42 U.S.C. § 1983

Heck does not bar an unconvicted person’s Section 1983 claim merely because success could undermine another person’s conviction.

Waller v. Smith · filed 2019-08-20

A plain reading of Heck suggests that courts are only required to consider whether a successful Section 1983 action brought by a convicted plaintiff would imply the invalidity of the convicted plaintiff’s conviction. ... Plaintiff Kham’s claim is not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that call into question a conviction or confinement unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated; this rule also applies to parole revocations.

Thompson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probatio · filed 2019-09-23

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it calls into question the lawfulness of her conviction or confinement, unless she can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. ... Thompson has not alleged that the convictions or revocations underlying the detention she challenges have been invalidated. As a result, her claims are barred by Heck, and the District Court did not err in dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by Heck when they would undermine a prison disciplinary finding that cost the prisoner earned time.

Matthews v. Koechle · filed 2019-12-23

Specifically, we agree that Matthews’s claim for damages arising from an alleged search was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); given that, in disciplinary proceedings, his allegations regarding the search were found to be false, and he was sanctioned with the loss of earned time.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for imprisonment under a challenged sentence unless that sentence has been reversed or otherwise called into question as required by Heck.

Johnson v. Bowers · filed 2020-01-31

As in his prior action, the allegations in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) do not suggest that the state sentences he challenges have been reversed on direct appeal or called into question in any of the ways articulated in Heck. Accordingly, this Complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to allege any plausible damages claim upon which Plaintiff may be granted relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction involving lost good-time credits.

RASUL v. VEREEN · filed 2020-02-27

However, this is not permitted under the line of cases arising from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’”

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims arising from an arrest that led to a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Bland v. Lyle · filed 2020-04-01

To succeed on her § 1983 unreasonable seizure claims, Plaintiff must show that her state conviction was rendered invalid.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim challenging imprisonment after probation or parole revocation until the revocation and related sentence have been invalidated.

GARVIN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-07-30

As Garvin appears to be seeking money damages from the City of Philadelphia based on allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, the Court construes the Complaint as one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As the decision to revoke Garvin’s probation or parole and his related sentence have not been invalidated, Garvin’s claims for damages based on his imprisonment are not cognizable at this time.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Strepka v. Thompson · filed 2020-10-16

We agree with the district court that claim one is barred by Heck, which holds that a state prisoner may not sue for damages under § 1983 if a favorable judgment “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless the prisoner shows “that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a claim that would necessarily show that a prisoner’s confinement lasted too long, even when the claim challenges the procedure used to calculate credits.

Kilman v. Williams · filed 2020-10-19

That would necessarily demonstrate that the duration of Kilman’s confinement was invalid, even if his claim is viewed purely as a due process challenge to CDOC’s allegedly wrongful procedure for computing credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.

Murphy v. Butler · filed 2020-12-02

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Butler are barred by the Heck doctrine.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an involuntary commitment when success on the claim would necessarily imply that the commitment is invalid, unless the commitment has first been invalidated.

Ardaneh v. U.S. Government · filed 2020-12-11

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the fact of his confinement, such claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on those claims would necessarily imply that his commitment is invalid.

Section 1983 bars a search-and-seizure damages claim when success would necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction.

Lee v. The City of Troy · filed 2021-02-16

Therefore, Lee's illegal search and seizure claim for the March 3 incident is barred by Heck unless he can prove that conviction was successfully challenged through some more appropriate mechanism.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation or conviction that has not been invalidated.

GRIFFITH v. TRAENDLY · filed 2021-03-10

Given that Plaintiff's revocation of parole and criminal conviction have not been overturned by any of the means discussed above, the Court dismisses his Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims as Heck barred.

Heck bars a § 1983 damages action challenging an added probation condition imposed after a violation hearing, even when the state court made no definitive finding that probation was violated.

Ray v. Recovery Healthcare Corporation · filed 2021-08-13

Second, even assuming that Ray is correct that (1) there is meaningful daylight between Art. 42A.751 and .752 hearings, (2) the state court operated under .751, and (3) the state court did not technically “modify” Ray’s probation despite the explicit language of its order, the policy reasons underlying Heck would still extend to bar a § 1983 action in this case for many of the same reasons expressed in the opinion.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Reed v. Williams · filed 2021-09-17

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Heck applies to § 1983 claims that would invalidate a parole revocation.33 Reed’s claims that his parole was improperly revoked are barred by Heck because he does not allege that his parole revocation has been invalidated. So I dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a parole revocation that has not been invalidated when success would undermine the prisoner’s continued confinement.

Mayfield v. MDOC · filed 2021-09-29

Plaintiff’s claims are not properly raised in a § 1983 proceeding. ... Here, because Mayfield expressly challenges his parole revocation and does not allege that the revocation has been invalidated, his claims are barred under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for unlawful confinement when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a supervised-release revocation that has not been overturned.

