42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A disparate impact claim requires plausible facts showing that a specific employment practice causes a significant disparity for a protected group. A survey that does not compare termination rates across racial groups cannot establish that disparity.

Liu v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2024-06-24(k)(1)(A)(i)

Because these allegations, taken together, do not support a plausible inference that there is a significant racially disparate impact in driver termination rates that is causally linked to Uber’s use of customer ratings in making termination decisions, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Liu’s disparate impact claims.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that each challenged employment practice caused an adverse impact, unless the practices cannot be separated for analysis.

Taylor v. Ingham Cnty. Cir. Ct. · filed 2024-06-27(k)(1)(B)(i)

And even if the use of an all-white panel qualified here as a specific employment practice to be challenged, Taylor offers no relevant statistical analysis to support her argument that this challenged practice has had an adverse impact on African Americans.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1) requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to plausibly allege that a specific employment practice causes a disparity affecting a protected group.

Muslim v. Sagamore Children's Psychiatric Center · filed 2024-07-15(k)(1)

Plaintiff fails to assert even the most rudimentary statistical analysis, (see Compl. ¶¶ 43, 44), and thereby fails to state a plausible disparate-impact claim.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to allege facts showing that an employment practice adversely affects a protected group, rather than only the plaintiff.

Ashcroft v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group · filed 2024-10-02(k)

Indeed, Plaintiff only alleges that she herself was terminated and does not allege any facts that people outside of her unspecified protected group were treated differently. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Claims 3 and 6.

A religious disparate impact claim must identify an affected faith or religious subgroup; people who share only a religious objection to vaccination do not form a protected group.

Boltz v. PeaceHealth · filed 2025-02-19(k)(1)(A)(i)

A group of individuals who hold any religious-based objection to the vaccine, as Plaintiff alleges, is not a protected group under Title VII.

A national-origin disparate-impact claim must plausibly allege that an employment practice significantly affects a protected group; when the impact is not obvious, basic statistical allegations may be needed.

Hamdard v. Swift Transportation Company of Arizona LLC · filed 2025-03-14(k)(1)(A)(i)

And without basic statistical allegations regarding the impact of the policy on the class, there is no plausible inference that Swift’s policy has a disparate impact on applicants of non-U.S. national origin.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that a specific employment practice caused a significant racial disparity.

Loiseau v. Bozzuto's Inc · filed 2025-08-08(k)(1)(A)(i)

In order to state a prima facie case of disparate impact for these policies, the plaintiffs have the make a threshold showing that the performance review practices led to statistically significant differences in the pay of black employees, and that the Bid Policy disproportionately concentrated black employees in lower paying jobs. Both of these questions deal with generalized, not individual, proof.

In a disparate impact claim, the employer must show that a challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.

Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the CA State Controller · filed 2025-08-29(k)(1)(A)(i)

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

A disparate impact hiring claim requires evidence that a specific employment practice excludes applicants because they belong to a protected group.

Davis · filed 2025-10-20(k)

Furthermore, Plaintiff offers no statistical evidence showing that St. Andrews consideration of an applicant’s arrest record has the effect of denying members of a protected class equal access to employment opportunities. As such, the allegations of the Complaint are insufficient to state a disparate treatment or a disparate impact claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not preclude employment discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Ruth JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1971-10-12

The trial court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 pre-empted the discrimination in employment field and because states and their political subdivisions are specifically excluded from coverage under such Act that these defendants cannot be required to answer in court for any alleged discrimination in employment. ... We hold, therefore, that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not preclude an action for discrimination in employment based upon §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Employment rights created by § 2000e-2 cannot be enforced through § 1983.

Hervey v. City of Little Rock · filed 1986-03-31

We do not feel, however, that the employment rights created by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, can be enforced through § 1983.

Section 2000e-2’s employment discrimination rights cannot be enforced through Section 1983 to bypass Title VII’s time limits.

Hervey v. City of Little Rock · filed 1986-05-22

We do not feel, however, that the employment rights created by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2, can be enforced through Sec. 1983. ... We therefore hold that Robinson cannot enforce her time-barred Title VII sex discrimination claim through Sec. 1983.

Section 2000e-2(a)’s employment discrimination rights cannot, standing alone, be enforced through § 1983.

Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission · filed 2017-08-30(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that Williams may not seek damages against Retort and Stalczynski under § 1983 for statutory violations of either Title VII or the ADA, standing alone.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits unlawful employment practices by employment agencies as well as employers.

McDonald v. General Mills, Inc. · filed 1974-12-05(b)

Defendants may properly wish to join Sacramento State as a party defendant to avoid inconsistent relief or sole responsibility; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 proscribes not only unlawful employment practices by employers, but also by employment agencies.

Section 2000e-2(b) does not cover an employment agency’s denial of unemployment benefits unless the denial affects its referral activities.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1092, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,203 Mary Vick, Cross-Appellee v. Texas Employment Commission, Cross · filed 1975-06-12(b)

We would do so only if such denial influenced or were included in TEC's referral activities, and we think it is not. First, there is no hint in the relevant statutory language that denial of benefits is covered.

An employment agency sued over its treatment of its own employee in its capacity as an employer must meet Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-09-19(b)

Under Schattman and the plain language of title VII, Greenlees must be considered to be suing Eidenmuller in its capacity as an employer, not as an employment agency. Thus, the district court was correct in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits discrimination by employment agencies, including a civil service office that controls access to jobs through eligibility lists.

Scaglione v. Chappaqua Central School District · filed 2002-07-11(b)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employment agency to “fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). ... Following the line of reasoning established in Sibley and Spirt, WCPO would qualify as an “employment agency” pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits employment agencies from discriminating in referrals on the basis of sex; an agency’s role in procuring workers matters regardless of the label it uses.

Olvera-Morales v. International Labor Management Corp. · filed 2007-11-07(b)

Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). “The term ‘employment agency’ means any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to proeure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). Regardless of the label attached to Defendants’ role in the recruitment process, it is evident that they regularly procured temporary foreign workers for employers.

Section 2000e-2(b) applies the usual discrimination burden-shifting framework to religious-discrimination claims against employment agencies.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kelly Services, Inc. · filed 2010-03-25(b)

We see no reason to vary from this burden-shifting scheme simply because the claim is against an employment agency instead of an employer.

