42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars a facially neutral wage garnishment discharge rule that disproportionately affects racial minorities without an overriding business purpose.

Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America · filed 1971-09-29(a)(1)

The policy or practice may be adopted in good faith with no intent to discriminate, may be racially neutral on its face and may be objectively and fairly applied; it is nonetheless interdicted by Title VII if the consequence of the policy or practice is to discriminate and there is no overriding business purpose. ... Here, Rule 6, authorizing the discharge of employees whose wages have been garnisheed, discriminates against members of minority groups, in that it subjects a disproportionate percentage of members of those groups to discharge from employment.

Section 2000e-2 bars the use of a hiring standard with an adverse racial impact unless it is validated as job related.

United States v. City of Chicago · filed 1974-11-07

3. No further use shall be made of a background investigation or the results thereof as a standard of appointment to the rank of Patrolman for the Chicago Police Department unless objective criteria are established and validated as job related or shown to have no adverse racial impact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a challenged employment practice has a discriminatory effect to establish a prima facie disparate-impact claim.

Willie L. ROBINSON, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DALLAS Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1975-06-23(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to show that Rule 7.18 has a discriminatory effect on Negroes. Since he has not established a prima facie case, we need not consider whether defendant succeeded in demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory “business necessity” rationale for the rule.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires proof that a facially neutral employment rule adversely affects a protected class before the employer must show a business necessity for the rule.

Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1975-11-18(a)

Since plaintiff failed to prove a “disparate effect” upon women due to the implementation of defendant’s rule, the requisite threshold issue has not been met and there is no need for defendant to show any business necessity for the rule.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a facially neutral grooming rule with a slight racial impact when a legitimate business purpose justifies it.

Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1976-07-15(a)

The Court concludes, however, that although some discriminatory impact may result from the “no beard” regulation, it does not violate the Act because the rule is justified by a legitimate business purpose.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits referral practices that perpetuate prior racial discrimination, even without discriminatory intent.

Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union · filed 1976-09-29

This six-year “freeze” on new applications for casual clerks referral perpetuated the condition of almost total exclusion of blacks from the group of casual clerks that had come into existence because of appellees’ prior discriminatory practices. This “freeze,” in conjunction with the practice of referring only persons in this group for employment as casuals, discriminated in favor of the disproportionately white referral group and against blacks seeking employment as casual clerks. It therefore violated Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer to show that height and weight requirements are job related when their disproportionate effect on women establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Mieth v. Dothard · filed 1976-11-29

Accordingly, the Court finds that, in the case of Ms. Rawlinson, plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that the Board of Corrections must now prove that the height and weight requirements are job related.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to justify an employment test as job-related when applicants show that it selects men and women at significantly different rates.

Bannerman v. Department of Youth Authority · filed 1977-08-31(a)(1)

Title VII forbids the use of employment tests which are discriminatory in effect. Once the complaining party has made out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the particular tests select candidates in a sex pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants, the burden shifts to the employer to show that a given requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. ... The Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to establish that the interview process is discriminatory.

Facially neutral employment qualifications with a disparate racial effect can establish a prima facie discrimination claim; the employer must show that the qualifications are job-related.

Rule v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local Union No. 396 · filed 1977-11-22

To the extent that the District Court held defendants’ motive to be relevant on these pattern and practice claims and to the extent that the District Court considered statistical evidence as being relevant only on the issue of motive, it was in error.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require proof of discriminatory motive for a disparate impact claim.

Neloms v. Southwestern Electric Power Co. · filed 1977-11-23(a)

As the instant case relies primarily on evidence of disparate impact, proof of discriminatory motive was not an essential element of the plaintiffs’ case.

Section 2000e-2 permits a Title VII employment discrimination claim based on racially discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent.

United States v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1977-12-20

The recent Supreme Court cases discussed above do not change the prevailing standard of discrimination under Title VII which was in effect at the time that the consent decree in this action was entered.

Section 2000e-2 measures the disparate impact of an employment requirement by the people it excludes, rather than the number of positions available.

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1978-01-06

The proper focus when determining the disparate impact of an employment condition is on those excluded by the requirement, not on the number of positions to be filled as Travenol suggests.

Section 2000e-2 requires an apprenticeship selection process to be assessed as a whole for disparate racial impact; poorer results on one component alone do not establish a prima facie case if the overall process has no disparate exclusionary impact.

Rule v. International Association of Bridge · filed 1978-02-21

The apprentice selection process must be viewed as a whole to discover whether there is a disparate racial impact. If the process as a whole does not have a disparate exclusionary impact on blacks, then the fact that blacks fare less well than whites on one "subtest" is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2 measures the disparate impact of an employment requirement by the people it excludes, and an employer may justify the requirement by business necessity.

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories · filed 1978-03-23

The proper focus when determining the disparate impact of an employment condition is on those excluded by the requirement, not on the number of positions to be filled as Travenol suggests.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to layoffs with a disproportionate impact, but an employer may justify eliminating positions when the work is no longer needed.

IMAGE of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown · filed 1978-03-30(a)

An employer's decision to discharge employees who draw a salary and yet contribute nothing to the product of the business is not the "arbitrary and unnecessary action" prohibited by Title VII and Griggs. This is true whether the employees do not contribute because they cannot do the work required of them or because the work that they have been doing is no longer necessary.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employment standard with a disproportionate racial impact when the standard is related to the duties of the job.

Hetherington v. State Personnel Bd. · filed 1978-07-07

We hold that in the case before us there is a clear relationship or nexus between conviction of a felony and performance of the duties of peace officers in general and that such relationship exists with specific reference to the particular peace officer positions involved in this case. The federal equal employment opportunities statutes (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) are not violated.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer to justify a prior experience requirement once employees make a prima facie showing that it has a discriminatory effect.

Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. · filed 1978-07-10(a)(2)

The statistical evidence, with the testimony by individual members of the class as to obstacles they encountered in seeking entry to the crafts, requires the conclusion that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the current system, with its prior experience requirement, is discriminatory in effect. Kaiser therefore has the burden of showing that the prior experience requirement has "a manifest relationship" to the legitimate needs of the craft positions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) allows a class to establish a prima facie disparate impact case by showing that facially neutral employment practices discriminate against the group.

