42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a nuclear licensee to enforce federal rights conferred by the Atomic Energy Act against a local government.

Kerr-Mcgee Chemical Corporation v. City of West Chicago · filed 1990-09-20

We do not need to decide today whether a private cause of action is implied in the AEA because we find that Kerr-McGee may rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the federal “rights, privileges or immunities” found in the AEA itself.

Section 1983 permits a juvenile detainee to enforce rights under the Juvenile Justice Act when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Grenier Ex Rel. Grenier v. Kennebec County · filed 1990-09-28

Grenier may use section 1983 to seek relief from the alleged injuries he has suffered as a result of the alleged infringement of his rights under the Juvenile Justice Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim to remedy injuries under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, because that Act does not preclude the remedy.

Pendleton v. Jefferson Local School District · filed 1990-12-20

Therefore, the plaintiff can use Section 1983 to remedy injuries brought under Section 794.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal statutory rights unless Congress forecloses that remedy through a comprehensive remedial scheme or an explicit, exclusive private cause of action.

Artist M. v. Gordon Johnson and Gary T. Morgan · filed 1990-12-20

In the absence of either a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of a statute or an explicit, exclusive private cause of action found in the statute itself, Congress cannot be said to have intended to foreclose Section 1983 as a remedial vehicle for statutory violations.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s protection against discharge based on a single wage garnishment.

Johnson v. Town of Trail Creek · filed 1991-07-22

If the defendants discharged Mr. Johnson by reason of the garnishment proceedings embodied by the LaPorte Superior Court’s order, they may be found to have deprived Mr. Johnson of his rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a). An action may be maintained for that deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce Title IV-D child support service rights when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1991-09-18

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs do have standing under § 1983 to bring this action to enforce their claims for Title IV-D child support enforcement services.

Section 1983 does not allow foster children to enforce the Child Welfare Act’s Part B § 627 or Part E § 671 provisions when those provisions give them no enforceable rights.

Del A. v. Roemer · filed 1991-10-21

The plaintiffs therefore do not have an enforceable right under § 1983 for violations of section 627 in Part B or section 671 in Part E.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Medicaid Act because Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Babbitt v. State of Mich. · filed 1991-10-30

Congress has not foreclosed enforcement of the Medicaid Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private plaintiffs to enforce the reasonable efforts requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).

Winston ex rel. Winston v. Children & Youth Services of Delaware County · filed 1991-11-07

We therefore conclude that subsection 671(a)(15) creates rights enforceable by private plaintiffs.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claimed violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s Class III gaming provision because that provision creates no enforceable federal right.

Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Doyle · filed 1993-01-26

Because plaintiffs have not shown that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act creates enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983 it is not necessary to reach the second question of whether Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits public housing tenants to enforce procedural requirements of HUD utility allowance regulations implementing the Brooke Amendment when challenging the reasonableness of allowances.

Dorsey v. Housing Authority Of Baltimore City · filed 1993-01-26

We thus reverse the district court's determination that Tenants have no enforceable rights to challenge procedural violations of the regulations promulgated under the Brooke Amendment.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Waiver Program’s mandatory requirements, including reasonable per capita expenditure estimates.

Wood v. Wallace · filed 1993-03-30

The Waiver Program provisions therefore, create a right, the violation of which is actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients and providers to enforce rights under the Medicaid Equal Access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Arkansas Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 1993-04-20

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Orders dated August 18, 1992 and November 5, 1992, the Court finds that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (Supp.1992) (the "Equal Access” provision), plaintiffs have enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that each of the plaintiffs has standing.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal statutory right only when the underlying statute unambiguously confers that right.

Evelyn v. v. Kings County Hospital Center · filed 1993-04-21

A few principles are discerned: (1) the two-prong test first articulated in Golden State, and not expressly repudiated by Suter, remains a useful tool in considering whether a private plaintiff can sue under § 1983 to enforce statutory rights; but (2) in applying this test, courts must look carefully at the precise language of any statute relied on by plaintiffs as the source of the right they seek to enforce; and (3) the right at issue must be unambiguously conferred by the statute.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of a federal statute only if that statute creates a federal right for the plaintiff.

McMaster v. State of Minn. · filed 1993-04-29

However, a mere violation of federal law will not support a section 1983 claim: section 1983 can be used to enforce a federal statute only if the statute creates a federal right.

Section 1983 does not allow health care providers to enforce Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision because that provision creates no federal right in providers.

Nutritional Support Services, L.P. v. Miller · filed 1993-06-30

Because the Court concludes that the freedom of choice provision was not intended to benefit Plaintiffs, the Court also concludes that § 1396a(a)(23) does not create a federal right that they may enforce under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal prevailing-wage rights under § 5310, and allegations that municipal contract restrictions effectively compelled a private contractor to underpay wages satisfy its state-action requirement.

Chan v. City of New York · filed 1993-07-26

In sum, we conclude that Sec. 1983 is available as a remedy for state action that violated Sec. 5310. ... In sum, the facts alleged would suffice to permit a finding that HPD effectively required CPC to pay less than the minimum wages required by Sec. 5310, that the actions of CPC in paying those subminimum wages were the responsibility of the municipal defendants, and that CPC's conduct was therefore state action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of § 5310's prevailing-wage rights against state actors despite the absence of an implied private action under § 5310, because Congress has not affirmatively withdrawn the § 1983 remedy.

Chan v. City of New York · filed 1993-07-26

Though there can be no implied direct private right of action unless Congress demonstrably intended to create one, the § 1983 remedy is presumptively available unless Congress has affirmatively withdrawn it. ... In sum, we conclude that § 1983 is available as a remedy for state action that violated § 5310.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the right to a substantially compliant Title IV-D child-support program because a funding-reduction remedy is insufficient to establish congressional intent to foreclose such suits.

