42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits damages claims challenging unconstitutional post-judgment enforcement practices without requiring the underlying convictions to be invalidated.

Cain v. City of New Orleans · filed 2016-04-21

Defendants cannot seriously argue that the facts necessary to support plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims (ie., the Criminal District Court judges’ failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the criminal defendants’ good-faith ability to pay) contradict or undermine the factual bases for plaintiffs’ state-court guilty pleas for theft, battery, and “simple criminal damage.” Therefore, Heck does not apply.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the challenged sentence has been invalidated through specified legal means.

Harris v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2016-04-25

To recover damages under § 1983 for his “allegedly unconstitutional . . . imprisonment,” Harris must prove that the challenged sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the challenged confinement unless that confinement has been invalidated.

Varner v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2016-04-26

Consequently, Mr. Varner’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages is dismissed without prejudice, in accordance with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional rights violations, but a claimant cannot recover when success would imply that an existing conviction is invalid.

Ducksworth v. Rook · filed 2016-04-29

Ducksworth’s excessive-force claim was properly dismissed under Heck. ... In short, Ducksworth’s allegations of a wanton attack by police officers directly challenge the validity of his subsequent convictions and thus his excessive-force claim is barred by Heck. ... Heck therefore bars recovery for his false arrest claim as well, because his convictions necessarily imply that there was probable cause for his arrest. ... Because we find that the district court properly applied Heck to bar Ducksworth’s § 1983 claims, we AFFIRM.

Section 1983 permits a suit unless success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Hoeft v. Anderson · filed 2011-01-21

Heck holds that, “unless a plaintiff can demonstrate his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” the plaintiffs § 1983 suit must be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Section 1983 does not allow damages for harm whose unlawfulness would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Nasir v. Gwinnett County State Court · filed 2017-03-16

“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487 (emphasis omitted). It is undisputed that Nasir’s criminal disposition has not been invalidated, and he did not allege otherwise in his complaint. Therefore, any claims arising from his arrest and prosecution are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Y. Weinacker v. Baer · filed 2017-05-25

A section 1983 claim for damages must be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would invalidate an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has been set aside.

Bagley v. Ortiz · filed 2018-07-24

Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for criminal defendants to collaterally attack an otherwise valid criminal conviction.

Section 1983 search and seizure claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily undermine the plaintiff’s conviction, but a conviction does not bar every such claim.

Shipman v. Sowell · filed 2019-03-21

Thus, Shipman’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sclider is barred by Heck. ... We do not hold that Heck bars a 1983 claim for every search and seizure that results in some ultimate criminal conviction.

A § 1983 claim challenging an outstanding conviction may be dismissed without prejudice while the plaintiff seeks to invalidate it.

Mayer (ID 116515) v. Emporia Police Department · filed 2019-08-14

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s contemplation of filing a state habeas action does not justify a continuation of the stay in this case. The Court finds that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a dismissal of this case without prejudice.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Gause v. Murray · filed 2019-09-09

Here, given the allegations in the Complaint, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that his conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his claims remained barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Waggoner v. State of Missouri (Linn) · filed 2019-09-23

Finding in plaintiff’s favor would certainly imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, and he has not demonstrated they have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or otherwise called into question. His claims are therefore Heck-barred, and will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a conviction or imprisonment are barred until the conviction or sentence is invalidated.

Mathis v. Collier · filed 2019-10-30

Having not done so, Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages is barred by Heck until he can show the conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged or otherwise set aside, including through calculating the sentence as concurrent rather than consecutive.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Neufville v. McGann · filed 2019-11-18

Because the Court finds that judgment in favor of Mr. Neufville would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction (that has not already been invalidated), it must dismiss these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Charles v. McBride · filed 2019-11-25

A finding in Charles’ favor in this case would necessarily imply that he is unlawfully confined. Therefore, he is entitled to proceed with his § 1983 claim only if the judgment against him previously has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Osborn v. Horry County Police Department · filed 2020-07-14

Thus, in a § 1983 suit, a district court is required to consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction; if so, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 relief for a claim that would necessarily challenge a conviction or sentence is unavailable unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Hubbard v. Knox County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-11-06

Under Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny, Hubbard is barred from bringing a civil rights case that would necessarily challenge the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence, unless that conviction has already been overturned.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred if success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Scott v. Thorpe · filed 2020-11-10

Under Heck, a plaintiff is barred from bringing a § 1983 suit for damages if a favorable judgement would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim that would undermine a criminal conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has been overturned; the plaintiff may refile after invalidating it.