Brooks v. Luebke · filed 2021-10-22

Were Brooks’ claim for damages successful, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of his revoked supervision and his continued detention because his claim is premised on Defendants allegedly lacking jurisdiction and authority to revoke his supervised release and detain him. Because Brooks has not overturned the revocation of his supervised release (in fact, his allegations indicate that his efforts to do so have repeatedly failed), his claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would call an existing conviction or sentence into question unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Risch, Kenneth v. Tallier, Tracy · filed 2021-11-17

A claim for damages that bears a relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim whose success would imply that a sentence is invalid unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Schuenke v. Kostheewa · filed 2022-04-08

Here, the plaintiff’s claim for damages would imply that his sentence is invalid, and therefore the rule of Heck applies.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a probation revocation cannot proceed unless the revocation has been vacated, set aside, or otherwise called into question.

Murphy v. Lock · filed 2022-05-02

Murphy does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the sanction regarding his probation violation has been vacated on appeal, set aside, or otherwise called into question. Unless and until that occurs, Murphy cannot pursue a claim that would undermine the validity of the probation revocation.

Section 1983 requires a defendant invoking the Mount Healthy defense to show that the adverse action would have occurred for legitimate reasons even if an improper motive played a part.

Broderick v. Evans · filed 2009-06-26

The Mount Healthy defense, applicable only to the section 1983 claims against Evans, requires the defendant to show that even if an improper motive played a part, the adverse action would have been taken for legitimate reasons.

Section 1983 does not require proof that a constitutional deprivation caused actual harm to establish a violation.

Estate Of Maria Teresa Macias · filed 2000-07-20

A plaintiff may prove a violation of S 1983 without demonstrating that the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights caused any actual harm.

Section 1983 requires proof of a policy before a public institution can be held liable for damages.

Horen v. BD. OF EDUC. OF CITY OF TOLEDO · filed 2009-09-08

Proof of such policy is a sine qua non of institutional liability in a § 1983 case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an institutional defendant only when its policy or custom sanctions a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Rankin v. Obaisi · filed 2019-08-05

A plaintiff can sustain a § 1983 claim against an institutional defendant like Wexford only if he can show that the entity has a policy or custom that sanctions the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 permits institutional liability when a policy reflects deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs and causes a constitutional injury.

Tuduj v. Lawrence · filed 2020-09-24

Institutional liability is possible under the Monell doctrine where a municipal or here, by extension, an institutional policy both reflects deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs and causes a constitutional injury. See e.g., Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). But Wexford’s alleged “policy” of not prescribing sunglasses did not harm Tuduj because, as just mentioned, he had no medical need for sunglasses and in any event he received post-operative sunglasses, which he does not contend were less helpful than rubber sunglasses.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an institution liable to show that its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Bowers v. University of Delaware · filed 2020-11-30

For an institution to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an institutional policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits an institution to be liable for its employees’ constitutional violations only when an official policy, custom or practice, or final policymaker caused the violations.

Stewart, Timothy v. Moore · filed 2022-05-06

An institution can be liable for the actions of its employees only if the violations were caused by an official policy, a custom or practice, or an official with final policy-making authority.

Section 1983 permits institutional liability only for the institution’s own wrongdoing, such as a policy or custom that causes the injury.

Spencer v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation · filed 2022-07-26

Rather, a plaintiff may only hold a defendant entity liable under § 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to pursue a retaliatory transfer claim against an individual prison official who retaliates for filing grievances.

Williams v. Brown · filed 2009-09-10

As to Appellee Brown, however, taking the well-pleaded allegations in his complaint as true, Williams stated a chronology of events and alleged sufficient facts to state a retaliatory transfer claim against Brown in his individual capacity. ... Furthermore, we agree with the magistrate judge in the second Report & Recommendation that qualified immunity does not shield Appellee Brown from liability. ... Thus, Brown cannot claim qualified immunity as a bar to Williams’s complaint.

In a § 1983 action where nominal damages are the only remaining relief, a defendant may consent to judgment for the full amount without admitting liability.

Husain v. Springer · filed 2009-10-26

However, plaintiffs cite no authority holding that a defendant may not dispose of a case by agreeing to entry of judgment against herself for the nominal damages which are the sole relief sought by a plaintiff, simply because the lawsuit concerns constitutional rights. In fact, the Second Circuit has made it clear that, even in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant “should be afforded the choice to consent to judgment and payment of nominal damages.”

A potential award of nominal damages under § 1983 can keep a procedural due process claim live after the plaintiff receives other relief.

TRAFFORD v. City of Westbrook · filed 2009-11-12

According to mootness doctrine, as applied in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Trafford’s success in reversing the deprivation of which he complains does not render his constitutional claims moot. ... The Court therefore determines, based on Trafford’s demand for expungement and his potential recovery of nominal damages, that the arbitral panel’s June 2009 award and the City’s response to it did not moot his procedural due process claims.

