42 U.S.C. § 1983

In a § 1983 action, a court assessing qualified immunity first asks whether the plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation.

Fales v. Garst · filed 2001-01-02

When an official claims entitlement to qualified immunity, we first ask whether the plaintiffs have alleged a violation of constitutional magnitude.

A public school principal is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 speech claim when the teachers’ interest in speaking is outweighed by the school’s interest in efficient administration.

Jacquelyn Fales, Dr. Mary Ann Kahmann Eileen Scarborough v. Garst · filed 2001-01-02

Because we believe that the teachers’ interest in speaking on these matters was outweighed by the interest of efficient administration of the middle school, we conclude the district court erred in not finding Garst was entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence could show that the officer repeatedly struck a compliant arrestee.

Tapp v. Banks · filed 2001-01-10

Such actions by an officer would offend the Fourth Amendment and would not be saved by a qualified immunity analysis. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Tapp’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Tapp’s excessive force claim should have survived, and we will remand this claim to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established federal law, even if a state administrative appeal received no decision.

Fuller v. Linda A. Dillon, Patti Wilson, John Zielinski, Doctor Vallabhaneni and Doctor Vidal · filed 2001-01-10

We agree with the trial judge and conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regardless of the fact that Dr. Shansky failed to issue a decision regarding Fuller’s appeal.

Qualified immunity can shield state officials from individual liability under Section 1983 even when factual disputes remain about whether they violated a constitutional right.

Garcia-Montoya v. State Treasurer's Office · filed 2001-01-18

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that, although there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the violation of Gareia-Montoya’s constitutional rights, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Greene v. Terhune · filed 2001-01-22

State officials such as Defendants have qualified immunity from civil liability under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to qualified immunity, which can protect subordinate officers who reasonably follow superiors’ orders without shaping the challenged policy.

Williams v. Goord · filed 2001-01-24

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials acting in their official capacity from suits for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their actions violate clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known. ... As these officers had no input into the development and implementation of the restraint policy and were merely following what they believed to be lawful orders, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual officials when the applicable law was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Anderson v. Burke County · filed 2001-01-24

We further conclude that, even if we are mistaken on the merits, the applicable law had not already been clearly established in the context of these circumstances. ... The individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Harmon v. Calderon · filed 2001-01-24

With respect to Harmon’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims, we conclude that he failed to establish that prison officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err by determining that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the applicable law did not clearly establish the asserted right in the circumstances at issue.

Judicial Complaint, In Re: · filed 2001-01-24

We further conclude that, even if we are mistaken on the merits, the applicable law had not already been clearly established in the context of these circumstances. ... The individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim when the right was clearly established by analogous case law or the conduct was plainly egregious.

Cody v. Dane County · filed 2001-01-25

We acknowledge that government officials are shielded from civil liability for discretionary actions taken in the performance of their duties unless (1) the right violated was clearly established by analogous case law, or (2) the conduct was so plainly egregious that the official ought to have known his conduct was improper.

Officials sued for damages in their personal capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when existing case law did not make their conduct clearly unlawful.

Lutheran v. Born, Gerald · filed 2001-01-25

The ground on which the district court dismissed the claim for damages against the defendants in their personal capacities, qualified immunity, was solid too. ... Before we upheld the constitutional challenge in the first suit there was no case authority that made it unreasonable for the defendants to assume the constitutionality of their actions.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Palmer v. Wagner · filed 2001-01-29

Because Palmer failed to allege a constitutional violation, the district court properly concluded that Wagner was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Palmer’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, disputed historical facts material to qualified immunity prevent the court from granting that defense as a matter of law.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt · filed 2001-01-31

In sum, because historical facts were in dispute concerning the reasonableness of the use of pepper spray in this case, as well as what Lewis and Philps knew and did when they authorized its use, the district court erred in deciding that these officials were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim was not decided at the demurrer stage.

Cobbs v. Commonwealth · filed 2001-01-31

Defendants claim that any actions were taken in their official capacities and they are therefore immune under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is not a question for the Court at this stage on demurrer.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Fender v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2001-02-02

The court additionally finds that a reasonable person in defendant Seymour-Hunter’s position would not have known that her conduct violated plaintiffs clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. ... Accordingly defendant Seymour-Hunter is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Jurgens v. Wood County, Texas · filed 2001-02-02

The district court did not err in determining that Deputy Criddle’s conduct was objectively reasonable and that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if a prudent person could believe reasonable cause existed, even if probable cause did not.

Avery v. Hoague · filed 2001-02-06

If a prudent individual could believe that reasonable cause existed to arrest Avery, Pohl and Dick are entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether probable cause existed to make the arrest.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the relevant right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Prison Legal News v. Cook · filed 2001-02-07

Publisher and Prisoners also argue that the district court improperly determined that the Department’s Officials are entitled to qualified immunity. We disagree.

Officers sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Estate of George Ex Rel. George v. Michigan · filed 2001-02-08

The Court does not believe that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing that Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct in performing a field sobriety test in the location chosen violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Defendants are therefore entitled to entry of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

State officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their objectively unreasonable conduct violates clearly established law.

Nelson v. Stalder · filed 2001-02-13

However, Nelson has demonstrated that defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law, and that defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the court finds as a matter of law that Baker, Ward, and Goines are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not resolve a § 1983 claim when the alleged employment discrimination or retaliation, if proved, would violate clearly established rights and could not be objectively reasonable.

