42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not make a North Carolina county liable for a sheriff’s personnel and training decisions when the sheriff has final policymaking authority over them.

Parker v. Bladen County · filed 2008-06-27

Thus, under North Carolina law, the sheriff, not the county encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority over hiring, supervising, and discharging personnel in the sheriffs office. ... That authority (and any resulting liability) is not attributable to Bladen County.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs suing a municipality to establish that a municipal custom or practice caused the alleged violation.

DL v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-06-27

Plaintiffs correctly assert that to prevail in their § 1983 action, they must establish a “custom or practice” that caused the alleged violation.

Section 1983 requires proof that a county employee acted with subjective deliberate indifference before a county can be liable for an episodic act or omission.

Anderson v. Dallas County Texas · filed 2008-07-07

If a plaintiff is unable to show that a county employee acted with subjective deliberate indifference, the county cannot be held liable for an episodic act or omission.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipal agency liable for constitutional harm to show that the harm resulted from an agency policy or custom.

Bowles v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2008-07-10

We also conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on Bowles’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Bowles appears to assert this claim against the Transit Authority alone. “In order to impose § 1983 liability upon a municipality [or municipal agency], a plaintiff must demonstrate that any constitutional harm suffered was the result of a municipal policy or custom.” Sorlucco v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1992). Bowles presented insufficient evidence that the Transit Authority had a policy that discriminated against Sunday Sabbath observers or that someone with policymaking authority for the agency discriminated against him.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability for constitutional deprivations caused by a municipal policy or custom, but not under respondeat superior.

Warfield Ex Rel. Fox v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-07-16

A municipality can be found liable under Section 1983 if the municipality itself, through a municipal policy or custom, deprives someone of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by a wrongful policy, but the claim fails without a constitutional violation.

Cain v. Irvin · filed 2008-07-17

For an injurious practice or policy claim to succeed, plaintiff must establish a causal link between her constitutional injury and the alleged wrongful policy. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). ... Without a constitutional violation, plaintiff’s concomitant municipal liability claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipality’s policy or custom, but does not impose vicarious liability for employees’ acts.

Montano v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-07-23

While a municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees, a constitutional deprivation may be attributable to a municipality “when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities, which are liable when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

DeRouen v. the Falls County Sheriff Department, Ricky Scaman, Deputy Sheriff, in His Individual and Official · filed 2008-07-23

“Municipalities face § 1983 liability ‘when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury….’” ... “Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an unlawful action is carried out pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.

Fera v. City of Albany · filed 2008-07-30

Municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the alleged unlawful action was implemented or executed pursuant to a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind a violation of federally protected rights.

Pelayo v. City of Downey · filed 2008-07-31

Rather, § 1983 liability may be imposed only when a municipal “policy” or “custom” is the “moving force” behind a violation of federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes a constitutional rights violation.

Ken Mar Development, Inc. v. Department of Public Works · filed 2008-07-31

First, we find sufficient allegations to support municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Moonblatt v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-08-01

Thus, the custom and policy prerequisite to § 1983 liability merely requires that the municipal action that causes the alleged constitutional violation be taken under the color of official policy.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities.

Collins v. Knox County · filed 2008-08-01

Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 based upon the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits claims against municipalities only when the plaintiff shows that an unlawful policy caused the alleged deprivation.

Vohra v. County of Orange · filed 2008-08-01

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the City of Santa Ana and the County of Orange on Vohra’s § 1983 claims because Vohra did not demonstrate that these defendants maintained unlawful policies.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a municipality to allege that the violation occurred pursuant to a municipal custom, practice, or official policy.

Uland v. City of Winsted · filed 2008-08-04

To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, the complaint must allege that the violation occurred pursuant to a custom or practice, or an official policy, by that municipality.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipality’s policy or custom causes a constitutional injury, but not under respondeat superior.

Ford v. Grand Traverse · filed 2008-08-05

But a municipality is not subject to liability pursuant to § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.

Section 1983 treats a town as a suable person when it acts pursuant to an official town policy.

Felde v. Town of Brookfield · filed 2008-08-07

A town is a “person” within § 1983 when it acts pursuant to official town policy.

A local government cannot avoid § 1983 liability by arguing that its employees acted in good faith.

Tardiff v. Knox County · filed 2008-08-07

A local government may not avoid § 1983 liability based on a defense that its employees acted in good faith.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipality's policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Bolton v. City of Dallas, Tex. · filed 2008-08-07

Municipal liability for civil rights violations under § 1983 is based on causation rather than respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for actions taken collectively by policymaking boards as official policy.

Paragon v. Town of Hanover · filed 2008-08-08

As a general rule, a municipality cannot be held liable for injuries inflicted by its employees or agents unless they were carrying out a “policy or custom” of the municipal government. ... Thus, to the extent that Paragon alleges that the Town and its various boards took these actions collectively rather than alleging that particular board members took them individually, these actions are policy decisions for which the Town may be held liable.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue a municipality for a constitutional deprivation caused by its policy, custom, or qualifying failure to train.

Charlie Rock, Jr. v. Roy McCoy and the City of Checotah, Oklahoma, a Municipal Corporation Wesley Jackson Emerson A/K/A · filed 1985-07-30

Thus, although not the general rule, there may exist certain circumstances whereby an isolated incident of police misconduct can render a city liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes a constitutional violation and applies the relevant state limitations period to claims.

