42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff may not use pendent state-law respondeat-superior claims to impose vicarious liability on a municipality that Section 1983 itself excludes.

Christensen v. Phelan · filed 1985-04-15

The assertion of a state law claim of vicarious liability in conjunction with a § 1983 claim has the effect of expanding the scope and coverage of federal law beyond that intended by Congress. The Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that a municipality cannot be sued under § 1983 on a claim of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 liability may not be imposed on a respondeat superior theory.

Bishop v. M. C. Hamby, Warden Officer Binkley, Correctional Officer and Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 1985-10-25

The law is clear that liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 will not lie on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior alone.

Wilkerson v. Ernest Pellegrin, Commissioner Howard Cook, Warden Ricky J. Bell, Captain Richbard Wire Donelson, C · filed 1986-08-15

The claim against Pellegrin, Cook, and Bell was premised solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Case law is explicit that a section 1983 action cannot be maintained on this basis alone. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). The district court's holding to this effect is correct.

A governmental board cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of a separate executive committee.

Roy P. Boucvalt, M.D., Cross-Appellant v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital Service District No. 1, Iberia Parish, Cros · filed 1986-08-27

The Executive Committee is not a party to this lawsuit. As Boucvalt concedes, the Board cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of the Executive Committee.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat-superior liability on public officials for another person's conduct.

Magill v. Appalachia Intermediate Unit 08 · filed 1986-09-24

However, A.J. Peliccioni is not a defendant in this action, and a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat-superior theory; the plaintiff must allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Dorsey v. City of Baltimore, and Richard Phillips, a Baltimore City Police Officer · filed 1987-11-06

Dorsey has made no allegations in the papers he has filed in district court or on appeal suggesting that his constitutional rights were violated due to a municipal policy or custom. Contrary to Dorsey's assertion, a city may not be held liable under Sec. 1983 based on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely because it employs a person who committed a constitutional violation.

Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz · filed 1988-04-12

As such, the court holds that, as a matter of law, a private corporation cannot be liable strictly on the basis of a respondeat superior theory under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely under respondeat superior.

Gravitt v. Johnson · filed 1988-05-05

The district court dismissed the matter as frivolous under Sec. 1915(d) because the plaintiff cited no facts which, if true, entitled him to relief, see Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir.1983), and because the named defendant could not be held liable under Sec. 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior. ... On review of the plaintiff's complaint, we conclude the district court properly dismissed this action for the reasons stated in its July 23, 1987 order.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a jail director for subordinates’ alleged misconduct solely under respondeat superior.

Powell v. James L. Kelley, Benjamin Taylor · filed 1988-06-10

Likewise, the evidence adduced at trial clearly establishes that plaintiff's claims against defendant for the denial of medical care and the interference with his mail are grounded upon the theory of respondeat superior. As a result, they may not serve as the basis of the imposition of liability upon defendant.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Soncrant v. Joe Parker, Carroll County Sheriff's Department, and Ronnie Webb, Defendants · filed 1988-07-29

As to the defendant Carroll County Sheriff's Department, the district court properly granted it summary judgment because Sec. 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Donnie Lair v. Dr. Walter Oglesby, Psychiatrist, Maximum Security Unit · filed 1988-10-20

Such a claim is predicated upon a respondeat superior theory which is inapplicable in section 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a county.

Brassfield v. County of Cook · filed 1988-12-28

And the potential respondeat superior liability on County’s part ... does not of course extend to Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Wall v. Wake County Jail Nathan Rice, Warden John Baker, Sheriff, in Re Harvey C. Wall · filed 1989-01-06

Of course, respondeat superior is no basis for liability under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against cities or sheriff's departments on a respondeat superior theory.

Brownlee v. Abbeville Sheriff Dept. · filed 1989-06-23

Further, the cities of Abbeville and Due West, along with the Abbeville Sheriff's Department, cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory; therefore, they will not be parties on remand.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on respondeat superior alone.

Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah · filed 1989-10-31

The law is well established that an action pursuant to Section 1983 cannot be based upon the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability for another person’s acts.

Dubose v. Oustalet · filed 1990-03-15

Furthermore, her actions cannot be attributed, as a matter of law, to defendants, as there can be no vicarious or respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police board for its officers’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Taylor v. Phelan · filed 1990-08-27

While we recognize that the principle of respondeat superior will not apply to implicate the Board in the Taylors' claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, see Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1531 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)), the Taylors also bring claims under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, Kan.Stat.Ann. Secs. 75-6101 through 6119, (1989).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff or jailer solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Bevins v. Charles E. "Fuzzy" Keesee, Poyster Keene, Nancy Lindsey, Dave Coleman, "Coon" Stratton, and Fred Carter · filed 1991-04-10

Sheriff Keesee and County Jailer Stratton are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr. Bevins' claim against them is based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is well settled that Sec. 1983 will not support such a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on corporate defendants solely under respondeat superior for their employees’ acts.

Taliaferro v. Voth · filed 1991-10-01

Plaintiff may not base his section 1983 claim against defendant Osco or defendant DeGoler’s on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability against a county or prison medical contractor for its employees’ conduct without a policy or custom attributable to the entity.

Unterberg v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-03-27

Because I conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist and there is no evidence of deliberate indifference, I must agree with defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s claims against Lehigh County and CMS are based on vicarious liability which is unavailable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Taylor v. Babcock · filed 1992-03-30

Because the theory of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 actions, Taylor's complaint against the public defender committee was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit county liability based solely on respondeat superior for a sheriff’s deputy’s conduct.

Sanders v. Miller · filed 1992-04-13

The motion to dismiss filed by defendants Jackson County and the Jackson County Commission will be granted because the claim against them is a thinly disguised effort to impose liability on a theory of respondeat superior, an improper basis for liability in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

McCrae v. Oldham · filed 1992-09-10

The district court properly awarded summary judgment to Flaherty and the Board on McCrae's claim concerning living conditions at the jail. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (respondeat superior may not be used as a basis for liability in § 1983 actions).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a corporate defendant; the plaintiff must allege a practice or policy of the corporation that caused the injury.

Sandlin v. Nurse Brown, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction Jeff Rhinehart, Dr. · filed 1992-10-26

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed PHP Healthcare because Sandlin did not allege a practice or policy of PHP that injured him and because the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Thrower v. Ohio Bar Association Akron Bar Association · filed 1993-01-25

The allegations against the OSBA are based upon a respondeat superior theory, which will not support a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Robinson v. Eng · filed 1993-03-02

Liability under § 1983 cannot be premised solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable merely because it employs the person who committed the alleged violation.

Ronny J. Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, a New York Corporation Daniel J. Geiger · filed 1993-03-23

The fact that Sears employed Geiger does not make Sears liable under § 1983. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Sears.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Moy v. County of Cook · filed 1993-03-29

We further hold that the circuit court correctly dismissed the section 1983 count, even if this court were to hold the County liable under a theory of respondeat superior. That must be so because section 1983 liability cannot be predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Fariello v. Rodriguez · filed 1993-05-08

Even if the claim against Drewry would survive, as stated above, a Section 1983 action cannot be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

King v. Professional Healthcare Practitioners · filed 1993-06-16

We agree with the district court that King's claim against PHP is founded only on respondeat superior and is not cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a sheriff solely for a deputy's misconduct, and a state statute imposing such liability cannot be applied to a Section 1983 claim.

Palmer v. Sanderson · filed 1993-11-23

Consequently, a state statute imposing vicarious liability on a sheriff for the conduct of his or her deputies is "inconsistent with the ... laws of the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 1988, notwithstanding our earlier holding in Hesselgesser. This inconsistency, in turn, precludes the district court from applying Wash.Rev.Code §§ 36.16.070 to this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Wayne Rush Meadows v. Augusta Correctional Center Augusta Security · filed 1993-12-28

Furthermore, we find that the district court was correct in determining that since Meadow had alleged no facts to suggest that Warden Saunders had any knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations, Meadow's claim against him was based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is inapplicable to Sec. 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so failing to serve a defendant sued solely on that basis is harmless.