Poulson v. Wheeler · filed 2020-12-14

The Court dismisses Poulson’s § 1983 claims without leave to amend. The Court’s dismissal of Poulson’s § 1983 claim is without prejudice to his right to refile those claims should he successfully invalidate his criminal conviction in the future.

A plaintiff who could have challenged a conviction while in custody cannot avoid Heck’s bar on § 1983 damages claims by waiting until custody ends.

Chapman v. Nassau County · filed 2021-05-21

It would be a dangerous precedent to allow an exception to Heck where a plaintiff has forgone the possibility of overturning his conviction in favor of a chance to extract a money settlement. ... Since the latter scenario is the one present in this case, I conclude that Heck is applicable to plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Farrier v. Louisiana State · filed 2021-06-01

A judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim that his conviction by a non-unanimous jury was unconstitutional would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state court conviction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim must be dismissed with prejudice until such time as the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Hayes v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2021-07-19

If a § 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the underlying sentence or conviction has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a similar proceeding.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Jordan v. Newman · filed 2021-08-02

In sum, because the redress that the Plaintiff seeks in this action would call into question the validity of his criminal convictions, the Court concludes that the present civil suit must be dismissed pursuant to Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a criminal conviction are premature while the conviction remains in force.

Chong Lee v. City of Appleton, Wisconsin · filed 2021-09-03

So long as that judgment stands undisturbed, litigation under §1983 is premature.

A related conviction does not necessarily bar a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when distinct acts by the officer could support civil liability.

(PC) Hatcher v. Junes · filed 2021-09-22

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims—unlike the claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution discussed in Heck and Wallace—will not necessarily be extinguished or barred by a conviction in state court. Excessive force claims are not inherently inconsistent with convictions for resisting arrest or battery against an officer, because a single altercation may involve acts of the accused that support a criminal conviction and distinct acts of the officer that support civil liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for a wrongful conviction unless the conviction has been overturned through judicial or executive action.

Keith v. Wisconsin Department of Workf · filed 2022-03-10

As for Keith’s claim for damages for wrongful convictions, he cannot bring this claim in federal court unless those convictions are overturned through judicial or executive action.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred by Heck when the plaintiff’s account of the encounter is inconsistent with an outstanding resisting arrest conviction.

Martin v. Roy · filed 2022-03-25

Consequently, nothing in the Amended Complaint shows that this case involves anything other than a “single violent encounter throughout which [Defendants] used excessive force,” id., and Plaintiff’s claim is thus barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Jackson v. State of Nevada · filed 2022-10-13

However, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff did not trespass into the Property because such a decision would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 claims cannot use the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to extend the chain of causation for damages.

Campbell v. Casey · filed 2016-02-29

Similarly, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine cannot appropriately be applied in the context of § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to establish liability for acts following an unlawful entry; liability for those acts must be established separately.

Hardigree v. Lofton · filed 2019-07-30

For these reasons, the Court finds that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine cannot be used to establish liability for Plaintiff’s other claims against Officer Lofton. Instead, Plaintiff must still establish Officer Lofton’s liability for his subsequent acts.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Davis v. Baker · filed 2019-11-18

However, this Court and many others have refused to extend the doctrine to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to false arrest claims, so evidence found after an unlawful stop may establish probable cause for an arrest.

Smith v. DeGirolamo · filed 2020-09-25

Under Second ... Circuit precedent, even if Officer DeGirolamo lacked any reasonable basis to stop plaintiff’s vehicle, that fact—though possibly meriting suppression of any subsequently acquired evidence in a criminal proceeding—does not taint the discovery of the forged license in plaintiff’s wallet to establish probable cause in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a false arrest claim based on an allegedly unlawful search.

Besley v. Elmira Police Department · filed 2022-04-15

Further, as noted in the Screening Order, Docket Item 5 at 10, to the extent that Plaintiff may be alleging that the unlawful search led to his arrest and, thus, the arrest was unlawful, said claim does not set forth a cognizable false arrest claim because the “fruit of poisonous the tree” doctrine applied in criminal cases to exclude evidence derived from an unlawful act – e.g., an unlawful search or seizure – does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims used to enforce § 1981 rights enabled by the 1991 Act are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Bryant v. Jones · filed 2010-03-12

The Eleventh Circuit found, in Baker, that § 1981 claims asserted pursuant to the 1991 Act are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658’s four-year statute of limitations. Defendants do not dispute that Bryant’s discriminatory transfer claim, Drake’s discriminatory transfer claim, and Kelley’s discriminatory demotion and hostile work environment claims are all claims asserted pursuant to the 1991 Act. Under Baker, a four year statute of limitations applies to these claims, and thus they are timely.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a claim seeking access to a public library based on an alleged violation of federal law.

