42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to show satisfactory job performance as part of a prima facie case.

McLee v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1996-05-29

In particular, he utterly fails to show that he performed his job in a satisfactory manner, an essential threshold predicate to any claim of discriminatory discharge.

A race-based discharge claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence connecting alleged racial incidents to a discriminatory motive for the termination.

Worlds v. Thermal Industries, Inc. · filed 1996-06-13(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed, however, to submit credible evidence that would sufficiently connect those occasional and isolated instances with an alleged invidious motive on the part of the company or his supervisor, Law, to terminate his employment on the basis of his race.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, a Title VII race-discrimination plaintiff must present evidence from which a jury could find that the reason was pretextual and the discharge was discriminatory.

Wixson v. Dowagiac Nursing Home · filed 1996-06-19(a)(1)

Applying the standards enunciated in cases discussed above, we conclude that neither plaintiff met her burden of producing evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the reason given by DNH for her termination was pretextual and that she was actually discharged for prohibited reasons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, but a discriminatory discharge claim fails when the evidence cannot support a finding that the employer’s stated performance reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Blankenship v. Warren County Sheriff's Department · filed 1996-08-15(a)(1)

No reasonable fact-finder could plausibly conclude that the stated reason for plaintiffs discharge — related to job performance — was pretextual and the real reason a discriminatory one.

A plaintiff claiming that a stated reason for discharge is a pretext for race discrimination must show that the reason was false and that race discrimination was the real reason.

Hernandez v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1996-10-24(a)(1)

To demonstrate a “pretext for discrimination,” the plaintiff must show both that the employer’s proffered reason was false and that race discrimination was the real reason.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee using indirect proof of racial discrimination must present evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

John PLAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E J. BRACH & SONS, INCORPORATED and E.J. Brach Corporation, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1997-01-23(a)(1)

Plair has failed to present evidence upon which a reasonable factfinder could infer that racial discrimination was the true reason for his discharge and that Brach lied about the reasons for terminating him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when similarly situated employees who violated comparably serious work rules received less severe treatment.

Starks v. Coors Brewing Co., Inc. · filed 1997-01-31(a)(1)

Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to infer that similarly-situated non-minority employees violated rules of comparable seriousness, but were not subjected to thorough investigation and ultimate termination as plaintiff was.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a discriminatory discharge to show that the employer did not honestly believe its stated reason for firing the employee.

Wilbert ESSEX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-04-17(a)(1)

In examining pretext, the question is whether the employer honestly believed its proffered reason for discharge.

Under § 2000e-2, an employee alleging discriminatory discharge must produce evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual; different discipline for employees whose misconduct was materially different does not suffice.

Chandler v. Sentry Insurance · filed 1997-04-29

Plaintiff has not adduced evidence of contradictions in defendant’s explanation or evidence that any other employee who instigated transfers contrary to the wishes of the policyholder was not terminated. No “rational factfinder could infer that the company lied” when it said it terminated plaintiff for her misconduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race.

Davis v. Rutgers Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-06-05(a)(1)

For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the plaintiff, Derek E. Davis, has proved he was terminated from his employment by defendant Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co., on account of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the plaintiff presents no evidence supporting a required element of a prima facie case and no substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Dyer v. TW Services, Inc. · filed 1997-06-20(a)(1)

Because Mr. Dyer has failed to establish a prima facie case, or alternatively because he has failed to produce specific, substantial evidence that Denny’s proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiffs claims under Title VII dismissed.

A racial discrimination discharge claim survives summary judgment when the evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Bradshaw v. St. Catherine's Hospital · filed 1997-08-07(a)(1)

However, considering all the evidence together, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants’ stated reason for terminating plaintiff was a pretext for racial discrimination.

A discriminatory firing claim requires evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for race discrimination; whether the employee committed the alleged misconduct is not decisive.

Russell v. Delco-Remy Division of General Motors Corp. · filed 1997-08-13(a)

It does not actually matter for present purposes whether Russell did anything wrong; what matters is whether General Motors is lying to cover up racial discrimination. Russell has failed to provide any reason to believe that General Motors's stated reason is pretextual, or that its real reason was race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of race; evidence that comparable employees were treated differently can support a finding that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Richardson v. Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 1997-11-25(a)(1)

The court finds that plaintiff has pleaded a prima facie case and has presented evidence that defendant’s articulated non-discriminatory reason may be pretext. The court also finds that the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe that the proffered reason is a pretext for race discrimination. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim under Title VII and § 1981, and the KAAD.

Section 2000e-2 allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of pretext and racial animus could support a finding of intentional discriminatory discharge.

Sandra RIVERS-FRISON, Appellant, v. SOUTHEAST MISSOURI COMMUNITY TREATMENT CENTER, Appellee · filed 1998-01-07(a)(1)

While these stray remarks fall short of being direct evidence of discrimination, they tend to prove that any pretextual reasons for discharge were proffered to hide intentional race discrimination. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment because questions of fact remain on the indirect evidence prong of Rivers-Frison’s claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee using indirect evidence to show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations and that similarly situated employees of another race received more favorable treatment.

Baker v. Jesse Brown, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 1998-01-13(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge through indirect evidence, Baker must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting the VA's legitimate expectations; (3) she was discharged; and (4) similarly situated employees of another race were treated more favorably. ... Because Baker failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas and failed to establish that the VA's reason for her termination was pretextual, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to show that employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Turner v. Claims Administration Corp. · filed 1998-02-05(a)(1)

Foremost, the Court finds that Turner has failed to establish even a prima facie case of discrimination. Turner is a member of a protected class (African-American), and he was qualified for the position he held based on his previous work experience. However, Turner has faded to demonstrate that other employees were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a jury to infer sex-based discharge from evidence of pretextual performance objectives and more favorable treatment of comparable male employees.

Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc. · filed 1998-02-26(a)

The jury could have credited this testimony and relied on it to support its conclusion that the objectives were unreasonable and, furthermore, that they served only as a pretext for termmating Williams’s employment. TMs evidence, together with the comparisons drawn between Williams and similar male employees, could support a rational inference that Pharmacia fired Williams because of her sex.