Gainer v. Fife Symington Leonard J. Kirschner Jenny Bell · filed 1994-02-11

As the district court found, failure to serve Symington was at most harmless error as Gainer's claims against Symington were based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for the conduct of its employee under respondeat superior.

John G. Holliday, Jr. v. Elahon Center · filed 1994-06-24

Because liability under section 1983 may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior, see Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.1984), the district court's determination was correct.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s violation of federal rights.

Obersteller v. Flour Bluff Independent School District · filed 1994-09-30

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a municipality or officials solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Frey v. City Of Herculaneum · filed 1994-10-12

A civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue a section 1983 action against a municipality or officials under a respondeat superior theory, and Frey's complaint intimates no other basis for liability for many of the defendants.

Section 1983 does not allow liability against a municipality or officials based solely on respondeat superior.

Frey v. City Of Herculaneum · filed 1995-01-09

A civil rights plaintiff cannot pursue a section 1983 action against a municipality or officials under a respondeat superior theory, and the Freys' complaint intimates no other basis for liability for many of the defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a local government or its officials based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Camboni v. Symington · filed 1995-09-27

The district court properly dismissed Pinal County and the members of the Board of Supervisors because a local government and its officials are not subject to liability under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for constitutional injuries inflicted by subordinate employees.

McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors · filed 1996-01-11

It cannot be done on any theory of vicarious liability; principles of respondeat superior do not apply in imposing liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation providing jail medical services liable for its staff members’ conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Hickey By and Through Timalu v. County of Stanislaus · filed 1996-02-20

The district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim because CFMG cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 724 (11th Cir.1991) (private corporation providing medical services under contract with State Department of Corrections cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior ). Because the plaintiffs failed to name individual staff members as defendants, the staff members' negligence or deliberate misconduct cannot serve as a basis for CFMG's liability on the Eighth Amendment claim.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior; a plaintiff must identify the officers personally responsible for the alleged failure to protect.

Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept. Sean McCormack Asst. D.A. Denis Thomason, Donald Urrutia · filed 1996-07-29

However, Urrutia will have a viable claim only if he identifies the police officers present following his arrest who failed to take preventive action, because respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a government entity to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Lee-Patterson v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc. · filed 1997-02-20

Patterson’s claims against NJT are dismissed to the extent they are based upon a theory of vicarious liability for the actions of the Individual Defendants. A Section 1983 action cannot be predicated upon a theory of vicarious liability such as respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a district attorney’s office solely for a prosecutor’s actions under respondeat superior.

Stokes v. Ward · filed 1997-11-21

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Hemmings v. Gorczyk · filed 1998-01-16

However, respondeat superior cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability for a sheriff or county based solely on an employee’s conduct.

Magill v. Lee County · filed 1998-01-20

There is, of course, no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on respondeat superior alone.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc. · filed 1998-04-17

GMC cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior alone.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a police chief for subordinates’ conduct.

Davis v. Zirkelbach · filed 1998-07-09

It is enough to recall that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make institutional or non-abusing defendants strictly liable for another person's conduct under a respondeat superior theory.

Snyder v. Eno, et al. · filed 1998-08-26

It is egually well established that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the institutional and non-abusing defendants are not "strictly liable" (under a respondeat superior theory of liability) for the conduct of Eno and Adams.

Section 1983 does not permit liability for the District of Columbia or its officials based on respondeat superior.

Stein v. District of Columbia · filed 1983-01-12

With respect to plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that neither the District nor Mayor Barry nor Chief Turner can be sued on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have personally violated the plaintiff’s civil rights; respondeat superior alone does not establish liability.

Valdez v. City of Farmington · filed 1984-01-10

One such distinction is that the concept of respondeat superior provides no basis for liability under § 1983, as it may in a common law tort action. A § 1983 defendant must be found personally to have violated the plaintiffs civil rights for § 1983 liability to exist.

