42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

LEE v. GALLINA-MECCA · filed 2021-12-03

Section 1983 itself severely limits injunctive relief against a state court judge: “[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

BROWNING v. YOUNG · filed 2021-12-15

Browning is not alleging a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Browning does not address the actions of Judge Young other than in his judicial capacity, Browning’s claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Paddock v. Dixon · filed 2021-12-30

While certain persons will be liable for their actions under § 1983, the statute makes clear that “except [] in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Id. (emphasis added).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

WILSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2022-01-20

In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against a judicial official for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Here, Plaintiff did not provide what decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Evans v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 2022-02-25

As a preliminary matter, the claim against Judge Kuhnke must be dismissed because injunctive relief against a judge “shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Lawrence v. Pelton, 413 F. Supp. 3d 701, 711 (E.D. Mich. 2019).

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Nieves v. Ward · filed 2022-03-03

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Ward under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable. Declaratory relief is available to Plaintiff because he may appeal Justice Ward’s decisions to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, and to the New York Court of Appeals.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Curcio v. Grossman · filed 2022-03-14

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Grossman under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Urena v. Roy · filed 2022-05-16

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Alvarado under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mercado v. Gregory M. Snyder, Judge of the CCP of York County, PA, in his official capacity · filed 2022-05-20

Because Mercado has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Mercado does not address the actions of Judge Snyder other than in his judicial capacity, her claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kelsey v. Sherman · filed 2022-07-05

Section 1983 provides “that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Here, declaratory relief was available to plaintiff. Plaintiff could have and did appeal Judge Catena’s decisions in his criminal case. ... Thus, injunctive relief against Judge Catena is foreclosed by Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against a defendant sued in her individual capacity.

Allen v. CHP · filed 2022-02-03

Specifically, Judge Mix determined: (1) ... (2) Defendant Mix is immune from suit for injunctive relief under § 1983 and therefore recommended that Plaintiff’s request to “be put on bottom bunk restriction for the duration of his incarceration” be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it is brought against Defendant Mix in her individual capacity; ... Having received no objections by the applicable deadline, on February 9, 2021 the Court adopted the Recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without prejudice in part and with prejudice in part.

Section 1983 does not allow injunctive relief against an official sued only in an individual capacity.

Aaron v. Ratkowski · filed 2022-08-24

As to defendant McBride, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims requesting injunctive relief against McBride in his individual capacity are dismissed.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Hartunian v. Sweeney · filed 2022-08-29

As such, the court lacks the authority under § 1983 to grant Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory or injunctive relief against Judge Sweeney.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Jones 603497 v. Marietti · filed 2022-09-22

Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, any claim for injunctive relief would also be barred.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Dillon v. Rosen · filed 2022-09-28

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Acting Justice Wittner under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity only if the judge violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Aruca v. Allan · filed 2022-10-05

Aruca does not argue that declaratory relief was unavailable or that Allan violated a declaratory judgment, which are prerequisites to injunctive relief against a state court judge under Section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint against multiple individuals must identify each defendant’s conduct and explain how it violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Miller v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services · filed 2022-10-28

Aside from identifying the constitutional rights implicated by his claims as substantive due process and equal protection, Plaintiff does not explain how the conduct of any of the Individual Defendants amounts to a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Thomas v. Briganti · filed 2022-11-02

Section 1983 provides: “[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Complaint also does not allege the violation of a declaratory decree, or the unavailability of declaratory relief, as required for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a plaintiff’s own losses caused by a violation of his rights, but not for losses suffered by his incorporated business.

Lindsey v. Orlando · filed 2019-03-26

Plaintiff Lindsey filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the losses he suffered as a result of an alleged false arrest. If he establishes a violation of his rights, he is entitled to recover losses he suffered as a result of that violation, including personal injuries, if any; emotional distress; or pay he lost during the time that the arrest and associated legal proceedings prevented him from working. Losses suffered by his incorporated business are separate losses, suffered by any owners or shareholders only as a result of the losses to their business; they are not directly recoverable by Plaintiff himself.

A § 1983 action brought on behalf of a decedent may include survivors’ losses of society and companionship when state wrongful death law supplies those damages through § 1988.

Arthur v. Hepler · filed 2019-10-11

The Michigan Wrongful Death Act applies to this § 1983 action pursuant to § 1988. There is no reason to bar Anderson’s family from seeking survivor’s losses, including the loss of society and companionship.

