42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under § 1983 when they reasonably believe their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Dziekan v. Gaynor · filed 2005-06-13

Thus, qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their actions violate clearly-established rights of which an objectively reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, defendant Gaynor was objectively reasonable in his belief that his actions would not violate clearly established law. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants is also appropriate on this alternative ground.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiffs raise a factual dispute about whether a reasonable official would have understood that the conduct violated their rights.

Martinez-Baez v. Rey-Hernandez · filed 2005-06-14

Lastly, we find that Plaintiffs have, at a minimum, controverted Defendants’ allegations that an objectively reasonable government actor, performing discretionary functions, would not have understood that their conduct violated Plaintiffs’ statutory or constitutional rights. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is DENIED.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, an officer is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when material facts remain disputed about whether the force was reasonable.

Nauman v. BUGADO · filed 2005-06-17

Defendant Paul Bugado’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, because material issues of fact remain as to whether the handcuffing of Plaintiff was reasonable. ... Thus, as to Defendant Bugado’s argument that qualified immunity applies, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official would not have known that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba v. Patricia Carter, and Governors State University · filed 2005-06-20

Public officials need not predict, at their financial peril, how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved. Disputes about both law and fact make it inappropriate to say that any reasonable person in Dean Carter’s position in November 2000 had to know that the demand for review before the University would pay the Innovator’s printing bills violated the first amendment. She therefore is entitled to qualified immunity from liability in damages.

An officer who increases and misrepresents a known danger may face § 1983 liability without qualified immunity when the violated right was clearly established.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2005-06-22

We conclude that Shields unreasonably violated Kennedy’s clearly established constitutional right. Under the state-created danger doctrine, a police officer may be liable for actions that create or augment known or obvious dangers. Here, Shields’s actions both increased and misrepresented the risk Plaintiff faced. Under Grubbs, increasing and misrepresenting a known risk may give rise to § 1983 liability. This doctrine was clearly established by the time the events of this case took place.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged conduct violates clearly established law governing deadly force.

Finks v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2005-06-22

For the reasons stated above, this court has jurisdiction over and AFFIRMS the district court’s determinations that, for purposes of applying qualified immunity, Bailey’s alleged conduct violated Finks, Jr.’s constitutional rights and was governed by clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that their use of force was excessive.

Brown v. Mazuka · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds because Brown failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of force to restore discipline and transport Brown from administrative segregation to the shower area was excessive.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff's version of the facts, the officer violated a clearly established right by increasing and misrepresenting a known danger.

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield · filed 2005-06-23

Resolving all factual disputes in her favor, we conclude that Kennedy has met this burden. Consequently, we hold that Shields is not entitled to have his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a doctor from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that a reasonable doctor would clearly recognize a substantial risk of serious harm.

Lopez v. Tell · filed 2005-06-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity because Lopez failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it would be clear to a reasonable doctor under the circumstances that a delay in Lopez’s scalp surgery would pose a substantial risk of serious harm.

Section 1983 claims against state officials may be barred by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Wrench Transportation Services, Inc. v. Bradley · filed 2005-06-27

Qualified immunity shields state officials performing discretionary functions from suit for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to an official whose conduct violated a right clearly established at the time.

Sowards v. TN · filed 2000-02-08

Because the law was so clearly established that he could not reasonably take political considerations into account when terminating Sowards, Guider is not entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity for Sowards’s political association claim.

Social workers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Roe v. TX Dept Protc & Regu · filed 2002-07-17

We answer the first prong of the Siegert test by concluding that Strickland did violate Jackie’s Fourth Amendment rights, but, moving to the second part of that test, we determine that those rights were not clearly established on July 10, 1999, so Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim does not require a prior case addressing the precise conduct if officers had fair warning that it was unlawful.

Austin v. Harrison County TX · filed 2003-04-25

Defendants’ contention that no case has specifically proscribed the withholding of medical treatment for boot camp attendees reads the right too narrowly; officers need only have “fair warning” that their conduct is unlawful.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the scope of the asserted First Amendment protection was sufficiently uncertain at the time of their conduct.

Hoffman v. Baltimore Police Dept. · filed 2005-06-29

At the time of the alleged conduct at issue in this count, the scope of the First Amendment protection is sufficiently uncertain in this context so as to entitle Defendants to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity cannot be granted at summary judgment when factual disputes remain about whether the official reasonably knew the challenged action violated a constitutional right.

Valdizán v. Rivera-Hernandez · filed 2005-07-01

There being issues of fact regarding the existence of political discriminatory animus and as to whether Rivera, as a reasonable officer, knew or reasonably should have known that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue, the Court may not grant, at this moment, qualified immunity protection.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the challenged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Sanders v. Parrish · filed 2005-07-01

Therefore, we hold that the Law Enforcement Officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Sanders in executing the search warrant at issue in this case. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the Law Enforcement Officers.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when material facts remain about whether a reasonable official would have understood her conduct to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Plaza-Torres v. Rey · filed 2005-07-05

With these contested facts in mind, we find that Co-defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity: (i) Plaintiff has alleged a constitutionally protected right to be free from sexual harassment; (ii) Plaintiff has also, at a minimum, controverted Co-defendant Garcia-Figueroa’s allegations that her right to be free from sexual harassment was clearly established at the time of the facts alleged in the complaint; and (iii) Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether an objectively reasonable government actor, performing discretionary functions, would have understood her conduct to violate Plaintiffs rights under Title VII.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Jarriett v. Wilson · filed 2005-07-07

He therefore cannot meet his burden of showing that a constitutional violation occurred. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity,9 and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

In a § 1983 suit, when officials act within their discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity.