Sledge v. J. P. Stevens & Co. · filed 1978-10-04(a)(2)

Instead, they were entitled to rest their Prima facie case, under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), upon a showing that the effect of facially neutral employment practices was to discriminate against them as a group.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an unvalidated employment test that has a racially disparate impact.

Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis · filed 1978-12-22

The use of a testing device, although neutral on its face, which has a racially disparate impact on members of minority groups and which has not been properly validated by the employer, constitutes a discriminatory act for which Title VII affords a remedy.

Section 2000e-2 requires a promotion procedure to be assessed as a whole when determining whether it has an adverse racial impact.

Friend v. Leidinger · filed 1978-11-29

The district court correctly pointed out that the entire selection procedure and not just one segment must be considered.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits facially neutral education and testing requirements when they do not result in discriminatory hiring.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAVAJO REFINING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1979-03-13(a)

Thus, the company is free to use its tests and high school education requirements if the result is not discrimination in fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) allows statistics showing a selection device’s disproportionate impact to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination without further proof.

Blake v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1979-05-02(a)(2)

Appellants here properly used statistics to establish the disproportionate impact of appellees’ selection devices. They did not need to make any greater showing to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits hiring practices that use a selection procedure with an unrebutted, non-job-related disparate impact on protected groups.

United States v. New York · filed 1979-09-06

A disparate impact of a selection procedure not job-related was proven by the plaintiff and not rebutted by the defendants, and justified the conclusion from statistics that the selection procedure was unlawfully discriminatory. ... The past hiring practices of the New York State Police are in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, as amended.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits employment classifications that adversely affect minority employees’ opportunities without a business necessity justification.

Members of Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1980-01-29(a)(2)

Clearly plaintiffs’ case of disparate impact violative of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) is complete.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies the adverse-impact standard to state employers without requiring proof of intentional discrimination.

United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 1980-04-17(a)(1)

Accepting this constitutional premise, we are in accord with those courts who have held that Title VII applies the Griggs impact standard to both public and private employees.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a firefighter hiring ranking system that disproportionately excludes minority applicants when the employer fails to show that the ranking relates to job performance.

Pina v. City of East Providence · filed 1980-06-03(a)(1)

In the present case, the individual Plaintiffs have proven that the Defendants’ use of the ranking and certification system constituted unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits disparate treatment and disparate impact theories to be considered as alternative grounds for relief when the evidence supports both.

Catherine M. BURWELL Et Al., Appellees, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Appellant · filed 1980-08-29(a)

Disparate treatment and disparate impact theories may be present as alternative grounds for relief in the same case. If sufficiently supported by the evidence, either may be analyzed by the trier of fact as alternative grounds for relief.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits employment selection criteria, but criteria that disproportionately exclude a racial group require a showing of business necessity.

Hameed v. International Association of Bridge · filed 1980-11-03(h)

Title VII permits employment criteria to be administered to applicants provided that the tests are not "used" to discriminate against a group protected by the Act. ... Criteria which disproportionately exclude one racial group are "used" to discriminate within the meaning of the Act unless the user can show a business necessity for their use.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a prima facie disparate-impact claim based on a discriminatory pass-fail stage of a selection process, even when the process's overall results show no disparity.

Teal v. State of Connecticut · filed 1981-03-26(a)

For the reasons stated below, we hold that where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection process produced disparate results and constituted a pass-fail barrier beyond which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie case of disparate impact is established, notwithstanding that the entire selection procedure did not yield disparate results.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a disparate impact theory when a plaintiff alleges that an individual promotion decision was based on race.

Pinckney v. County of Northampton · filed 1981-04-21(a)

In the case at bar, in view of plaintiff’s allegation that defendants refused to promote her because of her race the disparate impact theory does not apply.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a separate disparate impact theory for religious discrimination where the religious accommodation rule in § 2000e(j) governs.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1981-12-30(a)(1)

So, here, the affirmative defense of inability to accommodate without more than de minimis cost is a complete defense to the EEOC’s Title VII claim, and any disparate impact doctrine (other than that set forth in § 701(j) is inapplicable.

A Title VII disparate impact claim based on statistical evidence requires a significant or substantial disparity.

Clark v. Chrysler Corporation · filed 1982-04-29

In the use of statistical evidence to demonstrate the disparate impact of an allegedly discriminatory practice, the statistical disparity demonstrated must be "significant" or "substantial."

Section 2000e-2(a) does not establish a prima facie sex-based disparate-impact claim from a neutral height requirement used to select among women in an all-women hiring pool.

Lynda LeBoeuf COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John A. MARKEY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants · filed 1982-05-03(a)

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in deeming that the men-women height statistics established a prima facie case under the circumstances we have described.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a disparate-impact claim based on a discriminatory pass-fail barrier even when the employer's overall promotion results show no adverse impact.

Connecticut v. Teal · filed 1982-06-21(a)(2)

In sum, respondents' claim of disparate impact from the examination, a pass-fail barrier to employment opportunity, states a prima facie case of employment discrimination under § 703(a)(2), despite their employer's nondiscriminatory "bottom line," and that "bottom line" is no defense to this prima facie case under § 703(h).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate impact claim when an employment policy disproportionately burdens women, even if it is expressed in gender-neutral terms.

Wright v. Olin Corp. · filed 1982-12-23(a)

Turning to the overt sex-discrimination/b.f.o.q. theory of claim and defense and the disparate impact/business necessity theory, we conclude that the latter is best suited for a principled application of Title VII doctrine to the fetal vulnerability program.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits a disparate impact challenge to a physical requirement that can prevent graduation, even if the requirement has little weight in an overall grade.

Burney v. City of Pawtucket · filed 1983-03-09(h)

Any stricture which contains within its purview the ready potential for such decisive consequences cannot be de minimis, albeit that requirement is but one of many.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits professionally developed ability tests, but a plaintiff must show a substantially disproportionate impact before a court examines a test’s job relatedness.

Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Service · filed 1983-03-11(h)

Absent proof that an employment test exerts a substantially disproportionate racial impact, no inquiry may be undertaken into its job relatedness, or validity.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits apprenticeship screening practices that disproportionately exclude women when the employer cannot justify them as measures of job performance.