Section 1983 preempts Texas’s medical expert report requirement for excessive-force claims within a health care institution or against a health care provider or physician.

Ramona Rogers, M. D., Modesto Zambrano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Hern · filed 2019-06-13

Accordingly, in this narrow class of cases, we hold that § 1983 preempts § 74.351 when claims for excessive force occur within a healthcare institution or against a healthcare provider or physician.

Section 1983 does not preempt Texas’s expert-report requirement for health care liability claims brought in state court.

Ramona Rogers, M.D., Modesto Zamorano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Herna · filed 2021-04-16

Because the TMLA’s expert-report requirement is procedural in nature and would not cause reliably different outcomes in section 1983 cases brought in state and federal court, we hold that section 74.351 is not preempted by section 1983.

A nonlawyer parent cannot represent a minor child pro se in a § 1983 action; the child’s claims may be dismissed without prejudice.

Dobbs v. Warden · filed 2022-09-15

Dobbs, proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint “in the interest of” his minor child. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing on the ground that a non-lawyer litigant ... proceeding in federal court could not represent his child. Dobbs appealed. We affirm.

A parent may not litigate a minor child’s § 1983 claim pro se.

Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District · filed 2019-07-12

A parent, however, cannot proceed pro se to litigate a child’s claim under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, or § 1983.

A grandparent cannot litigate a minor grandchild’s § 1983 claim pro se.

C.R. v. Missouri Department of Social Services · filed 2021-09-21

If parents cannot litigate pro se on behalf of their minor children in § 1983 actions, grandparents certainly lack standing to do the same.

A nonattorney parent cannot litigate a minor child’s § 1983 claim pro se; motions on the child’s behalf must be filed through counsel.

C.H. v. Pattonville School District · filed 2022-07-20

While this rule “may not be ironclad,” there is no exception for lawsuits based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or general state tort law. ... All motions filed on behalf of plaintiff must be filed through counsel. Therefore, Ms. Hunt’s motions are denied.

Section 1983 defendants may dispute causation, but they may not seek to apportion fault under state comparative fault laws.

Estate of Marc A Moreno v. Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc · filed 2019-08-05

While defendants to section 1983 actions may argue that other people are responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, defendants may not ask the jury to apportion fault among parties and non-parties, including other defendants, under state comparative fault and apportionment laws.

Comparative fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Meagher v. King County · filed 2020-07-09

Comparative fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Contributory negligence or contributory fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

(PC) Jongpil Park v. Kitt · filed 2021-03-31

Contributory negligence or contributory fault is an inapplicable defense to a § 1983 claim.

Comparative fault does not apply to Section 1983 claims, so a defendant cannot use a state law nonparty fault designation to apportion liability.

Estate of Charles Anthony Hurtado v. Smith · filed 2022-07-05

Because comparative fault is not available for Plaintiff’s federal claim—the lone remaining claim in this action—the court concludes that Defendant’s Designation of Nonparties at Fault [Doc. 54] is of no operative legal effect.

Section 1983 does not categorically bar restitution or a refund of fines paid because of a Fourth Amendment violation.

Yannotti v. Arbor · filed 2019-10-28

The City fails to demonstrate that restitution damages or a refund of fines paid because of a Fourth Amendment violation are clearly not available to any claimant as a matter of law under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages for an unlawful stop do not cover later incarceration when a lawful arrest follows and those losses do not redress the stop.

Sherard Martin v. Marinez · filed 2019-08-12

We do not go so far as to hold that post-arrest damages may never be recovered, only that here such damages would be inconsistent with the rule in Carey that damages should be tailored to protect the right in question, 435 U.S. at 258.

Section 1983 permits damages for an unlawful search, but injuries resulting from the discovery of evidence and subsequent proceedings are not recoverable as damages for that search.

Brubaker v. Tucson, City of · filed 2020-02-18

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff seeks tort damages for the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment related to an allegedly illegal search of his house. ... Under Lingo, Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation related to anything but the alleged illegal search: September 29 and October 1, 2009. He cannot recover damages related to the seizure and forfeiture (euthanizing) of his cats, his criminal prosecution for animal neglect, or the condemnation proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for damages from an arrest and criminal charges that followed the discovery of evidence during an unlawful search.

WHITE v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO · filed 2022-06-22

Accordingly, the Greensboro Defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages for the § 1983 claim will be granted to the extent White seeks damages flowing from his alleged wrongful arrest and filing of criminal charges for theft of GPD property but will otherwise be denied.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights claim for a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Bosse v. Blades · filed 2019-11-19

A violation of the terms of the IAD can be the basis for a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 449 (1981).

