42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 plaintiff deprived of property without procedural due process may recover compensatory damages when the deprivation was unjustified, but only nominal damages when the deprivation itself was justified.

Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, Lawrence M. Loveless and Jane Doe Loveless, and the Marital Community Composed · filed 1987-11-18

A plaintiff deprived of a property interest without procedural due process can recover compensatory damages if the deprivation is determined to have been unjustified. ... However, only nominal damages are recoverable for a deprivation of property determined to be otherwise justified.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for an unauthorized deprivation when adequate state postdeprivation remedies satisfy due process.

Utke v. City of Houston · filed 1988-04-26

Because the posttermination state law remedies available to Utke were adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process, he is precluded from bringing this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits liability for depriving a public employee of her position without due process of law.

Harvey v. Treder · filed 1988-05-18

This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted two claims: (1) race discrimination in defendants’ having discharged plaintiff from the Suffolk County Police Academy and the position of police officer, and (2) denial of a property right without due process of law in defendants’ having refused to reinstate plaintiff as a community service aid. ... With respect to the second claim, for reasons stated on the record on May 15, 1988, this court found defendants liable for having deprived plaintiff of her position as a community service aid without affording her due process of law.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim fails when postdeprivation reinstatement with full back pay provides meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process, even though additional relief could be available under the section.

Dorsey v. State of Md., Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 1988-08-02

Whatever deprivation this may have constituted, however, was cured when the Secretary of Personnel reinstated him with full back pay. Postdeprivation remedies can satisfy due process requirements. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981). Although additional relief, including attorney fees, would be available under Sec. 1983, Dorsey got meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process. Id. at 544. Therefore, summary judgment on his Sec. 1983 claim was appropriate.

Section 1983 permits damages for denial of procedural due process even if the plaintiff later receives a hearing.

Schall v. Joyce · filed 1989-11-24

Moreover, although a hearing is an element of the relief available in a procedural due process suit, the Supreme Court has held that denial of the process due is itself compensable by damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Thus, although Schall has received a hearing, she may still be entitled to monetary relief if due process required that she be given a hearing more timely than the one that she ultimately received.

In a § 1983 procedural due process claim, once the plaintiff proves a violation, the defendant must prove that the same termination would have occurred with due process to avoid damages for lost employment.

Hough v. Dane County · filed 1990-06-07

Once Hough established a violation of his procedural due process rights, the burden shifted to the county to prove that the board would have terminated Hough's employment if no due process violation had occurred.

In a § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process, damages cover injury caused by the denial of process itself; absent proof of such injury, only nominal damages are available.

Royal Russell Long v. Shillinger · filed 1991-03-06

Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot recover for any injury caused by the extradition; he can only recover for any injury, such as emotional distress, caused by the deprivation of due process itself. ... Since plaintiff did not allege, much less prove, that he suffered any injury as a result of the deprivation of due process alone, he was entitled to receive only nominal damages on his claim.

Section 1983 permits a damages suit for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Mateen v. Carl Nink Ray Polanco Sherry Burright Jim Cecil · filed 1993-04-15

A party may sue for damages under section 1983 for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff to at least nominal damages when a municipal policy terminates water service without constitutionally required notice.

James v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 1993-10-22

Appéllees’ policy of disconnecting water service to a property without giving prior notice of termination to actual users constitutes a denial of due process and entitles appellant to at least nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging deprivation of procedural due process to show a protected life, liberty, or property interest and the absence of due process.

Farber v. City of Paterson · filed 2004-06-07

To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the individual interest of which she claims she was deprived is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to her did not provide “due process of law.”

Section 1983 permits damages for a procedural due process violation when conduct under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of life, liberty, or property without due process.

Schultz v. Egan · filed 2004-07-06

“To award damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of procedural due process, a court must find that, as the result of conduct performed under col- or of state law, the plaintiff was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a federal action for deprivation of constitutional rights when state officials fail to provide required predeprivation process.

Berlanti v. Bodman · filed 1985-12-26

As we held in Stana, "if the government entity could have, but did not, provide predeprivation procedures, a Sec. 1983 action complaining of the lack of procedural due process may be maintained in federal court, notwithstanding the availability of state judicial routes as well." Stana, 775 F.2d at 130.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local government actor for depriving them of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Hughes v. City of Bethlehem · filed 2008-10-02

We agree with the District Court that Hughes failed to make out a claim against the City that she was deprived of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for deprivation of procedural due process during a prison disciplinary proceeding when the claim does not necessarily invalidate the conviction.

White v. Fox · filed 2008-10-06

A claim for damages based on a failure to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under §1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations when success would not necessarily invalidate good-time credits.

Cox v. Clark · filed 2009-04-08

However, Cox’s claim for damages based on the failure to provide advance notice of the claimed disciplinary violation is not barred by Edwards, because a decision in Cox’s favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of the good-time credits.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would have produced the same result, but does not permit compensatory damages without resulting injury.

Parks v. Goff · filed 1980-01-08

The Court finds that plaintiff has not sustained any actual damages attributable to the lack of procedural due process, for the reason that a proper hearing would have resulted in the same disposition. Under such circumstances, reinstatement and backpay are not proper remedies, and an award of compensatory damages is not justified. ... Judgment will, therefore, be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of one dollar, representing nominal damages for such deprivation of procedure.

Section 1983 permits actual damages for a procedural due process violation if injury is proved, and nominal damages if no actual damages are shown.

Russell v. Dr. Robert Harrison, President of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 1984-07-16

Thus, if upon remand, the district court finds a denial of procedural due process, actual damages ... may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and nominal damages are appropriate in the event that no actual damages are shown.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but a public employee cannot use it to challenge a transfer that changes job functions without terminating employment.

Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German · filed 2009-09-30

Since the plaintiffs allegations in this case do not involve the termination of his employment, but merely a change in his functions, i.e. a transfer from one division of the municipal government to another, the plaintiff cannot obtain redress for a due process violation, even if the defendants’ alleged actions would constitute adverse employment actions. ... Therefore, the court must GRANT the defendants’ motion on this ground and dismiss the plaintiffs section 1983 due process claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or laws, and a procedural due process claim requires denial of available state process.

