42 U.S.C. § 1983

Under section 1983, whether a private volunteer fire company performs an exclusively public function requires a fact-specific inquiry into the state's treatment of fire protection, and summary judgment is inappropriate when material facts remain disputed.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun · filed 1993-10-04

Review of the preceding precedents and decisions does little to simplify the issue of when a private entity assumes the role of state actor due to its involvement or provision of an exclusive public function. The cases inform the analysis in two ways: first, the determination is a factually intense analysis; and second, its outcome hinges on how a given state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity. ... The district court’s analysis is flawed in that it draws factual conclusions inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment and that it makes a determination about the status of fire protection as a public function in Maryland without any direct evidence as to how fire protection is conducted throughout the State. ... Without establishing these facts as undisputed in the record, the district court erred by granting summary judgment as there remains a genuine issue of material fact.

Section 1983 does not treat private participants in involuntary commitments in Puerto Rico as state actors under the public function test because involuntary commitment is not exclusively a state function there.

Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hospital San Juan Capestrano · filed 2005-05-31

Because involuntary commitment is a function that is and has been routinely performed by private parties in Puerto Rico, Estades' public function argument as it relates to involuntary commitment fails.

Section 1983 does not treat private participation in involuntary commitment in Puerto Rico as state action under the public function test because involuntary commitment has not been reserved exclusively to the state there.

No. 04-1792 · filed 2005-05-31

There can be no finding of state action under the public function test in connection with Estades' involuntary commitment. This is because involuntary commitment is not a function that is or has been reserved exclusively to the state in Puerto Rico, and therefore, Appellees, in pursuing or otherwise participating in Estades' commitment, could not have performed a public function within the meaning of this test.

Section 1983 does not treat a private animal shelter’s volunteer program as state action under the public function test because operating it is not a function exclusively reserved to the state.

Lynch v. Southampton Animal Shelter Foundation Inc. · filed 2013-09-19

The Court finds that the operation of an animal shelter, including its volunteer program, is not a function exclusively-reserved to the state. ... In sum, the Plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 civil rights claim under the public function test. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants summary judgment with respect to this issue.

Under the public function test, § 1983 liability requires a private adoption agency to perform a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state.

Dahn v. Adoption Alliance · filed 2016-02-17

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that these Defendants acted under color of state law through the public function test.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities when a past disciplinary action has continuing effects.

Gomes v. University of Maine System · filed 2004-02-23

In the Court’s view, taking the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the request for injunctive relief to expunge the adverse actions from their academic records would meet applicable standards for the granting of injunc-tive relief, since the University’s record of discipline, though recorded in the past, has an ongoing and prospective effect.

Section 1983 permits prospective relief against a state official who has no immunity from such relief.

Jackson v. Millstone · filed 2002-06-21

Furthermore, regarding Taurus’s action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that the defendant-respondent Director of the Medical Care Financing and Compliance Administration has no immunity from prospective relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state, but allows an official-capacity claim against state officials for declaratory relief while barring a claim for refunds of previously collected fees.

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPEN. DRIVERS v. Anthony · filed 1994-07-05

Dismissal was properly granted as to the State of Oklahoma. Likewise, dismissal was proper as to the remaining Defendants/Appellees to the extent Appellants' § 1983 claims sought anything other than declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for monetary relief.

Buford v. Holladay · filed 1992-02-20

State officials, therefore, may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief under Section 1983, and may be sued in their individual capacities for monetary relief under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity suit against a state officer seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees without damages.

Lucchesi v. State · filed 1990-09-06

In addition, a state officer may be sued in his official capacity under § 1983 if, as here, a plaintiff seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief and attorney fees and does not seek any damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary relief against a state or its officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 1990-08-02

Monetary compensation is thus not available to the plaintiff because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”

Section 1983 is violated when state officials, acting in their official capacities, deprive people of constitutional rights.

Wade v. Kane · filed 1978-03-29

By depriving plaintiffs and others of their constitutional rights by acts done in their official capacity, defendants’ actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits reinstatement relief against individual state officials sued in their official capacities for proven constitutional employment discrimination.

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District · filed 1977-07-01

Plaintiffs’ case having been proven on the merits, reinstatement under a § 1983 cause of action against the individual defendants in their official capacities is available.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against higher public officials who supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Farber v. Rochford · filed 1975-11-25

Injunctive relief against higher public officials is available in situations where they have been found to supervise and authorize unconstitutional activities.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages from state officials in their individual capacities for unconstitutional deprivations caused by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

West v. Keve · filed 1978-02-15

On February 6, 1976, plaintiff filed a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 2 alleging that defendants, acting under color of state law, had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in denying him medical treatment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the complaint, as supplemented by docket entry 9, supra, states a claim for damages against the defendants in their individual capacities. ... Therefore, the damage claim was improperly dismissed.

Section 1983 authorizes judgment and a permanent injunction against a state official who enforces an unconstitutional state statute.

General Foods Corp. v. Priddle · filed 1983-08-09

Judgment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, shall therefore be entered for the plaintiff in this case. Defendant Brace Rowley is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the Kansas filled dairy products act.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 damages and retroactive monetary relief against a state agency and state officials in their official capacities, while prospective injunctive claims may proceed.

Elliott v. Hinds · filed 1983-10-24

Accordingly, and based on the above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED as to all claims for damages and retroactive monetary relief. This matter will go forward on the regular court docket on those injunctive claims of a solely prospective nature. SO ORDERED.

Section 1983 permits suits against public officials to vindicate constitutional rights, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar declaratory relief against officials sued in their individual capacities.

Bennett v. Lopeman · filed 1984-12-04

and embraces its theory: without a means to sue public officials, individuals would be denied the very mechanism contemplated under § 1983 to vindicate their rights. (Since the instant action seeks only declaratory relief and the state defendants are named only in their individual capacities, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action.

A section 1983 claim cannot obtain retroactive compensation or equitable restitution from a state's treasury, although a federal court may prospectively enjoin state officials to correct an ongoing constitutional deficiency.