A request for nominal damages does not keep a Section 1983 claim alive after the challenged law changes when the plaintiff alleges no completed violation or actual injury.

Management Properties, LLC v. Town of Redington Shores, Florida · filed 2021-04-19

However, damages claims can only save a Section 1983 claim from mootness “where such claims allege compensatory damages or nominal damages for violations of procedural due process.” ... Here, Management fails to allege any facts that would connect its nominal damages claim to a completed violation of a legal right.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state actor for a constitutional violation caused by that actor's conduct.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2010-01-14

Thus, all of the pre-trial proceedings in which plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated give rise to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a direct challenge to the validity of a sentence.

Pruett v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2015-04-24

We agree with the district court that this is a direct challenge to the validity of his sentence and, therefore, cannot be maintained under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a warrant for misrepresentations to show a knowing or reckless false statement or material omission that was necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Palmieri v. Kammerer · filed 2010-01-27

A plaintiff suing under § 1983 and challenging a warrant on the basis of misrepresentation of material facts must make the same showing that is required at a suppression hearing under Franks v. Delaware: the plaintiff must show that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard of the truth, made false statements or material omissions in his application for a warrant, and that such statements or omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for injuries caused by employees acting pursuant to municipal policy, and joint representation requires disqualification only when an actual conflict exists.

Lieberman v. City of Rochester · filed 2010-02-04

District courts have interpreted Dunton to require disqualification of counsel representing both an individual officer and the municipal employer in Section 1983 cases only where counsel acts in a way that is actually against the officer’s interests. ... In other words, a potential conflict is insufficient to warrant disqualification; rather, the employee must show that an actual conflict exists. ... Considering these unequivocal representations, the City’s and the Officers’ interests appear aligned at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Barnes v. Hennepin County District Attorney's Office · filed 2010-02-05

We further hold the district court did not err in concluding Barnes’s claims under the First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments described no conduct by defendants that violated the rights secured by these constitutional provisions, and thus Barnes failed to state a claim as to each. See Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (explaining, for a § 1983 claim to succeed, the plaintiff must show a causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the deprivation of a constitutional right).

Section 1983 can impose liability on an officer who causes another person to deprive someone of constitutional rights, but the court found no such liability where the shooting officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Pauly v. White · filed 2017-10-31

42 U.S.C. § 1983 not only imposes liability on those who actually deprive a person of their rights under the Constitution, but also imposes liability on those who “cause” a person to be subjected to a deprivation. ... But, as we explained above, Officer -White is entitled to qualified immunity because his alleged use of excessive force was not clearly established in the circumstances of this case. It therefore cannot serve as the basis of liability for Officers Mariscal and Trues-dale.

Section 1983 requires a legal duty to act when a claim rests on a defendant’s failure to act.

Kinsella v. Cooley · filed 2010-03-08

Kinsella’s complaint failed to show that the defendants were under a legal duty to file the abstract of judgment, as required to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for a state’s failure to prosecute another person.

Thompson v. Grey · filed 2010-07-20

As the district court properly recognized, there is no cause of action for the state’s failure to prosecute another person under section 1983.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 excessive-force claim must prove injury caused by clearly excessive force that was objectively unreasonable; each element is necessary to establish liability.

Aguilera v. Nava · filed 2010-07-21

In order to prevail on a claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show “(1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable.”

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on disparate impact alone.

INDIANAPOLIS CHAPTER OF NAACP v. Ballard · filed 2010-09-16

Even so, a disparate impact theory of liability is not available under section 1983.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil claims under § 1983.

Snider v. Pekny · filed 2012-09-27

This is in part because the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which in criminal cases generally directs a court to exclude all evidence “tainted” by an illegal search or seizure, does not apply to civil claims made under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to suppress evidence gathered after a Fourth Amendment violation if the evidence was otherwise constitutionally obtained.

Willis v. Mullins · filed 2011-08-16

In the context of a Section 1983 suit, the fact that Defendants’ initial entry into the hotel room was a Fourth Amendment violation does not require the suppression of any subsequent evidence if it is otherwise constitutionally gathered.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil actions under § 1983.

Hargroves v. City of New York · filed 2011-02-22

The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to civil actions brought under § 1983, see Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); therefore, we may analyze the initial stop independently of Wu’s subsequent identifications.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to civil actions under § 1983.

Hinds v. City of New York · filed 2010-09-28

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable to civil actions arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims do not apply the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained after an allegedly unlawful stop.

Ryan v. Koester · filed 2015-02-02

The Court concludes that because the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to § 1983 claims, the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Plaintiff based on alleged traffic violations or to administer field sobriety tests is immaterial.

In a § 1983 malicious-prosecution suit against police officers, the exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained through an illegal search from establishing probable cause for an arrest warrant.