King v. Bradley · filed 1993-08-09

The only remedial measure provided under Title IV-D is a reduction in funding. This is insufficient evidence of Congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement of the right under § 1983.

A requirement to submit a satisfactory emergency-assistance state plan does not establish a sufficient likelihood of rights enforceable under Section 1983 to support a mandatory preliminary injunction.

Fountain v. Kelly · filed 1993-08-23

The State’s only obligation under the Social Security Act, however, is to submit a satisfactory plan, and Suter establishes that this is insufficient to create a private right of action. ... It is not for this court, however, to question the Supreme Court’s adherence to its own precedents; we hold only that the prospects of distinguishing Suter are too bleak to entitle appellants to reversal here.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries of the public trust created by the Hawaii Admission Act to sue trustees for breach of trust because the Act creates federally enforceable rights.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1993-08-23

Congress enacted the Admission Act, a federal public trust, which by its nature creates a federally enforceable right for its beneficiaries to maintain an action against the trustee in breach of the trust. As a beneficiary, Price may therefore bring a § 1983 action under the Hawaii Admission Act against the trustees.

Section 1983 permits AFDC families to enforce Title IV-D's mandatory child support service requirements because its fiscal sanctions do not constitute a comprehensive remedial scheme foreclosing private enforcement.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1993-10-13

Title IV-D does contain an enforcement scheme in the form of fiscal sanctions the federal government may assert against the State, but these remedial measures are neither comprehensive nor available to the class. The federal government's authority to audit and impose monetary sanctions does not constitute "comprehensive" remedies. ... Our analysis under Wilder and Suter leads us to the conclusion that the Howe class may assert their claims under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits AFDC families to enforce Title IV-D child support services rights because its specific, mandatory obligations create enforceable rights and its fiscal sanctions do not foreclose private remedies.

Howe v. Ellenbecker · filed 1993-10-13

As a general rule, plaintiffs may bring private causes of action under section 1983 for violations of federal statutes. ... The mandates of Title IV-D are particular and specific enough to impose binding obligations on South Dakota, and accordingly, create substantive enforceable rights in the class. ... We see no enforcement provisions in Title IV-D that show a congressional intent to foreclose these Indian women and children from asserting private remedies.

Section 1983 may provide a remedy for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act because that Act does not preclude a section 1983 action.

Independent Housing Services v. Fillmore Center Associates · filed 1993-12-28

The court adopts Judge Norris’s reasoning and holds that the ADA does not preclude an action under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal spending statute only if its plain language imposes a direct obligation on the state in favor of intended private beneficiaries.

Eric L. by and Through Schierberl v. Bird · filed 1994-03-31

In the meantime, this court necessarily concludes that Wilder has been significantly modified by Suter, such that now a federal spending statute cannot be said to confer a right privately enforceable under § 1983 unless, at a minimum, the “plain language” of the statute imposes a “direct obligation” on the state, in favor of intended private beneficiaries.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce rights created by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act when Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court · filed 1994-04-21

Having thus determined that the Act creates a federally secured right and that Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement, we hold that appellant was and is entitled to seek relief through a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statutory right when the provision benefits the plaintiff, imposes a mandatory duty, and is definite enough for judicial enforcement.

Sobky v. Smoley · filed 1994-06-14

First, because they have not been repudiated, Golden State and Wilder still provide the basic framework in deciding whether an enforceable federal right exists under § 1983. Thus, the provision sought to be enforced must be “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,” must be mandatory rather than hortatory, and must not be so vague as to be “beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.”

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries to enforce the school-placement rights conferred by the McKinney Act’s section 11432(e)(3).

Brenda Lampkin, as Legal Guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, Minors v. District of Columbia, a Municipal · filed 1994-07-28

We conclude, from the foregoing, that section 11432(e)(3) of the McKinney Act confers enforceable rights on its beneficiaries and that appellants may invoke section 1983 to enforce those rights.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of federal statutory rights when agency oversight does not provide a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to foreclose that remedy.

Randy v. Tompkins · filed 1994-08-29

Nothing in Carelli remotely suggests that mere oversight by the Secretary in and of itself constitutes a remedial scheme so comprehensive as to foreclose a private remedy pursuant to § 1983; such a suggestion would not only be implausible, but would also be contrary to the explicit holding of Wilder.

Section 1983 permits rural water service users to enforce rights conferred by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) because that provision creates judicially enforceable rights and Congress supplied no comprehensive enforcement mechanism.

Wayne v. Village Of Sebring · filed 1994-09-29

Thus, pursuant to Sec. 1983, Sec. 1926(b) gives rise to a private right of action on the part of rural water service users.

Section 1983 gives rural water service users a private right of action to enforce their rights under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b).

Wayne v. Village of Sebring · filed 1994-09-29

And Congress provided no enforcement mechanism for protecting the right that § 1926(b) creates. Thus, pursuant to § 1983, § 1926(b) gives rise to a private right of action on the part of rural water service users.

Section 1983 permits noninstitutional Medicaid providers to enforce the reimbursement and equal access obligations of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against state officials.

Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen · filed 1994-10-12

The legislative history, and the context in which that history was made, supports the conclusion that Congress created obligations directly enforceable on the states, and did so for the benefit of these providers.

Section 1983 permits ANFC and Food Stamp applicants, including those ultimately denied benefits, to enforce their federal right to a timely eligibility decision.

Robidoux v. Kitchel · filed 1995-02-13

In light of these protections afforded to applicants who are subsequently denied benefits, we conclude that these individuals have rights that may be enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits native Hawaiian beneficiaries to pursue claims for breach of federal trust duties under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as incorporated by the Hawaii Admission Act.

Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 1995-03-14

Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that: (1) the Aged Hawaiians have asserted a viable claim under § 1983 alleging a breach of trust duties by the Appellees under the HHCA (via the Admission Act); and (2) the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal housing statutes through implementing regulations specific enough to create an individual right, absent congressional foreclosure of that remedy.

Simmons v. Charleston Housing Authority · filed 1995-03-22

The Hurt Court determined, and this Court concurs, the implementing regulations of the USHA and the LBPPPA are specific enough to create a § 1983 “right” in the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes such actions.

Veal v. Memorial Hospital of Washington County · filed 1995-07-31

In the court’s considered judgment, the remedial scheme created by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, communicates the intention of Congress to preclude § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of an unambiguously conferred federal statutory right unless Congress expressly forecloses that remedy or implicitly forecloses it through a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Buckley v. City of Redding · filed 1995-09-13

The nature of the section 1983 remedy remains broad and may be used to remedy infringement of any unambiguously conferred right, privilege, or immunity, so long as Congress has not foreclosed use of the remedy explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing the act in question with its own comprehensive remedial scheme.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce a state’s direct obligations to them under Title IV-D even when the state substantially complies with the program’s audit requirements.

Davis v. McClaran · filed 1995-10-30

To summarize, we hold that a plaintiff may bring an action pursuant to § 1983 to enforce the state’s “direct obligations” to him or her under Title IV-D; and that this right is not dependent upon whether the State is in “substantial compliance” with the requirements of Title IV-D for purposes of the Secretary’s audit.

Section 1983 does not allow enforcement of the Older Americans Act’s intrastate funding-formula requirements because those requirements are too amorphous to create enforceable rights.

The City Of Chicago v. Lindley · filed 1995-11-22

Accordingly, we hold that the City does not have a right, enforceable under Sec. 1983, to challenge the particular factors that are included in or excluded from Lindley's funding formula. The OAA's requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C) are too amorphous to create rights enforceable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the right to recreational boating access conferred by the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act.

Buckley v. City of Redding · filed 1995-11-30

Because the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act confers a right enforceable through section 1983, the district court erred in dismissing Buckley's and PWIA's suit for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits suit to enforce rights under the National Voter Registration Act without complying with that Act’s notice requirement.

Ass'n of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller · filed 1995-12-13

For these reasons, I conclude that the above plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under § 1983. Because notice is not required by this statute, the above plaintiffs’ failure to provide notice is wholly irrelevant.

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of CAPTA’s child abuse investigation and protection requirement because it leaves the state discretion over how to investigate and protect children.

Tony'' v. Childers, II · filed 1995-12-20

Despite this quandary, we hold that Plaintiffs have no enforceable rights under this provision of CAPTA. The statute and regulations at issue are more like those in Suter (no guidelines) than those in Wilder (mandatory guidelines). Ultimately, neither CAPTA nor the relevant regulations mandate a particular means of investigation or state what type of actions must be taken to protect abused or neglected children.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a federal statutory violation unless the statute creates an enforceable right intended to benefit the plaintiff.

Lochman v. County Of Charlevoix · filed 1996-09-03

There is no § 1983 remedy for violation of a federal statute unless the statute creates "rights, privileges, or immunities"; the violation of every federal statute does not lead to the conclusion that § 1983 provides a remedy.

Section 1983 allows health care providers to enforce a statutory right to reasonable Medicaid reimbursement even when state administrative review is available.

Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer · filed 1996-12-09

4. Section 1983 protects the statutory right to reasonable reimbursement through the Medicaid program to providers of health care services, despite the availability of state administrative review procedures.

Section 1983 allows public housing tenants to enforce their federal right to an enforceable grievance procedure under the Housing Act.

Farley v. Phila Housing Auth · filed 1996-12-17

We also hold that Farley can bring a § 1983 action to enforce her federal right to implement the grievance procedure provided for in the Housing Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violations of the Pittman-Robertson Act because that Act creates an enforceable federal right and Congress did not foreclose this remedy.

Sportsmen's Wildlife Defense Fund v. United States Department of the Interior · filed 1996-12-26

I conclude that the PR Act creates a “federal right” that is enforceable under § 1983. ... Thus, I conclude Congress did not foreclose an action under § 1983 for violations of the P-R Act.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a rural water association to enforce rights conferred by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) against an encroaching municipality.

Rural Water System 1 v. City of Sioux Center · filed 1997-05-27

Second, this court holds that one means to enforce the rights created by § 1926(b) is a cause of action pursuant to, but not for “violation” of, § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a medical provider to enforce the Medicaid equal access provision when that provision creates an enforceable right for the provider and Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement.

Moody Emergency Medical Service, Inc. v. City of Millbrook · filed 1997-06-12

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that Section 1396a(a)(30)(A) creates a private enforceable right and that Moody Emergency Medical Service as a medical provider is an intended beneficiary of that right. Therefore, Moody may pursue a claim under Section 1983 to enforce the requirement that the state plan provide reimbursement methods and procedures which ensure the participation of enough health care providers so that Medicaid recipients have access to services and care at least to the extent as the same is available to the insured population in the same geographic area.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of ADA or Rehabilitation Act rights when those statutes provide sufficiently comprehensive remedies.

Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners · filed 1997-07-03

However, it is equally clear that Congress would not have intended that plaintiffs seek redress for violations of their ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights through the vehicle of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act creates substantive rights and does not foreclose § 1983 enforcement.

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton · filed 1997-10-06

The TCA does not implicitly or explicitly foreclose § 1983 suits. More particularly, the TCA does not provide a comprehensive enforcement scheme intended to supplant a § 1983 remedy.