Once an employer states a legitimate reason for discharge, an employee alleging race discrimination must prove that the reason was false and a pretext for discrimination.

Ebbs v. Folger Coffee Co · filed 1998-03-26(a)(1)

If the defendant provides such a reason, the plaintiff then must prove both that the articulated reason is untrue and that it was given as a pretext for discrimination.

A plaintiff can meet the initial burden for a discriminatory discharge claim by showing disparate treatment and a sequence of events that raises an inference of discriminatory motive.

Tout v. County of Erie · filed 1998-03-30(a)(1)

On the record presented, I find that plaintiff has met her de minimis burden of showing disparate treatment and a sequence of events sufficient to raise the inference of a discriminatory motive for her termination.

A national-origin discharge claim fails when the employee produces no evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were false or that national origin motivated the decision.

Marmolejo v. Birdair, Inc. · filed 1998-04-10(a)(1)

In short, no admissible evidence has been produced by plaintiff to support a rational finding that Birdair’s reasons for placing plaintiff on layoff status in June of 1994 were false, or that plaintiffs national origin was the true reason. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendant is appropriate dismissing plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim.

A discriminatory discharge claim requires a showing of satisfactory job performance, which chronic tardiness and attendance problems can defeat.

Stephens v. State University of New York at Buffalo · filed 1998-04-21(a)(1)

Based on this record, no rational trier of fact could find that plaintiff meets the second prong of the prima facie discrimination inquiry.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a connection between workplace remarks and the challenged employment decision for the remarks to serve as direct evidence of discriminatory discharge.

Merlee EILAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRINITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-07-24(a)(1)

The statements, made over time, are stray workplace remarks that will not qualify as direct evidence of discrimination unless Ms. Eiland can show that the remarks were related to the employment decision at issue, namely her termination.

A disparity in discipline supports a Title VII discriminatory discharge claim only when the employees’ misconduct is sufficiently comparable to permit an inference of racial discrimination.

Hotchkins v. Fleet Delivery Service · filed 1998-08-14(a)(1)

Although Forsyth’s conduct was certainly inappropriate, it is not sufficiently comparable to Hotchkins’ failure to report to work for the disparity in disciplinary consequences to create an inference of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to show that he was qualified for the job and that the circumstances support an inference of discrimination.

Moore v. Time Warner GRC 9 · filed 1998-08-18(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination under Title VII, Moore must show that: (1) he is a member of the protected category; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of race or sex discrimination.

For a national origin discriminatory discharge claim, an employee may show that the employer's stated legitimate reason for the discharge was pretextual.

Rodriguez v. Kantor, Sec · filed 1998-08-20(a)(1)

If the defendant discharges its burden of production, the plaintiff must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the reason articulated by the defendant is pretextual.

A race or national-origin termination claim under Title VII may proceed through the circumstantial-evidence burden-shifting framework.

Richards v. Seariver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. · filed 1998-11-12(a)

In order to establish a prima facie case of termination based on race and national origin under Title VII, Richards must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied for a position for which he was qualified; (3) he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, Defendants promoted or continued to seek other candidates not in his protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not permit a discriminatory discharge claim to rest solely on remote racial remarks by people who had no authority over the firing.

Martin v. Orthodontic Centers of South Carolina, Inc. · filed 1999-03-04(a)

These disputed comments, allegedly made by persons without the authority to hire, discipline, or fire Martin cannot alone be the basis for concluding that the real reason Dr. Niremblatt fired Martin was due to her race, and not her failure to follow leave policy, her tardiness, and unprofessional conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to show that the employer terminated the job for an intentionally discriminatory reason.

Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23954p Roy A. Jackson and Carlos E. Serment v. E.J. Brach Corporation · filed 1999-05-05(a)(1)

To succeed with a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer terminated his job because of intentional discriminatory reasons.

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires membership in a protected group, qualification for the job, and more favorable treatment of employees outside that group.

Bailey v. Storlazzi · filed 1999-04-28(a)

Thus, a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge only requires a plaintiff to show that 1) he is a member of a racial minority; 2) he is qualified for the job from which he was discharged; and 3) others not in the protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of race, and a race discrimination claim under it requires the same proof as a Section 1981 claim.

Holiness v. Moore-Handley, Inc. · filed 1999-06-23(a)(1)

Thus, both Title VII and section 1981 prohibit an employer from discharging an employee on the basis of race, and both statutes require the same proof to show liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a discharge to show that the employer's stated legitimate reason was pretextual and that race or sex motivated the discharge.

Walker v. MCI · filed 1999-07-16(a)(1)

Once MCI proffers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse action, the burden shifts back to Walker to demonstrate that MCI's proffered reason for discharging her was merely pretextual and that it was discriminatory because of her race and gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; a wrongful-termination complaint must allege facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Farrell v. Child Welfare Administration · filed 1999-12-15(a)(1)

In this action, Farrell does not allege any facts that would connect her national origin with her termination such that the Court could plausibly infer discriminatory intent. Notably, she does not allege that her employer was aware of her national origin. Moreover, Farrell does not allege that she was qualified for the job. Thus, she has not pleaded a prima facie case of wrongful termination based on discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a white employee’s discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence of a decision-maker’s race-conscious employment goals could support an inference that race influenced the discharge.

Perry v. Community Action Services · filed 2000-01-26(a)(1)

A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that this statement, which dealt explicitly with employment and was made by an aggressive Chairperson who was admittedly taking a more active role in the management of CASI, was probative of discrimination and “causally related to the discharge decision making process.”

The employee in this case did not establish a prima facie race discrimination claim where she offered no evidence that a nonminority person replaced her.

Curry v. First USA Bank · filed 2000-03-02(a)

Curry fails to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. ... However, Curry does not complain that she was replaced by a non-minority individual.

A discriminatory discharge claim requires evidence of satisfactory job performance and circumstances supporting an inference that race motivated the discharge.

Brady v. KBI Security Service, Inc. · filed 2000-03-27(a)(1)

A review of the evidence shows that plaintiffs cannot meet even their de minimis burden because they cannot show satisfactory performance of their duties and because the discharges did not occur in circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge can satisfy the fourth element of a Title VII prima facie case by showing that someone outside the protected class replaced her.