Copper ex rel. Copper v. Denlinger · filed 2010-01-29

As such, even assuming arguendo that the 6 October meeting was constitutionally deficient and deprived the student of his right to procedural due process, the complaint fails to make the additional requisite allegation that the injury was completed when Ms. Denlinger, acting under color of law, refused to provide or somehow denied the student due process following the initial alleged deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 114. The sole relevant allegation as to Ms. Denlinger, that she “purposefully postdated her letter... to cut off Todd’s right to appeal,” even when taken as true, is insufficient to establish that he was denied his right to appeal. Simply put, the student can show no claim under § 1983 for violation of procedural due process when his own allegations reveal that he and his mother failed to avail themselves of the due process offered under state law.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.

mark East v. Clayton Coumty, GA · filed 2011-08-01

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of procedural due process, an individual must show “the state refuse[d] to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.”

Section 1983 permits procedural due process relief only when the plaintiff shows deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and a lack of process.

Fellowship v. County of San Diego · filed 2011-12-23

To obtain relief on § 1983 claims based upon procedural due process, the plaintiff must establish the existence of “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] ... (3) lack of process.” ... Without such a deprivation, procedural due process claims are moot.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim when the plaintiff proves deprivation of a protected interest, state action, and constitutionally inadequate process.

KTK Mining of Virginia, LLC v. City of Selma · filed 2013-10-31

In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show a protected property interest and deprivation by state actors without constitutionally adequate process, subject to adequate post-deprivation remedies.

Williams v. City of Brockton · filed 2015-11-13

“In order to establish a procedural due process claim under § 1983, ‘a plaintiff must allege first that [he] has a property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived [him] of that property interest without constitutionally adequate process.’ ” Bolduc, 629 F.Supp.2d at 147 (quoting SFW Arecibo, Ltd, v. Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135, 139 (1st Cir.2005)) (alterations in original).

Section 1983 provides no damages cause of action for a government employee whose procedural due process rights have adequate state remedies resulting in reinstatement and back pay.

Boatright v. Glynn County School District · filed 2012-03-22

Notwithstanding, we have held that a government employee had no § 1983 cause of action for damages for violation of her procedural due process rights when available state remedies were adequate, resulting in reinstatement and back pay.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for a procedural due process violation only if the deprivation was unjustified on the merits; if it was justified, the plaintiff may recover only nominal damages.

Zhang v. County of Monterey · filed 2021-06-08

Rather, Raditch’s holding applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases like Plaintiff’s. “[I]n § 1983 cases, a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages for a proven due process violation only if the deprivation was unjustified on the merits. If, after postdeprivation procedure, it is determined that the deprivation was justified, a plaintiff can recover only nominal damages for the due process violation.”

A § 1983 claim requires factual allegations showing that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

United States Ex Rel. Smith v. Robinson · filed 1980-07-31

A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim requires a factual averment that shows some personal involvement by the defendants.

Section 1983 requires a showing that the defendant was personally responsible for the conduct complained of before liability may be imposed.

Howard v. Cronk · filed 1980-03-20

In order for liability to be imposed under section 1983, there must be some showing that the defendant is personally responsible for the conduct complained of.

Section 1983 makes the decision-maker accountable when the official acts for legally impermissible reasons.

Ollman v. Toll · filed 1981-07-27

As discussed previously, it is the decision-maker who is accountable in a suit such as this one brought under § 1983, if he or it acts for legally impermissible reasons.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations attributing the alleged constitutional deprivation to the defendant through direct action or inaction, participation, or acquiescence; bare conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk · filed 1981-11-24

Nothing in the record before us discloses a single allegation of direct, personal action on the part of Rodriguez in regard to the alleged deprivations, either by participation or acquiescence. ... Here, the complaint dismissed as to former warden Felix Rodriguez fails utterly to contain any factual allegations of wrongdoing attributable to Rodriguez, either by direct action or inaction. Thus, the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an arrest and reincarceration that cannot be attributed to any dereliction by the defendant jail officials.

Harris v. Elrod · filed 1985-01-17

Llewellyn Harris (“Harris”) brings this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and other relief against Cook County Sheriff Richard J. Elrod (“Elrod”). ... Thus, the arrest and reincarceration of Harris cannot be attributed to any dereliction of duty on the part of jail officials.

Section 1983 does not reach a property deprivation caused only indirectly by state officers when an independent private party directly caused the alleged harm.

Sullivan v. New Jersey, Division of Gaming Enforcement · filed 1985-02-14

To adopt the plaintiffs’ contentions and to allow them to pursue their § 1983 claim in a case where their alleged deprivation of property resulted only indirectly, if at all, from the conduct of state officers would be to engage in an unwarranted expansion of the reach of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a private prison medical contractor’s direct involvement or its policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.

Howell v. Evans · filed 1991-01-28

If she fails to show causation, no action can stand under section 1983, and we would not reach the issue of qualified immunity or other subsequent issues in the section 1983 analysis. ... Mrs. Howell can allege causation by showing either that CMS was directly involved in the violation, or that a policy or custom of CMS led to the violation.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical contractor liable for its medical director’s policies when the director lacked final authority over the challenged staffing and equipment decisions.

Howell v. Evans · filed 1991-01-28

We therefore conclude that as Robinson was not the final authority on the matters of equipment and staff procurement at ACMI, CMS could not be found liable, as a matter of law, for Robinson’s actions and policies even though he was CMS’s authority at the institution.

A private employer is liable under § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional arrest only if the plaintiff proves that the employer’s policy caused the violation.

Rojas v. Alexander's Department Store, Inc. · filed 1990-11-29

Thus, to recover under § 1983, it is not enough for Rojas to show that his arrest by Luck was without probable cause. He must show that Alexander’s had a policy of arresting shoplifting suspects on less than probable cause.

