42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A racial discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that race caused the firing to survive summary judgment.

Edwards v. Indiana University · filed 2020-10-01(a)

But to avoid summary judgment on this claim, he needed to produce evidence that the University fired him because of his race—in other words evidence “considered as a whole, [that] ‘would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [Edwards’s] race . . . caused [his] discharge.’” Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2018) ... (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)). Edwards has not met this burden.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Affiah v. Texas Southmost College · filed 2020-11-06(a)

It is illegal under Title VII for an employer to discharge an employee because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). ... Affiah points to no evidence that can support his claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires plausible facts showing that an employee was terminated because of race or color.

Hector v. Wolf · filed 2020-12-10(a)(1)

With respect to plaintiff's first claim, plaintiff must allege plausible facts demonstrating that he was terminated because of his race or color. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); MeCleary- Evans v. Md. Dep't of Trans., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff's claim in this regard fails and the motion to dismiss must be granted.

A race discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when the plaintiff raises a genuine factual dispute under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Foster v. Sumner Village Community Association, Inc. · filed 2021-02-17(a)(1)

Because Foster has met her burden at this stage under the McDonnell Douglas, the Court need not reach whether Foster’s discrimination claims would also survive a mixed-motive analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when evidence could show that an employer fired a white employee because of her race despite citing a reduction in workforce.

Wethje v. CACI-ISS, Inc. · filed 2021-02-24(a)(1)

If this liability theory is believed, then a reasonable juror could find that CACI did not treat Wethje’s race neutrally because her race was indeed the animating force behind her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a claim fails without evidence connecting the discharge to race.

Taylor v. Davies · filed 2021-03-29(a)(1)

But even assuming that CDS/CES fired Taylor, Taylor has offered neither argument nor evidence showing that his discharge was because of his race.

Race can be a motivating factor in a termination even when other factors also influenced the decision; an employer may be liable when a supervisor’s biased recommendation was intended to cause, and did cause, the termination.

Blash v. Cape · filed 2021-04-21(m)

In other words, the jury could find that that the Sheriff’s Office was liable under Title VII because Brannen’s biased recommendation was intended to cause, and did cause Blash’s termination, and because Blash’s race was at least “a motivating factor” for his termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge based on race or national origin; an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for discharge must show that reason was pretextual.

LaChica v. Chocolates · filed 2021-04-27(a)(1)

LaChica’s claims, considered “as a whole,” fail to show that Russell Stover’s reason for terminating him was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race or national origin; without direct evidence, a plaintiff must show satisfactory job performance and, if the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason, pretext.

Kariuki v. North Carolina Department of Insurance · filed 2021-08-25(a)(1)

Title VI prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment action against an employee “because of” such individual’s race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kariuki, Kariuki has not established his prima facie case. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to the NCDOI on Kariuki’s race and national origin discrimination claims.

An employee claiming sex discrimination in a discharge must present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that gender motivated the decision, even if the employer’s stated reason was false.

Moss v. VB Franchise Development LLC · filed 2021-09-08(a)(1)

But even assuming Moss is correct that LeVan fabricated the reason, because Moss does not allege facts to support a reasonable inference that Le Van discharged her because of gender discrimination, she has failed to meet her burden.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, a Title VII discrimination claim turns on whether the employee has evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Cheatham v. Nielsen · filed 2021-09-13(a)(1)

Defendants’ have set forth legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Cheatham’s termination. ... Thus, whether Cheatham made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant, and the Court turns directly to the issue of whether he has produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that FEMA’s stated reason was not the actual reason for his termination, but rather pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory-discharge claim to proceed when alleged comments, considered together, plausibly show that sex motivated the discharge.

Belov v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc. · filed 2021-10-13(a)(1)

With those guideposts in mind, the Court concludes that Williams’s comments — when taken together and in combination with granting Plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn in her favor from the Complaint — support a plausible claim of sex discrimination.

An employee claiming discriminatory discharge under Title VII must offer evidence from which a jury could find that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

HANKERSON v. LEGACY TREATMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2021-10-20(a)(1)

In sum, we conclude that Hankerson has failed to point to evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Legacy’s articulated non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment was actually pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to plausibly connect the firing to a protected characteristic.

Jeanty v. Bottini Fuel Oil · filed 2021-11-05(a)

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that Defendants discriminated against him because he does not allege that his race, color, or national origin were motivating factors in the decision to fire him. He instead alleges that Defendants fired him because he refused to drive in the snow.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim must plausibly connect an adverse employment action to discrimination based on a protected trait.

Lazarte v. Montgomery County Public Schools · filed 2021-12-06(a)(1)

She has not, therefore, alleged facts that would plausibly establish a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory conduct and her termination.

A plaintiff relying on a comparator to establish a prima facie claim of racially discriminatory termination must identify a similarly situated employee outside her protected class who received more favorable treatment.

Handy v. Alabama Department of Labor · filed 2021-12-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s failure to identify a proper comparator is fatal to her prima facie case alleging a racially discriminatory firing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory discharge claim to reach a jury when the evidence could show that discrimination was a motivating factor in the termination.

Bautista v. Chanel, Inc. · filed 2022-02-08(a)(1)

The record evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor in Plaintiff’s termination.

A complaint plausibly alleges discriminatory discharge under Title VII when the alleged circumstances support an inference of race or sex discrimination; the plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage.

Loecker v. Colorado Mesa University · filed 2022-03-22(a)(1)

At the motion to dismiss phase, a plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case to prove her claim for disparate treatment under Title VII. ... In light of the foregoing—and given the minimal burden that Plaintiff bears at this stage—Plaintiff has plausibly alleged circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-based unlawful termination claim when the alleged facts plausibly suggest that the employer discharged the employee because of race.

Holloway v. State of Maryland · filed 2022-04-25(a)(1)

To state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Bing, 959 F.3d at 616–617.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence from which a jury could find that an employer fired an employee because of a protected characteristic; a stated reason must be shown to be pretextual.

Graham v. Coca-Cola Consolidated · filed 2022-06-24(a)

Graham needed to furnish evidence that these stated reasons were pretextual—that Marty did not believe them.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of race or sex.