Section 2000e-2(b) applies to an employment agency only if the person for whom it procures work is an employee of the entity receiving that work.

Girard v. International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Inc. · filed 2021-01-22(b)

Under this theory, Girard must plausibly plead an employer-employee relationship with the schools for defendants to have acted as employment agencies.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a ministerial employee’s sexual harassment claim against a religious employer when the employer disavows the conduct and the claim does not challenge its choice of ministers.

Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus · filed 1999-12-01(a)

Because Title VII applies without a constitutionally compelled exception where, as here, the defendant church is neither exercising its constitutionally protected prerogative to choose its ministers nor embracing the behavior at issue as a constitutionally protected religious practice, we find that plaintiff Bollard has stated a claim sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not regulate a church’s employment relationship with its minister, including the minister’s compensation, assignments, and duties.

Mrs. Billie B. McCLURE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the SALVATION ARMY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-04-26(a)

We therefore hold that Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister.

Section 2000e-2’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to religious institutions’ employment of ministers; any ministerial exception comes from the Constitution.

Petruska v. Univ · filed 2006-05-24(a)(1)

The plain language of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to the employment of ministers by religious institutions.

Section 2000e-2 applies to sex discrimination by religious institutions; its religious preference exemption does not exempt sex discrimination.

Petruska v. Gannon University · filed 2006-09-06

Accordingly, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended Title VII to apply to cases involving sexual discrimination and retaliation by religious institutions.

A Title VII discrimination claim can survive summary judgment if the plaintiff shows a genuine factual dispute under either the mixed-motive or pretext theory.

Akpan v. Holy Cross Health, Inc. · filed 2025-09-10(a)(1)

Ultimately, in order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff “need only present a genuine issue of material fact as to one liability theory” (mixed motive or McDonnell Douglas), and a court need not decide whether a plaintiff’s discrimination claims would similarly survive under the alternative analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a protected characteristic caused an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Rafati v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois · filed 2025-08-25(a)(1)

Rafati’s discrimination claim would have survived summary judgment if “the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude” that his race, sex, religion, or national origin caused the adverse employment action that he experienced.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for an employment decision, a Title VII discrimination plaintiff must produce evidence that the reason was pretextual or that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor.

Searcy v. TTEC Services Corporation · filed 2025-04-21(a)(1)

Because TTEC has met its burden of production, the burden now shifts back to Searcy to produce evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to find, for her age discrimination claim, that her age was the but-for cause for her termination, and, for her Title VII claim, either that TTEC’s proffered reason was pretextual or that a “motivating factor” for Searcy’s termination was her race, sex/gender, or national origin. Searcy has failed to meet this burden.

A plaintiff challenging a termination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must offer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a protected trait caused the termination.

Wilkes v. Faurecia Emissions Control Technologies USA, LLC · filed 2025-04-17(a)(1)

In sum, the critical question at summary judgment is whether the plaintiff has produced enough evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race or other proscribed factor caused the adverse employment action. ... The answer to that question is easy, Wilkes has not met his burden with the showing presented here. Summary judgment should thus be granted in Faurecia’s favor on both his race and gender discrimination claims under Title VII.

An employer can rebut a prima facie discrimination case by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse actions.

Rodriguez v. Arapahoe County Sheriff Tyler S. Brown · filed 2021-03-08(a)(1)

As to the latter issue, the Court finds that Defendant has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse actions.

Race discrimination violates Title VII when race is a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Ortiz v. Hempstead Union Free School District · filed 2021-03-01(m)

Having reviewed the record de novo, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to submit admissible evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Plaintiff’s race was at least one of the motivating factors in his termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; a claim fails when the evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find that either trait caused the adverse action.

Igasaki v. IDFPR · filed 2021-02-17(a)(1)

No reasonable jury could have found that the Department discriminated against Igasaki based on his race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference that an adverse employment action was based on sex.

BRANDT v. THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC. · filed 2020-02-26(a)(1)

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Brandt has not produced evidence sufficient to show that her termination occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an adverse employment action occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of sex discrimination.

FRITZ v. UWCHLAN AMBULANCE CORPS, INC., INC. · filed 2020-03-04(a)

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth element of her gender discrimination claim, and summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant with respect to this claim.

A Title VII sex discrimination claimant must offer evidence that the employer acted because of the claimant’s sex.

Walczak v. Pratt & Whitney · filed 2020-02-21(a)(1)

Mr. Walczak has failed to establish a prima facie case because he failed to provide evidence that Pratt & Whitney fired him because of his gender, i.e., because he is a man.

A Title VII plaintiff may defeat summary judgment with evidence of discriminatory motive without using the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Lalau v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2013-03-28(a)

But Lalau eschews the McDonnell Douglas framework and opts to go directly to producing evidence that the City likely acted for a discriminatory reason. Lalau’s approach is clearly permitted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that an employer’s adverse treatment was motivated by sex.

Cifra v. General Electric Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation, as Its Successor · filed 2001-06-07(a)(1)

And equally plainly, once the court found that Cifra had failed to persuade it that her treatment was the result of a discriminatory motive, the gender discrimination claim could not be sustained.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) is not violated when an employer treats employees differently because of a mistaken belief in a race-neutral reason.

Richard S. Silvera, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Orange County School Board, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 2001-03-30(a)(1)

Even if we believed, as the district court did, that the Board was not bound by an old agreement with Ritter, that would only establish the Board was mistaken, and an employer who treats two employees differently because of a mistaken belief in the existence of a neutral reason does not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a hiring discrimination claim to reach a jury when the evidence taken together could show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Board of Education, Body Corporate Cromwell Board of Education Body Corporate · filed 2001-03-15(a)(1)

A combination of factors, any of which judged on their own would be much less compelling, provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Cromwell’s explanation for failing to hire Byrnie was a pretext for impermissible discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason to produce evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Evans v. The City of Houston · filed 2001-03-21(a)

... we find that Evans has produced no substantial evidence to support her contention that the City’s legitimate nondiscriminatory justification5 for her demotion was, in fact, a pretext for racial or age discrimination.

Comparative qualifications and statistical evidence can show pretext sufficient to defeat summary judgment on a discriminatory failure-to-promote claim.