Black v. Wigington · filed 2016-01-22

The Blacks’ claim of malicious prosecution fails because Deputy Kain, Deputy Stamatellos, and Investigator Wilson are entitled to qualified immunity. The evidence from the Blacks’ trailer provided probable cause for the arrest warrants. It does not matter whether that evidence was discovered in compliance with the Fourth Amendment because the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit against police officers.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases.

Lia Lingo v. City of Salem · filed 2016-06-27

Accordingly, regardless whether this is an intrasovereign or an intersovereign case, that fact would not alter our conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a § 1983 case.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, evidence obtained through an unlawful stop or search may be used to establish probable cause.

Kinslow v. Duckins · filed 2016-07-20

To be sure, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the exclusionary rule may invalidate an arrest based on evidence obtained from an illegal stop or search. But courts have repeatedly held that such evidence may be used to establish probable cause in the context of § 1983 and other civil claims.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases, so officers may rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to defend a false arrest claim.

Lia Lingo v. City of Salem · filed 2016-08-08

Accordingly, regardless whether this is an intrasovereign or an intersovereign case, that fact would not alter our conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a § 1983 case.

The exclusionary rule does not apply to civil suits under § 1983.

Lipford v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-03-05

Although the Defendant Officers might have illegally entered and searched Plaintiff’s home (an issue for a jury to decide), the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil suits under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose civil liability solely because an officer obtained a warrant using evidence that could be suppressed in a criminal proceeding.

Thorp v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-05-24

Put more plainly, even were a court to suppress the pills found in Plaintiff’s freezer in a criminal proceeding, Kyle would not face any additional civil liability solely because he obtained a second warrant based on that discovery.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, so evidence found during an unlawful search can establish probable cause for a later detention.

Mayo v. LaSalle County · filed 2019-07-15

As the defendants explain, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

The exclusionary rule does not prevent a court from considering a confession suppressed in a criminal case when deciding probable cause in a Section 1983 suit.

Livingston v. Luberoff · filed 2020-02-21

Therefore, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not err in relying on case law beyond the purview of the Fourth Circuit by including the suppressed confession and the two arrest warrants issued for Unlawful Conduct Toward a Child in determining that probable cause did exist.

The exclusionary rule does not bar evidence from an allegedly unlawful search when assessing probable cause in a § 1983 action.

BARNETT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-10-29

Finally, to the extent that Barnett contends that we cannot consider the items found during the allegedly unlawful search, Barnett is mistaken. Although the exclusionary rule may apply in criminal cases, rendering the fruits of an allegedly illegal search inadmissible, that is not the case in a § 1983 proceeding.

The criminal exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases.

Linin v. Neff · filed 2021-03-18

But this exclusionary rule applies only in criminal cases, not § 1983 cases.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in actions brought under § 1983.

Johnigan v. City of Vancouver · filed 2021-08-02

The exclusionary rule, applicable in criminal cases and prohibiting the government from introducing illegally seized evidence against a defendant, does not apply in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine do not apply in Section 1983 actions.

Shaw v. Schulte · filed 2022-06-06

Considering the marginal deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule within the § 1983 context with the fact that not applying the rule would merely truncate the scope of a § 1983 action but not bar pursuit of the action, we agree with the seeming consensus in our sibling circuits that the exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine do not apply in the § 1983 context.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in Section 1983 suits against police officers, so evidence found after an unlawful stop may support probable cause for later detention.

Stubbs v. City Of Chicago · filed 2022-07-25

Because the Court agrees with Defendants that the exclusionary rule is not available in Section 1983 suits against police officers, the question is whether the Defendant Officers had probable cause to detain and charge Stubbs once they stopped him, regardless of whether the initial stop was lawful.

Section 1983 permits courts to consider illegally obtained evidence when assessing probable cause because the exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases.

Klein v. Steinkamp · filed 2022-08-16

Under federal law, we agree with other circuits that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in § 1983 cases,” because the use of illegally obtained evidence (as opposed to an unlawful search or seizure itself) is not a constitutional violation.

The exclusionary rule does not prevent evidence suppressed in a criminal case from establishing probable cause in a § 1983 damages action.

Brodanex v. St. John Town of · filed 2022-09-29

Even though the state criminal court found that the evidence from those searches must be excluded in the criminal case as fruit of the poisonous tree because the search warrants were based on information learned during the illegal search on September 11, 2017, that exclusionary rule does not apply in this § 1983 claim for damages based on the officers’ actions.

Section 1983 liability does not require proof of maliciousness.

Repking v. Lokey · filed 2010-09-30

We note where the circuit judge looked at maliciousness as a factor for § 1983 liability. While it certainly is a factor under state immunity law, we do not find maliciousness to be a prerequisite for § 1983 liability under federal law or federal jurisprudence.

Section 1983 does not create a separate excessive-force claim when it duplicates a claim alleging the same Fourth Amendment violation.