Bartholomew v. Frank Fischl and City of Allentown · filed 1986-02-07

We hold that the facts alleged in Bartholomew’s complaint state a cause of action against the City of Allentown under Owen. ... Consequently, we hold that Wilson applies retroactively to Bartholomew’s action, and that his complaint was timely filed within two years of the date on which his employment ceased.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities but allows liability when a constitutional violation results from municipal policy, law or custom.

Benskin v. Addison Township · filed 1986-03-06

Section 1983 does not allow for vicarious liability of cities.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county solely because it employs a tortfeasor; municipal liability requires an injury caused by an official policy or custom.

Williams v. A. Mensey R. Bordeaux J. Simmons v. Vaughn Armstrong W. Pecha St. Louis County Edward M. Moreland · filed 1986-03-07

However, the county cannot be liable “solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words * * * [it] cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Section 1983 requires a municipal constitutional deprivation to result from the municipality's official policy or custom.

Mazzilli v. Doud · filed 1986-03-25

Essential to any recovery in an action brought against a municipality under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, is a showing that the alleged constitutional deprivation flowed from an official policy or custom of the municipality, and that the policy or custom was "the moving force of the constitutional violation."

Section 1983 does not make a county vicariously liable for its agents’ actions; a plaintiff must identify a county policy or custom that caused the injury.

Riehm v. Engelking · filed 2008-08-15

The county cannot be held vicariously liable for its agents’ actions under § 1983. ... Instead, the Riehms must identify a county policy or custom that caused their injuries, which they fail to do.

Section 1983 does not make a county vicariously liable for its agents’ actions.

Riehm v. Diercks · filed 2008-08-15

The county cannot be held vicariously liable for its agents’ actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability based on a municipal custom requires evidence that the practice was widespread and reflected a municipal policy choice.

Grieveson v. Anderson · filed 2008-08-18

But we need not decide whether the practice is unconstitutional, because Grieveson has not put forth adequate evidence showing that the alleged practice was widespread and reflective of a policy choice by the Marion County Sheriff, which is the pivotal requirement of a § 1983 official capacity claim.

An official-capacity claim under Section 1983 requires a causal link between a government policy or custom and the alleged constitutional injury.

Grieveson, Joseph R. v. Anderson, Frank J. · filed 2008-08-18

This § 1983 official-capacity claim against the Sheriff fails for lack of causation.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs an officer who violated someone’s rights.

Trueman v. City of Upper Chichester · filed 2008-08-19

A municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 makes a local government liable for an employee’s conduct only when a government policy or custom causes the injury.

Meyers v. La Porte Indep · filed 2008-08-19

A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Brown v. Farrell · filed 2008-08-22

Because we have already held that Brown failed to make a case under the state-created danger theory, thereby failing to show that Farrell caused an underlying constitutional violation, we must join the District Court in rejecting Brown’s claim of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a subordinate’s unconstitutional act when final policymakers retain authority to review the act and give it final approval.

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy · filed 2008-08-25

Liability premised on ratification is appropriate under Monell because retaining and then giving final approval to the subordinate’s act makes that act the act of the entity. There is no evidence in this case that the Board retained final authority to review and approve Marlatt’s actions or that it actually gave such approval.

Section 1983 municipal liability for an episodic act or omission requires subjective deliberate indifference by a municipal employee and a resulting act under a policy or custom maintained with objective deliberate indifference.

Corley v. Prator · filed 2008-08-25

To hold a municipality liable, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal employee acted with subjective deliberate indifference and that the municipal employee’s act resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim survives dismissal when the complaint alleges a policy, practice, or custom and a causal link to the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Smith v. Lanier · filed 2008-08-26

“At the pleading stage, only an allegation of the existence of a policy, practice, or custom and its causal link to the constitutional deprivation suffered is required.” ... Plaintiff has met this burden and therefore it would be inappropriate to dismiss her claim against the District at this time.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to allege that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Stegeman v. State of Georgia · filed 2008-08-26

Fourth, Stegeman failed to state a § 1983 claim against DeKalb County because his complaint did not allege any claimed constitutional violations that were the result of an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an allegation that the officers acted pursuant to an official municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Mahle v. Municipality of Anchorage · filed 2008-08-29

To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, the complaint must allege that the individual officers’ conduct was pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice of that municipality.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable only when its official policy or custom directly causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Slusher v. Carson · filed 2008-09-02

Under § 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the injury suffered was a direct result of the city’s official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy or custom for municipal liability, including liability based on failure to train.

Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. · filed 2008-09-02

Thus, a plaintiff suing a municipality or its agency must establish both a constitutional deprivation and the existence of a municipal custom or policy that caused the deprivation. ... Because the Court has concluded no genuine issue of material fact remains that Rader used reasonable force, Plaintiffs cannot establish LVMPD is liable for a constitutional violation from its alleged failure to train Rader.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Lelaind v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 2008-09-02

A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the acts of its employees.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for failure to train when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2008-09-02

Because the Court has concluded no genuine issue of material fact remains that Rader used reasonable force, Plaintiffs cannot establish LVMPD is liable for a constitutional violation from its alleged failure to train Rader.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes the injury, but not on a theory of vicarious liability.

