42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the State of Nevada.

Vigil v. Maguire · filed 2020-05-15

Moreover, Judge Cobb found that Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the State of Nevada under § 1983 or the Eleventh Amendment. ... The Court agrees.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Summers v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-05-18

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, cannot be sued for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Caraffa v. Arizona, State of · filed 2020-05-27

Furthermore, “a state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Zapata v. State of Tennessee · filed 2020-06-08

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is not a “person” that can be sued under § 1983.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-06-17

Finally, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute.

A state is not a person that can be sued for money damages under § 1983.

Raugust v. Abbey · filed 2020-06-29

The Court need not consider the statute of limitations defense as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the State because the State is not a “person” that can be sued for money damages under 42 U.S.C, § 1983.

Section 1983 treats counties as persons that may be sued for deprivations of federal rights.

Knight v. Montgomery County, Tennessee · filed 2020-06-30

Counties are also persons for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state as a defendant.

Jenkins v. State of Utah · filed 2020-07-23

First, given the parties’ agreement that the State is not a proper defendant for Jenkins’ Section 1983 claim, the court grants the State’s motion in that respect.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Lenti v. Connecticut · filed 2020-07-24

The State of Connecticut is not a “person” subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Anyanwu v. State of Louisiana · filed 2020-07-31

A state is not a person under § 1983; thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state brought under this section.

Section 1983 permits suit only against a person, and a state is not a person under the statute.

Marchant v. Judge Bailey · filed 2020-08-07

Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute.

A county jail cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a juridical entity.

Cody v. Ste. Genevieve Co Jail · filed 2020-08-10

Plaintiff's claims against the Saint Genevieve County Jail are legally frivolous because it cannot be sued.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Ruza v. The People of the State of Michigan · filed 2020-08-12

In addition, the State of Michigan is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages.

A state is not a “person” that can be sued under § 1983.

ELANSARI v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-08-14

Additionally, the Commonwealth is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Jackson v. Lawson · filed 2020-08-18

Because the State of Missouri is not a § 1983 person, plaintiff cannot prevail against it in a claim for money damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Blankumsee v. The State Of Maryland · filed 2020-08-27

A state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Collinsworth v. Claiborne County Justice Center (TV2) · filed 2020-09-11

However, it is well established that a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Kelly v. Tennessee, State of · filed 2020-09-11

However, the State of Tennessee is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983 and is immune from such a claim.

Chapman v. Smith · filed 2020-09-21

Chapman’s claims against the Commonwealth of Virginia also lack merit as that entity is not a person for purposes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is immune from suit.

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person subject to suit.

Lee v. State of TN Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-28

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Vieth v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2020-10-02

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under §1983.

A state is not a person who may be sued under § 1983.

Townsend v. TN Dept of Corrections · filed 2020-10-02

Townsend’s claim for monetary damages against the TDOC are must be treated as a claim against the State of Tennessee itself. ... Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory or injunctive relief against a judge acting as a neutral adjudicator, and absolute judicial immunity bars damages for judicial acts within the court’s jurisdiction.

Malhan v. Katz · filed 2020-10-14

Because we agree with the District Court that Judge Katz is not a proper defendant for declaratory or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages, we will affirm.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

ORTIZ v. WOODBRIDGE · filed 2020-10-20

Because the State of New Jersey is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and because the State is not a person under Section 1983, Count 15 is dismissed as to the State.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

NICKENS v. MERCER COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER · filed 2020-10-27

a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Williams v. TDOC · filed 2020-10-30

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of law, but a county jail cannot be sued as a separate entity.

Neubecker v. Kenosha County Jail · filed 2020-12-07

The court first notes that the plaintiff cannot sue the Kenosha County Jail under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The Kenosha County Jail is not a person—it is not an individual subject to suit under §1983.

A detention center is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Mays v. Daviess County Detention Center · filed 2020-12-08

Defendant DCDC is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against a state because a state is not a person under the section.

Alvarez v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2020-12-10

The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under § 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Porterfield v. Shelby County Jail · filed 2020-12-29

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of42 U.S.C. §1983.

A state is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action because it is not a person under the statute.

Perez v. State of Nebraska · filed 2021-01-04

Secondly, the State of Nebraska is not a proper defendant in this § 1983 action, for the reasons already explained.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Isgar v. State of Missouri · filed 2021-01-08

Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, it must be dismissed.

A state is not a person that can be sued under § 1983.

Tennessee Prisoners v. Parker · filed 2021-01-08

Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Davidson v. Stringer · filed 2021-01-11

Because the State of Missouri is not a person, plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983. Therefore, these claims must be dismissed.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Robinson v. Hurt · filed 2021-01-14

A jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not immunize a detention officer from liability for excessive force merely because the officer acted in good faith; the objective immunity inquiry turns on clearly established law.

Williams v. Thomas · filed 1981-04-03

Consequently, the Court concludes that the use of excessive force against prisoners necessarily involves the violation of well-established constitutional norms regarding the treatment of prisoners. ... As a matter of law no “good faith” defense was applicable in this action.

A police officer sued under Section 1983 for excessive force in making an arrest has a good faith defense, available where the officer reasonably believed the force used was lawful and necessary, paralleling the common-law privilege of arrest.

