42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor directly participated in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s conduct was causally connected to it.

Rhiner v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-04

Furthermore, Rhiner failed to show that there was a causal connection between the defendants’ conduct and any Eighth Amendment violation. See Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1298. Rhiner failed to show a history of widespread gang-related violence against non-gang members sufficient to put prison officials on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, because the record suggests there were only ten such assaults at most in the relevant two-year period.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisory officials for their subordinates’ conduct.

Doss v. Wise · filed 2020-06-04

In Section 1983 suits, liability of government officials for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates may not rest solely upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct; liability requires the supervisor’s own conduct.

(PC) Thompson v. Omari · filed 2020-06-05

Supervisory personnel – such as the prison warden – are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Humphries v. Newsome · filed 2020-06-05

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” ... Plaintiff does not allege that Newsome was actually aware of Plaintiff’s medical needs or played any direct role in his medical treatment.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor personally participates in unconstitutional conduct or the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to the deprivation.

Keeling v. Holder · filed 2020-06-05

A supervisor is liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 only if he personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or when there is a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a supervisor’s personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection to the alleged rights violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Perez v. Nooth · filed 2020-06-05

However, the Court grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendants Cain, Jost, Nooth, Gilmore, and King because Plaintiff has not provided evidence of their supervisory liability.

Section 1983 requires personal participation in a constitutional violation; a supervisor is liable only if the supervisor participated in or directed it, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Hentz v. Gruenwald · filed 2020-06-05

Liability under § 1983 arises upon a showing of personal participation, and a supervisor is not liable for the constitutional violations of employees unless the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The record reflects that Wilson only reviewed plaintiff’s grievance appeal and did not participate in plaintiff’s removal from the bakery.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for an employee’s conduct; the plaintiff must connect the supervisor’s own conduct to the alleged violation.

(PC) Merriman v. Martin · filed 2020-06-08

Rather, it appears plaintiff assigned liability under a respondeat superior theory, which is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their subordinates’ actions; a complaint must allege the supervisors’ own involvement.

(PC) Davis v. Hutcheson · filed 2020-06-08

Plaintiff has not, however, alleged facts to show how either Spearman or Diaz personally acted to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rather, it appears plaintiff is suing Spearman and Diaz under a respondeat superior liability, which is not cognizable in a federal civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal participation; a supervisor may be liable for a subordinate’s violation if the supervisor participated in it, directed it, or knew of it and failed to prevent it.

Prentice v. Dzurenda · filed 2020-06-08

A defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” ... “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§]1983.” ... There are no allegations to support Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims against these supervisory defendants and there are no allegations that they knew that Mullins, Wheeler, and Gonzales were going to commit each of these different acts throughout the specified time period.

Section 1983 requires facts linking a supervisory defendant to an alleged constitutional injury through personal involvement, causation, and a culpable state of mind.

Simmons (ID 117440) v. Cline · filed 2020-06-09

The necessary affirmative link between the supervisor and the alleged constitutional injury requires: 1) personal involvement; 2) causal connection; and 3) culpable state of mind.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in one.

Bieri 288329 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-06-09

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Weatherspoon 471817 v. Huss · filed 2020-06-09

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew of a pervasive risk of harm and that the supervisor’s inaction was causally linked to the plaintiff’s injury.

Brooks v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-09

Likewise, with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability and failure to train claims, the magistrate judge found no evidence (1) that Lewis was aware that correctional officers were involved in conduct creating a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm or that there was any causal link between Plaintiff’s injuries and Lewis’s alleged inaction; or (2) that Lewis failed to train his subordinates or that such failure was linked in any way to Plaintiff’s injuries. ... The court agrees with, and wholly adopts, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report, (ECF No. 69), which is incorporated herein by reference.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on supervisors.

Hamilton v. Davis · filed 2020-06-10

As explained in the Court’s October 29, 2019 screening order, there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, and a prisoner must offer more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability for subordinates’ actions without the supervisor’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

Walton v. Ray · filed 2020-06-10

Additionally, Warden Brookhart cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinate employees, as the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) is not applicable to section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of supervisory authority; the supervisor’s own conduct must be linked to the constitutional injury.

Savage v. City of Springfield · filed 2020-06-10

Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior theory. ... The proposed amended complaint does not state a § 1983 claim against Sarno for violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection.

A policymaking official can face § 1983 liability when allegations sufficiently link the official to a custom that caused a constitutional violation.