Grose v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2022-07-11(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”) make it unlawful to discharge an employee because of the employee’s race or sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

A race-based discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive dismissal when the pleaded facts plausibly suggest racial animus, without establishing a prima facie case.

Nelson v. Bollman Hat Factory · filed 2022-07-18(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharge[ing] any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... However, a complaint does not need to establish a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss because a prima facie case “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790 (citation omitted). ... Plaintiff’s alleged facts, taken as true as required at the pleading stage, raise a reasonable expectation that discovery could reveal evidence of racial animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of her sex; an employee challenging the employer’s stated reasons must show they were pretextual.

Gladden v. The Proctor & Gamble Distributing, LLC · filed 2022-07-27(a)(1)

We hold that even if Gladden established a prima facie case of discriminatory or retaliatory discharge, both claims fail because she hasn’t shown that P&G’s stated reasons for firing her were pre- textual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because of sex.

AMIOTT v. NSK AMERICAS INC. · filed 2022-08-22(a)(1)

Title VII and the ADEA prohibit an employer from terminating an employee because of the employee's sex or age, respectively.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of sex; the evidence must permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that sex caused the discharge.

Moody v. Indiana Department of Correction · filed 2022-09-02(a)(1)

The court must determine “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude” that Ms. Moody’s sex “caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. The record doesn’t reasonably permit this finding.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racial discrimination in employment, and a discriminatory discharge claim survives dismissal when the alleged facts plausibly show that racial animus motivated the firing.

Cromartie v. Correction · filed 2022-09-14(a)(1)

When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the proffered reason for the adverse action was pretextual and motivated by racial animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race or sex.

Williams v. Westchester Medical Center Health Network · filed 2022-09-27(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discharging any individual “because of such individual’s race” or “sex.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex caused the challenged employment action; a discrimination claim fails when the evidence cannot support that finding.

Badanish v. Lake County Juvenile Detention Center · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

The Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Judge Stefaniak took her sexual orientation into consideration when deciding to fire her and has failed to demonstrate that his stated explanation was a pretext for discrimination. The Court thus concludes that a reasonable factfinder could not attribute the Plaintiff’s firing to sex discrimination and grants summary judgment in favor of all Defendants on the Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discharging an individual because of race or sex.

Johnson v. Rockland County BOCES · filed 2022-09-28(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discharging any individual “because of such individual’s race” or “sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

A sex or national origin discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the protected trait caused the adverse action.

Gonzalez v. Dhillon · filed 2022-09-23(a)(1)

But Gonzalez has failed to offer any evidence, circumstantial or direct, that would permit a reasonable finding that she was terminated because she was a Mexican woman. Nor has Gonzalez offered evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that she was treated less favorably regarding her attendance issues from similarly situated employees outside her classes or that the agency's proffered reason for terminating her was pretextual, contrived, or inconsistent. Accordingly, the EEOC is entitled to summary judgment on Gonzalez's Title VII discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharge because of race, and evidence that an employer treated employees differently by race can support a discrimination claim despite its stated performance reason.

ANDREWS v. PNC NATIONAL BANK, N.A. · filed 2022-10-06(a)

Accordingly, summary judgment in PNC’s favor on Andrews’ discrimination claim under Title VII claim is inappropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence linking an adverse employment decision to a protected characteristic; a discriminatory termination claim can be supported by evidence of a replacement outside the protected group or less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees.

DeVries v. Harris County, TX · filed 2022-11-29(a)(1)

But Plaintiff does not demonstrate that she was either replaced by a person who was not a member of her protected group or treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin, but a discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that he met the employer’s legitimate expectations.

Pak, Jae v. McDonough, Denis · filed 2023-02-16(a)

Therefore, Pak’s discrimination claim fails because of overwhelming, undisputed evidence that he was not meeting VAMC’s legitimate employment expectations.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires evidence that sex was a motivating factor in an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it.

Cromartie v. Central Alabama Food Services · filed 2023-08-11(m)

Cromartie fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his sex motivated his termination. Therefore, summary judgment will be entered in favor of CAFS.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory discharge claim to proceed when a reasonable jury could find that sex was a motivating factor in the termination.

Carmody v. New York University · filed 2023-09-07(a)(1)

Plaintiff offers sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that prohibited discrimination was at least one of the motivating factors in her termination.

A discriminatory discharge claim must plausibly allege that the employer fired the plaintiff because of race; allegations of bias among employees are insufficient without facts linking that bias to the decisionmakers.

Krehbiel v. BrightKey, Inc. · filed 2023-11-17(a)(1)

Thus, Krehbiel had to plausibly allege that he was terminated “‘because of’” his race to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). ... But Krehbiel’s vague and conclusory allegations fail to plausibly allege that the unidentified superiors who fired him shared the unidentified employees’ bias.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race, sex, or national origin; a discrimination claim fails if the evidence cannot support a finding that a protected trait caused the discharge.

STRINGHAM v. CARMEL CLAY SCHOOLS · filed 2024-01-04(a)(1)

The Court's evaluation of the evidence, presented as a whole and providing all reasonable inferences to Stringham as the non-moving party, convinces it a trier of fact could not conclude that Defendants terminated her for impermissible reasons. The Court finds no genuine issues of material facts in dispute and thus grants summary judgment for Defendants on Stringham's Title VII discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that an employee’s color or national origin caused an adverse employment action.

Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital · filed 2024-03-05(a)(1)

Based on the record, and considering everything as a whole, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Lohmeier’s national origin or color caused her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of race or religion; a discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Burnett v. Franciscan Alliance Inc · filed 2024-03-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext, and the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on her § 1981, Title VII, and ADEA discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer discharged a worker because of race or sex.

Miller v. Nelson · filed 2024-03-27(a)(1)

In sum, Miller does not plausibly allege facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that he was terminated because of his race or sex. His Title VII discriminatory termination claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; a racial discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

Beddingfield v. SOG Surgical Center, LLC · filed 2024-08-22(a)(1)

For these reasons, the Court must grant SOG’s motion for summary judgment as Ms. Beddingfield has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, nor has she offered evidence that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge was actually a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discharge complaint to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the employer terminated the employee because of sex.