Section 1983 is available to enforce individual rights under Part H of the IDEA because the IDEA does not foreclose that remedy.

Marie O. v. Edgar · filed 1997-12-02

Consequently, we hold that not only did Congress not intend to foreclose resort to § 1983 in Part H, but it actually provided for its availability to enforce the IDEA.

Section 1983 allows enforcement of federal statutory rights unless the statute creates no enforceable right or Congress expressly forecloses private enforcement.

Coalition for Homeless v. Dshs · filed 1997-12-24

Section 1983 is to be broadly construed to provide coverage unless (1) the federal statute involved does not create enforceable rights, privileges or immunities, or (2) Congress has expressly foreclosed private enforcement within the terms of the statute itself.

Section 1983 lets food retailers enforce the Food Stamp Act’s prohibition on imposing the costs of a computerized food stamp system on participating retailers.

Pennsylvania Food Merchants Ass'n v. Houstoun · filed 1998-01-21

With these principles in mind, it is obvious that the plaintiffs can enforce, section 2016(g)(2) by way of section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a wireless service provider to enforce rights under § 332(c)(7) of the Telecommunications Act against a local zoning board acting under color of state law.

SMART SMR OF NY v. Zoning Com'n of Town of Stratford · filed 1998-02-17

... we find that a section 1983 elaim-is available to Nextel. As a local zoning board, the Commission acted under the color of state law. ... Also, by violating section 332(c)(7) of the Act, we find that the Commission deprived Nextel of its federally guaranteed rights.

Section 1983 permits claims for consequential damages arising from FMLA violations because the FMLA does not foreclose that remedy.

Knussman v. State of Md. · filed 1998-08-13

The Court therefore concludes that Congress did not intend to foreclose FMLA enforcement by actions under § 1983, and plaintiff may assert his claims for consequential damages resulting from violations of the FMLA under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an enforceable federal statutory right unless Congress expressly or implicitly forecloses that remedy.

National Warranty Insurance v. Greenfield · filed 1998-08-17

Thus, NWIC may bring its claim under § 1983 unless such an action is expressly or implicitly foreclosed by Congress. Nothing in the LRRA suggests that Congress expressly intended to foreclose the § 1983 remedy. Nor has Congress impliedly foreclosed this remedy by providing a comprehensive remedial scheme within the LRRA itself.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act because the Act does not provide an exclusive means of enforcing those rights.

Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska · filed 1998-09-17

The villages’ claims based on violations of the ICWA, which provided the basis for the district court’s declaratory judgment, are within the scope of § 1983 and support an award of fees under § 1988.

Section 1983 can enforce federal statutory rights unless the statute’s remedial scheme shows congressional intent to preclude that remedy.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1983-05-31

Further, the Model Cities Act clearly lacks a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme that would evidence a congressional intent to preclude a § 1983 suit as a remedy for its violation.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of rights under §§ 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act does not foreclose the remedy.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Southern New England Telephone Co. · filed 1998-09-29

The court further finds that Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement of §§ 251 and 252, either expressly in the 1996 Act itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with private enforcement under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce the federal rights identified in the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid Act provisions at issue.

Reynolds v. Giuliani · filed 1999-01-25

In light of the Court’s ruling that plaintiffs have stated claims under § 1983, the Court need not resolve the analytically distinct issue of whether the statutes and regulations on which plaintiffs rely can support private rights of action independent of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce a federal civil rights statute even if that statute provides no express or implied private right of action.

Altman v. Bedford Central School District · filed 1999-05-21

Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, a private right of action exists by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of a federal civil rights statute even where the statute does not provide an express or implied private right of action.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce rights under the Nursing Home Reform Amendments when the complaint sufficiently alleges them.

Rolland v. Cellucci · filed 1999-06-04

In particular, the court finds section 1983 to be an appropriate vehicle to vindicate NHRA-based rights and Plaintiffs have made a sufficient claim for relief thereunder.

Section 1983 permits an advocacy system to enforce its federal statutory right to access records against state officials when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Advocacy Center v. Stalder · filed 1999-07-30

Therefore this court concludes that the Advocacy Center is not precluded from bringing a § 1983 action against the defendants.

Section 1983 permits intended beneficiaries to enforce a binding federal statutory right when the right is sufficiently concrete for judicial enforcement.

National Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Face · filed 1999-09-10

The plaintiff has a federally enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This test is satisfied here because (1) nonfederally chartered housing creditors belonging to NHEMA are intended beneficiaries of the Parity Act, (2) the Parity Act creates a present right to be free of state law, and (3) the judicial remedies being sought are traditional and well established.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against state officials for alleged violations of § 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act.

Dittman v. State of California State and Consumer Affairs Agency Medical Board of California Acupuncture Com · filed 1999-09-14

In summary, we conclude that a private plaintiff may not maintain an action against a state official — either in her official or her individual capacity — under § 1983 to remedy alleged violations of § 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act.

Section 1983 permits food stamp recipients to enforce their individual fair hearing rights under the Food Stamp Act.

Meachem v. Wing · filed 1999-12-09

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs may assert claims pursuant to § 1983 based on defendants’ alleged violations of the sections of the Food Stamp Act that guarantee them fair hearings in accordance with the standards provided for by federal law.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a federal statute only when the plaintiff asserts a federal right, rather than merely a violation of federal law.

Charlie H. v. Whitman · filed 2000-01-27

However, in order to seek redress under Section 1983, Plaintiffs “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute to allege the violation of an individually enforceable right; the cited Title IV-D service provisions do not confer such a right.