Under the circuit's then-governing rule, agents of a private corporation contracting to provide prison medical services are independent contractors who do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Crawford v. Doe · filed 1986-09-25

The district court dismissed Crawford's complaint because as independent contractors, agents of Frank Basil, Inc. were not acting under color of state law, a requirement in any Sec. 1983 action. This conclusion is entirely consistent with this Court's holding in Calvert v. Sharpe, 748 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 53 U.S.L.W. 3838 (May 28, 1985).

Section 1983 permits suit against a private corporation performing duties traditionally within the State's province and receiving substantial state funds when its relationship with the State is sufficient.

Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn · filed 1980-03-21

We observe that Excepticon’s argument that it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is without merit. Where a private corporation undertakes to perform duties which have been largely within the province of the State, and wherein it receives substantial sums of money from the State for the performance of such duties, there exists a sufficient relationship between it and the State to make it a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Indirect government involvement does not establish state action for Section 1983, and an activity is not a public function merely because it serves society generally.

Community Medical Center v. Emergency Medical Services of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Inc. · filed 1983-07-15

Even “indirect involvement” in the challenged decisions is not enough. ... We decline to muddy any further public function analysis by concluding that activities, not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, become public merely because they serve society in general rather than specific individuals.

A private entity’s status as a state actor does not alone establish Section 1983 liability; the alleged deprivation must also result from a right, privilege, or rule of conduct sourced in state authority.

Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. · filed 1983-07-08

This holding, however, does not end the inquiry and does not, in and of itself, render CAGW and the defendants liable for actions cognizable under section 1983. Also to be satisfied is the second aspect of the... test: whether the alleged deprivation of rights resulted from the exercise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state authority.

Section 1983 does not reach a private rescue squad's membership decision when government funding, regulation, and the squad's possible public function do not make that decision state action.

Eggleston v. Prince Edward Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc. · filed 1983-08-08

Because plaintiff has failed, even taking into consideration the funding, regulation, and possible public function of defendant Rescue Squad, to establish sufficient indicia of State action to support a § 1983 action, the Court will grant summary judgment to defendants as to Counts I through V, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private physician does not act under color of state law merely by executing a statutory application for a patient’s involuntary commitment.

Willacy v. Lewis · filed 1984-06-20

The Court concludes, therefore, that in executing an application for plaintiff’s involuntary commitment no state action is involved.

A Section 1983 complaint sufficiently alleges state action when it says a parole board delegated its judgment over a parolee’s conduct to a private treatment provider.

Jones v. Eagleville Hospital & Rehabilitation Center · filed 1984-06-20

Plaintiff has alleged such a system permitting private parties to substitute their judgment for that of a state official or body.

A private organization so entangled with a city through funding, payroll, and supervisory control can be a state actor for purposes of section 1983, making its employee a de facto government employee for the state-action requirement.

Casias v. City Of Raton · filed 1984-07-06

However, the relationship between the Council and the City of Raton was such that Casias may well have been a "de facto" City employee for purposes of the state action requirement of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

A private party who performs a function delegated to it by the state, such as administering a court-ordered driver alcohol assessment and treatment program, acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 while carrying out that function.

Granberg v. Ashland County · filed 1984-07-25

Whenever a state, formally or informally, delegates to private persons functions that have traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state, those persons become state actors for the limited purpose of performing those functions.

A private hospital’s termination of staff privileges is not actionable under section 1983 when the state neither participated in nor influenced that decision.

Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. · filed 1985-07-09

The Court’s conclusion of no state action in defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s staff privileges ends the § 1983 inquiry, ... and likewise bars plaintiff’s federal procedural due process argument. Private conduct, no matter how wrongful or arbitrary raises no Fourteenth Amendment concern.

A private physician acts under color of state law when state law delegates to physicians the sovereign public function of certifying an individual’s involuntary confinement.

Plain v. Flicker · filed 1986-10-21

Here, the state has statutorily delegated to physicians its power to deprive an individual of his liberty where the individual suffers from a dangerous mental illness. ... Clearly, physicians, certifying a commitment have assumed a public function.

A private entity’s extensive government regulation and public funding do not establish Section 1983 state action without a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged decision.

Nail v. Community Action Agency of Calhoun County · filed 1986-12-16

A private party may be so closely connected to the state that its activities may be attributed to the state. However, extensive regulation by the state is not enough to establish state action. The complaining party must show "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."

Public funding of a private organization does not make its employment decision state action under § 1983 unless the challenged decision stems from a policymaking function assumed by the state.

Young v. Cedar County Work Activity Center, Inc. · filed 1987-11-25

The record fails to indicate that the decision to discharge the plaintiff was compelled or even influenced by any recognized state policy. In order for a public entity to be liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, there must be some basis for concluding that the challenged action stems from a policy-making function assumed by the state.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private entity only when its relationship with state or local government makes its acts attributable to the state.

Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa. · filed 1988-03-03

Middle Department is a private entity which may not be sued under Section 1983 unless it was so significantly and substantially interwoven with state and local governments that a symbiotic relationship existed between the two and the acts of the entity can be reasonably said to be the acts of the political state.

In an employment-discrimination action under § 1983, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case through direct proof of open intentional discrimination without satisfying the mechanical McDonnell Douglas criteria.

Mauro RAMIREZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SLOSS · filed 1980-04-07

These same principles are applicable in employment discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Appellant established that the city had a written personnel policy favoring United States citizens and that city officials told him and others that the city had a citizen preference policy. Proof of these evidential facts established a prima facie case. We think it abundantly clear that under this proof it was more likely than not that the rejection of Ramirez was "based on a discriminatory criterion." Id. It was not necessary or proper to require proof of the McDonnell Douglas criteria.

In a § 1983 action alleging racially motivated employment discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas factors may be used to establish a prima facie case whether or not Title VII is used as a parallel remedy.

Anthony T. Lee, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor v. Conecuh County Board of Education · filed 1981-01-22

Logic dictates that the McDonnell Douglas factors may be used to establish a prima facie case in cases of racially motivated employment discrimination brought under section 1983 whether or not Title VII is used as a parallel remedy.