Jarriett v. Wilson · filed 2005-07-07

In the present case, Jarriett does not dispute that the defendants were acting within their authority as correctional facility officers, so the burden shifts to Jarriett to overcome the qualified immunity defense.

Officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims when they had probable or arguable probable cause to arrest.

Bradley v. Village of Greenwood Lake · filed 2005-07-13

The existence of probable cause, or arguable probable cause, gives government officials an absolute defense to such claims and affords the arresting officers qualified immunity from litigation.

Qualified immunity can dispose of a § 1983 claim against prison officials when the plaintiff offers no evidence that they acted with wantonness or deliberate indifference.

MacLeod v. Kern · filed 2005-07-15

Plaintiff's claims against the DOC defendants are also dismissible on the ground of qualified immunity because the plaintiff offers no evidence that they acted with "wantonness” or “deliberate indifference” as required by case law.

Qualified immunity may be denied on a § 1983 home-search claim when the evidence disputes whether officers searched the home and they offer no legal justification for doing so.

Onie Ward v. Moore · filed 2005-07-18

The defendants’ affidavits denying that they had searched her home were controverted by the allegations in Ward’s verified complaint that Officers Moore and Collins had searched her home, including her bedroom, the area under her bed, her closets, and her dresser drawers. The defendants offered no legal justification for searching the residence. Accordingly, the district court was right to deny Officers Moore and Collins qualified immunity on Ward’s claim regarding their search of her home.

An official sued under § 1983 has no qualified immunity for violating clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Garland Independent School District v. Wilks · filed 1987-04-13

While under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), an official has no qualified immunity when he or she has violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” there is no evidence of this type of willful violation in this case.

A defendant is shielded from civil liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Steinberg v. Thomas · filed 1987-05-05

The law on whether Steinberg’s speech was a matter of public concern was not clearly established in September of 1982 when Thomas fired Steinberg.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action protects an officer when a reasonably competent officer could have concluded that probable cause supported the warrant application.

Cahill v. Montgomery County · filed 1987-07-16

In other words, an officer of reasonable competence could have objectively and reasonably concluded from these facts that probable cause existed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed.

McLaurin v. NEW ROCHELLE POLICE OFFICERS · filed 2005-07-20

Because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Moretti to believe that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff, Officer Moretti is entitled to qualified immunity.

Individuals sued under Section 1983 for federal constitutional violations committed under color of state law may assert qualified immunity.

Torres v. Village of Sleepy Hollow · filed 2005-07-21

As discussed more fully below, qualified immunity is a defense afforded to individuals acting under color of state law who are sued for federal Constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest had arguable probable cause.

Walker v. City of Pine Bluff · filed 2005-07-21

No reasonable police officer could believe that he had arguable probable cause to arrest such an on-looker in this situation, for obstruction of governmental operations or for any other purported crime. Thus, on this summary judgment record, the district court properly denied Grace’s motion for qualified immunity protection.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were reasonable in light of clearly established law.

BARLOW EX REL. MONCEBAIZ v. Owens · filed 2005-07-22

Because Defendants’ actions in investigating the neighbor’s report, detaining Moncebaiz, and then arresting him were not unreasonable in light of clearly established law, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 prison free-exercise claim turns on whether it was clearly established that officials needed a legitimate penological interest to substantially burden an inmate’s religious exercise, including in disciplinary segregation.

Conyers, Blake H. v. Abitz, Tom · filed 2005-07-25

The relevant inquiry is whether, at the time the defendants refused Conyers’s request, the law was clearly established that prison officials must have a legitimate penological interest before imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of an inmate’s religion, even when that inmate is in disciplinary segre- gation.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to line officers who follow a longstanding departmental strip-search directive when a similarly situated officer would not have understood that compliance violated constitutional rights.

DeToledo v. County of Suffolk · filed 2005-07-26

Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to conclude that a similarly situated line officer would have believed that compliance with a long-established policy directive emanating from the leadership of the Department involved a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. ... Consequently, both Sinclair and Thomas are entitled to a grant of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity from suit.

Padilla v. Mason · filed 2005-07-28

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit available to government officials sued in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Government officers are qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 when a reasonable officer could believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Bosteder v. City of Renton · filed 2005-07-28

Because it would be objectively reasonable for an officer to glean from the McCready decisions that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in a situation very similar to the one we consider here (though we now clarify to the contrary), we hold that the individuals were qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 and affirm the dismissal of that claim against them.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established constitutional right through objectively unreasonable conduct.

Stidham v. Texas Commission on Private Security · filed 2005-07-28

For purposes of qualified immunity, defendants Biggs, McGlasson, Shimek, and Grumbles violated Stidham’s clearly established liberty interest in pursuing his chosen occupation without providing due process of law. For the reasons stated, their conduct was not objectively reasonable. Therefore, they are not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity, and we VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment and REMAND this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

A state officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Andrews v. Fuoss · filed 2005-08-01

In summary, even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to her claims, Andrews fails to establish that Sheriff Fuoss violated a clearly established constitutional right, and we hold that Sheriff Fuoss is entitled to qualified immunity.