Toth v. Gates Rubber · filed 2000-06-21(a)

Although Toth may satisfy the fourth element of her prima facie burden by presenting evidence that she was treated less favorably than similarly-situated employees, in a discriminatory discharge case a plaintiff may also satisfy the fourth element by demonstrating that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class.

A discharged employee alleging national origin discrimination under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Ghose v. Century 21, Inc. · filed 2000-08-18(a)(1)

While acknowledging that a district court should hesitate in granting summary judgment where an employer’s intent is at issue, on the record here adduced, this Court finds no sufficient evidence of circumstances from which a discriminatory motive could be inferred by the decision to terminate Ghose’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory-discharge plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class committed the same infraction but were retained.

Holston v. Sports Authority, Inc. · filed 2000-09-29(a)(1)

In order to state a claim for discriminatory discharge under Title VII, plaintiff can not merely allege that she is black and that she was fired. She must show that her employer did not fire other similarly situated non-minority employees who committed the same infraction that she allegedly committed, thereby giving rise to a presumption that her termination was based on her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race or national origin; to avoid summary judgment, an employee must raise a genuine fact issue that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Okoye v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center · filed 2001-04-03(a)(1)

Because Okoye has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that her employment with UTHHSC was concluded because of discrimination by UTHHSC, the district court’s decision to dismiss her case on summary judgment was proper, and we AFFIRM.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff to present sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason for firing him was a pretext for discrimination.

English v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2001-04-26(a)

Therefore, we hold that English has failed to raise sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and we therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a discharged employee to show they were qualified for the job despite findings of misconduct.

Aguirre v. New York State Police · filed 2001-07-05(a)

Accordingly, the findings of misconduct here cannot preclude Plaintiffs from showing their qualification for employment.

Evidence that an employer may have known an employee performed her duties can support a jury question about whether her discharge was because of her sex.

Smith v. Iowa Jewish Senior Life Center · filed 2001-08-17(a)(1)

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Smith has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was terminated because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory discharge, and a White employee may establish a prima facie claim by showing less favorable treatment based on a protected trait.

Kondrat v. Ashcroft · filed 2001-10-03(a)(1)

Accordingly, we find that the plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the burden thus shifts to the defendants to establish that his dismissal from employment was based on legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers an employer’s decision to fire someone because of race or sex, even if the employer’s motive is to avoid discrimination claims rather than hostility toward that employee.

Tappe v. Alliance Capital Management L.P. · filed 2001-12-19(a)(1)

If proven, these facts would qualify as unlawful discrimination. It may be true that the typical Title VII case or claim involves impermissible animus or stereotyping of an employee, but the statute is not limited to such situations. Rather, Title VII extends to any case in which an employer treats an employee differently “because of’ the person’s race, sex or other protected characteristic.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence raises a factual question about whether the employer’s stated reason for firing the employee was pretextual.

Elries v. Denny's, Inc. · filed 2002-01-10

Thus, Elries has presented enough evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether Defendant’s reasons are pre-textual. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on disparate treatment and discriminatory discharge are thus denied.

A supervisor’s racial threat can be direct evidence of discriminatory discharge when it is sufficiently connected to the termination decision.

Eruanga v. Grafton School, Inc. · filed 2002-01-24(a)(1)

Taken together, these two factors give Lore’s statement a sufficient relationship with the discharge decision so as to make it direct evidence of discriminatory discharge. Accordingly, Grafton’s motion for summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim is denied.

A supervisor’s racial threat can be direct evidence of discriminatory discharge when the threat is linked to the employee’s firing.

Oladokun v. Grafton School, Inc. · filed 2002-01-24(a)(1)

Taken together, these two factors give Lore’s statement a sufficient relationship with the discharge decision so as to make it direct evidence of discriminatory discharge. Accordingly, Grafton’s motion for summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; when an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must show that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Eason v. Town of Salem · filed 2002-02-12(a)(1)

In response, Eason has failed to point to evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the Town's proffered explanation for her termination is pretextual and, in fact, designed to disguise its true, unlawful, discriminatory conduct. Consequently, the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A prima facie claim of discriminatory discharge requires evidence that the employee met the employer’s legitimate expectations and was replaced by a comparably qualified person outside the protected class.

Chyu v. Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene · filed 2002-04-30(a)(1)

On the record here, this Court concludes that plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Two of the elements have in fact been satisfied. Plaintiff Chyu is a member of a protected class, and she was discharged by her employer. However, at the time of her discharge, she was not performing her job at a level which met her employer’s legitimate expectations. Moreover, there was no evidence of record indicating that following her discharge she was replaced by someone of comparable qualifications outside the protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to be proved through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Jane v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine-North Carolina Baptist Hospital · filed 2002-07-02(a)(1)

Under a Title VII claim for discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff may provide direct evidence of discrimination, such as “conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the' contested employment decision,” or, in the absence of such direct evidence, the plaintiff may proceed using circumstantial evidence under the burden-shifting proof scheme established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Workplace comments that do not support an inference of discrimination cannot alone establish a prima facie discriminatory discharge claim.

Ahmad v. Nassau Health Care Corp. · filed 2002-11-12(a)(1)

The alleged comments cited by Plaintiff on their own cannot support his prima facie claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to reach a jury when a prima facie case and evidence that the employer's stated reason is false support an inference of race or national origin discrimination.

Siraj v. Hermitage in Northern Virginia · filed 2002-11-20(a)(1)

This is a situation where the plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with the above outlined evidence which is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's proffered reason is false, permits the trier of fact to infer that VUMH discharged Siraj in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; a gender discrimination claim fails when the alleged discipline cannot support an inference of gender bias.

Thomas v. Westchester County Health Care Corp. · filed 2002-11-21(a)(1)

Given the record of the disciplinary hearing, in particular Thomas’s statements contradicting her pleadings, the Court concludes that Thomas could prove no set of facts consistent with her allegations of gender discrimination under Title YII, even under the most generous reading of the facts in her case.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge through circumstantial evidence to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were retained under similar circumstances.