Section 1983 does not allow recovery based on respondeat superior.

Vaughn v. Dickens County Corr · filed 2000-11-01

In a § 1983 claim, recovery is not available based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Abston v. Shelby County Justice Center · filed 2001-09-17

Abston’s claims against Shelby County and Sheriff Gilless are frivolous because they are based upon a respondeat superior theory of liability, which cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Pittman v. Kurtz · filed 2001-09-28

Although defendants did not raise the issue in their motion for summary judgment, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Becker v. Wilkinson · filed 2002-01-31

The theory of respondeat superior cannot provide the basis for liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not allow a county to be held liable solely for the acts of its employee under respondeat superior.

Wallis v. Warriner · filed 2002-12-05

Respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal connection to the alleged deprivation; respondeat superior does not establish liability.

Ephraim v. Angelone · filed 2003-03-03

Plaintiff has not provided evidence that any of Defendants acted personally to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. It is well-established that respondeat superior is not applicable in § 1983 cases. ... Since Plaintiff has not alleged any personal connection between Defendants and the purported denial of his constitutional rights with regard to his commissary purchases, his claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Finlay v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas · filed 2003-11-20

Among other things, Finlay improperly proceeded on a respondeat superior theory, see Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978), and he did not name as defendants the persons discussed in his complaint, or seek leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Hales v. City of Montgomery · filed 2004-03-31

In a case premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability may not be imposed vicariously or pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior, even when state law would.

Gary Baskin and Beulah Baskin v. Eugene Parker and Curtis L. Smith · filed 1979-09-24

In other words, it rejected respondeat superior as a theory of recovery under § 1983. We interpret Monell’s ruling as uniformly applicable to § 1983 action in any state.

Section 1983 requires personal culpability for liability and does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Brown v. Washington · filed 1987-06-01

That leaves no genuine issue of material fact under Complaint Counts I and II, because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on personal culpability and not respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must show a causal link between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged deprivation of rights.

Kramer v. Village of North Fond Du Lac and Larry Wodack · filed 2004-09-27

Because § 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, and because the plaintiff has not shown any causal link between either defendants’ actions and the alleged deprivation of his rights, the Fourth Amendment claims against him and the village must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a sheriff department liable for its employees’ constitutional torts under a respondeat superior theory.

Sloane v. Kanawha County Sheriff Department · filed 2004-10-15

In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged constitutional torts against the named defendants. Under well-settled law, the Department may not be held liable for these claims under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Dubois v. Abode · filed 2005-07-27

Dubois’ claim against MCACC lacks merit because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be solely based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant solely for an employee’s conduct under respondeat superior.

McCray v. First State Medical System · filed 2005-08-03

It is established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Dubois v. Vargas · filed 2005-09-07

As the District Court explained, Dubois’s claims against C.M.S. and MCACC lack merit because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, so a public entity is not a proper defendant based solely on an employee's conduct.

Bartes v. School Board of Alachua County · filed 2005-10-26

We also note that, because there is no respondeat superior liability available under Section 1983, SBAC is not shown to be a proper defendant on this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a school district to be held liable solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Cowan v. Strafford R-VI School District · filed 1998-04-07

The School District contends that this instruction permitted it to be held liable for Cowan’s §1983 claim under an impermissible theory of respondeat superior. See Springdale Educ. Assoc. v. Springdale School Dist., 133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998). The School District properly states the law with respect to respondeat superior liability in the § 1983 context, but as indicated above, the School District failed to properly state its objection on the record.

Section 1983 does not support liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Zivojinovich v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC · filed 2006-08-01

The Ritz is correct both in its claim that only respondeat superior liability is plead in the Amended Complaint and that this is legally insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a private prison corporation.