Betty Bledsoe and Gail Wesson v. Daniel v. Garcia, Bill Sieferd, and Bill Peppler · filed 1984-09-04

We are satisfied that the privilege of arrest as available at common law provides a sufficient parallel for recognizing in a § 1983 suit a good faith defense to a claim of excessive force in making an arrest.

Evidence that an official consulted counsel does not support good faith in satisfying constitutional requirements without evidence of the advice or that the official followed it.

Gary Murphy, Cross-Appellee v. City of Flagler Beach, and Daniel H. Bennett, Cross-Appellants. Gary Murphy v. Flagler Be · filed 1985-05-28

Evidence that a defendant has consulted with his attorney is of no probative value as to issues of good faith in attempting to meet Constitutional or other legal requirements in the absence of evidence of the substance of the advice that the defendant received from his attorney or, at the very least, some evidence that he acted in conformance with his attorney’s advice.

Private garnishees who rely in good faith on government instructions may avoid liability under § 1983 for failing to give additional notice.

Burris v. Mahaney · filed 1989-05-03

The private defendants’ failure to give any additional notice was in complete good faith reliance upon government instructions. Accordingly, they would not be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if there had been a due process violation.

A private physician has a good faith defense to Section 1983 liability when he believes a valid search warrant compels his act and relies on hospital counsel’s advice.

Carlton v. Herschel · filed 1991-01-31

Defendant is entitled to assert a good faith defense based upon his belief that he was acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, and based upon the advice of the hospital attorney. See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir.1988); Burris v. Mahaney, 716 F.Supp. 1051, 1063-64 (M.D.Tenn.1989). Defendant should not be held liable under Sec. 1983 for performing an act he thought he was compelled to do.

Section 1983 damages liability for private defendants invoking unconstitutional ex parte prejudgment statutes requires the plaintiff to show malice and that the defendants knew or should have known the statute was unconstitutional.

Wyatt v. Bill Cole, John Robbins, II · filed 1993-06-25

In light of these considerations, we think that private defendants, at least those invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes, should not be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing of malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the statute’s constitutional infirmity.

Private defendants invoking state procedures may avoid § 1983 damages liability through a good faith defense based on objectively reasonable reliance and lack of actual knowledge that the statute was unconstitutional.

Britt v. Whitehall Income Fund '86 · filed 1993-07-29

This Court adopts the Fifth Circuit’s good faith test for a private defendant in a § 1983 action, which has an objective and subjective component, in assessing whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. ... Summary judgment is appropriate where there is an absence of evidence showing that a defendant had actual knowledge that a statute was unconstitutional.

Private defendants invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes are liable for damages under § 1983 only upon a showing of malice and evidence that they knew or should have known the statute was unconstitutional.

Wyatt v. Cole · filed 1993-12-28

In light of these considerations, we think that private defendants, at least those invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes, should not be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing of malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the statute's constitutional infirmity.

A private entity acting as a municipality cannot avoid § 1983 liability by claiming good faith reliance on a policy it adopted.

Nemo v. City of Portland · filed 1995-12-12

By standing in the shoes of the City, Pioneer Courthouse Square, Inc., cannot claim that it relied in good faith on its own policy.

In a § 1983 excessive force action, the plaintiff must prove excessive force before good faith becomes a defense; defendants need not prove that the force was not excessive.

Peraza v. Paul Delameter, James Keane, and City of Santa Monica · filed 1984-01-13

Finally, the trial judge was not obliged to instruct the jury that it was the defendants’ burden as part of their good faith defense to prove that the force used to arrest was not excessive. ... We note that generally the issue of good faith arises as a defense if the plaintiff proves that a constitutional violation has occurred.

Defendants in a § 1983 action bear the burden of establishing a good faith defense.

Arebaugh v. Governor John Dalton, Attorney General Marshall Coleman, Terrell D. Hutto, Director · filed 1984-03-28

First, the burden is on the defendants to establish a good faith defense.

Section 1983 allows police officers sued for damages to defend their conduct by showing they reasonably and in good faith believed it was lawful.

Notaras v. F. C. Ramon and Jane Doe Ramon · filed 1967-09-22

Subsequent to the submission of this case on appeal the Supreme Court announced in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), that it is a defense to an action for damages against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the officers reasonably and in good faith believed that their conduct was lawful, even though it was not. In the present case the defense of good faith was tendered in the pretrial order. A determination that the officers acted in the reasonably held good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful is implicit in the district court’s findings. It is amply supported by the evidence.

A police officer defending a § 1983 claim arising from a warrantless arrest must show objective probable cause as well as good faith.

Boscarino v. Nelson · filed 1974-06-05

In such a case, there is a particular constitutional requirement that such an arrest be based on probable cause to be valid, and the court of appeals has said that it must also be so based to support a defense to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow an officer to use subjective good faith as a defense at trial when qualified immunity does not shield the officer's actions.

DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale · filed 2005-04-12

We also hold that a police officer's subjective good faith belief may not constitute a defense at trial to a § 1983 Federal Civil Rights Act claim when the police officer's actions are not otherwise shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Personal good faith is not a defense to equitable relief under § 1983.