Bailey v. Southeastern Area Joint Apprenticeship Committee · filed 1983-04-05

The Court further finds that the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the screening mechanism which the Plaintiffs encountered in 1978 was “a reasonable measure of job performance.” Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendant has violated the Plaintiffs’ rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits disparate impact analysis of employment benefits practices.

Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1983-05-17(a)(1)

We conclude that disparate impact analysis is appropriate in this § 703(a)(1) case.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat a neutral hiring barrier as having a disparate impact on a protected group when only members of that group compete for the job.

Costa v. Markey · filed 1983-05-23

We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee challenging a promotion test for disparate impact to show that the test disproportionately prevented Black employees from advancing.

Byrd v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1983-07-15(a)

Here, he must prove that the testing requirements disproportionately prevented blacks from advancing.

Section 2000e-2 permits preliminary relief against an employment test when the evidence makes adverse racial impact likely and the employer presents no evidence that the test was validated.

York v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1983-08-10(h)

With these principles in mind, the court must conclude that the plaintiffs have met their initial burden of establishing that there is a substantial likelihood that the trial evidence will reveal adverse racial impact. ... Finally, since at this time there is no evidence of validation of the test requirement, the court must further conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs will prevail in this case.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), business justifications for a compensation practice must outweigh the national interest in eliminating employment discrimination to defeat a disparate impact claim.

AM. FED. OF ST., CTY. & MUN. EMP. v. State of Wash. · filed 1983-12-14(a)(1)

In assessing the viability of the Defendants business justifications in a section 703(a)(1) case, this court is obliged to balance said considerations against the countervailing national interest in eliminating employment discrimination.

An employer may justify a hiring requirement with a disparate impact by showing that it is job related.

Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Board · filed 1984-02-16(a)(2)

Because of the great similarity between the two positions, the Court concludes that defendant has carried its burden of demonstrating that the high school education requirement is job related.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that the challenged employment practice caused a discriminatory effect on the protected class.

Robinson v. Polaroid Corp. · filed 1984-04-25

It is also clear that plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the application of the criterion in question and an alleged discriminatory impact on the protected class.

Section 2000e-2(d) does not prohibit a veterans' age credit in apprenticeship admissions when it gives veterans no more time to apply than nonveterans and does not disadvantage women.

Brown v. Puget Sound Electrical Apprenticeship & Training Trust · filed 1984-05-03(d)

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the veterans' age credit did not prevent the admission of women to the apprenticeship program. Under the challenged program women had a maximum of eight years to apply for apprenticeship training. The existence of the age credit did not give veterans more than eight years to apply for the apprenticeship program. Thus, the existence of the age credit had no adverse effect whatsoever on women.

Section 2000e-2(d) does not prohibit an apprenticeship age credit that gives veterans the same opportunity to apply as non-veterans without disadvantaging women.

Brown v. Puget Sound Electrical Apprenticeship & Training Trust · filed 1984-05-03(d)

The age credit gave veterans no more than eight years to apply. The age credit’s sole effect was to afford veterans the same opportunity to apply for the apprenticeship training available to non-veterans.

Section 2000e-2 allows a disparate impact claim based on a facially neutral employment practice without proof of discriminatory intent when the practice significantly harms a protected group.

League of Martin v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1984-06-08

By contrast, plaintiffs alleging that a facially neutral employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected group in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2 and 2000e-5 need not show discriminatory intent, To state a prima facie case, the plaintiffs need only show that the practice results in a significantly adverse statistical impact on the protected group. ... Although the defendants have not conceded liability on any of the plaintiffs’ claims, the plaintiffs have stated a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(h) prohibits facially neutral employment tests that have a discriminatory effect.

Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes · filed 1984-06-14(h)

Title VII, and more particularly 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), forbids the use of employment “practices, procedures or tests, neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent” if they are discriminatory in effect.

Section 2000e-2 allows an individual employee to bring a disparate impact claim without filing a class action.

Carlos A. LASSO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WOODMEN OF the WORLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-08-24

In sum, we must reject defendant’s contention and we hold instead that an individual plaintiff, like Lasso, may maintain a disparate impact claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits hiring practices that disproportionately exclude women when the employer cannot establish a business necessity.

Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad · filed 1984-09-12(a)

Due to the Plaintiffs’ evidence of discrimination on the part of Defendant RF & P through its disparate impact analysis and Defendant RF & P’s failure to establish a business necessity defense, the Court concludes that Defendant RF & P has engaged in actions that constitute violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a disparate impact claim based on a facially neutral hiring test without proof of discriminatory intent.

Evans v. City of Evanston · filed 1985-01-16(a)(2)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Under the Supreme Court’s construction of this provision, relief is provided based upon disparate impact alone.

Section 2000e-2 allows promotion statistics from one workplace to support a disparate impact claim even when systemwide promotion figures show minorities receiving a proportional share.

Erlinda REGNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-05-01(a)(2)

We think the district court erred in refusing as a matter of law to consider work force data from one library branch. While minorities may ultimately get their fair share of promotions within the library system as a whole, plaintiff’s data suggest that the promotions awarded to minorities are clustered in the branch libraries while the main library primarily promotes whites.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits an employer to rely on the overall selection result when challenged test components assign numerical scores but do not bar candidates from further consideration.

Brunet v. City of Columbus · filed 1986-07-14(a)(2)

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Teal is distinguishable from the instant case and, therefore, rejects ... contention that the bottom line result does not negate adverse impact.

A plaintiff from a historically favored group claiming disparate impact must show background circumstances supporting an inference that the neutral policy is a vehicle for unlawful discrimination.

Allen B. LIVINGSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-10-02(a)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that in impact cases, as in disparate treatment cases, a member of a favored group must show background circumstances supporting the inference that a facially neutral policy with a disparate impact is in fact a vehicle for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits disparate impact challenges to subjective employment practices when plaintiffs identify a specific practice and show that it caused a significant adverse impact on a protected class.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Company · filed 1987-02-23(a)(2)

We now hold that disparate impact analysis may be applied to challenge subjective employment practices or criteria provided the plaintiffs have proved a causal connection between those practices and the demonstrated impact on members of a protected class. The three elements of the plaintiffs' prima facie case are that they must (1) show a significant disparate impact on a protected class, (2) identify specific employment practices or selection criteria and (3) show the causal relationship between the identified practices and the impact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires an identifiable employment policy or practice for a disparate impact claim; a single wage decision does not qualify.