A prima facie § 1983 claim challenging racial discrimination is established in the same manner as a prima facie Title VII racial discrimination claim.

Felton v. City of Auburn · filed 1997-01-17

In the Eleventh Circuit, a prima facie claim for a § 1983 claim challenging racial discrimination is established in the same manner as a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under Title VII.

An employment discrimination plaintiff under § 1983 can establish a prima facie case even when replaced by someone in the same protected class.

Brawner-Ahlstrom v. Husson · filed 1998-04-30

Thus, under the rule of Roadway Express, with which we agree, a prima facie case can be established notwithstanding replacement by a member of the same protected class.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims have the same elements as Title VII claims when they arise from the same facts.

Keaton v. Cobb County, Georgia · filed 2009-01-30

“Although McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case, Title VII and section 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the same set of facts.”

Employment disparate treatment claims under § 1983 use the same analysis as Title VII claims.

Hopkins v. St. Lucie County School Board · filed 2010-10-13

The analysis of a disparate treatment claim is the same whether that claim is brought under Title VII, § 1981, or § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of constitutional rights.

Lockhart v. Willingboro High School · filed 2015-03-31

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. To establish § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her constitutional rights were violated and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. ... The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a person acting under color of law who subjects another person, or causes that person to be subjected, to a deprivation of rights.

Whitley v. City of Portland · filed 2009-08-12

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability arises when a person, acting under color of law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to the deprivation of particular rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a federal rights violation committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law.

Johnson v. Waters · filed 2004-05-11

In order to state a valid claim under section 1983, plaintiffs must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person [or entity] acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 liability requires a violation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Hopkins v. Bell · filed 2003-02-19

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hopkins must demonstrate a violation of his rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 damages claims require a federal-law duty imposed on a person acting under color of state law, breach, causation, and actual damages.

Zehner v. Trigg · filed 1997-01-15

To maintain a cause of action for damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege each of the following elements: (1) a duty imposed by federal law on persons acting under color of state law to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the actor’s breach of duty and the plaintiffs injury; and (4) actual damages.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Hudgins v. DeBruyn · filed 1996-04-05

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege both action under color of state law and deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tomkins v. Village of Tinley Park · filed 1983-04-26

To state a claim under § 1983 plaintiff must allege both that defendants acted under color of state law and that they deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 action requires deprivation of a federal right under color of law, and local governmental units are persons subject to the statute.

Odell v. City of Eagan · filed 1984-05-08

A § 1983 action has two elements. First, a person must be deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution and laws by another person. Second, it must be done under color of law. Local governmental units are persons for purposes of § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires both deprivation of a federally secured right and conduct by a person acting under color of state law.

Judson Bldg. v. First Nat. Bank of Longview · filed 1984-06-04

A cause of action under Section 1983 can only be established when plaintiffs show (1) that they have been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

A Section 1983 claim requires conduct under color of state law that deprives the claimant of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Rand v. Perales · filed 1984-06-15

First, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law, and, second, that conduct must have deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.

Christenson v. Ramaeker · filed 1985-04-17

Plaintiff had the burden to prove as an element of his section 1983 case that defendant’s conduct violated his constitutional rights.

A § 1983 plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Brumley v. Gene A. Scroggy and Oliver H. Barber, Jr. · filed 1987-10-13

To be entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendants, while acting under the color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the United States Constitution or statutes.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of law deprived the plaintiff of a federally secured right; an ordinary violation of state law is insufficient.

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wyo. · filed 1988-02-09

A party alleging a civil rights violation under section 1983 must prove that one acting under color of law deprived him of a federally secured right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Violation of a state law ordinarily is not cognizable under section 1983.

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute.

Rodriguez v. Al Chandler · filed 1996-05-29

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or federal statute.

A plaintiff need not bring a § 1983 claim in state court rather than federal court.

Carter v. Harris · filed 1999-09-03

Accordingly, the court concludes that there is no requirement that a plaintiff pursue a § 1983 claim in state, rather than federal, court.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a conventional challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance absent an alleged deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Tyler v. City of North Royalton · filed 1982-08-20

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity of the North Royalton zoning ordinance cannot be permitted to enter federal court disguised as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiffs have failed to allege the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law and are therefore not entitled to this forum.

Section 1983 provides a separate federal remedy and assures access to a federal forum, so duplicative litigation from a concurrent state action does not by itself justify Colorado River dismissal or a stay.

Tucker v. Callahan · filed 1987-05-26

The purpose of section 1983 was to provide a separate federal remedy for plaintiffs’ civil rights claims. Dismissal or stay under these circumstances would undermine and thwart the result intended by the passage of the legislation. This is of particular concern because res judicata could effectively preclude plaintiffs from being able to avail themselves of the federal forum section 1983 provides.

A plaintiff does not waive the right to bring a § 1983 suit in federal court under the Leaman doctrine without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

Smith v. Terry P. Duncan Lawrence Mendel · filed 1996-10-09

Smith's § 1983 complaint is not barred under Leaman, because Smith did not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waive his right to sue the defendants in federal court.

Section 1983 claims based on allegedly unfair civil-service selection procedures fail when the procedures do not deprive plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Tumulty v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1980-05-08

The fact that the law provides procedures does not mean that they acquire constitutional dimension; the due process clause does not constitutionalize all local law.

For a § 1983 claim seeking a pretermination hearing, a plaintiff must show a property or liberty interest, and whether a property interest exists is determined by state law.

Tatter v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 306 · filed 1980-06-13

It is well established that plaintiff must establish a property or liberty interest to be entitled to a pretermination hearing and that whether a property interest exists must be determined by reference to state law.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for denial of a particular public job without a legitimate property interest or entitlement to that employment.

