker acted for a prohibited reason.

Graber v. MAD BREWER, INC. · filed 2011-02-24(a)(1)

Graber’s evidence is insufficient because it does not show that the decision maker, Eric Brewer, acted with discrimination, much of it does not fit into the three categories of circumstantial evidence that can prove discrimination, and she is not able to prove pretext as discussed below.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in compensation because of sex.

Kramer v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF BALTIMORE COUNTY · filed 2011-03-09(a)(1)

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice” to discriminate “against any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Because Plaintiff alleges that even up to the present date she continues to be paid less than men doing equal work, she has sufficiently alleged that she was paid discriminatory wages during the requisite period.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex; unfair treatment alone does not establish a violation.

Durant v. MillerCoors, LLC · filed 2011-03-16(a)(1)

Many of Durant’s arguments assert MillerCoors treated him unfairly. But Title VII prohibits only those employment practices that discriminate on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a reason for its decision, the plaintiff may challenge it as a pretext for discrimination.

Cypert v. Independent School District No. I-050 · filed 2011-10-19

Cypert failed to establish defendants’ proffered reason for not renewing her contract was a pretext for gender or age discrimination.

Derogatory remarks unrelated to the challenged employment action do not, by themselves, support an inference of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Mason v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2011-11-09(a)(1)

Calling another women “honey” or a “lesbian in a zoot suit,” although obviously inappropriate, is not related to Plaintiffs adverse employment action, therefore there is no permissible inference of gender discrimination in this case.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence disputes the employer’s stated reason for termination and could support an inference of intentional discrimination.

Richardson v. Prairie Opportunity, Inc., et a · filed 2012-04-25(a)

That evidence was sufficient to create a genuine dispute on the truth of Prairie’s proffered explanation. It, along with the evidence Richardson presented in making his prima facie case, would permit a trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. Therefore, summary judgment against Richardson’s discrimination claim was improper.

A prima facie Title VII sex discrimination claim can proceed when evidence exposes inconsistencies in the employer’s stated reasons for firing.

Keene v. Pine · filed 2012-05-15(a)

Each employee has clearly met the proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination “head on,” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1088, by demonstrating “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” that would permit findings of pretext and discrimination, Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Prine and the County on these claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make mistreatment based on personal jealousy actionable as sex discrimination without evidence of treatment because of sex.

Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corporation · filed 2012-08-20(a)(1)

The district court correctly found that personal animus, such as that allegedly exhibited by Keller, cannot be the basis of a discrimination claim under federal or Ohio law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex caused or motivated a termination; an isolated gendered insult, without evidence that the employer relied on sex, is insufficient.

Hazzard v. Express Services, Inc. · filed 2012-09-27(a)(1)

Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that Chapman actually relied on Hazzard’s gender in making his decision to lay off. The Court finds this one remark, without more, insufficient to suggest that Hazzard was terminated because of her sex or that her gender motivated such action.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, including pregnancy discrimination.

Quinlan v. Elysian Hotel Co. · filed 2013-01-04(a)

For the following reasons, Elysian’s motion is granted in part and denied in part: the Title VII claim survives, but the FMLA and harassment claims do not. ... Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

An employee’s replacement by someone of another sex, by itself, is insufficient to raise an inference of sex discrimination.

Hosick v. Chicago State University Board of Trustees · filed 2013-02-14(a)(1)

That one’s replacement is of another sex is not, by itself, sufficient to raise an inference of gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from terminating or refusing to promote an employee because of sex.

Allen v. Radio One of Texas II, L.L.C. · filed 2013-02-26(a)(1)

Discrimination under Title VII occurs if an employer, inter alia, terminates or fails to promote an employee based on a protected characteristic. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sex discrimination claim against an employer when an employee alleges that her job duties were limited because of her sex.

Maldonado-Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Police · filed 2013-03-05(a)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to bring a Title VII claim against PRPD. Plaintiff points to numerous instances in which her job duties were limited or taken away due to her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; to show that an employer’s stated reason is pretext, a plaintiff must present evidence that sex discrimination was the real reason.