B.H. Papasan, Superintendent of Education v. United States of America · filed 1985-05-21

Such relief was retroactive in character and satisfiable only from the Mississippi treasury. ... A federal court can enjoin state officials to correct a constitutional deficiency or eliminate an unconstitutional status even though expenditures incident to that order will expend themselves on the public treasury.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 suit seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials for enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional law.

Nordgren v. Hafter · filed 1985-08-27

However, because the instant case presents only claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against individual state officials, the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity is unavailable.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a § 1983 claim against a state official seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief for an alleged ongoing constitutional violation.

Gilbert Central Corp. v. Kemp · filed 1986-06-13

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, and it alleges that defendant’s actions are contrary to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, defendant is stripped of any eleventh amendment immunity.

In a Section 1983 equitable action, state officials may be ordered to take action necessary to remedy an established constitutional violation even if they did not directly cause it.

Libby v. Marshall · filed 1986-11-26

Plaintiffs have certain constitutional rights and state action is necessary to vindicate those rights. A federal court has authority to order the state defendants to take the necessary action even though there is no allegation that the state defendants directly caused the constitutional violation in the first place.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities when they are responsible for the challenged conduct, without requiring that they personally committed it.

Horace Luckey, III v. Joe Frank Harris, Governor · filed 1988-11-23

Personal action by defendants individually is not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged action.

Section 1983 provides no basis for prospective relief against officials in their personal capacities when only actions taken in their official capacities could affect the plaintiff’s asserted property interests.

DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills · filed 1989-06-29

Plaintiffs similarly failed to propose any legal basis for their obtaining injunctive relief against the individual defendants acting in their personal capacities. The plaintiffs have still not explained how prospective relief from this Court against the individual defendants in their personal capacities could protect the plaintiffs’ property interests.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials who have not been sued specifically in their individual capacities.

James Taylor, Jr. v. Ronald G. Shull Melody A.P. Wallace Charles Green Edward Nakfoor · filed 1990-05-02

The defendant state officials are not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983 because they were not sued specifically in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery of monetary damages from state officials in this context.

Tate v. Brown · filed 1990-05-03

The only remaining claim is one for monetary damages, which may not be recovered from state officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against Guam officials in their official capacities to prevent enforcement of an unconstitutional law.

Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada · filed 1990-10-13

Similarly, and relying again on the reasoning of Ex parte Young and its progeny, the Court finds that § 1983 provides an independent ground to permanently enjoin defendants Governor Ada, Attorney General Barrett-Anderson, and Dr. Espal-dón from enforcing any of the provisions of Public Law 20-134.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state officials who are not sued in their individual capacities.

Holland v. William Seabold, Michael Samberg, Wayne Dunn · filed 1991-02-04

It should also be noted that Holland failed to sue the defendants in their individual capacities; therefore, the defendants are not subject to suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 limits relief against a State to injunctions and declarations absent congressional abrogation or the State’s waiver of immunity.

Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton · filed 1991-02-25

Section 1983 limits remedies against the State, in the absence of congressional abrogation or the State’s waiver of immunity, to injunctive and declaratory relief.

Section 1983 permits claims for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity.

Trinsey v. COM. OF PA., DEPT. OF STATE · filed 1991-06-10

Moreover, civil rights plaintiffs may pursue Section 1983 claims for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking monetary damages from state officials to plead the capacity in which they are sued; without that pleading, the officials are not subject to suit.

Boswell v. Ray Toombs, Beverly Williams, Dana Hartman · filed 1991-06-14

Boswell failed to plead the capacity in which he sued the defendants as he is affirmatively required to do. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593-94 (6th Cir.1989). Therefore, because Boswell only sought monetary damages from the defendants, they are not subject to suit under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities, but does not permit retroactive back pay in such suits.

Dachenhausen v. Crosson · filed 1992-03-25

Generally, the State and State agencies are not amenable to suit for deprivation of constitutional rights (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58) and, while State officials acting in their official capacities, such as here, are subject to suits for injunctive relief under said statute, such can only be prospective, not retroactive (see, supra, at 71, n 10). Thus petitioners would not be able to obtain back pay under a 1983 action, but only prospective appointment to Senior Court Clerk or reappointment to Associate Court Clerk.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief directed at future conduct.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1993-03-25

Because the Court’s prohibition of this conduct would constitute prospective in-junctive relief, Plaintiff might be able to amend the complaint to state facts which support a Section 1983 claim against Nuc-kolls in his official capacity.

Under § 1983, an Indiana circuit court clerk is a state official excluded from official-capacity damages liability but subject to prospective injunctive relief, and qualified immunity bars personal damages liability for retaining support-payment interest when the unlawfulness was not clearly established.

Winters v. Mowery · filed 1993-11-04

We find that Parsons controls this case and that Mowery is not a “person” subject to suit in her official capacity under § 1983. ... We find that Mowery has not violated “clearly established” law by her actions and should not be liable in her individual capacity for damages because a reasonable person could have believed that retention of interest income on funds held in the public treasury was lawful. ... With regard to plaintiffs’ suit for injunctive relief, a person can be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief and would be deemed a “person” under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective injunctive relief are not treated as actions against the State.

State officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Goss v. Sullivan · filed 1993-12-06

Further, because an action against state officials acting in their official capacities is in actuality an action against the State, such individuals are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore are not subject to suit under that statute.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Coeur D'alene Tribe Of Idaho v. State Of Idaho · filed 1994-12-09

Injunctive relief is available against state officials in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state judge, but equity and comity can warrant denying that relief when it would intrude on state judicial proceedings.

Hoover v. Wagner · filed 1995-03-06

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-36, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1974-78, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984), held that such relief may be sought against a state judge in a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. But the Court made clear that the power was to be reserved for "really extraordinary causes," id. at 538, 104 S.Ct. at 1979, citing with approval (id. at 539 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 1979 n. 20) O'Shea v. Littleton, supra. ... O'Shea is strong support for affirming the rejection of the relief sought by our plaintiffs against the state court judge.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officers acting in their official capacities.

Remlinger v. State of Nev. · filed 1995-07-31

Injunctive relief is available under § 1983 against state officers acting in their official capacities, and one of the defendants here is Molini, who is the official with authority to hire and fire that Division's employees, including Remlinger.