Kaelin v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1980-12-31

Second, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a deprivation of civil rights “secured by the Constitution and laws” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claim cannot be sustained on the undisputed facts and law. ... this court has found no authority for the proposition that employment in a particular position must be offered upon demand. On the contrary, even where public employment is available, constitutional rights are not implicated unless some “property” interest is at stake. ... That entitlement is precisely what is lacking here and requires the rejection of plaintiff’s claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not protect a person from termination for an arbitrary or capricious reason, or for no reason at all, absent a cognizable liberty or property interest.

Derrickson v. Board of Ed. of City of St. Louis · filed 1982-03-31

In the absence of a cognizable liberty or property interest, § 1983 does not protect plaintiff from being terminated for an arbitrary or capricious reason, or for no reason at all.

Section 1983 reaches a claim only when the defendant’s conduct deprives the plaintiff of a right; lacking a right to a continuing service contract, Rothfuss had no cognizable § 1983 claim.

Board of Education of Bellevue v. Rothfuss · filed 1982-08-31

It is apparent that this statute deals with a deprivation of some right. To come within the provisions of this statute, Rothfuss must either presently have a right that is being circumvented or a right that is proposed to be circumvented. Rothfuss did not have a continuing service teaching contract nor was he entitled to such a contract for the school year 1975-76. Since he had no right to a continuing service contract, he did not have a right cognizable by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a public employee's termination when the employee lacks a constitutionally protectable property or liberty interest.

Sommer v. City of Dayton, Ohio · filed 1983-01-14

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate the existence of a constitutionally protectable “property” or “liberty” interest disposes of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a due-process claim where the plaintiff has received the process due and has no protected property or liberty interest; mere reputational damage is insufficient.

Estes v. Tuscaloosa County, Alabama · filed 1983-01-24

We hold that it does not, for the reasons stated by the district court in its dispositive memorandum opinion, Record, vol. 1 at 86, set out in the appendix and therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. ... Plaintiff’s request that her personnel file be expunged of derogatory material cannot form the basis of a § 1983 action under the circumstances of this case. It is clear that no action lies under § 1983 for mere damage to reputation.

Section 1983 permits a due-process claim when a state employer disseminates a false and defamatory impression about an employee in connection with termination, with a name-clearing hearing required if the liberty interest is implicated.

Goetz v. Windsor Central School District · filed 1983-01-24

A liberty interest is therefore implicated and a name-clearing hearing required where an employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about an employee in connection with the employee's termination. ... We are satisfied that, granting plaintiff every reasonable intendment to be derived from the allegations in his papers opposing summary judgment, he has raised factual issues regarding the deprivation of a liberty interest which may not properly be resolved without benefit of discovery. ... We hold, finally, that plaintiff's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to provide an explanation for his alleged involvement in this affair does not constitute a waiver of his right to assert a due process claim.

An abstract desire to obtain city-owned property, without a legitimate claim of entitlement, is not a property interest protected by Section 1983 due process.

Allen v. Brodie · filed 1983-10-20

Plaintiffs allegation of a due process violation is rooted in an abstract desire to own property for which he has no legitimate claim of entitlement. He admits that he is unable to afford the City owned property, and acknowledges that he is unable to meet the criteria that the City has established to qualify for a loan. Plaintiff has failed to identify, or even suggest, any individual entitlement to City owned property.

An unsuccessful public bidder does not state a Section 1983 due-process claim merely by alleging violation of local bidding rules, absent a protected entitlement such as material compliance by the plaintiff and material noncompliance by the winning bidder.

Northwest Disposal Co. v. Village of Fox Lake · filed 1983-11-10

The complaint, however, has not stated the limited due process right essential to a cause of action under section 1983. In the absence of facts alleging that H.O.D., the successful bidder, failed to meet the qualifications under the bidding procedure, no cause of action has been stated nor can be stated which would entitle plaintiff to relief under count III.

A public employee’s Section 1983 due-process claim fails when no statute, ordinance, contract, or mutual understanding creates a property interest in continued employment.

Duncan v. The City of Oneida, Tennessee, and Mack Burchfield · filed 1984-06-04

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming he had been deprived of a “property” interest in his job and that he was discharged without due process of law. ... We conclude that the district court correctly found that Duncan presented no evidence to support the contention that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his job as a police officer in Oneida, Tennessee. Tennessee law does not create such an interest; no local statute or ordinance existed; no employment contract existed; nor does the evidence indicate that any mutually explicit understanding, or implied contract, existed to create a property interest.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim fails when state law gives children no property interest in tuition-free attendance at a particular school after moving out of its district.

Daniels v. Morris · filed 1984-11-12

Two children seek damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because they were not permitted to attend a school located in a district in which they formerly resided but from which their father and they had moved, on the basis that they were not accorded procedural due process before school officials reached the conclusion they could not continue to attend the school they had been attending. ... Since the children possessed no state created property interest in attending the Arlington school at the time of their dismissal, the principal's action in ordering their withdrawal was not subject to the procedural strictures of the due process clause.

A public employee cannot recover under section 1983 for inadequate termination procedures without proving a protected property or liberty interest in the employment.

Payne v. Ballard · filed 1985-05-09

In order for Payne to demonstrate a liberty interest he must show that the reasons for discharge stigmatized him and that the defendants made the reasons public.

A procedural deficiency alone does not support a § 1983 due-process claim unless the plaintiff was deprived of a legally cognizable liberty or property interest.

Linhart v. Glatfelter · filed 1985-08-22

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Linhart was entitled to certain procedures — including a hearing — before being disciplined, that is not enough by itself to support a section 1983 action. The plaintiff must have been deprived of some legally cognizable interest.

North Dakota's discretionary parole statutes, rules, and practices create no protected liberty interest enforceable through Section 1983.

Patten v. North Dakota Parole Board · filed 1986-02-10

Accordingly, we hold that North Dakota has not created a protected liberty interest in parole, and thus Patten has no due process rights that attach to his interest in parole.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; losing a discretionary prison work assignment does not suffice.