Foster v. Wiedefeld · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

However, the Amended Complaint offers no facts to support an inference that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on account of his sex.

Section 2000e-2 covers sexual orientation discrimination, but a discriminatory discharge claim requires facts connecting the termination to that discrimination.

Lawson v. American Airlines · filed 2024-11-25(a)(1)

While Plaintiff belongs to a protected class on the basis of sexual orientation, the Complaint lacks any substance linking his termination to sex discrimination beyond mere speculation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the employee plausibly alleges that a coworker of another race was retained despite more serious conduct.

Martin v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources · filed 2025-01-29(a)(1)

At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff's allegation is sufficient to state a claim of discrimination under Title VIL.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination discharge claim to proceed when a supervisor’s harassment and firing threats plausibly connect the later discharge to sex, even if the complaint does not identify the supervisor as the decisionmaker.

Parker v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. · filed 2025-02-04(a)(1)

While Plaintiff does not specifically allege that Smith made the decision to terminate him, Plaintiff’s allegations that Smith, as Plaintiff’s supervisor, harassed him and subsequently made threats to take employment action during his probationary period—which inevitably did occur—are sufficient to allege a plausible inference of sex discrimination in termination.

A racial-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment when no reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason for the employment action was pretextual.

Saint Hubert v. 1754 Properties LLC · filed 2025-07-14(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... However, it finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment under the final step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, because a reasonable jury could not conclude that Defendant’s proffered reason for the furlough and termination was pretextual.

A race-based discriminatory discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that race motivated the termination or that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Morris v. BorgWarner, Inc. · filed 2025-07-25(a)(1)

Because there is no evidence that the decisionmaker’s decision to fire Plaintiffs was on the basis of their race or pretextual, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; replacement by someone outside the employee’s protected class can establish a prima facie case but does not alone create a triable issue of discrimination.

Taitague v. City of New London · filed 2025-08-12(a)(1)

As a result, even though evidence of Taitague’s replacement by Guzman is sufficient to support a prima facie case, it does not suffice to create a triable issue of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that race caused an employee’s termination.

Richards v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2025-09-16

In sum, considering Richards's evidence as a whole, no reasonable jury could find that IDOC discriminated against him on the basis of race when it terminated his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discriminatory discharge plaintiff proceeding without direct evidence to show that she met her employer’s legitimate job expectations.

Barringer-Brown v. Southside Virginia Community College · filed 2025-09-24(a)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim fails because Plaintiff has not established that her job performance was satisfactory at the time of her discharge.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discriminatory discharge finding when sex was a motivating factor in the termination, even if other factors also motivated it.

Krause v. Kelahan · filed 2025-12-03(m)

During trial, Krause had to adduce sufficient evidence for a jury to find by a preponderance that she was discharged because of her sex: that is, that sex was at least “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to terminate her, even if “other factors also motivated” her termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In light of the evidence presented at trial, the jury could reasonably conclude as it did: that Krause’s sex was a motivating factor here.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits firing an employee based on protected characteristics such as race, color, national origin or gender.

Zaal · filed 2026-01-13(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits firing people based on protected characteristics, like race, color, national origin or gender. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a); see also 29 U.S.C. §623(a). ... But the plaintiff has not alleged that she was fired for discriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer defending a disparate impact claim to show that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

RAMOS v. WALMART INC. · filed 2023-03-02(k)(1)(A)(i)

Plaintiffs have persuasively argued that, though they may pre-date the Class Period, any documents and information concerning the initial formulation of the CBCP and the adjudication criteria used by Walmart to screen Plaintiffs and the putative Class, as well as subsequent revisions to the procedures and criteria, relate directly to Walmart’s demonstration of business necessity, that is, to its burden of showing that the CBCP was tailored to the requirements of the job in question and intended to accurately identify applicants whose criminal histories presented an unacceptable level of risk.

In a disparate impact claim, the employer must show that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory impact.

RAMOS v. WALMART INC. · filed 2023-03-02(k)(1)(A)(i)

Proving liability on this claim requires a shifting burden of proof analysis: once Plaintiffs have made a prima facie demonstration that implementation of the background check policy has resulted in significantly discriminatory hiring, Walmart must show that its policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity, i.e., that the criteria applied in the challenged practice are those that “define the minimum qualifications necessary to perform the job.”

An employer can satisfy the disparate impact business necessity defense by showing that its layoff practice reasonably reflects its staffing needs.

Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Board Of Education City Of Chicago · filed 2020-01-03(k)(1)(A)(i)

Under these standards, defendant meets its burden of showing that its enrollment-based layoff practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

An employer’s exclusion of an applicant disqualified from bank employment under Section 19 qualifies as a business necessity under Title VII.

Noel v. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Incorporated · filed 2019-10-16(k)(1)(A)(i)

Accordingly, the Court finds that MUFG’s employment exclusion qualifies as a business necessity.

An employer's legitimate business justifications defeat a disparate impact claim when the employees present no contrary evidence.

Abril-Rivera v. Johnson · filed 2015-11-17(k)(1)(A)(i)

We reject the disparate impact claim because, regardless of whether plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of impact, defendants have presented legitimate business justifications for their actions, and there is no contrary evidence.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) allows an employer to rebut a disparate-impact showing by establishing that the challenged practice is job related.

Gulino v. Board of Education of the City School District · filed 2015-08-07(k)(1)(A)(i)

The Court does not need to decide the issue, however, because the Court holds 'that the ALST is job related. This is sufficient to rebut any showing of disparate impact Plaintiffs might have made.

A drug test meets the job-relatedness requirement when it measures a characteristic important to job performance.

Jones v. City of Boston · filed 2015-08-06(k)(1)(A)(i)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that drug testing aims to measure a characteristic that is an important element of work behavior and job performance. The job-relatedness requirement therefore is met.