Section 1983 injunctive relief cannot halt a coercive state administrative proceeding involving an important state interest when the proceeding began before substantial progress in the Section 1983 action and permits litigation of constitutional claims.

Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co. v. Angoff · filed 1995-10-24

Here the proceedings are clearly coercive, the administrative action began before the issues were joined in the § 1983 action, and Missouri has an important interest in preventing unfair discrimination by licensed insurance companies. In addition, the constitutional issues may be preserved before the administrative agency and litigated by way of judicial review. Applying the Younger principle, as reiterated in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the remedy of injunction pursuant to § 1983 may not be relied on to impede the administrative proceeding.

Section 1983 permits an injunction suit against state agency directors even when they are far removed from the actions of agency employees.

Futernick v. Sumpter Township · filed 1996-04-25

The directors also argue that only the officer with immediate control over the challenged act or omission is amenable to § 1983. We find this claim ridiculous. Such a rule would allow a state agency to avoid, or defer, liability merely by transferring the defendant in a particular case, or by changing the scope of the defendant official's authority.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official for prospective injunctive relief, including job reinstatement.

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory · filed 1997-12-15

However, there is one exception to this general rule: When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a "person" for § 1983 purposes. ... Rather, reinstatement is a legitimate request for prospective injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits money damages against officials in their personal capacities, but the Eleventh Amendment bars money damages against a state.

Roniger v. McCall · filed 1998-09-15

Money damages are available under § 1983 only in suits brought against officials in their personal capacities, since money damages against a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Harrison v. Coffman · filed 1999-01-25

The claim for injunctive relief (reinstatement) properly remains in the case, despite the Eleventh Amendment rights of the State of Arkansas. ... Another case cited by defendants, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), reaffirms the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment defense to injunctive claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a state official for prospective relief designed to end a constitutional violation.

KHODARA ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. EX REL. EAGLE v. Beckman · filed 1999-03-31

Under the jurisprudential principles that have grown out of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), state officials may be subjected to suit under § 1983 where the relief is prospective only and is designed to end a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a discharged state employee to sue state officials in their personal capacities in state court.

East Mississippi State Hospital v. Callens · filed 1999-10-26

We simply clarify today that when an individual, such as Dr. Callens, is discharged by a state agency, and that individual, as a result of such discharge, asserts a claim actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against one or more state officials in their personal (individual) capacities, that claim may be appropriately asserted via an action commenced in our state courts.

Section 1983 damages claims against state prison officials lie only against them in their personal capacities.

Cruz v. Giovanny Gomez, I/o and Classification Committee · filed 2000-01-26

The claim for damages lies only against the defendants in their personal capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide a detailed remedial scheme that bars prospective relief against state officials under Ex parte Young.

Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas · filed 2000-04-07

Because there is no detailed statutory remedial scheme available for the § 1983 claims asserted 'by Plaintiffs in the case at bar, the limitation is immaterial.

Section 1983 does not allow a state court to grant injunctive relief against state taxes when taxpayers have an adequate remedy at law.

Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors v. Haller · filed 2001-03-02

The United States Supreme Court has held that state courts may not award either declaratory or injunctive relief against state taxes under section 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy. ... Because OCGA § 48-5-311 provides the Glynn County taxpayers with an adequate remedy at law, we hold that the trial court erred in granting them injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits a suit against state officials in their official capacity for injunctive relief despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Nanda, Navreet v. Bd Trustees Univ IL · filed 2002-09-17

We agree with the district court that, under § 1983, a suit against state officials in their official capacity limited to injunctive relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amend- ment.

Section 1983 permits a permanent injunction against a territorial official in his official capacity to remedy a violation of a federal statutory right.

Berne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2003-05-12

The plaintiffs having established their entitlement to injunctive relief, I will issue a permanent injunction against Roy Martin, in his official capacity as the Tax Assessor for the Government of the Virgin Islands, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enjoining Martin from assessing any of the named plaintiffs real properties until he establishes a rehable and credible system that will appraise real property consistently at its actual, market value in compliance with 48 U.S.C. § 1401a.

Section 1983 permits suits against public officials to enjoin violations of constitutional rights.

Bouffier v. Frank · filed 1975-02-19

It has consistently been held, however, since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), that suits may be brought against public officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against local officials to halt unconstitutional jail conditions.

Miller v. Dale Carson, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of Duval County, Florida · filed 1977-11-23

The plaintiffs’ 1983 action was proper: it sought injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions rather than money damages from a nonperson.

State officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Cyrus Ex Rel. McSweeney v. Walker · filed 2005-01-26

However, as indicated by Plaintiffs, Will explicitly recognizes that cases seeking prospective, injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official capacities are permitted. ... Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to Defendant’s contention that she is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacity.

Greenawalt v. Indiana Department of Corrections, William K. Kromann, and Kathy J. Lisby · filed 2005-02-14

But the error is of no consequence because section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual as distinct from their official capacity.

Section 1983 permits claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Peter v. Johnson · filed 1997-03-26

Because the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against the State defendants in their official capacities for alleged violations of federal law, the court concludes that the § 1983 claims against the state defendants are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against supervisory officials for a pattern of constitutional violations only when their affirmative involvement is proved.

Lewis v. Hyland · filed 1977-04-19

What we hold here is that in this case, absent proof of affirmative involvement in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations by supervisory officials, injunctive relief may not issue against them.

Section 1983 can support an injunction against a state civil action when the Dombrowski requirements are met; a chilling effect alone is insufficient.

Wallace v. Brewer · filed 1970-06-09

It is also clear that Dombrowski relief is not limited to state criminal prosecutions, but also is applicable to state civil actions. ... In this case these elements are not present; only the action itself is challenged as infringing upon plaintiffs’ first amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not permit an injunction against supervisory police officials based on a pattern of constitutional violations without proof of their affirmative involvement.

Lewis v. Hyland · filed 1977-03-25

What we hold here is that in this case, absent proof of affirmative involvement in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations by supervisory officials, injunctive relief may not issue against them.

Section 1983 permits a governor to be sued for injunctive relief for a federal constitutional violation.