Fairclough v. Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary's County · filed 2003-02-04(a)(1)

The court need not address the second and third prongs because it is clear that Plaintiff has not satisfied the fourth prong, and, therefore, has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff has failed to show that similarly situated, non-Jewish employees who failed to attend numerous department head meetings or engaged in other acts similar to the alleged behavior of Plaintiff were not terminated.

A discriminatory discharge claim based on comparator evidence requires nearly identical misconduct by an employee outside the protected class who was not discharged.

Keel v. United States Department of Air Force · filed 2003-03-27(a)(1)

The Court finds as a matter of law that Morgan’s conduct of engaging in illusory threats with two different individuals is not nearly identical to Plaintiffs alleged conduct of mailing derogatory and violent threats to a person’s home address on two different occasions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff to show satisfactory job performance and that the employer sought a roughly equally qualified replacement.

Bermudez-Vazquez v. Centennial De Puerto Rico · filed 2003-08-04(a)(1)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a prima facie case for termination based on race under Title VII because they have failed to satisfy prongs two and four as listed above.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; an employee challenging a stated nondiscriminatory reason must offer evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer discrimination.

Taylor v. Local 32E Service Employees International Union · filed 2003-09-30(a)(1)

In sum, Taylor has presented no evidence and this Court has found no evidence from which any rational factfinder could infer that Taylor was treated differently or was fired because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff to show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Payano v. CMHC · filed 2003-10-22(a)(1)

Payano has failed to meet even his minimal burden to raise a prima facie case of employment discrimination because the circumstances of his discharge do not in any way raise an inference of unlawful discrimination.

A racial discrimination claim under Title VII cannot survive summary judgment without a genuine factual dispute about the employer’s motive for termination.

Aime v. Augustana Lutheran Home · filed 2003-10-30(a)(1)

Absent dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact regarding Augustana’s motive for terminating Aime, her Title VII claim cannot survive summary judgement.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence could show that sex or pregnancy bias influenced the decision, even if a staff reduction was also a reason.

Batka v. Prime Charter, Ltd. · filed 2004-02-04(a)(1)

Thus, Prime Charter’s evidence that Batka was but one of several employees terminated in the relevant time period may establish that the need to reduce staff was certainly a factor in Batka’s termination. That alone, however, does not eliminate the factual issue of whether unlawful discrimination also played a role.

An employee is not entitled to summary judgment on a discriminatory termination claim when the employer's evidence could support a finding that it terminated the employee for poor performance and insubordination.

Howard v. City of New York · filed 2004-01-29(a)(1)

The plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to summary judgment on the claim that he was terminated because of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee opposing summary judgment on a discriminatory discharge claim to raise a genuine factual issue that race or sex motivated the discharge.

Allaire v. HSBC Bank · filed 2004-09-27(a)

Regardless of how his claim is styled, however, to avoid summary judgment Allaire had to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether his discharge was motivated by his race or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race, but a discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Mosley v. Meristar Management Company · filed 2005-06-23(a)(1)

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... Because Mosley failed to present evidence indicating that MeriStar’s reasons for her termination were pretextual, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of MeriStar.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory discharge, and a claim may proceed when evidence of discriminatory motive and pretext raises a genuine issue of material fact.

Vergara v. Yonkers Public Schools · filed 2005-06-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of discriminatory motivation on the part of Defendant and has raised a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the trier of fact could find either that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and Defendants’ reasons for Plaintiffs termination are merely pretext or that Plaintiffs proof is insufficient to show discrimination as the reason for her termination. Since all inferences are to be drawn in support of Plaintiff, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence connecting an adverse employment decision to the employee’s race or national origin.

Castlino v. Thomas · filed 2005-07-06(a)(1)

In addition, there is no evidence that the County’s actions were directly or indirectly related to Castlino’s claimed Sicilian national origin or that race or national origin played any role in the Department’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence that similarly situated employees were disciplined less harshly could show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Scott-Riley v. Mullins Food Products, Inc. · filed 2005-10-03(a)

Mullins Food says it fired Scott-Riley because she violated the company’s attendance policy. But, as discussed above, Scott-Riley has put forth evidence indicating that non-black and male employees violated the same attendance policy and were not disciplined. A jury reasonably could find, given this inconsistency, that Seott-Riley’s tardiness was a pretext for gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory termination claim to proceed when evidence of pretext and discriminatory motive would permit a reasonable finder of fact to infer intentional discrimination.

Campbell v. Windham Community Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2005-08-26(a)(1)

Campbell raises issues of fact regarding the defendants’ purported non-discriminatory basis for her termination. She also points to evidence to support an inference that decision-makers at Windham had discriminatory motives in firing her. The rational finder of fact could conclude that her termination was motivated by intentional discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination may establish a prima facie case by showing that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

Moore v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2005-10-04(a)

Since Moore did not provide the district court with any additional evidence, he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that others similarly situated were treated more favorably and cannot establish a prima facie case.

A discriminatory termination claim fails when the employee has no evidence of a similarly situated male employee treated more favorably or other evidence of discrimination.

Pierri v. Cingular Wireless, LLC · filed 2005-10-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendant retained any other male employee who had “nearly identical” violations of the corporate credit card and expense reporting policies. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharge because of race; a discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employee does not prove that race motivated the termination.

Palmer v. Stewart County School District · filed 2006-05-10(a)

Palmer’s argument, while creative, does not render clearly erroneous the district court’s factual finding that she failed to prove that her termination was motivated by race. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s findings regarding Palmer’s race discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

Miller v. Lowe's Home Centers Inc. · filed 2006-06-07(a)(1)

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Miller, the district court correctly granted Lowe’s motion for summary judgment based on Miller’s failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

A discriminatory termination claim under Title VII requires evidence that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment for comparable conduct.

Sullivan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. · filed 2006-05-18(a)(1)

There is no evidence in the record that other employees who were supervised by the same supervisor and who engaged in the same conduct were not terminated. Specifically, Sullivan has failed to come forward with any evidence that other employees exceeded their allotted amount of short-term disability leave, elected not to apply for long-term disability benefits, and were not subsequently terminated. Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Sullivan failed to make out a prima facie case of wrongful termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a racial discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about the employer’s reason for terminating the employee.