A state officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Andrews v. Robert Fuoss, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of Jones County, South Dakota · filed 2005-08-01

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s grant of Sheriff Fuoss’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A caseworker is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable caseworker in the same circumstances would not understand that her conduct violated clearly established law.

Jordan v. Murphy · filed 2005-08-02

Given Williams’s reasonable reliance on the police officers, her statutory duty to investigate reports of abuse and neglect, and her statutory duty to cooperate with the police, we conclude that a reasonable case worker in Williams’s position would not have understood her actions as violating clearly established law.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the challenged conduct does not violate the Constitution.

Simasko v. County of St. Clair · filed 2005-08-03

The defendants’ actions leading to Simasko’s termination did not violate the Constitution; thus, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the denial of summary judgment is reversed.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages when the rights their conduct allegedly violated were not clearly established.

Conley v. Town of Elkton · filed 2005-08-04

The court also concludes that even if the termination of Conley did operate to violate his First Amendment rights, Chief Pullen and the members of the Elkton Town Council are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific circumstances.

Lyons v. Xenia · filed 2005-08-04

After considering the Supreme Court’s treatment of similar qualified-immunity issues in Brosseau, we now extend qualified immunity to Officer Foubert for Lyons’ excessive-force tackling claim.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities can survive a qualified immunity defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage when the well-pleaded allegations, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, support the claim.

Padilla Roman v. Perez · filed 2005-08-08

Defendants, Jose Hernández and Edgar González, are also being sued under section 1983 in their individual capacity. ... Having presented the applicable three pronged-test for a qualified immunity defense, and, because under a motion to dismiss standard as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court most view in the light most favorable to the plaintiff all well-pleaded factual averments, this Court finds that defendants may not at Motion to Dismiss standard be granted qualified immunity.

Officers who obtain a search warrant through material false statements are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Baldwin v. Placer County · filed 2005-08-08

The plaintiffs’ established civil rights were violated by presentation of the false affidavit. Liston, 120 F.3d at 972-73. Qualified immunity was rightly denied.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, the court first asks whether the challenged conduct violated the claimant’s rights, before asking whether those rights were clearly established.

Masek v. Bob Wills · filed 2005-08-08

We clarify that under the Saucier approach (which is not without its critics, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 600-01 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)), the first question in a qualified immunity analysis is whether the conduct in question violated the complainant’s rights, not whether any rights allegedly violated were “clearly established.”

Qualified immunity is unavailable in a Section 1983 action when the conceded facts establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Baldwin, Dds v. Placer County · filed 2005-08-08

Placer County and several of its police officers (collectively, the County) have taken this interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by Michael Baldwin and Georgia Chacko (the plaintiffs). On the basis of the facts conceded as undisputed by the County for purposes of this appeal, we hold that the County violated established constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and that qualified immunity was properly denied.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield a prison officer who knowingly disregards a substantial suicide risk in violation of a prisoner’s clearly established rights.

Schultz v. Sillman · filed 2005-08-10

Therefore, if a jury determines that Schultz demonstrated a strong likelihood of suicide, and that Sillman was aware of this likelihood but chose to disregard it, Sillman’s actions would constitute a violation of Schultz’s clearly established Eighth Amendment right to receive medical treatment for his suicidal tendencies.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s allegations and evidence fail to show a violation of clearly established rights.

Nickleberry v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-10

Because Nickleberry’s speculative and conclusory factual assertions and his own summary-judgment evidence do not show that Phelps-Sanders violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, we conclude that the district court erred in rejecting Phelps-Sanders’s qualified-immunity claim.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors who deprive them of rights secured by federal law.

K.M. Ex Rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Central School District · filed 2005-08-11

Claims under Section 1983 lie only against state actors — that is, persons acting under color of state law — who deprive the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or a federal law. ... Defendant Burpee is not qualifiedly immune from suit under Section 1983.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages suit can waive a pretrial qualified immunity claim by failing to appeal timely from its denial.

Littles v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2005-08-12

We conclude that the defendants waived their pretrial qualified immunity claims by failing to appeal timely from the denial of these claims in their original summary judgment motion.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no evidence shows that her conduct violated a constitutional right.

David v. Rich · filed 2005-08-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Officer Rich after determining that she was entitled to qualified immunity because no evidence established that Officer Rich’s conduct violated a constitutional right.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows that the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Douglas v. Condon · filed 2005-08-16

Absent a showing that Dobbs’ actions in authorizing the submission of the Motion and proposed Order to the magistrate judge violated a clearly established constitutional right, qualified immunity applies and Douglas’s suit must fail.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an official from a retaliation claim when the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Mitchell v. Street · filed 2005-08-16

However, it is clear that both of these rights were established at the time Mayor Street acted. ... Thus, I find Defendant Mayor Street shall not be entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the right was clearly established and the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of that right.

Bultema v. Benzie County · filed 2005-08-17

In sum, we conclude that when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Bultema, Ketz is not entitled to qualified immunity, because the constitutional right at issue was clearly established and Ketz’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of that right.

A government official seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim must show that the challenged actions were taken while performing duties within the scope of the official’s authority.