Williams v. Sumner · filed 1986-06-24

Lacking a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections, plaintiff fails to demonstrate a legal basis of constitutional dimension to sustain his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff must allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Grossman v. School Board of I.S.D. 640 · filed 1986-06-24

However a plaintiff must allege a liberty or property interest.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on loss of public employment requires a protected property interest in continued employment.

Wright v. John Will Holbrook, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Morehead, Kent · filed 1986-07-11

Plaintiff appeals following the dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in which he claimed that he had been deprived of his property interest in continued employment without due process of law. ... Since plaintiff did not have a property interest in continued employment, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on loss of public employment requires a protected property interest in continued employment.

Wright v. Holbrook · filed 1986-07-11

Plaintiff appeals following the dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he claimed that he had been deprived of his property interest in continued employment without due process of law. ... Since plaintiff did not have a property interest in continued employment, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

A § 1983 due-process claim based on discharge from public employment requires a legitimate expectation of continued employment or another protected liberty or property interest.

Bragg v. Trupo · filed 1986-07-14

It is clear that the Plaintiffs had no legitimate expectation of continued employment and, therefore, were not denied a property interest without due process of law.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process claim based on public employment depends on a constitutionally protected property right in continued employment.

Averitt v. Cloon · filed 1986-07-22

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 federal constitutional claim depended on the existence of a property right in his continued employment by the Gogebic Court.

A probationary California public employee has no property right in continued employment supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Dorr v. County of Butte Butte County Sheriff's Department Mick Grey, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of Butte · filed 1986-07-30

He brought suit against the defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of his property and liberty rights. ... In California, a probationary public employee does not have a property right in continued employment.

An Ohio prisoner has no § 1983 due-process claim based on parole-release procedures because Ohio law gives parole officials complete discretion and creates no protected liberty interest in parole release.

Mapson v. Seiter · filed 1986-08-13

In past decisions, this Court has held that parole decisions in Ohio lie completely within the discretion of state parole officials and that an Ohio inmate has no cognizable due process rights in parole proceedings. ... The plaintiff having no due process rights in the parole proceedings, he has no cause of action for alleged deprivation of such rights.

A prisoner's classification status supports no § 1983 due-process claim when neither federal law nor discretionary state prison law creates a protected liberty interest in that classification.

Vanaarsten v. Brown · filed 1986-08-13

Because there is no right to a particular classification status under federal law, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976), such a right, if it exists, can arise only under state law. ... Given this grant of discretion, there arises under state law no liberty interest necessary for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 due-process claim must identify a deprivation of a distinct property or liberty interest; the alleged due-process violation cannot itself be repackaged as the protected liberty interest.

Rudow v. City of New York · filed 1986-09-03

Plaintiff tries to evade this problem by urging that not only does the conduct cited above deny him due process, but also it deprives him of a liberty interest in being free from this type of conduct. This argument strikes us as impermissible bootstrapping. It would enable plaintiff to escape the section 1983 requirement that he be deprived of a liberty or property interest by allowing him to substitute in their place the alleged due process violation itself.

A public employee asserting a Section 1983 due-process claim must show a property or liberty interest in employment before Fourteenth Amendment protections are triggered.

Downum v. City of Wichita, Kan. · filed 1986-10-03

When bringing a § 1983 action, a public employee has the burden to show that she possesses a property or liberty interest in her employment in order to trigger the due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.

A prisoner's expectation of retaining a particular work assignment is not a liberty or property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim, and removal requires no factfinding hearing.

Stewart v. Barry Mintzes, Elton Scott, and Ed Burns · filed 1987-02-04

Classifications and work assignments of prisoners in state prisons are matters of prison administration, within the discretion of the prison administrators and do not require fact finding hearings as a prerequisite of the exercise of such discretion.

A § 1983 due-process claim fails without a constitutionally protected property interest, including when an applicant has not satisfied the prerequisites for the requested government certificate.

Carolan v. City Of Kansas City, Missouri · filed 1987-03-06

We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment on appellants' substantive due process claim because appellants did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the occupancy certificate. ... Appellants' procedural due process claim was properly dismissed for the same reason.

A § 1983 due-process claim requires deprivation of life, liberty, or property; denial of process by itself is not actionable.

Illinois Psychological Association, Dr. Jean J. Rossi, and Dr. John R. Day v. Falk · filed 1987-05-12

Even if all this is wrong we don’t think the plaintiffs have shown a deprivation of either liberty or property, and such a showing is a prerequisite to maintaining a suit under the due process clause. The clause does not make the denial of due process actionable; it only makes the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, actionable.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming a due process violation from loss of employment to allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and conduct under color of state law.

Simpkins v. Sandwich Community Hospital · filed 1988-08-02

To make out a Sec. 1983 claim here, Simpkins must allege that the defendants deprived her of a liberty or property right secured by the Constitution and that their conduct arose under color of state law. ... We affirm the district court's dismissal of Simpkins's cause that the defendants deprived her of due process in suspending and then firing her precisely because she has failed to allege a cognizable liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on defamation, reputational injury, or inability to enlist research assistance without deprivation of a recognized liberty or property interest.

Fong v. Purdue University · filed 1988-08-10

In the interest of crystallizing the legal issues here, this court pointed out at the outset of the proceedings, that allegations of defamation, damage to reputation, and inability to enlist research assistance, will not, without deprivation of a recognized liberty or property interest, support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming deprivation of a protected property interest to establish that the interest was entitled to constitutional protection when the deprivation occurred.

Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Dunn · filed 2003-05-12

To state a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the plaintiff was required to first establish that it had a valid property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection at the time the plaintiff was deprived of that benefit (see Reed’s of Armonk Bldg. Supply v Curry, 246 AD2d 587 [1998]; RRI Realty Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Southampton, 870 F2d 911, 918 [1989], cert denied 493 US 893 [1989]).

Section 1983 does not provide a federal district-court route for reopening a state disciplinary proceeding after the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were pursued and decided in state court.

Brunwasser v. Strassburger · filed 1980-05-29

We believe that we lack jurisdiction to reopen the case against him in the guise of a civil rights action. This holding disposes of plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 1343(3), and under the various constitutional amendments.