Wolf v. State of Washington · filed 2020-12-03

Petitioner’s requested relief, access to the Clark County library, is properly raised in a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 provides an actionable route for a Section 1981 claim against state actors.

Hu v. The City of New York · filed 2022-01-20

Here, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim proceeds under § 1983, see FAC ¶¶ 40–44, and is therefore actionable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce state prison regulations or policies.

Anthony v. Jeffreys · filed 2021-06-16

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to enforce IDOC regulations and policies.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce prison regulations and policies.

Regan v. Wills · filed 2021-06-16

As such, Plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to enforce IDOC regulations and policies.

A violation of prison procedural policy alone does not state an actionable claim under § 1983.

Mack v. Mullins · filed 2020-07-24

Mack’s claims that Mullins’ actions violated various VDOC procedural policies do not rise to the level of constitutional claims so as to be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to follow an administrative directive.

Schlosser v. Cook · filed 2020-07-08

Failure to comply with an administrative directive, however, does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a state administrative policy alone.

Filmore v. Officer Cooper · filed 2020-03-17

A violation of a state’s administrative policy is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on prison officials’ failure to follow departmental procedures.

Fonck v. Allen · filed 2019-10-30

The failure to follow prison directives or procedures is not a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violating prison policy alone.

Cabrera-Asencio v. Young · filed 2018-01-19

Cabrera-Asencio’s claim that defendants are liable for violating SDDOC policy does not preclude summary judgment because “there is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.” Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App’x 759 (8th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 does not establish a violation merely because a defendant failed to comply with state law or an administrative directive.

Harris v. Taylor · filed 2011-09-14

While failure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does not by itself establish a violation of § 1983, see Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child & Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990), the record demonstrates that the defendants complied with the directives Harris cites in his brief.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a state regulation alone.

Amaker v. Annucci · filed 2018-05-09

In any event, the violation of a state regulation alone does not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a failure to follow a state administrative directive actionable by itself.

Page v. Obaisi · filed 2018-05-15

Thus, any purported failure to follow a state administrative directive is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating an internal jail policy without a constitutional violation.

Thomas v. Cook County D.O.C. · filed 2020-01-16

The court agrees that an alleged violation of jail policy is not relevant; Section 1983 provides for challenges to constitutional violations, not violations of internal jail policy.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on violations of state policies.

GRIFFITH v. BRANNICK · filed 2020-02-05

The Defendants correctly argue that violations of state policies cannot give rise to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of a prison administrative directive.

Schlosser v. Walker · filed 2020-08-17

Failure to comply with an administrative directive, however, does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policy or state law alone.

Spann v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-09-03

To the extent Mr. Spann is claiming that the lack of manual locks violates prison policies or guidelines, the violation of prison policy or other state law does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Patton v. Shelby County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2021-02-18

Also § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

A violation of prison policy or state law alone does not state a claim under § 1983.

McCants v. Calloway · filed 2021-03-30

He states that Sergeant Calloway “did not follow safety and security protocol,” but a violation of prison policy or other state law does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Lee v. Corizen Mental Health Provider · filed 2021-04-08

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Section 1983 does not remedy a violation of state law or prison policy alone.

Allen v. Williams · filed 2021-08-05

But Plaintiff did not specify to what law he was referring, and regardless, a violation of a state law or prison policy, in and of itself, does not violate the Constitution. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Section 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state law or . . . departmental regulations”).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state law alone.

(PC) Muhammad v. Azevedo · filed 2021-08-05

First, plaintiff’s allegations amount to a violation of state law. Section 1983 is, by its terms, limited to federal constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law or policy alone.

Churn 165703 v. Black · filed 2022-03-17

Claims under § 1983 do not provide redress for a violation of a state law or policy.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of an administrative directive.

Dupas v. Mulligan · filed 2022-05-08

“[f]ailure to comply with an administrative directive . . . does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a failure to follow state law or a prison administrative directive.

Jusino v. Gallagher · filed 2022-06-09

Accepting that as true does nothing to bolster Jusino’s argument because “failure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does not by itself establish a violation of [section] 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a supplemental remedy for violations of rights created by the IDEA.

I.H. v. Cumberland Valley School District · filed 2012-02-08

Instead, Defendants argue quite correctly that Supreme Court has held that the cause of action and attendant remedies provided under the IDEA are the exclusive remedy for violations thereof, and that Congress did not intend Section 1983 to serve as a supplemental remedy for violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that duplicates an IDEA claim because the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Dizio v. Manchester Essex Regional School District · filed 2022-03-31

Because the § 1983 and IDEA claims are virtually identical, the § 1983 claim cannot survive. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count 2 will be granted.