Bell, Karen v. EPA · filed 2000-11-06(a)(1)

However, we find that plaintiffs’ comparative qualifications and their statistical evidence preclude summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows statistics about broader employment patterns to help show pretext in an individual discrimination claim, even when they cannot establish a systemic discrimination claim.

Karen Bell, Lolita Hill, Farro Assadi, and Christina Prasinos v. Environmental Protection Agency and Carol M. Browner, i · filed 2000-11-06(a)(1)

Although the statistics in this case may be too broad to support a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, they can be admitted as probative evidence indicating pretext.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when a prima facie case and evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false allow a jury to infer discrimination.

Sobba v. Pratt Community College & Area Vocational School · filed 2000-08-22(a)(1)

In sum, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s proffered reason for rescinding its offer of the tennis coaching position was a pretext. ... Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment insofar as plaintiff claims that the failure to rehire her for the tennis coach position was motivated by unlawful sex discrimination.

A plaintiff bringing a Title VII national origin disparate treatment claim must produce evidence that the employer's stated reason was pretextual and that the true reason was discriminatory animus to survive summary judgment.

De La Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club · filed 2000-07-28(a)(1)

It is the settled law of this circuit that to survive a motion for summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence that: (1) the employer's articulated reason for laying off the plaintiff is a pretext; and (2) the true reason is discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a jury could find that an employer's stated reason for an adverse employment decision was pretext for race discrimination.

Ellis v. Blood Systems, Incorporated, Doing Business as United Blood Services · filed 1996-06-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, Ellis has not presented any evidence from which a trier of fact could rationally conclude that UBS's reason for not promoting her to a CRR position was pretextual. ... Accordingly, Ellis has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Anania and Peasley fired her due to her race rather than an honest belief that she made repeated, harassing telephone calls to Hansen.

After a sex discrimination claim is tried, the plaintiff must prove that discrimination motivated her termination.

Diana TURGEON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PREMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-06-25

After a discrimination claim is tried on the merits, we go directly to the question of whether a plaintiff has carried her burden of proof that the reason for her termination was discriminatory.

A discriminatory discharge claim requires evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination based on race or national origin.

Avril v. Village South Inc. · filed 1996-05-23(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the stated reason for the discharge was simply a pretext and was actually the result of intentional discrimination based on her race or national origin.

A religious discrimination claim does not shift the burden of persuasion to the employer without direct evidence connecting discriminatory intent to the hiring decision.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wiltel, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(a)(1)

No direct evidence was presented by EEOC and Jordan that Smith’s determination that Jordan was not qualified for the position of carrier customer service representative was influenced by a discriminatory intent. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that WilTel had the burden of persuading the court that Jordan was not qualified, and that rejection of her application was not based on her evangelical Christian views.

An employee’s belief, conjecture, or speculation about an employer’s motive does not establish direct evidence of race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a).

Marthel v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. · filed 1996-04-22(a)

The incident described by the plaintiff in this case simply does not constitute direct proof of racial discrimination. The plaintiff's race was not directly or indirectly mentioned by Mr. Davenport when he left instructions to send the plaintiff home if he was caught sleeping. Although the plaintiff may truly believe that Mr. Davenport's conduct in this regard was motivated by racial discrimination, a plaintiff's personal beliefs, conjecture and speculation as to the defendant's motivation are not competent evidence to withstand summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race-based discipline, and an employee challenging a dismissal must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1996-02-28(a)(1)

I, therefore, hold Lisek has not satisfied his burden by persuading me that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dismissing him as articulated by NW were a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires a claimant challenging an employer’s stated reason for dismissal to show that the reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate.

Parks v. Piedmont Tech. Center · filed 1996-02-12

The claimant must show both that the employer's proffered reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate against him by taking the challenged action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race discrimination in hiring; under the indirect method of proof, an employee must show that the employer's stated reason was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason.

Balele v. Klauser · filed 1996-02-08(a)(1)

If defendant meets the burden, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case drops out of the picture, Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, and plaintiff must go on to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual and that the real reason for the adverse action was based on discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the plaintiff challenges some reasons for termination but leaves an independently sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason unrebutted.

Tipsword v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc. · filed 1996-01-29(a)(1)

This is because 0 & M has offered three reasons for including Tips-word in the December 1993 RIF, and the plaintiff has lodged credible attacks on only two. So long as at least one of the reasons goes unchallenged — and that reason standing alone would have been sufficient to justify the termination — the fact that Tipsword raises genuine factual issues with regard to the other reasons is of no import.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee challenging an employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for termination to raise a genuine issue of pretext to avoid summary judgment.

Hanson v. Heckler Manufacturing and Investment Group, Inc., and Barbara Shindler · filed 1996-01-24

The district court properly granted summary judgment against Hanson's Title VII and FEHA claims because Hanson failed to establish a genuine issue of whether Heckler's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires a claimant challenging an employer's stated reason for dismissal to show that the reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate.

Seyvelle Parks v. Piedmont Technical College · filed 1996-01-31

Further, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Parks's Title VII claim because he failed to show that Piedmont intentionally discriminated against him. ... The claimant must show both that the employer's proffered reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate against him by taking the challenged action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex motivated the challenged employment decision.

Gastineau v. Home Depot Usa, Inc., an Ohio Corporation, Beth Burzloff, a Single Woman · filed 1996-01-18(a)(1)

Because Gastineau failed to show evidence that his termination was motivated by his gender, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a claimant alleging disparate treatment to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination; an employer may also prevail by adequately justifying the challenged practices.

Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan · filed 1981-01-21(a)(1)

Because Ali failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and alternatively because the Bank adequately justified the practices complained of, the Bank is entitled to the judgment previously entered dismissing the action.

A claim that an employer took discrete adverse actions against an employee because of sex is analyzed as disparate treatment.

Kralowec v. Prince George's County, Md. · filed 1980-11-17(a)(1)

Therefore, this Court concludes that plaintiff here did not advance a case under the disparate impact theory and the Court will analyze plaintiff’s claims under the case law governing the disparate treatment approach.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows statistical evidence of racial disparities, corroborated by subjective hiring and promotion practices, to establish employment discrimination.

Marvin W. BROWN, Appellant, v. GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1972-05-22(a)

In sum, the lack of objective guidelines for hiring and promotion and the failure to post notices of job vacancies are badges of discrimination that serve to corroborate, not to rebut, the racial bias pictured by the statistical pattern of the company's work force.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination with statistics showing a significant racial imbalance, which defendants must then rebut.