Davis v. Eubanks and DHS · filed 2000-03-31

In conclusion, we hold that the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Director of Child Support Services under 1983 because the complaint fails to successfully allege the violation of an individually enforceable right under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, also known as the Child Support Enforcement Act.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights conferred by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act does not exclude § 1983 actions.

AT&T Wireless PCS Inc. v. City of Atlanta · filed 2000-04-26

Because Congress did not expressly exclude § 1983 remedies from the TCA plaintiffs arsenal, § 1983 actions are not so excluded.

Section 1983 allows eligible individuals to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement.

Boulet v. Cellucci · filed 2000-07-19

In short, I find plaintiffs meet the requirements necessary to show that § 1396a(a)(8) establishes a federal right which the plaintiffs may enforce with a § 1983 lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce the cited foster care plan provisions of the Adoption Assistance Act because their language is too imprecise for judicial enforcement.

Daniel H. Ex Rel. Hardaway H. v. City of New York · filed 2000-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds that plaintiffs do not have an implied private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute to assert a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Brian A. Ex Rel. Brooks v. Sundquist · filed 2000-10-26

In order to seek redress through Section 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 does not let an incumbent local exchange carrier enforce Telecommunications Act negotiation and bundling provisions that were not intended to benefit incumbent carriers.

Verizon North, Inc. v. Strand · filed 2000-12-06

No evidence has been presented that the FTA’s provisions regarding negotiation and bundling were designed to benefit the Plaintiff or incumbent LECs generally. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients, but not health care providers, to sue to enforce the equal access right in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood · filed 2000-12-11

However, we conclude that because section 30(A) did not confer upon providers an "individual entitlement" to a particular level of payment, the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that they are intended beneficiaries of the section. Furthermore, we find that section 30(A) is sufficiently definite for the judiciary to enforce and that Congress intended to impose a binding obligation on states when it enacted the section. As such, the recipient plaintiffs may maintain a suit under § 1983 to redress violations of the federal rights conferred upon them by section 30(A).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b) because Congress did not foreclose that remedy.

Rural Water District No. 1 v. City of Wilson · filed 2001-03-22

With these principles in mind, we conclude that Congress has not foreclosed a § 1983 remedy for violations of § 1926(b).

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for a city’s violation of the federal right created by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c).

Anna S. Petrey, D/B/A Magnum Towing v. City of Toledo · filed 2001-04-02

Because Petrey’s federal right under § 14501(c) not to be regulated was violated, and because § 1983 relief was available for the violation of that right, we remand this case to the district court for a determination of the amount of damages, if any, that Petrey has incurred due to the violation of her federal right, as well as whether Petrey is entitled to attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce the Medicaid Act’s equal access and quality of care requirements as federal rights.

Antrican v. Buell · filed 2001-04-17

Additionally, equal access and quality of care are sufficiently specific and detailed to create an enforceable right under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a private action to enforce the temporary appraiser licensing right created by 12 U.S.C. § 3351(a).

Groten v. California · filed 2001-06-01

We conclude that Groten may maintain a cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed Groten’s § 1983 claim for a violation of § 3351(a).

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce ADA and Rehabilitation Act § 504 rights when Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 2001-07-23

Because the Defendants have not fulfilled their burden of establishing that Congress intended to foreclose relief through section 1983, I cannot make such a finding. Moreover, as the legislative history reveals, it seems that Congress in fact intended to permit redress of ADA and section 504 violations through section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of federal rights under the TCA.

Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains · filed 2001-12-04

I conclude, however, that § 1983 affords plaintiff relief, in the form of damages, for any violations of the TCA committed by defendants.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a statute or regulation that creates no federal right for the plaintiff.

Lechuga v. Crosley · filed 2002-01-10

Plaintiffs have no federal right upon which to base their Section 1983 claim and this action should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid providers to enforce the Medicaid Act’s Section 30(A) because that provision was not intended to benefit them.

Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association v. Houstoun. · filed 2002-03-13

In sum, we are convinced that Section 30(A) is not intended to benefit providers and that therefore providers may not assert a Section 30(A) claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 presumptively permits enforcement of a federal statutory right unless Congress forecloses that remedy.

Cox Communications PCS, L.P. v. City of San Marcos · filed 2002-04-18

When a statute creates a federal right, a “rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983” exists. ... The court dismisses § 1983 claim as it relates to Sprint’s constitutional claim, but denies defendants’ motion to dismiss as it relates to Sprint’s federal rights claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue a state official in her individual capacity to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Vinson v. Thomas · filed 2002-05-03

We therefore join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 permits an action to enforce section 5(f) of the Admissions Act.

Arakaki v. Cayetano · filed 2002-05-08

Any action to enforce section 5(f) of the Admissions Act may instead be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because the Act provides a comprehensive enforcement mechanism.

Shepard v. Irving · filed 2002-06-05

A person cannot enforce the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to Section 1983 because the Act provides a specific comprehensive internal enforcement mechanism structured to protect the rights of disabled individuals.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state officials to enforce rights protected by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).

Higgins v. Beyer · filed 2002-06-12

We are persuaded that S 5301(a) provides a federal right that is enforceable under S 1983.

Section 1983 permits a veteran to enforce against state officials the right to benefits protected by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).

Higgins v. Beyer · filed 2002-06-12

We are persuaded that § 5301(a) provides a federal right that is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits tenants to enforce QHWRA’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing because that duty benefits them, is judicially manageable, and binds the states.