When an employment test has a disparate impact, its proponent must show that the test is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Gulino v. Board of Education · filed 2015-06-05(k)(1)(A)(i)

The burden then shifts to the proponent of the test to demonstrate that the test was “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also M.O.C.H.A. Soc’y II, 689 F.3d at 274. The BOE has failed to make such a showing.

An employer defending a disparate impact claim must show that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity; a policy barring employment based on remote convictions may not satisfy that defense as a matter of law.

Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools · filed 2013-04-24(k)(1)(A)(i)

An employer may defend against a prima facie showing of disparate impact only by showing that the challenged practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). ... Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant’s policy constituted a business necessity.

Section 2000e-2(k) treats business necessity as an employer’s affirmative defense to a disparate impact claim; the defense supports dismissal only when it is clear from the complaint.

Davis v. District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency,et Al · filed 2013-02-27(k)

Instead, the District argues that both the reduction and the increased requirements were business necessities. That is an affirmative defense on which the District bears the burden of proof, see Segar, 738 F.2d at 1298, and therefore inappropriate on a motion to dismiss unless “the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint.” Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer defending a promotion process against a disparate impact claim to produce evidence that the process is job related.

Paige v. California · filed 2002-07-18(k)(1)(A)(i)

Therefore, on the record before us, the defendants have failed to meet their burden of production demonstrating that the promotional process is "job related."

In a disparate impact case, an employer must show that a challenged employment practice is job related and serves a genuine business need.

Paige v. California · filed 2002-05-31(k)(1)(A)(i)

We also hold that the defendants have failed to demonstrate that the promotional process at issue fulfills a genuine business need; thus, they also are not entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires an employer to justify a hiring test with a disparate racial impact by showing that its cutoff score is related to the skills needed for the job.

Green v. Town of Hamden · filed 1999-08-09(k)

The burden of proof in disparate impact cases is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). ... Since defendants have not offered any evidence of how the cutoff score furthered the business necessity of testing for the minimum competence levels for firefighters, the Court finds plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their disparate impact claim.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer defending a discriminatory cutoff score to show that it measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful job performance.

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1999-06-29(k)(1)(A)(i)

Accordingly, we hold that the business necessity standard adopted by the Act must be interpreted in accordance with the standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Griggs and its pre-Wards Cove progeny which demand that a discriminatory cutoff score be shown to measure the minimum qualifications necessary for the successful performance of the job in question in order to survive a disparate impact challenge.

For a hiring test with a disparate impact, the employer must show that a discriminatory cutoff score measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful job performance.

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1999-06-29(k)(1)(A)(i)

With respect to a discriminatory cutoff score, the business necessity prong must be read to demand an inquiry into whether the score reflects the minimum qualifications necessary to perform successfully the job in question.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) permits liability when minimum eligibility requirements disproportionately affect Black employees and are not job-related or consistent with business necessity.

Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp., Inc. · filed 1997-09-10(k)(1)(A)

Even if true, this fact would not immunize BAC from Title VII liability if (a) the "minimum eligibility requirements” developed by BAC disparately impact Black employees and (b) these requirements either are not job-related and/or are not consistent with business necessity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not require merging railroad crafts and carrying over seniority when business necessity and the effects on employees preclude that remedy.

United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. · filed 1971-03-09(a)(2)

Frisco has acted in good faith. This merger is precluded both by business necessity and by the collateral effects the proposed remedy would have on the present and former employees of Frisco. No injunction is warranted.

A discriminatory employment practice is not necessary when an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative is available.

Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation (Two Cases) · filed 1971-07-01

It should go without saying that a practice is hardly “necessary” if an alternative practice better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally effective but less discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires relief from the continuing effects of a discriminatory job seniority system unless defendants prove that safety or efficiency makes those effects necessary.

Long v. Georgia Kraft Co. · filed 1971-11-12(a)

However, failure or refusal of some of the parties to reach such an understanding cannot operate to relieve the district court of its duty under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., to eradicate the past effects of discrimination to the extent not forbidden by considerations of safety and efficiency. We agree with the plaintiffs that the defendants have the burden of showing that business necessity justifies any continuing effects of past discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(h) requires an employer to justify a test as a genuine business need only after the plaintiff establishes a discriminatory result.

Woods v. Norht American Rockwell Corp. · filed 1973-06-25(h)

Therefore the company was not called on to show that the test fulfilled a genuine business need and was permissible under § 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h).

An employer can justify a promotion requirement challenged for disparate impact by showing that it is necessary for safe and efficient job performance.

24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1683, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,146 · filed 1975-03-03(a)(1)

After reviewing the record, we are similarly convinced that the City met its burden of showing the necessary relationship of the one year patrol requirement to safe and efficient job performance.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require evidentiary proof of business necessity for a manifestly job-related requirement that manual laborers have a good back, even if the requirement disproportionately affects a protected class.

Varice Smith, Jr. v. Olin Chemical Corporation · filed 1977-07-18(a)

In sum, without indicating at all what other physical requirements for various jobs would fall within the principle of this case, we hold that an employer does not have to justify with evidentiary proof of business necessity the exclusion from manual labor of any person with "bone degeneration in his spinal region," a bad back, even if such practice affects disproportionately some class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a compelling business necessity for a facially neutral employment policy unless the policy discriminates against a protected group on its face or through disparate impact.

Bracamontes v. Amstar Corporation · filed 1978-07-07(a)

Bracamontes and Manale urge that Amstar must show a compelling business necessity to justify its rule. That would be true only if the rule discriminated against their group, either on its face or through a disparate impact. The policy is neutral on its face; plaintiffs never demonstrated that it had a disparate impact on women. The policy is thus immune from attack under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits promotion requirements that have a disparate racial impact when the employer cannot establish a business necessity for them.

Liberles v. Daniel · filed 1979-09-10(a)(2)

Accordingly, we find that the degree requirement was not a business necessity within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits a facially neutral grooming rule that disproportionately excludes black workers when the employer fails to prove business necessity.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1979-10-29(a)

Under this test the Court concludes that Defendant’s business necessity defense must fail. This Court finds that the regulation before this Court is not sufficiently compelling to justify its negative racial impact. The evidence introduced at trial was limited to conclusory allegations about consumers and their preferences.