Dozier v. Chupka · filed 1975-04-16(a)

However, plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case by use of statistics which reveal a significant racial imbalance. Then the defendants must rebut the presumption that the racial imbalance is a result of discriminatory practices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of discriminatory results before subjective disciplinary standards can establish race discrimination.

Harrell ALEXANDER, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARDNER-DENVER COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-07-02(a)(1)

Thus, before we can condemn the subjectivity of the standards applied by the foreman (the trial court found those standards to be subjective), we must determine that discriminatory results occurred.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based hiring decisions; an employer’s different treatment of strikers does not establish discriminatory pretext when workers of both races received the same amnesty.

Percy H. GREEN, Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1976-01-28(a)(1)

We think appellant's attempt to compare the lack of discipline of striking employees in the nonracial labor strikes of 1965, 1967 and 1972 with appellant’s unlawful “stall-in” activities is without merit for several reasons. First, the evidence reveals that the labor strikes were participated in by both black and white employees. No preferential treatment was shown whites in defendant’s decision not to discipline striking employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires proof that an employer discriminated because of sex or maintained a pattern or practice of sex discrimination.

Walker v. Columbia University · filed 1976-02-11(a)

Given the foregoing, I am unable to conclude that any individual plaintiff has demonstrated by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence either discrimination as to that plaintiff by reason of sex or any pattern or practice at Columbia of discriminating against women generally.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment conditions and privileges; replacing female employees with men does not alone establish discrimination.

Brown v. American Enka Corp. · filed 1976-10-07(a)(1)

With the state of the proof in this posture, this Court cannot, and does not, draw the inference that the elimination of the female plaintiffs as cakewrappers from the employ of the defendant and their replacement by male cakewrappers constituted a discrimination against the plaintiffs with respect to the conditions and privileges of their respective former employments because of the sex of the plaintiffs. It appears further to the Court that the defendant’s personnel adopted and sought with becoming diligence to implement the only reasonable alternatives to the allocation of its cakewrapping which was having an adverse impact, because of their sex, on the employment opportunities of the plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in discharge, compensation, or other terms of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving it.

Jawa v. Fayetteville State University · filed 1976-12-21(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proving that defendants, or either of them, as employer, or agent of an employer, discharged or otherwise discriminated against plaintiff with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some difference in treatment between men and women to establish sex discrimination.

Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-01-03(a)(1)

We decline to follow this dicta and reiterate the necessity of indicating some dissimilarity in treatment between the sexes before an allegation of sex discrimination can be upheld.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires proof of sex discrimination; irregular promotion procedures alone do not establish it.

Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n · filed 1977-01-11(a)

Allegations of irregular promotion practices violative of HCCAA Guidebook procedures in the selection of Jones do not automatically translate into a showing of unlawful sex discrimination.

Sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some difference in treatment between men and women; a marriage rule applied to an all-female group of flight attendants does not establish it.

Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-02-23(a)(1)

We decline to follow this dicta and reiterate the necessity of indicating some dissimilarity in treatment between the sexes before an allegation of sex discrimination can be upheld.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sex discrimination to be based on the employee’s sex, rather than the sex of the people the employee serves.

Jackson v. Armstrong School District · filed 1977-04-12(a)(1)

It is clear from the statute that the sex of the claimants must be the basis of the discriminatory conduct.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a pay disparity alone does not establish a violation without proof of discrimination.

Cayce v. Adams · filed 1977-10-21

Plaintiff also alleges a Title VII violation for a period' before August 27, 1975, coincident with and predating the Equal Pay Act claim. The proof does not support this earlier violation. There was no pattern of sex discrimination in the unit.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discrimination because of race; failures to follow hiring procedures alone do not establish a violation.

Alexander v. Northern Arizona Council of Governments · filed 1978-03-31(a)(1)

Thus to prevail in this action plaintiff must establish discrimination because of race rather than mere violations of appropriate bureaucratic procedure. ... The Court is unable to conclude that plaintiff’s first allegation, regarding denial of an interview, amounts to racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an employer discriminated because of race before a court may grant relief.

Wiggins v. Spector Freight System · filed 1978-09-06(a)(1)

That statute is aimed only at discriminatory practices, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company, 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970), Aff'd, 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971), and, before granting the plaintiffs and class members any relief, the Court must have found by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer discriminated against the aforementioned plaintiffs and Mr. Edward McKinney on account of their race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discrimination because of sex; shortcomings in a hiring process alone do not establish it.

Flucker v. Fox Chapel Area School District · filed 1978-12-18(a)(1)

Thus to prevail in this action plaintiff must establish discrimination because of sex rather than mere shortcomings with respect to accepted academic practice.

Racially disparate hiring statistics, unvalidated employment tests, and subjective interviews can establish a Title VII employment discrimination violation.

Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, Inc. v. City of Louisville · filed 1979-09-18

When, with these statistics, there is considered the failure of the defendants to validate the tests which were used in 1972 and 1973, and the subjective nature of the oral interviews, the violation of Title VII during those years is clear and convincing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and a plaintiff must prove that sex influenced the employer’s actions.

Meehan v. New England School of Law · filed 1981-09-11(a)(1)

However, I find that Meehan has failed to demonstrate that her sex influenced the defendants and was in any respect a basis for their actions. Therefore, Meehan has not proved that the defendants violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s stated hiring reasons were pretexts for sex discrimination.

Lamb v. Rantoul · filed 1981-12-03

Considering all the evidence, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons articulated by the defendants for her not being given a permanent faculty appointment and for her not being considered for post-1972 regular faculty openings were pretexts for sex discrimination. Under McDonnell and Texas Department, her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 must fail.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to defend a discrimination claim with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal when the employee fails to prove that reason is a pretext.

Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n · filed 1982-02-09

Therefore this Court concludes that the defendant YWCA dismissed plaintiff from employment solely on the basis of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. As to the final burden on the plaintiff to show that defendant’s reasons were merely a pretext to disguise an otherwise discriminatory intent, this Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to make the required showing.

In a sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), plaintiffs must first show different treatment because of sex; the employer may then offer a legitimate business purpose, which plaintiffs may show is pretextual.