WALDRON v. WETZEL · filed 2020-06-10

Plaintiff has alleged that Secretary Wetzel, a policy-making official, was involved in the custom of placing certain pretrial detainees in the RHU. At this stage of the proceedings, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional violation or the supervisor’s wrongful acts were causally connected to it.

Gama v. Bd of Trustees, Cal State Univ · filed 2020-06-11

It does not matter, though, because even if Gama was not afforded due process before being deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, Gama has not pleaded a viable claim for supervisory liability against Hong. ... Gama cannot, on these facts, establish supervisory liability against Hong.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a supervisor’s own conduct and the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisor is not liable solely for an employee’s actions.

(PC) Green v. McFarlane · filed 2020-06-11

Because supervisory personnel are only considered liable for their own conduct, plaintiff’s § 1983 action is not the appropriate vehicle for relief and any further amendment would be futile.

Section 1983 imposes supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Ogbechie v. Covarrubias · filed 2020-06-11

Instead, a “supervisory official” is liable under § 1983 only if “there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). ... As the Court just held, however, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable dispute that Officer Covarrubias committed a constitutional violation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants contributed to any violation likewise fails.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because subordinates allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Welch v. Maxson · filed 2020-06-15

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability solely for a subordinate’s actions; a supervisor may be liable for personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation.

(PC) Huffman v. Batra · filed 2020-06-15

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. ... Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Withrow and Defendant Hamerick were personally involved in denial of his medical care.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their employees’ actions solely because they supervise them.

(PC) Monroe v. Mortell · filed 2020-06-15

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their employees’ actions; liability requires the supervisor’s own involvement in the constitutional violation.

(PC) Healy v. Yasmeen · filed 2020-06-15

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because the supervisor has the right to control employees.

McDowell v. Mattingly · filed 2020-06-15

However, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when a supervisor participates in, directs, or knowingly acquiesces in a constitutional violation, or maintains a policy or custom that causes constitutional harm.

Price v. Williams · filed 2020-06-15

In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to establish plausible supervisory liability claims against Defendants Williams, Garman, and Wetzel. Plaintiff cites no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants Williams, Garman, and Wetzel directed others to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, knew of such violations and acquiesced in them, or maintained a policy or custom that caused Plaintiff constitutional harm.

Section 1983 permits a supervisory liability claim when a supervisor knows of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, responds with deliberate indifference, and that inaction causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Duncan v. Farmer · filed 2020-06-16

It is a matter of well-settled law that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in suits brought pursuant to § 1983. ... Here, Plaintiff has met his burden in alleging all three elements. ... The Court therefore credits his objection, agrees he has stated a claim for supervisory liability, and vacates Magistrate Judge Eifert’s conclusions to the contrary.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for a subordinate’s constitutional violation only when the supervisor’s action or inaction is affirmatively linked to that violation.

Creach v. Dookhan · filed 2020-06-16

Here, the allegations against Nassif, Han, Auerbach and Bigby, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, fail to plausibly state a claim that these defendants knew of, or condoned, Dookhan’s alleged violation of Creach’s constitutional rights, or that these defendants would have known of it but for their deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a supervisor when the complaint sufficiently alleges the supervisor’s personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.

Clay v. Weidner · filed 2020-06-16

“Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on their own unconstitutional behavior.” ... Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Roger Moore engaged in the alleged retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff, Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim survives.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a policymaking supervisor when allegations plausibly connect the supervisor to a custom that caused a constitutional violation.

BOWMAN v. WETZEL · filed 2020-06-16

Plaintiff has alleged that Secretary Wetzel, a policy-making official, was involved in the custom of placing certain pretrial detainees in the RHU. The Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, these allegations are enough to state a claim.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a prison supervisor merely because of the supervisor’s position.

Cook v. Sheldon · filed 2020-06-17

Sheldon cannot be liable under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior simply because he is the warden at MCI.

Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior or supervisory liability.

Bentz v. Allsup · filed 2020-06-18

Because respondeat superior or supervisory liability is not recognized under Section 1983, John Doe #14 and John Doe #15 are dismissed.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor personally participates or has a causal connection to the alleged deprivation.

Fleeman v. Corizon · filed 2020-06-18

A supervisor is liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 only if he personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or when there is a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s misconduct; the supervisor must have personal involvement.

Hitner v. John Doe I · filed 2020-06-18

Accordingly, to the extent that Hitner’s claims against defendant Downs relies on a respondeat superior theory of liability, defendant Downs is entitled to judgment in his favor on this claim.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of the supervisor’s position; a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim requires facts showing deliberate indifference and a causal connection to the injury.