A Section 1983 plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from litigating excessive force when the prior criminal conviction did not necessarily determine that issue.

Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1980-08-06

The jury’s rejection of the self-defense theory does not mean that the jury necessarily made any finding about the conduct of the officers. ... If the rejection of the defense rested on either of these theories, Hernandez would not be collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of excessive force in the present action. ... The officers have not resolved this ambiguity and thus have not carried their burden of showing that the conviction necessarily involved a determination that they did not use excessive force.

Section 1983 damages may not be asserted as a counterclaim in a special statutory condemnation proceeding that does not authorize tort damages.

Brooks v. Department of Transportation · filed 1985-03-04

The counterclaim for damages under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1988 also lies outside of the trial court’s powers in a condemnation action brought under OCGA § 32-3-1 et seq.

Collateral estoppel bars a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating issues already decided on direct appeal of the underlying conviction.

White v. Daniel Murphy, John J. Walsh, Nancy Kutta, Sheriff Edward Havlik · filed 1986-04-24

Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of these issues in the present action.

State administrative and judicial proceedings do not preclude a federal Section 1983 claim unless the record clearly shows that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before a tribunal authorized to decide its merits.

Scroggins v. Kansas · filed 1986-10-07

Nevertheless, absent a clear indication from the record that either the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, ... or that the court hearing the claim had the authority to adjudicate the merits, ... we resist the imposition of res judicata to bar a federal plaintiff's Sec. 1983 suit.

A federal court must give preclusive effect to a state judgment rejecting a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff voluntarily and fully litigated that claim in state court without reserving it for a federal forum.

Gladman Humbles v. City of Paducah · filed 1987-03-20

Appellant's Sec. 1983 claim was dismissed by the state court after appellant briefed that claim and indicated reliance on the federal claim in addition to the state remedies sought in the Kentucky court. Therefore, preclusive effect must be given the state court decision under these circumstances.

A § 1983 retaliatory discharge claim may proceed despite a prior state finding of employee misconduct when the state proceedings did not resolve whether protected speech motivated the discharge.

Robert Barnes (86-6261) and Joe Thompson (87-5776) v. Charles McDowell Ed Fossett, and Sam Serraglio · filed 1988-08-04

The district court’s initial conclusion is correct. The factual determination of the state administrative proceedings, as sustained by the state courts, that Barnes was guilty of sexual harassment may not be relitigated in federal court. However, the fact that Barnes harassed females during his tenure at the Bureau does not eliminate the possibility that the real reason he was discharged from the Bureau was because he spoke out on a matter of public concern. Thus, if Barnes can establish that he spoke on a matter of public concern and that his speech was a motivating factor for his dismissal, Barnes may be able to prevail in a retaliatory discharge action under section 1983 even though he was guilty of sexual harassment.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to relitigate in federal court a constitutional issue raised and decided against him in state court.

Hanzimanolis v. Codd · filed 1975-11-12

He may not relitigate the very same issue in this court by asserting a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for trivial or frivolous invasions of personal rights.

Brown v. Officer Bigger Individually and in Their Official Capacities Officer Whistler Officer Mullins Kenneth Ol · filed 1980-06-10

Trivial or frivolous invasions of personal rights are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A brief detention under a valid warrant without harsh or egregious treatment is not a deprivation of sufficient constitutional magnitude to support Section 1983 relief.

Eischen v. Minnehaha County · filed 1985-02-20

Under these circumstances, we believe that the deprivation of appellant’s liberty was not of such a substantial constitutional magnitude as to warrant a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a state to be sued in federal court.

Glaros v. Perse · filed 1980-08-12

As to the State of New Mexico, we agree with the district court that dismissal was also required because a state may not be sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state is a “person” under § 1983 and may be held liable like a municipality when it voluntarily waives Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Della Grotta v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1986-01-17

We therefore hold that a state is a “person” within section 1983 such that, where it has voluntarily waived its eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court, it may be held liable in the same respect as municipalities and local units of government.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state correctional enterprise that operates independently of state government and is not an arm of the state.

Hale v. State of Arizona · filed 1992-09-16

Under these circumstances, we conclude that ARCOR is not an "arm of the state" and is therefore amenable to suit under section 1983.

A county sheriff's department without separate legal existence cannot be sued under § 1983.

Slay v. Marion County Sheriff's Department · filed 1992-11-23

We next address the issue of whether a civil rights action can be maintained against the Marion County Sheriff's Department. ... Therefore, we must affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff's Department as to any claim against it under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Reiff v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1975-07-21

A state is not a “person” under § 1983 and hence not subject to suit pursuant to that section of the Civil Rights Act.

A sheriff’s office generally is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Thompson v. Black Hawk County Sheriff's Of · filed 2008-03-06

The sheriff’s office generally is not a suable entity under § 1983, and Thompson did not allege any official policy or widespread practice or custom of the sheriff’s office which deprived him of his constitutional rights.

A county detention center is not subject to suit under Section 1983.

Williams v. Pulaski County Detention Facility · filed 2008-05-19

We agree with the district court that the Pulaski County Detention Center (PCDC) is not subject to suit under section 1983.

Private prison medical contractors can be sued under § 1983 when they exercise powers traditionally reserved to the state, act closely with state officials, and are significantly entangled with state activities.

Johnson v. Horn · filed 2011-04-13

CPS and PHS, despite being private entities, are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they exercise powers that were traditionally the prerogative of the state, act in close concert with state officials, and are significantly entangled with traditional state activities.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a task force that is a subdivision of a district attorney’s office and lacks separate legal status.

Garrett v. Talladega County Drug & Violent Crime Task Force · filed 2013-11-19

Further, the section 1983 claims are also due to be dismissed because the Task Force is not a legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Jails and police departments are not typically subject to suit under Section 1983.

Smith v. Heath Dickson · filed 2019-05-03

These entities are not typically subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state cannot be sued in its own name under §1983 because it is not a “person” under the statute.