Rife v. Borough of Dauphin · filed 2008-09-08

Although municipalities and other local government entities may not be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, a municipality may be held liable "when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury____” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking only prospective relief from a municipality need not show that their injury resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Truth v. Kent School District · filed 2008-09-08

Monell’s requirements do not apply where the plaintiffs only seek prospective relief, which is the case here.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking only prospective relief against a municipality need not satisfy Monell’s policy-or-custom requirement.

Truth v. Kent School District · filed 2008-09-09

Monell’s requirements do not apply where the plaintiffs only seek prospective relief, which is the case here.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy that caused a constitutional violation; when the policy is not facially unconstitutional, it must have been adopted or maintained with deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences.

Hines v. Henson · filed 2008-09-10

In light of these undisputed facts, Hines has not succeeded in establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Sheriff Henson adopted this policy with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 only when a violation results from its policy, custom, pattern, or practice; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Barnhart v. Town of Parma · filed 2008-09-15

Municipalities may be found liable under Section 1983 only where the violation resulted from a municipal custom, policy, pattern or practice; liability may not be based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes the injury; a municipality is not liable solely because its employees caused it.

Filipek v. Krass · filed 2008-09-16

In addition, a “municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” ... Plaintiff, however, does not allege that the actions of the officers were brought about by a “policy or custom” of the City. Thus, the City of Chicago is dismissed as a defendant.

A sheriff’s single decision can support county liability under Section 1983 when the sheriff is the final policymaker for that law enforcement decision.

Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County, Miss. · filed 2008-09-18

The Sheriff’s decision to deny the Plaintiffs the right to issue bonds is the kind of single decision by the relevant policymaker that can be the basis of liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city to identify a municipal policy that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights and connect that policy to the injury.

Shaw v. Pfeiffer · filed 2008-09-23

Turning now to the City’s summary-judgment motion, Shaw was required to identify a policy of the City that allegedly violated his constitutional rights and to connect that policy with the injury suffered in order to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single unconstitutional decision by an official with final policymaking authority over that decision.

Welch v. Ciampa · filed 2008-09-23

We are bound by Pembaur and conclude that a single decision by a final policymaker can result in municipal liability.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when no constitutional right was violated.

Walker v. City of Wilmington · filed 2008-09-29

Here, however, the court holds that there has been no violation of constitutional rights. Thus, there is nothing for which the City might be liable.

Section 1983 permits local government liability for an employee’s harm only when the employee’s actions represent a government policy or custom.

Wood v. Summit County Fiscal Office · filed 2008-09-29

A local government may not be held liable under § 1983 for harm caused by its employees unless the employee’s actions represent a policy or custom of the local government.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on an employee’s conduct; a municipal policy or custom must cause the constitutional deprivation.

Wrighten v. City of New London Police Department · filed 2008-09-29

A constitutional violation brought pursuant to § 1983 may not be attributed to a municipality on the basis of responde-at superior, but the City may be held liable “if the conduct that caused the [alleged] unconstitutional deprivation was undertaken pursuant to a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers ... or pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018).

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a municipality’s policy or custom and the alleged constitutional injury.

Thompson v. Wagner · filed 2008-09-29

There is no causal relationship between Johnstown’s alleged racial classifications (which would implicate the Equal Protection Clause) and the Fourth Amendment violations allegedly committed by Wagner and Kopera. Under these circumstances, Thompson cannot hold Johnstown liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for the actions of its agents and employees.

Thomas v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2008-09-30

To the extent that Thomas attempts to hold the District of Columbia liable under Section 1983 for the actions of its agents and employees, his attempts must fail. A municipality cannot be held liable vicariously under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 holds a county liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Jones v. Oakland County · filed 2008-09-30

Instead, “[f]or liability to attach, there must be execution of a government’s policy or custom which results in a constitutional tort.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school board liable to show that the board’s policy or custom reflected deliberate indifference and was the moving force behind the deprivation of protected rights.

Hill v. Bradley County Board of Educat · filed 2008-09-30

Even accepting as true Hill’s allegation that the Section 504 policies were deficient (or as Hill alleges non-existent), such evidence is insufficient to conclude that the Board had a policy or custom that reflected deliberate indifference to the protected rights of its disabled students. And even if Hill could establish deliberate indifference, a reasonable jury could not conclude from the facts of this case that the Board’s inaction was the moving force or direct cause of Rocky’s death.

Section 1983 requires a municipal constitutional injury to result from a policy, widespread settled practice, or action by a final policymaker.

Butler v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2008-10-07

To state a claim under § 1983 against the City of Milwaukee, Butler was required to allege that his constitutional injury resulted from a City policy, a widespread and settled City practice, or the actions of a person with final policy-making authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show a constitutional injury caused by the municipality’s policy or custom or by an official responsible for establishing final policy.

Hartline v. Gallo · filed 2008-10-08

To prevail against a municipality on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate both an injury to a constitutionally protected right and that the injury “was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality or by a municipal official ‘responsible for establishing final policy.’ ”

Section 1983 makes a local government liable only when an official municipal policy causes the constitutional tort.