Akins v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2005-08-17

To benefit from qualified immunity, a government official must make a threshold showing that his actions were undertaken pursuant to performance of his duties within the scope of his authority.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian Cty., AR · filed 2005-08-18

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a § 1983 claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government official is immune from liability under § 1983 unless the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Talisa D. Pool v. Sebastian County · filed 2005-08-18

Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a § 1983 claim unless his or her conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when genuine factual disputes remain over whether an officer violated clearly established rights.

Goins v. City of Detroit · filed 2005-08-19

Moreover, because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Zani, in fact, engaged in conduct that would have violated Plaintiffs clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights, Zani is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

A police defendant is immune from a § 1983 claim if the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Mensah v. Darby Borough Police Department · filed 2005-08-19

Even assuming arguendo that Mensah could show that her claim states a violation, the Darby Police would be immune because to succeed under § 1983, the violated right must be “clearly established.” ... Mensah cannot make this showing.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the search violated a clearly established right or that a reasonable official would have known it was unlawful.

Biby v. Bd. of Regents · filed 2005-08-22

He has also failed to make a showing sufficient to overcome appellees' defense of qualified immunity, a defense at issue in this case but not in O'Connor. He has not demonstrated that a clearly established right of his was violated by the search or that a reasonable official would have known that the inception or scope of the search would violate Biby's Fourth Amendment rights.

A plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known the conduct violated to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Biby v. Board Of Regents, Of The University Of Nebraska At Lincoln · filed 2005-08-22

He has also failed to make a showing sufficient to overcome appellees' defense of qualified immunity, a defense at issue in this case but not in O'Connor. He has not demonstrated that a clearly established right of his was violated by the search or that a reasonable official would have known that the inception or scope of the search would violate Biby's Fourth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity under Section 1983 protects an official whose conduct was objectively reasonable despite a mistaken identification.

Stewart v. District Attorney for the Eighteenth Circuit Court District for the State of Mississippi · filed 2005-08-23

Although failure to discover the single picture in one of the multiple files may indicate a slight degree of negligence, it cannot be stated that overall, the actions of the assistant district attorney were not objectively reasonable.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, qualified immunity requires a separate analysis from the merits, but witness evidence may affect both at summary judgment.

Woodward v. Town of Brattleboro · filed 2005-08-23

Furthermore, while the qualified immunity analysis does not duplicate the merits analysis, it may still be affected by the testimony and affidavits in question. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand to the district court for consideration of the summary judgment motion on both the merits and qualified immunity, including proper consideration of the testimony and affidavits of Ames, the Hunts, and Wilson.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when it turns on a disputed fact about the officers’ conduct.

Notice v. Koshes · filed 2005-08-24

Furthermore, because the question of qualified immunity, therefore, turns on a question of fact — whether the officers in fact entered the residence without knocking and announcing — it is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to parole agents at summary judgment when disputed material facts could establish that they violated clearly established rights.

Green, Michael v. Butler, Marlo · filed 2005-08-24

For the foregoing reasons, disputed issues of material fact remain and the parole agents are not, at this stage, entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when they did not violate clearly established federal law.

Pennington v. Teufel · filed 2005-08-26

Because Plaintiffs have not alleged and cannot show that any of these Defendants violated any clearly established federal law, the Court agrees that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claim against an officer for the first arrest.

Wheeler v. Gidley · filed 2005-08-29

Accordingly, he is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ claim that Wheeler’s first arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when existing law did not give reasonable officers fair notice that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Cipes v. Graham · filed 2005-08-29

In the absence of any controlling caselaw bearing on similar circumstances so as to have framed this issue with sufficient precision to put reasonable law enforcement officials on notice of the constitutional infirmity of such a nighttime misdemeanor warrant execution, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they violated was not clearly established at the time.

Draper v. Logan County Public Library · filed 2005-08-29

But under the circumstances presented here, the contours of Ms. Draper’s rights were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable government official would understand that prohibiting Draper from wearing her necklace while on duty at the library violated her rights. Accordingly, neither “plainly incompetent” nor “knowingly violating the law,” Kompanik and Appling are entitled to qualified immunity, and the individual capacity suits against them must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages and injunctive relief against state actors who violate federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Angulo v. Cruz · filed 1987-08-17

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages and a dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek damages for a constitutional rights violation committed under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity doctrines.

Reinglass v. State of Ohio · filed 1987-09-01

Finally, the court is of the opinion that, assuming the defendants, as held by the district court, have only a qualified and not an absolute immunity, there has been a total failure on the part of the plaintiff to establish any facts which if true would show that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiff of which the defendants should have known at the time that right was supposedly violated.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established and they reasonably applied existing law.

Rachamim v. Ortiz · filed 2005-08-31

However, on the present record, as indicated, we agree with the district court that there was no clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiffs to a kosher diet free of all conditions for the years 1998 to 2000. Additionally, we also believe and hold that, in any event, the defendants made “a reasonable application of existing law to their own circumstances.”

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from § 1983 liability for a brief delay in releasing an arrestee while police complete routine paperwork and obtain a cuff cutter.

Wilson v. City of Boston · filed 2005-08-31

There remains the approximately thirty minutes during which the police completed routine paperwork and awaited a cuff cutter after they had reached the inescapable conclusion that there had never been a warrant for Wilson's arrest. Although the issue is close, we conclude that Dunford continued to enjoy qualified immunity during this final thirty minutes of detention.