Section 1983 claims alleging violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and failure to train on its procedures may proceed beyond initial screening.

Baird v. Curtis · filed 2020-01-29

The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as § 1983 claims for violation of the IAD against Defendants Bergenson and Page in their individual and official capacities and for failure to train on the procedures under the IAD against Defendant Bergenson in his official capacity. Upon review, the Court will allow these claims to proceed beyond initial screening.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment retaliation claim alongside FMLA claims when the retaliation claim rests on an independent constitutional violation.

Hopfinger v. City of Nashville, Illinois · filed 2019-12-02

After reviewing the parties’ limited arguments on this issue, the Court finds that Hopfinger is entitled to bring a Section 1983 First Amendment Retaliation claim in addition to her FMLA claims.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional Equal Protection claim based on disability discrimination even when the ADA has its own enforcement mechanism.

Leibas v. Dart · filed 2020-10-19

As the court reads their complaint, however, Plaintiffs are not using Section 1983 to enforce the ADA; they are instead asserting Equal Protection claims based on alleged differential treatment because of their status as disabled persons.

Hawai‘i’s qualified privilege does not immunize a defendant from liability under Section 1983; it applies to state law claims.

Reyes v. Tanaka · filed 2019-12-13

In the Motion, Tanaka erroneously argues that qualified privilege immunizes him from liability for the § 1983 claims. Mot. at 19-21. Qualified privilege applies to state law claims.

Section 1983 does not require a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim.

Ornstein v. Cessna · filed 2020-01-29

As to the federal constitutional claim against the Moving Defendants, the Court must also deny the motion because there is no requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a plaintiff provide a certificate of merit for a medical deliberate indifference claim under U.S. Constitution.

Paying a fine does not, by itself, waive the right to bring a Section 1983 claim.

Muladzhanov v. The City of New York · filed 2020-03-16

The voluntary payment doctrine does not relinquish Plaintiffs’ right to bring a claim under Section 1983.

In this official-capacity claim for prospective relief, the court required a Tennessee policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Wood v. State of Tennessee(PSLC1) · filed 2020-03-27

Notably, Defendant State of Tennessee may only be liable for these claims if its custom or policy caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for its officers’ actions under respondeat superior.

Kaswatuka v. DFW Airport Police · filed 2020-04-29

First, § 1983 does not allow a governmental entity to be held vicariously liable for the actions of its officers under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Because plaintiff's § 1983 claims against a unit of government rely on respondeat superior, such claims should be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a governmental entity liable for a constitutional deprivation to allege that its policy, custom, or official with final policymaking authority caused the deprivation.

McQueary v. State of Florida Child Support Enforcement · filed 2020-05-04

To the extent she is suing the Florida child support enforcement agencies for allowing child support to accrue above $100,000, she has not presented a valid constitutional or § 1983 claim because she has not alleged that any of the agencies’ policies, customs, or officials with final policymaking authorities caused the deprivation of her constitutional rights.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires a government policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Broach v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2020-05-08

Rather, to establish a prima facie § 1983 claim against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to show (1) the existence of a government policy or custom, which (2) directly caused an injury to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not make an entity liable solely because its employees acted.

Borden-Vasallo (ID 108165) v. Miami County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-06-18

Further, an entity is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because its employees took certain actions.

An entity acting under color of state law may face a Section 1983 claim when its policy or custom caused an agent’s constitutional violation.

Smith-Bey v. Warden · filed 2020-08-06

The Court will also allow the claim to proceed as to Wexford, since, construing Plaintiff's pleadings liberally at this early stage, the Court determines he has alleged a Wexford policy, practice, or custom of denying or delaying necessary treatment.

Section 1983 allows claims against government entities, but an entity cannot be liable when none of its officers committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Asprey v. Northern Wyoming Community · filed 2020-08-11

NWCCD is a “person” subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Under § 1983, a government entity “may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.” Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1199 ... (internal quotation marks omitted). “Without an underlying constitutional violation” by Trebby, NWCCD “cannot be liable.” Id.

Section 1983 requires a claim against an entity to allege an official policy that directly caused the constitutional violation.

Dunn v. NENMDF · filed 2020-08-20

And, to the extent the Amended Complaint raises claims against GEO Group, there are no allegations demonstrating GEO Group “had an ‘official . . . policy of some nature . . . that was the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity that provides prison healthcare to allege that the entity’s policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

PAGLIAROLI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-09-18

Here, Plaintiff would need to provide facts showing that UCHC and/or Rutgers had a relevant policy or custom, and that the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation he alleges.