Derello 037292 v. Shinn · filed 2020-06-19

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. ... Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim against Defendant Shinn, and the Court will therefore dismiss this claim.

Section 1983 generally does not make supervisors liable for their employees’ actions; a supervisor’s own conduct must connect them to the violation.

(PC) O'Connor v. Matharu · filed 2020-06-19

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s own misconduct.

(PC) Eric O'Dell v. Mims · filed 2020-06-19

To the extent that Plaintiff names either of the defendants because he holds a supervisory position, the Court notes that section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because his subordinate has violated Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but a supervisor may be liable for knowingly approving a subordinate’s misconduct.

Taylor v. Porter · filed 2020-06-19

While there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors can be held liable when they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019).

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor controlled the response that led to a constitutional violation.

Finch v. Wichita, Kansas, City of · filed 2020-06-19

That is very close to a respondeat superior theory, which is not permitted under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because of their position; the supervisor must personally cause or participate in the constitutional deprivation.

Nicholson v. Sullivan · filed 2020-06-22

Sullivan cannot be held liable based solely on his position as an administrator because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make a government official liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct solely because the official supervises that subordinate.

Burnett v. Chapman · filed 2020-06-22

A governmental official may not be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate because the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in this context.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a warden who arranges medical visits when the plaintiff shows no authority to do more.

Ambrose v. Mulligan · filed 2020-06-23

Absent any suggestion that Warden Mulligan has authority to do more than arrange for a medical visit, Ambrose fails to state a claim for supervisory liability against him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position.

Hyer v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2020-06-23

Neither Defendant John Doe 1 nor Chief Ballard can be liable for a Section 1983 claim pursuant to a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s conduct was sufficiently connected to it.

DePaepe v. White · filed 2020-06-24

A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 only upon a showing of personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability can remain at issue when facts are disputed about a warden’s awareness of staffing shortages and response through training or discipline.

Ellerbe v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-24

Regarding Stephan’s personal involvement, however, the record—when construed in a light most favorable to Ellerbe—reflects remaining disputes of material fact relevant to his supervisory liability, such as whether Stephan was aware of McCormick’s substantial staff shortage and took steps to ameliorate that inadequacy by, for instance, properly training correctional officers or disciplining them for violating the existing the policies. ... The Court, therefore, adopts Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss Count Three as to Cartledge and Stephan in each’s official capacity, dismiss Count Three as to Cartledge in his individual capacity, and retain Count Three as to Stephan in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 requires a specific causal link between a supervisor and the alleged constitutional violation; a subordinate’s conduct alone does not establish supervisory liability.

(PC) Davis v. Jones · filed 2020-06-25

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. ... Here, plaintiff has failed to allege any specific causal link between Sheriff Jones and the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely because of their position; a claim requires personal involvement or a sufficient causal connection between their conduct and the constitutional violation.

Montalvo v. Diaz · filed 2020-06-25

As Defendants point out, there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, and as a result, in order to state a claim against Diaz and Allison, Plaintiff must allege their “‘personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation’” or “‘a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Betson v. Suprunowski · filed 2020-06-25

In addition, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but supervisory prison staff may be liable if they know about misconduct and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye to it.

Comer v. Cabanaw · filed 2020-06-25

As for Deputy Warden Payne, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but supervisory prison staff can be held liable when they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official solely for supervising employees who violate someone’s rights.

Tutt v. Hubbard · filed 2020-06-25

Thus, the mere fact that a defendant acted in a supervisory capacity is not enough because respondeat superior (vicarious liability) is not an available theory of liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisor for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the supervisor personally participates or the supervisor’s actions have a causal connection to the violation.

Nolley v. Warden · filed 2020-06-26

Here, however, Mr. Nolley failed to state a plausible claim for relief against Mr. Dozier because he (1) did not allege any facts suggesting that Mr. Dozier was personally involved in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; and (2) did not allege facts suggesting a causal connection between Mr. Dozier’s actions and the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a police chief for an officer’s conduct.

Harrison v. South Bend Police Department · filed 2020-06-26

To the extent Harrison is seeking to hold the Chief liable as Detective Hasbrook’s employer, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Rogers 447843 v. MacLaren · filed 2020-06-26

Moreover, section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely for an employee’s violation; the supervisor must cause or participate in it.

Webb v. Neal · filed 2020-06-29

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The claims against the Unknown Sergeant must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for a subordinate’s actions solely because of their supervisory role.

Bodway v. Hastings · filed 2020-06-29

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not make an official liable solely because of a supervisory role.