Faircloth v. Herkel Investments, Inc. · filed 2013-03-25(a)(1)

The only evidence tending to show that sex discrimination was the real reason for his firing was that Thompson took over some of his duties as General Manager of the Warner Robins store. At best, this evidence constituted a scintilla, and was insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find that Herkel terminated Faircloth because of his sex.

A sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must plausibly allege an adverse employment action taken because of the plaintiff’s gender.

Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps · filed 2013-03-31(a)(1)

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint asserting sex discrimination must plausibly allege that the plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action taken on the basis of her gender.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in promotion; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, the employee must show that reason was pretextual.

Johnsqn v. City of Blaine · filed 2013-08-26

The Court applies the same analysis to both MHRA and Title VII claims. ... Plaintiff cannot show pretext. ... The Court grants summary judgment to the City on Johnson’s sex discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-plus discrimination claim without proof that the employer discriminated against all members of a sex; unequal treatment of a subgroup sharing another characteristic can suffice.

King v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2013-09-17(a)(1)

To succeed on a gender-plus claim, plaintiffs need not establish that their employer discriminated against the entire class of men or women; instead, they need only establish that their employer treated a subclass of men or women (those with the plus characteristic) differently from those without the plus characteristic.

A sex-plus claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer treated one sex less favorably than the other among employees who share the additional trait.

Rolfs v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2013-09-20(a)(1)

Here, Home Depot could only be liable if Rolfs were able to prove that Kelly treated women who were faithful to their spouses better than he treated men who were faithful.

A sex discrimination claim can survive dismissal when the alleged facts plausibly connect an employee’s discharge to sex or failure to conform to gender norms.

Hart v. Lew · filed 2013-09-23(a)(1)

Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of sex discrimination in employment that is plausible on its face. Her allegations allow the Court “to draw the reasonable inference” that she was discharged because of her sex, her status as a transsexual, and/or her failure to conform with gender norms.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its action, the employee must show that reason is pretextual.

Nathan v. Ohio State University · filed 2013-10-29(a)(1)

To show pretext, a plaintiff must show that the employer’s proffered reasons: (1) lack a basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s adverse action; or (3) are insufficient to motivate the employer’s adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on sex; harsh treatment alone is insufficient.

Pavao v. Town of Wallingford · filed 2014-01-09(a)(1)

Although the plaintiff undoubtedly has presented evidence that would support a finding of harsh treatment by her supervisor, no reasonable fact finder could conclude from the evidence in the record that adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff was based on her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit favoritism toward an employee because of a romantic relationship with a supervisor when the plaintiff was not treated differently because of sex.

Allessi v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision · filed 2014-04-22(a)(1)

Instead, Plaintiff argues that she was treated less favorably than another female corrections counselor who was in a romantic relationship with a supervisor. Disparate treatment caused by such a relationship, although unfair, does not fall within the purview of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment, but a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a jury could find that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Richardson v. American Security Programs, Inc. · filed 2014-07-25(a)(1)

Mr. Richardson does not point to evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that the nondiscriminatory reasons for removing him from the supervisory position were pretextual and the real reason was gender discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment on the claim of discrimination will be granted in favor of ASP.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-discrimination plaintiff to prove an adverse employment action caused by sex.

Williams v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 2014-08-28(a)(1)

Ms. Williams’s claim fails for two reasons. First, as discussed above, she failed to present any evidence showing she suffered an adverse employment action for any unlawful reason. Second, there is no evidence that things would have turned out any differently if she had been a man.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; the same legal standard applies to analogous claims under the DCHRA.

Craig v. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2014-11-24(a)(1)

Thus, because Sgt. Craig alleges the same facts and violations under both Title VII and the DCHRA, and because both statutes apply the same legal standard, the Court will analyze the claims against the District simultaneously.

Section 2000e-2(h) incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s wage discrimination defenses; salary negotiation cannot justify a pay difference if employees of both sexes cannot negotiate.

Thibodeaux-Woody v. Houston Community Col · filed 2014-11-14(h)

Title VII incorporates the same affirmative defenses as the EPA, including the “factors other than sex” defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171. ... If negotiation is not available to persons of both sexes, it cannot be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay differential.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a workplace wrong to occur because of the employee’s sex; an adverse action alone is insufficient.