Section 1983 permits liability against an entity only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal law.

Baker v. Trinity Services Group · filed 2021-01-08

Moreover, where Baker has asserted this claim only against Trinity and CCS and not an individual correctional or medical staff member, such an entity may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir. 1999); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Here, the Complaint does not allege, and does not provide sufficient facts to show, that CCS has such a custom or policy.

Section 1983 makes a government entity liable for a constitutional violation only when its policy, practice, or custom caused the violation.

Stewardson v. Cass County · filed 2021-03-09

A government entity is legally responsible for a constitutional violation only when its policies, practices, or customs caused the violation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities or other government entities.

Garza v. Tewalt · filed 2021-03-31

To bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 against a municipality or other government entity, a plaintiff cannot rely on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an entity liable under Monell to allege a specific policy or custom that caused the claimed injury.

Flores v. County of Fresno · filed 2021-08-02

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has again failed to allege the existence of a policy or custom by Corizon, and thus the allegations of her Monell claim under brought pursuant to § 1983 against Corizon in the SAC fail to state a cognizable claim. Therefore, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against defendant Corizon.

A prison medical contractor’s policy cannot support § 1983 liability as applied to a prisoner when the nurse following it committed no constitutional violation.

Shipp v. Murphy · filed 2021-08-13

Because we see no constitutional violation in Nurse Kendall’s actions, CCS’s policy and practice cannot be unconstitutional as applied to Shipp.

Section 1983 allows a prison operator to be liable when a policy it continued to operate caused the alleged wrongdoing.

Mendez v. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2021-09-03

GEO can be liable under Section 1983, but only if it is responsible for the continued operation of a policy that caused the wrongdoing.

Section 1983 does not make an entity automatically liable for its employees’ conduct; a damages claim requires a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

HAMMONDS v. ISSACS · filed 2021-11-02

These entities are not automatically liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the failings of their employees. To state a § 1983 damages claim against these entities, Mr. Hammonds must allege that their policies, practices, or customs caused a constitutional violation.

A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Edwards v. Department of Human Services · filed 2021-12-14

Though Plaintiff names the Department of Human Services and Child Protective Services as defendants, she has not alleged that any official policy or custom caused her injury.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a governmental entity’s policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Raymond v. Minnehaha County State Attorney Office · filed 2021-12-28

Raymond fails to identify a policy or custom that has caused a constitutional injury.

A governmental entity cannot be liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts under a policy theory if the employee committed no constitutional violation.

Everhart v. CYFD · filed 2022-01-12

As a result of the first requirement, a governmental entity “cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of an employee if . . . [the] employee committed no constitutional violation.” Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)). ... Based on our earlier conclusions that the Everharts failed to advance evidence capable of supporting the proposition that Ms. Becker violated their constitutional rights, the policy-based claim against CYFD necessarily fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a governmental entity to allege that the entity itself committed the unconstitutional acts, rather than relying on acts by its employees or agents.

Hopkins v. Wayside Schools · filed 2022-03-23

In order to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wayside, Hopkins must allege that the unconstitutional acts he complains of were committed by Wayside itself rather than by its employees or agents.

Section 1983 does not make a private entity liable solely for an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must allege a policy or custom that caused the violation.

Vreeland v. Carson · filed 2022-03-29

A private company is not generally liable under § 1983 based only on the actions of an employee. ... This single instance is insufficient to plausibly allege a basis for entity liability as no officially adopted policy is identified.

Section 1983 allows an entity-liability claim to proceed when repeated retaliation and ignored complaints plausibly show deliberate indifference and causation.

Elliott v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31

Because Elliott has plausibly alleged deliberate indifference and causation, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One is denied.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking Monell liability to identify a policy or practice; a conclusory reference to a policy is insufficient.

Dragisich v. Schmaling · filed 2022-04-28

Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding an unconstitutional policy that resulted in his harm, such that either RCJ or Mend, Inc. (“Mend”) (which provides healthcare services to RCJ) could be liable under a Monell framework of liability, are underdeveloped. At one point, Plaintiff alleges that RCJ and Mend discontinued his treatment due to their “policy, practice, procedures, discretionary decisions.” ECF No. 23 at 9. This statement does not adequately identify what that procedure was—it is essentially conclusory.