Qualified immunity does not shield correctional officers from a § 1983 claim when existing law fairly warned them that failing to address a detainee’s known, urgent medical need was unlawful.

Bozeman v. Silas Orum, III · filed 2005-08-31

Given these circumstances, we conclude that the Officers were fairly warned by our ease law and that the Officers’ total failure to address Haggard’s medical need during the fourteen-minute period violated Haggard’s constitutional rights, which violation should have been obvious to any objectively reasonable correctional officer.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when material facts remain disputed about a prison official’s deliberate indifference and immunity defense.

Ahearn v. Vose · filed 2005-09-02

Summary judgment should not have been granted for defendant Hall. There remains a genuine issue of material fact whether he was deliberately indifferent to the risk to the inmates’ health after May 16, 1991, so as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. There are also issues of fact remaining pertaining to his defense of qualified immunity. ... Insofar as the judgment dismisses the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant Hall, it is reversed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims when a reasonable officer could have made the same judgment, even if the arrest lacked probable cause.

Zellner v. Summerlin · filed 2005-09-06

Thus, while Defendants may have acted without justifiable cause in arresting Plaintiff, the Court cannot say that their “judgment was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice.” ... Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest and malicious prosecution charges.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to municipalities and to municipal officials sued only in their official capacities under § 1983.

Myers v. Potter · filed 2005-09-07

The qualified immunity defense is not available to municipalities or to persons acting on behalf of municipalities, such as Police Chief Joe Melton, when sued in their official capacity only.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings when the alleged facts support a claim that officials deliberately fabricated evidence.

McSherry v. City of Long Beach · filed 2005-09-07

The facts alleged by McSherry support a claim of deliber- ate fabrication, and thus, on the basis of the pleadings, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Bradley v. City of Ferndale · filed 2005-09-08

A government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity if his conduct does not violate constitutional standards in light of clearly established law at the time of the alleged violation. ... For the reasons stated above, defendants Simpson, White, Crouse and Thomson are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s denial of these defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Bradley’s 1983 claim is REVERSED and judgment is entered in their favor on those claims.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit requires determining whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Wernsing, Jenny v. Thompson, Odell · filed 2005-09-09

For each claim we must determine (1) whether plaintiffs have alleged violation of a valid constitutional right and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when clearly established law gave them fair warning that their conduct violated a private citizen’s First Amendment rights.

Bennett v. Hendrix · filed 2005-09-09

Because this Court has held since at least 1988 that it is “settled law” that the government may not retaliate against citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights, Ga. Ass’n of Educators, 856 F.3d at 145, we hold that the defendants were on notice and had “fair warning” that retaliating against the plaintiffs for their support of the 1998 referendum would violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, would lead to liability under § 1983.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Kennedy v. Ridgefield · filed 2005-09-12

Resolving all factual disputes in her favor, we conclude that Kennedy has met this burden. Consequently, we hold that Shields is not entitled to have his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe their warrantless home entry and arrest were lawful.

Breitbard v. Mitchell · filed 2005-09-14

Under the circumstances, no officer could have reasonably concluded that it was lawful to lie to plaintiff in order to gain entry into her house—without a warrant or her consent and absent exigent circumstances—and arrest her under these facts for a minor offense. ... Thus, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and their motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to that claim.

Section 1983 does not give an officer qualified immunity from fabrication of evidence and Brady claims when the rights at issue were clearly established.

Atkins v. County of Riverside · filed 2005-09-14

Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the fabrication of evidence and Brady claims.

Factual disputes about discriminatory animus can preclude resolving qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Ramos-Martinez v. Negron-Fernandez · filed 2005-09-19

The Magistrate-Judge reported that “because issues of fact exist regarding possible discriminatory animus, the Court is precluded from considering the qualified immunity defense at this time.” The Court agrees.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer in their position could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Burrell v. McIlroy · filed 2005-09-19

Thus, on the facts of this case, the district court did not err in finding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 search claim when a reasonable officer would not have known that the consent to search was involuntary.

Burrell v. Mike McIlroy Glen C. Rector, Jeff Thorpe · filed 2005-09-19

Thus, on the facts of this case, the district court did not err in finding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the specific constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s conduct.

May v. City of Springfield · filed 2005-09-23

Emmel argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs federal law claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is predicated upon his alleged use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ... In particular, Emmel relies upon the defense of qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the particulars of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force had been clearly established before December 15, 2001. Therefore, it sustains the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #8), as it relates to the Plaintiffs federal law claim against Emmel.

Officials sued under § 1983 for denying a prisoner’s religious diet are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when a factual dispute remains about whether the restriction was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo · filed 2005-09-26

Based on my earlier opinion and my conclusion in this opinion that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their reasonable relation argument, I again conclude that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. The motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED on this ground.

A defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional rights.

Ross v. City of Memphis · filed 2005-09-29

Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims. ... However, in light of the Court’s analysis above, the totality of the circumstances, and Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights, the Court finds that Defendant Gray’s actions, as alleged, were objectively unreasonable. Defendant Gray thus fails to meet his burden, and his motion for qualified immunity is DENIED.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the arrest warrant was supported by arguable probable cause.