Watts v. Lyon County Ambulance Service · filed 2015-01-20(a)(1)

In other words, a plaintiff who is subjected to some workplace impropriety cannot recover for that wrong under Title VII simply because he happens to have a gender; the impropriety must have been done to him “because of [his] . . . sex.”

Section 2000e-2 allows a sex discrimination claim based on termination to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about whether the employee was terminated because of sex.

Gipson v. Cochran · filed 2015-03-04(a)(1)

The Court finds that Gipson has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether she was terminated based on her sex. Accordingly, Sheriff Cochran’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to Gipson’s claim of sex discrimination based on her termination.

A sex discrimination claim based on a denied committee appointment can survive dismissal when the plaintiff alleges that she alone volunteered and the employer chose a male colleague who had not volunteered.

Gascard v. Franklin Pierce University · filed 2015-03-11(a)(1)

Gascard has likewise set forth a prima facie claim that she was denied the committee appointment on a account of her sex, through her allegations that she “was the sole volunteer” for the spot, but that it was “granted to a male colleague who had not volunteered” with the explanation that he “needed more committee work” (rather than any claim that Gascard was unqualified).

A pay difference between employees of different races does not establish a violation of § 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence that race caused the difference.

Knight v. Delaware Economic Development Office · filed 2015-03-19(a)(1)

En-nis and Richardson were either reclassified or promoted which resulted in an increase in salary. Despite the difference in salaries, there is no evidence of record that the difference is based upon the race of plaintiff or her comparators.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee lacks evidence that the employer’s stated reason for its decision was a pretext for discrimination.

Henrikson v. Town of East Greenwich ex rel. Raposa · filed 2015-03-23(a)(1)

On this record, there is simply a paucity of evidence to suggest that the Town’s and Union’s reliance on the contractual language of the CBA was a mere pretext for a more insidious attitude, or a sham rationale to hide unlawful discrimination. The interpretation of the CBA to allow the Town to impose the qualifications that Ms. Henrikson acknowledges she does not meet is not only a substantial and reasonable explanation for the failure to transfer her, it is a correct interpretation that accords with this Court’s own interpretation of the CBA.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-discrimination claim to be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when the plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discriminatory attitudes.

Andersen v. Mack Trucks, Inc. · filed 2015-07-30(a)(1)

Since Plaintiff has adduced no direct evidence showing conduct or statements reflecting discriminatory- attitude toward his gender, we will analyze Plaintiffs gender discrimination claims- using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim requires evidence that the employer acted because of the employee’s sex.

Harris v. Treasure Canyon Calcuim Co. · filed 2015-09-22(a)(1)

Harris has failed to satisfy her prima facie case and has put forth no evidence that her termination was motivated by her gender; as such, summary judgment as to both her Title VII and IHRA gender-based discrimination claims is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a gender discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of sex stereotyping raises a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for its decision was pretextual.

Tornabene v. Northwest Permanente, P.C. · filed 2015-12-28(a)

A genuine issue exists as to whether Permanente’s decision to not renew Tornabene’s contract was motivated by her gender. ... Perma-nente’s motion for summary judgment against Tornabene’s First and Second Claims, under ORS § 659A.030(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), respectively, is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated an employer’s decision to discharge an employee.

Vaughn v. Radio One of Indiana · filed 2015-12-30(a)(1)

However, no facts have been adduced that demonstrate that Radio One’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by Ms. Vaughn’s gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment and applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when a claim rests on circumstantial evidence.

Johnson v. Donahoe · filed 2016-03-02(a)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Because Johnson relies on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we analyze her sex-discrimination claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars covered employers from discriminating in the terms or conditions of employment because of sex.

Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-03-31(a)(1)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a covered employer may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

An employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for an adverse action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must offer probative evidence that the reason is false and sex discrimination was the real reason.

Schrock v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 2016-06-22(a)(1)

Ms. Schrock failed to offer any probative evidence that Publix’s reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason for her demotion and transfer.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a sex-plus claimant to allege that a corresponding subclass of men received more favorable treatment.