E.A. v. Gardner · filed 2019-07-17

Indeed, Alden cannot sue Illinois in its own name because it is not a “person” for the purpose of §1983.

A county sheriff’s office that is a municipal department cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Beasley v. State of Missouri · filed 2019-09-03

However, this entity is a municipal department of Crawford County, Missouri, and is not itself an entity that can be sued under § 1983.

A detention center is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Blake v. Lea County Correctional Facility · filed 2019-10-18

Lea County Correctional Facility is a detention center and, thus, is not a suable entity for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county sheriff’s department as a separate entity.

Taylor v. Madison County Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-11-06

The Madison County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A county sheriff’s office that is a department of the county is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Walters v. Brooks · filed 2020-05-04

First, the Court finds that the “Claiborne County Sheriff’s Office” is not a suable entity under § 1983, and it will be DISMISSED.

A county jail is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Crass v. Sevier County Jail (PSLC1) · filed 2020-06-16

Thus, the Clerk will be DIRECTED to substitute Sevier County as a Defendant in place of the Sevier County Jail, which is not a suable entity under §1983, see Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §1983”), and this claim will proceed against Sevier County.

A Florida sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Rasheed v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-04-08

In Florida, a sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a component of a sheriff’s office that lacks separate legal existence.

McCants v. Jordan · filed 2021-04-21

Similarly, component parts or bureaus of a Sheriff’s Office, such as AID, are not amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a Florida sheriff’s office because the office is not a legal entity subject to suit.

Stevenson v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-06-01

Because the JSO is not a legal entity amenable to suit, Stevenson fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted against the JSO and, therefore, his claims against the JSO are due to be dismissed.

A jail is not a person or policy-making unit that can be sued for constitutional violations under § 1983.

Hern v. Allen County Jail · filed 2021-07-13

But the jail is a building; it is not a person or a policy-making unit of government that can be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a county jail as an entity.

Page v. Warren County Police Department · filed 2021-07-26

Here, as noted above, the Warren County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the amended complaint does not state a valid municipal liability claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a county jail, police department, or state department of correction.

Ellis v. Pulaski County Jail · filed 2021-08-10

Neither the Pulaski County Jail, Little Rock Police Department, or Arkansas Department of Correction is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against a county sheriff’s office or correctional center that is not subject to suit.

Smoot v. Franklin County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-08-30

Here, Mr. Smoot has filed brought his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two sui juris entities – the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office and the Franklin County Corrections Center II. Because of this, dismissal of Mr. Smoot’s claims against these sui juris entities under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

A sheriff’s department that is not a jural entity cannot be sued under § 1983.

Crocker v. Smith · filed 2021-10-25

On August 2, 2021, the magistrate judge submitted a report and recommendation that the motion be granted with respect to the Smith County Sheriff’s Department because it is not a jural entity subject to suit under § 1983. ... Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report, and being satisfied that it contains no clear error, the court accepts its findings and recommen- dation.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a sheriff’s office or jail facility because it is not a legal entity subject to suit.

Watkins v. Chase · filed 2021-12-22

Finally, even if Plaintiff had a viable claim against any named officer, he may not proceed against the Duval County Jail because a sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A county jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Breneman v. Kentucky State Police · filed 2022-01-28

the HCJ is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A county sheriff’s office or jail cannot be sued under § 1983.

Smith v. Baliva · filed 2022-02-08

In this case, plaintiff’s allegations establish that Baliva’s employer is the Cape Girardeau County Sheriff’s Office or the Cape Girardeau County Jail, neither of which can be sued under § 1983.

A county jail is not an entity subject to suit under Section 1983.

Hollins v. Cassidy · filed 2022-04-13

Also, while Plaintiff has named the Sullivan County Jail as a Defendant, this is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.

A sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Battle v. Clay County Court · filed 2022-04-27

Even if Plaintiff had a viable claim against any named officer, he may not proceed against the Clay County Sheriff’s Office, his former public defender, the judge, or the prosecutor. A sheriff’s office or jail facility is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a county jail that lacks separate legal existence.

Arnoff v. Lorain County Jail · filed 2022-05-26

The Lorain County Jail is not sui juris, meaning it is not capable of suing or being sued for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 officer liability requires integral participation in the alleged violation.

Blankerhorn v. City of Orange · filed 2007-05-07

An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his “integral participation” in the alleged violation.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege the defendants’ personal participation in the constitutional deprivation.

Rucker v. Grider · filed 1980-08-21

In the Tenth Circuit, personal participation of defendants is an essential allegation in a § 1983 complaint.

Individual-capacity liability for damages under Section 1983 requires the defendant's own personal responsibility for causing the constitutional deprivation, not mere supervisory or official position.

Schultz v. Fred Baumgart, Chief, Waukesha Fire Department · filed 1984-07-02

Individual liability for damages under section 1983 is predicated upon personal responsibility.

Section 1983 requires proof that an official acting under color of state law caused a federal-rights deprivation for personal liability, while official-capacity liability requires a governmental policy or custom to play a role.

Medina v. Housing Authority of San Miguel County · filed 1992-09-04

To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Id. at 166. A plaintiff in an official capacity suit under § 1983 must prove that the entity's "policy or custom" played a role in the violation of federal law.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability for officials acting under color of state law without evidence of a governmental policy or custom.

BOYER-GLADDEN v. Hill · filed 2010-02-09

We conclude that the § 1983 claim against the deputy was made in his personal capacity, rather than in his official capacity. Therefore, the summary judgment granted to the deputy on the claim must be reversed because it was based upon the district court's conclusion that there was no evidence the deputy had violated a custom or policy of the county or the sheriff's office. Such evidence is not required to show a personal-capacity violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits personal-capacity liability when a defendant causes deprivation of a federal right while acting under color of state law, and official-capacity liability requires a municipal policy or custom.

McCray v. County of Suffolk · filed 2015-03-19

Official-capacity liability would have required proof of a municipal policy or custom, whereas personal liability would have required only that Dr. Geraci himself caused the deprivation of a federal right while acting under color of state law.