Brown v. J.L. Abercrombie · filed 2005-09-30

In order to be entitled to qualified immunity in this case, Abercrombie need only show that the arrest warrant was supported by arguable probable cause.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim over a traffic stop if they reasonably believed probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed, even if it did not.

Holeman v. City of New London · filed 2005-09-30

Even if the totality of facts were insufficient to satisfy probable cause or reasonable suspicion, Officer Williams' belief that they were was objectively reasonable, and therefore protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages under Section 1983 unless they violate clearly established rights; material factual disputes can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

Perez v. ZAYAZ · filed 2005-10-03

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are not liable for monetary damages in § 1983 suits unless their actions violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... It has been clearly established, however, that when there is a material dispute of fact, summary judgment cannot be ordered. ... As such, defendants’ summary judgment request on qualified immunity grounds is Denied.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim turns on whether the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Jones, Mark D. v. Wilhelm, Ron · filed 2005-10-03

Thus, following Saucier, we reaffirm that the proper standard for qualified immunity remains a two-part test which first examines whether the defendant’s alleged actions constitute a violation of constitutional rights, and then determines whether the implicated right was clearly established at the time.

Officials who knowingly disregard hiring requirements to favor political allies may be denied qualified immunity on a § 1983 First Amendment claim.

Roman v. Altieri · filed 2005-10-05

Defendants, knowing the law, purposely refused to follow the law, and, hence, qualified immunity is DENIED.

A § 1983 defendant may be denied qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s assumed-true allegations would defeat the defense.

Calvert v. Clerk of Superior Court · filed 2005-10-06

On the limited record before us, we cannot say the district court erred by concluding that, if the allegations in Calvert’s complaint are true, which we too must assume they are, Appellants’ qualified immunity defense fails.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Tague v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2005-10-07

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002) (citation omitted).

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation.

Boldin v. Limestone County · filed 2005-10-12

Thus, because Raby did not violate Boldin’s rights under the First Amendment, Raby is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer had notice that the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kingdom v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2005-10-12

After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly denied summary judgment to Officer Cosby because Officer Cosby had notice that his actions toward Kingdom violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.

Section 1983 shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Earle v. City of Vail · filed 2005-10-17

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officials are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Farrow v. Stanley, et al. · filed 2005-10-20

Therefore, the right is not clearly established and defendants are qualifiedly immune from Farrow’s claim for damages.

In a § 1983 action, once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a specific constitutional right.

Mata v. Saiz · filed 2005-10-21

After a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff in a case like this one, which alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment, must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a specific constitutional right.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued under § 1983 from suit, not merely from liability.

Janis v. Biesheuvel · filed 2005-10-25

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not simply from liability.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state executive officers for conduct violating clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Adorno v. Gonzalez · filed 1987-12-31

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for constitutional violations by government officials, subject to qualified immunity.

Livingston v. Luken · filed 2005-10-26

Defendants-Appellants Officer Porter Eubanks, Cincinnati Police Chief Thomas Streicher, and Cincinnati City Manager John Shirey appeal the magistrate judge’s denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff-Appellee Nathaniel Livingston, Jr.’s constitutional claims against them in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... “According to the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Section 1983 authorizes civil actions against state actors who deprive people of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McSherry v. Long Beach · filed 2005-10-26

Pre-trial dismissal on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate if the plaintiff establishes that material issues of fact exist.

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional or statutory rights.

Patrick v. Lewis · filed 2005-10-28

Plaintiffs assert claims under section 1983 for alleged violations of Patrick’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... Therefore, Officer Wilson is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions on the morning of June 8.

Section 1983 claims against officials sued individually require heightened pleading when qualified immunity is raised.

St. Louis v. Sands · filed 2005-11-08

However, in § 1983 actions where government officials sued in their individual capacities have raised the defense of qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has “tightened” the pleading requirements.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity cannot apply when disputed facts, if true, would show that the defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Holden v. Knight · filed 2005-11-16

When disputed issues of material fact exist, which, if true, show that the defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable, the defense of qualified immunity cannot apply.

A § 1983 claim may be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the pleading stage when the allegations cannot establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Jackson v. Schultz · filed 2005-11-18

This court may dismiss Jackson’s complaint only if it is clear that no violation of a clearly established constitutional right could be found under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations or pleadings.

A plaintiff pursuing a Section 1983 claim must plead a violation of a clearly established constitutional right once the defendant raises qualified immunity.

Jackson v. Andreas Schultz Richard Cadoura · filed 2005-11-18

But once the EMTs raise qualified immunity, Jackson must plead the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when a reasonable official would have known under existing law that the employee’s speech addressed matters of public concern.

Campbell v. Town of Southern Pines · filed 2005-11-21

A reasonable official in defendants’ positions would have known this under the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit law that existed at the time plaintiff was fired. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and their motion for reconsideration on this point will be denied.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs fail to show that the asserted rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.

Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Simmons · filed 2005-11-22

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that any of the rights asserted in these eases were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. All defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims for damages.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from damages under § 1983 when the officer’s conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.

Coffey v. Morris · filed 2005-11-23

Accordingly, Officer Morris is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court will grant his motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officers from damages when they could not reasonably have known their conduct violated a person’s civil rights.