Joseph T. Rozecki, Jr. v. Charles W. Gaughan, Superintendent · filed 1972-04-26

Whether personal good faith of the individual defendants could constitute a defense to monetary damages is not before us. We can only say that it cannot be thought a defense against equitable relief.

A private garageman who acts in good faith under a state mechanics’ lien procedure may assert a good faith defense to § 1983 damages liability.

Williams v. Johnson · filed 1974-09-30

Acordingly, since it is factually conceded that Modern acted in good faith, Modern is entitled to summary judgment as to Holderbaum’s 1983 suit against it.

Police officers sued for false arrest under § 1983 may assert a good faith defense.

Flair v. Cox · filed 1975-10-22

Without a lengthy discussion of the precedents, suffice it to state that it is well established that the good faith defense is available to the defendant police officers when they are being sued for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 affords officers a complete defense when they act in good faith and reasonably believe their actions lawful.

Samuel v. Busnuck · filed 1976-11-30

When officers act in the bona fide and reasonable belief that their actions are in accordance with law, even though it be later determined that such belief was erroneous, they have a complete defense to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private towing company may assert a good faith defense to a § 1983 claim when it follows apparently lawful police instructions.

Clement v. J & E Service · filed 2008-03-10

However, the courts have previously held open the possibility that private defendants may assert a “good faith” defense to a section 1983 claim. ... The facts of this case justify allowing Monterey Tow Service to assert such a good faith defense.

Section 1983 permits a private towing company to invoke a good faith defense when it follows police instructions for an apparently lawful tow.

Clement v. City of Glendale · filed 2008-03-11

However, the courts have previously held open the possibility that private defendants may assert a “good faith” defense to a section 1983 claim. ... Having acted on instructions from the Glendale Police Department that specifically called for the tow, Monterey Tow Service is entitled to invoke the good faith defense.

Section 1983 allows a person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law to sue for redress, subject to an officer’s affirmative defense of good faith action under apparently valid authority.

Murray v. City of Chicago · filed 1980-11-25

With respect to the arresting officers themselves, good faith action under apparently valid authority is an affirmative defense which they must plead and prove. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

A private party has a good faith defense to a § 1983 claim unless the party acted with malice or knew or should have known the conduct violated the Constitution.

Hunsberger v. Wood · filed 2008-07-03

This court follows those courts that have found good faith to be a defense for private parties unless those parties act with malice or those parties knew or should have know their actions violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a good faith defense only where that defense would be available in the parallel common law tort action.

Laverne v. Corning · filed 1972-11-15

I do not read Bivens as disagreeing with the principle enunciated by both Monroe and Pierson and the subsequent decisions of other courts that a good faith defense to § 1983 is available only where such a defense would be available to tort liability in the parallel common law cause of action.

In a § 1983 damages claim for an allegedly unlawful arrest, an officer asserting a good faith defense must establish subjective good faith and a reasonable belief that the arrest was legal.

Thompson v. Anderson · filed 1977-12-27

Thus, in order to determine whether or not the defendant herein has met his burden of establishing his good faith defense in connection with the alleged unlawful arrest complaint, this Court must first consider subjective good faith and then consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that his arrest of plaintiff was legal.

Section 1983 permits equitable backpay against a school district despite its good faith.

Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, Wyoming · filed 1979-11-26

We hold that an award of backpay is an element of equitable relief, and that equitable relief is not precluded by a good faith defense.

Good faith is a defense to Section 1983 damages actions, but does not defeat a claim seeking only injunctive relief.

Addante v. Village of Elmwood Park · filed 1982-06-11

Addante seeks only injunctive relief, and good faith is a defense only to Section 1983 damage actions in any event.

Private persons acting under color of law may assert a good faith defense to a § 1983 claim, and they bear the burden of establishing their good faith.

Ambrose v. Coffey · filed 2010-03-31

Private persons who act under the color of law may assert a good faith defense to a § 1983 claim. ... In the Ninth Circuit, the defendant asserting the defense of good faith bears the burden of establish their good faith.

A private defendant facing liability under Section 1983 may assert a good faith defense by showing a subjective belief that their conduct was constitutional and that the belief was objectively reasonable.

Lewis v. McCracken · filed 2011-03-21

Because the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility of a good faith defense for private individuals in a Section 1983 action, we conclude that such a defense is available here to Bennett. ... Other cases — ones which we find to be more persuasive — hold that, in order for a private individual to show good faith in a Section 1983 case, he must demonstrate that he had a subjective belief that his actions were constitutional and that that belief on his part was objectively reasonable.

Private defendants may invoke a good faith defense to § 1983 damages for conduct authorized by then-binding law.

Crockett v. Nea-Alaska · filed 2019-03-14

Given that the good faith defense is indeed available to private defendants in § 1983 cases, the court must consider whether it in fact shields the Union Defendants from monetary liability here. In line with the three other district courts that have applied the defense under nearly identical facts, the court concludes that it does.

A private defendant sued for damages under § 1983 may assert a good-faith defense when it reasonably relied on a state statute permitted by controlling precedent.

Rauner v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 · filed 2019-03-18

Consequently, the court concludes that the good faith defense applies, and plaintiff is not entitled to any damages.

Section 1983 allows a union to raise a good-faith defense to a claim for fees it collected in reliance on then-binding law.