Duncan v. State · filed 2009-06-11

The Governor can thus be sued for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which makes clear that equitable relief is available for a federal constitutional violation and that, if there is any limitation on granting injunctive relief, the limitation pertains only to judicial officers.

Section 1983 does not permit equitable relief against state officers sued in their individual capacities.

Jones v. Buckner · filed 2013-08-09

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 to end continuing violations of his federal rights and prevent future violations of his federal rights. However, state officers may only be sued in their individual capacity for money damages under the statute.

Section 1983 allows prospective injunctive relief against a state official to enforce federal law even when compliance may require spending state funds.

Farrington v. Adjutant General of State of Mich. · filed 1980-07-02

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of back benefits because the State had not waived its sovereign immunity, see, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), and that plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 must be dismissed because the State is not a “person” for purposes of that statute. ... The relief sought by plaintiff is no different than that requested in Barnes. This court is being asked to sever the allegedly unconstitutional portion of a statute from the body of the statute, and to then enjoin the defendant official so that he will comply with the law. This is prospective relief, and it is within this court’s power to grant it, even if it has the ancillary effect of making defendant adjutant general spend more money from the state treasury than he would have under his previous course of conduct. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 permits a claim for injunctive relief compelling state officials to comply with federal law only when they are sued in their official capacities.

Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine · filed 2017-09-29

As a result, we hold that when a plaintiff in a § 1983 action seeks injunctive relief to compel state officials to com- ply with federal law, the claim is available only against a state official sued in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law; allegations of past conduct without an ongoing violation or future harm do not support that relief.

Delgado v. Ocasio · filed 2019-08-27

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that an exception to the Eleventh Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity from suit existed to permit a plaintiff to sue a state official acting in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief for continuing violations of federal law. ... Thus, there are no allegations of an ongoing violation of the plaintiff’s right to medical or mental health treatment for injuries that he suffered as a result of the force used by the defendants in May 2017. Nor are there allegations that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the future if his request for relief is not granted. Accordingly, the request for injunctive relief against defendants Colby, St. John, Thibodeau, and Ocasio is dismissed.

State officers sued for prospective relief under § 1983 must be responsible for the alleged ongoing violation and have authority to remedy it.

Smith v. Demory · filed 2020-03-12

Therefore, the state officer being sued must have both the responsibility for the alleged ongoing violations of federal law and the authority to provide prospective redress for those alleged violations. ... Smith’s allegations do not indicate that either Jacumin or Phyall have authority to provide for relief, as they have no role in setting jail policy.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief against a state official only in an official-capacity suit.

Henderson v. Hannah · filed 2020-07-31

A plaintiff may seek injunctive relief under Section 1983 only by suing a state official in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state corrections department or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Scott v. Kauffman · filed 2021-12-21

Scott may not amend his complaint to allege any claim for monetary damages brought against the DOC or any claim for monetary damages brought against any Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities for a plausibly alleged violation of federal rights.

Hanes v. Frakes · filed 2022-05-26

Plaintiff has alleged a plausible § 1983 claim for violation of his rights under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and may pursue this claim for prospective injunctive relief against the NDCS Director and members of the Nebraska Board of Parole in their official capacity only.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state official only when the official has a direct connection to enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional act.

Peltier v. McTighe · filed 2022-07-29

A plaintiff may seek injunctive relief under § 1983 against a state official only when the official has a direct connection to enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional act.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 1983 against a state agency must name an official who can respond to the injunction.

Dang v. Johnson · filed 2022-09-19

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a § 1983 action against a state or state agency must “name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.” Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 732 (9th Cir. 2022). This the Plaintiff has not done.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional-violation finding for a prisoner’s delayed release only when the delay is unreasonable.

Burgess v. Roth · filed 1975-01-09

Only an unreasonable delay in a prisoner’s release will result in the tort of false imprisonment. Only such a delay will justify a finding of a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides damages when established state practices prolong a prisoner’s confinement past the correct release date without a meaningful hearing.

Haygood v. Evelle J. Younger, and Harold Cranke and Benjamin Seymour · filed 1985-08-27

For these reasons, we hold that Haygood has stated a § 1983 claim for damages for denial of liberty without due process of law.

Section 1983 claims challenging lethal injection protocols may be dismissed for unreasonable delay when the claim was available earlier.

Arthur v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections · filed 2008-07-29

Specifically, we have observed that Arthur was on notice that a § 1983 challenge to Alabama's lethal injection protocol was available as early as June or August 2006.

Section 1983 claims challenging city actions remain subject to Arkansas’s required appeal procedures, even when the city council could not have addressed the alleged constitutional violations.

Talley v. City of North Little Rock · filed 2009-12-03

One additional argument that warrants discussion is appellant’s assertion that his causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not have been addressed by the city council, so District Court Rule 9 does not apply to those claims. ... We also note that whether the city council could have addressed appellant’s alleged constitutional violations is of no moment, as appellant was still required to appeal the City’s actions upon which those allegations were based pursuant to the proper procedures.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for pursuing an available state-court appeal.

Resources for Human Development, Inc. v. Furber · filed 1975-01-22

What we are faced with here is an attempt by plaintiffs to utilize the Civil Rights Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a substitute for the right of appeal in State Court. Having initiated the state judicial process by appealing first from the Board’s denial of the request for a special exception and then from the order of the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, plaintiffs must pursue their claims through the State Courts.

Section 1983 does not permit a litigant to use a federal district-court action to circumvent the obligation to seek direct Supreme Court review of a state court’s disciplinary order.

Rivera v. Monge · filed 1978-12-01

This complaint in essence seeks review of a state court’s disciplinary order, although it is couched in terms of a suit against the individual members of the court. Appellant “cannot invoke the provisions of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act in federal district court so as to circumvent and avoid his obligation to seek direct review in the United States Supreme Court.”

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal from a state-court decision.

Vorbeck v. Whaley · filed 1979-10-18

As to plaintiff’s civil rights claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not designed to be used as a substitute for the right of appeal.

A plaintiff who fails to timely pursue the state-law procedure for obtaining judicial review of an administrative suspension decision is barred from proceeding on a Section 1983 claim raised in the same complaint.