Harris v. Turner · filed 2020-06-29

A plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot establish that a government official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights simply by virtue of the official’s role as a supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor based solely on supervisory position.

Ward v. Griffin · filed 2020-06-29

Second, because Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior, Supt. Griffin’s supervisory position does not give rise to a plausible Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for employees’ acts solely because they supervise them; the supervisors must be personally involved in the alleged violation.

Thacker v. Goins · filed 2020-06-29

First, as Defendants correctly point out in their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not allege in his complaint that Defendants Sheriff Goins or Captain Love was personally involved in any violation of his constitutional rights, and these Defendants cannot be liable under § 1983 for the acts of employees they supervise based on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based on a supervisory position alone; a supervisor must know of and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye to the conduct.

Sharif v. Funk · filed 2020-06-30

First, Dr. Funk’s supervisory position alone does not subject him to § 1983 liability: “Section 1983 ‘does not allow actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others.’ To be liable, a supervisor ‘must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.’” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely for denying a grievance or failing to act on information in it.

Kyle 448371 v. Skipper · filed 2020-06-30

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants solely because they hold supervisory positions.

Caradine v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-07-01

Moreover, to the extent Caradine seeks to hold Defendants liable based on their supervisory positions, his claim fails because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because the supervisor oversees an officer.

Conley v. Brysgel · filed 2020-07-02

Captain Black is not liable merely because he was Officer Brysgel’s supervisor.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because a subordinate violated someone’s rights.

(PC) Rood v. Burden · filed 2020-07-06

To the extent that Plaintiff names the warden merely because he is a supervisor, the Court notes that section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor simply because his subordinate has violated Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ acts solely because they supervise them.

(PC) Leonard v. Zuniga · filed 2020-07-06

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Griffith and Williams are also insufficient to proceed. Supervisors are not liable under section 1983 for the acts of their subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued in an individual capacity to have known of, facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to a subordinate’s unlawful conduct.

Simpson v. Tri Valley Community Unit School District No. 3 an Illinois Local Governmental Entity · filed 2020-07-06

To bring a § 1983 claim against Mouser for his role as the supervisor of Derges, Plaintiff must show Mouser knew about Derges’ conduct, facilitated it, approved it, condoned it, or turned a blind eye toward it. ... Given that Mouser had no knowledge of any alleged custom of unlawful cellphone searches, Mouser could not possibly facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye toward it. As such, Mouser is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability; an individual defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Link v. Hood · filed 2020-07-06

If he wishes to pursue his claims, Link must file an amended complaint describing how the defendants, named as a party in the case caption, violated his rights, keeping in mind that in Section 1983 actions, there is no supervisory liability.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a supervisor for a subordinate’s conduct.

Penninger v. Indiana Dept of Corrections · filed 2020-07-06

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a prison official’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation; a supervisor’s policy or custom can establish that involvement.

Santos v. Wood · filed 2020-07-06

Santos has adequately alleged that Annucci was personally involved in denying Santos certain medical treatment through his “policy or custom” of prohibiting the provision of all narcotic drugs.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct; the supervisor must personally cause or participate in the violation.

Kozikowski v. Hassel · filed 2020-07-07

“It is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” ... Because Mr. Kozikowski doesn’t describe how Sheriff Hassel was personally involved with his claims, he may not proceed against him on a claim for money damages.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Williams v. Salvucci · filed 2020-07-07

A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability for a prison policy requires proof that the supervisor knew of and disregarded an unreasonable risk of constitutional injury caused by a specific policy or practice.

MICHAUX v. TEMAS · filed 2020-07-07

There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Temas was aware of an unreasonable risk caused by the lack of communications or assessment/postponement training or was indifferent to that risk.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for a subordinate’s misconduct.

Jones v. Degrave · filed 2020-07-08

Under § 1983, a supervisor is not liable for the misconduct of a subordinate.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a warden solely because he oversees prison operations when he was not personally involved in the alleged deprivation.

Smith v. Indiana State Prison · filed 2020-07-08

There is no indication that the warden was personally involved in these events, and he cannot be sued for money damages solely because he oversees operations at the prison.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a supervisor when failure to supervise causes a constitutional violation and amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Davies v. LeBlanc · filed 2020-07-08

As a result, the Court finds Davies’ allegations meet the pleading requirements the Fifth Circuit articulated in Rains for a deliberate indifference claim against a supervisor under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denied a grievance or failed to act on information in it.

Hill 793484 v. Newhall · filed 2020-07-08

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor personally participated in, knew or should have known of, or caused the alleged constitutional violations through a policy.