Lee v. Ass'n · filed 2019-03-25

The Court agrees with the rationale of these decisions and incorporates it herein. Accordingly, NEA may present a good faith defense and the request for injunctive relief is moot.

Private parties sued under § 1983 may assert a good-faith defense when they collected fees in reliance on state law and controlling Supreme Court precedent.

Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass'n · filed 2019-04-11

On review, the Court concludes private parties facing a § 1983 lawsuit may advance a good-faith affirmative defense and Defendants have successfully done so in this case.

Private defendants may assert a good-faith defense to Section 1983 refund claims when they relied on presumptively valid law and controlling precedent.

Akers v. Md. State Educ. Ass'n · filed 2019-04-18

The refund claims shall be dismissed with prejudice because Defendants may assert the good-faith defense, having complied with and relied upon presumptively-valid state law and controlling Supreme Court precedent.

Private unions may assert a good-faith defense to § 1983 refund claims for agency fees collected before Janus in reliance on then-controlling law.

Babb v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n · filed 2019-05-08

The Court agrees with every other district court to have decided this question and concludes that "[t]he good faith defense should apply here as a matter of law."

Private parties sued under Section 1983 may invoke a good-faith defense when they collected agency fees in reliance on then-valid law.

Hernandez v. Afscme Cal. · filed 2019-06-20

This court concurs. The Ninth Circuit has held that private parties may be entitled to a good-faith defense to a claim under Section 1983 where they "did [their] best follow the law and had no reason to suspect that there would be a constitutional challenge to [their] actions." ... Thus, the union is entitled to the good-faith defense as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a good-faith defense for a union that collected agency fees in compliance with then-existing law.

Hamidi v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000 · filed 2019-10-25

Today, in reliance on the guidance above, this court makes the standard clear: in the agency fee context, a union’s compliance with then-existing law indeed suffices to find good faith.

A private party acting under color of state law may raise a good-faith defense to § 1983 liability when it reasonably relies on established law.

Janus v. American Federation of State · filed 2019-11-05

We now join our sister circuits in recognizing that, under appropriate circumstances, a private party that acts under color of law for purposes of section 1983 may defend on the ground that it proceeded in good faith.

Section 1983 allows a good-faith defense to retrospective monetary relief for agency fees collected in reliance on then-controlling precedent.

SMITH v. NEW JERSEY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION · filed 2019-11-27

Additionally, because the Union Defendants’ deduction of representation fees from non-member employees was conducted in good-faith reliance on the Supreme Court decision overruled by Janus, Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Court declines to order retrospective monetary relief.

Section 1983 permits a private union to assert a good-faith defense to damages liability for fair-share fees it collected in reliance on then-valid state law and Supreme Court precedent.

Kioussis v. Service Employees International Union Local 668 · filed 2019-12-10

In short, this court concurs with the numerous cases which have found that unions, such as SEIU, that collected fair-share fees from nonmembers prior to Janus, and pursuant to state law and Abood, can assert the good-faith defense to §1983 liability for the First Amendment claims raised by plaintiffs.

A private party may assert a good faith defense to retrospective monetary liability under Section 1983 when it relied directly on binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively valid state law.

Danielson v. Inslee · filed 2019-12-26

We agree with our sister circuit that a union defendant can invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected pre-Janus, where its conduct was directly authorized under both state law and decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Private defendants who reasonably rely on a state statute not yet held unconstitutional may invoke a good-faith defense to § 1983 damages claims.

Seidemann v. Professional Staff Congress Local 2334 · filed 2020-01-10

Therefore, the Court must find as a matter of law that Defendants acted in good faith and cannot be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a union to invoke a good faith defense against repayment of fair-share fees collected before Janus under then-governing law.

Penning v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1021 · filed 2020-01-16

With respect to the claims for repayment of fair-share fees previously deducted before Janus, the good faith doctrine precludes such relief under section 1983.

Private parties may invoke a good faith defense to retrospective monetary liability under Section 1983 when they relied on then-binding law.

Grossman v. Hawaii Government Employees Association/AFSCME Local 152 · filed 2020-01-31

Because a private party is not expected to anticipate changes in constitutional law, the good faith defense shields HGEA, as a matter of law, from pre-Janus monetary liability.

A private party sued under § 1983 may assert a good-faith defense when it relied on existing state law and binding precedent to collect agency fees.

Lee v. Ass'n · filed 2020-02-24

Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because the Union’s reliance on existing authority satisfied the good-faith defense as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a private union to assert a good-faith defense to monetary liability for fair-share fees collected before Janus in reliance on state law and Supreme Court precedent.

Chambers v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees International Union, AFL-CIO · filed 2020-03-31

Under binding Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendants here may assert good faith as a complete defense to Plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983.

A party that collected fair-share union fees in reliance on controlling Supreme Court precedent and then-valid state law has a good-faith defense to monetary damages under § 1983.

Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001 · filed 2020-04-15

We hold that a party who complied with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent in collecting fair-share fees cannot be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983.

A party that collected fair-share fees in compliance with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent cannot be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983 for those collections.