Thomas v. Istar Financial, Inc. · filed 2006-07-07(a)(1)

The Court is persuaded that Thomas has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the basis for his termination.

In a discriminatory discharge claim based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must present substantial evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for discrimination.

Fields v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co · filed 2006-10-18(a)(1)

If Appellees meet their burden, then it shifts back to Fields to present substantial evidence that the employer’s reason was nevertheless pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a discrimination claim requires circumstances supporting an inference of racial discrimination.

Boyce v. Bank of New York · filed 2006-11-02(a)(1)

With respect to Boyce’s remaining claims, Boyce cannot show that she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial or age discrimination.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a discriminatory termination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received better treatment for comparable misconduct.

Keith v. MGA, Inc. · filed 2006-11-08(a)(1)

The district court correctly concluded that this fourth element required Keith to establish that similarly situated non-African American employees were retained despite the fact that complaints alleging sexually inappropriate behavior were made against them.

A discriminatory discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee lacks sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for firing her were pretext for discrimination.

Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center · filed 2007-01-19(a)(1)

Because Turner has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to adequately rebut RHA’s contention that she was fired for poor work performance and insubordination, summary judgment in favor of RHA was warranted on the discriminatory discharge claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory-discharge plaintiff to show replacement outside the protected class when an employer reassigns most of the plaintiff’s duties without formally filling the position.

Tolbert v. Briggs and Stratton Corp. · filed 2007-02-08(a)(1)

If an employer could insulate itself from a Title VII suit merely by reassigning a discharged employee’s duties to a white employee but never formally call it a replacement, Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII would be thwarted.

Under § 2000e-2, an employee challenging a termination as sex discrimination must present evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was pretextual.

Hankinson v. Thomas County School System · filed 2007-12-03(a)(1)

Assuming arguendo that Hankinson presented a prima facie case under Title VII, she did not present evidence to rebut Thomas County’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her, namely that it had received numerous complaints about her performance as softball coach.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show pretext after the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.

Suitt v. Honeywell Consumer Products Group · filed 2008-03-17(a)(1)

In sum, Suitt has not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact exists as to pretext. Because Suitt fails to satisfy her pretext burden, summary judgment is appropriate.

A discriminatory termination claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge and the employee presents no evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer pretext.

Isaac v. City of New York · filed 2008-03-26(a)(1)

Isaac, in turn, did not satisfy his burden to present evidence that would permit a rational factfinder to infer that the reasons for his termination were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a discriminatory discharge claim when the employee cannot connect biased remarks to the termination decision or show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Coltin v. Corporation for Justice Management, Inc. · filed 2008-03-31(a)(1)

Accordingly, because the record does not support a connection between the discriminatory treatment and the decision to terminate employment, it cannot, as a matter of law, support a cause of action for discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, or CFEPA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics; a plaintiff challenging a discharge must present evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Salgado-Candelario v. Ericsson Caribbean, Inc. · filed 2008-09-18(a)(1)

From this, plaintiff asks the Court to infer that Ericsson’s stated reason for terminating her is not only pretextual, but also that she was terminated because she fell into the various protected categories. The Court declines to do so.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails when the plaintiff does not establish the fourth element of the prima facie case.

Arora v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2008-09-30(a)(1)

Arora failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the fourth element of a prima facie discrimination claim. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting Starwood’s motion for summary judgment on those claims.

Lighter punishment for other employees does not show pretext under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when their circumstances differ materially from those that led to the plaintiff’s discharge.

Lopez v. ALROD ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2009-03-11(a)(1)

Lopez has failed to carry this burden. First, he does not offer any evidence that could lead one to disbelieve Alrod’s stated reason. His examples of other employees who were punished less severely are fully consistent with Alrod’s explanation. None of them involves FPS’s contracting officer directing Gindrow to remove the employee from the contract.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on race or national origin; a plaintiff must offer evidence that discrimination was the real reason for the discharge.

Toro v. ARNOLD FOODS CO., INC. · filed 2009-04-15(a)(1)

As a result, the court has no basis to conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial on Toro’s discrimination claim, and therefore Arnold is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee cannot establish a prima facie case or show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Portugues-Santa v. B. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. · filed 2009-05-15(a)(1)

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework because he fails to make a prima facie case and also because — even assuming arguendo that he stated a prima facie case — he has not rebutted BFH’s proffered legitimate reason for terminating his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits termination because of race or sex; a claim fails without evidence linking the decision to either trait.

Lew v. Superior Court · filed 2009-10-01(a)(1)

Lew has not set forth any evidence that the Superior Court judges and staff responsible for her termination made their decision on the basis of race or gender, rather than because she could not fulfill her responsibilities as a staff attorney for the court. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriately entered in favor of the Superior Court on Lew’s Title VII/FEHA claims.

A discriminatory discharge plaintiff using the circumstantial evidence framework must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Thompson v. Carrier Corp. · filed 2009-12-23(a)(1)

Thompson failed to establish the fourth prong of the prima facie case, in that she could point to no non-minority coworker who allegedly disobeyed a supervisor’s orders and yet was not terminated.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly link the firing to race.

Drew v. PLAZA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION · filed 2010-01-28

Drew also alleges circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination, including that he was subjected to unusually harsh treatment that his Caucasian coworkers were not, that Defendants could not give him examples of the insubordination for which he was terminated, and that he was ultimately replaced by a member of an unprotected class. ... Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Drew’s discriminatory discharge claim.

A discriminatory termination claim based on comparator evidence requires a similarly situated worker outside the plaintiff’s protected class who was treated more favorably.

DeLEON v. ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. · filed 2010-02-09(a)(1)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to point to a similarly-situated individual outside their protected class that was treated more favorably, they have not established a prima facie case of discrimination.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails at summary judgment when the employee presents insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the employer’s stated reason pretextual.

Ade v. Kidspeace Corp. · filed 2010-03-10(a)(1)

In short, plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparator evidence in a discharge claim to identify an employee outside the protected class who engaged in nearly identical misconduct but was treated more favorably.