Section 1983 requires a release of claims under it to be voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Tabi v. Ortega · filed 2016-04-21

Tabi failed to establish that his consent to the agreement was not informed. See Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981) (a release of claims under § 1983 must be voluntary, deliberate, and informed).

Section 1983 lets an employee challenge a demotion motivated by preventing protected political activity even when the employer acted on a factual mistake.

Heffernan v. City of Paterson · filed 2016-04-26

We conclude that, as in Waters, the government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here. When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U. S. C. §1983—even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior.

Section 1983 requires a private entity’s policy or custom to cause a constitutional violation; a supervisor must be personally involved or have a sufficient causal connection to the violation.

Wolf v. Sandy · filed 2016-05-02

The district court properly dismissed Wolf’s action because Wolf failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if a constitutional violation was caused by an official policy or custom); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue for police behavior that shocks the conscience, including conscience-shocking interrogation tactics.

Cairel v. Alderden · filed 2016-05-05

A plaintiff may sue under §..1983 for police behavior that “shocks the conscience,” including “conscience-shocking interrogation tactics.”

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations are not subject to state medical malpractice damages caps.

Commonwealth v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Grp. Self Ins. Risk Pool · filed 2016-06-23

Clearly not. The statutory cap on damages applies only to state tort or contract claims alleging medical malpractice, not federal civil rights claims alleging constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims against local governments are not subject to Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act damages cap.

Johnson v. City of Annapolis · filed 2022-03-30

The LGTCA cap will therefore apply only to the Johnson class’s state law claim (count VI) but not to the federal claims (counts I-V).

Section 1983 damages claims based on random and unauthorized acts of prison officials are barred by the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.

Kupstis v. Davis · filed 2012-07-10

Kupstis’s claims rest on the purported random and unauthorized acts of prison officials, and his claims for § 1983 damages are barred by the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for discrimination in the federal workplace.

Husain v. Shah · filed 2016-08-19

To the extent Count 3 alleges a Title VII claim, it is also dismissed as duplicative, and, to the extent it alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim is dismissed because § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for discrimination in the federal workplace.

Section 1983 claims may be compelled to arbitration when they fall within an applicable arbitration agreement.

Anderson v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. CA4/1 · filed 2016-08-29

On these facts, we conclude that Anderson's section 1983 claim is arbitrable.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to mandatory arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement unless the agreement clearly and unmistakably requires it.

Amalgamated Transit Union v. New Orleans Regional Transit Authority · filed 2022-04-27

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the CBA in this action does not clearly and unmistakably require union members to arbitrate § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for enforcing federal rights against state actors, and a court may construe a pro se complaint seeking that relief as a claim under the section.

Jimenez v. Fourth Judicial District Attorney's Office · filed 2016-08-29

Moreover, Jimenez’s pleadings make clear that he seeks to enforce his federal rights against state actors. Therefore, construing his pro se pleadings liberally, we interpret Jimenez’s complaint as alleging causes of action under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 provides the means for private individuals to enforce Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a court may construe a self-represented plaintiff’s complaint to invoke it without an express citation.

Thornton v. Edwards (PLR1) · filed 2020-11-13

However, rather than dismiss her claims outright, Plaintiff’s complaint will be construed liberally as though she had invoked § 1983 because she is self-represented.

Section 1983 allows recovery for pre-death pain and suffering when the decedent’s death was caused by a violation of federal law, despite California’s restriction on those damages.

Willis v. City of Fresno · filed 2017-03-01

Shortly after entry of judgment, this court held that § 377.34 limits recovery too severely to be consistent with the deterrence policy underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that plaintiffs may therefore seek damages for pre-death pain and suffering under § 1983 when the decedent’s death was caused by the violation of federal law. Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). We must accordingly vacate the judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim and remand the case to the district court so that plaintiffs may present evidence in support of their claim for pre-death pain and suffering damages.

Section 1983 allows recovery for a decedent’s pain and suffering caused by a constitutional violation despite the Florida Wrongful Death Act’s exclusion of those damages.

Howard v. Wilkinson · filed 2019-05-21

Because the purpose of § 1983 is to provide compensation for actual damages-not a subset of those damages-the FWDA is inconsistent with the compensatory purposes of that federal law.

Section 1983’s deterrence purpose prevents Arizona’s survival statute from barring an estate’s pain-and-suffering damages for alleged excessive force that preceded a separate fatal use of force.

Andrich v. Kostas · filed 2020-07-01

Applying A.R.S. § 14-3110 to preclude recovery for the fist strikes and taser use that preceded Mr. Andrich’s death would be inconsistent with the goals underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain and suffering.