Frederick v. DHHS · filed 2016-08-16(a)

Given that precedent, Frederick’s allegations that she was treated differently from other lactating women – women whose children would drink breastmilk from bottles and who were allowed to pump in private – do not give rise to a Title VII claim. She has not alleged that her subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to a corresponding subclass of men.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment, and a claim may proceed when a reasonable jury could find that gender influenced a negative review and termination.

Tucker v. Johnson · filed 2016-09-30(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the court finds that there are factual disputes, if read in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because she is a woman.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence linking an adverse employment action to discrimination based on sex.

Hargett v. Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees · filed 2016-11-08(a)

There is absolutely no evidence that Har-gett’s sex played a role in her suspension. Consequently, summary judgment is awarded in FAU’s favor on Hargett’s Title VII sex discrimination count.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment; a disparate-impact claim requires identification of the specific employment practice causing the alleged disparity.

Robert C. Mills v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Shirley Starks, Kristen L. Sparks, Melanie Reising, and Elizabe · filed 2017-04-28(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual because of such individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Accordingly, we conclude that Mills has failed to prove disparate-treatment or disparate-impact discrimination, and DCS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mills’s sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment, and a termination claim fails when admitted facts establish that the conduct leading to termination was not based on sex.

Goodson v. Brennan · filed 2017-05-08(a)(1)

Similarly, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discipline any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). However, Plaintiff also admitted, by operation of law, and conclusively established, that “[t]he interactions between Mr. Roy Ray and Plaintiff between October 2006 and January 200[8] were not based on Plaintiff’s sex or gender.” As the district court held, “this admission alone effectively precludes . . . [P]laintiff from raising a [sex] discrimination claim based on her termination, since her termination was initiated by Mr. Ray.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex-based disparate-pay claim to proceed when the evidence could support a finding that comparable male employees received higher pay.

Reid v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2017-04-07(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. no. 34] only on Burns’s claim that she received lower pay while working as an associate and while in the MIT program due to her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and a claim can proceed when alleged adverse actions and more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee of another sex make discrimination plausible.

Pizarro-Correa v. Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Department · filed 2017-07-31(a)

In relevant part, Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Pizarro’s gender discrimination claim against Hacienda and the Commonwealth.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination were pretextual.

Rollins v. Cone Distributing, Inc. · filed 2017-09-28(a)(1)

Rollins did not demonstrate that Cone’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual, so we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation; when an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for a pay disparity, the employee must prove that reason is pretextual.

Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human S · filed 2017-11-30(a)(1)

If the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the pay discrepancy, the plaintiff must prove that the em- ployer’s justification was pretext for a decision made on pro- hibited criteria (here, sex).

Section 2000e-2(m) allows a sex-plus discrimination claim when sex is a motivating factor, without requiring an opposite-sex comparator.

Franchina v. Providence Fire Department · filed 2018-01-25(m)

Title VII requires no such proof. The text bars discrimination when sex is "a motivating factor," not "the motivating factor."

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from suspending an employee because of her sex.

Gosbin v. Comm'rs · filed 2018-02-23(a)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action, such as a suspension, against an employee because of her sex.

Unsupported hearsay about male coworkers’ pay did not establish a sex-based pay disparity under Title VII.

Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc. · filed 2018-08-01(a)(1)

In light of Medina's proffered facts, Rivera needed to provide a direct factual basis for doubting or calling into question the salaries listed on the federal W-2s and summary chart. And the fact that Rivera may have heard someone utter that the men made $800 a week doesn't cut it.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based differences in compensation, and an unequal pay claim under Title VII requires discriminatory intent.

Heise v. Canon Solutions America, Inc. · filed 2018-07-23(a)(1)

In this context, however, in the absence of a similarly compelling explanation for the pay disparities, a reasonable factfinder viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Heise could infer that Canon intentionally paid Heise less than several of the male regional managers because she is a woman. The Court therefore denies Canon's motion for summary judgment on Heise's Title VII unequal pay claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from treating an employee differently because of the employee's sex.