Zeigler v. Alabama Department of Human Resources · filed 2010-04-29(a)

The court finds that the evidence of misconduct engaged in by these white comparators does not create a question of fact as to whether their conduct is “nearly identical” to the misconduct engaged in by Zeigler on the basis of both the quantity and the quality of the misconduct. ... Thus, Zeigler has failed to meet his burden of pointing to a white employee who engaged in the same or similar conduct, and the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Zeigler’s wrongful termination claim is due to be GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars discharge because of race, and workplace racial tension alone does not show that an employer fired an employee for that reason.

Hervey v. Mississippi Department of Education · filed 2010-12-13(a)(1)

Hervey devoted most of her briefs in our court discussing racial problems on campus, but such problems do not create the requisite genuine issue of material fact on whether Drs. Bounds and Buckley terminated her “because of” her race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Under Title VII, an employee does not establish pretext merely by disputing a work rule violation when the employer reasonably relied on its investigation in deciding to terminate her.

Bush v. Houston County Commission · filed 2011-02-15(a)(1)

Moreover, Bush’s attempt to establish pretext by showing that she did not violate the use-of-force policy also fell short. Even if Bush subsequently told the defendants that she sprayed the inmate in order to protect herself, nothing in the record suggested that the defendants did not reasonably terminate her based on the results of their investigation and the account in her initial incident report.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a discharge motivated by race; disagreement with the employer’s decision alone does not establish discrimination.

Suggs v. Lowndes County School District · filed 2011-04-11(a)(1)

While Plaintiff may not agree with the School Board’s ultimate resolution, the School Board’s decision only runs afoul of Title VII if it was based on improper motives that the statute proscribes.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits summary judgment on a discrimination claim when the employee fails to rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Iqbal v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc. · filed 2011-07-14(a)

Plaintiff has also failed to present any authenticated exhibit or affidavit that rebuts Defendant’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate proficiency with the glass cockpit, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. There are no genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiffs claims of race, national origin, accent, religious, and age discrimination, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment on a pretext theory without evidence that the employer’s stated reason concealed unlawful discrimination.

Kim-Foraker v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2011-07-15(a)(1)

Kim-Foraker presented no evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact that Allstate’s proffered legitimate reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-based discharge claim to proceed when evidence of unequal discipline and an incomplete investigation could show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Woods v. Von Maur, Inc. · filed 2011-08-24(a)(1)

That Von Maur did not follow up on an obvious line of investigation allows an inference, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, that the purchase was a pretext for firing Woods based on her race.

A discriminatory-discharge claim requires the employee to show that he was meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations when discharged, judged from the employer’s perspective.

Jones v. DOLE FOOD CO., INC. · filed 2011-10-27(a)(1)

The pivotal inquiry here is whether at the time of his discharge plaintiff was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. Such element requires the court to focus on the employer’s perceptions, not the perceptions of the employee. ... As discussed at length above, plaintiff was not meeting the legitimate expectations of his employer at the time he was discharged.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence connecting a discharge to the employee’s protected status; subjective suspicions of discrimination do not create a genuine issue of fact.

Dellapenna v. Tredyffrin/easttown School Dis · filed 2011-10-28(a)

At bottom, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Dellapenna was fired because of her race, national origin, or gender.

A discriminatory discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment without admissible evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Igwe v. Saint Anthony's Hospital · filed 2012-01-31

Plaintiff has not met her burden of pointing to some admissible evidence showing that SAH’s proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on her discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII, § 1981 and state law. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the same reasons stated in its published order granting SAH’s motion for summary judgment.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee claiming discriminatory discharge through indirect proof must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations and that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment.

Bhat v. Incorporat · filed 2012-03-28(a)(1)

Even if Bhat could show that she was meeting Accenture’s legitimate expectations, she cannot establish that there were similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably.

A Title VII discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employee does not rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination.

Tyrone White v. Planned Security Ser · filed 2012-05-03(a)(1)

We need not address whether White made out a prima facie of discrimination because we agree with the District Court that, even if he had done so, White failed to rebut PSS‟s stated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment -- i.e., his admitted public altercation with Glencamp and his failure to correct his behavior despite repeated warnings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; an employee must offer specific evidence of discriminatory motive to survive summary judgment when the employer gives a legitimate reason.

Delphin v. Grayson County, Texas · filed 2012-08-07(a)(1)

Without specific evidence that Delphin’s discharge was racially motivated, Grayson County is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for a discharge was pretextual or that race was the true reason for the discharge.

Harris v. Powhatan County School Board · filed 2012-08-07(a)(1)

Harris claims that his termination is an act of racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. This claim is unsuccessful as Harris neither discredits the Board’s proffered justification for eliminating his position nor shows that the Board’s true reason for the adverse employment action was discriminatory.

A discriminatory discharge claim based on comparator evidence requires employees outside the protected class who engaged in nearly identical misconduct but were treated differently.

Beckles v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2012-09-11(a)(1)

Accordingly, Beckles did not establish valid comparators, and the district court did not err when it determined that Beckles failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a discharge as race discrimination to present evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Hart v. Broadway Services, Inc. · filed 2012-09-26(a)(1)

Because Mr. Hart does nothing more than allege discrimination, he cannot meet his burden under McDonnell Douglas of countering Broadway’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim of race discrimination with regard to his termination fails, and Broadway is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

A national origin discriminatory discharge claim requires facts permitting an inference that national origin motivated the termination.

Alfonso v. SCC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co. · filed 2012-12-17(a)(1)

However, ás to plaintiffs national origin claim, there are no facts permitting an inference that defendant’s termination decision was motivated by plaintiffs national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly show satisfactory job performance, race-based termination, and different treatment of employees outside the protected class.

Tims v. Carolinas Healthcare System · filed 2013-10-16(a)(1)

Taking those facts as true, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allege a claim for discriminatory discharge. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with regard to this claim.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails without a prima facie showing that the termination was racially motivated.