Pellegrino v. New York State United Teachers · filed 2020-04-30

Because Wholean is nearly identical to the case at hand, its hold- ing—“that a party who complied with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent in collecting fair-share fees cannot be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983,” id. at *2— completely forecloses Plaintiffs’ only remaining claim.

Section 1983 allows a good faith defense for unions that collected agency fees under presumptively valid state law and then-applicable Supreme Court precedent before Janus.

Gabriele v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 · filed 2020-06-12

Accordingly, union defendants here are entitled to the good faith defense and, as a matter of law, cannot be liable for agency fees collected prior to Janus.

Section 1983 allows a good faith defense to a claim for a refund of past union agency fees.

Littler v. Ohio Association of Public School Employees · filed 2020-07-17

While Ms. Littler has preserved her claim for appeal, all agree that Lee controls. See 951 F.3d at 388 (holding that good faith defense barred claim for refund of agency fees). OAPSE’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

Section 1983 permits a good-faith defense for towing company employees who follow police orders without evidence that they knew of a defect in those orders.

Holmes v. Thompson · filed 2020-08-06

Second, even assuming that there is a plausible basis for concluding that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, Defendants are shielded from § 1983 liability by the good-faith defense recognized in Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 allows a private party to avoid monetary liability when it acted in good faith reliance on a state statute and controlling Supreme Court precedent.

Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Education A · filed 2020-08-28

In this unique circumstance, the good faith defense applies here to protect the Unions from monetary liability under § 1983.

A private party acting under color of state law may invoke a good-faith defense to a Section 1983 claim for repayment of fair-share fees collected before Janus.

Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union · filed 2020-12-09

We held that a private party acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes was entitled to a good-faith defense, which applied to the union’s collection of fair-share fees before the Supreme Court’s decision. ... As Ocol admits, the exact same rationale applies to bar his claim for repayment of past fair-share fees from the Chicago Teachers Union.

Section 1983 does not impose monetary liability for collecting fair-share fees in compliance with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent.

Seidemann v. Professional Staff Congress · filed 2021-01-11

Since the district court’s order, we have reached the same conclusion about § 1983. Specifically, in Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, this Court held “that a party who complied with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent in collecting fair-share fees cannot be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983.” 955 F.3d 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2020). Though Plaintiffs’ brief was filed after Wholean, it provides essentially no explanation why Wholean’s holding does not control the outcome here, choosing instead to explain why, in their view, the case was wrongly decided. But absent such a distinction, Wholean controls.

Section 1983 does not apply when the governing statute provides an exclusive judicial remedy.

Gary B. v. Cronin · filed 1982-03-23

If the governing statute provides an exclusive judicial remedy, section 1983 is not applicable.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy in this situation for constitutional claims brought against a state official, precluding direct actions under the First and Eleventh Amendments.

May v. Lawrence J. Hackett, Morris May v. Lawrence J. Hackett · filed 1988-12-09

The plaintiff's attempts to bring direct actions under the first and eleventh amendments fail because Sec. 1983 is his exclusive remedy in this situation.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for employment discrimination claims based on acts prohibited by Title VII when the claims are not independent of the Title VII claim.

Sauers v. Salt Lake County · filed 1989-05-12

In the case at bar, plaintiff Sauers’ civil rights claims are based on acts which are prohibited under Title VII. Thus, plaintiffs civil rights claims are not independent of her Title VII claim, and Title VII constitutes the exclusive remedy in this case. Allowing plaintiff Sauers to pursue her civil rights claims in this case would circumvent Title VIPs comprehensive scheme. Accordingly, plaintiff Sauers’ §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of Section 1981 by state actors.

Jett v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 1989-06-22

We hold that the express “action at law” provided by § 1983 for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,” provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional violations when a plaintiff pleads a § 1983 cause of action.

Wynn v. Morgan · filed 1994-07-08

For these reasons defendant asserts and the court agrees that plaintiffs constitutional claims must be treated as arising exclusively under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doe. 16a, p. 4].

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for an equal protection claim based on disability discrimination in educational services when IDEA is the exclusive avenue for that claim.

Ft. Zumwalt School Dist. v. MISSOURI BD. OF EDUC. · filed 1994-10-11

The counterclaim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the child was discriminated against on the basis of his handicap in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not cognizable; Congress intended IDEA to be the exclusive avenue through which such a claim can be pursued.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for retaliation based on Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision when Title VII supplies the exclusive remedy.

Lightner v. TOWN OF ARITON, AL · filed 1995-08-17

Because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy in this context, the court finds that Plaintiff may maintain no action under section 1983 predicated on retaliation.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for employment discrimination for which Title VII is the exclusive remedy.

Willis v. William N. Morris, Jr Richard Swiggart Henry Marmon Joseph Jackson Shelby County Tennessee Informatio · filed 1995-10-18

The claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was also properly dismissed, as Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for the employment discrimination alleged here.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by state employees.

Cummings v. Kilroy · filed 1995-12-18

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by state employees.

Section 1983 does not provide alternative or additional relief for employment discrimination based solely on a Title VII violation.

Jackson v. Atlanta, TX, City of · filed 1996-01-24

Consequently, § 1983 is not available to Jackson for either alternative or additional relief.

Section 1983 precludes a direct Fourteenth Amendment claim when a plaintiff also asserts a § 1983 claim.