Herr v. Peterson · filed 2010-11-16

Count III asserts the same claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is, therefore, duplicative of Count I.

Section 1983 claims against individual agency employees are duplicative when the complaint alleges no conduct separate from their actions as agents of the agency.

R.B. v. County of Westmoreland · filed 2013-05-28

We also agree with the District Court that plaintiffs‘ § 1983 action is against Westmoreland County and WCCB, not the individual WCCB employees; dismissal of the duplicative claims against the employees was therefore proper.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed as duplicative when it relies on the same facts and seeks the same relief as a Rule 80B appeal.

Fair Elections Portland, Inc. v. The City of Portland · filed 2020-05-13

Similarly, Plaintiffs' 1983 claims (Counts III and IV) rely on the same factual allegations and seek the same relief as the Rule SOB appeal. ... Because these claims require the court to engage in the same legal and factual analysis necessary to decide the Rule SOB appeal, Counts III and IV are also dismissed as duplicative.

A Section 1983 official-capacity claim against an employee may be dismissed as duplicative when the employee’s governmental employer is already a defendant.

Hill v. Madison County · filed 2020-09-02

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Bufford are duplicative of her claim against Madison County because an official-capacity claim is really a claim against the official’s employer.

A § 1983 claim against a county board is duplicative when an official-capacity claim against the sheriff already names the county and no separate basis for board liability is alleged.

Banks v. Hayes · filed 2020-10-22

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Board is simply a redundant claim against Delaware County, and plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Board should be dismissed as duplicative.

Section 1983 provides a means to bring constitutional claims, so a separate general Section 1983 count duplicates constitutional claims already treated as brought under it.

Harris v. University of Massachusetts Lowell · filed 2021-08-27

The Court will address the freestanding constitutional claims as if brought under § 1983, see id., therefore Count IV is duplicative of the other counts.

Section 1983 makes separate direct constitutional claims unnecessary when they seek the same relief for the same alleged violations.

Myers v. St. George Police Department · filed 2022-03-11

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are duplicative of his § 1983 claim and unnecessary.

Section 1983 claims against officers in their official capacities are duplicative when the relevant governmental entity is already a defendant.

Bhattacharya v. Murray, Jr. · filed 2022-03-16

The Court will sustain Defendants’ objections to the R&R here—under Fourth Circuit case law, as held in Love-Lane, where a Plaintiff seeks to add cause of action under § 1983 against a party in their official capacity after already having a cause of action against the relevant governmental entity, the proposed amendment is redundant and thus should be denied.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against school officials are duplicative when the same claims are brought against the school entities.

E.D. v. NOBLESVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2022-09-30

With regard to Plaintiffs' official capacity claims against Defendants Niedermeyer and Swafford, because Defendants Noblesville School District and NHS (the municipal entities) are also named as defendants in each of those claims, naming Defendants Niedermeyer and Swafford in their official capacity is duplicative.

Section 1983 does not govern claims against federal employees; those claims are brought under Bivens.

Jackson v. United States of America · filed 2020-12-28

Plaintiff claims he is bringing this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, because he is bringing this action against federal employees, the action is one brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not govern a claim against a federal employee for acts in a federal capacity; that claim arises under Bivens.

Aruanno v. Cavanaugh · filed 2012-01-31

The District Court characterized Aruanno‟s entire complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Because Judge Cavanaugh is a federal employee, that claim should have been construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).

Section 1983 is not the cause of action for a claim against a federal employee; such a claim should be brought under Bivens.

Aruanno v. Walsh · filed 2011-08-29

Although the District Court characterized Aruanno’s complaint as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, it technically should have been brought as a Bivens action since the Defendant is a federal employee.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against federal actors alone.

United States v. Lee · filed 2010-12-10

Section 1983 is improper, however, because Lee sued only federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors; constitutional claims against federal actors are construed as Bivens claims.

Lewis v. U.S. Parole Commission · filed 2012-01-20

The plaintiff’s complaint charges federal actors, not state actors, with violating the Constitution by maintaining inaccurate records. See Compl. at 2. As such, the court did not err in construing the plaintiff’s purported § 1983 claims as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for relief against federal actors.

Moore v. Hollingsworth · filed 2012-08-20

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an appropriate vehicle for his claim because he seeks relief from federal, not state, actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors acting under color of state law, not federal actors.

Smith v. Donahoe · filed 2013-01-08

Section 1983 applies only to state actors acting under the color of state law, not to federal actors. ... Therefore, whether brought under Section 1983 or Bivens, Plaintiffs claims for monetary relief against the USPS under Count I — III must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal actors such as the Social Security Administration or its employees.