DiLegge v. Gleason · filed 2001-02-13

The doctrine of qualified immunity is unavailable on the facts of this case. The right to be free from discrimination in employment on account of race is well established, both by Title VII, and, with respect to state actors, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as is the right to be free from retaliation for speech or union activity, or asserting claims of discrimination. If discrimination or retaliation played a substantial part in the employment decisions, Defendants’ conduct could not be characterized as objectively reasonable. Accordingly, this case may not be resolved on the basis of qualified immunity, and that portion of the motion is denied.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established such that they should have known their conduct was unlawful.

Hauge v. Brandywine School District · filed 2001-02-13

Given the fact-intensive nature of the Pickering balancing test, however, the right is not clearly established such that the individual defendants should have known whether their conduct violated Hauge’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court will grant the individual defendants’ motion for qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on a Section 1983 illegal-entry claim when exigent circumstances do not justify their warrantless entry.

Weimer v. Mahoning County · filed 2001-02-20

Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in its rulings. ... We therefore AFFIRM that portion of the district court’s opinion denying summary judgment on the basis of exigent circumstances, DISMISS that portion of the appeal related to the question of consent, and REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Copeland v. Nunan · filed 2001-02-21

While in 1995, it was clearly established by cases like Farmer and Schwenk that a forced sexual assault was repugnant to the conscience of man and therefore an Eighth Amendment violation, it was not clearly established that isolated and uninvited sexual touchings with little if any resulting physical or psychological damage, like those alleged in this case, amount to constitutional violation.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Glenn v. City of Tyler · filed 2001-02-22

Officer Rhodes “exercis[ed] reasonable discretion based on his perception of the circumstances on the scene,” and this court finds that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claim to the extent that it was grounded on a wrongful arrest.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when they reasonably could have believed probable cause existed.

Adolphus v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2001-02-22

The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful arrest claim on the basis of qualified immunity ... because the undisputed material facts indicate that the officers reasonably could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Adolphus.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Flagner v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-02-22

In light of our decision in Pollock, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that the law was clearly established.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on a retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Johnson v. Collins · filed 2001-02-23

To evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, we engage in a two-step analysis. First, we determine whether the plaintiffs’ claim states a violation of their constitutional rights. Second, we determine whether those rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred. ... As for the second step, these rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred.

An officer who joins a seizure already underway may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer has no reason to know the basis for the seizure.

Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills · filed 2001-02-26

While officers must affirmatively intervene to prevent other officers from violating an individual’s constitutional rights, ... that obligation does not extend to questioning the basis for a fellow officer’s reasons for arrest in this situation. ... He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute prevents the court from deciding whether the defendants’ conduct was reasonable.

Scott v. Sills · filed 2001-02-27

In this case, the court will not grant the defendants the cover of qualified immunity because there is a genuine factual dispute over the exact nature of their conduct that prevents it from ruling on this issue as a matter of law.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for releasing a social security number when the constitutional privacy right in that information was not clearly established.

Arakawa v. Sakata · filed 2001-03-06

The constitutional right to privacy in a SSN has not been clearly established, and its parameters have not been clearly defined, as the discussion in Section A of this opinion demonstrates. ... Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs federal claims and those claims are, therefore, dismissed.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim at summary judgment when sufficient evidence supports a constitutional violation and defeats the immunity defense.

Pullin v. City of Canton · filed 2001-03-09

Thus, Pullin has met her burden of offering sufficient evidence to both establish a constitutional violation and defeat Ditt-more’s qualified immunity. Accordingly, Pullin’s unlawful arrest claim under § 1983 survives summary judgment.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when similarly situated officers could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Nelson v. Wayne Kline and Matthew Cunningham · filed 2001-03-12

We believe that similarly situated officers, confronted with similar circumstances, could reasonably believe that these actions were lawful under clearly established law. The officers are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Private persons sued under § 1983 have no qualified immunity defense.

Keeling v. Schaefer · filed 2001-03-14

As private persons, the Impact defendants have no qualified immunity defense.

A prior denial of qualified immunity does not establish liability under § 1983 when factual disputes remain for trial.

Joseph v. Maynard · filed 2001-03-16

We find that Joseph was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, because this court’s prior decision did not settle liability-related issues. Rather, this court determined that there were factual disputes to be decided concerning the ultimate issue of whether Maynard was entitled to qualified immunity.

In an excessive-force claim under § 1983, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when the force was unreasonable under clearly established law.

Deorle v. Greg Rutherford, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Mick Grey, Butte County Sheriff County of Butte · filed 2001-03-16

Accordingly, in line with established Ninth Circuit precedent, it is clear that because, on the facts presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the force used was unreasonable, Rutherford is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Still v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-03-19

The defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity in light of Still’s failure to establish a First Amendment violation.

Officials executing a facially valid child-removal order have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no precedent would alert a reasonable official that the removal violates a protected parental right.

Chapman v. Lilac · filed 2001-03-20

The district court held that “[i]n removing the plaintiffs daughter from her custody Ms. Lilac and Detective Deputy Sheriff Claypool were executing a facially valid court order ... Plaintiff has not cited any precedent holding that under such circumstances a reasonable public official could/ should have considered that action as interfering with a constitutionally protected parental right.” ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its memorandum opinion filed February 22, 2000.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable prison official would not have understood that asking an inmate to establish the religious character of his demands violated a clearly established right.

Rawlins v. Stewart · filed 2001-03-23

The authorities were neither plainly incompetent nor knowingly in violation of the law when they asked Rawlins to establish the religious character of his demands. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials performing discretionary functions are subject to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Bazan Ex Rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County · filed 2001-03-27

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages liability if their actions were objectively reasonable in the light of then clearly established law.