Olivas v. Correctional Corp. of America · filed 2007-01-30

Contrary to Olivas’s argument, CCA may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Jones v. Huckabee · filed 2007-02-15

With respect to Jones’s civil rights claims against the ACIC, its director, and the governor, arising out of the alleged misuse of the arrest records, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under the federal Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a company liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Stankowski v. Farley · filed 2007-05-17

In any case, the actions of Prime Care employees cannot give rise to liability for the company, since respondeat superior liability is not available under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold the United States liable for judges’ actions under a respondeat superior theory.

Falade v. United States · filed 2007-06-06

Among other infirmities with the pleading, Falade could not hold the United States liable under a respondeat-superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer for a security guard’s acts without the employer’s active participation.

Thompson v. McCoy · filed 1976-10-01

In the present case there has been a finding of state action but there is no evidence or allegation to be found in the plaintiff’s pleading of any active participation in this event on the part of the defendant McKeown. Since in the absence of such participation there can be no liability on his part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint against the defendant McKeown on that cause of action should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability.

Vera v. Bd Jdg of Nueces Cty · filed 2007-12-21

Although Vera also challenges the district court’s reasoning that Vera failed to state a claim against the Board because § 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability, that finding was proper as well.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender service based solely on respondeat superior liability for its attorney’s actions.

Rice v. District of Columbia Public Defender Service · filed 2008-01-30

Even if PDS were acting under color of District of Columbia law, PDS could not be held liable for Mr. Hayes’ actions. “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superi- or theory of liability.”

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Chilcott v. Erie County Domestic Relations · filed 2008-06-23

However, it is well-established that there is no respondeat-superior liability in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on an employer’s responsibility for its employees.

Cox v. Jackson · filed 2008-09-29

It is well established that liability in a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s mistreatment.

Feliz v. Kintock Group · filed 2008-10-30

The District Court properly granted the Commonwealth defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to any claims involving mistreatment Feliz allegedly suffered while housed at the Kintock Center. E.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (no respondeat superior liability in § 1983 cases).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county through respondeat superior for its officers’ actions.

Ryan v. New Castle County · filed 1973-10-02

respondeat superior has no application in an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a mayor, city, or its people under a respondeat superior theory for a judge’s acts.

Careaga v. James · filed 1980-03-17

Any attempt to hold the mayor, city, or people of St. Louis liable is predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior which does not apply in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on board members solely because of their supervisory relationship to the official who dismissed an employee.

Fracaro v. Priddy · filed 1981-05-01

Applying the reasoning in the Monell case to the instant facts, the Court concludes that respondeat superior will not support a finding of liability on the part of the Board members.

Section 1983 does not permit liability for alleged physical abuse solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Stacey v. Ford · filed 1982-05-19

It is clear that defendant Ford cannot be held liable for any alleged physical abuse solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory, since this has been rejected as a theory of recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants solely because they supervise officers who allegedly violated civil rights.

Morgan v. District of Columbia · filed 1982-10-27

As a result, this Court must dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 and direct constitutional claims for damages as they apply to defendants whose liability rests on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely through respondeat superior.

Clark v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1982-11-03

The only way by which the latter two defendants could be held liable is upon an application of respondeat superior. This doctrine has, however, been explicitly rejected by the Sixth Circuit in the recent case of Hayes v. Jefferson County. In light of Hayes, the Court will not belabor the point. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED with respect to defendants Mintzes and Michigan Department of Corrections.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city or supervisory officials solely under respondeat superior.

Silo v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1984-08-29

Absent proof of such a policy, Mr. Silo has alleged only that Judge Bradley, Mr. Campbell, and the City are liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Section 1983 does not impose liability on this theory.

Section 1983 does not make a local government official liable solely for employees’ acts under a theory of respondeat superior.

Todd v. Navarro · filed 1988-03-31

In this regard Plaintiffs complaint is deficient because neither of these Defendants may be held liable under § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 bars respondeat superior liability regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks prospective relief.

Reynolds v. DeBuono · filed 2007-10-31

We join several of our sister circuits in adopting the view that Monell's bar on respondeat superior liability under § 1983 applies regardless of the category of relief sought.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a deputy’s actions.