A Section 1983 claim based on entity liability requires facts plausibly showing that the injury resulted from the entity’s policy or custom.

Gartor Brown v. Moore · filed 2022-06-01

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Brown did not allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim that any injury resulted from the execution of a policy or custom of CEC.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an entity to show that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

JACKSON v. MILLER · filed 2022-06-28

However, New Jersey Department of Corrections is an entity, rather than an individual, so Plaintiff instead must demonstrate that a policy or custom of the entity caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a government entity to connect the alleged constitutional deprivation to the entity’s policy or custom; liability cannot rest solely on its employees’ actions.

MIRETSKAYA v. RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2022-07-29

To validly state a constitutional claim against Rutgers, Miretskaya must allege a constitutional deprivation resulting from Rutgers’s policies or customs.

Section 1983 protects against constitutional violations; a violation of police department policy alone does not establish liability.

MITCHELL v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2020-03-31

However, the Seventh Circuit “has consistently held that ‘42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of … departmental regulations and police practices.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Scott, 346 F.3d at 760). While the IMPD’s policies are not completely irrelevant to our analysis, they are not determinative of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry here.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a government agency’s internal policies alone.

Phillips v. Baxter · filed 2020-05-06

Accordingly, any violation of the IDHS policy is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violating police policy unless the conduct also violates a constitutional right.

Rizk v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-22

Accordingly, an act or omission that violates police policy but does not also violate constitutional rights is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a state corrections policy alone.

Maddux v. Metzger · filed 2020-11-16

Defendants’ alleged failure to follow DOC Policy 8.60 is not itself a violation subject to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a violation of jail policy actionable unless it also violates a constitutional right.

Newson v. Biederwolf · filed 2021-02-18

And, to the extent that the defendants did not follow policy and procedure, violation of a jail policy is not a constitutional violation enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim merely because a jail official failed to follow jail policy.

Over v. Markwardt · filed 2021-03-16

Whether any defendant failed to follow Jail policy in providing him treatment is not at issue in this lawsuit and is not the basis for a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make state officials liable merely for violating a state corrections policy.

Braun v. D.O.C. · filed 2021-08-26

But the R&R correctly observed that neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor any other provision of federal law known to the Court renders state officials liable merely for violating a state’s own corrections policy.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policy alone without a constitutional violation.

JACOBS v. PHERSON · filed 2022-03-21

A violation of policy by itself is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state corrections policy alone.

GARDNER v. HARRY · filed 2022-08-09

To begin, Gardner’s claims that his placement in a double cell violates DOC policy is not cognizable in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violating a private medical policy unless the conduct also violates the Constitution.

Colin v. Gerst · filed 2022-08-31

Even if Gerst did violate the policy, a violation of a private policy is not equivalent to a violation of the constitution. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws, or in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.”). Gerst’s alleged non-adherence to Wexford policy does not establish a constitutional violation, and it is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact about Gerst’s alleged deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating state procedures or regulations without a constitutional violation.

Lightfoot v. Bartley · filed 2022-09-15

Thus, even if one of the defendants had violated a state procedure or regulations, that violation is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violations of non-federal law, and an officer’s breach of department protocol does not defeat qualified immunity.

White v. City of Hernando · filed 2022-09-28

Although that fact may appear on its face to render Officer Brown’s conduct more culpable, as discussed in Pasco where the officer similarly disobeyed a supervisor, it is well-established that the fact that Officer Brown acted contrary to Lieutenant Coleman’s order to Officer Chatham is “constitutionally irrelevant.” Pasco, 566 F.3d at 579 (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 375 n.1, 127 S. Ct. 1769) (additional citations omitted). “Violations of non-federal laws cannot form a basis for liability under § 1983, and qualified immunity is not lost because an officer violates a department protocol.” Id.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of police department policy because such policies do not create federally protected rights.

Christiansen v. Eral · filed 2022-10-31

We've repeatedly explained that police department guidelines and policies do not create rights that give rise to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a court reporter who intentionally alters a transcript to deny a litigant due process; an alleged inaccuracy alone does not establish intentional alteration.

Johnson v. Piontek · filed 2020-04-01

Further, although court reporters can be liable if they intentionally modify transcripts to deny a litigant due process, Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006), nothing in Johnson’s allegation that the transcript did not appear “word for word,” nor his assertion on appeal that the transcript “did not coincide with prior proceedings of what was stated on record,” plausibly suggests that Piontek intentionally altered the transcript.

Section 1983 does not provide medical parole as injunctive relief for inadequate medical care.