Thompson v. Sawyer · filed 1982-04-27(a)(1)

First, the plaintiffs must prove a prima facie case: that they were treated differently because of their sex. If they succeed, the responsibility shifts to defendants to come forth with evidence that the practice had a legitimate business purpose. Finally, the plaintiffs have the opportunity to show that defendant’s asserted purpose was pretextual.

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim requires proof that the employer treated the employee differently because of sex.

Briggs v. City of Madison · filed 1982-05-07

As in any employment discrimination suit brought pursuant to Title VII, plaintiffs must show that they have been subjected to differential treatment by their employer for an illegal reason; in this instance, their sex.

A discharged employee who was not replaced must show that a retained male employee engaged in nearly identical misconduct to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Davin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1982-06-14(a)

As to the fourth, Davin failed to prove that she was replaced; her burden, therefore, was to establish that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom Delta retained. ... With these findings, which are well supported by the record, the court was authorized to conclude that Davin had not shown disparate treatment at the hands of Delta and therefore had failed to prove a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

A plaintiff bringing an individual disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) must prove intentional discrimination.

Johnson v. Michigan State University · filed 1982-08-20(a)

As stated above, plaintiff’s case was pleaded and tried under a theory of disparate treatment. Simply stated, she contends that she suffered administrative indignity and was not given tenure because she was a black female. Under this theory, plaintiff is obligated to prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a link between an employer’s use of subjective employment criteria and disparate treatment.

Mateen v. Connecticut Transit · filed 1982-10-05(a)(1)

The absence of a link between management’s use of subjective criteria and disparate treatment is fatal to plaintiff’s case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars adverse employment treatment motivated by race; an employee claiming disparate treatment must show that the employer’s stated lawful reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Duggar v. Thomas · filed 1982-10-29(a)(1)

There is simply no evidence to indicate that the employer’s motivation was, even in some part, racial. Neither demonstrating selective enforcement nor disparate treatment nor any dissimilar treatment in employment, Ms. Duggar’s claim of discrimination based on race is wholly lacking in merit and demands judgment for defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging classwide disparate treatment of women to establish a pattern or practice of gender-based discrimination and discriminatory motivation.

Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff · filed 1983-08-08(a)

While such practices are expressly prohibited by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b), the class aspect of this suit was brought for discriminatory treatment of female employees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The plaintiff claiming disparate treatment of women as a class must establish a pattern and practice of gender-based discrimination by the employer, and must also establish discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing a qualified employee a transfer because of race.

Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hospital · filed 1983-08-31(a)(1)

Applying the disparate treatment theory to the individual plaintiffs, in this case, the Court finds a violation of Title VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), only as to the plaintiff Mosley.

An employer’s established attendance reason can rebut an inference of discriminatory discharge and shift the burden of production back to the employee.

Johnson v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. · filed 1984-02-13(a)

An employer’s discharge based on attendance, if properly established, is sufficient to rebut an inference of discrimination and shift the burden of production to the Plaintiff in a disparate treatment case.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, and courts should assess the sufficiency of proof without a rigid test.

Segar v. Smith · filed 1984-06-26(a)

In affirming the District Court’s liability determination we stress that tests for the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ proof should not be applied in a “rigid, mechanistic, or ritualistic” way.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious-discrimination plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reasons for discharge were pretextual and that the employer intentionally discriminated because of religion.

Baz v. Walters · filed 1984-11-19(a)(1)

That burden requires him to show that the reasons articulated by the defendants were pretext and that the true motivation of the defendants in discharging him was an intention to discriminate against him on the basis of his religion. The plaintiff also bears the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff as he claims. ... The court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of persuasion, and that the reasons for the plaintiff’s discharge announced are not a pretext but rather reflect the legitimate aims and needs of the defendants in conducting the affairs of the Veterans Administration.

When a plaintiff offers direct evidence of sex discrimination, the court must decide whether it believes that evidence before resolving a disparate treatment claim.

Thompkins v. Morris Brown College · filed 1985-02-04(a)(1)

We hold that this was error. When direct evidence of discrimination has been introduced, the lower court must, as an initial matter, specifically state whether or not it believes plaintiffs proffered direct evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 treats an alleged denial of reclassification because an employee is a woman as a disparate treatment claim.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. County of Nassau · filed 1985-05-17

While defendants stated- that this allegation constitutes a disparate impact claim, I believe that the allegation should be analyzed under the disparate treatment theory.

An employer can rebut a prima facie employment discrimination claim with a legitimate explanation for a layoff and failure to rehire when the employee does not prove that explanation was pretextual.

James White, Cross-Appellant v. Colgan Electric Co., Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1986-01-29

In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that Colgan successfully rebutted Mr. White's prima facie case against his employer and that Mr. White did not prove that Colgan's proffered explanation was pretextual, the third stage of proof in a Title VII case.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof of discrimination; evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action can defeat a claim.

Alexander v. City of Menlo Park · filed 1986-04-24

There is ample evidence that the reasons behind any adverse employment action were Leydon’s assessment of Alexander’s abilities and perhaps a fair, if mistaken, belief that Alexander was not entitled to bumping rights.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a finding of intentional racial discrimination when an employer dismisses a worker who met its announced qualifications under a newly applied subjective standard.

Griffin v. City of Omaha · filed 1986-03-04(a)(1)

From our review of the record, we are left with the firm impression that the district court mistakenly concluded that neither Griffin nor McWhorter was subject to intentional discrimination on the basis of race. ... Thus, according to the testimony of the official responsible for the decision, the appellants were not discharged for failure to meet the announced OPD firearms standards, but for failure to meet a new, subjective standard. ... We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court with respect to appellant Griffin, and remand with directions that it enter a judgment in favor of Griffin and determine the remedy that will make her whole.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination; after the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff may prove that reason is pretextual.

Mary Ann DAVIS, Appellant, v. LAMBERT OF ARKANSAS, INC., Appellee · filed 1986-03-14(a)

A discrimination claim which relies on a disparate treatment theory has three phases: first, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination; second, if the plaintiff meets her initial burden of proof, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the disparate treatment; and third, should the defendant carry this burden, then the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered were a pretext to cover a discriminatory motive.

In a disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2, evidence that minority employees were treated less favorably than comparably situated white employees is generally admissible to prove discrimination.