A Ph.D. requirement may satisfy Title VII’s business-necessity standard even when it disproportionately affects women, if it serves the employer’s academic needs and no adequate alternative exists.

Campbell v. Ramsay · filed 1980-02-13(a)(1)

The defendant has established by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the requirement of a Ph.D. in mathematics is a ... business necessity.

An employer may justify a promotion requirement challenged for its disparate impact by showing that it is necessary for safe and efficient job performance.

McCosh v. City of Grand Forks · filed 1980-07-30(a)(1)

As to the claim of “disparate impact,” we note that even assuming that plaintiff did in fact make out a prima facie case, it is clear that the employer met its burden by demonstrating that the practice was necessary for safe and efficient job performance.

An employer must prove business necessity to rebut a prima facie showing that a hiring practice has a discriminatory impact.

Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colorado, School District 11 · filed 1981-02-09(a)(2)

In a disparate impact case, on the other hand, we have said that the employer must prove business necessity for the challenged practice to rebut the prima facie case.

A no-beard policy that disproportionately excludes Black men with PFB violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the employer cannot show business necessity.

Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp. · filed 1984-07-20(a)(1)

In summary, defendant has not met its burden of showing business necessity for enforcing its no-beard policy against plaintiff. Plaintiff has shown that defendant’s enforcement of the no-beard policy against plaintiff violates Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2 permits a business necessity defense to a facially neutral practice with a disproportionate impact only if the practice is essential to safety and efficiency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The Rath Packing Company · filed 1986-03-20

A neutral employment practice may be justified by business necessity only if the practice not only fosters safety and efficiency but is essential to that goal.

An employer rebuts an individual disparate impact claim by showing that the employee’s termination rested on job-related business necessity.

Emile STEPHEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PGA SHERATON RESORT, LTD., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1989-05-23(a)(1)

We need not address the validity of this finding to hold that PGA Sheraton successfully rebutted any prima facie disparate impact case by demonstrating that Stephen’s termination rested on proper concerns of business necessity.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employer to defend a practice with disparate impact by showing that it is necessary to an important business goal, unless the plaintiff shows a comparably effective alternative with less discriminatory impact.

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta · filed 1993-09-27(k)(1)(A)

Where a Title VII disparate impact challenge is mounted against a practice or action which admittedly causes a disparate impact, the defendant is entitled to prevail if (1) the defendant shows that the practice or action is necessary to meeting a goal that, as a matter of law, qualifies as an important business goal for Title VII purposes, and (2) the plaintiff fails to show the availability of less discriminatory alternative practice or action that would provide a comparably effective means of meeting that goal.

In a disparate impact claim, the employer bears the burden of proving a business justification for the challenged practice.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc. · filed 1993-10-21(k)(1)(A)(i)

The 1991 Act returned the burden of persuasion regarding business justification to the defendant employer.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer to establish a business justification once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that an employment policy has a disparate impact.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska · filed 1993-11-26(k)(1)(A)

Under the Griggs standard, once the EEOC made out a prima facie case of disparate impact created by the strict no-beard policy (which, as we held in Pizzaco I, the EEOC clearly did here), the burden shifted to Domino's to establish a business justification defense. Domino's has not met this burden.

A challenged employment practice that causes disparate impact may be justified if it is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1995-05-19(k)(1)(A)

Moreover, ... even assuming the presence of disparate impact, the court is convinced, and so finds, that the practice challenged by the Dodson intervenors was “job related ... and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A). The Dodson intervenors’ disparate impact claim lacks merit.

An employer establishes that a challenged practice is consistent with business necessity by proving it is reasonably necessary to achieve an important business purpose.

Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education · filed 1996-06-21(k)(1)(A)(i)

In short, URI has sustained its burden of proving that Plan A’s multi-tiered system is “consistent with business necessity” because it is reasonably necessary to achieve an important business purpose.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires an employee to show disparate impact before the employer must demonstrate a business necessity for the challenged practice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc. · filed 1999-01-20(k)

And here Section 2000e-2(k) provides that in a disparate impact case the employer’s obligation to demonstrate a business necessity is triggered only after the employee has borne his or her burden of demonstrating a disparate impact from a statutorily prohibited employment practice.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer rebutting a disparate impact claim to show that the challenged practice is job-related for the position and consistent with business necessity.

Smith v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 2001-08-22(k)(1)(A)(i)

To rebut the plaintiffs’ claim that any one of the challenged employment practices resulted in a disparate impact, the defendants must establish that the “challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(I).

Section 2000e-2’s business necessity defense applies to disparate impact claims and cannot justify intentional discrimination.

Gordon v. JKP Enterprises Inc · filed 2002-04-10(k)(2)

Business necessity is a defense to disparate impact analysis, and not to cases of overt discrimination or disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(k) allows an employer to justify a hiring test with a disparate impact by showing that its cutoff measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful job performance.

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2002-10-15(k)

Because we conclude that SEPTA produced more than sufficient competent evidence to support the finding that a pre-hire, pre-academy training aerobic capacity of 42.5 mL/kg/min measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful performance as a SEPTA transit police officer and has, thus, justified the conceded ... disparate impact on female candidates by showing business necessity, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in favor of SEPTA.

When a plaintiff establishes that a selection practice causes a disparate impact, § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires the employer to show that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Hearn v. City of Jackson · filed 2003-08-07(k)(1)(A)(i)

In this case, based on the statistical disparity between the passing rates of blacks and whites, the City has stipulated that the May 1998 written sergeant’s exam had an adverse impact on black applicants. Thus, the City must show that the test is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.

When an employment test has a disparate impact, § 2000e-2(k) requires the employer to show that the test is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Bradley v. City of Lynn · filed 2006-06-02(k)

The burden thus shifts to the HRD to show that the test has been validated as job related and consistent with business necessity.

An employer may defend against disparate impact liability by showing that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Terry v. City of San Diego · filed 2010-05-21(k)(1)(A)(i)

Because the City did not attempt to “defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is ‘job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity,’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)), we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on Terry’s claim of employment discrimination under a theory of disparate impact, and remand for trial.