Vasquez v. City of Kinsley · filed 2008-10-08

Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint does not claim that the alleged malicious prosecution was caused by any such official policy, nor does the complaint reasonably suggest that such a claim could be supported.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when allegations of inadequate jail funding and failure to maintain the jail sufficiently plead a governmental custom.

Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill. · filed 1986-05-09

In the present case, as in Mayes and Holland, plaintiffs allege not only that Jackson County provides inadequate funding for its jail facility, but also that it has failed to maintain the jail facility in conformity with state law and constitutional standards. The Court finds that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to satisfy the “custom” requirement, and that plaintiffs have therefore stated a cause of action against Jackson County.

A supervisor’s misconduct alone does not make a city liable under § 1983.

Geraldine Harris, Willie G. Harris, Bernadette Harris v. Stanley Cmich, City of Canton Ohio · filed 1986-07-02

While it is clear that a city "can act only through its principal officials," id. at 875, a supervisor does not automatically render the city liable under section 1983 merely by engaging in misconduct.

Section 1983 permits government bodies to be sued directly for violations carried out through official policy.

Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind) · filed 1986-09-24

As plainly, government bodies are persons who can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability may rest on an express policy, a widespread practice or custom, or the deliberate act of a policymaking official.

Almaraz v. HALEAS · filed 2008-10-09

The City’s liability, however, is not limited to the Supervisory Defendants’ personal knowledge and participation. Instead the focus is on whether plaintiffs deprivation is caused by an express policy, a widespread practice or custom, or the deliberate act of a policymaking official.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that an official policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional injury.

M.Y. Ex Rel. J.Y. v. Special School District No. 1 · filed 2008-10-14

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official “policy or custom” and that such “policy of custom” was the moving force behind plaintiffs injury. ... The Court concludes that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment against Parents as to their § 1983 claims. The Court finds no evidence in the record that District maintained any customs or policies such as those suggested by Parents.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation and was the moving force behind the injury.

M.Y., etc. v. Special School District · filed 2008-10-14

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official “policy or custom” and that such “policy of custom” was the moving force behind plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an officer’s conduct only when a municipal policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Harvey v. City of Stuart · filed 2008-10-17

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for the actions of a police officer “only when municipal ‘official policy’ causes a constitutional violation.” ... A plaintiff must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused [his] injury.”

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy linked to a constitutional violation to hold a municipality liable.

Jo v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-10-28

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a predicate constitutional violation, as well as a policy that would subject the District of Columbia to municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make the District of Columbia liable for a federal marshal’s acts when the District cannot control him and must turn arrestees over to him.

Johnson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2008-10-31

Because the Superior Court Marshal is a federal employee acting pursuant to generally applicable federal law, and because the District of Columbia has no authority to control the Superior Court Marshal and no choice but to turn over arrestees to him, the District of Columbia cannot be held liable for his allegedly unconstitutional acts.

A school district cannot be liable under § 1983 under Monell when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Vassallo Ex Rel. K v. v. Lando · filed 2008-10-31

In the instant case, as the Court finds as a matter of law on summary judgment that no constitutional violation was committed against plaintiff by the individual defendants, see supra, no Monell claim can lie against the District pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a causal connection between a local government’s policy or custom and the plaintiff’s injury for local government liability.

Johnson v. Williams · filed 2008-11-03

For the District to be liable, there must be a connection between the District’s policy or custom and plaintiffs injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional violations carried out under an official policy or custom, including deliberately indifferent failure to train.

Ramos v. City of New York · filed 2008-11-04

A municipality may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the constitutional violations of its employees occurring pursuant to an official policy or custom. ... We therefore agree with the district court that Ramos failed to allege any basis for municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when no constitutional violation occurred.

Gonzalez v. City of Federal Way · filed 2008-11-06

As there is no constitutional violation, there can be no Monell liability and thus the claim against City was also properly dismissed.

A § 1983 claim against a county can survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint alleges that the county permitted or acquiesced in the challenged conduct.

Butler v. Los Angeles County · filed 2008-11-12

At the pleading level, these allegations are sufficient to allege Monell liability against the County.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable solely because it employed the person who allegedly violated a right.

Mullaney v. City of Worcester · filed 2008-11-14

The City cannot be held liable pursuant to Section 1983 simply because it was Mr. Hoover’s employer.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when the claimant suffered no underlying constitutional violation.

Houskins v. Sheahan · filed 2008-11-25

We also find that Houskins’s Monell claim necessarily fails because Houskins’s constitutional rights were not violated.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability under Monell when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation.

Houskins, Virgean v. Sheahan, Michael F. · filed 2008-11-25

We also find that Houskins’s Monell claim necessarily fails because Houskins’s con- stitutional rights were not violated.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a government policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Simms v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2008-11-26

Municipal liability only arises when the execution of the government’s policy or custom inflicts a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely because a municipality employs the officers who allegedly violated a person’s rights; the complaint must allege a municipal policy or custom.

Houston ex rel. Houston v. City of Athens · filed 1986-12-05

Moreover, this Court at this juncture also declines to speculate whether plaintiffs’ counsel of record can or will, consistent with Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., place his attorney signature to an additional amendment to amended Count II containing the requisite additional allegations of fact with respect to “policy” or “custom” mandated by Monell which are clearly necessary to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s alleged beating when the officers caused no constitutional injury.