Fleming v. City of Bridgeport · filed 2005-11-29

We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated that she was not a tenant. The police defendants therefore could not have known that removing the plaintiff from the apartment she actually possessed would violate her civil rights. Because federal qualified immunity applies to the police defendants’ conduct, we reject the plaintiffs federal constitutional claims.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation.

Lewter v. Kannensohn · filed 2005-11-29

As we found that Lewter’s First Amendment rights were not violated because she did not engage in protected speech, we also affirm the district court’s ruling that Kannensohn was entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot obtain qualified immunity at summary judgment when the record does not establish that the challenged restriction on religious exercise was reasonable as a matter of law.

Boles v. Neet · filed 2005-11-30

Accordingly, at this stage of the case, this Court cannot say as a matter of law that Defendant Neet’s determination to prohibit the wearing of such items during transport was a reasonable restriction on plaintiffs free exercise of his religious practices, consistent with prison security needs, such that he is entitled to be clothed with qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Byers v. City of Eunice · filed 2005-12-01

In sum, for summary-judgment purposes, Byers fails to satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: the Detective’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable in the light of then clearly established law.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. Cupp · filed 2005-12-02

However, the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrate that Dunn’s use of deadly force violated Smith’s constitutional rights. The particular right at issue was clearly established. Thus, Dunn is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, once a government official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the official is not entitled to it.

Smith v. Williams-Ash · filed 2005-12-06

When this defense is raised, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to prove that the government official is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows people to sue state officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when officials could not reasonably have known their conduct was unconstitutional.

Lumbreras v. Roberts · filed 2005-12-07

It is not clearly established under Oregon law that BOLI could have permitted Plaintiffs to continue operating under their farm labor license while it investigated the forest license discrepancies. Even if failing to split the license did violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process, Defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable government official would not have know that a failure to split the license under the circumstances in this case was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 permits civil damages claims against government officials, subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

James v. York County Police Department · filed 2005-12-08

The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force on the basis of qualified immunity, either. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state actor who, under color of state law, deprives the person of a constitutional right.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-12-08

The determination of whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In the first step we must view the record in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury in determining whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If the plaintiff establishes the violation of a constitutional right, we must next consider whether that right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Id.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Chavez v. De La Paz · filed 2005-12-08

To prevail against a qualified-immunity claim, Chavez must show: (1) his allegations state a violation of current law; and (2) the Officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of the clearly-established law at the time of such conduct. ... Based solely on the well-pleaded facts in that complaint, the district court correctly denied qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful.

Bills v. City of Rialto · filed 2005-12-08

A reasonable officer could have believed that both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state official for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Moreno v. Baca · filed 2005-12-09

Having established that Appellants violated Moreno's constitutional rights when they conducted the suspicionless search and seizure, we must evaluate whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the incident and whether the "unlawfulness [of Appellants' conduct] was apparent in light of preexisting law." Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for a reasonable mistake about whether an offense is jailable.

State v. Rodarte · filed 2005-12-12

We agree with Justice O’Connor’s qualified immunity analysis, and we reiterate that reasonable mistakes regarding the jailability of a particular offense will not subject an officer to § 1983 liability, and thus under-enforcement will not be a major concern.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives another of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity.

McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff's Department Roy Livingston, Richland County Sheriff Department Sheriff of Ric · filed 2005-12-12

In order to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.”

Section 1983 claims against state officials may be barred by qualified immunity unless the asserted right was clearly established.

Hardney v. Rosario · filed 2005-12-12

The district court properly denied defendant’s motion because Hardney’s right to outdoor exercise is clearly established.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity analysis, the first stage asks whether a constitutional right was violated.

McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff · filed 2005-12-12

The question at stage one of the qualified immunity analysis is not whether the officer was reasonable, but whether a constitutional right was violated.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against officials whose conduct was reasonable under clearly established law.

Gooden v. Crain · filed 2005-12-13

Furthermore, he is not entitled to damages because he cannot satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Plaintiff did not have a right to grow a one-fourth inch beard in light of his religious beliefs under clearly established law. The actions of the Defendants in prohibiting him from wearing a one-fourth inch beard was not unreasonable in light of clearly established law.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in the same situation, even if the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Spruill v. Watson · filed 2005-12-13

Therefore, even if Spruill had made out a constitutional violation on Watson’s part, Watson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Brown v. Castro · filed 2005-12-13

The district court properly determined that the defendants involved in incidents alleged to have occurred on September 18, 2000, December 13, 2000 and November 1, 2001 were entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants presented evidence that, at the time of these incidents, Brown was not wearing a vest, and did not provide a medical history document (referred to as a “ehrono”), either of which would have identified him as having a disability or mobility issues. Accordingly, defendants could have reasonably believed that their conduct in requiring Brown to get down during alarm sessions and punishing him for not following commands did not violate Brown’s rights.

Section 1983 claims against an official are subject to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established.

Helmer v. Middaugh · filed 2005-12-15

Amendment would also have been futile for the related reason that, because the constitutional claims were not clearly established, defendant Lisi was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for failing to intervene in an unlawful arrest because that duty was clearly established.

Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Comm. · filed 2005-12-16

However, given our holding in Jackson–that a claim of excessive force predicated on the unlawfulness of an arrest is subsumed into an unlawful arrest claim–we do not believe the district court erred in concluding that a duty to intervene in an unlawful arrest was clearly established.