Beard v. Whitley County REMC · filed 1987-03-19(a)(2)

The court rejects this argument and holds that this case is not proper for adverse impact analysis. First, the decision not to give the office and clerical group a wage increase in 1985 was a single decision; it was not a policy or practice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate-impact challenge to a neutral rule governing fringe benefits, subject to the employer’s showing of a good business justification.

Diane Colby, on Her Own Behalf and That of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc. · filed 1987-03-24(a)(1)

We conclude that Colby can attack Penney’s spouse rule under a disparate-impact approach, but of course not all rules that have a disparate impact are unlawful; the defendant can rebut by showing a good business justification for the rule.

Section 2000e-2 permits a prima facie disparate-impact showing even when a minority group's selection rate exceeds four-fifths of the white group's rate, if the evidence shows significant racial disparity.

Cuesta v. State of New York Office of Court Administration · filed 1987-04-07

The four-fifths rule should not, however, be seen as establishing a bright line rule applicable to all situations. The Guidelines acknowledge that “[s]maller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms____” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) Particularly in light of the evidence of gross racial disparities as to candidates who were not provisionals, I find that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make different pay for different jobs, by itself, a disparate impact violation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Madison Community Unit School District No. 12 · filed 1987-05-05(a)(1)

Merely paying different wages for different jobs (coaching basketball and coaching soccer being, as we have held, different jobs and therefore outside the boundaries of the Equal Pay Act) cannot violate the prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII on the basis of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) covers working conditions that have a disparate impact on a protected group of employees.

Lynch v. S. David Freeman, Charles H. Dean, Jr., and Richard M. Freeman as Members of the Board of Directors of t · filed 1987-07-09(a)(2)

However, the language of Sec. 703(a)(2) is clearly broad enough to include working conditions that have an adverse impact on a protected group of employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make different pay for different jobs unlawful based solely on disparate impact.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Madison Community Unit School District No. 12 · filed 1987-07-09(a)(1)

Merely paying different wages for different jobs (coaching basketball and coaching soccer being, as we have held, different jobs and therefore outside the boundaries of the Equal Pay Act) cannot violate the prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII on the basis of disparate impact.

A Title VII disparate impact claim based on word-of-mouth recruiting does not benefit applicants who actually applied for the positions.

Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1987-09-09

Since the individual plaintiffs all applied for maintenance positions, they were not victims of this discriminatory practice, and they cannot benefit from the court’s disparate impact analysis.

A college education requirement for a professional supervisory position may be upheld when it has no adverse impact on women or is sufficiently job-related.

Thompson v. Mississippi State Personnel Board · filed 1987-10-05

Based upon the preponderance of the credible evidence and the applicable law, the court concludes that the educational requirement for the Supervisor II position does not have an adverse impact on women or on individuals at least 40 years of age. Even if there were such an impact, the educational requirement is sufficiently job-related to justify its continued application.

Section 2000e-2 permits a disparate impact claim based on word-of-mouth recruiting, but applicants who actually applied cannot claim they were harmed by that recruiting practice.

Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1987-10-23

Since the individual plaintiffs all applied for maintenance positions, they were not victims of this discriminatory practice, and they cannot benefit from the court's disparate impact analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows liability for employment discrimination under either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact theory.

Kincade v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1987-11-25(a)

Either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts. ... Thus, these theories merely present alternative foundations upon which a court may base liability.

Section 2000e-2(d) makes a committee controlling apprenticeship admissions liable when its selection procedures unjustifiably have a discriminatory impact on women, even if employers make the hiring decisions.

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship · filed 1987-12-09(d)

The district court failed to recognize that the employers are merely delegates of the JATC's power to determine which applicants will be admitted into the program. Because the JATC may, under the trust agreement, select apprentices in any way it deems appropriate, it violates Title VII if it uses procedures that unjustifiably discriminate against a class of people protected under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits disparate impact analysis of subjective or discretionary employment practices in appropriate cases.

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust · filed 1988-06-29(a)(2)

We conclude, accordingly, that subjective or discretionary employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases.

Section 2000e-2(d) permits a disparate-impact challenge to apprenticeship selection, but the plaintiff must show that the selection method actually had a racial impact.

Washington v. Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of Northern Indiana · filed 1988-04-28(d)

So it was fine in principle for Washington to base his case on population statistics rather than applicant statistics. The weakness of his ease lies elsewhere— in his failure to show that the Committee’s methods of selection actually had a racial impact.

A disparate impact claim requires a causal connection between the challenged employment practice and the alleged discrimination.

Harris v. Lyng · filed 1989-07-07(a)

Nevertheless, despite the potential for racial discrimination by the all-white PAC, plaintiff has failed to show the necessary causal connection between the PAC’s actions and any claimed discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(2) requires a disparate-impact plaintiff challenging a union’s hiring practices to identify a specific practice that causes a discriminatory impact.

Lucas v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers · filed 1989-07-28(c)(2)

In conclusion, this Court finds that plaintiff has failed to show a specific employment practice which causes a discriminatory impact on black workers.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate impact claimant to prove that a challenged employment practice caused a significant imbalance affecting a protected group.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. · filed 1989-10-26(a)(1)

However, the EEOC has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is significant imbalance of Hispanics at the Fort Lauderdale terminal or that any alleged disparity is caused by Carolina Freight’s conviction policy.

Section 2000e-2 permits disparate impact challenges to subjective hiring practices, including interviews.

Green v. USX Corp. · filed 1990-02-23

We previously noted, and continue to hold, that because "subjective practices such as interviews are just as capable of operating to hinder the employment opportunities of blacks as are tests or other presumptively objective criteria," subjective hiring criteria are an appropriate subject for disparate impact analysis.

Section 2000e-2 permits a disparate impact claim based on a subjective hiring interview that significantly reduces employment opportunities for a protected group.

Green v. USX Corp. · filed 1990-02-23

We also conclude that the class sufficiently identified the employment interview as a discriminatory hiring practice, and established that the interview had a “significantly disparate impact” on the employment opportunities for black and white applicants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a disparate impact claim based on subjective promotion practices when the plaintiff shows relevant statistical disparities caused by those practices.