Schanzer v. Rutgers University · filed 1996-07-16

In addition, plaintiff may not bring a claim directly under the Fourteenth Amendment where a claim is asserted under section 1983.

Section 1983’s limits cannot be bypassed by pleading a duplicate Fourteenth Amendment claim for the same state action.

Eddy v. VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER AND POWER AUTHORITY · filed 1997-03-06

Accordingly, plaintiff is precluded from seeking relief under a Fourteenth Amendment claim which he would not be able to obtain under a section 1983 claim. Since Count III is duplicative of Count IV, Count III will be dismissed.

Section 1983 remains the sole avenue of relief against state actors for violations of Section 1981 after the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

McPhaul v. Board of Com'rs of Madison County · filed 1997-07-28

For these reasons, we find that Jett was not overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and accordingly § 1983 remains the sole avenue of relief against state actors for violations of § 1981.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act because that Act provides an exclusive remedy.

CHRISTOPHER N. v. McDaniel · filed 1983-06-03

Therefore, this court must conclude that a § 1983 claim is not cognizable in conjunction with the Education Act.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for Section 1981 claims against state actors.

Sims v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2000-10-24

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to clarify that she is pursuing her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims, to the extent that they allege municipal liability, solely through the remedies provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights based solely on Title VII because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for those claims.

Truax v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2001-06-18

Because I agree with those circuit courts that have held that Title VII has its own detailed and comprehensive remedial scheme, I conclude that it provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination actions based solely on its violation.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, so a claim pleaded directly under the Constitution may be treated as identifying the rights underlying a Section 1983 claim.

McGuire v. City of Moraine, Ohio · filed 2001-09-04

Although Count 3 purports to set forth claims directly under the federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that "constitutional violations by state officials are not cognizable directly under the [C]onstitution (or by virtue of general federal question jurisdiction) because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for such constitutional violations." ... As a result, the Court will treat Count 3 as identifying the constitutional violations underlying the § 1983 claim in Count 1 of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Section 1983 permits a claim for constitutional violations by a state employer even when the same facts also support a Title VII claim.

Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1986-07-09

The district court improperly dismissed the three claims brought under section 1983 and the claim brought under clause two of Sec. 1985(2) on the theory that Title VII is plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 provides no separate remedy for the injuries claimed when the EAHCA is the exclusive remedy for those injuries.

Seymour Wexler and Daisy Wexler, Individually and on Behalf of Their Child, Douglas Wexler v. Westfield Board of Educati · filed 1986-03-18

On appeal, plaintiffs appear to have abandoned any separate arguments based on section 1983 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and we decide this case under the EAHCA and cases interpreting it. In any case, under the circumstances of this case, the EAHCA is the exclusive remedy for the injuries claimed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for race-based selective enforcement of traffic laws, but it is not the exclusive remedy.

Jones v. Sterling · filed 2005-05-04

But the fact that a § 1983 claim is an available remedy for selective enforcement does not make it the exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for retaliation for filing a Title VII complaint; Title VII supplies the sole federal remedy.

Morris v. Oldham Cnty Fiscal · filed 2000-01-20

Whatever the scope or source of a constitutional claim of improper retaliation in other circumstances, where the plaintiff asserts that she has been retaliated against for filing a complaint under Title VII, her sole federal remedy is the cause of action provided for under Title VII.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations by state actors even when public defender immunity bars recovery.

Bartee v. Yanoff · filed 1981-04-07

Section 1983 is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for any violations of his constitutional rights by the defendants. This is so despite the judge-made rule of public defender immunity which prevents any recovery here.

Section 1983 subsumes duplicative direct constitutional claims alleging the same violations.

Aarti Hospitality LLC v. City of Grove City, Ohio · filed 2009-09-18

The direct constitutional claims asserted in Counts Six, Seven, and Eight are duplicative of, and are therefore subsumed by, those brought pursuant to § 1983 in Counts Ten, Eleven, and Twelve.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional violations by a local government, so a plaintiff cannot bring a direct Fourteenth Amendment claim against it.

LaBorde v. City of Gahanna · filed 2013-05-20

And even then, there can be no direct Fourteenth Amendment claim brought against a local government defendant, as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for violations of rights created by the FMLA because the FMLA provides the exclusive means of recovery.

Callan v. City of Dover · filed 2014-08-26

A majority of courts have held that FMLA provides the exclusive means of recovery for violation of rights created by FMLA. ... This single reference to a case decided in 1998 does not persuade me to disagree with the substantial weight of recent case law ruling otherwise.

Section 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for a § 1981 claim against a local governmental authority.

Tigner v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools · filed 2019-05-23

In light of the foregoing, and so as not to conflate the issues, Plaintiff is directed to plead this cause of action as a “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the protections set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” That way, it is clear that Plaintiffs exclusive remedy lies under § 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for the constitutional deprivations alleged in the complaint.

Langford v. Cobb · filed 2019-09-27

Furthermore, § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for the constitutional deprivations Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for alleged federal constitutional violations.

Annette v. Haslam · filed 2019-09-30

The statutory enactment in Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for alleged federal constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional claims against state and local officials and local governments.

Young v. Kenney · filed 2019-11-08

A plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the Constitution. Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim as being brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for constitutional claims against state and local officials, so a separate direct constitutional claim cannot proceed.