Reese v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2002-07-02

Plaintiffs attempt to enforce their QHWRA claim through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... First, any provision requiring governmental agencies to “affirmatively further fair housing” is clearly intended to benefit, among others, individuals such as the Plaintiffs in this case. Second, Plaintiffs’ right to have governmental agencies affirmatively further fair housing does not appear to be so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. ... Finally, as the previously cited cases suggest, the Court finds that the duty to “affirmatively” further fair housing imposes a binding obligation upon the States. Accordingly, the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss count X should be denied.

Section 1983 does not allow individuals to enforce statewide Medicaid participation or performance standards that create no individual federal right.

Frazar v. Hawkins · filed 2002-07-24

Moreover, we believe that plaintiffs cannot sue under § 1983 to require a plan to meet statewide or systemwide participation or performance measures, because, under Blessing, state compliance with such standards is not an individualized right actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not give Medicaid recipients a private action to divert tobacco settlement funds that Congress left states free to allocate.

Barton v. Paul G. Summers, Harshell C. Downs, Jr. Kathleen D. Downs v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2002-08-09

This is a clear-cut Congressional statement that forecloses the existence of an implied private right of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to divert the tobacco settlement money.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages remedy for a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) because that provision does not confer individual rights on motor carriers.

Henry's Wrecker Service Co. v. Prince George's County · filed 2002-08-16

Accordingly, as the text and structure of § 14501(c)(1) do not demonstrate a congressional intent to confer individual rights to motor carriers, Defendant’s alleged violations of that statute do not give rise to a cause of action for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of Medicaid’s comparability-of-services provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).

Martin v. Taft · filed 2002-09-19

The Court concludes that the comparability of services provision is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce the federal housing statute’s 75% Rule.

Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority · filed 2002-11-27

A straightforward application of Blessing to this provision recognizes that a private action under § 1983 to enforce the 75% Rule is appropriate.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce a statute that does not confer an individual federal right.

Lines v. Wargo · filed 2003-01-10

Because we discern no intent by Congress to confer a new individual right on parolees like Plaintiff, § 1983 does not supply a viable cause of action for claims premised upon a violation of the Parole Compact.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only if the statute creates an enforceable right and Congress has not foreclosed its enforcement through § 1983.

Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Houston · filed 2003-01-17

It follows, therefore, that as prerequisite to proceeding under § 1983 for an alleged violation of a federal statute (1) the statute creates “enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983” and (2) that Congress has not specifically foreclosed plaintiffs ability to use § 1983 as a vehicle for enforcement of the statute within the enactment itself.

Section 1983 permits claims to enforce federal statutory rights unless the statute creates no enforceable right or Congress forecloses that enforcement.

Rolland v. Romney · filed 2003-01-28

A section 1983 claim would not be permitted where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities or where "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself."

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Nextel Partners, Inc. v. Town of Amherst, NY · filed 2003-03-04

The Court concurs with the reasoning in the cases holding that a plaintiff has a remedy under Section 1983 for violations of the TCA.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it unambiguously confers an individual right; the Adoption Act’s definitional provisions in § 675(5)(D) and (E) alone confer no such right.

Foster Children v. Jeb Bush, Kathleen Kearney, Chuck Bates, Robert Williams, Ester Tibbs · filed 2003-05-08

Because §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) are definitional in nature, they alone cannot and do not supply a basis for conferring rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit individuals to enforce the NCLBA’s notice, transfer, or supplemental educational services provisions because those provisions create no individual rights.

Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2003-06-20

Consequently; the plaintiffs in this case cannot maintain an action under § 1983 to enforce provisions of the NCLBA.

Section 1983 cannot vindicate a Rehabilitation Act claim against an official in an individual capacity when that Act provides no enforceable right against the individual.

Purvis v. Williams · filed 2003-07-25

Since we agree with the district court that an individual, in their individual capacity, is not a “program or activity” as that term is construed in our previous discussion, then Purvis had no enforceable right under the Rehabilitation Act to vindicate under a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits private suits to enforce rights conferred by section 7 of the Privacy Act and section 1971 of the Voting Rights Act.

Schwier v. Cox · filed 2003-08-11

Thus, the presumption that the rights conferred by section 7 of the Privacy Act may be vindicated via a suit under § 1983 stands, and we hold that the rights conferred by section 7 may be enforced under § 1983. ... Thus, we hold that the provisions of section 1971 of the Voting Rights Act may be enforced by a private right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster children to enforce individual rights conferred by the Adoption Act and Medicaid’s EPSDT provisions.

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue · filed 2003-08-18

The Court concludes that the statutes do create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5).

Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2003-12-23

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs may sue under § 1983 to combat a violation of § 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for rights created by 47 U.S.C. § 253 because the Telecommunications Act does not foreclose that remedy.

Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego · filed 2004-01-05

Based on all the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that defendants have failed to rebut the presumption that a right of action under § 1983 remains. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiffs may maintain a right of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an intended beneficiary to enforce a federal statute only if the statute unambiguously confers an individual right on that person.

Sanchez Ex Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson · filed 2004-01-05

Under Gonzaga, a plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 as an intended beneficiary of a statute only if the statute unambiguously demonstrates congressional intent to confer an individual or personal right on that plaintiff.

Section 1983 cannot remedy a federal statutory violation unless the statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983.

Keup v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services · filed 2004-03-04

First, § 1983 may not be used to remedy a statutory violation, if the statute in question does not create an enforceable right under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce the rights conferred by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), (10), and (17).

Mendez v. Brown · filed 2004-03-26

Accordingly, the court concludes that section 1983 provides Plaintiffs with a cause of action to pursue all three of the statutory claims they allege in Count I.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce federal statutory rights when state action is involved.

Larry P. v. Riles · filed 1979-10-16

While plaintiffs did not argue this theory, it appears also that a private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the . federal statutory rights, since state action is involved.