McGiboney v. Corizon · filed 2020-04-03

The Court agreed with Defendants that medical parole was not available injunctive relief in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denied the Motion to the extent it requested such remedy.

A prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action may recover taxable costs without showing that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

(PC) Barker v. Osemwingie · filed 2020-04-21

However, unlike with claims brought under the ADA, this same standard does not apply to the award of costs to a defendant prevailing on a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a freestanding claim of actual innocence, even when that claim is unavailable in habeas corpus.

Walker v. Cuomo · filed 2020-05-18

His inability to assert a freestanding claim for actual innocence in a habeas corpus petition does not create a legal right for him to assert such a claim in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to expunge a criminal record.

Luster v. Cahokia Police Department · filed 2020-07-10

Finally, Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 or the FTCA to expunge his criminal record. If he seeks to challenge a sentence or conviction, he should do so in a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or habeas action.

Section 1983 does not provide expungement of a criminal record as a remedy.

Johnson v. Fulton · filed 2021-12-07

However, expungement is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to seek another person’s prosecution or an investigation of jail administration.

Chambers v. Carter County Jail · filed 2020-07-16

However, Plaintiff “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Thus, these claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff obtain an order directing another person's criminal prosecution.

WARE v. SANCHEZ-BERMUDEZ · filed 2020-11-05

Courts “have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties,” finding that those plaintiffs lack standing or that such relief is simply unavailable in a civil suit.

Section 1983 does not allow bystanders to recover for emotional harm from witnessing police conduct when they were neither the objects of that conduct nor physically injured by it.

Crane v. City of Arlington Texas · filed 2020-07-16

Because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing that Jefferson, Johnson, or Z.C. were the object of Roper’s conduct or physically harmed by that conduct, the Court finds that they are bystanders of this incident and therefore do not have a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows bystanders to recover for excessive force only when the force violates their own Fourth Amendment rights; witnessing force against someone else is insufficient.

Crane v. City of Arlington · filed 2022-09-30

Thus, bystanders may recover when they are subject to an officer’s excessive use of force such that their own Fourth Amendment right is violated; however, bystanders cannot recover when they only witness excessive force used upon another.

The alternate dispute resolution procedure requested by the plaintiff is unavailable in a Section 1983 action.

Logan v. Meeker · filed 2020-10-20

Plaintiff files [6], a letter and [7], a motion, each requesting alternate dispute resolution. This procedure is not available to Plaintiff in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for an alleged HIPAA violation because HIPAA creates no privately enforceable right.

FELICIANO v. MAY · filed 2021-03-29

So even assuming the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are true, Plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 against Officer May for an alleged HIPAA violation.

An inmate may seek postconviction DNA testing under § 1983 when success would not necessarily imply that the conviction is invalid.

Nero v. Crow · filed 2021-06-23

Additionally, an inmate’s request for DNA testing is properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not § 2254, because “[s]uccess in his suit for DNA testing would not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction.”

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violation unless a compelled statement was used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding.

Chavez v. Robinson · filed 2021-09-08

We conclude that because Chavez did not make a statement that was used in a criminal proceeding, see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion), he may not bring a civil action against the government under § 1983 for a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.

A plaintiff waives a § 1983 claim by first pursuing the same cause of action in the Ohio Court of Claims.

Heyward v. Cooper · filed 2021-09-27

The Leaman doctrine provides that a plaintiff waives his right to pursue any cause of action, including claims under § 1983, if the plaintiff first pursued those causes of action in the Ohio Court of Claims.

Section 1983 claims are exempt from Idaho's bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Bowman v. City of Boise City · filed 2022-04-01

The statutory bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Claims under Section 1983 are not subject to Idaho’s bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Ludwig v. City of Pinehurst · filed 2022-04-18

The statutory bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations are not subject to Idaho’s bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Weldon v. Francis · filed 2022-05-31

The bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations are exempt from Idaho’s bond requirement for suits against law enforcement officers.

Hall v. Gooding County Sheriff Department · filed 2022-07-25

The bond requirement “does not apply to alleged violations of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a county jail is not a legal entity amenable to suit.

Walker v. St. Louis County Justice Center · filed 2021-09-30

The St. Louis County Justice Center is a county jail, and “county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Elliott v. Maricopa County Lower Buckeye Jail · filed 2021-12-17

Because a jail is neither a corporation nor a body politic, it is not a person for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Crisano v. Rappahanock Regional Jail · filed 2022-01-04

Because RRJ is not a person under § 1983 and lacks the capacity to be sued under Rule 17(b), it must be dismissed as a defendant, with prejudice.