Swink v. City of Pagedale, Daniel J. O'COnnOr and Tony D. Gibson · filed 1987-02-02

This contention fails, however, because the jury verdict in favor of the two police officers, which we today confirm, renders the dismissal of the City academic.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city or county to allege conduct by the government itself, rather than rely on vicarious liability for its employees’ independent acts.

Herrera v. Conner · filed 1987-02-26

Thus, these rulings dictate that Herrera must allege at least some conduct that would render the city and the county liable in themselves as opposed to any vicarious liability for the independent conduct of their employees.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an independent health district’s decision merely because county officials advised the district; the county must have caused the decision or supplied the policy behind it.

Crosby v. Pickaway County General Health District · filed 2008-12-08

Regardless of whether the Board listened to the advice of county officials such as the County Prosecutor or County Engineer, the record displays no evidence that the Health District abdicated its ultimate decisionmaking authority or handed over such authority to the County, its Commissioners, or any other county employee. As such, neither the County, its Commissioners, nor any other county employee can be the source of any official policy that resulted in the suspension or denial of Appellants’ sewage permits.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a custom of tolerating federal rights violations if a persistent pattern, notice, tacit approval amounting to deliberate indifference, and a causal link to the deprivation are proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Aureus Holdings, Limited v. Detroit City · filed 2008-12-09

Granted, Aureus may establish municipal liability under § 1983 upon a showing that the City had “a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). To prevail on such a theory, however, Aureus must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: there was a clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity; the City had notice of it; the City tacitly approved the unconstitutional activity such that its deliberate indifference amounts to an official policy of inaction; and this custom or policy of inaction was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff has not established an underlying constitutional violation.

King v. County of Gloucester · filed 2008-12-10

Because appellants did not establish a constitutional violation, they likewise did not establish that the Township was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a deprivation of constitutional rights proximately caused by a municipal custom or policy.

Borck v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-12-12

The court instructed the jury that to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Borck was required to show that she was deprived of her constitutional rights and that a custom or policy of the City was the proximate cause of the deprivation. This was a correct instruction on the elements of municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Ennis v. Lott · filed 2008-12-15

The District of Columbia, then, is subject to liability under Section 1983 only “when an official policy or custom causes the complainant to suffer a deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district to survive dismissal when the allegations describe a retaliatory policy by the district.

Moore v. Middletown Enlarged City School District · filed 2008-12-16

These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss as they describe a retaliatory policy on the part of the District (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694 [1978]; see also Cioffi v Averill Park Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F3d 158 [2006], cert denied 549 US 953 [2006]; cf. Back v Hastings on Hudson Union Free School Dist., 365 F3d 107, 128 [2004]).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Freeman v. Guy · filed 2008-12-16

Unless there is an unconstitutional policy that causes the injury, there cannot be municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a government policy or custom causes the injury, but conclusory expert statements do not establish deliberate indifference.

Barker-Puza v. Carbon County · filed 2008-12-17

A municipality is liable under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury . . . .” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, the district court correctly concluded that the conclusory statements in plaintiffs’ expert’s report were insufficient to establish the deliberate indifference of Carbon County. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 325.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 if no constitutional violation occurred.

Curtis v. City of Redmond · filed 2008-12-17

The City of Redmond is entitled to summary judgment on each of Curtis’ constitutional claims, because “[i]f no constitutional violation occurred, the municipality cannot be held liable.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its policy causes an unconstitutional detention; good faith does not shield it from liability.

McDay v. Travis · filed 2008-12-19

Rather than serving as a basis for summary judgment in favor of the City, these uncontradicted assertions might prove to be grounds for the City’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they reflect a City policy that resulted in a violation of plaintiff’s due process rights.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs suing local governing bodies to allege that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Fekete v. County of Chenango · filed 2008-12-19

For plaintiffs to state claims against defendants, several local governing bodies, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they were required to allege that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely for its employees’ actions; municipal liability requires an official policy, custom, or practice.

Dzwonczyk v. Syracuse City Police Department · filed 2008-12-22

Although Plaintiff insists that the municipal defendants are liable for the actions of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the law is clear that a municipal entity may not liable pursuant to § 1983 under the theory of respondeat superior, but may be only liable where its employee acted pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice of said entity.

Section 1983 does not make a local government liable for an employee’s misconduct unless the challenged action implemented an official policy or custom.

Hansen v. Board of Trustees of Hamilton Southeastern School Corp. · filed 2008-12-23

To prevail on a § 1983 claim for damages against a local government, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly illegal action implemented an official policy or custom adopted by the governmental body.

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom that causes a constitutional deprivation to hold a local government entity liable.

Orgain v. Wicomico County, Maryland · filed 2008-12-29

The record contains no evidence that in either decision by the Liquor Board to suspend the Orgains’ liquor license, the Liquor Board Commissioners were acting pursuant to a policy or custom of the Liquor Board to discriminate against businesses serving predominantly black clientele.

Section 1983 permits suit against a local government, but its liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.

Ransom v. Leopold · filed 2008-12-30

In addition, a unit of government is a “person” subject to suit under section 1983, although not on a respondeat superior basis.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city acquiesces in a mayor’s implementation of an unconstitutional policy, even without legislative approval.