Section 1983 provides a private right of action when conduct under color of state law denies a person a right secured by a federal statute.

27 Fair empl.prac.cas. 33, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,767 · filed 1981-04-20

Whether or not the appellees' right to bring their claim for relief can be inferred directly from the Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for any claim that action has been taken under color of state law to deny a plaintiff a right secured by a federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a private action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by a federal statute.

Members of the Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1981-04-20

Whether or not the appellees’ right to bring their claim for relief can be inferred directly from the Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for any claim that action has been taken under color of state law to deny a plaintiff a right secured by a federal statute.

Section 1983 presumptively allows individuals to enforce unambiguously conferred statutory rights unless Congress expressly bars individual suits or provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that precludes them.

Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Richman · filed 2004-05-11

Even where a right has been unambiguously conferred, a state may rebut the presumption of the availability of § 1983 by demonstrating that Congress, either expressly or by providing a comprehensive remedial scheme, intended to preclude individual suits.

Section 1983 permits eligible Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce their individual rights to medical assistance and reasonable promptness under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10), and 1396d(a)(15).

Sabree, Sabree v. Richman · filed 2004-05-11

This analysis, which, as will become clear, is assuredly not for the timid, compels the conclusion that the provisions invoked by plaintiffs-42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10), and 1396d(a)(15)-unambiguously confer rights vindicable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke · filed 2004-06-01

Moreover, that advantage is a “right” within the meaning of § 1983. ... In light of these considerations, the court concludes that Congress intended to create a federal right vis á vis national banks. Nor is this right “so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.” ... Finally, section 484 is “couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” ... This satisfies the third prong of the Blessing test.

Section 1983 makes a claim for violation of the Medicaid statute enforceable in court.

Morenz v. Wilson-Coker · filed 2004-06-10

Because this claim for violation of the Medicaid statute is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Morenzes, as a prevailing party, are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to enforce federal statutory rights under the Social Security Act against state defendants.

Koster v. Webb · filed 1983-11-09

It is also clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be used by plaintiffs to enforce their purported right to emergency shelter under the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 permits public housing tenants to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a.

Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Housing Authority · filed 1985-03-12

Therefore, the statutory claims of the plaintiff class under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes only when private enforcement is not foreclosed and the statute creates enforceable rights.

Wright v. City Of Roanoke Redevelopment And Housing Authority · filed 1985-08-26

Not all violations of federal law, however, give rise to Sec. 1983 actions. In order to determine whether a violation of a particular federal statute constitutes a basis for Sec. 1983 liability, a court must make two inquiries: 1) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of the pertinent statute in the enactment itself, and 2) whether the statute at issue was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights created by mandatory federal funding conditions, including rights under the Older Americans Act.

Meek v. Martinez · filed 1989-02-21

A federal statute that requires a state to comply with certain conditions in order to qualify for federal funding creates enforceable rights under section 1983 for individuals who are deprived of the benefit of those conditions. ... Under this principle, the OAA plainly provides Plaintiffs here with "rights" that can be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a state refuses to grant benefits provided by federal law, including rights under the IDEA’s stay-put provision.

J.D. v. Manatee County School Board · filed 2004-10-08

Section 1983 is available as a remedy when a state refuses to grant benefits provided by federal law, including the right to enforce 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

Section 1983 permits enforcement of HAVA’s individual provisional voting rights because Ohio’s administrative review process does not preclude that remedy.

Sandusky County v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-14

In view of the stringent standard which the defendant must meet to avoid being held accountable under § 1983, I cannot find Ohio’s process of administrative review to be a comprehensive enforcement scheme sufficiently strong and effective to preclude relief under § 1983. The defendant, accordingly, has failed to meet his burden of showing that the rights given to individual voters to vote provisionally in HAVA cannot be enforced in this § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of individual rights created by HAVA because HAVA’s enforcement procedures do not foreclose private suits.

Bay County Democratic Party v. Land · filed 2004-10-19

After reviewing the parties’ submissions and considering the evidence, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims, HAVA creates individual rights enforceable through Section 1983, Congress has provided a scheme under HAVA in which a voter’s right to have a provisional ballot for federal offices tabulated is determined by State law governing eligibility, and the defendants’ directives for determining eligibility on the basis of precinct-based residency are inconsistent with State and federal election law.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of HAVA’s provisional-voting right against state officials.

Florida Democratic Party v. Hood · filed 2004-10-21

In sum, under Schwier and the line of cases it interpreted, this statute clearly creates a federal right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for an individual’s right under HAVA to cast a provisional ballot upon making the required affirmation.

Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-26

HAVA does not itself create a private right of action. Appellees contend that HAVA creates a federal right enforceable against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to the right to cast a provisional ballot under the circumstances described in HAVA § 302(a), we agree.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce HAVA’s right to cast a provisional ballot because HAVA does not foreclose that remedy.

Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell · filed 2004-10-26

Individual enforcement of this right under § 1983 is not precluded by either the explicit language of HAVA, or by a comprehensive enforcement scheme incompatible with individual enforcement.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce rights under the Communications Act when the Act lacks a comprehensive enforcement scheme, but it does not automatically make attorney’s fees available.

Time Warner Cable-Rochester v. City of Rochester · filed 2004-11-03

Since the Act itself lacks a comprehensive enforcement scheme, § 1983 provided a vehicle for Time-Warner to enforce its rights under the Act, but I see no basis to conclude that Congress envisioned a successful plaintiff in a case like this one recovering attorney’s fees as well.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce individual relocation assistance rights under Section 104(k) of the Housing and Community Development Act.