Emanuel v. Marsh · filed 1990-03-07(a)(2)

By proving the existence of relevant statistical disparities within the Army's workplace and a causal connection between these disparities and the Army’s use of subjective performance awards, Emanuel has established a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a disparate impact claim when a promotion examination significantly reduces minority candidates’ opportunities.

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1990-03-21(a)

Thus, the Court concludes that the examination itself had a disparate impact on Black and Hispanic candidates, significantly and disproportionately reducing their promotional opportunities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a disparate impact claim based on subjective promotion practices when statistical disparities and causation establish a prima facie case.

Emanuel v. Marsh · filed 1990-05-14(a)(2)

By proving the existence of relevant statistical disparities within the Army's workplace and a causal connection between these disparities and the Army's use of subjective performance awards, Emanuel has established a prima facie case of disparate impact.

A disparate impact claim under § 2000e-2 requires evidence that the challenged employment practice had a discriminatory effect.

Herbert J. GULLEY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Verne ORR, Secretary, United States Department of the Air Force, Defenda · filed 1990-06-11

Nonetheless, because Gulley failed to present any evidence of the discriminatory effect of defendant’s detailing policy, he was not entitled to relief under this theory.

In a disparate impact claim, an employer must produce evidence that a challenged promotion exam is job related and serves its asserted business justification.

Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville · filed 1990-07-09(a)

This holding does not affect our conclusion because Jacksonville failed to meet its burden of producing evidence that the exam was job related and served the asserted business justification of promoting the most qualified firefighters to fire lieutenant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits a municipal hiring residency requirement that disproportionately excludes Black applicants when the requirement lacks a significant business justification.

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Newark Branch v. Town of Harrison · filed 1990-11-05(a)(2)

Thus Harrison’s facially neutral residency requirements have been shown to have a disproportionate impact upon black persons. ... For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the residency requirements imposed by the Town of Harrison do not serve in a significant way the Town’s legitimate goals.

When selection rates are close, § 2000e-2(a)(2)'s disparate-impact analysis considers practical as well as statistical significance.

Waisome v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1991-01-29(a)(2)

When the examination process under challenge here is scrutinized with an eye towards practical as well as statistical significance, there are insufficient disparities between the Black and White selection rate to base a finding of discriminatory impact at this juncture.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that the challenged employment practice caused the alleged discriminatory effect on a protected group.

United States v. City of Warren · filed 1991-02-14(a)(2)

In other words, the plaintiff must show the challenged practice caused the alleged disparate impact on a protected group.

A disparate impact claim requires a showing that an identified employment practice substantially disadvantages a protected group.

Drake v. City of Fort Collins · filed 1991-03-13(a)(2)

Plaintiff does not dispute defendants' evidence that more than 18% of white applicants during this hiring period were rejected because of the two-year college requirement. Because the facts show the two-year college requirement operated less harshly on black applicants than white applicants, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits use of a promotion test with a disparate racial impact when a less discriminatory selection method can meet the employer’s legitimate needs.

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City Of Bridgeport · filed 1991-05-28(a)

While the court ruled, and plaintiffs do not here contest, that the City proceeded to meet its task of showing that the examination was content valid and justified by the City's business needs, the court also properly ruled that plaintiffs had sufficiently rebutted that evidence by showing that the City could have chosen to use banding in order to alleviate the disparate racial effect of the examination without disserving its legitimate interests.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) makes each employer responsible for its own discriminatory hiring practices, regardless of job opportunities offered by other employers.

Newark Branch, National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of Harrison · filed 1991-07-19(a)(2)

Title VII itself clearly makes each employer responsible for its own employment practices, see Sec. 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(2), and does not support the proposition that one employer is free to discriminate against a class of employees as long as other employers are willing to hire them.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) makes each employer responsible for the discriminatory impact of its own hiring practices, regardless of opportunities with other employers.

Newark Branch, National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of Harrison · filed 1991-07-19(a)(2)

Given that the focus of Title VII does not extend beyond a specific employment practice to the overall picture of the operations of a single employer, we find no merit in the argument that we should evaluate Harrison’s hiring practices only in the context of other municipal employers state-wide. The practices of other employers, even when they are undertaken pursuant to a permissive state statutory scheme, are simply irrelevant.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits representative statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case that an employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected group.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska · filed 1991-07-24(a)

Thus, Bradley and the EEOC presented statistical studies representative of the general black male population, and their reliance on these statistics to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact was not misplaced.

A disparate-impact claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a facially neutral employment practice; a rule expressly singling out one language does not qualify.

Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center · filed 1991-10-21(a)(1)

The Court finds that plaintiffs disparate impact argument must fail, because she has not identified a faeially-neutral employment practice. Rather, the employment practice of which plaintiff complains was expressly non-neutral, in both word and fact.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify the specific employment practice being challenged.

Frank Daniels, Cross-Appellant v. Pipefitters' Association Local Union No. 597, Cross-Appellee · filed 1991-10-30

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under a theory of disparate impact, a plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice that is challenged.

A promotion test can have a disparate impact when protected candidates' scores cluster too low for promotion, even if they pass the test in sufficient numbers, if the clustering could not have occurred by chance.

Waisome v. The Port Authority Of New York And New Jersey · filed 1991-11-19

Where a test serves dual functions, as the written examination does in the present case, evidence that the scores of members of a protected group were clustered at the low end of the grading scale--though such group members may have passed the examination in sufficient numbers--provides support for a finding that the test had a disparate impact on that group, assuming the clustering could not have occurred by chance.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits medical testimony and representative population studies to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska · filed 1991-07-25(a)

In our view, the EEOC was entitled to rely on the military studies and the opinions of the dermatologists equating the studies' results to the black male population to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a prima facie disparate-impact showing through expert medical evidence that a facially neutral work rule disproportionately excludes a protected racial group.

Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc. · filed 1991-07-25(a)

When the disparity under attack has its roots in a medical condition peculiar to a protected racial group, the disqualifying racial condition and its prevalence may be established by expert medical testimony.

A single decision allocating one round of layoffs is not a specific employment practice for a disparate impact claim.