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill. · filed 2009-05-18

Monell and a host of later cases firmly establish that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a sheriff for a deputy’s actions.

Askew v. Cook County Sheriff · filed 2009-05-18

Monell and a host of later cases firmly establish that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Tanner v. Kenney · filed 2009-07-28

The district court properly dismissed Tanner’s claims against defendants Quinn and Kollasch because “[t]here is no re-spondeat superior liability under, section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

OWENS-ALI v. Pennell · filed 2009-12-04

Respondeat superior liability is unavailable under § 1983 and, therefore, Plaintiffs claims are legally baseless.

Section 1983 does not allow liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

Jones v. Michigan · filed 2010-03-18

However, § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 liability cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Dickson v. City of Clovis · filed 2010-04-01

Section 1983 liability cannot be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a government entity or official for another person's actions.

Gomez v. City of Fremont · filed 2010-07-21

The Court also grants summary judgment in part on claim ten because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison health provider liable for its employees’ misconduct solely through respondeat superior.

Weigher v. Prison Health Services · filed 2010-11-23

Because a § 1983 claim cannot be grounded in a theory of respondeat superior, Weigher‟s claim against PHS fails.

Section 1983 does not permit a school board to be held liable solely for its superintendent’s actions.

McComas v. Board of Education, Rock Hill · filed 2011-05-10

To the extent that McComas attempts to hold the Board liable based on Evans’s actions, this claim also fails. See Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 589 (“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability in actions under § 1983 . . . .”).

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against the Public Defender Service based solely on its attorneys’ actions under a respondeat superior theory.

Martin v. the Public Defender Service · filed 2011-05-16

"Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability." ... Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs claim against the Public Defender Service rests on a respondeat superior theory, his claims fail.

Section 1983 does not allow derivative liability based solely on an employer’s relationship with the person who allegedly violated a right.

Ramos v. Patnaude · filed 2011-05-23

Since the group had no contract with the House of Correction, and in any case because respondeat superior is not a channel of derivative liability in a § 1983 action, Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005), the trial judge could not understand why the medical practice group had been sued, and neither can we.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Afdahl v. Cancellieri · filed 2012-02-24

As the District Court explained, however, liability under § 1983 cannot be based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not allow a private company to be held liable solely for its employee’s actions under respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Savoie v. Martin · filed 2012-03-06

Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Savoie cannot pursue a claim of liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability against Stites & Harbison pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Royster v. Nichols · filed 2012-10-30

Even assuming that Plaza Security is a state actor for § 1983 purposes, we hold that Royster's claims against Plaza Security and the Board fail as a matter of law. First, "respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Bell v. Kan. City Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Section 1983 does not hold a defendant liable solely because it employs people who may have violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Martin v. Johnson · filed 2013-12-11

The district court properly dismissed Martin’s claim against defendant P.N.A./C.H.C. because a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs individuals who may have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and Martin alleged only that P.N.A./C.H.C. “allowed their staff to operate below standards.”

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on an employer’s relationship to an employee.

Carter v. Broward County Sheriff's Department Medical Department · filed 2014-03-10

However, as the district court noted, § 1983 claims cannot be based solely on theories of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Cooper v. McCollum · filed 2014-04-29

The Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and, that in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each defendant.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a county for the actions of its officials.

Tilli v. Ford · filed 2014-05-06

The District Court further concluded that Tilli failed to state a claim against Lehigh County because it is not the “employer” of the elected individual defendants and, even if it were, there is no respondeat superior liability in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ... There is no arguable basis to challenge the District Court’s rulings in this case for the reasons that it thoroughly and adequately explained.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff seeking to hold a company liable must show that its policy directly caused a constitutional injury.