Price v. City Of Stockton · filed 2004-12-06

Because the City has not met its burden of proving that either Section 104(d) or Section 104(k) provides a comprehensive remedial scheme inconsistent with Section 1983 enforcement, we conclude that Plaintiffs have a cause of action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 allows federally qualified health centers to sue to enforce their federal right to Medicaid wraparound payments.

Rio Grande Community Health Center, Inc. v. Rullan · filed 2005-02-14

Not so; a § 1983 action does lie for an FQHC to enforce the Secretary's obligation to make wraparound payments under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb).

Section 1983 permits a person to enforce a federal statute only if it unambiguously confers an individual right on that person; Medicaid providers have no enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

OKLAHOMA CHAP. OF AMER. ACA., PEDIAT. v. Fogarty · filed 2005-03-22

Since the Court's opinion, the Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 as an intended beneficiary of a statute only if the statute itself unambiguously demonstrates congressional intent to confer an individual or personal right on that plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that OKAAP, as it represents Medicaid providers, does not have enforceable rights under § 1396a(a)(30)(A), and should be dismissed from this lawsuit.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Chavez v. County of San Diego · filed 2005-04-07

First, insofar as Chavez seeks to enforce her rights under the ADA and RA through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, she is clearly precluded from doing so under this court’s ruling in Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 1155.

Section 1983 cannot be used by Medicaid recipients or providers to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) because that provision creates no individually enforceable right.

Sanchez Ex Rel. Hoebel v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-02

Congress did not unambiguously create an individually enforceable right in § 30(A) that would be remediable under § 1983 either by recipients or providers of Medicaid services.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against individual defendants for violations of USERRA because USERRA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Morris-Hayes v. Board Of Education · filed 2005-09-12

Instead, we hold that USERRA is not a statute for which redress is available against the Individual Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against individual defendants for violations of USERRA because USERRA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Morris-Hayes v. Board of Education of the Chester Union Free School District · filed 2005-09-12

Instead, we hold that USERRA is not a statute for which redress is available against the Individual Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits adoptive parents to enforce federal rights to individualized adoption assistance payment determinations and a fair agency hearing.

ASW v. Oregon · filed 2005-09-13

Because we conclude 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(12) and 673(a)(3) create federal rights enforceable through a § 1983 cause of action, we reverse.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce § 253 of the Federal Telecommunications Act.

Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of New York · filed 2005-09-15

Although Qwest has stated a claim that the City’s regulations violate section 253 of the FTA, it is a separate question as to whether Qwest has stated a claim under section 1983 for the FTA violation; the Court concludes it has stated a viable 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action to enforce the Telecommunications Act when the plaintiff has not shown that the Act confers a federal right on it.

Level 3 Communications v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO · filed 2005-12-19

This Court concludes Level 3 has not met its burden to demonstrate that the Act confers a federal right on it, see Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 523, and therefore holds that no cause of action under § 1983 is available.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce rights conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(e), but the cited notice regulation does not confer an enforceable right.

Beeker v. Olszewski · filed 2006-02-13

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(e) confers rights upon the plaintiffs that are enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, 42 C.F.R. § 435.905 does not confer such a right.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce a federal statutory provision only if the provision satisfies the Blessing requirements for an individual right.

Arrington v. Fuller · filed 2006-02-13

In summary, when a plaintiff claims a statutory provision creates individual rights enforceable under § 1983, she must establish all three requirements set forth in Blessing.

Section 1983 allows voucher program participants to enforce their federal rights concerning utility allowances under § 1437f(o)(2).

Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish · filed 2006-03-06

We hold that in adopting § 1437f(o)(2), Congress intended to grant to voucher program participants like these Plaintiffs-Appellants, federal rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Act’s freedom-of-choice provision.

Harris v. Olszewski · filed 2006-03-21

Gauged by this test, Medicaid’s freedom-of-choice provision creates enforceable rights that a Medicaid beneficiary may vindicate through § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action to enforce a state’s violation of federal law, including LIHEAA.

Goodwin v. Perales · filed 1994-04-15

The complaint in this action asserts a violation of 42 USC § 1983, which authorizes the maintenance of a cause of action seeking to vindicate a State’s violation of Federal law.

Section 1983 allows CHMS recipients and providers to enforce rights conferred by the Medicaid provisions at issue.

Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department Of Human Services · filed 2006-04-17

Moreover, even accepting ADHS's invitation to reconsider prior established precedent, we find no error in the district court's holding that these provisions of the Medicaid Act are enforceable by both CHMS recipients and providers through a § 1983 private cause of action.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when it confers an individual right; Medicaid § 1396a(a)(30) confers no such right on recipients or providers.

Westside Mothers v. Olszewski · filed 2006-07-17

After examining the text and structure of § 1396a(a)(30), we agree with the First and Ninth Circuits that § 1396a(a)(30) fails the first prong of the Blessing test and does not therefore provide Medicaid recipients or providers with a right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only when Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to create individual rights; the Hawaii Admission Act creates no such rights.

Day v. Apoliona · filed 2006-08-10

Because Gonzaga University clarifies that claims for statutory violations may be brought under § 1983 only if the text or legislative history of the statute shows clear and unambiguous congressional intent to create individual rights, and because the Ninth Circuit has already concluded that neither the text nor the history of the Admission Act indicates such congressional intent, Plaintiffs may not enforce the public trust duties in the Admission Act under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits foster care providers to enforce their individual right to reimbursement of the specific costs listed in the Child Welfare Act.

California Alliance of Child & Family Services v. Allenby · filed 2006-10-27

First, plaintiff must demonstrate that Congress “unambiguously conferred [a] right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” ... Accordingly, the court concludes that CWA confers an individual right on plaintiffs members for enforcement of the foster care maintenance payments pursuant to section 675(4)(A).