Council 31, American Federation of State Employees v. Ward · filed 1991-07-30(a)(1)

Plaintiffs are challenging the single decision by IDES on how IDES would allocate one round of layoffs. We find that plaintiffs have failed to prove its prima facie case because plaintiffs have failed to identify a specific employment practice that allegedly has an adverse impact on black employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits disparate impact analysis for claims involving compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Cota v. Tucson Police Department · filed 1992-02-05(a)(1)

The parties disagree as to whether disparate impact analysis is appropriate in an action alleging discrimination as to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... For purposes of this decision, the Court holds that such an analysis is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that a facially neutral standard produced a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.

Newark Branch, National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Township of West Orange · filed 1992-02-14(a)

To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII the plaintiff must demonstrate “that application of a facially neutral standard has resulted in a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.”

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate impact plaintiff to demonstrate an employment practice that adversely affects a protected group.

Kelber v. Forest Electric Corp. · filed 1992-07-07

We need not resolve that issue in the context of Kelber’s disparate impact claim, however, because Kelber has not met her initial burden of demonstrating an employment practice which has a disparate impact on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(k) preserves the requirement to identify the particular employment practice causing a disparate impact.

Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc. · filed 1992-06-20(k)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), however, did not alter the "particularity" aspect of Wards Cove as applied in this case.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a plaintiff to show that each particular challenged employment practice caused a disparate impact, unless the decision-making process cannot be separated for analysis.

Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc. · filed 1992-07-01(k)(1)(B)(i)

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), however, did not alter the “particularity” aspect of Wards Cove as applied in this case.

A Title VII disparate-impact claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when limited data and competing statistical analyses do not establish whether a promotion process had an adverse impact.

Guinyard v. City of New York · filed 1992-08-25(a)(1)

In sum, the statistical evidence does suggest adverse impact at varying phases of the promotion process. But the limitations of the data pool and subsequent statistical analyses offered by both parties fail to establish adverse impact as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2 treats an employment policy that explicitly uses sex in hiring as disparate treatment, rather than disparate impact.

Reidt v. County of Trempealeau · filed 1992-09-23

We believe that disparate treatment is the proper theory for analyzing the facts of this case, not disparate impact. ... The Department's actions were facially discriminatory, not facially neutral.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate impact challenge to a single employer decision when it causes significant disparities for a protected class.

Council 31, American Federation Of State, County And Municipal Employees, Afl-Cio v. Ward · filed 1992-10-28(a)

To the extent that members of a protected class can show significant disparities stemming from a single decision, however, there is no reason that decision should not be actionable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify a specific employment practice and show a significantly discriminatory hiring impact.

Paul v. F.W. Woolworth Co. · filed 1992-12-30(a)(2)

Pursuant to these opinions, plaintiff must first provide a “specific employment practice” and, second, must show a “significantly discriminatory” hiring impact. Plaintiff has shown the former element, but not the latter.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate impact claim when a workplace policy significantly harms a protected group’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Priscilla Garcia Maricela Buitrago United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Afl-Cio v. Spun Steak Company · filed 1993-07-16(a)(1)

We are satisfied that a disparate impact claim may be based upon a challenge to a practice or policy that has a significant adverse impact on the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of the employment of a protected group under section 703(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(k) shifts the burden to the employer to show business necessity after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact case.

Pumphrey v. City of Coeur D'alene, a Municipal Corporation City of Coeur D'Alene Police Department · filed 1994-02-24(k)

After a disparate impact plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the challenged practice is "consistent with business necessity." See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(k); Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-661 (1989). Because the defendant has as yet made no effort to justify the adoption of the .669 in this case, we must remand.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer to show that a hiring test with a demonstrated disparate impact is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Legault v. aRusso · filed 1994-02-10(k)(1)(A)(i)

Given that Legault has made a prima facie showing of substantial disparate impact and that defendants have failed to justify their two tests as "job related" and "consistent with business necessity", I conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that Legault will ultimately prevail on the merits of her claim.

A disparate impact claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires statistical evidence that the challenged employment practice disadvantages a protected class.

Thompson v. State of Arizona · filed 1994-06-14(a)(1)

Thompson failed to offer statistical evidence supporting this claim. Indeed, the State hired Mabry, another African American, for the position. Accordingly, the district court did not err by finding that Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

A disparate impact claim under § 2000e-2(a) may proceed after an adverse § 1981 verdict when the verdict did not resolve all its elements, although the jury’s findings on common factual issues bind the court.

Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1994-08-15(a)

While it is clear that the jury’s fact-finding on issues common to the Section 1981 claim and the Title VII disparate impact claim are binding on this court, the verdict itself is not binding on the claim since all of the elements have not been considered.

A disparate impact plaintiff must use adequate statistics to show that a specific employment practice caused an adverse impact on a protected group.

Pelli v. Stone Savannah River Pulp and Paper Corp. · filed 1995-01-20(k)(1)(A)(i)

Because Pelli has not presented the Court with the relevant labor market statistics required for a prima facie case of disparate impact, she has failed to demonstrate the existence of an essential element of her case. Summary judgment for Stone will be granted on Pelli’s claim of disparate impact.

A disparate impact claim requires evidence that the challenged employment practice causes a disparate effect on a protected group.

Hodges v. Stone Savannah River Pulp and Paper Corp. · filed 1995-04-11(k)(1)(A)

Although Hodges has introduced statistics showing among other things that there are no women electricians at Stone’s plant, these statistics do not even begin to show that Stone’s no-transfer policy has a disparate effect on women.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) requires an employee challenging an English-only workplace rule under a disparate-impact theory to show adverse impact; the rule’s mere existence does not establish a prima facie case.

Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia · filed 1995-04-12(k)(1)(A)

The EEOC’s determination that the mere existence of an English-only policy satisfies the plaintiffs burden of proof is not consistent with the drafting of the statute but is rather agency-created policy. The plaintiff still bears the burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1) places the burden of proving business necessity on the employer in a disparate impact case.

Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville · filed 1995-08-04(k)(1)

Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed Wards Cove by adding a new amendment, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1), restoring pre-Wards Cove law in which, inter alia, “business necessity” is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion and “business necessity” really means “necessity.”