Augborne v. Filson · filed 2020-07-08

Judge Baldwin also found no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Dzurenda because Plaintiff failed to provided evidence that Dzurenda personally participated in or knew or should have known of the alleged constitutional violations, or promulgated or implemented a policy that was the moving force of those violations. ... For these reasons, the Court agrees with Judge Baldwin’s recommendation to grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Dzurenda.

Section 1983 does not allow a failure-to-train claim against a supervisor based solely on a subordinate’s alleged misconduct in one incident.

Duncan v. Bibb County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-07-09

Duncan’s argument—that the alleged unconstitutional acts of a single officer during a single incident necessarily equal a supervisor’s failure to train—effectively calls for the imposition of de facto respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Theories of liability that the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have repeatedly refused to impose under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations of a supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation; a supervisory role alone is insufficient.

Shabazz v. Delaware Department of Corrections · filed 2020-07-09

The allegations regarding Dr. Carr’s supervisory role in all Department of Correction medical care are insufficient for Plaintiff to state a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor for subordinates’ acts; the supervisor must be personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

Garcia v. Griffin · filed 2020-07-09

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Griffin liable for the acts of his subordinates, § 1983 cannot support such a theory of “vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on an employee’s actions; the supervisor must personally participate, know of the violation and fail to prevent it, or implement a policy that causes it.

Moore v. Firth · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s assertion that “[a]s a result of the . . . defendants’ . . . policies, practices, and customs . . .” medical staff at the Monroe Correctional Complex “believed that their actions or inactions would not be properly monitored . . .” is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability without allegations that the supervisor knew of and turned a blind eye to the specific constitutional violations.

Wilson v. Alles · filed 2020-07-10

Wilson may not proceed against these three defendants under a theory of supervisor liability because he does not allege that they knew of and turned a blind eye to the specific constitutional violations at issue in this case.

A supervisor’s policy allowing inmates to possess an item does not establish § 1983 liability without evidence that the supervisor knew it posed an excessive risk of harm.

LAURIER v. D'ILIO · filed 2020-07-10

While Plaintiff experienced an unfortunate physical attack by another inmate who employed a stinger to burn him with hot water, the facts before the Court do not demonstrate Defendant D’Ilio’s policy was in place in spite of his knowledge of the excessive harm that could be potentially caused by stingers.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because they supervise someone who committed a constitutional violation; the plaintiff must allege their personal involvement.

DeLaney v. Canfield · filed 2020-07-10

It is well established that respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Rasheed Joel Hilson, Sr. v. Mijares · filed 2020-07-13

In a Section 1983 action, a supervisory official cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a supervisor solely because of the supervisor’s position; the claim requires personal involvement or a causal connection to the constitutional deprivation.

Garrett v. Gastello · filed 2020-07-13

In a Section 1983 action, a supervisory official cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory or respondeat superior liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory role.

Underwood v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2020-07-13

However, “Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability,” Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002)), and such an allegation cannot form the basis of a claim against White under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s individual involvement in a constitutional violation; supervision alone does not establish liability.

White v. Taylor · filed 2020-07-13

Liability under § 1983 must be predicated on a defendant’s individual involvement in the constitutional violation and cannot be premised on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because an official supervises someone who violated a right; claims based on the supervisor’s direct involvement may proceed.

Chambers v. Cruz · filed 2020-07-14

The Court finds that to the extent Chambers has alleged Frakes and Deol were directly involved in executing the decisions at issue, his claims can proceed, but to the extent he alleges only supervisor liability against Deol and Frakes, his claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ acts.

Kravitz v. State of New York · filed 2020-07-14

And to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Annucci generally liable for the acts of his subordinates, § 1983 cannot support such a theory of “vicarious liability.”

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because subordinates erred.

Pulera v. Sarzant · filed 2020-07-15

He is not liable under § 1983 merely as a supervisor, even assuming his subordinates had erred.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for their employees’ actions; a plaintiff must allege a causal link between each supervisor and the constitutional violation.

(PC) Torres v. May · filed 2020-07-15

Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability solely because a defendant holds a supervisory role.

Williams v. Alfonso · filed 2020-07-15

Furthermore, under Section 1983, Johnston cannot be held liable simply because she is in a supervisory role.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely because they supervise staff who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc. · filed 2020-07-15

To the extent he alleges that Jeffries and Meeks were supervisors responsible for the medical staff, respondeat superior, or supervisory, liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim against supervisors to allege their participation in a constitutional violation or an unconstitutional policy that caused it.