Maner v. Dignity Health · filed 2018-10-10(a)

An employer violates Title VII when it subjects an employee to disparate treatment because of the employee's sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated the challenged employment action; an alleged bias unconnected to that action does not establish a discrimination claim.

Terry v. G4S Secure Solutions (Usa) Inc. · filed 2019-02-13(a)(1)

The inquiry thus centers on whether the record contains sufficient evidence to lead to an inference of discrimination based on Terry's sex. As explained above, nothing shows that Parker's alleged discriminatory bias motivated Terry's removal from her post.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, but a plaintiff must show that sex caused an adverse employment action.

Hubers v. Gannett Co., Inc. · filed 2019-03-11(a)(1)

The record thus does not support a conclusion that any adverse action was taken against Hubers because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on sex; documented billing errors and insubordination supported a nondiscriminatory termination.

Eggers v. Saturn Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-03-28(a)(1)

There is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Saturn discriminated against Eggers because of her age or sex under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes discrimination because of pregnancy a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Parish v. Upmc Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh · filed 2019-04-10(a)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") is an amendment to Title VII stating that "[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) sex-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Sabo v. Altoona · filed 2019-04-26(a)(1)

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII sex-discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and a Title VII unequal pay claim requires a suitable comparator or evidence connecting pay differences to sex.

Gagliardi v. Sacred Heart University · filed 2019-07-16(a)(1)

As noted above, however, Mr. Gagliardi has not offered a suitable comparator coach or demonstrated that Sacred Heart’s athletics allocations were directed at him on the basis of his gender. His Title VII unequal pay claim thus fails for lack of a prima facie case for the reasons discussed above.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover adverse treatment driven by personal jealousy rather than the employee’s sex.

Thacker v. GPS Insight LLC · filed 2019-08-14(a)

The alleged basis for the conflict is Donat’s alleged ... jealousy of Lisson’s relationship with Plaintiff, not that Plaintiff was a male dating a ... female.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sex-discrimination complaint to allege an adverse employment action and facts supporting an inference of sex discrimination.

Peniska v. Cj Foods Inc. · filed 2019-08-19(a)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a sex-discrimination claim upon which relief may be granted, and Plaintiff will be given leave to amend her Complaint in order to state such a claim, provided that truthful facts exist to support it.

A gender discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the plaintiff alleges no facts showing discrimination because of gender.

Chavez v. State of New Mexico · filed 2019-08-27(a)(1)

The Court dismisses Plaintiff's gender discrimination claims for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff does not allege any facts that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating because of sex in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Mooney v. New York City Department of Sanitation · filed 2019-09-13(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To summarize: (1) Mooney offers no evidence other than her speculation about the reasons that she was replaced by a male XO; (2) there is no evidence that the switch in Mooney’s storage rooms was due to her sex; and (3) there is no evidence that plaintiff was not asked to work overtime on February 14, 2017 because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible connection between the alleged adverse treatment and the plaintiff’s sex.

Lucio v. Fern at Tenth LLC · filed 2019-10-08(a)(1)

There is nothing in the record to suggest that Defendant Vackar or Del Barrio, as an employee of Defendant Bert Ogden, harassed, abused, threatened, made false allegations against, or constructively discharged Plaintiff because Plaintiff is a male.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a sex discrimination claim when pleaded facts plausibly show that an employee received lower pay or was demoted because of her sex.

Winn v. Cleburne Independent School District · filed 2020-01-02(a)(1)

Taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Winn, the Court finds she has sufficiently pleaded a plausible claim for disparate treatment discrimination, specifically alleging facts showing she has suffered adverse employment actions because of her membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was because of the employee’s sex.

Valluzzi v. Azar · filed 2020-01-10(a)(1)

But nothing in the record supports that any such adverse action was on account of Valluzzi’s gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment; a claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Iverson v. DECO Products Company, LLLP · filed 2020-01-22(a)(1)

This evidence is insufficient to establish that the proffered reason for terminating Iverson—that a second woman complained he engaged in sexual harassment—was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence linking an adverse employment action to sex; a remark about an earlier hiring decision does not establish discriminatory firing.