Private foster parents are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims based on their care of a child placed by the state.

Hernandez v. Hines · filed 2001-03-29

This Court declines to extend the law of the Fifth Circuit to grant qualified immunity to foster parents. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 claims based on qualified immunity is denied.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest or detention are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause.

Garcia v. New York State Police Investigator · filed 2001-03-29

Defendants had “arguable probable cause” and, thus, are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged arrest and detention.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law gave adequate warning that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Bell v. Marseilles Elementary School · filed 2001-03-29

Because the case law has been clear for sixteen years that student searches by school agents in schools must be reasonable, Officer Long is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies to a § 1983 arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Muendel v. Los Angeles Police Department · filed 2001-03-29

The officers and the City are also entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Based on the facts described above, “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed” to arrest Muendel.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison officer from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the alleged conduct, if proved, would be an egregious abuse of governmental authority.

Johnson v. Freeburn · filed 2001-03-30

Regarding the qualified immunity issue, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... Whether considered separately or in combination, each act, if proven, would exhibit an egregious abuse of governmental authority and shock the conscience.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects government officers from suit when their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed at the time.

Metoyer v. Connick · filed 2001-03-30

Government officers are protected from suit under the qualified-immunity doctrine when their actions were objectively reasonable “in light of clearly established law” and the information possessed by the officers at the time of their relevant conduct.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity on false arrest and malicious prosecution claims when an officer’s probable cause determination was objectively reasonable.

Menon v. Frinton · filed 2001-03-30

Because Frinton had probable cause to issue the summons to Menon, he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and his conduct was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Frinton is entitled to qualified immunity on Menon’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims as a matter of law.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they implement a federal court’s remedial decree and reasonably believe their actions do not violate clearly established rights.

Ehrenberg v. Goord · filed 2001-03-30

Insofar as defendants were merely implementing the terms of the remedial decree issued by the federal district court in Santiago, they are protected by qualified immunity against plaintiff’s action for damages.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a police chief when there is no evidence that he violated a clearly established constitutional right or knew of or was deliberately indifferent to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Wrenn v. Clge · filed 2001-04-03

That court was also correct in concluding that there is no evidence that Hayes’s “conduct violated any clearly established constitutional right nor that he had knowledge of or was deliberately indifferent to any constitutional violation by any of his subordinates” and that he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a clearly established federal right.

ABATE of Georgia, Inc. v. State of Georgia · filed 2001-04-04

Additionally, Plaintiffs have not shown that, even if a constitutional violation existed, the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. There is no case law stating that there is a federal constitutional right to a list of approved motorcycle headgear. Accordingly, the individual Defendants sued for damages in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 qualified immunity analysis, a court need not decide whether a right was clearly established if it finds no constitutional violation.

Milstead v. Kibler · filed 2001-04-05

Because no Fourth Amendment violation was shown, we need not proceed with the remainder of the qualified immunity analysis, i.e., to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct or to resolve whether the contours of such a clearly estab- lished right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that he was violating the right.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability for an arrest when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Fersner v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD · filed 2001-04-11

To deny the defendants the benefit of the qualified immunity defense, I would have to be persuaded that no reasonably competent' officer could have concluded that probable cause existed to believe Fersner was operating under the influence. On this record, even viewing the material facts in the fight most favorable to Fersner, I am not persuaded that no reasonable law enforcement officer could have concluded (as did Bailey) that probable cause existed based on the aborted investigation of Fersner’s physical and mental condition after the single field sobriety test.

Qualified immunity does not shield § 1983 defendants from compliance with an order for injunctive relief.

Herron v. Schriro · filed 2001-04-12

Likewise, the prison officials’ cross-appeal arguments are without merit, as the district court’s grant of limited injunctive relief and a partial fee award were well within its discretion, and the doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield defendants from compliance with an order for injunctive relief.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right violated was clearly established.

Giebel v. Sylvester · filed 2001-04-12

In light of history, a solid body of Supreme Court decisions, and common sense, we reject any contention that the First Amendment violation alleged in this case was not clearly established, and conclude that Sylvester is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit does not lose eligibility for qualified immunity simply by failing to follow agency policies.

Leverette v. Bell · filed 2001-04-13

While formal sources are instructive, a defendant does not lose official status for purposes of qualified immunity analysis simply by failing to adhere to an agency’s stated policies.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right asserted against them was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Gill v. DeFrank · filed 2001-04-16

With respect to Gill’s privacy claim, the court concluded that “Gill’s right to privacy regarding his HIV status was not clearly established law in 1997, and thus defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.” ... Having conducted such a review, we conclude that summary judgment on all claims was warranted, and affirm, for substantially the same reasons as stated in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation as to the claims for which the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal, 2000 WL 270854 at *1, and in the district court’s memorandum and order, 462 Mich. 591, 614 N.W.2d 88, 2000 WL 987152 at *1.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have understood that his conduct violated clearly established rights.

Romaine v. Rawson · filed 2001-04-17

Consequently, he is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions against Plaintiff.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no constitutional violation is alleged.

Brown v. Armenti · filed 2001-04-17

We conclude that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count V because no actual constitutional violation was alleged.

An officer facing a § 1983 wrongful arrest claim has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest, even when actual probable cause was absent.