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify a specific employment practice and show that it causes a substantial disproportionate impact on a protected class.

York v. Jesse Brown, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 1995-08-30(k)

To establish a prima facie case under this theory, the plaintiff must first identify a specific employment practice and then demonstrate that the application of this employment practice causes a substantial disproportionate impact on the protected class. ... Because there is no evidence of causation presented, the magistrate judge properly concluded that York failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the disparate impact theory.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff challenging an infertility benefit exclusion for disparate impact to show that it significantly affects female employees.

Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center · filed 1995-10-02(a)(1)

In the present case, to make a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s policy of excluding infertility benefits from its insurance plan has a significantly disparate impact on female employees.

Section 2000e-2(k) does not treat training in Mexico as a protected class for a national origin disparate impact claim.

Moses Muzquiz, Jr., M.D., (94-1088), Cross-Appellee v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc., (94-1089), (94-1420) · filed 1995-11-16(k)

Those who receive training in Mexico are simply not a protected class for purposes of discrimination analysis under Title VII or the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employment test with significant racial disparate impact when the employer fails to show that the test serves a legitimate employment goal.

Fickling v. New York State Department of Civil Service · filed 1995-12-22(a)

Because I find that the examinations had a significant disparate impaet and defendants have failed to offer credible evidence that the examinations served the legitimate business goal of fair competition in civil service employment, I find for the plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires evidence of a substantially disproportionate impact on a protected class to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim.

Batson v. Powell · filed 1996-01-11(a)(2)

To advance their challenge to defendant’s facially neutral dress policy on Title VII grounds, plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case by showing that the UDP had a substantially disproportionate impact on the protected class of female guards.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) requires a disparate impact claimant to show that a particular employment practice caused the exclusion of applicants in a protected group.

Dorsey v. UNC-WILMINGTON · filed 1996-03-19(k)(1)(A)

In the present case, Ms. Dorsey’s evidence simply did not show that any of UNC-W’s hiring practices caused minority applicants, and ... more specifically, black applicants, to be excluded from jobs or promotions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) recognizes a personal injury when a discriminatory hiring practice directly prevents an applicant from being hired or promoted.

Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company · filed 1996-04-25(a)(2)

In contrast, where a plaintiff demonstrates that he was not hired or promoted as the direct result of a discriminatory hiring practice, he has suffered a personal injury within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits subjective hiring and promotion procedures unless they have a disproportionately negative effect on a protected class.

Vitug v. Multistate Tax Commission, Dan R. Bucks, as Executive Director, Les Koenig, as Director of Audit · filed 1996-07-08(a)

It is not enough for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an employment practice could theoretically be used to discriminate — Title VII does not forbid subjective selection processes. Under a disparate impact theory of discrimination, a plaintiff may successfully attack a subjective and arbitrary hiring procedure only if it has a disproportionately negative effect on members of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) allows a gender disparate impact claim when a specific employment practice causes a disparity and lacks a sufficient business justification, or when the employer refuses an available alternative that would reduce the disparity.

Diehl v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1996-07-23(k)(1)(A)

A disparate impact gender claim will lie under Title VII where: (1) the plaintiff demonstrates that an employer uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex and the employer fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (2) the plaintiff demonstrates that an alternative employment practice was available to alleviate the disparate impact of a policy and the employer has refused to adopt the alternative employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A).

In a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff may challenge an employer's practice by offering evidence of an alternative employment practice.

Brine v. University of IA · filed 1996-07-19(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(1)(C)

The plaintiffs offered no evidence relative to an "alternative ... practice," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C), that could substitute for the use of the strategic plan.

A plaintiff relying on an alternative practice to establish disparate impact must offer evidence that it could replace the challenged practice.

Brine v. University Of Iowa · filed 1996-09-20(k)(1)

The plaintiffs offered no evidence relative to an "alternative ... practice," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C), that could substitute for the use of the strategic plan. ... For the same reasons, the trial court was correct in granting judgment as a matter of law to the university on the federal disparate impact claim.

In a disparate-impact pregnancy discrimination claim, once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must prove that the challenged requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Garcia v. Woman's Hospital · filed 1996-10-22(k)(1)(A)(i)

Should she establish her prima facie case, the burden would then shift to the Hospital to prove that the lifting requirement was job related and consistent with business necessity.

A pregnancy-based disparate impact claim requires an adverse effect from a specific employment practice and a causal link; after the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must offer a business necessity for the practice.

Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor · filed 1996-11-11(k)(1)(A)

Lehmuller has shown that the Village adopted a light-duty policy that has an adverse impact on pregnant officers and, therefore, has established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a “business necessity” for the policy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate impact claim when a facially neutral leave policy disproportionately burdens women.

Roberts v. United States Postmaster General · filed 1996-12-03(a)(1)

While an employer can violate Title VII by applying unequally a policy it does have, an employer can also violate Title VII by failing to provide an adequate policy — a policy which on its face is neutral, but which has a disparate impact on women.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer defending a challenged hiring practice to show that it is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Banks v. City of Albany · filed 1997-01-28(k)(1)(A)(i)

Accordingly, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the “challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).

Section 2000e-2(k) prohibits hiring practices that disproportionately exclude women when equally effective alternatives are available.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc. · filed 1997-07-03(k)

Title VII expressly forbids practices resulting in an unjustifiable disparate impact on women, including practices simply carried on from pre-Title VII days. Accordingly, having found an illegal disproportionate impact which is traceable to Joe’s employment practices, the court finds Joe’s guilty of violating Title VII from October 1986 through December 1995.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits hiring practices with a disparate racial impact when the challenged practice causes a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.

NAACP v. City of Bayonne · filed 1998-01-13(a)

The parties agree this clause requires Bayonne to comply with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which makes it unlawful to "limit ... applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ... because of such individual's race...." ... In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that application of a facially neutral standard has caused a "significantly discriminatory hiring pattern."

Section 2000e-2(k) permits a disparate impact claim without proof of discriminatory motive or intent.

National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Town of East Haven · filed 1998-03-25(k)

Though disparate treatment is asserted, requiring proof of discriminatory motive and intent, that claim has not been proven. In view of the relief sought, the case will be considered under the disparate impact theory which does not require such proof. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify an employment practice and show that it causes a significant impact based on a protected characteristic.