Pyles v. Fahim · filed 2014-11-13

Finally, with regard to Mr. Pyles’s claim against Wexford, because § 1983 does not permit liability to rest on the doctrine of respondeat superior, Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1145–46 (7th Cir. 2013), Mr. Pyles was required to show that a Wexford policy was the “direct cause” of or “moving force” behind his constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a corporation for its employees’ actions; liability requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

Kelly v. Ambroski · filed 2015-03-31

For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report and accepts his recommendation. ... Specifically, while a corporation providing prison medical services may be liable under § 1983 if it is established that the constitutional violation was the result of the corporation’s policy or custom, such a corporation may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Grayson v. City of Aurora · filed 2016-01-17

The Court accordingly dismisses this claim on this basis and because respondeat superior is not available as a remedy under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on an agency solely for the actions of its agents.

Jimenez v. Wizel · filed 2016-02-17

Even if it is not a state agency, though, Jimenez’s claim still fails because the only allegation he raised was that DCF is liable for the actions of its agents, and “[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not allow damages based on respondeat superior liability.

Green v. Schmelzle · filed 2016-09-28

A plaintiff cannot recover damages based on a responde-at superior theory of liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior or mere negligence; the defendant’s deliberate indifference must be the moving force behind the unconstitutional deprivation.

Gentry Smith v. v. Horton · filed 2016-11-23

Liability under § 1983 may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior or on a finding of mere negligence; rather, the defendants’ deliberate indifference must be the “moving force” behind the unconstitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for an employee’s alleged constitutional violation under respondeat superior.

Li v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-31

And just as a municipal entity cannot be held liable under respondeat superior, a private corporation cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of its employee.

Section 1983 does not make a county or sheriff's department liable for its officers' actions solely under a respondeat superior theory.

McGarry v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners for the Cnty. of Lincoln · filed 2018-02-28

McGarry's respondeat superior claim fails, because § 1983 does not give rise to respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical contractor liable solely for its employees’ acts; the complaint must allege a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Glenn v. Myers · filed 2018-06-07

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state any other ground on which MHM may be liable pursuant to § 1983, other than through the actions of its employees, and because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to identify any policy or custom creating the required causal connection between MHM and its employee(s), Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against MHM fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 generally does not allow respondeat superior liability for a subordinate's actions.

Green v. Florez · filed 2018-11-16

First, respondeat superior liability generally does not apply in the context of § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a county or a private company acting under color of state law liable solely for its employees’ acts; the entity must be liable for its own acts.

Carr v. El Paso County, Colorado · filed 2018-12-04

But El Paso County, as a governmental entity, “cannot be held liable [under § 1983] for the acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior,” Brammer-Hoelter, 602 F.3d at 1188, and neither can Correct Care Solutions, a private company acting under color of state law, see Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1216.

Section 1983 does not allow respondeat superior liability.

Jones v. Gadsden County Schools · filed 2019-03-04

Furthermore, as Jones correctly acknowledges, respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ actions solely because of the employment relationship.

Mister v. Nawoor · filed 2019-05-28

Plaintiff’s claims against Wexford, based on its status as Defendants’ employer cannot proceed, however, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer for a subordinate’s civil rights violation solely because of their employment relationship.

Schenke v. Phelps · filed 2019-06-17

The doctrine of respondeat superior, which allows an employer to be held liable for subordinates’ actions in some types of cases, has no application to § 1983 actions for civil rights violations.

Section 1983 liability is personal and cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Gaddis v. Belk · filed 2019-06-17

Further, Defendant Payne cannot be held liable for the alleged acts of the other officers because liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely because it employs the person who allegedly violated a right.

Johnson v. TFC Scott Sears 5563 · filed 2019-07-09

To the extent that he seeks relief from Barrack V for employing Sears, his claims necessarily fail, because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely because it employs a person who allegedly violated constitutional rights.

Graves v. Westford Health Service · filed 2019-07-17

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private medical company solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a prisoner’s rights.