Section 1983 permits suits against persons acting under color of state law; Virginia jails are not persons subject to suit under it.

Fleurival v. Caroline Detention Facility · filed 2022-01-19

Assuming without deciding that the Detention Facility is a proper party, it would not be amenable to suit under § 1983. The statute permits lawsuits only against a “person,” who, under color of state law, deprives another person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jails in Virginia “are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and thus not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 890, 892 (E.D. Va. 1992). The § 1983 claim therefore cannot proceed against the Detention Facility, and the claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person.

McAlister v. Middle River Regional Jail Staunton VA · filed 2022-01-24

A jail is only a building and cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Swann v. District Attorney · filed 2022-01-27

However, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, and therefore, the Sullivan County Jail must be DISMISSED as a Defendant.

A prison or correctional facility is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

GREEN v. LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON · filed 2022-02-09

The Complaint does not articulate a claim against the Lehigh County Jail under Section 1983 because “[i]n the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a prison or correctional facility is not a ‘person’ that is subject to suit under federal civil rights laws.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

LITCHFIELD v. LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON · filed 2022-02-17

However, a jail is not a “person” under § 1983 and therefore is not subject to liability under the Section .

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county jails or local government detention centers because they are not suable entities.

Anderson v. Pemiscot County Jail · filed 2022-02-23

Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Pemiscot County Jail are legally frivolous because jails and local government detention centers are not suable entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Morden v. State of Iowa · filed 2022-03-03

The Cedar County Jail, however, is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county detention center because it is not an entity subject to suit.

Dishner v. Sullivan County Detention Center · filed 2022-03-03

Also, while Plaintiff has named the Sullivan County Detention Center as a Defendant, this is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a Michigan county jail because the jail is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Gray v. Boose · filed 2022-03-04

The Court will summarily dismiss the case with respect to Defendant Genesee County Jail, as it is not a legal entity capable of being sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a jail or detention center to be sued as an entity.

Dortch v. Lewis · filed 2022-03-07

A jail/detention center is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

JOHNSON v. RUSSELL · filed 2022-03-11

The claims against LCP are dismissed with prejudice because a jail is not a “person” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because the jail is not an entity subject to suit.

Arnold v. Sullivan County Jail · filed 2022-03-21

Also, while Plaintiff has named the Sullivan County Jail as a Defendant, this is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a money damages claim against a jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

Robinson v. Sedgwick County Jail · filed 2022-03-25

Prison and jail facilities are not proper defendants because none is a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because a jail is not a person subject to suit.

CHIANCONE v. CAPE MAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2022-04-01

The jail, however, is not a proper defendant in a prisoner civil rights matter, and must be dismissed as such.

A jail is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Poston v. Campbell Co. Jail · filed 2022-04-06

However, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, and therefore, the Campbell County Jail must be DISMISSED as a Defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a local jail facility because the facility is not a person subject to suit.

Harris v. Amherst County Adult Detention Center · filed 2022-04-14

A local jail facility itself cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against county jails because they are not persons under the statute.

Norton v. Franklin County Jail · filed 2022-05-02

County jails are not persons subject to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a jail to be sued because a jail is not a person subject to liability under the section.

Mitchell-Feazell v. Campbell County Jail · filed 2022-05-05

However, a jail is not a person subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a jail is not a separate suable entity.

Chambers v. Windham · filed 2022-06-03

A jail, however, is not a distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Childress v. Bailey · filed 2022-06-06

However, the Johnson City Jail is not an entity subject to suit in a § 1983 action, as a jail is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.

A county jail is not a person subject to liability under Section 1983.

BASKERVILLE v. COUNTY OF HUDSON · filed 2022-06-07

The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against HCCF with prejudice for failure to state claim, as a county jail is not a “person” subject to liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a distinctly suable entity.

Chambers v. Windham · filed 2022-07-07

A Jail, however, is not a distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a municipal department is not a suable person.

Kimmons v. Fulton County Detention Center · filed 2022-07-21

FCDC is not a proper Defendant in this action. It is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a jail to be sued because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Dickerson v. Blomme · filed 2022-07-22

A jail is not a “person” within the meaning of §1983, and therefore, it is a “non-suable entity.”

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Burtton v. Livingston County Jail · filed 2022-07-29

Finally, the Jail is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a jail because a jail is not a suable entity.