Walker v. Briley · filed 2001-04-18

In the context of a claim of wrongful arrest, even if an officer lacks “actual” probable cause, he will still be protected by qualified immunity if there is at least “arguable” probable cause, i.e., if a reasonable police offer, given his knowledge of the facts and circumstances, could have believed there was probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. ... Here, the Court concludes that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Walker, Briley had neither actual nor arguable probable cause to arrest Walker for disorderly conduct, as that offense is defined by § 13A-11-7 and authoritatively interpreted by the Alabama appellate courts.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right.

Campos De Suenos, Ltd. v. County of Bernalillo · filed 2001-04-18

The individual county commissioners argue that because CDS has failed to demonstrate a violation of equal protection, their qualified immunity claim prevails. We agree.

Government officials performing discretionary functions may claim qualified immunity from individual-capacity suits under Section 1983.

Chesser v. Haralson County, Georgia · filed 2001-04-18

Qualified immunity protects government actors performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot identify a clearly established right they violated.

Lile v. Simmons · filed 2001-04-20

Absent an identifiable liberty interest, plaintiff cannot establish that defendants violated clearly established law. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 mistaken-identity arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity unless the officer acted objectively unreasonably, such as by failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence.

Brown v. Wiita · filed 2001-04-23

In sum officers who mistakenly arrest the wrong person are immune from § 1983 liability unless they act in an objectively unreasonable manner in the circumstances, as for example, in failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed or competent officers could disagree about probable cause.

Pistorio v. Fleagane Enterprises, Inc., No. Cv-00-0504270 (Apr. 24, 2001) · filed 2001-04-24

Nothing in these allegations, even construed most favorably to the plaintiff, establishes facts which show that Candels lacked an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Alternatively, at the very least, officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the test for probable cause was met.

Officers facing a Section 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity when their mistaken assessment of a threat was reasonable under the circumstances.

City of San Antonio v. Hernandez · filed 2001-04-25

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” ... The fact that they failed to recognize that the gun was harmless and that the situation escalated to life-threatening proportions is most unfortunate, but under the stressful circumstances presented here, does not demonstrate unreasonableness or a knowing violation of Hernandez’s constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity is unavailable on a § 1983 public employee retaliation claim when the employee’s First Amendment right was clearly established.

Baldassare v. County of Bergen · filed 2001-05-02

Defendants insist they are immune under the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... But it r emains unavailing. ... Defendants' argument that Baldassare's First Amendment rights wer e not clearly established cannot be sustained.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2001-05-04

As we recently reiterated in Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying a strict two-part test once a defendant invokes a qualified immunity defense. “‘First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right. Second, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.’” Id. at 1206 (quoting Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Strouss v. Michigan Department of Corrections, a State Agency and Body Politic Marie Fletcher Gerald Devoss, in Th · filed 2001-05-04

In light of this caselaw, the individual defendants did not violate a clearly established constitutional right by giving Strouss a five-day suspension without pay. Since the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Strouss’ Section 1983 due process claim was properly dismissed.

Prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when no reasonable official could have believed their alleged conduct was lawful.

Robinson v. Prunty · filed 2001-05-07

We agree with the district court that if Robinson’s gladiator-like scenario is true, then no reasonable prison official could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful. ' We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the defendants.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department · filed 2001-05-09

We hold that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could believe that the conduct did not violate Case’s constitutional rights.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for implementing a prison policy if they reasonably believed it did not violate an inmate’s First Amendment rights; a genuine factual dispute about the policy’s justification can preclude summary judgment.

Davis v. Norris · filed 2001-05-10

Here, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they reasonably believed that their implementation of the photograph policy did not violate Davis’s First Amendment rights. ... A genuine issue of fact therefore existed as to whether the photograph policy reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, precluding summary judgment.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against individual officials when the plaintiff has not alleged the violation of a clearly recognized constitutional right.

Mooneyham v. BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EX'RS · filed 2001-05-11

The threshold question for determining whether the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to a given constitutional claim is whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly recognized constitutional right. ... The Supreme Court's refusal in Siegert to recognize an injury to one's reputation as a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest forecloses Mooneyham's ability to defeat the individual defendants' immunity defenses. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Mooneyham's § 1983 claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 does not shield local legislators with qualified immunity when they implement their authority to indemnify police officers for punitive damages in bad faith.

Navarro v. Block · filed 2001-05-11

This much is clear after Trevino II and Cunningham: local legislators are not entitled to qualified immunity if they implement their state-created power to indemnify police officers from punitive damage awards in bad faith.

A public official may be dismissed from a Section 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege conduct violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Jackson v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Corrs. · filed 2001-05-15

We also agree with the trial court's finding that Secretary Stalder was entitled to immunity for the federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). ... We find that the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish conduct by the Secretary that violated Ms. Jackson's constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established federal law.

Carroll v. Mays · filed 2001-05-16

In short, the record fully supports the District Court’s conclusion that Mays’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established federal law and that he therefore was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability for an arrest when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Predmore v. Schwartz · filed 2001-05-21

There is no genuine dispute of material fact that a reasonable officer, in light of the information of which he was aware at the time of the arrest, could have believed he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

A local official cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 racial discrimination claim when the right to nondiscriminatory treatment was clearly established and the evidence permits a finding that the official violated it.

Caldwell v. Caesar · filed 2001-05-22

A local official faced with a claim of violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct alleged “does not violate ... clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... It is the constitutional right to nondiscriminatory treatment under the Fifth Amendment that must be “clearly established,” not the validity of the particular individual’s underlying substantive claim which, in this case, is his claim to exercise his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. ... Qualified immunity does not provide Rev. Caesar a defense to this action.