WHATLEY v. EDNA MAHAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2021-02-23

Because damages for pain and suffering are cognizable under § 1983, Plaintiff’s request for pain and suffering damages may proceed.

A defense attorney’s representation of a criminal defendant does not make the attorney a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Newson v. Atkins · filed 2021-09-23

However, Newson may not sue his defense attorney under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney, even an appointed one, because the attorney does not act under color of state law.

Mayberry v. Keller · filed 2021-09-16

It would be pointless to allege federal question jurisdiction based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a criminal defense attorney, even an appointed one, does not act under color of state law and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a defense attorney for representing a criminal defendant.

Perez v. Dickison · filed 2020-11-23

Defense attorneys are not “persons” for purposes of civil rights cases such as these.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a suit against a private attorney because private attorneys are not official state actors.

Ingram v. Mooney · filed 2017-03-13

As for Stephenson, to the extent that Ingram intended to allege federal constitutional claims and not simply state-law claims against her, private attorneys are not official state actors and thus are generally not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a private criminal defense lawyer absent facts showing concerted action with a state representative.

Casiano v. Roth · filed 2019-05-21

As Defendant Roth is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against her under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not allow claims against private attorneys, including court-appointed attorneys, because they do not act under color of law.

Curry v. Shumate · filed 2020-03-19

Section 1983 “claims require that the conduct complained of be done under color of law, and private attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.” ... Plaintiff therefore cannot state a § 1983 claim against Defendant.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a claim against a private defense attorney because the attorney is not a state actor.

Craig v. Ritchie · filed 2020-07-21

The claim for ineffective assistance against her is thus not cognizable in a section 1983 action.

A private defense attorney is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for representing a client.

Ruiz v. Hall · filed 2020-07-27

Defense attorneys are private citizens and are not state actors within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present case, Defendant is a private individual and cannot be the object of a civil rights lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defense attorneys merely because they are officers of the court.

CRESPO v. MASORTI & SULLIVAN, P.C. · filed 2021-10-27

It is well-settled that “attorneys are not subject to § 1983 claims on the basis that they are officers of the court. This is true whether they are private attorneys or public defenders.” Rushing v. Pennsylvania, 637 F. App’x 55, 57 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that Defendants are liable pursuant to a § 1983 claim, and this claim can be dismissed with prejudice.

An acquittal does not bar a Section 1983 claim for denial of a fair trial or make suppressed defense testimony immaterial.

Park v. Thompson · filed 2017-03-14

We decline to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, and instead reaffirm our binding rule: Park’s acquittal does not render Ayala’s allegedly suppressed testimony immaterial, nor does it preclude her from bringing a Section 1983 action to vindicate her right to a fair trial.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner to pursue claims over retaliatory loss of good-time credits when he sought collateral relief while in custody and Heck and Balisok do not bar the claims.

Whitfield v. Howard · filed 2017-03-28

We therefore find that Whitfield’s claims are not barred by Heck or Balisok, and REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 permits a claim concerning misconduct at a vacated trial when success would not undermine a later conviction based on the same conduct.

Dennis v. City of Phila. · filed 2019-05-15

Because, here, success on Mr. Dennis's § 1983 action would only undermine the validity of his 1992 conviction, where the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations occurred, the Court moves to the second question: has the 1992 conviction been invalidated? Yes. The 1992 conviction was vacated by a federal writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Heck does not bar this action.

In a Section 1983 constitutional tort claim, the eggshell skull rule applies even when the plaintiff’s preexisting conditions increase the risk of injury.

Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 2017-08-09

As our fellow circuits have noted, the eggshell skull rule “like most principles of the common law of torts is applicable to a constitutional tort case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Accordingly, the plaintiff can show that the use of force was the direct and only cause of Darden’s death.

Section 1983 permits a government volunteer to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim based on the loss of a government benefit or privilege.

Ortiz v. Alvarez · filed 2018-09-21

The court finds that Ramos' volunteer status does not preclude him from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 based upon a claimed deprivation of governmental benefit or privilege.

Section 1983 does not make intervenors liable for a state’s constitutional violation merely because they defend the challenged law in litigation.

Brat v. Personhuballah · filed 2018-02-26

Clearly, simply engaging in the act of litigating and taking a position opposed to the plaintiffs are not violations of § 1983 and the Constitution so as to justify a fee award.

For a § 1983 retaliatory arrest claim against a city based on an official policy of retaliation, the plaintiff need not prove the absence of probable cause; the Mt. Healthy standard applies.