Williams v. H & H Auto Parts, LLC · filed 2020-01-30(a)(1)

Zane’s alleged single remark nearly a year earlier which he made to explain his hiring decision, not his firing decision, does not constitute gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-discrimination plaintiff to plead facts plausibly connecting sex to an adverse employment action.

Warmington v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, The · filed 2020-04-21(a)(1)

Warmington has not alleged facts plausibly permitting an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege an adverse employment action motivated at least in part by sex.

Cox v. Huntington Museum of Art, Inc. · filed 2020-04-23(a)(1)

To survive the Motion to Dismiss, Cox must plausibly allege the Museum took an adverse employment action against her because of her sex and the motive to discriminate was at least one of the Museum’s motives.

A sex discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence would allow a reasonable factfinder to find that the employer discriminated on the basis of sex.

Merritts v. Department of Corrections, SCI Houtzdale · filed 2020-06-12(a)(1)

Accordingly, because there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable finder of fact to find that Defendants discriminated against Merritts on the basis of sex, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that claim.

A male employee plausibly alleges sex discrimination when female coworkers were spared discipline for conduct that led to his firing.

Walker v. Answer Topeka, Inc. · filed 2020-07-21(a)(1)

As a result, the Court concludes that Walker has adequately made a prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII. Accordingly, this claim will not be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation, and disputed facts about employees’ duties can preclude summary judgment on a pay discrimination claim.

Dunn v. Apache Industrial Services, Inc. · filed 2020-08-12(a)(1)

Title VII states that it is unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual's sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). ... Accordingly, summary judgment is not proper at this juncture.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in compensation; an employee challenging a pay disparity must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Coles v. Johnny Appleseed Broadcasting Company · filed 2020-08-18(a)(1)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to carry her burden at the pretext stage and that the Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s compensation rate are supported by facts that sufficiently justify the modest differences in pay between Plaintiff, Mahoney, and Clark.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination claim to plausibly allege that an employer took adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Ally v. Chipotle Mexican Grill · filed 2020-08-21(a)(1)

Ally does not allege that he is a member of a protected class, or that Chipotle took any adverse employment action against him on the basis of his sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex.

Wensel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2002-08-07(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual, with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits adverse employment action based on an employee’s sex together with another characteristic, but does not prohibit discrimination based on that other characteristic alone.

Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC · filed 2020-08-28(a)(1)

Sex-plus discrimination occurs when an employer takes adverse action against an employee because of both the employee’s sex and another immutable characteristic, though neither statute prohibits discrimination based on the additional characteristic alone.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, including disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims.

Gonzalez v. Glendale, City of · filed 2020-09-03(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... As discussed below, each claim fails.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits sex discrimination claims based on sexual orientation or gender stereotype nonconformity.

Sarco v. 5 Star Financial, LLC · filed 2020-09-11(a)(1)

Applying Bostock to Satco’s case, this court rejects AFBA’s argument that Title VII does not covert sexual orientation and will permit Sarco to proceed with his sex disctimination claim under both theories of liability: (1) gender stereotype nonconformity discrimination and (2) sexual orientation discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits adverse employment action based on an employee’s sex together with another characteristic, but does not prohibit discrimination based on that other characteristic alone.

Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC · filed 2020-10-14(a)(1)

Sex-plus discrimination occurs when an employer takes adverse action against an employee because of both the employee’s sex and another immutable characteristic, though neither statute prohibits discrimination based on the additional characteristic alone.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex.

Lebel v. Insight Securities, Inc. · filed 2020-11-17(a)

Employers violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when they discriminate against their employees on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Evidence that similarly situated men received more favorable treatment can create a triable issue of sex discrimination in employment.

Beardsley v. Oracle Corporation · filed 2020-12-16(a)

Viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, the evidence creates a material issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s gender played a role in OFSS’s decision to terminate her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a claim based on circumstantial evidence cannot survive summary judgment without a genuine factual dispute about discrimination.

Wright v. Portercare Adventist Health System · filed 2021-01-13(a)

She has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the critical issue in this case: whether Centura engaged in unlawful discrimination and retaliation based on Wright’s gender. For the following reasons, the Court concludes it did not.