Otis v. Collier · filed 2020-07-17

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Otis’s claims because they were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, see Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1998), and because Otis failed to allege or show that the defendants participated in the constitutional violations or that they implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused the alleged constitutional violations.

A police chief may face individual liability under § 1983 when evidence of his participation in ratifying subordinates’ conduct raises a factual dispute about his role in causing a constitutional injury.

L.F. v. City of Stockton · filed 2020-07-17

Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support their position that Chief Jones, in his individual capacity, participated in a ratification process so as to raise a material question whether “he set in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely for the acts or omissions of their employees.

McGinnis v. Davis · filed 2020-07-17

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Applewhite v. City of New York · filed 2020-07-17

Second, a supervisory liability claim cannot survive in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement to hold a supervisor individually liable; supervisory authority alone is insufficient.

Walberts v. Abele · filed 2020-07-20

The plaintiff has not alleged that Abele’s or Carr’s actions personally deprived him of his rights. Nor has he alleged that they were aware of or facilitated Samanko’s allegedly wrongful conduct and approved or condoned it. Because he alleges no personal involvement by either defendant, the court will dismiss Abele and Carr as defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera · filed 2020-07-20

The allegations against Wardens Godert and Redington sound in respondeat superior, which is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; a supervisory position alone does not create liability.

Mays v. Kemper · filed 2020-07-21

But the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to cases filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of that position; the plaintiff must link the supervisor’s own conduct to the injury.

Osborn 178862 v. Wishchuen · filed 2020-07-21

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability, but a supervisor may be liable for knowingly facilitating, approving, condoning, or ignoring a constitutional violation.

Taylor v. Loshnowsky · filed 2020-07-21

While there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors can be held liable when they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019).

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement; a prisoner’s vague allegation that he sent letters does not show the supervisor had notice of a constitutional violation.

Franks v. Eckert · filed 2020-07-21

But nowhere does he suggest what he wrote to Eckert that might have put Eckert on notice that Dr. Levitt was violating his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a supervisor and subordinates’ conduct to hold the supervisor liable for deliberate indifference.

Lara-Haynes v. Garcia · filed 2020-07-21

Finally, as the Magistrate Judge concluded in the FCR, even under a Section 1983 “deliberate indifference” inquiry, Plaintiff failed to establish the required causal connection between Richerson and Defendant Garcia and Defendant Herrera’s actions during the escort.

Section 1983 does not permit supervisory liability without an underlying constitutional violation by a defendant.

Wilkins v. Magat · filed 2020-07-22

Finally, without an underlying constitutional violation by one of the defendants, Dr. Magat cannot be held liable as a supervisor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a causal link between a supervisor and the claimed deprivation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

(PC) Howell v. Johnson · filed 2020-07-22

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. ... As set forth above, plaintiff may not name such defendants based solely on their supervisorial roles.

Section 1983 holds a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct only if the supervisor personally participates or has a causal connection to the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Keeling v. Holder · filed 2020-07-22

A supervisor is liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 only if he personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, or when there is a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a warden for a subordinate’s actions based solely on the warden’s supervisory role.

Hazley v. State of MN · filed 2020-07-23

The mere supervisory or oversight role of a warden is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct solely because of the supervisory relationship.

Simpson v. Guana · filed 2020-07-23

In section 1983 suits, liability of government officials for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates may not rest solely upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability based solely on an official’s position; the plaintiff must allege the official’s own involvement or a causal connection to the violation.

Phillips Jr. v. County of Riverside · filed 2020-07-24

Here, Defendants Bianco and Sniff cannot be liable simply based upon their position as Sheriff of Riverside County.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely because the supervisor employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

McCardie v. Ahern · filed 2020-07-24

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff's rights.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability when the supervisor was personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or the supervisor’s wrongful conduct had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Solorio v. Ducart · filed 2020-07-24

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). Therefore, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendants Ducart, Nelson, and Wilson are also DISMSSED with leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their positions.

Scroggin v. Galipeau · filed 2020-07-24

Finally, insofar as Mr. Scroggin believes that the Warden and the Assistant Warden should be liable because they are the top supervisors at WCF, he cannot maintain a § 1983 lawsuit against them under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s knowledge of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the misconduct, and a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the injury.