Johnson v. Office of Social Security Administration · filed 2013-03-19

Section 1983 does not confer federal jurisdiction over claims against federal actors like the SSA or SSA employees.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 2013-03-28

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors, Settles v. U.S. ... Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and “[d]efendants argue correctly that the United States has not consented to be sued for monetary damages based on a constitutional violation or, in other words, for a “‘Bivens-type cause of action directly against a federal agency.’” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486).

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law and does not allow claims against federal agencies or officials acting under federal law.

Prentice v. United States · filed 2013-07-11

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state law and does not permit claims against federal agencies or federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an FBI agent acting as a federal officer.

Snyder v. United States · filed 2014-01-07

Defendant Giordano, of course, is an employee of the FBI and thus a federal actor. Therefore, he cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a federal actor acting under color of federal law.

Humphrey v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2014-12-30

The district court analyzed Humphrey’s claims in Counts 1 and 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though a plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim against a federal actor acting under the color of federal law.

Section 1983 applies to persons acting under color of state or territorial law; a claim against the federal Bureau of Prisons for federal action is insubstantial.

Robleto v. United States · filed 2015-12-10

There is no substantial claim here, if there ever could be, that the Bureau of Prisons was acting under color of state (or territorial) law or is a “person” doing so.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a federal agency and its officials generally cannot be sued under it.

Haines v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration · filed 2016-02-18

However, as a general matter, “[t]he federal government and its officials are not subject to suit under [§ 1983].” Conner v. Greef, 99 F. App’x 577, 580 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.1987)). ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Haines’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency acting under federal law.

Ryan v. McDonald · filed 2016-06-13

As a general matter, claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only be brought against state officials acting under color of state law, not federal actors acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for injuries caused by federal Public Health Service employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Camerano v. United States · filed 2017-04-19

And given that plaintiff has not submitted any evidence disputing that this case involves employees of the United States Public Health Service acting within the scope of their employment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for plaintiff's alleged injuries even if, as plaintiff argues, those employees violated the Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r–1396r-8.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal agencies.

Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-01

42 U.S.C. § 1983 only applies to state actors and not federal agencies.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a federal contractor.

Cage v. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center · filed 2019-08-14

Section 1983, however, does not provide a cause of action against a federal contractor like Alutiiq.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional damages claims against federal actors; those claims are governed by Bivens.

Shade v. Welsh · filed 2019-09-17

When the Court entered the dismissal order, it mistakenly referred to Plaintiff's claim as a “civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983” rather than a Bivens civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against federal actors; such claims are properly classified as Bivens claims.

Kornafel v. United States Postal Service · filed 2019-11-20

In his complaint, Kornafel indicated that his claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are more properly classified as Bivens claims because they are against federal actors.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional claims against individual federal officials acting as federal officials; those claims are considered under Bivens.

Kevin Grady, Sr. v. Kinder · filed 2020-02-11

Although Grady framed his due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court properly understood him to have brought the action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because he sued individual defendants who are federal actors.

Section 1983 does not provide the cause of action for individual-capacity claims against federal employees; those claims proceed under Bivens.

Abram v. Leu · filed 2020-03-02

However, to the extent he sues federal employees in their individual capacities, the Court construes such claims as being brought pursuant to Bivens, the federal analog to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal marshals acting as federal officers because they are not acting under color of state law.

Miller v. US Marshals Services · filed 2020-03-13

But § 1983 does not apply to the USMS because marshals are federal actors, not state actors.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal agency or individuals acting under color of federal law.

Quintana-Dieppa v. Department of the Army · filed 2020-03-25

However, it cannot form the basis of an action against individuals acting under color of federal law or against a federal agency. Rogers v. Vicuna, 264 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001). There is no dispute that plaintiff’s allegations hinge on defendants’ actions under color of federal law. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. As such, plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 necessarily fail.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Quansah v. Justice Department · filed 2020-03-26

Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not applicable to federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state actors, not federal actors.

Rivera v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service · filed 2020-08-12

To begin, § 1983 only applies to constitutional violations committed by state actors, not federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal actors.

United States v. Dorio · filed 2020-09-02

As to the latter, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to state, not federal, actors.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a federal judge acting as a federal government actor; such a claim must be brought under Bivens.

Dunigan v. Simon · filed 2021-01-07

Technically, because Judge Simon is a federal government actor, a claim against him must be brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 authorizes claims against persons acting under color of state or local law; claims against federal actors may be construed under Bivens.

Ellis v. Hawk · filed 2021-01-26

Thus, the Court construes Ellis’s reference to seeking relief under “1983” as seeking relief under Bivens.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against federal actors whose challenged conduct lacks a connection to state action.

O'Donnell v. Nedd · filed 2020-11-10

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s §1983 claim cannot be brought against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, or the United States because of their positions as federal government actors. ... Plaintiff concedes that the § 1983 claim cannot stand against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States. See Doc. No. 14 at 7. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against Defendants Nedd, Pendley, Bernhardt, Stewart, and the United States.