Lozman v. Riviera Beach · filed 2018-06-18

For these reasons, Lozman need not prove the absence of probable cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest against the City. On facts like these, Mt. Healthy provides the correct standard for assessing a retaliatory arrest claim.

Section 1983 generally requires a First Amendment retaliatory arrest plaintiff to plead and prove lack of probable cause, unless objective evidence shows that similarly situated people who did not engage in the same protected speech were not arrested.

Nieves v. Bartlett · filed 2019-05-28

The plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest. ... For those reasons, we conclude that the no-probable- cause requirement should not apply when a plaintiff pre- sents objective evidence that he was arrested when other- wise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.

A wage-discrimination claim under Section 1983 is analyzed under the framework used for Title VII wage-discrimination claims.

Mitchell v. City of Naples · filed 2018-07-10

As an initial matter, although Mitchell’s wage-discrimination claim was brought under § 1983, his claim should be analyzed under the doctrinal framework applicable to wage-discrimination cases brought under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide for aiding and abetting liability.

Shao v. Roberts · filed 2019-01-17

To the extent Shao’s aiding and abetting claims against Wang—or Orlando, Fadem, Mitchell, and Sussman—can be characterized as § 1983 claims, the Court dismisses them for failure to state a claim. ... Courts to have addressed the issue have found that because Congress did not explicitly provide for aiding and abetting liability in the text of § 1983, § 1983 does not support aiding and abetting liability.

Section 1983's deterrence purpose weighs against withdrawing a final judgment on a jury verdict merely because the parties settled.

Ostrander v. Kosteck · filed 2019-02-11

Even if the Settlement Agreement provides compensation to Ostrander, it would directly undermine the deterrence goals of Section 1983 to withdraw a final judgment pursuant to that jury verdict merely because the parties have settled their dispute.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim based on constitutional rights distinct from those protected by the Safe Drinking Water Act; that Act does not preempt the claim.

Hootstein v. Amherst-Pelham Reg'l Sch. Comm. · filed 2019-02-11

Thus, the court concludes that the SDWA does not preempt Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff can plausibly plead that a defendant tainted grand jury proceedings, preventing the independent intermediary doctrine from defeating the claim.

In Re: Lucas Babin · filed 2022-05-25

If “it can be shown that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant,” then the doctrine will not apply. Id. at 1428. ... We agree that the complaint contained enough to satisfy the requirement of plausibly pleading a taint in grand jury proceedings, without speculating and before discovery.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim can proceed despite a grand-jury indictment when the complaint plausibly alleges that the officer maliciously tainted the grand jury’s deliberations.

Poullard v. Jones · filed 2022-03-31

As such, the Court finds that the independent-intermediary doctrine does not bar Poullard’s claim.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim against an officer cannot proceed under the independent intermediary doctrine when a grand jury indicts the plaintiff and the complaint does not allege that the officer tainted its deliberations.

Poullard v. Jones · filed 2021-09-17

However, Poullard’s failure to plead that the grand jury proceeding was, in any way, tainted by Jones precludes her recovery under the independent intermediary doctrine.

A grand jury indictment breaks the chain of causation for a § 1983 false arrest claim unless the defendant tainted the grand jury’s deliberations.

Curtis v. Sowell · filed 2019-02-15

So unless an exception to the independent intermediary rule applies, Curtis’s grand jury indictment dooms his false arrest claim. ... Because Curtis failed to present well-pleaded allegations of taint, and because a grand jury found probable cause, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

A prison’s fifteen-day grievance filing period does not limit the scope or damages of a continuing Section 1983 claim when officials reviewed the grievances without objecting to their timeliness.

Jones v. Vowell · filed 2019-02-19

Defendants would have the Court take the requirement of the ADC’s grievance procedure and turn it into a substantive limitation on both the inmate’s ability to pursue his claim and his ability to recover damages. This the Court cannot do.

Section 1983 claims by Texas inmates are subject to the thirty-one-day filing deadline after receipt of a prison grievance decision.

Alton Jordan, TDCJ 000640541 v. Menchaca · filed 2019-03-28

Jordan contends that his suit was timely filed because sections 1983 and 1985 both have a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985. In other words, Jordan is arguing that because he is filing his suit under federal law, he does not have to comply with state procedural rules. We disagree. ... Therefore, Jordan still needed to file his suit within thirty-one days of receiving a response to his Step 2 grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely for improperly processing a prisoner’s grievances or appeals.