Solis v. West · filed 2019-08-23

However, even if he had alleged that Nurse West or Nurse Jeanine violated his rights, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely because it employed the person who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

PARKER v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. · filed 2019-09-03

As discussed above, respondeat superior liability will not support a claim pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely through an agency relationship with the person who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Ridgley v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2019-09-13

However, liability through a mere agency relationship is not available for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Cleveland v. Warden · filed 2019-09-24

Even if Cleveland had sued the company that employs the medical staff, he could not proceed here because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on employers for their employees’ actions.

Cleveland v. DOC · filed 2019-09-25

In some cases, an employer can be liable for the actions of employees, but there is no such general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private prison medical contractor or a warden solely for employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

Stedman v. Pierce · filed 2019-09-30

Wexford and Warden Bishop cannot be held liable for the acts of Wexford employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Thus, Stedman has not stated a viable § 1983 claim against Wexford or the Warden.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Rodriguez v. Newsom · filed 2019-10-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Hopkins v. Ahern · filed 2019-10-10

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Brown v. Wine · filed 2019-10-23

Brown has also sued Wexford Medical Services, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Brown’s allegations against Wexford appears to be based only on the poor decisions that its staff made in connection with his care, he cannot proceed against Wexford.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Banks v. Ivy · filed 2019-10-25

Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit an imposition of liability solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Johnson v. Daugherty · filed 2019-11-04

The corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government entity solely because it employed the alleged wrongdoer.

Hudson v. People of the State of California · filed 2019-11-08

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant employs or supervises an alleged wrongdoer.

Morris v. State of California · filed 2019-11-26

First, there is no respondeat superior liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability.

Stanley v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2019-12-02

Stanley has sued only Wexford Medical Services, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Neisser v. Wexford Health Services, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10

Additionally, plaintiff makes no direct allegations against Wexford. Instead, he seeks to hold Wexford liable for the actions of its employees. As noted, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison contractor liable for an employee’s conduct solely because it employs that person.

Bason v. Stover · filed 2019-12-27

But Core Civic cannot be liable under § 1983 for the conduct of its employee Stover solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.

Respondeat superior does not apply to a § 1983 claim against an individual defendant when the plaintiff has sued no employer or other entity.

Banks 504504 v. Torrey · filed 2020-01-10

As the Magistrate Judge observed, respondeat superior in inapplicable because “Plaintiff has not asserted a claim against Defendant’s employer or any other entity (ECF No. 47 at PageID.476). This objection is denied.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an entity merely because it employs someone who violated a person’s rights.

Craig v. CDCR · filed 2020-01-17

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a department solely for the actions of its employees.

Lacy v. Jones · filed 2020-01-27

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow vicarious liability for another person’s misconduct.

Robison v. Department of Insurance, Finanical Institutions and Professional Registration · filed 2020-02-04

Robison’s claim for respondeat superior liability against DIFP also fails. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (no vicarious liability under § 1983 because government officials are liable for only their own misconduct).

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a private prison medical company for its employees’ conduct.

Creer v. Livers · filed 2020-02-11

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on private prison contractors for their employees’ acts.

Gunn v. Management Training Corp · filed 2020-02-27

This attempt cannot succeed, as there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a private corporation to be held liable solely for its employees’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Lee v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC · filed 2020-02-27

Rather, courts in this Circuit consistently conclude that “Monell extends to private corporations and thus they cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for their employees’ conduct.” ... Thus, plaintiff’s claim for respondeat superior liability under § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Springer v. Wexford Health · filed 2020-03-11

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Lyons v. Franklin County, Kentucky · filed 2020-03-16

Defendants are correct that respondeat superior principles are inapplicable in the context of a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of others’ civil rights.

Barker v. Ritter · filed 2020-03-23

In some fields of law, an employer is liable for things the employee does wrong, but there is no such general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a medical provider based solely on respondeat superior liability.

Blackmon v. Myers · filed 2020-04-06

This defendant is not mentioned anywhere in the statement of claim, and Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against the medical provider based solely on a theory of respondeat superior liability because it is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a parole board for money damages.

Swegman v. Indiana Parole District · filed 2020-04-07

Second, to the extent he seeks money damages, he cannot proceed against the Indiana Parole Board because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.