Fox v. Saginaw, County of · filed 2021-01-13

Today, the Sixth Circuit recognizes § 1983 as the “exclusive remedy for constitutional violations.” Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Count II will be dismissed.

Section 1983 holds officers liable for an initial unlawful seizure even if the person’s later resistance supplies probable cause for a separate arrest.

Petro v. Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore · filed 2012-09-07

The Court finds that officers maintain liability for an initial unlawful seizure, regardless of whether an arrestee commits a crime thereafter that provides probable cause for a new and distinct crime.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of a person's constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures of the person and property.

Skrocki v. Caltabiano · filed 1981-04-13

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their “persons, houses, paper and effects”. A cause of action will be recognized under Section 1983 where a person’s right to be free from illegal searches and seizures of himself and his property has been violated.

In a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, proof of a warrantless home search establishes a constitutional violation unless the defendants prove a recognized exception such as consent.

Tyree v. Keane · filed 1987-05-14

Proof that the police conducted a warrantless search of his apartment was sufficient for the plaintiff to show a constitutional violation. As in the criminal context, the defendants may then rely on one of the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to justify the search and avoid liability under § 1983.

In a § 1983 Fourth Amendment action, defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished their constitutional rights.

Feliciano v. City of Cleveland · filed 1987-06-12

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for a fourth amendment violation, defendants bear the burden of demonstrating plaintiffs’ voluntary relinquishment of their constitutional rights, in the face of a presumption against such a waiver.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, or ADA.

D.B. Ex Rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito · filed 2012-03-23

However, we have already explained that § 1983 does not provide a remedy either for IDEA violations, see Diaz-Fonseca, 451 F.3d at 29, or for Rehabilitation Act or ADA violations, see Ramírez-Senda, 528 F.3d at 13 n.3.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for an alleged violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay because the Bankruptcy Code provides the exclusive enforcement mechanism.

Chitty v. Nye County Sheriff'S Department · filed 2002-09-18

There can be no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on an alleged violation of an automatic stay because the bankruptcy code provides an exclusive and comprehensive enforcement mechanism for such a violation.

A handicapped child denied access to public education may not use a Section 1983 equal-protection claim to supplement the exclusive remedies provided by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.

Alexopulos v. Riles · filed 1986-03-18

In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), the Supreme Court decided that the provisions of the EAHCA provide the sole remedy for a handicapped child who has been denied his right to a free public education. ... Thus appellants may not assert an equal protection claim, but are limited to the remedies provided in the EAHCA.

When the Education for All Handicapped Children Act is available for a free-appropriate-public-education claim, Section 1983 remains available only for alleged procedural-due-process violations and damages caused by that deprivation.

John H. v. Brunelle · filed 1986-03-19

In view of the above, plaintiffs may not maintain an action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs may not maintain a claim for attorneys fees and plaintiffs may maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only to the extent that the complaint alleges procedural due process violations and only to the extent of alleged damages based on that deprivation.

Section 1983 is unavailable to remedy a violation of a federal statute that provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.

Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 94 v. City of New York · filed 1981-04-17

However, § 1983 certainly is not available to remedy violations of statutes which provide an exclusive remedy for violation of its terms.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the EAHCA when that statute provides an express and exclusive remedy.

Anderson v. Thompson · filed 1981-09-08

Because we hold that plaintiffs' action is not cognizable under section 1983, attorney's fees are not available under section 1988.

Section 1983 does not provide an alternative cause of action or a conduit to attorney’s fees when another federal statute supplies an exclusive remedial scheme.

Anderson v. Thompson · filed 1981-09-08

In sum, the availability of a private right of action under the EAHCA, the detailed statutory administrative and judicial scheme, the fact that Congress intended the EAHCA to create new rights, and the absence of a traditional damage remedy, together compel our conclusion that the judicial remedy provided in the EAHCA was intended to be exclusive. The EAHCA does not itself provide for attorney’s fees and plaintiffs cannot rely on section 1983 as a conduit to attorney’s fees under section 1988.

A plaintiff may not bypass Title VII’s detailed exclusive remedial process by recasting the same employment discrimination as a constitutional claim under § 1983.

Weide v. Mass Transit Administration · filed 1985-06-28

Plaintiff is not relieved of the obligation to follow the detailed remedy provided by Congress in Title VII particularly when the exact same conduct which she claims violates Title VII is the conduct which she claims also violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

The ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme precludes a duplicative § 1983 age-discrimination claim.

Morgan v. Humboldt County School District · filed 1985-12-04

As seen above, the ADEA has a specific statutory scheme, which would be thwarted if the Court were to allow a separate § 1983 action for the alleged age discrimination. In that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for these rights, allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a § 1983 action for their violation would be futile, in that the newly amended complaint would immediately fall prey to a motion to dismiss.

Title VII does not preclude a state or local employee from pursuing an independent § 1983 claim based on preexisting constitutional rights such as equal protection.

Roybal v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1986-07-01

The Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue in this case were not created by Title VII; they predate that statute. Therefore, plaintiff has stated an independent cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Title VII is the exclusive remedy when a § 1983 employment-discrimination claim rests only on a violation of Title VII, so § 1983 affords no additional cumulative relief.