Roark v. City of New Albany · filed 1984-07-26

This is true of Roark's complaint even though, as amended, it included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City had violated his civil rights by suspending him.

Section 1983 confines a federal court to deciding whether federally protected rights were violated and does not authorize it to retry the merits of a fair county employment grievance hearing.

Stermetz v. Harper · filed 1985-07-23

Instead, this court is confined to determining whether any of plaintiff’s “federally protected rights” have been violated. ... After having determined that he was entitled to a hearing and that he got an eminently fair one, the court’s function is complete.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain lower-federal-court review of a final state-court judgment.

Carbonell v. Louisiana Dept. Of Health & Human Resources, Secretary of the Louisiana Dept. Of Health & Human Resou · filed 1985-10-03

A federal district court, as a court of limited original jurisdiction, lacks power to review, modify or nullify a final order of a state court. Nor can a party, aggrieved by a judicial decision of a state’s highest court, invest a lower federal court with such jurisdiction by clothing his or her grievance in the garb of § 1983 and alleging that the decision of the state court deprived him or her of constitutionally protected rights or inter-ests____ A party seeking relief from such an allegedly unconstitutional action by a state court may seek review in only one federal court — the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to relitigate issues decided by a state supreme court; the federal remedy is direct review in the United States Supreme Court.

Fleming v. W. Bedford Moore, Iii, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Amicus Curiae · filed 1985-12-26

Fleming has, on two occasions, attacked the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia by petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. This, of course, was the appropriate, procedure. We detect nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would permit a federal court to relitigate the libel issues under circumstances present here.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district-court review of state divorce rulings; those rulings must be challenged through the state appellate system and ultimately the Supreme Court.

James E.M. Spencer v. Jessie L. Spencer, Mildred Hassell, Nathan T. Everett, Mitchell Norton, Judge Hardison · filed 1987-10-30

The proper method of challenging rulings or actions by the state court is, however, by appeal within the state system, and ultimately by petition to the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1983 does not permit a federal district court to act as an appellate tribunal over state eviction proceedings after the plaintiff has received and used available state procedures.

Goodman v. Shepard Ellenberg Associates · filed 1987-12-02

Here, Goodman has availed herself of the full array of state court procedures in her attempt to establish her right to remain in her apartment. She has not asserted, and her complaint cannot be construed to state, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation has standing to sue under § 1983 for deprivation of its constitutional rights.

Hamilton v. Lokuta · filed 1992-09-30

Because Jo-Bet is suing for a deprivation of its rights under the fourth amendment through the fourteenth amendment and section 1983, it has standing.

Section 1983 permits a union to sue when the union and its members are constitutionally injured by the same conduct.

Elk Grove Firefighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis · filed 1975-01-29

In this case, the unions have had both a First Amendment and pecuniary injury, and those injuries are logically related to the defendants’ conduct. The same is true of the injuries suffered, allegedly, by the union members. Accordingly, where a union and its members are coincidentally constitutionally injured by the same conduct, the union has standing to sue under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages against officials sued individually when each defendant, acting in the performance of official duties, in bad faith deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Muir v. County Council of Sussex County · filed 1975-03-14

In order for plaintiff to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the three Councilmen in their individual capacities, he must have established by a preponderance of the evidence that each defendant in bad faith exercised his discretion in the performance of his official duties to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right.

A political committee lacks standing under Section 1983 to challenge reapportionment when it alleges no injury to its members’ right of association and does not represent their interests.

Suffolk County Democratic Committee v. Gaffney · filed 1993-09-10

Neither does the Committee have standing to assert a civil rights cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 since the Committee does not assert that the reapportionment plan effects an injury to its members right of association ... nor is it representing its members’ interests ... .

Section 1983 does not allow an organization to sue solely for violations of its members’ rights; an associational-rights claim must also involve the organization’s own associational interests.

American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Shiffrin · filed 1999-03-31

American Charities’ articulation of its “right to associate” claim in no way involves the associational interests of the organization itself and thus it lacks standing under § 1983 to sue on behalf of its members under its current description of its association claim.

Section 1983 permits an organization to sue for violations of its own civil rights but generally does not permit it to assert its members’ personal claims.

Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie · filed 2002-04-29

Thus, while NYTWA may bring a § 1983 claim for alleged violations of the organization’s own civil rights, it has no standing to assert the § 1983 claims of its members.

Section 1983 does not give an organization standing based on expenses it incurs processing police misconduct claims.

Calvin v. James B. Conlisk, Jr., Etc. · filed 1976-04-27

The organizations’ other alleged basis for standing, viz., that they will incur expenses in processing claims of police misconduct unless the federal equity court intervenes, assuming this amounts to injury in fact, ... is not within the zone of interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows an organization to sue for its own injury if it independently satisfies Article III standing.

Nnebe Ex Rel. Amin v. Daus · filed 2011-03-25

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

An organization may bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf if it independently satisfies Article III standing requirements.

Nnebe v. Daus · filed 2011-04-07

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

An organization may bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf if it independently satisfies Article III standing requirements.

Nnebe v. Daus · filed 2011-05-31

However, nothing prevents an organization from bringing a § 1983 suit on its own behalf so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing as enumerated in Lujan.

Section 1983 makes the rights it secures personal to the injured person, so an organization lacks standing to assert those rights on behalf of its members.

Steel Institute v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-21

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on behalf of its members.

Section 1983 does not allow organizations to sue in a representative capacity for alleged violations of their members’ rights.

Kwong v. Bloomberg · filed 2012-03-26

However, because this is a § 1983 action, the organizational plaintiffs may not sue in a representative capacity for the alleged violations of rights of their members.

An organization cannot assert § 1983 claims on behalf of its members because the rights the section secures are personal to those injured.

Kiryas Joel Alliance v. Village of Kiryas Joel · filed 2012-09-10

Moreover, because “the rights [§ 1983] secures [are] personal to those purportedly injured,” organizations lack standing to assert § 1983 claims on behalf of their members.

An organization suing under Section 1983 must assert its own rights, rather than the rights of its members.

New York State Citizens' Coalition for Children v. Velez · filed 2015-10-29

When an organization brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, this Circuit has held that it must do so on its own behalf, rather than that of its members.