Section 1983 does not govern constitutional claims against federal actors; Bivens applies instead.

Keys v. Lane · filed 2021-03-17

Although Plaintiffs reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because they are suing federal actors for constitutional violations, Bivens is applicable.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Ward v. Parker · filed 2021-03-30

Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to claims against state actors; constitutional claims against federal actors may instead arise under Bivens.

Herbin v. Roman · filed 2021-04-26

Plaintiff brings his complaint as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But because he alleges that agencies and employees of the federal government – not state actors – violated his constitutional rights, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 applies to state and local government actors, not federal officials or entities.

Lenhart v. Savetski · filed 2021-06-11

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 apply only to state and local government actors. It does not provide a cause of action against federal government officials or entities.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Rizvi v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2021-08-16

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

Section 1983 does not apply to the federal government or federal employees acting under federal law.

Chavez v. United States of America · filed 2021-09-14

The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the only Defendants named in the Complaint are the United States, the USDA and federal employees.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal actors acting under federal law.

Small Business in Transportation Coalition v. Department of Transportation · filed 2021-09-27

Here, SBTC’s claims of First Amendment violations plainly apply to federal actors acting under federal law, and so SBTC cannot rely on a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal agents acting in their federal capacity.

Selvam v. United States of America · filed 2021-11-05

Since the individual defendants—Agent Connor and unnamed individuals “employed by defendant USA”—are federal agents, Compl. 2, Section 1983 cannot sustain his claims against them.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law, but not against federal officials.

Barrett v. GEO · filed 2021-12-02

“Section 1983, however, provides no right of action against federal (rather than state) officials.” Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999). To the extent Plaintiff has named federal rather than state actors as Defendants, his Complaint is properly construed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of federal authority.

Rayborn v. Marion · filed 2021-12-03

Although Plaintiff asserts this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants, it appears he should have pursued relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for alleged violations of his constitutional rights by persons acting under color of federal authority.

Section 1983 permits claims only against persons acting under color of law for a state, territory, or the District of Columbia.

Haughton v. US Department of Homeland Security · filed 2021-12-17

But, it is well-established that plaintiff may only bring a Section 1983 claim against persons acting under the color of law for a state, territory, or the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 provides no right of action against federal officials; constitutional claims against them must be brought, if at all, under Bivens.

Gonzales v. Noonan · filed 2022-03-30

“Section 1983, however, provides no right of action against federal (rather than state) officials.” Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999). To the extent Plaintiff has named federal rather than state actors as Defendants, his Complaint is properly construed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 authorizes suits against state and local officers but provides no cause of action against federal actors.

David Campeau, Jr. v. Sandercock · filed 2022-05-20

The appellants brought their lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, by its own terms, authorizes suits against state and local officers; it does not provide a cause of action against federal actors.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal actors.

Carter v. Bexar County Sheriffs Off. Personnel Admin. Sergeant Abraham · filed 2022-06-03

By its very terms, § 1983 applies to state, not federal actors.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors.

HALL v. SAMPSON · filed 2022-06-08

However, because §1983 does not apply to federal actors, the Court will construe all of Hall’s claims as having been raised pursuant to Bivens.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against federal employees acting under federal authority.

Liggins v. Reicks · filed 2022-03-15

In response, Liggins concedes that such an action cannot lie here under § 1983 and clarifies that any reference to section 1983 was made in error. Dkt. 88, at 2 n.1.4 Thus, the Court dismisses any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not cover constitutional tort claims against federal actors.

Moss v. Wooley · filed 2022-08-16

§1983 is inapplicable to claims for constitutional torts committed by federal actors.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a federal actor; the court construed the constitutional claim against that actor as a Bivens claim.

Matney v. Harker · filed 2022-08-24

Matney actually asserts her First Amendment retaliation claim against Caldwell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, because Caldwell is a federal actor, the Magistrate Judge construed that claim as a Bivens claim. ECF No. 31 at 1 n.1 (citing Navarrete v. United States, 532 F. App’x 121 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013)). Neither party objected to that construction of Matney’s complaint, and the court finds no clear error in the same.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials for processing an inmate’s grievances or appeals alone.

Hill v. Diaz · filed 2022-11-01

A prison official’s processing of an inmate’s appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on denying an administrative grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Frisby 926352 v. Cobar · filed 2022-09-19

However, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison grievance examiner merely because an inmate disagrees with the examiner’s decision.

Walker v. Cirian · filed 2022-09-15

Walker’s disagreement with ICE Payne’s decision is not enough to state a §1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for failing or refusing to investigate a prisoner's complaints or grievances.

Golden v. Jefferys · filed 2022-06-28

Prison officials incur no liability under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to investigate a prisoner's complaints or grievances.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for failing to investigate a prisoner’s complaints or grievances.