Section 2000e-2(k) places both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for the business necessity defense on the employer.

National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue · filed 2010-09-21(k)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly established that “both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion in establishing business necessity rest with the employer.”

Section 2000e-2(k) requires an employer to establish business necessity before a plaintiff must show an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative.

Howe v. City of Akron · filed 2011-03-21(k)(1)(A)(i)

But, the plaintiffs only had to show an alternative measure of equal validity if the defendant succeeded in carrying its own burden of proof to show business necessity.

An employer defending a hiring test with a disparate impact must show that the test is significantly correlated with relevant work behavior.

Easterling v. State of Connecticut · filed 2011-05-05(k)(1)(A)(i)

The 1.5 mile run times imposed by DOC during the 2004 and 2006 physical fitness examinations cannot be characterized as “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity” under the Significant Correlation Standard or the Minimum Qualification Standard.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer to justify a hiring practice with a discriminatory effect by showing that its criteria define minimum qualifications for the job.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue · filed 2011-12-12(k)(1)(A)(i)

In sum, the District Court properly concluded that North Hudson’s purported business-necessity arguments fail. They are not tied to minimum firefighter qualifications in North Hudson and, in some cases, less discriminatory alternatives are available.

An employer may establish that a test with disparate impact is job related and consistent with business necessity using a statewide job analysis, without employer-specific data, when reliable evidence shows the jobs share critical tasks and skills.

M.O.C.H.A. Society, Inc. v. City of Buffalo · filed 2012-07-30(k)(1)(A)(i)

While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry his burden at the second step of Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law to support a factual finding of job relatedness and business necessity.

An employer’s policy of excluding workers disqualified by a federal employment bar can satisfy Title VII’s business necessity defense to a disparate impact claim.

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-08-29(k)(1)(A)(i)

In our view, Wells Fargo’s policy of summary employment exclusion following a Section 19 disqualification is a business necessity.

An employer defending a Title VII disparate impact claim must show that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

Freyd v. Univ. of Or. · filed 2019-05-02(k)(1)(A)(ii)

The University must show that the employment practice is both job-related and consistent with business necessity.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) allows an employer to justify a practice with disparate impact by showing that it is job related and consistent with business necessity.

BYRD v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS · filed 2021-12-10(k)(1)(A)

PGW’s preference for Specialists and Work Dispatchers, the second of the facially neutral policies Byrd identifies, has a clear business justification. Even if a given employment action results in a disparate impact on a protected class, an employer can justify a facially neutral policy if the challenged practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A).

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) allows an employer to defend a hiring test with a disparate impact by proving that it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

Erdman, Catherine v. City of Madison · filed 2022-07-20(k)(1)(A)(i)

Based on the record at trial as a whole, therefore, the court finds that defendant has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 2014 PAT was job- related for the position and consistent with business necessity.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact, the employer must show that the challenged practice is justified by business necessity.

Davis v. District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency,et Al · filed 2024-02-23(k)(1)(A)(i)

Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discriminatory disparate impact, Title VII’s burden-shifting framework kicks in, and the defendant has the burden to show that its practices were justified by “business necessity.”

A grooming policy required by binding safety regulations can satisfy Title VII’s business-necessity defense to a disparate-impact claim.

Davis v. City of Cleveland · filed 2024-02-28(k)(1)(A)(i)

And in any event, the court finds that Cleveland’s policy is in fact based on business necessity. Accordingly, the court grants judgment on the pleadings to Cleveland on Davis’s race-discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) permits an employer to defeat a disparate impact claim by proving that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

WALDEN v. RAIMONDO · filed 2024-08-02(k)(1)(A)(i)

Even if Walden could prove his prima facie case, Raimondo has carried her burden of proving her business necessity defense. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover employment discrimination based on alienage.

Ramirez v. Sloss · filed 1980-04-07(a)

The 1964 act does not apply to employment discrimination on the basis of alienage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit refusing to hire someone solely because they are not a citizen, unless the citizenship rule conceals national origin discrimination.

Cecilia ESPINOZA and Rudolfo Espinoza, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FARAH MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1972-07-21(a)(1)

More precisely, we must determine whether the words "national origin" should be read to mean, or at least include, "citizenship." Since we conclude they should not; that none of the reasons offered for doing so will withstand close analysis; that this is one of those cases where Congress should be taken at its words; and that, put simply, "national origin" means exactly and only that, we reverse the judgment below.

Section 2000e-2 does not protect against employment discrimination based on alienage or the foreign residence of an employee’s family.

Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corporation · filed 1972-11-06

If there was any discrimination, it was based upon the foreign residency of the plaintiff’s family and the plaintiff’s status as an alien. This classification like that of citizenship is not a protected classification of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a citizenship requirement unless it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.

Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. · filed 1973-11-19(a)(1)

Certainly Tit. VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on national origin but does not cover discrimination based solely on lack of United States citizenship.

Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp. · filed 1974-07-31(a)(1)

Like Mrs. Espinoza, appellee Guerra has failed to demonstrate that he suffered from discrimination based on ... his national origin rather than on his status as an alien. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a discharge based on union affiliation merely because the union promotes the interests of a national group.

Juventino Balderas, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. La Casita Farms, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross · filed 1974-08-30(a)(1)

We are convinced that Title VII, as construed by the Guideline, does not reach so far.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on national origin, but a preference based on citizenship alone does not violate it.

Longnecker v. Ore Sorters (North America), Inc. · filed 1986-04-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s theory is simply not cognizable under Title VII. ... Because plaintiff’s pleadings and briefs make it plain his claim is based on alleged discrimination arising ... from contractual arrangements linked to citizenship, ... his Title VII claim founders.

Section 2000e-2 permits employment decisions based on citizenship alone, which is distinct from national origin.

Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc. · filed 1993-07-30

As noted above, however, both American companies and foreign companies operating in the United States enjoy the right to discriminate based on citizenship even in the absence of a treaty.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin, but does not prohibit distinctions based on citizenship.

Anderson v. Zubieta · filed 1997-08-22(a)(1)

Where differentiation took place in this case, it was “because of’ citizenship, not because of membership in a Title VII protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national-origin discrimination, but bias based on citizenship or immigration status alone does not establish a violation.