An organization suing under Section 1983 cannot rely on its members’ standing and must establish its own injury.

Singh v. Joshi · filed 2016-01-26

The Court notes, however, that "an organization does not have standing to assert the rights of its members in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

An organization bringing a Section 1983 claim must establish standing in its own right rather than assert its members’ rights.

Rest. Law Ctr. v. City of N.Y. · filed 2019-02-06

Accordingly, Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing in their own right, and not on a theory that they are acting on behalf of their members.

In the Second Circuit, an organization may sue under § 1983 for its own injury, but not on behalf of its members.

Christa Mcauliffe Intermediate School Pto v. De Blasio · filed 2019-03-04

In the Second Circuit, however, an organization only has standing to sue under § 1983 on its own behalf, not that of its members.

Section 1983 does not allow organizations to assert claims on behalf of their members because the rights it protects are personal to those injured.

Christa McAuliffe Intermediate School PTO, Inc. v. De Blasio · filed 2019-12-20

First, the organizational plaintiffs bringing this appeal do not have standing to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of their members.

An organization suing under Section 1983 cannot assert its members’ rights, but may sue on its own behalf if it independently has standing.

Conn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont · filed 2021-07-28

Because CCDL brought this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it lacked “standing to assert the rights of its members.”

An organization seeking nominal damages under § 1983 must allege its own injury; its members’ injuries alone do not give it standing.

National Rifle Association of America v. Hochul · filed 2021-11-16

Because the NRA failed to allege its own injuries separate and apart from injuries to its members, it lacks standing in this § 1983 action to pursue a claim for nominal damages.

An organization may bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf if it independently satisfies Article III standing.

Restaurant Law Center v. City of New York · filed 2022-02-10

An organization may nonetheless bring a § 1983 suit on its own behalf “so long as it can independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.” ... The NYSRA has standing to pursue its federal claims.

Section 1983 claims are governed by federal law rather than being controlled by state law.

Bergstralh v. Gayle Lowe and City of Bend, Oregon · filed 1975-02-18

The vindication of federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be determined by federal law.

The scope of an evidentiary privilege in a § 1983 civil-rights action is governed by federal law.

Breed v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Lionel Taylor and Henry Parker, · filed 1976-09-29

The scope of an evidentiary privilege in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is a question of federal law.

Federal privilege law governs a § 1983 action because state law does not supply the rule of decision.

McArthur v. Robinson · filed 1983-07-22

Since a section 1983 action is not an action wherein state law supplies the rule of decision, it would seem that federal law governs. ... The Court holds that federal law applies.

State tort-claim notice requirements do not apply to federal § 1983 actions.

Cain v. City of Chicago · filed 1985-10-02

It already has been determined that the notice provisions of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act are not applicable to federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982), since the Tort Immunity Act was intended to apply to common law tort claims as opposed to quasi-tort actions of a constitutional nature.

Federal common-law tort and damages principles govern recovery under § 1983.

Jeffrey Watts, Cross-Appellee v. James Laurent, Youth Supervisor Ii., Cross · filed 1985-11-01

Federal common law principles of tort and damages govern recovery under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery for an arrest made under a warrant valid on its face or for minimal force incident to that arrest.

Bur v. Gilbert · filed 1976-06-23

In contrast, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, the relevant inquiry is not into whether or not there was probable cause to make the arrest, but whether or not the warrant pursuant to which the arrest was made was valid. ... The Court must conclude in the circumstances of this case that the defendants’ arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to the authority of the warrant in question was not violative of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and that the plaintiff can thus not recover under § 1983. ... Granted, a minimal battery and handcuffing incident to arrest might well be offensive to the sensibilities of a responsible and law-abiding citizen. But given that the initial arrest has been determined to have been a deprivation of liberty in accordance with due process, the secondary effects of the use of minimal force incident to that arrest is not violative of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor can it be said that such force amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against a public defender’s investigator acting solely to assist the defense of an accused in the judicial process.

Waits v. Hon. Raymond McGowan A. J. S. C., Monmouth County · filed 1975-04-30

In view of the allegations in this record that Gearity was acting solely in the course of his employment as an investigator for a public defender, working as a member of the bar in representing Waits as defendant in a state criminal prosecution (see first sentence of second paragraph under C below), we have concluded that he is immune from this suit. ... In the same way, an investigator of the public defender has no power to deprive anyone of his or her rights. The only function of such an investigator is to assist in the defense of the accused, a function directly related to the judicial process.

A covenant releasing § 1983 claims against public officials in exchange for dismissal of pending criminal charges is void as against public policy.

Bernard E. Rumery, Jr. v. Town of Newton, Etc. · filed 1985-12-02

We hold that a covenant not to sue public officials for alleged violations of constitutional rights, negotiated in exchange for a decision not to prosecute the claimant on criminal charges, is void as against public policy.

Section 1983 liability for unjustified detention requires knowledge of the sentencing problem and its risk, deliberate indifference, and a causal connection to the detention.

Royal v. Durison · filed 2004-05-26

To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the contention that the sentence the prisoner is serving has been incorrectly calculated and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted.

Section 1983 permits liability for an individual's own actions and, in limited circumstances, for the actions of subordinates.

Holloman Ex Rel. Holloman v. Harland · filed 2004-05-28

There are two ways in which an individual may be held liable under § 1983—he may be sued for his own personal actions (“direct liability”), or, under certain limited circumstances, for the actions of his subordinates (“supervisoral liability”), see, e.g., Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 imposes federal liability on governmental defendants only when their conduct constitutes constitutionally forbidden mistreatment, rather than merely unfair or arbitrary employee treatment.

Cygnar v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-12-30

One last consideration should be identified at the outset: Section 1983 is not a generalized guaranty of fairness in employee relations. Governmental employers may be mistaken and even arbitrary in dealing with their employees. They may (as Mathis was accused of here) break promises that no early (or wholesale) personnel changes will take place. But governmental defendants will not be subject to federal liability unless their conduct masks constitutionally forbidden mistreatment (such as politically- or racially-motivated mistreatment).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federally guaranteed rights under color of state law, including conduct by state officials within or beyond their authority.