Qualified immunity shields officials performing discretionary functions from § 1983 damages liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established right.

Steigmann v. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ILLINOIS · filed 2005-12-20

“Qualified immunity shields government officials who are performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their mistake about the law governing their conduct was reasonable.

Winchester v. Cosaineau · filed 2005-12-21

Finally, even if the Defendants were incorrect in their belief that they could enter Plaintiffs home under the circumstances stated above, I find that this mistake was reasonable given the uncertainty in the law in this area. ... Accordingly, I find that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and grant their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would know that a blanket strip-search policy violated clearly established rights.

Howes v. Chesley · filed 2005-12-21

The court concludes that a reasonable, similarly-situated official would have been aware of the First Circuit’s decision in Swain and would therefore have been on notice that the policy of strip searching every incoming inmate, regardless of suspicion, was unconstitutional.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when a jury could find that they violated clearly established rights by deliberately interfering with prescribed medical care.

Prewitt v. Roos · filed 2005-12-22

Rex Allen Prewitt appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on account of the defendants’ qualified immunity. ... Moreover, the defendants violated law that was clearly established at the time of the alleged deliberate indifference. ... We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to serious needs for pain medication and pillows.

A § 1983 defendant may raise qualified immunity in a post-trial motion despite not raising it before trial or submitting it to the jury.

Pitt v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-12-23

The Court does not agree with plaintiffs either that the defendants have waived the right to raise the defense of qualified immunity on their post-trial motion or that, in the end, the differing formulations of the standards for reasonable good faith belief at common law and for qualified immunity make a difference.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities can be barred by qualified immunity.

Burgest v. Colquitt County, Georgia · filed 2005-12-23

We also agree with the district court’s reasoning that summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims was appropriate, based on its conclusions that: (1) Colquitt County is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Burgest’s and Walker’s § 1983 claims, as Burgest and Walker failed to show that the County employed a policy or custom that caused constitutional harm; (2) Lanier, Whittington, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the § 1983 claims brought against them in their official capacities; (3) Lanier, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities; and (4) Lanier, Whittington, Bryant, Copeland, and Grim are entitled to official immunity from the state law claims brought against them; (5) Colquitt County is entitled to sovereign immunity from the state law claims brought against them; and (5) Burgest and Walker failed to establish their claims under §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer who had arguable probable cause to arrest, even if actual probable cause was absent.

Whitner v. Rick Moore · filed 2005-12-23

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there was even “arguable” probable cause to arrest the defendant, regardless of whether the facts later establish that probable cause did not exist.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when clearly established law gave fair warning that the alleged use of deadly force was unlawful.

Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia · filed 2005-12-23

For the foregoing reasons, a jury could conclude that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris by ramming him off the road under the instant circumstances, and we find no reversible error in the denial of qualified immunity to Scott at this stage in this case.

When a defendant raises qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Perez v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2005-12-27

When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of conduct.

A defendant in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged facts, if proved, would defeat that defense.

De Litta v. Village of Mamaroneck · filed 2005-12-28

With respect to the plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege that the plaintiff was retaliated against for speaking on a matter of public concern. ... Because the plaintiffs right to be free from First Amendment retaliation was clearly established at the time this alleged conduct took place, the plaintiff has thus alleged facts which, if proven, would defeat Flynn’s assertion that he enjoys qualified immunity with respect to the retaliation claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their mistaken belief that probable cause supported a search warrant was reasonable.

Armstrong v. City of Melvindale · filed 2006-01-06

Defendants wrongly believed that probable cause supported the warrant, but their mistake was not so unreasonable as to deny them qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when sufficiently specific precedent did not clearly establish the asserted right at the time of the conduct.

McKee v. Hart · filed 2006-01-06

Accordingly, because of the dearth of precedent of sufficient specificity (and factual similarity to this case) regarding a public employee’s First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory harassment by his or her employer at the time of Sattele’s conduct, we cannot say that the constitutional right Jones alleged Sattele violated was clearly established. Sattele is therefore entitled to qualified immunity under the second, as well as the first, prong of our Saucier analysis.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Bruton v. Paesani · filed 2006-01-06

Officials are not liable for monetary damages unless they have violated a constitutional right and that right is clearly established, meaning “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

For a § 1983 claim alleging a constitutional violation with an intent element, qualified immunity requires an inquiry into the defendant’s mental state.

Muzquiz v. Clackamas County · filed 2006-01-06

Where the underlying alleged constitutional violation has an intent element, however, deciding whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity necessarily involves inquiring into mental state.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts, no reasonable officer applying clearly established law would have acted as the defendant did.

Saliby v. Kendzierski · filed 2006-01-09

Based upon Saliby’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer, acting in accord with clearly established law, would have taken Saliby into custody. ... Therefore, Kendzierski’s motion for summary judgment on Saliby’s Fourth Amendment claims must be denied.

A § 1983 claim against a police officer fails at the first qualified-immunity step if the facts viewed most favorably to the claimant show no constitutional violation.

Wertish v. Norman D. Krueger, in His Individual Capacity · filed 2006-01-09

In determining whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim, we first consider whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the claim, show that the officer violated a constitutional right. ... In these circumstances, we conclude that summary judgment dismissing Wertish’s § 1983 excessive force claim must be affirmed because the facts construed most favorably to that claim show that no constitutional right was violated.