Peters v. Healthsouth of Dothan, Inc. · filed 2013-10-10(a)(1)

Based on the arguments presented to the district court, HealthSouth was entitled to summary judgment on Peters’ discriminatory discharge claim because she failed to make a prima facie showing that her termination was racially motivated.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails when the employee cannot show an inference of discriminatory intent or rebut the employer’s legitimate reason for firing him.

Dellaporte v. City University of New York · filed 2014-02-21(a)(1)

However, this issue of fact is immaterial because Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, and has failed to rebut Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him.

A racial discharge claim may proceed when evidence that an employee met attendance requirements could show that the employer’s stated reason for firing her was pretextual.

Gosey v. Aurora Medical Center · filed 2014-04-11(a)(1)

By introducing evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would show that she was complying with Aurora’s attendance requirements, Gosey also satisfied her burden to present evidence that she was meeting Aurora’s legitimate employment expectations, that she was similarly situated to all other employees who arrived on time but were not fired, and that Aurora’s supposed reason for firing her is pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim when the alleged facts plausibly show that similarly situated employees of another race or national origin were spared in a workforce reduction.

Brown v. Daikin America Inc. · filed 2014-06-27(a)(1)

We conclude, therefore, that Brown has stated a plausible claim of discrimination against both DIL and Daikin America. Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s Title VII claim against DIL and Daikin America, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based discharge; a discriminatory termination claim can fail when the employee identifies no similarly situated comparator and offers no evidence undermining the employer’s good faith belief in the cited misconduct.

Winborn v. Supreme Beverage Company Inc. · filed 2014-07-14(a)

The district court did not err in concluding that Winborn did not establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory termination. He failed to identify Caucasian comparators who were treated more favorably after engaging in substantially similar misconduct. Moreover, there was nothing in the material before the district court on summary judgment to suggest that his supervisors did not hold a good faith belief that he had committed the misconduct for which they terminated him.

A discriminatory discharge claim can proceed when evidence permits a jury to find that a similarly situated employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class received more favorable treatment and that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Sims v. Quality Trans, Inc. · filed 2014-09-05(a)(1)

The Court finds genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether he is a proper comparator, and thus Plaintiff satisfies her prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on religion or national origin; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, the employee must show evidence of pretext to avoid summary judgment.

Chawla v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2014-09-22(a)(1)

The burden therefore shifts back to Dr. Chawla to show that LMC’s stated reasons are pretext for unlawful discrimination. ... Dr. Chawla fails to meet his burden of showing either pretext or a genuine dispute of material fact.

A discriminatory termination claim under the indirect method requires the employee to show satisfactory job performance and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Mustafa v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board · filed 2014-09-17(a)(1)

Likewise, here, Mustafa has fallen short of meeting his burden of demonstrating that he was meeting PTAB’s legitimate expectations. Thus, he was required to identify potential comparators in order to meet his burden under the indirect method. Mustafa’s failure to identify any potential comparators also dooms his case under the indirect method.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated an employee’s discharge.

Powell v. American Remediation & Environmental, Inc. · filed 2014-11-20(a)(1)

In sum, Powell has failed to submit sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that ARE’s termination decision was based on race.

An independent disciplinary committee’s decision based on undisputed misconduct can defeat an inference that a supervisor’s discriminatory motive caused an employee’s discharge.

Daniel v. T & M Protection Resources LLC · filed 2015-02-19(a)(1)

Although the disciplinary committee’s independent decision alone warrants granting summary judgment on this claim, for several reasons the Court separately concludes that, to the extent Melidones was responsible for the decision to terminate Daniel, Daniel has not provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that Melidones was motivated by racial animus when he supported firing Daniel.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof that race motivated a discharge; an incorrect termination decision alone does not establish racial discrimination.

Harris v. Fedex Freight, Inc. · filed 2015-06-17(a)(1)

The fact that Plaintiff may be able to show that FedEx Freight incorrectly terminated his employment does not necessarily show, without more, that the decision was based on race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a complaint must plausibly allege that race motivated the firing.

Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2015-08-24(a)(1)

In sum, Ruffin has failed to plausibly allege that Lockheed terminated her because of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence could show that the employer’s stated reason for eliminating a position was pretextual.

Dyer v. City of Gastonia · filed 2016-02-29(a)

The court thus finds that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of showing pretext at this stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court will allow Plaintiffs claim for discriminatory discharge to proceed and deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment, but a discriminatory discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment when the plaintiff offers no admissible evidence casting doubt on the employer’s legitimate reason for termination.

James v. Tri-Way Metalworkers, Inc. · filed 2016-05-26(a)

While Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to establish a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision”, Plaintiff does not present any admissible evidence to demonstrate “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence”, see Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that an employee would not have been fired if the employee’s race were different and everything else remained the same.

Lane v. Riverview Hospital · filed 2016-08-26(a)

The core issue is whether Lane has offered evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that he would not have been fired if he were not African American and everything else remained the same.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory discharge, but a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

White v. Washington Nursing Facility · filed 2016-08-31(a)(1)

White has adduced no evidence contradicting his employer’s honestly held belief that he falsified patient care entries and, in so doing, exhibited dishonesty, which the Employee Handbook lists as a ground for immediate discharge. Thus, no reasonable jury presented with these facts could find that WNF’s reason for terminating White was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a national-origin discrimination claim to reach a jury when evidence of departures from usual employment practices could support an inference that national origin partly motivated a termination.

Pineda v. Byrne Dairy, Inc. · filed 2016-08-31(a)(1)

But because Byrne did not allow drivers to bid on at least one of the available routes given to a non-Hispanic driver and did not consider the drivers’ qualifications, if plaintiffs allegations about Byrne’s typical practices and his superior qualifications were credited over Byrne’s, a reasonable jury could infer the decision to terminate him was based in part on national origin discrimination.

In a Title VII discriminatory discharge claim, an employer may support its nondiscriminatory reason for termination with admissible evidence showing its good-faith belief in that reason.

Holmes v. Branch Banking and Trust Company · filed 2016-12-09(a)(1)

Having concluded that Defendant has carried its burden of offering a non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination with admissible evidence, the court turns to whether Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to rebut that explanation.