Public officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they should have known that firing an employee for truthful whistleblowing violated a clearly established First Amendment right.

Hufford v. McEnaney · filed 2001-05-22

The district court correctly denied qualified immunity to the defendants because they should have been aware that discharging Hufford in retaliation for his truthful whistleblowing violated his constitutionally protected right to free speech.

A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim bears the burden of showing that the asserted right was clearly established when it was allegedly violated.

Hufford v. Mcenaney · filed 2001-05-22

Hufford, as the party seeking to deprive the defendants of qualified immunity, bears the burden of proving that the rights he claims were "clearly established" at the time they were allegedly violated.

An official who adopts an unconstitutional jail policy can have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when existing law did not clearly establish that the policy was unlawful.

Wilson v. Shelby County · filed 2001-05-23

Therefore, although we hold that the strip search of Wilson was unconstitutional, we conclude that Sheriff Jones is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A defendant performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established constitutional standards.

Ellis Ex Rel. Lanthorn v. Jamerson · filed 2001-05-25

Hence, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless Plaintiff shows Defendant’s acts or omissions “violate[d] constitutional standards in light of clearly established law at the time [he] acted .”

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity inquiry, a court must consider evidence of discriminatory intent when that intent is an essential element of the plaintiff's claim.

Thomas v. Talley · filed 2001-05-25

Because evidence of improper motive is an essential component of Mr. Thomas's affirmative case, we conclude that when ruling on Captain Talley's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court was indeed required to consider the evidence of Captain Talley's intent to discriminate.

A prosecutor sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the known facts support an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause exists.

McGee v. Broz · filed 2001-05-25

We hold that Mr. Broz, a Missouri prosecuting attorney, was in possession of facts sufficient to justify an objectively reasonable official in believing that Mr. McGee had committed a crime, even though this belief turned out to be wrong. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Mr. Broz was entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest and search claim when the plaintiff fails to establish an arrest without probable cause.

Galletta v. Deasy · filed 2001-05-29

We conclude Mr. Galletta has failed to establish Sergeant Deasy arrested him without probable cause, which means the subsequent search of Mr. Galletta’s wallet did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Sergeant Deasy is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to a private health care provider that has no discretion to deny necessary medical care to incarcerated people.

Elie v. St. Barnabas Hospital · filed 2001-05-31

Finally, there is no merit to defendant’s contention that it is entitled to qualified immunity, which ordinarily attaches only when a governmental official is “performing a discretionary function” (Liu v New York City Police Dept., 216 AD2d 67, 68, lv denied 87 NY2d 802, cert denied 517 US 1167; see also, Richardson v McKnight, 521 US 399, 406). St. Barnabas, a private health care provider, having undertaken to provide necessary medical care to incarcerated persons, had no discretion to deny such care by means of institutional policies manifesting deliberate indifference to those persons’ serious health needs (see, Hinson v Edmond, 192 F3d 1342).

Qualified immunity protects deputies from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Hall v. City of Vicksburg · filed 2001-06-04

At the time of the situation and under the circumstances set forth in the defendants’ summary-judgment evidence, the deputies’ actions were objectively reasonable.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action turns on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct under clearly established law; that determination does not establish immunity to state-law claims that depend on intent.

Andrews v. Crump · filed 2001-06-05

Rather, the court should examine the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct based upon law clearly established at the time. ... Thus, the federal judge’s determination that defendants had qualified immunity against plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims does not operate under the doctrine of issue preclusion to mandate a finding that defendants have immunity to plaintiffs’ state law claims, which do involve issues of intent and state of mind.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established right.

Kies v. City of Aurora · filed 2001-06-05

Here, Kies fails to adequately allege that the conduct of either Nila or Brown violated a clearly established constitutional right, and, therefore, Kies has not met her burden of demonstrating that Nila and Brown are not protected by qualified immunity.

Officials exercising delegated discretion may be entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Lombardi Rest Home, Inc. v. Richter · filed 2001-06-05

The defendants exercised their judgment in determining the rates pursuant to § 17-314, now § 17b-340, and were thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Gardner v. Vespiia · filed 2001-06-11

The facts alleged by Gardner, even if true, do not allege the violation of an actual constitutional right. Accordingly, Vespia is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield officials from a claim when they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Dietz · filed 2001-06-12

Because plaintiff has successfully established that defendants’ actions violated a clearly established constitutional right, qualified immunity will not shield defendants from fully defending plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is available only to a person sued in an individual capacity.

Chute v. City of Cambridge · filed 2001-06-12

For example, qualified immunity, as a defense to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is available only to a person who has been sued in that person’s individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official for filing a counterclaim when a right to be free from that counterclaim was not clearly established.

Venable v. Keever · filed 2001-06-13

There is no clearly established right to be free from a counterclaim filed by a government official.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim against a public official and must be granted when undisputed facts establish that the official did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Doe v. Gayle Bowles Richard Kemp Ronald Stratton · filed 2001-06-19

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim against a public official. ... Provided that there are no disputed issues of material fact precluding jurisdiction, qualified immunity must be granted by this court if, as a matter of law, defendants’ conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had probable cause for the arrest.

Huang v. Harris County · filed 2001-06-22

Scudder and Darbe have demonstrated probable cause for Huang’s arrest, entitling them to the defense of qualified immunity. Huang has failed to carry her summary judgment burden by producing competent evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim to the extent it was grounded on an alleged false arrest.