Trewhella v. City of Findlay · filed 2008-12-31

Applying these rules to the facts in this case, the Court has little difficulty ... concluding the City is liable under Section 1983 for the First Amendment violations. While the AEP was adopted in a mayoral vacuum without legislative approval, the City approved the custom of giving its Mayor authority over event planning.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying deprivation of a constitutional right.

Shenk v. Cattaraugus County · filed 2009-01-07

Because the Shenks lack any underlying claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right, summary judgment was properly granted on the municipal liability claim too.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to be the moving force behind a constitutional violation before the municipality can be held liable.

Plemons v. Amos · filed 2009-01-09

In addition, the court erred legally by concluding that Plemons’ assumed unconstitutional detention was pursuant to a City policy because it did not find the alleged policy was the moving force behind the detention.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable solely for its employees’ conduct; liability requires a law, policy, or procedure intended to violate constitutional rights.

Purvis v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HALL HIGH SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2009-01-12

Although there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a municipal entity can be held liable under § 1983 if there is a showing of a law, policy, or procedure intended to violate a person’s constitutional rights. ... The Hall Defendants maintain that Pur-vis’ claims against the Board remain completely unsubstantiated as anything other than respondeat superior. The Court agrees, and the Board’s request for summary judgment will therefore be granted on Purvis’ § 1983 claims against it.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior; the plaintiff must allege a municipal policy that caused the constitutional violation.

Sanders v. Agnew · filed 2009-01-12

First, municipalities may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior, and Sanders failed to allege any policy of Limestone County that was the moving force behind any of the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an allegation that the challenged unconstitutional actions were part of a municipality-wide practice or custom.

Sommer v. County of Suffolk · filed 2009-01-13

Even construing Sommer’s complaint liberally and accepting its factual allegations as true, an independent review shows that the district court properly dismissed Sommer’s complaint because (1) qualified immunity shielded defendant-appellee DiVincenzo from suit, (2) Sommer failed to allege personal involvement on the pai’t of defendant-appellee Spotta, (3) as to defendant-appellee County of Suffolk, Sommer failed to allege that any allegedly unconstitutional actions were part of a municipality-wide practice or custom; and (4) Judge Crecca was shielded from suit by the doctrine of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a supervisor’s own actions or a municipality’s own policies must cause the constitutional violation.

Betty J. Archie, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Rena M. Delacy, Deceased v. City of Racine, Ronald W. Chiapet · filed 1987-09-08

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. ... Chiapete and the City are not liable under § 1983 because their acts and policies did not cause DeLacy to be subjected to a violation of her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a county; the alleged violation must arise from the county’s own policy or custom.

Carr v. City of Chicago · filed 1987-09-16

In naming Cook County as a defendant, plaintiff cannot base his claim on a theory of respondeat superior. Rather, plaintiff must establish that the alleged § 1983 violation arose from implementation of the county’s own policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s decision only when that official establishes final policy on the subject at issue.

Morrash v. Strobel · filed 1987-10-06

Municipal liability under § 1983 exists only where a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made by the official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to connect the alleged injury to a municipal policy or custom.

Rogers v. Detroit Police Department · filed 2009-01-16

While Plaintiff disputes that Defendant Harrell acted objectively reasonable, Dkt. # 48 at 14, the allegations do not indicate that the policy was in any way related to the injury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a school district’s discretionary implementation of state law creates a causal link between its policy and a constitutional deprivation.

Sherman Ex Rel. Sherman v. Township High School District 214 · filed 2009-01-21

The constitutional infirmities of this legislation require the exercise of discretion by each school district that creates the causal link between the municipal policy embodied in that discretion and the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against municipal officials only when a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Flanagan v. Anne Arundel County · filed 2009-01-22

This means that the Chiefs can be held liable in their official capacities only if the execution of a policy or custom inflicts the injury on the plaintiffs.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Alex LL. v. Department of Social Services · filed 2009-01-22

Rather, a municipality may only be held liable where “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort” (Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US at 691; see Pembaur v Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 477 [1986]; Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d at 48-49).

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without a constitutional violation by one of its officers.

Silvan W. v. Briggs · filed 2009-01-23

Any claims against the municipality of West Jordan City fail in the absence of a constitutional violation by one of its officers.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation by an individual defendant.

Swann v. City of Richmond · filed 2009-01-27

The court noted that “there can be no municipal liability in the absence of a claim of a constitutional violation by one of the individual defendants.” ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court’s careful and thorough opinion in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a public entity without evidence of a policy or custom supporting liability.

BARSAMIAN v. City of Kingsburg · filed 2009-01-28

There is no vicarious liability for a public entity under the civil rights law without Monell-type evidence.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Gardner v. Luzerne County · filed 2009-01-28

As in all § 1983 claims, a municipality’s liability depends upon the occurrence of a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 claims against a municipality require evidence that the challenged conduct resulted from a municipal policy or practice.

Butts v. Nyc Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development · filed 2009-01-28

To the extent that plaintiff brings discrimination claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, they must fail because, as the district court concluded, plaintiff presented no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding a municipal policy or practice of discrimination.