Guimaraes v. SuperValu, Inc. · filed 2012-03-23(a)(1)

The “green card” statement does not show a specific link between placement on the PAP and Grubbs’s alleged discriminatory animus toward Guimaraes’s national origin. Guimaraes conflates citizenship or immigration status with national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects against national-origin discrimination, but does not cover discrimination based on citizenship or immigration status.

Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2012-05-21(a)(1)

The question, then, is whether Title VII guards against alienage-based discrimination. It does not.

Section 2000e-2 does not protect citizenship or alienage status alone from employment discrimination.

Alhayoti v. Blinken · filed 2022-07-21

Citizenship and alienage are not protected classes for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not protect citizenship or alienage status, so a claim seeking preferential treatment based on U.S. citizenship is not actionable under Title VII.

Alhayoti v. Blinken · filed 2023-07-28

The court dismisses the claim because the plaintiff’s core theory — that the Department violated Title VII by not giving him special treatment for his U.S. citizenship — is not actionable under Title VII because citizenship and alienage are not protected categories.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) allows a decision making process to be analyzed as one employment practice only when the plaintiff shows its elements cannot be separated for analysis.

Okeke v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund · filed 2021-06-26(k)(1)(B)(i)

Plaintiff cannot rely on this exception because she has not specifically identified particular, facially neutral policies or practices and, as a result, has not “demonstrated to the [C]ourt that the elements of [the employer’s] decision making process are not capable of separation for analysis.”

A disparate-impact claim can survive a motion to dismiss without statistical evidence of causation at the pleading stage.

Sanders-Hollis v. State of CA, Health and Human Services Agency, Dept. of Social Services · filed 2021-07-02(k)(1)(A)(i)

While plaintiff does not allege statistical evidence supports the causation element of the disparate impact case at this stage, she is not required to at this stage. ... The court finds plaintiff has provided sufficient allegations and her claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact survive the motion to dismiss.

A policy limiting the hiring of applicants with certain felony convictions can support a disparate impact claim when it plausibly excludes Black applicants at a higher rate than white applicants.

Carson v. Lacy · filed 2021-04-19(k)(1)(A)(i)

We conclude, however, that Carson stated a Title VII claim against D&B because he plausibly alleged that D&B’s policy of not hiring, or limiting the hiring of, applicants with certain felony convictions had a disparate impact on black ... applicants, in that it excluded them from the opportunity of employment at a higher rate than white applicants.

An employer defending a disparate impact claim must show that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with business necessity; conflicting evidence on that defense precludes summary judgment for the employer.

Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 2021-03-17(k)(1)(A)(i)

Given the conflicting evidence, whether the school-level turnaround decisions were job-related and consistent with business necessity remains a question for the trier of fact. And because the Board bears the burden on this question, the Court cannot grant summary judgment for the Board on Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim and so need not consider the parties’ arguments as to the availability of equally valid and less discriminatory alternatives.

A pregnancy-based disparate impact claim requires concrete evidence that an employment practice caused a disparity.

LaBarbera v. NYU Winthrop Hospital · filed 2021-03-16(k)(1)(A)(i)

While this rationale may have surface appeal, surviving summary judgment necessitates concrete evidence of a disparity in fact.

A disparate-impact plaintiff can identify a specific employment practice by challenging retention raises awarded without corresponding raises for professors of comparable merit and seniority.

Freyd v. University of Oregon · filed 2021-03-15(k)(1)(A)(i)

First, Freyd has challenged a specific employment practice. ... Instead, she challenges the practice of awarding retention raises without also increasing the salaries of other professors of comparable merit and seniority.

A disparate impact claim must link each challenged employment practice to an adverse impact unless the elements of the employer’s decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis.

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2019-10-11(k)(1)(B)(i)

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). However, when a plaintiff is able to “demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” Id. The problem with Williams’s allegations here is that she fails to connect the dozens of policies and procedures listed in her complaint with discernible, identifiable adverse employment impacts.

A disparate impact plaintiff must connect each challenged employment practice to an adverse impact, unless the elements of the decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis.

Colson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2019-10-11(k)(1)(B)(i)

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). However, when a plaintiff is able to “demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” Id. The problem with Colson’s allegations here is that she fails to connect the dozens of policies and procedures listed in her complaint with discernible, identifiable adverse employment impacts.

Section 2000e-2 permits a disparate-impact claim when an employment practice causes a racial disparity, and basic factual allegations of that disparity can suffice at the pleading stage.

Chaidez v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2019-08-28(k)(1)(A)(i)

But the plaintiffs’ “basic allega- tions” regarding the disparity between the racial makeup of Ford’s workforce and the surrounding area are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 733.

An employer may be liable for disparate impact if it continues a challenged practice after an available, equally effective alternative with less disparate impact is proposed.

Jones v. City of Boston · filed 2016-12-28(k)(1)(A)(ii)

Accordingly, we agree with the Officers that the summary judgment record reveals a material dispute of fact concerning whether, sometime in 2003, the Department, by continuing to administer the challenged hair test, "necessarily . . . refused to adopt" the alternative made available to it by the suggestion of Dr. Kidwell.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) permits a disparate impact claim to succeed when an available alternative has less adverse impact, is at least as valid as the employer’s selection practice, and the employer refuses to adopt it.

Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusett · filed 2016-05-18(k)(1)(A)(ii)

And if the alternative test with less adverse impact has equal or greater validity, it makes no difference how valid the employer's actual test is; the employee wins.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) permits a disparate impact claim based on a decisionmaking process that cannot be separated for analysis and disproportionately affects a protected class.

Achagzai v. Broadcasting Board of Governors · filed 2016-03-18(k)(1)(B)(i)

First, the essence of a disparate impact claim is that a particular employment practice, or, in the case of Title VII, a decisionmaking process that is “not capable of separation for analysis,” has disproportionately affected a protected class. ... That is not a disparate impact claim.

A disparate impact claim requires the plaintiff to identify a specific employment practice and isolate its effect from other practices that may have caused the disparity.