Champagne v. USPS · filed 1998-06-22(k)(1)(A)(i)

To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer "uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of . . . sex. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k)(1)(A)(i). ... Second, even if a generally applicable policy does exist, Champagne has produced no evidence that this policy has a significantly discriminatory impact.

A disparate impact claim based on women working part-time requires evidence that the challenged practice caused a disparity based on sex; comparing part-time women with full-time men does not isolate the effect of sex.

Schallop v. New York State Department of Law · filed 1998-09-14(k)(1)(A)

Comparing women working part-time with men working full-time provides no guidance because it is impossible to discern from those statistics whether any disparity is based on gender or on part-time status, a classification not protected.

An employer defending a disparate impact claim must establish that the challenged practice is job-related for the position and consistent with business necessity.

Allison v. Citgo Petro Corp · filed 1998-08-27(k)(1)(A)(i)

To rebut the plaintiffs’ claim that any one of Citgo’s challenged employment practices resulted in a disparate impact, Citgo would have to establish that the “challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”

Section 2000e-2 requires a meaningful statistical comparison to support a disparate impact claim based on a promotion process.

Villanueva v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla. · filed 1998-10-20

Plaintiff does not discuss, for example, how many Hispanic officers are in the Police Department, how many take the promotional examination and are qualified to be promoted, and how their failure rates compare to comparable figures for white officers. It is not enough to merely allege that there are no minority supervisors.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires an employer rebutting a disparate impact claim to establish that the challenged practice is job-related for the position and consistent with business necessity.

Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. · filed 1998-10-02(k)(1)(A)(i)

To rebut the plaintiffs’ claim that any one of Citgo’s challenged employment practices resulted in a disparate impact, Citgo would have to establish that the “challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(I).

A disparate impact claim requires the plaintiff to show that a particular employment practice causes a race-based disparity; the employer may then show that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.

Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc. · filed 1999-03-18(k)(1)(A)(i)

In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race ... and the respondent [must fail] to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).

Section 2000e-2(k) requires statistical comparisons supporting a disparate impact claim to use the qualified labor pool.

Albright v. City of New Orleans · filed 1999-04-14(k)(1)(A)(i)

As seen in the Judiciary Committee’s report discussed above and the jurisprudence, a qualified labor pool must be used in statistical comparisons for adverse impact purposes. ... Plaintiffs have presented no other evidence in support of the adverse impact claim arid, therefore, have failed to meet their burden of establishing a prima facie case of adverse impact.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify the particular employment practice causing the alleged disparity unless the decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis.

Chavez v. Coors Brewing Co. · filed 1999-03-25(k)(1)(B)(i)

Although plaintiff attacks the methodology and criteria used in the selection of senior specialists, he does not identify any particular aspect of the process that had a disparate impact on Hispanics.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that an employment practice adversely affects the plaintiff's protected group; statistics from a very small sample may be insufficient.

Mems v. City of Saint Paul-Department of Fire & Safety Services · filed 1999-05-29(k)

The Court finds that the instant case, however, does not present any such egregious circumstances and does not present a factual scenario that could justify an exception to the requirement that statistics purporting to show disparate impact be based on a study involving a statistically significant sample size.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires an employer to show that a selection procedure is job related after employees establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Allen v. Entergy Corp. · filed 1999-06-22(k)

The standard of proof articulated in the Griggs case and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) states that where the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of disparate impact from a selection procedure, the burden then shifts to the employer to justify the procedure by showing that it is related to safe and efficient job performance.

Section 2000e-2(k) requires an employer to show that a selection procedure is job related once employees make a prima facie showing of disparate impact.

Allen v. Entergy Corporation · filed 1999-08-10(k)

The standard of proof articulated in the Griggs case and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) states that where the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of disparate impact from a selection procedure, the burden then shifts to the employer to justify the procedure by showing that it is related to safe and efficient job performance.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie disparate impact claim by showing that a specific employment practice significantly harms a protected group.

Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-08-12(k)(1)(A)(i)

Instead, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by showing that a “specific identifiable employment practice or policy caused a significant disparate impact on a protected group.” Id. ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

An English-only workplace rule can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact when it disproportionately burdens Hispanic employees who are prone to lapse into Spanish conversation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Premier Operator Services, Inc. · filed 1999-10-19(k)(1)(A)

Thus, the Court concludes that the EEOC has established a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to show that a particular employment practice caused a significant disparity; general workforce statistics do not suffice.

Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Public Schools · filed 1999-10-25(k)(1)(A)(i)

This raw data is insufficient to support a finding that defendants’ overall selection procedures had an adverse impact on men or applicants over age 50.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to identify a particular employment practice or policy that disproportionately affects a protected group.

Wayne v. Dallas Morning News · filed 1999-11-24(k)(1)(A)(i)

Other than alleging that the Morning News has habitually avoided assigning blacks to large accounts and has failed to promote them as compared to non-minorities, Wayne has failed to identify a particular policy or practice that disparately impacts African-Americans and thus has not satisfied the first element of her prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) requires a disparate impact claimant to identify an employment practice that disproportionately affects a protected group.

Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., David Otani, William Betts, Diane Lewis, Sara Lee Corporation, and Herve Heriveaux · filed 2000-01-20(k)(1)(A)

Not only was the district court correct on this ground, but even assuming that Cruz had stated a disparate impact claim, she also failed utterly to establish a prima facie case, because she never alleged that any “facially neutral” Coach policy has a disparate effect on minority employees.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate impact claimant to show that a specific employment practice causes a sufficiently substantial class based imbalance.

Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2000-07-14

In order to prove a disparate impact case, plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice “that can be shown to have a causal connection to a class based imbalance in the workforce.” ... In the court’s opinion, these numbers are not “sufficiently substantial.”

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) does not require an employer to excuse pregnant employees from legitimate attendance requirements under a disparate impact theory.

Dormeyer, Jennifer v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-07-24(k)(1)(A)(i)

The argument here is not that the employer has adopted rules or practices that arbitrarily exclude pregnant women, but that the employer should be required to excuse pregnant employees from having to satisfy the legitimate requirements of their job. It is an argument for subsidizing a class of workers, and the concept of disparate impact does not stretch that far.