Carmichael v. Murphy · filed 2020-07-24

However, Plaintiff fails to make any plausible allegations that any of these Defendants knew of a pervasive risk of constitutional injury or that any of these Defendants displayed deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of their subordinates’ allegedly wrongful conduct. The allegations as stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint provide no basis for a § 1983 claim against these Defendants, and therefore the claims against them will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a supervisor’s involvement in a constitutional violation or responsibility for an unconstitutional policy.

Marshall v. Menchaca · filed 2020-07-27

He otherwise has not alleged a constitutional violation in which the supervisory defendants were involved and has not ascribed to them an unconstitutional policy.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability only when the supervisor was personally involved in the deprivation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

Chiprez v. Adame · filed 2020-07-27

As explained above, a supervisor may be liable under section 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires evidence supporting a supervisory-liability claim to hold prison supervisors individually liable for a failure to protect an inmate.

GAFFNEY v. EDELEN · filed 2020-07-27

There is no evidence that the warden, assistant warden, or Secretary knew before the assault that Mr. Gaffney asked for protection, nor is there evidence sufficient to support a supervisory-liability claim against them.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a supervisor; the plaintiff must show that the supervisor’s own actions violated his constitutional rights.

Criddle v. Lewis · filed 2020-07-27

There is no vicarious liability under § 1983, and to survive summary judgment plaintiff must demonstrate that Crowe, through her own individual actions, violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable merely because a subordinate violated a plaintiff’s rights; the plaintiff must link the supervisor to the alleged deprivation.

(PC) Revis v. Moore · filed 2020-07-28

Plaintiff also fails to link Corral, Huffman, Dominguez, Voong, and Sherman to his claims. To the extent that Plaintiff names any of these defendants solely because he is a supervisor, the Court notes that section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor simply because his subordinates have violated Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 requires a connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation; holding the position of prison warden alone does not establish liability.

(PC) Murray v. Aung · filed 2020-07-28

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. ... To the extent these claims are based solely on the fact that the unnamed individual is the prison warden, plaintiff fails to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor sued in an individual capacity to know of and participate in, approve, or knowingly ignore a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Barnett v. City Of Chicago · filed 2020-07-28

Because Barnett does not allege that the State’s Attorney ... Defendants had knowledge of ASA Griffin-Johnson’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct, Barnett does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim against them in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability based solely on a supervisory role; the defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Turner v. Burnett · filed 2020-07-28

The doctrine of respondeat superior is not recognized under § 1983; to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct based solely on the supervisor’s position.

Muse v. Lawson · filed 2020-07-28

Thus, the mere fact that a defendant acted in a supervisory capacity is not enough because respondeat superior (vicarious liability) is not an available theory of liability in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires specific allegations linking a supervisor’s own conduct to a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

(PC) Baker v. Lynch · filed 2020-07-29

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. ... Here, plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations specific to defendant Lynch.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable for their subordinates’ errors solely because of their supervisory roles.

Krueger, Jr. v. Santos · filed 2020-07-29

Finally, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under § 1983 and therefore, supervisors cannot be held liable for the errors of their subordinates.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors solely for their subordinates’ conduct; each supervisor must be personally involved in unconstitutional conduct.

Larkin 962642 v. Schroeder · filed 2020-07-29

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. ... Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Washington or Schroeder engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.

Section 1983 requires a supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; failing to take corrective action after a grievance is insufficient.

Sanford v. Armour · filed 2020-07-30

Furthermore, a failure to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the necessary personal involvement for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability based solely on a defendant’s role as a supervisor, but a supervisor may be liable for her own knowing failure to act.

Miller v. Whitman · filed 2020-07-31

While defendant Whitman cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in her role as a supervisor, see Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff alleges that Whitman “did not rectify such issue after answering plaintiff’s medical request”—presumably the plaintiff’s July 28, 2019 HSU request asking what to do for pain and asking why he was taken off pain medication so far ahead of his appointment. The plaintiff appears to claim that Whitman knew about the plaintiff’s pain and did not do anything about it. The plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Whitman based on this allegation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires more than a supervisor’s knowledge of alleged unconstitutional conduct and failure to act.

Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2020-07-31

At most, Plaintiffs allege that Conrad knew or should have known of the alleged illegality of the officers’ conduct and failed to act—which does not amount to acquiescence and cannot lead to civil liability.

A council president with apparent power to affect an employee’s job, benefits, and investigations may have supervisory capacity for individual liability under § 1983.

RIOS v. CITY OF PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-07-31

To the extent Defendants argue that Petrick was not Plaintiff’s “supervisor” and thus cannot be individually liable, such a finding would be inappropriate at this stage. As Council president with the apparent ability to directly impact Plaintiff’s employment and benefits and initiate investigations against her, Petrick plausibly had a degree of supervisory capacity over Plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a supervisory prison official when the official learns of an ongoing violation and fails to remedy it.