Shultz v. Stoddard County Jail · filed 2022-09-12

A Jail, however, is not a distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail because the jail is not a suable entity.

Huff v. Warren County Jail · filed 2022-09-27

Suits against a public entity or department are subject to dismissal because jails, local government detention centers, and sheriff’s departments are not suable entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a correctional facility because it is not a person acting under color of state law.

MCCLAIN v. AVILES · filed 2022-09-27

As an initial matter, HCCF, as a correctional facility, is not a “person” acting under color of state law and, therefore, is not amenable to suit under § 1983.

A private medical contractor is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Cook v. Daviess Co. Detention Cnter · filed 2022-10-21

Thus, liability of a contracted private entity must be based on a policy or custom of the entity.

A private medical contractor may face liability under § 1983 when a widespread practice causes a constitutional injury; evidence of similar later conduct can help establish that practice.

Gabor v. Wexford Health Sources Incorporated · filed 2021-12-13

This evidence “sufficiently relates to the central occurrence” because it has the potential to convince a reasonable juror that there was a widespread practice among Wexford-employed doctors to automatically refuse benzodiazepines to inmates who may have required them to maintain the stability of their mental health and avoid dangerous withdrawal symptoms.

A private medical contractor can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Belton v. Southern Correctional Medicine · filed 2021-10-29

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Southern Correctional Medicine because he does not allege the existence of a “custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to [a] constitutional right” and that caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a prison medical contractor to be held liable when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Watson v. Ndi · filed 2022-01-28

Such corporations can only be held directly liable if they established or maintained a policy or custom that is responsible for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical contractor only when its custom or policy caused the deprivation of rights.

Barnes v. Bernice · filed 2022-09-08

A private corporation carrying out a state function such as medical care for prisoners may be held liable under § 1983 only upon a showing that it had a custom or policy that caused the deprivation of rights.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against states, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Seugasala v. State of Alaska Department of Corrections · filed 2021-11-17

It is well established that neither a state, nor its agencies, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Pierce v. Connors · filed 2021-11-30

But, even if the court assumes that the State retaliated against Plaintiff, the State (and any state actor in his or her official capacity) cannot be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary claims against a state official in an official capacity because the official is not a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Scott v. Watson · filed 2021-12-06

It is well settled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Scruggs v. Stirling · filed 2021-12-20

But a state official in his official capacity is not a “person” amenable to a damages suit pursuant to § 1983.

States, state agencies, and their employees sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Sadler v. Wellpath · filed 2022-02-01

A state, its agencies, and employees sued in their official capacities, however, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Rucker v. Purviance · filed 2022-02-09

As a result, the complaint fails to state a colorable claim for damages under Section 1983 against the State or any defendant in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state agencies or state employees sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Jones v. Robey · filed 2022-02-14

States, state agencies, and state employees sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit the official-capacity claims against Justice Center employees asserted in this case.

Johnson v. Saint Louis City Justice Department · filed 2022-03-07

As a threshold issue, plaintiff cannot state a claim against Justice Center employees in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state employees in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Rose v. Adams · filed 2022-03-17

State employees acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Dunn v. State of Louisiana Through the Department of Public Safety & Corrections · filed 2022-03-24

Thus, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims are barred against Defendants in their official capacity, as they are not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief to proceed against an official positioned to implement that relief.

Harris v. Franke · filed 2022-04-06

Typically, official capacity claims for injunctive relief proceed against the high-ranking official responsible for implementing any injunctive relief that is ordered. ... Of the three named defendants, Captain Franke is the most appropriate official to carry out any injunctive relief ordered herein. Count 1 shall proceed against Captain Frank, in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow economic damages or other retrospective relief against state employees sued in their official capacities.

Owens v. Pearl River Community College · filed 2022-05-05

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred insofar as Plaintiff seeks economic damages or other retrospective relief.

Section 1983 does not allow damages claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Morrissey v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2022-05-09

In sum, and in accordance with the above law, the Commonwealth, the DOC, as well as Mici and O’Brien in their official capacities are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the section 1983 claims against them in the original and amended complaints are subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against persons acting under color of state law; states and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under the section.

Gregory v. Currituck County · filed 2022-05-20

Moreover, claims for damages brought under § 1983 can only be brought against “persons” acting under color of state law, and neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are considered “persons” under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state, including through an official-capacity claim against a state employee.

Durley v. Ahlborg · filed 2022-05-23

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under §1983.