Section 1983 does not support municipal liability for a policy, custom, or hiring practice when the officer committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Kline v. KDB, INC. · filed 2009-01-30

In the absence of any Fourth Amendment violation by Officer Freeman during the arrest, there is no basis for Kline’s claim against the City of Smyrna under 42 USC § 1983 that a City policy, custom, or hiring practice authorized the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when action pursuant to an official policy causes a constitutional tort.

Stevens v. Cox, Wd-08-020 (1-30-2009) · filed 2009-01-30

It is undisputed that Cox's discretion to investigate or not investigate was written into Ordinance 630 and, as the trial court observed, it was Pemberville's longstanding policy not to investigate before filing criminal charges for nonpayment of income taxes. Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Cox was acting pursuant to Pemberville's policy which, in turn, caused a constitutional tort to occur.

Municipal liability claims under § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders · filed 2009-02-04

Indeed, “complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983” are not subject to heightened pleading standards.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on respondeat superior.

Barnard v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2009-02-04

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Charles’ municipal liability claim. Charles’ municipal liability claim is founded primarily on the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is not cognizable as a theory of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A county is liable under § 1983 for a social services department’s actions only when a county policy or custom causes the injury; appointing board members does not establish county control over state-directed policies.

Wolf v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-02-06

A county may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only "when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." ... The proper defendant was thus not Fauquier County Board of Supervisors, but rather Fauquier County Social Services Board.

Section 1983 municipal and supervisory liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Julia Huff Walker v. City of Huntsville Alabama · filed 2009-02-06

These claims fail because we have found that there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits suit against a local governing body when the alleged constitutional violation results from a governmental policy or custom.

Harrison v. Prince William County Police Department · filed 2009-02-10

A local governing body may be sued under § 1983 when unconstitutional actions are taken in the course of executing a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 allows an Arizona county to be sued for alleged constitutional violations arising from law enforcement policies made by its sheriff.

Melendres v. Arpaio · filed 2009-02-10

In the absence of precedent to the contrary, the Court is inclined to follow this line reasoning — particularly when the Arizona statute cited by Defendants to support their point is inapposite. ... The County of Maricopa will therefore remain in the instant lawsuit as a municipal defendant pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a municipal failure-to-train claim when no individual defendant committed a constitutional violation.

Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Department · filed 2009-02-10

A failure to train claim cannot exist where no individual defendant has committed a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability claim to identify a policy or custom that caused the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Shipley v. New Castle County · filed 2009-02-12

A municipality can only be liable under § 1983 if the alleged injury is permitted under a specific policy or custom.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee.

Jennis v. Rood · filed 2009-02-17

There cannot be an independent claim against the Department for municipal liability unless Jennis could prove a constitutional violation by one of the Onondaga County jail deputies.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege that an official custom, practice, or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Scott v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-02-19

In order to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must assert that the municipality, through an official custom, practice, or policy, caused the alleged constitutional violation.

A municipal policymaker’s decision not to investigate further does not establish ratification for § 1983 liability when the policymaker believed the alleged misconduct had not occurred.

Lassiter v. City of Bremerton · filed 2009-02-26

Thus, this single decision not to pursue an additional investigation into the specific arrest claims cannot be fairly characterized as an affirmative choice to ratify the alleged conduct, since he believed they had not engaged in such conduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a policymaker’s single decision only when the plaintiff shows a conscious, affirmative choice to ratify the conduct.

Lassiter v. City of Bremerton · filed 2009-02-26

A single decision by a municipal policymaker “may be sufficient to trigger Sec- tion 1983 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations,” but the plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the product of a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify the conduct in ques- tion.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a county; a claim against a county requires evidence of a policy or custom amounting to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Murray v. Idaho · filed 2009-03-02

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Murray’s section 1983 claims against the County of Fremont, as there is no vicarious liability under section 1983, and Murray put forth no evidence of a policy or custom amounting to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking liability against a governmental entity to show action under color of state law, deprivation without due process, and an established custom or policy rather than a random and unauthorized act.

Brown v. City of Colorado Springs · filed 1987-12-31

We conclude that under Parratt, Hudson, Daniels and Davidson, in order to impose § 1983 liability upon a governmental entity, a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) defendant or defendants acted under color of state law; (2) plaintiff was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and (3) the act or acts complained of were the result of an established custom and policy, and were not random and unauthorized.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional injuries caused by a policy or custom, but not under respondeat superior; the policy or practice must be the moving force.

Samples v. City of Atlanta · filed 1988-06-13

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court determined that municipalities can be subject to § 1983 liability “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury....” Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38. As the Monell Court also pointed out, however, there are limitations to this liability. A local government cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); Fundiller, 777 F.2d at 1443. Instead, the policy or practice must be the “moving force of the constitutional violation” at issue. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694,105 S.Ct. at 2037; Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2434-35, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality).

Section 1983 does not allow a county or other local government to be sued solely under respondeat superior.

Owens v. Fulton County · filed 1988-06-15

The law is well established that a county or other local government may not be sued under § 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a city policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Fisher v. City of San Jose · filed 2009-03-11

In light of the jury’s verdict and our legal determination that no warrant was required, the plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment against the City under the Mo-nell standard, which governs when a municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior or vicarious liability; a municipality is liable only when its own policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation.