Kinser v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-07-06

Once again, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to Defendants Ward and Madsen because an official’s allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, does not serve as a sufficient basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Ivey v. MSOP · filed 2019-02-19

The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff fails to state a claim with respect to injunctive relief because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit such relief against state officials sued in their individual capacity. ... 2. Magistrate Judge Tony M. Leung’s December 12, 2018 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. [83]) is ADOPTED.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Macdonald v. Strafford County Sup. Court Tina L. Nadeau Mark E. Howard Town of Lee, NH · filed 2019-03-27

Injunctive relief against judges under Section 1983 is also extremely limited. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (only available if “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”). There is no suggestion that the exceptions apply here.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Bennett v. Supreme Court of the State of New York · filed 2019-04-26

As amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This amendment generally precludes a plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against a judge arising from rulings or actions taken in that judge’s judicial capacity because the plaintiff can usually appeal that judge’s rulings or actions in an appellate court.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for actions taken in a judicial capacity when those actions can be appealed.

Berrian v. State of New York Unified Court System · filed 2019-07-03

This amendment generally precludes a plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against a judge arising from rulings or actions taken in that judge’s judicial capacity because the plaintiff can usually appeal that judge’s rulings or actions in an appellate court.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Johnson v. Marsiglia · filed 2019-07-15

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Nor is there any indication that either of those situations was the case here. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against Judge Darensberg.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County · filed 2019-07-26

In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that a declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless the judge violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Tarver v. Reynolds · filed 2019-08-16

There is no indication that Judge Reynolds violated a declaratory decree. Nor is there any evidence that declaratory relief is unavailable. Indeed, Timothy himself prays for a declaratory judgment. (No. 18-cv-1034, Doc. # 1, at 13.) That is enough to bar his claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Epperson v. Graves · filed 2019-10-07

Because Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief he seeks does not address the actions of Defendants other than in their judicial capacities, his claim for injunctive is barred.

Section 1983 permits a prison director to be named in an official capacity to implement injunctive relief even without personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Pickett v. Valdez · filed 2019-10-10

Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend is granted insofar as he is allowed to add NDOC Director James Dzurenda as a defendant in his official capacity for the limited purpose of implementing any injunctive relief that Plaintiff may obtain.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Gochin v. Markowitz · filed 2019-10-21

Further, because Gochin has not shown that “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” she is not entitled to injunctive relief against Judge Branca.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

O'Connor v. Chatfield · filed 2019-10-31

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012).

A Section 1983 complaint must allege what each defendant did or failed to do; naming a defendant only in the caption does not state a claim against that person.

Andrews v. Gains · filed 2019-11-18

Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Grant v. Cafferri · filed 2019-12-04

To the extent that Grant is seeking injunctive relief against Judge Zaro, her claims are precluded by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983). This law bars all claims for injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial action or omission unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable. Grant does not allege that Judge Zaro acted in violation of a declaratory decree.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Taveras v. Schreiber · filed 2019-12-06

Therefore, for injunctive relief to be available, the Court must determine whether Defendant violated a declaratory decree or whether declaratory relief was unavailable to Plaintiff. Defendant is not alleged to have violated a declaratory degree nor has Plaintiff alleged that declaratory relief is unavailable to him.

A prison warden may be an official-capacity defendant in a Section 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief that the warden would carry out.

Taylor v. Sutterer · filed 2019-12-09

Further, as previously noted, Defendant Lawrence, as the Warden of Menard is the appropriate official capacity defendant to address Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Yun v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-19

In addition, as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Harris 476889 v. Kitchka · filed 2019-12-31

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012).

A § 1983 complaint must specify the capacity in which each individual defendant is sued.

Spottswood v. Washington County · filed 2020-01-13

Furthermore, for any individual defendant named, the Second Amended Complaint must specify the capacity or capacities in which Spottswood is suing that person for purposes of any § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; courts apply that limit in Bivens actions against federal judges.

Lohnes v. Magistrate Judge John E Martin · filed 2020-01-16

Congress has since amended § 1983 to provide that injunctive relief shall not be granted in an action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. This amendment bars injunctive relief against both state and federal judges because federal courts incorporate § 1983 law into Bivens actions. ... Here, Lohnes is seeking injunctive relief against a federal judge, which is not permitted.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

WILLIAMS v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER · filed 2020-02-10

Nevertheless, to the extent plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from Judge Brown, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that such exception applies in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against Judge Brown will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Markham v. Rosenbaum · filed 2020-02-18

Moreover, Section 1983 was amended in 1996 to extend judicial immunity to claims for injunctive relief: “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Judge Dollinger violated any declaratory decree or that any declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Marjamaa v. France · filed 2020-02-19

To the extent this is intended as a request for injunctive relief, such relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, any claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Nieves v. Farber · filed 2020-03-30

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state- court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Justice Farber.