Martinez v. Duquin · filed 2020-07-31

Martinez also alleges that he informed defendants Noeth, Michalek, and Koenigsmann of this ongoing denial of care, and they also chose not to intervene or otherwise provide him with adequate care. Those claims suffice to allege that these officials “after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.” Colon, 58 F.3d at 873. In other words, Martinez also has adequately alleged that the defendant supervisory DOCCS officials were personally involved in the claimed constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors for their employees’ actions through respondeat superior.

Cummings v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction · filed 2020-07-31

The doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto employers.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Edwards v. Trent · filed 2020-08-03

A government official cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors vicariously liable for subordinate officers’ actions; a claim against a supervisor requires facts showing personal involvement or a causal connection to the constitutional violation.

Cardenas v. County of Tehama · filed 2020-08-04

As a preliminary matter, Defendants Hencratt and Johnston — the “individual Defendants” bringing the present Motion — cannot be held liable for the actions of individual officers on a vicarious liability theory under § 1983, as discussed above.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors; a plaintiff must plead how each supervisor’s own actions violated the Constitution.

Norvell v. Roberts · filed 2020-08-04

“Vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, [and] a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through [his] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution,” in order to plead a plausible claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

Blankumsee v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2020-08-04

Respondeat superior is not a recognized theory of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a deliberately indifferent policy that caused constitutional harm or the supervisor’s personal involvement in or acquiescence to the violation.

HEARNS v. WETZEL · filed 2020-08-04

This is not sufficient to state plausible claims since there is no allegation that any Defendant maintained with deliberate indifference a policy, practice or custom which directly caused constitutional harm, or was personally involved or acquiesced in the destruction of Hearns’s legal material and other property.

A Section 1983 failure-to-supervise claim requires an adequately alleged underlying constitutional violation.

Schadel v. Gochis · filed 2020-08-05

And because Plaintiff ... has failed adequately to allege either a deprivation of his reputational liberty interest or a violation of equal protection rights, Plaintiff’s failure to supervise claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires each defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; it does not impose supervisory or vicarious liability.

Hampton v. Meli · filed 2020-08-05

Moreover, the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

Hampton v. Bauer · filed 2020-08-05

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires evidence that the supervisor knew a subordinate engaged in conduct posing a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury.

Wilson v. Eagelton · filed 2020-08-05

Nor does the record contain sufficient evidence that Stonebreaker knew a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury that is needed to support a finding that Stonebreaker has supervisory liability. The Second Cause of Action is, therefore, dismissed as to Stonebreaker in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose general liability on supervisors for constitutional violations committed by officers they supervise.

Smith v. Buckman · filed 2020-08-06

To the extent Mr. Smith claims Warden Neal didn’t properly supervise correctional officers, there is no general liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for supervisors when those who report to them violate a person’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability based on knowledge and acquiescence requires the supervisor’s actual knowledge of the alleged violation.

SMITH v. SMITH · filed 2020-08-06

Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Chew had actual knowledge of the conspiracy against her, much less that he acquiesced in it.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for subordinates’ actions; the complaint must allege the supervisor’s own involvement in the violation.

(PC) Howell v. Johnson · filed 2020-08-10

Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim against defendant Lynch based on his supervising capacity as warden and the actions of his subordinates alone.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor solely because of a supervisory relationship.

Barraillier v. Muniz · filed 2020-08-10

Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make supervisors liable solely because of their job responsibilities; a claim must connect their own conduct to the alleged constitutional violation.

Ybarra v. Mee · filed 2020-08-10

“[A] defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 merely because [they] had certain job responsibilities.” ... Ybarra fails to allege sufficient facts showing that Dr. Mee, Mun, Harrington, or Espinda are personally liable for his claims. ... As such, Ybarra’s supervisor liability claims against Dr. Mee, Mun, Harrington, and Espinda are DISMISSED with prejudice because granting further leave to amend appears futile.

Section 1983 requires specific conduct by an individual supervisor to establish liability for failure to train or supervise.

Wagle v. Corizon · filed 2020-08-10

Even construed liberally, the complaint has alleged no specific actions by McCarthy or Jane Doe that would permit a finding of individual supervisory liability. These defendants will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability merely because a supervisor denies a grievance or fails to act on information in it.

Brown 712722 v. LeBarre · filed 2020-08-10

Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.