Swann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. · filed 2015-12-15(k)(1)(A)(i)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims must fail as a result of their failure “to identify and isolate the effects of each specific employment practice” that impacted each CST’s performance metrics.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) shifts the burden to an employer to justify a promotion exam once employees establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Smith v. City of Boston · filed 2015-11-16(k)(1)(A)(i)

All of this evidence combined is enough for this Court to rule that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of raising an inference of causation and demonstrating a pri-ma facie case of disparate impact. The burden thus shifts to the City to defend its promotional process as a valid selection tool.

Section 2000e-2(k) allows a disparate impact claim based on a facially neutral employment practice that disproportionately harms a protected group; a complaint need only allege that effect to survive dismissal.

United States v. Pennsylvania · filed 2015-05-21(k)(1)(A)(i)

Taken together, and drawing all inferences in the United States’ favor, the complaint has adequately alleged that Defendants’ employment practice has had a disparate impact on women. Nothing more is required at this stage.

A repeated hiring practice involving worker visas can support a disparate-impact claim when it plausibly causes a disparity based on race or national origin.

Koehler v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. · filed 2015-05-08(k)(1)(A)(i)

They allege that the defendants use a customary and repeated practice of growing their U.S. offices by setting visa quotas for additional South Asian workers, budgeting for the associated expenses of securing the visas, and filling employment vacancies by assisting persons of the South Asian race to enter this country to work in the defendants’ U.S. offices. The court concludes that these allegations constitute a specific and particular employment practice that disparately impacted them because of their race or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact; the claim fails if the employer did not use the alleged practice.

Rocha v. Coastal Carolina Neuropsychiatric Crisis Services, P.A. · filed 2013-10-16(k)(1)(A)(i)

In order to state a disparate impact claim under Title VII, Rocha first must identify “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of ... national origin ...” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i). ... Because the evidence shows that CCNCS did not use the alleged “particular employment practice,” Rocha’s disparate impact claim fails.

A disparate-impact claim requires showing that a particular employment practice caused an adverse impact on a protected group.

Briscoe v. City of New Haven · filed 2013-09-09(k)(1)(A)(i)

In any event, on all the evidence I may properly consider on these motions, for the reasons stated I conclude that Briscoe does not and cannot show that the 60/40 weighting of exams had a disparate impact on African Americans as a race. His action, while not time barred, must be dismissed on substantive grounds.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a plaintiff to show that an employment practice causes a disparate impact on a protected basis before the employer must show that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

West v. Prudential Ins Co of America · filed 2011-11-18(k)(1)(A)(i)

In Title VII cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion sex, or national origin.”2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). ... In this case, West has not satisfied the first step because he has not alleged that he is a member of a protected class.

A prima facie disparate impact claim requires evidence that the challenged practice causes a significant disparity among otherwise qualified people in the relevant labor market.

Foss v. Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, Health & Human Services · filed 2001-03-16(k)(1)(A)(i)

Foss's showing, however, leaves it conjectural whether among the pool of those qualified for the Managed Care Coordinator position, the gender disparity resulting from the nursing degree requirement would be sufficiently significant to support a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to show that a specific employment practice caused a disparity affecting a protected group.

McCraven v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-08-11(k)(1)(A)(i)

Plaintiffs statistics fail to establish that the CPD’s practice of evaluating arrest records disproportionally disqualifies African Americans.

A disparate impact claim based on an affirmative employment plan requires evidence connecting the plan to the alleged discrimination.

Axel v. Apfel · filed 2000-09-11

The absence of proof of reliance on the AEP is also why Plaintiffs allegations fail under a disparate impact theory. To prove a prima facie case, Plaintiffs must show an actual connection between the specific employment practice, here the AEP, and the discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify a specific, facially neutral employment practice and show that it caused a significant disparity affecting a protected group.

EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc. · filed 2000-08-04(k)(1)(A)(i)

As correctly identified by the district court, a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit must establish three elements: first, that there is a significant statistical disparity between the proportion of women in the available labor pool and the proportion of women hired; second, that there is a specific, facially-neutral, employment practice which is the alleged cause of the disparity; and finally, and most critically in this case, that a causal nexus exists between the specific employment practice identified and the statistical disparity shown.

A disparate impact claim requires a plaintiff to connect a specific, facially neutral employment practice to the alleged disparity; a workforce imbalance alone is insufficient.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc. · filed 2000-08-04(k)(1)(A)(i)

As a result, a plaintiff must do more than simply identify a workforce imbalance to establish a prima facie disparate impact case; it must causally connect a facially-neutral employment practice to the identified disparity.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires employees to show that an employment practice causes a disparate impact, after which the employer must show that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Smith v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 2000-03-07(k)(1)(A)(i)

In disparate impact cases, the plaintiffs must establish that the “respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race ... and the respondent [must fail] to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(k)(1)(A)(i). Thus, the plaintiffs bear the initial burden of demonstrating a disparate impact, and the burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate the otherwise neutral policy was justified by business necessity.

An employer can justify a promotion test with a disparate impact by showing that it is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Lloyd Bryant, Desmond Butler, Doris Byrd v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-01-14(k)(1)(A)(i)

If the plaintiff makes this required initial showing, the burden then shifts to the employer who must prove that the evaluation method is valid by showing that it is “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.”

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate-impact plaintiff to show that a specific employment practice caused a disproportionate effect on a protected group.

Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1999-11-30(k)(1)(A)(i)

Appellant has failed to offer any evidence at all that Appellee's modified duty policy results in a disproportionate termination of pregnant employees.

To show that an overall employment decision process causes a disparate impact, plaintiffs must analyze everyone subject to that process.

Smith v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1999-11-05(k)(1)

For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs relied on the wrong population for their statistical analyses. It is only reasonable to infer a disparate impact from the IRIF decision-making process if all persons who were subject to the process are included in the analysis.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B) permits a disparate impact claim to analyze an employer’s decision-making process as a whole when its elements cannot be separated for analysis.

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1997-08-13(k)(1)(B)

This language recognizes that in many disparate impact cases the elements of a defendant’s decision-making process may not be capable of separate analysis and that in those cases the decision-making process may be analyzed as one whole.