Government actors generally receive qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, and the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it.

Rodgers v. Hawley · filed 2001-06-22

Government actors generally receive qualified immunity in § 1983 actions. Irvin bears the burden of defeating this immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 illegal detention claim when the law governing their asserted community caretaking authority is not clearly established.

Winters v. Adams · filed 2001-06-25

As discussed earlier in this opinion, the availability of the community caretaking function as an alternative to reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio is still a subject of debate in the courts. Thus, the appellants’ conduct cannot be found to have violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, and the appellants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment illegal detention claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity based on the objective legal reasonableness of their conduct in light of what they knew at the time.

Winters v. Robert Adams and Craig Prahm · filed 2001-06-25

The determination of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity requires consideration of the “objective legal reasonableness” of the officer’s conduct in light of the information he possessed at the time of the alleged violation.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law made the unlawfulness of their conduct apparent.

Thornburg v. Peters · filed 2001-06-28

The Defendants also are not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense. Public officials are protected from liability for civil damages if their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when they rely on an executive order that was patently unconstitutional under existing precedent.

Sonoda v. Cabrera · filed 2001-07-03

It was impermissible for the defendants to rely upon an executive order that was patently unconstitutional under precedent of the CNMI Supreme Court and had been expressly declared unconstitutional by a federal district court. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment for the defendants and hold that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Sonoda’s due process claims.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they violate no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Dobson v. City & County of Denver · filed 2001-07-06

In any event, we do not see that the individual defendants violated any “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not established a deprivation of a federally protected right.

Townsend, Gary v. Vallas, Paul · filed 2001-07-09

Because Mr. Townsend has not established that he was deprived of a federally protected property right, Mr. Vallas and Ms. Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Delaney, Glen v. DeTella, George · filed 2001-07-09

Having found that Delaney has alleged a constitutional violation, we consider whether the right he asserts was clearly established prior to the spring of 1996. ... On this record, Judge Coar was right to deny the qualified immunity plea of all defendants.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 failure-to-train claim when the asserted duty was not clearly established.

District Council 20, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. District of Columbia · filed 2001-07-10

Accordingly, the Court holds that all plaintiffs, including Escobar, fail to state a claim against Williams in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train, because Williams is entitled to qualified immunity as to these claims which have not been clearly established in this or any other circuit.

Section 1983 does not shield police officers with qualified immunity when they withhold exculpatory evidence from prosecutors in violation of a clearly established right.

Newsome, James v. McCabe, John · filed 2001-07-11

If Newsome can prove what he alleges, then under the approach of Brady and Jones v. Chicago he will establish a violation of the due process clause, a kind of violation for which officers McCabe and McNally do not have immunity.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Mukaida v. Hawaii · filed 2001-07-12

To the extent Mukaida’s claims are asserted against Okamura in his individual capacity, he has qualified immunity from those claims. Qualified immunity bars claims against state officials in their individual capacities if their conduct did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about the officer’s perceptions and their reasonableness remain disputed.

Clem v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VA · filed 2001-07-17

A close review of the current record compels the conclusion that neither summary judgment nor qualified immunity can be determined at this time because there remain disputes regarding what Officer Corbeau actually perceived and the reasonableness of his conclusion either that plaintiff was armed or that he posed a threat of death or serious physical injury.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Doe v. Delie · filed 2001-07-19

Although we ultimately agree that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we do not agree with the District Court’s reasoning. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects an inmate’s right to medical privacy, subject to legitimate penological interests. However, because this right was not clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct, we will affirm the dismissal of Doe’s complaint.

A defendant in a Section 1983 claim is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would understand that penalizing an employee for requesting religious accommodation is unlawful.

Phillips v. Collings · filed 2001-07-19

This Court finds that an objectively reasonable official would understand that it is unlawful to recommend the termination of a subordinate in the first instance, and then author an exceedingly negative and voluminous performance evaluation of the employee in the second instance, based on that employee’s request for accommodation of his religious beliefs. Collings is not entitled to qualified immunity for her actions.

In a Section 1983 suit, an official cannot rely on counsel’s advice to support qualified immunity if the official failed to give counsel complete information.

York v. Purkey · filed 2001-07-20

And, second, Purkey could not rely on Cantwell’s advice because he failed to provide Cantwell with complete information.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 retaliation claim when prosecutors independently review the case and the officers supply no materially false information or omissions.

Petersen v. Cazemier · filed 2001-07-23

Neither Cazemier nor McDonald furnished any material false information to the prosecutors, or omitted any material information in their reports. The prosecutors’ independent review entitles the defendants to qualified immunity on plaintiffs retaliation claim.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action protects an official from the burdens of trial as well as liability.

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-07-23

Qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability but also “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”

A government actor performing a discretionary task is immune from a § 1983 suit if the action did not violate clearly established law.

New York State National Organization for Women v. Pataki · filed 2001-07-23

A government actor performing a discretionary task is entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits if his or her “action did not violate clearly established law.”

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, a defendant is entitled to judgment if no constitutional violation occurred; if a violation occurred or may have occurred, the court proceeds with the immunity inquiry.

Wayne v. Shadowen · filed 2001-07-23

If the alleged violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right did not occur, the defendant is entitled to immediate judgment; whereas if the alleged constitutional violation did occur, or may have occurred, the court should proceed with the qualified immunity inquiry.

An officer’s belief that a person posed a threat after an unlawful seizure began cannot provide qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for that seizure.

Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills · filed 2001-07-24

Officer Miller’s subjective belief that plaintiff was going to strike her, after she had already commenced an illegal seizure, cannot serve as a basis to hold her immune for her actions.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for removing children from parental custody when the removal is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Pace v. Montalvo · filed 2001-07-24

Thus, under the second and third prongs of the Robison analysis, the 96-hour hold on custody and removal of the Pace children was objectively reasonable as Defendant Lopez personally observed and recorded the situation and reviewed the police and EMS personnel statements. She, as well as the other three Defendants, is to be granted qualified immunity as to'that act.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged conduct would violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Williams v. Belknap · filed 2001-07-24

In fact, it is clear that Defendants’ alleged conduct would have violated rights that were clearly established on May 17,1998. ... Accordingly, qualified immunity does not shield Defendants from suit.

Qualified immunity can entitle an individual school official to summary judgment on a § 1983 claim.

Chiu v. Plano Independent School District · filed 2001-07-24

For the following reasons, we dismiss Defendants Davis, Wohlgehagen, Burleson, Criswell, and Sellers’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity for want of jurisdiction; however, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Defendant Brooks.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Doe v. Delie · filed 2001-07-24

However , because this right was not clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct, we will affirm the dismissal of Doe's complaint.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from § 1983 liability when the jury’s supported findings establish that the officer acted unreasonably.

Corcoran v. Fletcher · filed 2001-07-26

Therefore, because the jury instructions demonstrate that the jury must have determined that Officer Fletcher not only lacked probable cause to arrest Corcoran but did so unreasonably, and because this Court holds that the jury’s determination was sufficiently supported by the record, this Court hereby denies Fletcher’s assertion of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful at the time.

Kerman v. City of New York · filed 2001-07-26

We find that at the time of the officers’ conduct in this case no clearly established law prohibited a warrantless entry into an apartment on the ground of exigent circumstances based solely on an anonymous 911 call. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all nine defendant police officers with regard to defendants’ entry into Kerman’s apartment.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts material to the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct remain.

Kerman v. City of New York · filed 2001-07-26

However, the parties' versions of the facts differ markedly and "[s]ummary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d at 143. Therefore, we remand to the district court the issues of whether Crossan employed excessive force following the initial seizure and handcuffing of Kerman and whether qualified immunity attaches.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiffs fail to show that their actions violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Veile v. Martinson · filed 2001-07-30

For these reasons, we also hold defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on plaintiffs’ failure to meet their summary judgment burden of showing defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause for the arrest.

Merrick v. Sattle Police Department · filed 2001-07-30

If a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause for the arrest, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Merrieks, the record supports the conclusion that the officers could have reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest the Merricks.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Ayres v. City of Beaumont · filed 2001-07-31

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability of civil damages as long as their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... As such, Chief Bertrand was acting within his discretion as a city official and enjoys qualified immunity from a federal claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Cantrell v. DeKalb County · filed 2001-08-03

Based on the undisputed facts, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably and did not violate any of Mr. Cantrell’s clearly established rights when they asked him to talk with them in the parking lot of the church and then suggested that he pursue his disagreements with the pastor on another day.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action does not protect officials whose conduct patently violates clearly established fundamental constitutional rights, even if they relied on statutes authorizing it.

Gorromeo v. Zachares · filed 2001-08-07

Because Plaintiff alleges conduct that is patently violative of clearly established, fundamental constitutional rights, the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity, regardless of whether Defendants relied upon statutes that purportedly authorized their conduct.

A government official is immune from a § 1983 claim based on issuing a ticket when the complaint alleges neither knowledge that the act would violate the plaintiff’s rights nor malice.

Smith v. Herbert, No. Cv99-0266709-S (Aug. 10, 2001) · filed 2001-08-10

In the absence of an allegation of scienter or malice, Herbert's issuance of the ticket was protected by an immunity from suit, and summary judgment is entered for the defendants on the first count.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when, on the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor, no reasonable officer could think their coercive interrogation was lawful.

Wilson v. Lawrence Cty. · filed 2001-08-15

Against this background case law, in light of Wilson's limited intelligence and mental capacities, no officer could have reasonably thought this conduct consistent with Wilson's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 generally shields officials sued in their individual capacities through qualified immunity unless controlling law clearly established that their conduct was impermissible.

Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Education · filed 2001-08-15

As noted supra, officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are generally entitled to qualified immunity unless a factually similar and controlling case has clearly established that the conduct is impermissible.

In a § 1983 claim, school officials are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged retaliation concerns classroom speech germane to the subject and advancing an academic message.

Hardy v. Jefferson Community College and Kentucky Community and Technical College System, Mary Pamela Besser · filed 2001-08-15

Given this court’s indepth analysis of the protections available to one using the “N” word in an academic context, reasonable school officials should have known that such speech, when it is germane to the classroom subject matter and advances an academic message, is protected by the First Amendment.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wilson v. Lawrence County · filed 2001-08-15

In determining if appellants are entitled to qualified immunity we must ask whether Wilson states a violation of a constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time, such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated the law. ... Against this background case law, in light of Wilson's limited intelligence and mental capacities, no officer could have reasonably thought this conduct consistent with Wilson's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a prison officer for malicious and sadistic force causing actual injury when clearly established law prohibited that conduct.