Henderson v. City of Mexico · filed 1986-08-13

Indirect evidence of discrimination, including evidence that minority employees were treated less favorably than comparably situated white employees, is generally admissible to prove the ultimate question of discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination claim survives summary judgment when the evidence, viewed favorably to the employee, creates a genuine factual dispute over intentional discrimination.

Vera L. POLLOCK, Appellant, v. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH LONG LINES · filed 1986-06-30(a)(1)

In a Title VII case, the court’s task is to determine whether upon viewing all of the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there exists sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment comparison to use similarly situated employees; probationary bus drivers are not similarly situated to permanent drivers.

Lywanna COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF NORTH OLMSTED, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants · filed 1986-07-16(a)(1)

Probationary bus drivers therefore do not stand on equal footing with permanent drivers, and cannot be considered to be similarly situated.

A statistical imbalance alone does not establish an unlawful employment practice under Section 2000e-2(j).

Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co. · filed 1986-10-14(j)

However, a mere statistical imbalance in itself does not constitute a discriminatory practice under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j); ... Thus, it is clear that plaintiffs need more than just their statistical evidence to prove Title VII claims against Jewel, particularly in light of the fact that Jewel has articulated a legitimate explanation for the disparity.

A discrimination plaintiff’s own testimony can establish a triable claim under Section 2000e-2.

Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1987-08-19

There is simply no rule of law that provides that a discrimination plaintiff may not testify in his or her own behalf, or that such testimony, standing alone, can never make out a case of discrimination that will survive a motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination to present evidence supporting that claim to withstand summary judgment.

Skeeter v. City of Norfolk · filed 1987-09-21(a)(1)

As discussed in relation to plaintiff’s other statutory claims requiring a showing of racial discrimination to state a cause of action, plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily support her claims of racial discrimination, and, therefore, defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Section 2000e-2(a)(l).

A pattern or practice of employment discrimination requires proof that race or sex discrimination was the employer’s standard operating procedure; isolated acts do not suffice.

Monroe-Lord v. Hytche · filed 1987-08-19(a)

Proof of isolated discriminatory acts is insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. Rather, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that sexual and/or racial discrimination was defendants’ standard operating procedure.

A Title VII sexual harassment claim fails when the plaintiff cannot show that the employer’s legitimate reason for termination was pretextual.

Howard v. PINE FORGE ACADEMY, PINE FORGE, PA. · filed 1987-11-25

Thus, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the legitimate reason for her termination was pretextual, the final step in the Bellissimo analysis.

A Title VII race discrimination claim follows a burden shifting framework: the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, the employer must give a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and the plaintiff may prove that reason was a pretext.

Miller v. State of Ill. · filed 1988-03-08

Miller’s Title VII claim is that he was discharged on the basis of race. ... First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” ... Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.

Direct evidence of racial discrimination does not require proof that a similarly situated white employee received more favorable treatment.

Thermidor v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 1988-04-08(a)(1)

The Court notes, in this regard, that contrary to defendant’s assertions, direct evidence of racial animus does not require plaintiff to prove that a similarly situated white employee was treated more favorably than his black counterpart solely due to his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that racial animus manifested in a challenged employment action to establish disparate treatment.

Harris v. Marsh · filed 1987-12-28(a)(1)

In other words, to establish employment discrimination on the basis of disparate treatment, it must be shown that the employer bore a racially discriminatory animus against the employee, and that this animus manifested itself in some challenged action, whether it be dismissal, failure to hire, or failure to promote.

A facially neutral attendance policy violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) if the employer applies it in a racially discriminatory manner.

Grayer v. Copperweld Steel Co. · filed 1988-01-29(a)(1)

Only if Copperweld diseriminatorily applied this facially neutral policy can it be found guilty under Title VII.

A plaintiff alleging race-based disparate treatment must show facts supporting an inference of discrimination, including that she was similarly situated to applicants outside her protected class.

Dodson v. Marsh · filed 1988-02-09(a)

The plaintiff never established a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff is a member of a protected class since she is black. However, the plaintiff was not otherwise similarly situated to the members of the unprotected class who applied for the Lead Personnel Clerk position or who could be detailed to the position. She did not have the knowledge and experience of civilian personnel procedures that the other candidates possessed. The facts of this case do not give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging a pattern or practice of disparate treatment to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cross-Appellee v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, Cross-Appellant · filed 1988-03-15(a)(1)

To succeed in a claim alleging disparate treatment, the EEOC ultimately had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Sears engaged in a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against female employees.

A worker’s discharge or layoff without good cause does not, by itself, establish racial discrimination under § 2000e-2.

Bullard v. Sercon Corp. · filed 1988-05-13

The fact that a black worker is fired or laid off without good cause does not establish racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of racial discrimination; firing or laying off a Black worker without good cause alone does not establish it.

Bullard v. Sercon Corp. · filed 1988-06-23(a)(1)

The fact that a black worker is fired or laid off without good cause does not establish racial discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging sex-based disparate treatment must show membership in a protected class, an adverse employment action, and different treatment of a similarly situated person outside that class.

Cordova v. Harrah's Reno Hotel-Casino · filed 1988-10-27(a)

To show a prima facie case of disparate treatment, plaintiff Jan Cordova must show that she is a member of a protected class, was subjected to adverse employment actions, and also that a similarly situated unprotected person was treated differently than she.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire women because of their sex; admissions and hiring statistics can establish a pattern of discrimination.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1989-04-14(a)(1)

The pattern or practice of discriminating against women stands so clearly revealed on the basis of the Sheriffs admissions and the statistical evidence that we do not need to rely, to establish the existence of pattern or practice, on the testimony of the three complainants to resolve the liability question.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that an employer’s challenged treatment was motivated by sex to establish disparate treatment.

Mammay v. J. Arthur Dosher Memorial Hospital, Arthur Pittman · filed 1989-09-19(a)(1)

We begin by recognizing that federal law forbids employment practices which involve disparate treatment of employees on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a violation of the law, Mammay must prove that her employer's actions were motivated by considerations of sex, i.e., she must establish intentional discrimination. ... We find that the district court was correct in holding that Mammay failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination. The fatal defect in her case is that she failed to show that the posting of the coffee duty list was motivated by considerations of sex.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit uneven enforcement of workplace rules without evidence of racial bias.