A discriminatory discharge claim requires evidence that race was the real reason for termination, even when the employer’s stated reason is disputed.

Scott v. District Hospital Partners, L.P. · filed 2016-12-29(a)(1)

Scott must point to evidence showing not only that the hospital’s stated basis for her termination was pretextual, but also that the real reason was unlawful—namely, that it was the product of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discharge because of race; a race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Turner v. Enzler · filed 2017-02-21(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment were pretextual and find for Plaintiff on her factually unsupported claims of race and age discrimination; therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on sex and requires evidence that sex motivated the employer’s decision.

Smyth-Riding v. Sciences and Engineering Services · filed 2017-08-17(a)(1)

As for her failure of proof, the record contains no affirmative evidence that SES terminated Smyth-Riding’s employment because she was a woman.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for race or sex discrimination when the employer offers a legitimate reason.

Stewart v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center · filed 2018-03-26

In response, Stewart has failed to identify any evidence suggesting that the true reason for her discharge was unlawful discrimination (either racial or gender-based).

Prior tenure does not establish qualification for a Title VII discriminatory discharge claim when the job's requirements changed substantially before termination.

Thomas v. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc. · filed 2018-09-06(a)(1)

However, here Plaintiff cannot rely on her tenure with Defendant because she admits that the qualifications for her position changed drastically after the mainframe was decommissioned in 2014, two years prior to her discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that gender or national origin was a basis for termination to sustain a discriminatory discharge claim.

Gogel v. Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc. · filed 2018-09-24(a)(1)

There is evidence that Ms. Gogel suffered discrimination based on her gender and national origin during her employment at Kia. But there is no evidence suggesting that discrimination formed a basis for her termination.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that discrimination motivated an employee’s discharge.

Vasquez v. Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. · filed 2018-11-14

As the district court correctly noted, the record would not allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that unlawful discrimination influenced the decision to fire Vasquez.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; failure to meet sales targets is a legitimate reason for termination absent evidence of pretext.

Coss v. Briggs Healthcare · filed 2018-11-21(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not genuinely dispute that her sales numbers were inadequate because she did not meet the sales targets that were set for her. That is a perfectly legitimate reason for termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to reach a jury when the evidence as a whole could show that race caused the firing.

Turner v. The American Bottling Company · filed 2019-02-26(a)(1)

That evidence, when considered along with the evidence suggesting that Graham used Hughes’s investigation to launder his true intent, would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiffs’ protected characteristics, race and age, “caused the[ir] discharge.”

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2 cannot rely on a coworker’s different treatment without evidence that the coworker was directly comparable in all material respects.

Keenan Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2019-04-24(a)(1)

Brown also asserts, generally, that Wal-Mart treated him differently from his similarly situated coworker in the bakery department who slapped his hand and was the subject of his complaints but not fired. But here too he failed to point to evidence to suggest that she was “directly comparable to [him] in all material respects.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A discriminatory discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that could support a finding that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Barreto v. SGT, Inc. · filed 2019-07-19(a)(1)

Accordingly, Barreto can defeat summary judgment by presenting some evidence that SGT’s proffered reasons were pretextual. ... Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Barreto, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that SGT fired Barreto for discriminatory reasons. Summary judgment is entered in SGT’s favor on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars race or color discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that reason is pretextual.

Gilbert v. State of Alabama Department of Human Resources · filed 2019-07-25(a)

As a result, Gilbert has not shown that the proffered reasons for her discharge are implausible or unworthy of credence, or that DHR acted with a discriminatory purpose.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge claim to allege that the employer acted because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Graham v. Lear Corporation · filed 2020-01-06(a)(1)

Even the most liberal reading of the Complaint fails to reveal an inference of different or discriminatory treatment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Complaint does not identify any protected class to which the Plaintiff belongs, if any.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that a protected characteristic caused the adverse employment action.

Ibrahim v. The University of Chicago · filed 2020-01-24(a)

Considering the evidence as a whole, because Ibrahim fails to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the University discriminated against him based on his sex, religion or national origin, the Court need not consider the University’s remaining arguments, and its motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of race or sex; a discriminatory firing claim requires evidence supporting a prima facie case or showing that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Hoskins v. Eugene Droder, III · filed 2020-02-07(a)(1)

This evidence does not create a prima facie case that Hoskins was fired based on her race or gender. Even if she had made a prima facie case, Hoskins did not produce any evidence that GE’s non-discriminatory reason for her firing—excessive absences and tardiness—was pretextual or that race was also a motivating factor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits race and sex discrimination claims to proceed when evidence creates a jury question about whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Perry v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana · filed 2020-07-14(a)(1)

After considering the parties’ arguments as well as the record materials, the Court finds plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether TSG’s articulated reason for terminating plaintiff’s employment was pretext for discrimination and/or retaliation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence linking a discharge to a protected characteristic such as race or sex.

Jeffries v. Federal Emergency Management Agency · filed 2020-07-24(a)(1)

Jeffries, however, can point to no evidence that she was fired on account of her race or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; allegations supporting a reasonable inference of racial motivation can state a plausible claim.

THOMAS v. EAST PENN MANUFACTURING CO. · filed 2020-07-28(a)(1)

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly claim that she was terminated because of her race, not because she was performing unsatisfactorily at work.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that a discriminatory motive based on sex or national origin led to an employee’s firing to support a discriminatory discharge claim.

Gogel v. KIA Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc. · filed 2020-07-29(a)

Concluding that there was no evidence that a discriminatory motive based on Gogel’s sex or national origin led to her being fired, the panel opinion held that summary judgment was warranted as to any termination claim based on those grounds. ... We agree with and adopt both of these rulings by the panel.

When an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for a discharge, the employee must show that those were not the true reasons for the decision.

Kramer-Navarro v. Bolger · filed 1984-05-10(a)

It was plaintiff’s burden “to demonstrate that the proffered reason[s] w[ere] not the true reason[s] for the employment decision.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer discharged a person because of race or color.

Flynn v. Memphis Pathology Laboratory (AEL) · filed 2020-09-29(a)(1)

Because there are no factual allegations to support different treatment based on race or color, the Title VII termination claims are DISMISSED.