Foulk v. Charrier · filed 2001-08-17

Moreover, the district court did not err in declining to grant judgment as a matter of law based upon Charrier’s qualified immunity defense. By June of 1994, the law was well established that a malicious and sadistic use of force by a prison official against a prisoner, done with the intent to injure and causing actual injury, is enough to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for an arrest supported by probable cause and reasonable force, while a disputed later use of force remains for the jury.

Smith v. City of New Haven · filed 2001-08-20

Thus, the Court holds that the four police officers are worthy of qualified immunity from Smith’s claim of false arrest, lack of probable cause and excessive force in removing Smith from the vehicle. Wexler, Papa and Muller are not granted qualified immunity on the charge of excessive force in escorting Smith to the patrol car.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when factual questions remain about whether the officers acted objectively reasonably.

LaLonde v. Bates · filed 2001-08-20

Viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, questions exist as to whether the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. ... Defendants’ request for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity must be denied.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Armstrong v. District of Columbia Public Library · filed 2001-08-21

Here, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable person would have known that the regulation at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right. ... Thus, the Court concludes that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Director and Trustees of the Library, as well as the three unnamed Library employees, on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against state officials cannot rest on conclusory allegations that fail to overcome qualified immunity.

Fennell v. TX Education Agency · filed 2001-08-23

Fennell and Rameses offer only conclusory allegations and fail to show why the state officials are not entitled to qualified immunity; accordingly, their claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 were properly dismissed.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Carroll v. Pfeffer · filed 2001-08-23

Because Carroll has not established a violation of her constitutional rights, she has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Officer Pfeffer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is available for § 1983 claims but does not apply to Title VII claims.

Cutts v. Peed · filed 2001-08-24

Although this claim is similar to the § 1983 claims, contrary to the parties' apparent belief, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity only with respect to the claims brought under § 1983; there is no qualified immunity from liability under Title VII.

A prison director who knows officers are applying an unlawful obscenity standard and allows the practice to continue can be personally liable under § 1983 without qualified immunity.

Broulette v. Starns · filed 2001-08-27

Once Director Stewart knew that deputy wardens were not applying the standard set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3501 required by his own policy and the Hook Decree, a reasonable officer in the position of Director Stewart could not have reasonably believed that allowing review of publications for depiction of specific sexual acts only to continue for another two years was lawful. Therefore the Court has determined that Director Stewart has personal liability along with Defendant Schiavo for the con-trabanding of Plaintiffs magazines.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit shields officials from the burdens of discovery and trial as well as liability.

Locurto v. Safir · filed 2001-08-27

Because qualified immunity is a shield not only from liability, but also from the burdens of discovery and trial, a denial of immunity is effectively unreviewable if appeal is delayed until after a final judgment has been entered.

Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally immune from Section 1983 suits if their conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Williams v. Franklin County Board of Commissioners · filed 2001-08-28

Summary judgment in favor of the FCCS employees was warranted for the additional reason that these defendants were entitled to immunity from the Section 1983 claim. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to immunity from suit in a Section 1983 action as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action bears the burden of showing that the defendant violated a federal right that was clearly established at the time.

Snyder v. Cache County · filed 2001-08-29

Because Defendants raised a qualified immunity defense, Snyder bears the burden of showing that Defendants’ actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of Snyder’s arrest.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence does not show that it was unreasonable for the defendant to believe the challenged conduct complied with constitutional rights.

Rider v. Town of Farmington · filed 2001-08-29

But in this case, the plaintiff has presented no evidence that Bangham’s actions were discriminatory, nor that it was unreasonable for Bangham to believe that yelling at employees during a heated dispute, and investigating employees who had been accused by a superior officer of insubordination, would not violate those employees’ constitutional rights. Bangham is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Second Count, and summary judgment will enter in his favor as to the § 1983 claim.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when plaintiffs cannot show that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

McGee v. Snyder See also Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing - filed Nov. 7, 2001 · filed 2001-08-29

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that defendants' conduct violated any clearly established right; therefore, we hold that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in the present case.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against jail officials when detention beyond a prisoner’s lawful term is objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Jones v. Lopez · filed 2001-08-31

Again, based on the authorities discussed, this Court finds the holding of Mr. Jones 253 days beyond his term of confinement was not objectively reasonable in light of the case law on this issue and the nondelegable duty .imposed upon these defendants. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Motion to Dismiss (docket # 3) and Defendants’ Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 15) are DENIED.

Section 1983 qualified immunity applies when an officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed to use deadly force.

Jerry Charges Vaughn v. Cox · filed 2001-08-31

For qualified immunity purposes, therefore, we ask whether officers had “arguable probable cause” – that is, whether the officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed. ... In our prior opinion, we concluded that Deputy Cox had arguable probable cause, see Vaughan, 264 F.3d at 1036, and we reaffirm that decision today.

An officer sued individually under Section 1983 for using deadly force is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause to believe the suspect committed a violent crime or posed a threat of serious harm.

Jerry Charges Vaughn v. Cox · filed 2001-08-31

Under that standard, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if he had “‘arguable probable cause’” that the suspect either had committed a violent crime or presented a threat of serious harm.

An officer sued under § 1983 may be denied qualified immunity even without a prior case involving the same type of force in precisely the same circumstances, if the law was clearly established.

Deorle v. Greg Rutherford, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Mick Grey, Butte County Sheriff County of Butte · filed 2001-08-31

Although there is no prior case prohibiting the use of this specific type of force in precisely the circumstances here involved, that is insufficient to entitle Rutherford to qualified immunity: notwithstanding the absence of direct precedent, the law may be, as it was here, clearly established.