A Section 1983 claim against an individual defendant requires factual allegations concerning that defendant.

Del Campo v. Galleger · filed 2020-07-31

The Court also explained that the Complaint failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Galleger because there are no factual allegations regarding Defendant Galleger.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated.

Brown v. Ludi-Leitch · filed 2020-08-24

To the extent that Brown is seeking injunctive relief, § 1983 has been amended to bar claims for injunctive relief “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity” unless a declaratory decree was violated.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief for acts taken in a judge’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Gilliam v. Watanabe · filed 2020-09-01

Nevertheless, Congress extended judicial immunity by statute by amending § 1983 in 1996 “to limit the circumstances in which injunctive relief may be granted against judges.” ... The emphasized language is directly on point, and Gilliam’s Complaint does not allege that “a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Johnson-El v. Deprospo · filed 2020-09-03

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive against Judge DeProspo.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judges for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Baquero v. Mendoza · filed 2020-09-16

To the extent that Baquero sought injunctive relief against the judicial defendants, such relief is barred by § 1983 itself, where Baquero has made no allegation that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

McCone v. Thorpe · filed 2020-10-29

Section 1983 states that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Browning v. Grant · filed 2020-11-06

Further, Browning has named as defendants only judges, and “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Browning has not shown that the exception to the general bar on injunctive relief applies.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief for a judge’s acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; the restriction also applies to Bivens claims against federal judges.

Nieves v. Liman · filed 2020-12-07

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for any injunctive relief against Judge Liman as barred by the 1996 amendment to § 1983, which applies to Bivens actions against federal judges. Plaintiff has not set forth any facts suggesting that Judge Liman violated a declaratory decree, or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Rhoads 504915 v. Booher · filed 2020-12-16

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits a sheriff to be enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional orders even if the sheriff is not a municipal policymaker.

Daves v. Cty · filed 2020-12-28

We see no basis, though, to conclude that enjoining a sheriff from enforcing unconstitutional orders depends on whether a sheriff is a policymaker for purposes of municipal liability.

Section 1983 allows injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Norman v. Lindsay · filed 2020-12-29

With respect to Norman’s request for injunctive relief, § 1983 provides that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Blanche Brown v. Friel · filed 2021-01-28

“in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown has not shown that this exception applies.

A Section 1983 complaint against multiple officials must identify the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County · filed 2021-03-05

Accordingly, a complaint that “fails to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant . . . does not provide adequate notice as to the nature of the claims against each,” and is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

HONE v. THOMPSON · filed 2021-03-29

Most importantly, after Pulliam, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, which amended Section 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Thus, the section of Pulliam on which Plaintiff relies has been overturned by statute.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Williams v. Clott · filed 2021-05-19

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state- court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against Justice Clott.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against defendants sued in their individual capacities.

Dreyer v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare · filed 2021-09-02

And as Plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief in an individual capacity suit under § 1983, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the injunctive relief Claim against the individual capacity Defendants, with prejudice.

Section 1983’s exception allowing an injunction against a judge when declaratory relief is unavailable does not cover temporary unavailability.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson · filed 2021-09-10

They do, however, focus on this proviso to Section 1983, which states that where declaratory relief is “unavailable,” an injunction may be ordered against state judges. The proviso has no force here because temporary unavailability, which is all the Plaintiffs assert, is not “unavailability.”

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mamot v. Bilingual · filed 2021-09-27

The amendment to Section 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against Judge Oing or the Appellate Term judges because Plaintiff could have appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, and to the New York Court of Appeals.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

MAJERSKA v. United States · filed 2021-10-12

Here, injunctive relief is not available against Chief Judge Wolfson because Plaintiff has not properly pleaded that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

MURRAY v. United States · filed 2021-10-13

Here, injunctive relief is not available against Chief Judge Wolfson because Plaintiff has not properly pleaded that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Nieves v. Best · filed 2021-10-13

The amendment to Section 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Justice Best.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

SHIVANANJAPPA v. RAJENDRA · filed 2021-10-27

Shivananjappa seeks an injunction compelling actions by Judge Abode and Judge Corson, such as the rescinding of orders they have entered. Such relief is prohibited by § 1983 itself. “[I]n an action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Ann Klein Forensic Ctr., No. CV189606PGSDEA, 2020 WL 614657, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). Because the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff only addresses the actions of Judge Abode and Judge Corson in their judicial capacities, the court lacks the jurisdiction to proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Washington v. Harder · filed 2021-11-18

Injunctive relief is not available in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a judicial officer for acts taken in that official's judicial capacity "unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 1996 amendments to § 1983). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.