Hatcher v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority · filed 1989-10-03(a)(1)

To the extent that he complains that the RTA fails to enforce these rules evenhandedly, he does not state a claim cognizable under Title VII without showing racial-bias; this statute offers employees no protection against bad business judgment or caprice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race caused the challenged employment action; a claim without such evidence cannot survive summary judgment.

Newton v. A.B. Dick Co. · filed 1990-06-01(a)(1)

Given that Newton failed to offer any credible evidence to support his claim that his race was the reason he was demoted and terminated, there is no genuine dispute of fact as to an essential element of his claim, and A.B. Dick is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A plaintiff relying on indirect proof of racial disparate treatment must show less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees and discriminatory intent.

Henderson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1990-02-23(a)(1)

The plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees and that the defendant’s intent was discriminatory.

Evidence that an employer treated other members of a protected class more favorably is relevant but does not defeat an individual claim of discriminatory discipline.

Payne v. Frank · filed 1990-02-27(a)(1)

Similarly in the instant case, this Court believes that the employer’s refusal to impose similar punishment on other members of the protected class is relevant, but not dispositive, on the merits of a Title VII action in which a claim of unequal punishment for the violation of an employee work rule has been alleged.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show different treatment because of sex that affected a term or condition of employment.

King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 1990-03-22(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie ease under McDonnell Douglas, she must prove that she was subject to treatment different from other members of the department that affected a term or condition of employment. She has not met this burden; her contract renewal chances were not diminished by Stein.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show different treatment based on sex that affected a term or condition of employment.

King v. Board Of Regents Of The University Of Wisconsin System · filed 1990-04-23(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, she must prove that she was subject to treatment different from other members of the department that affected a term or condition of employment. She has not met this burden; her contract renewal chances were not diminished by Stein.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employee to prove national origin discrimination by showing that the employer’s stated reasons for denying a promotion were pretextual.

Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health, Office of Health Systems Management · filed 1990-05-25(a)

We are here persuaded that appellant — by clearly demonstrating the pretextual nature of the Department’s proffered explanation — met his ultimate burden of persuasion and should prevail in his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2 allows a race discrimination claim to proceed to trial when unequal discipline supports a prima facie case and the employer’s stated reason may be pretextual.

Bester v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1990-07-25

The plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. ... Nevertheless, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the defendant’s stated reason was a pretext for race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits applying employment policies differently based on sex; it does not require employers to adopt wise policies.

Horton v. Dixie-Narco, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Dihanna R. Vaught, of the Estate of James Vaught, Randy · filed 1990-07-05(a)

Title VII, however, does not require employers to develop and enforce rational or wise policies. It only requires that whatever policies exist not be applied differentially on the basis of sex, race, or other impermissible basis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that racial differences in workplace treatment affect employment terms or conditions; a supervisor’s greater social interaction with employees of one race is insufficient.

Young v. City Of Houston · filed 1990-07-20(a)(1)

But the court correctly found that laughing in the office has no bearing on terms and conditions of employment, and is not evidence of disparate treatment.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment through direct evidence of intentional discrimination or circumstances supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

Selester GILTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF OAK PARK, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1990-12-07(a)

To establish a prima facie case as to his disparate treatment (i.e., intentional discrimination) claim, Gilty may take one of two routes. He may either offer direct evidence of intentional discrimination or he may offer evidence of a combination of circumstances from which we may infer discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits sex discrimination in access to employment opportunities, including through discretionary decisions that favor men.

Contardo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1990-12-14(a)(2)

The defendant’s failure to afford her an equal shot at some lucrative business, while in my view a violation of Title VII and M.G.L. c. 151B, was not career-ending.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee alleging disparate treatment to prove that race motivated the adverse employment action; proving the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual does not alone satisfy that burden.

Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center · filed 1991-01-31(a)(1)

Although plaintiff proved pretext, plaintiff still bears the ultimate burden to prove that race was the determining factor in defendant's decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on sex to show different treatment of similarly situated employees under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Ketron v. University of Kentucky · filed 1991-03-07(a)(1)

Jessie Offutt, a male day shift security I employee, was similarly situated to Ketron. He performed the same parking and security duties as Ketron. There is no evidence that Ketron was treated differently than Offutt because of her sex. That Ketron and Offutt performed identical duties prevents Ketron from establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment in the terms and conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits intentional discrimination in employment because of sex; a disparate-treatment plaintiff must prove that discrimination caused the challenged treatment.

George v. Frank · filed 1991-03-27(a)(1)

Here, the court is inclined to follow the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework, and under such an analysis George ultimately failed to establish that defendant intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to prove intentional sex discrimination, even if she establishes a prima facie case.

Bonnie Collins and Billie Fryman v. Webber Farms, Inc. · filed 1991-05-15(a)

While the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous, it must be remembered that the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the employer intentionally discriminated. Under the deferential standard of review applicable to this case, we hold that the district court did not clearly err by concluding that plaintiffs were not victims of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to rebut a disparate-treatment claim based on its failure to offer a transfer or demotion by showing legitimate performance reasons for discharging the employee.

Charles v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 1991-05-15

It follows that the issue is whether the defendants rebutted the prima facie case presented by Charles with respect to the failure to offer a transfer or demotion. The district court found that defendants rebutted Ms. Charles' prima facie claim by presenting evidence that she did not satisfactorily perform her duties as casualty claim manager, and that her performance was deteriorating over time. Especially significant is the district court's finding that the relationship between Charles and defendants became defensive and adversarial because of Charles' attitude. The record fully supports these findings and rebuts the prima facie case.

A failure to offer a transfer before discharge does not establish disparate treatment when the employee fails to show a transfer policy and the record supports termination for poor performance.

Charles v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1991-05-15

Charles has failed to establish that it was, in fact, a company policy to offer transfers to managers who are no longer satisfactorily performing their duties. The district court made specific findings as to why Charles’ performance was inadequate and warranted termination. These findings are not undermined by a failure to make specific findings of fact favorable to Charles with respect to Schaefer’s decision not to offer a transfer to Charles.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate treatment claim when a qualified employee alleges that an employer treated employees outside her protected class more favorably.