Shrader v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. · filed 2005-02-25

It does not follow, however, that § 1983 provides a remedy only if a state official acts outside the scope of his or her employment. On the contrary, § 1983 imposes liability on state officials for conduct taken within, as well as "without[,] the scope of their authority." Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 12, 15 (D.Me.1970).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim based solely on coercive police interrogation that produces an involuntary confession.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2005-02-28

After Chavez, it is clear that the mere act of coercing a confession is not a Fifth Amendment violation upon which a § 1983 claim may be predicated.

Section 1983 imposes liability based on a violation of federal constitutional rights rather than an administrative provision or state law.

McCabe v. Mais · filed 2008-10-02

Defendant Mais is liable to Plaintiff McCabe for the damages that Plaintiff McCabe suffered as a direct result of Defendant Mais’s violation of the Fourth Amendment — not the Policy or any other administrative or state-law provision. Cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-95, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (reiterating that liability in a § 1983 action turns on whether the defendant violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional rights, not whether the defendant ran afoul of some administrative provision or state law).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state for merely knowingly tolerating segregation without affirmative conduct supporting or authorizing it.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1995-03-27

Since we are unable to find, after an exhaustive inquiry, conduct on the part of the State which would satisfactorily distinguish this case from Arthur v. Nyquist, and since this case, rather than the Ohio precedents, is controlling on this Court, we answer in the negative the question of whether the State may be held liable for knowingly tolerating, ie., for not proceeding aggressively against, the de jure segregation that existed in the Yonkers schools.

Section 1983 permits claims against government officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Cole v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD. · filed 2011-07-26

As it turns out, discovery has not yielded facts sufficient to establish a case for section 1983 liability, so Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement and action under color of state law, and permits municipal liability for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom.

McCarthy v. Barrett · filed 2011-07-26

“Liability under section 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.” ... In order to succeed on this claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a person deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the person acted under color of state law when doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when an official policy, practice, or custom causes the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal rights violations and permits liability under specific conditions, including limited failure-to-train claims.

Mohney v. Pennsylvania · filed 2011-08-19

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for the violation of rights created by federal law. ... To state a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged wrongful conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Both elements must be simultaneously present to sustain a claim. ... Generally, in order to establish supervisory liability against government officials in their individual capacities under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officials were personally involved in the commission of the conduct alleged. ... However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a second theory of supervisory liability in that “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of ‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, Defendants are not correct in asserting that personal involvement is a necessary element of a viable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that each defendant, acting with intent, deliberate indifference, or gross negligence, deprived him of meaningful periodic reviews during his confinement in administrative segregation.

Selby v. Caruso · filed 2013-10-31

To prove liability under § 1983 at trial, Selby must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that each defendant, acting with intent, deliberate indifference, or gross negligence, deprived him of meaningful periodic reviews during his confinement in administrative segregation.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, including claims against municipalities when a policy or custom caused the deprivation.

Traylor v. Hammond · filed 2015-03-18

“In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” ... Here, Traylor does not allege that Connecticut College is a state actor or a private party that acted under color of state law. ... Thus, Traylor’s Section 1983 Equal Protection claim is being dismissed as to Connecticut College.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right by a person acting under color of state law.

Griego v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2015-04-11

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law and limits county and supervisory liability to specified policy or personal involvement requirements.

Rojero v. El Paso County · filed 2016-04-28

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under § 1983 for the deprivation of civil rights by demonstrating: (1) a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by an individual acting under the color of state law. ... Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights created under federal law.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity and municipal liability requirements.

Parver v. Jet Blue Airlines Corp. · filed 2016-05-04

We need not determine whether the removal was an unconstitutional arrest because the LVMPD officers’ conduct did not violate any “clearly established” law, and they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. ... The district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the individual officers on Parver’s unlawful arrest claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Parver’s remaining § 1983 claims for excessive force against Officer Rodriguez-Gallar and for municipal liability against the LVMPD under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), fail because there was insufficient evidence to support either claim. ... We also affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of JetBlue on Parver’s § 1983 claims because JetBlue was not a joint state actor with the LVMPD officers.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the Younger abstention doctrine.

Anonymous J. v. Bar Ass'n · filed 1975-04-03

However, it is equally clear that section 1983 is not exempted from the Younger abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 plaintiffs must wait until available state proceedings that offer an opportunity to raise the federal issue have concluded before federal courts consider that issue.

Dostert v. Neely · filed 1980-09-10

Thus, once state proceedings have begun which offer, at any stage, an opportunity to raise the federal issue in defense or in any other fashion, the federal courts must abstain from considering that issue in a § 1983 action until the state proceedings are concluded.

When a § 1983 action implicates unsettled state-law issues, Pullman abstention may warrant staying the action rather than dismissing it.

Bryant v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ETC. · filed 1982-01-20

Accordingly, defendants’ motions are denied insofar as they seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims on grounds of abstention, and are granted, insofar as they seek, by their request for “such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper,” to have this action placed on the Suspense Docket of this Court.

Section 1983 claims trigger a particularly weighty federal obligation to exercise jurisdiction, though exceptional circumstances may outweigh that concern and support abstention.

Sisler v. West · filed 1983-02-23

The obligation of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction is particularly weighty when a plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as do plaintiffs in this case.

Including a § 1983 claim does not prevent Burford abstention because abstention is not equivalent to requiring exhaustion of state remedies.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Directors of Wisconsin Ins. SEC. Fund · filed 1983-09-07

The fact that plaintiffs have included in their complaint a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not affect the decision to abstain. Abstention is not the equivalent of exhaustion of state court remedies, a requirement that cannot be imposed upon § 1983 claims.

A Section 1983 action raising Fourth Amendment issues also pending on direct state criminal appeal warrants federal abstention until the state appellate court decides those issues.

Doby v. Ronald Strength and T.H. Gray · filed 1985-03-06

Nevertheless, abstention is still appropriate. Apparently, Doby raised the Fourth Amendment violations at his state court trial. That conviction is currently being reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Therefore, we believe that federal abstention is proper until the state appellate court has decided the relevant issues.

Although section 1983 authorizes injunctions against state criminal proceedings, federal courts generally must abstain absent proof of bad-faith harassment or similarly great and immediate irreparable harm.

Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster P.C. v. Dearie · filed 1985-07-17

The court has the power to enjoin state criminal proceedings pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42. ... The court finds that injunctive relief would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding, that plaintiff has not shown the bad faith harassment necessary to warrant such interference, and that plaintiff is unlikely to be able to make such a showing. Since there is not a likelihood of eventual success on the merits, and important public interests would be thwarted were the court to grant a preliminary injunction, the motion is denied.

When Younger abstention bars equitable relief in a § 1983 action, the court must separately address the damages claim rather than dismissing the entire action without explanation.

Rakauskas v. William Gargiulo Morris Becker, Mayor Sabrina Kelley John (Tom) Doe, an Unknown Eastlake Officer · filed 1985-11-06

Next, we find that the district court failed to recognize expressly the request for damages or to explain whether it believed that Younger precluded its adjudication of the damages claim. Consequently, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

A federal court should abstain from a Section 1983 action challenging denial of counsel when the claim can be litigated in an ongoing state criminal prosecution and federal intervention would cause obvious federal-state friction.

Mann v. Rita Jett, Ricki MacEy and County of Pima Arizona · filed 1986-02-10

We conclude that abstention is appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Mann can adequately litigate in the ongoing state criminal proceedings his underlying claim of unconstitutional deprivation of counsel, and “the potential for federal-state friction [resulting from federal intervention] is obvious.”

Section 1983 actions are not exempt from abstention, although abstention should not become a de facto exhaustion requirement for substantial constitutional claims.

Coin Call, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1986-04-11

Where as here, however, a plaintiff advances a tenuous constitutional claim, abstention, if applicable, is lawful notwithstanding that jurisdiction is grounded on section 1983.

A federal court should abstain from a Section 1983 challenge that would interfere with pending state criminal proceedings where the plaintiff can present the constitutional issue in state court.

Wilson v. De Bruyn · filed 1986-04-28

The remainder of Wilson’s complaint is dismissed as premature, without prejudice to its renewal (if necessary) at the conclusion of state criminal proceedings.

A federal court should abstain from a section 1983 suit seeking to enjoin a pending coercive state administrative proceeding that implicates an important state interest and permits later judicial review of constitutional claims.

Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. · filed 1986-06-27

We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the cited authorities. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims.

Younger abstention does not invariably require dismissal of a Section 1983 damages action; the federal court may stay the damages claim while related state proceedings continue.

Suggs v. Brannon · filed 1986-11-03

We now hold that Younger does not invariably require dismissal of Sec. 1983 damage actions.

Younger abstention does not invariably require dismissal of a Section 1983 damages action; the federal court may stay the damages claim while related state proceedings continue.

Suggs v. Brannon · filed 1986-11-03

We now hold that ... Younger ... does not invariably require dismissal of § 1983 damage actions.

A federal court may abstain from a Section 1983 institutional-care action when concurrent review could undercut a comprehensive state consent decree covering the same claims.

Hartshorn Ex Rel. Sade v. Heydinger · filed 1986-11-04

The fact remains that there exists a comprehensive and detailed state scheme which may be undercut by concurrent federal court scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that abstention is appropriate.

A Section 1983 claim is not categorically exempt from abstention when unresolved state-law questions may dispose of the case without a federal constitutional ruling.

Holt v. City of Maumelle, Ark. · filed 1986-11-20

The fact that the plaintiff has asserted a § 1983 claim does not prevent the Court from abstaining. Although federal courts have generally regarded vital questions of civil rights as the least likely candidates for abstention, they have repeatedly held that actions brought under the civil rights statutes are not exempt from the abstention doctrine.

A Section 1983 plaintiff invoking bad-faith prosecution as an exception to Younger abstention must allege specific facts supporting an inference of bad faith.

Collins v. County Of Kendall · filed 1986-12-03

A plaintiff asserting bad faith prosecution as an exception to Younger abstention must allege specific facts to support an inference of bad faith.

A Section 1983 plaintiff invoking the bad-faith exception to Younger abstention must show that the state prosecution was brought to retaliate for or deter constitutionally protected activity.

Collins v. County of Kendall · filed 1986-12-03

This specific evidence must show that state prosecution “was brought in bad faith for the purpose of retaliating for or deterring the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”

Younger abstention does not bar Section 1983 damages claims arising from a private state-court contract action that implicates no vital state interest.

Carras v. Williams · filed 1986-12-15

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in abstaining from Carras’ claims for monetary relief.

Although federal courts may enjoin state proceedings in § 1983 actions, Younger abstention bars an injunction against a pending good-faith criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances.

Kelley v. State of Ohio, Judge Gerry L. Hayes, and Timothy Waterson, Defendants · filed 1987-05-20

Although Congress has authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in SS 1983 actions, ... the present action presents no extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant the drastic measure of enjoining a pending state criminal prosecution.

Younger abstention can require dismissal of a § 1983 action challenging an ongoing coercive state administrative proceeding involving an important state interest and adequate state review of constitutional claims.

Ronwin v. Warren B. Dunham, Gordon A. Sweitzer, and Alton B. Chrystal · filed 1987-06-04

We believe that the ... Younger ... doctrine is fully applicable to the pending state administrative proceeding in this case. ... First, the state’s interest in the safety of its roadways is considerable. ... Ronwin also will have an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding.

A federal court may abstain from a § 1983 action that would interfere with pending state quasi-criminal enforcement proceedings when the state forum can hear all federal claims and no Younger exception applies.

Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Municipal Corporation · filed 1987-08-24

And to the extent that the plaintiff also seeks damages under § 1983 for the alleged harassment, there is every indication that he could have this claim heard as well. ... In any event, there is an adequate state forum for all the plaintiff’s claims to be addressed.

A federal court should abstain from a § 1983 challenge to an ongoing professional-license proceeding when it is judicial in nature, implicates an important state interest, and affords an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.

Damino v. O'NEILL · filed 1987-09-28

First, the state court review proceeding is obviously judicial in nature. Second, the state has a strong interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens and the granting and revocation of physicians’ licenses is clearly an integral part of this state function. ... Finally, plaintiff has had the opportunity to raise all his constitutional claims in the state proceeding.