Golden v. Jefferys · filed 2022-05-11

Prison officials incur no liability under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to investigate a prisoner's complaints or grievances.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official merely for denying an administrative grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Anderson 979199 v. Huss · filed 2022-03-22

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because an official denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely for reviewing inmate grievances.

(PC) Martinez v. Davey · filed 2021-09-30

The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials for failing to investigate a prisoner’s complaints or grievances.

Brand v. Oglesby · filed 2021-09-23

Thus, prison officials incur no liability under § 1983 if they fail to investigate a prisoner’s complaints or grievances.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability for reviewing or mishandling a prisoner’s grievance without causing or participating in a violation of rights.

(PC) White v. Krantz · filed 2021-09-16

Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal generally cannot serve as the basis for liability in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to process or respond to a grievance.

Boyd v. Doe · filed 2021-06-30

Judge Deere explains that Mr. Boyd’s complaint about the grievance procedure fails as a matter of law because a prison official’s failure properly to process or respond to a grievance, standing alone, is not grounds for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Id., at 2). ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the Recommended Disposition as its findings in all respects (Dkt. No. 4).

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable for failing or refusing to investigate a prisoner’s complaints or grievances.

Pryor v. Atkins · filed 2021-06-16

Therefore, prison officials incur no liability under § 1983 if they fail or refuse to investigate a prisoner’s complaints or grievances.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to respond to grievances.

AZCONA v. ELLIS · filed 2021-03-25

But the failure to respond to grievances does not state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for reviewing and denying an inmate grievance.

(PC) Mekhtarian v. Ortega · filed 2021-03-03

This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for denying a prisoner's grievance.

Johnson 753595 v. Dixon-Ingalls · filed 2020-09-03

Such an allegation does not even support a claim against Defendant Barnes, Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that denying a grievance does not create liability under § 1983), much less demonstrate that Defendant Barnes is placing Plaintiff in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a prison official based solely on the official’s participation in the prison grievance process.

Allen v. Simon · filed 2020-12-14

However, a § 1983 plaintiff cannot proceed against a prison official based solely on the official’s participation in the prison grievance process.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for reviewing an inmate grievance.

(PC) Montgomery v. Wong · filed 2020-11-12

This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official solely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievance or appeal.

Salmen v. California Department of Correction Rehabilitation · filed 2020-11-02

However, a prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials solely for denying or failing to act on an inmate’s grievances.

Curtis v. Christian County, Kentucky · filed 2020-10-05

By the same token, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based solely on his handling of the plaintiff’s grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official for processing an inmate’s grievances or appeals without more.

Valdez v. Zhang · filed 2020-09-09

However, as to Defendants Robert and Gates, a prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for failing to investigate or respond to grievances.

Reilly v. Washington · filed 2020-06-15

Failure to investigate or respond to grievances does not establish a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison appeals coordinator merely for improperly processing a prisoner’s grievances or appeals.

Walker v. Gonzalez · filed 2020-04-30

Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim as to Inmate Appeals Coordinator Foston because an official’s allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, does not serve as a sufficient basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison officials merely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievance or appeal.

Battensby v. Zhang · filed 2020-01-28

A prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on prison medical officials merely for improperly processing an inmate’s grievances or health care appeals.

Powell v. Basto · filed 2019-10-24

However, a prison medical official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or health care appeals, without more, cannot serve as an independent basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a prison official merely for denying an inmate grievance.

Walker v. Hickenlooper · filed 2015-10-08

But even if his allegations are credited, the officials would not incur personal liability because we have squarely held that a prison official’s denial of a grievance cannot create liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official merely for denying an administrative grievance.

Thompson v. Stapleton · filed 2010-12-15

And Hofbauer’s denial of Thompson-Bey’s administrative grievance is otherwise not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for failing to properly investigate or rectify an inmate grievance.

Lewis v. Zon · filed 2013-01-25

However, plaintiff does not oppose the portion of defendants’ summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss that claim, and in any event, failure to properly investigate or rectify inmate grievances does not provide a basis for liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make prison officials liable merely for failing to process or investigate an inmate’s grievances.

King v. Houston · filed 2014-05-14

Likewise, King’s allegation that they did not adequately consider his grievances did not state a claim. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (prison officials’ failure to process or investigate grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely for responding to grievances or participating in the grievance procedure.

Kiser v. State of Ohio · filed 2019-08-30

Responding to a grievance or otherwise participating in the grievance procedure is insufficient to trigger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on a failure to investigate a complaint or grievance.

Zambon v. Crawford (TWP1) · filed 2019-09-09

As noted above, failure to investigate a complaint or grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. Thus, Defendant Myers is not liable under § 1983, even if he failed to investigate a complaint about Officer Crawford.

Section 1983 does not make a complaint examiner liable merely for recommending dismissal of an inmate grievance.

Pirtle v. Brooks · filed 2019-09-16

A complaint examiner is not liable under § 1983 for merely recommending that an inmate complaint be dismissed.