Butler v. Elwyn Institute · filed 1991-05-29(a)

Butler has clearly stated a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. She has alleged the elements of a prima facie disparate treatment claim: 1) she is a member of a protected class—she is a black female citizen of the United States; 2) she was qualified for her job from which she was discharged; and 3) others who were not in the protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed to trial when evidence casts doubt on an employer’s stated reasons for a promotion and could support a finding of discriminatory motive.

Lindahl v. Air France, a French Corporation · filed 1991-04-22(a)

While not overwhelming, Lindahl’s evidence of discriminatory motive is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. She has pointed to facts that could call into question the credibility of Air France’s nondiscriminatory explanations and could suggest discriminatory motives.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment and discharge; evidence that an employer considered an employee’s sex in those decisions is direct evidence of discrimination.

Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University · filed 1991-07-12(a)(1)

In this case, there was a substantial amount of direct evidence that defendant took plaintiff’s sex into account in her employment and in its decision to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2 does not support an inference of sex discrimination in a promotion decision merely because the employer considered the employee unsuited for a different position.

Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp. · filed 1991-10-18(a)(1)

Whether Beneficial thought Miller was ill suited for the position of a Government Relations Director has no relevance nor can it be the basis of an inference that Beneficial did not promote Miller to Vice President because of age or gender.

Differences in an employer’s treatment of similarly situated male workers do not by themselves constitute direct evidence of sex discrimination.

Vincenti v. Hilliard-Lyons, Inc. · filed 1991-12-05(a)(1)

We therefore hold that Vincenti's evidence of Hilliard-Lyons' allegedly different treatment of similarly situated male employees does not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging leave decisions as sex discrimination to show that the employer treated women less favorably than men, intentionally or through disparate impact.

Wallace v. Pyro Mining Company · filed 1991-12-19(a)(1)

Thus, whether Wallace sought to recover under the disparate treatment theory or the disparate impact theory, she had to show that Pyro treated women less favorably than men, either intentionally or unintentionally, with respect to requests for leaves of absence. She failed to make such a showing.

An employer’s reliance on word-of-mouth recruiting can support a finding of intentional race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works · filed 1991-12-23(a)

We cannot conclude that as a matter of law it is impossible for an employer to discriminate intentionally against blacks by relying on word-of-mouth to provide its applicants.

An individual claiming discriminatory discharge under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must present evidence that the discharge resulted from discrimination; anecdotal evidence of other replacements alone is insufficient.

Dwight C. Bowdish and Rebecca Bowdish v. Continental Accessories, Inc., and Eugene A. Lehman · filed 1992-06-12(a)(1)

An individual plaintiff in an employment discrimination case must present some evidence that demonstrates that his or her individual discharge was the result of discrimination.

Once an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, an employee claiming disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must offer evidence that those reasons are pretext for discrimination.

Becerra v. Metro, a Municipality of the City of Seattle, Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Dave Lilly, Dale · filed 1992-06-15(a)(1)

The defendants, then, met their burden of articulating legitimate reasons for their actions, and Becerra was required to offer evidence that their reasons were merely a pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits proof of national-origin disparate treatment through evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Pacheco v. State of Kansas Department of Social Rehabilitation Services Peggy Wolfe Carol Rittmayer · filed 1992-10-21(a)(1)

Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination by showing that similarly situated non-Hispanics were treated differently. Plaintiff, while maintaining she is a victim of discrimination, has failed to offer any evidence that would show non-Hispanics, similarly situated, were treated differently.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that unequal treatment was caused by intentional discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLASHER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1992-12-29(a)(1)

Under Title VII, the defendant does not have to prove why the differential treatment occurred; it is up to the plaintiff to prove why it did occur — and to prove that it was caused by intentional discrimination against a protected class. If, after trial, no motivation or reason for the differential treatment has been established by either side to a preponderance of the evidence, the judgment must be for the defendant.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a discrimination plaintiff opposing summary judgment must raise a genuine issue about discriminatory intent or the credibility of the employer’s stated reasons.

Michael WHITE, Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION; McDonnell Douglas Aircraft, Appellees · filed 1993-03-30(a)(1)

We find nothing in these materials that establishes a genuine issue of fact with respect either to discriminatory intent on the part of McDonnell Douglas or to the credibility of the reasons given for McDonnell Douglas’s choices for the positions in question.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim requires evidence that a similarly situated employee of another sex received different treatment and that the difference was connected to sex.

Asher v. Riser Foods, Inc. American Seaway Foods, Inc. And John Doe, Supervisor · filed 1993-03-30(a)

For Asher to establish a prima facie case she must initially show that (1) she is female; (2) she and a similarly situated male employee received dissimilar treatment; and (3) sufficient evidence exists from which the court can find a causal connection between gender and the alleged acts of discrimination. ... Other than showing she is female, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case.

When an employer gives separate reasons for an adverse employment decision, finding one reason pretextual does not by itself establish discrimination; the court must assess the others.

Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co. · filed 1993-04-19(a)(1)

Because a finding that one of Westin's proffered reasons was pretextual does not in itself support the district court's ultimate conclusion that Westin had discriminated against Odima, we vacate the judgment and remand for further findings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed when evidence raises a triable issue of sex discrimination in an employer's hiring decision.

Reynolds v. State of Arizona · filed 1993-04-28(a)(1)

In a sex discrimination action under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment by introducing evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination based on sex. ... This evidence is sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact regarding whether the psychological evaluation of Reynolds, the sole reason given by DPS for rejecting her application, was sex biased. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on her disparate treatment claim.

A racial disparate treatment claim requires evidence that similarly situated nonminority employees were treated differently.

Parker v. Housing Authority of Kansas City, Kan. · filed 1993-06-09(a)

Because there is no evidence that the white employees accused of sexual harassment were similarly situated to plaintiff, there is no evidence of disparate treatment.

When both inquiries turn on the same conduct, a Title VII court may consider whether an employee met legitimate business expectations together with whether the employer gave a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Atkins v. School Com'rs of City of Indianapolis · filed 1993-06-21(a)(1)

In resolving this claim, the Court also must decide concurrently whether IPS has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge because both inquiries center on the propriety of IPS’s demand that Atkins submit to a drug test. The facts of this case are such that the second inquiry, which normally would begin once Atkins had established his prima facie case, collapses into the first, or that part of the plaintiffs prima facie case concerning the employer’s legitimate business expectations.