Barnhardt v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-11

Plaintiff pleads his way out of court on his Section 1983 claim, however, by alleging that the sole basis for the District’s liability “for the actions of the Property Clerk [is] under the doctrine of Re-spondeat Superior.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under [Section] 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Hence, the Complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability on a city merely because it employs a tort-feasor; liability requires an official policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

Davis v. City of Hartford · filed 2009-03-11

Hartford and HPS are correct that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 merely for employing a tort-feasor.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when personnel decisions by a mayor and city commission represent official city policy.

Barkley v. City of Jackson, Tenn. · filed 1988-11-10

The City of Jackson has moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim against it. That motion is denied. ... The court finds untenable any argument that the personnel decisions of the Mayor and the Jackson City Commission do not represent official city policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when private citizens cause the injury and the municipality’s policy supplies only an insufficient causal link.

Saldana v. City of Camden · filed 1989-12-21

Despite accepting as true all allegations in the complaint, including that the fires were the “direct and proximate result” of the policy (1133 Amended Complaint), where plaintiffs concede that the fires were set by private citizens, the chain of causation has been broken, and plaintiffs do not state a claim under section 1983.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an officer’s conduct when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Schubert v. City of Springfield · filed 2009-03-12

On Count I, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon an unconstitutional custom and practice, and on Count II, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligent hiring, training and supervision, the City of Springfield is entitled to judgment on the authority of City of Los Angeles et al. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986), since the liability of the municipality in these circumstances is derivative of the claims for unconstitutional actions by Defendant Stern.

A city is not liable under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional custom or policy when no individual officer violated the Constitution.

Flowers v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2009-03-13

Because Flowers cannot establish that an individual officer violated the Constitution, the district court also correctly dismissed Flowers’s claim against the City for allegedly maintaining an unconstitutional custom or policy.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for its policy or training when the individual state actors caused no underlying constitutional injury.

Holloway v. THE CITY OF SUFFOLK, VA · filed 2009-03-16

Finally, as there is no underlying constitutional violation by Jordan or the John Does, the court finds that partial summary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate on Counts Two and Three.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs the person who committed the alleged wrong.

Nyenhuis v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 2009-03-17

Nor may the MDC “be held liable in a § 1983 action under a theory of respondeat superior merely because it employs a tortfeasor.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official with final policymaking authority causes a constitutional injury through conduct within that authority.

Garlasco v. Stuart · filed 2009-03-17

In the Court’s opinion, Stuart was the final policymaker with respect to the particular conduct at issue here, especially considering that it was his responsibility to care for and maintain Town property and enforce the laws. Consequently, with regard to the Town’s argument that it cannot be held liable in this case, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 1983 permits damages against municipalities when a policy or custom causes deprivation of federal rights, but not on a respondeat superior theory.

Moss v. Kopp · filed 2009-03-18

To establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities or local government bodies, the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom (2) that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for constitutional torts only when the challenged action implements an official policy or results from a governmental custom.

Henderson v. Town of Greenwich · filed 2009-03-18

The section 1983 liability of municipalities is governed by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Supreme Court in Monell held that municipalities can be sued for constitutional torts only if “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or “pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. at 690, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The record contains no evidence that Henderson’s illegal car stop was the product of town policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a municipality to have acted pursuant to a policy or custom for municipal liability, and a single unconstitutional incident is generally insufficient.

Tabb v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-03-19

In order to hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the municipality must have acted in accordance with a “government policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” ... Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to impose liability unless there is proof that there was a policy in place that was unconstitutional. ... The Court finds that the one incident of alleged retaliation against plaintiff does not qualify as pervasive.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its customs or policies amount to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and were the moving force behind the violation.

Cabral v. County of Glenn · filed 2009-03-19

Finally, to prevail against City, Plaintiff “must have sufficiently alleged that: (1) [Plaintiff] was deprived of his constitutional rights by the City acting under color of state law; (2) that the City has customs or policies which amount to deliberate indifference to [Plaintiffs] constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies were the moving force behind the constitutional violations.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality or county without an underlying constitutional violation by one or more of its officers.

Marion v. City of Corydon, Indiana · filed 2009-03-23

Furthermore, municipalities or counties cannot be liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by one or more of their officers.

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an officer’s conduct that did not violate a constitutional right.

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park · filed 2009-03-25

However, having concluded that the officers’ impoundment of Ramirez’s car was reasonable ... Buena Park may not be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for employee retaliation to show a municipal policy of retaliation.

Lee v. City of Syracuse · filed 2009-03-25

Here, in order for defendant City of Syracuse to be liable, plaintiff must show that the SPD had a policy of retaliating against individuals who complain about discrimination.

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state or local government entity or official for violating federal rights under color of state law.

Browning-Ferris Indus. v. City of Maryland Heights · filed 1990-09-24

As a threshold question the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs have brought an appropriate action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Maryland Heights. It is clear that the individuals are persons who can bring an action under § 1983, and the courts have held that a corporation is also a person for the purposes of bringing a § 1983 action. ... The law is also now clear that cities are persons for the purpose of § 1983 liability. ... Certain things are plain. It is clear for instance, that a municipal corporation may be held liable for a single decision by the policy makers of the municipality, because the acts of such policy makers, particularly its properly constituted legislative body, are unquestionably acts of official governmental policy.