Storey v. City of Sparta Police Department · filed 1987-05-26

Title VII provides the exclusive remedy when the only § 1983 course of action is based on a violation of Title VII.... Since the plaintiff will be made whole by the hiring mandate and the back pay and job benefits award, any § 1983 damages would be cumulative.

Section 1983 is unlikely to provide a remedy for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA because those statutes have comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.

Davis v. Francis Howell School District · filed 1997-01-09

Furthermore, the comprehensive enforcement mechanisms provided under § 504 and the ADA suggest Congress did not intend violations of those statutes to be also cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 may be used to redress Title IX violations because Title IX does not foreclose that remedy.

Crawford v. Davis · filed 1997-03-27

We believe, therefore, that there is no evidence that Congress intended to foreclose the use of § 1983 to redress violations of Title IX.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.

Welch Foods, Inc. v. Wilson · filed 1999-06-18

Plaintiff has no private right of action or 42 USC § 1983 claim under that Act (see, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 US 1, 14-18).

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce FERPA because FERPA assigns enforcement to the Secretary of Education through funding remedies.

Meury v. Eagle-Union Community School Corp. · filed 1999-06-30

As noted, FERPA explicitly provides for funding remedies to be enforced by the Secretary of Education in a prescribed manner. The Meurys have failed to state a private cause of action by invoking § 1983 to remedy an alleged FERPA violation.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the EAHCA because the EAHCA provides an exclusive remedy.

DAVIS, ETC. v. Maine Endwell Central School Dist. · filed 1982-07-01

This Court adopts the rationale and decision of the Seventh Circuit that 1983 is not available to the plaintiffs to enforce their rights under the EAHCA.

Section 1983 claims based on constitutional rights are displaced by a comprehensive statutory scheme only if Congress expressly withdraws the remedy.

WINTERGREEN GROUP, LC v. Utah Department of Transportation · filed 2007-09-18

Regardless, it is clear that to extinguish a $ 1983 claim which is based on an underlying constitutional right, a defendant must establish that by passing a comprehensive statutory scheme "Congress has expressly withdrawn" the underlying constitutional remedy.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue ADA or other statutory claims that provide their own damages remedies.

MMR-Z. Ex Rel. Ramirez-Senda v. Rico · filed 2008-06-05

Section 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle for ADA or other statutory claims that provide their own frameworks for damages.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws unless another statute's remedial scheme forecloses that remedy.

Laird v. Ramirez · filed 1995-04-24

Thus, the court concludes that the remedial scheme of Titles II and XVI of the SSA do not foreclose a § 1983 cause of action of the kind presented here in Laird’s first cause of action.

Section 1983 remains available for equal protection age discrimination claims despite the ADEA.

Levin v. Madigan · filed 2014-05-05

The motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied by this Court, because Levin controls both the question of whether the ADEA precludes § 1983 actions and whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FLSA overtime rights because the FLSA provides the exclusive remedy for those violations.

Perez v. City of New Orleans · filed 2016-03-24

However, “courts have consistently held that the FLSA provides an exclusive remedy for overtime violations.” ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim based on due process rights that differ from the Safe Drinking Water Act’s protections; the Act does not preempt that claim.

Hootstein v. Amherst-Pelham Regional School Committee · filed 2019-02-11

It leads this court to the same conclusion that the SDWA does not preempt Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, which is based on alleged violations of constitutional rights that provide protections greater than or different from the SDWA’s protections.

Section 1983 does not provide compensatory damages for loss of property in which the plaintiff admits having no ownership interest or legitimate claim of entitlement.

Jackson v. Cross · filed 1985-03-07

But since the plaintiff admits that he is not the true owner of the stone, plaintiff has failed to allege that he has sustained damages which can be compensated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize a claimed future-ownership or continued-operation interest as a protected property right when the agreement leaves control to the state commission.

Uptown People's Community Health Services Board of Directors v. Board of Commissioners · filed 1981-04-21

The portion of the agreement relating to future ownership of the clinic, then, did not confer a property right on the Board so as to create federal jurisdiction under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a due-process claim for deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest, which requires a legitimate claim of entitlement rather than a unilateral expectation.

Uptown People's Community Health Services Board of Directors, an Illinois Not- For-Profit Corporation v. The… · filed 1981-05-29

The starting point for the analysis of the § 1983 claim is whether the agreement conferred on the Board a constitutionally protected right. ... The Board must request independence from the Commission. ... the plain terms of the agreement do not require that the Commission comply. ... This is insufficient to create a property interest cognizable under § 1983, since the parties' "intent" did not amount to a requirement that the Commission turn the clinic over to the Board: discretion to do so was reserved exclusively in the Commission. ... Whatever rights the agreement grants to the Board, they are not property rights cognizable under § 1983 as alleged in the Complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal due-process claim for an unauthorized property deprivation by state officials when an adequate state postdeprivation remedy is available.

Sheppard v. Moore · filed 1981-06-05

After analyzing the nature of the deprivation in this case, the Court is convinced that the due process clause can be satisfied by an appropriate postdeprivation hearing. ... The plaintiffs here had immediate access to the state courts for redress for the alleged deprivation of their property. ... The Court must hold that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.