29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(j)(2) calls for a flexible assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity; its listed factors are not a mandatory checklist.

Pomares v. Pfizer Corporation · filed 2001-08-20(j)(2)

The mechanistic assumption that all the enumerated factors invariably must be present before an impairment can be termed "substantially limiting" in an ADA case is, therefore, unfounded.

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires evidence that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity; an ankle impairment without evidence of a substantial limit on standing or walking does not meet that standard.

Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc. · filed 1996-07-12(j)(1)

In the instant case, there is no evidence that Rogers's impairment substantially limits his ability to stand and walk.

An impairment that substantially limits a major life activity can qualify as a disability under § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Williams v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2024-10-24(j)(1)(ii)

Accordingly, we find that the record supports a finding that the appellant’s Meniere’s disease rendered him disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(h)(1)’s definition of physical or mental impairment does not remove the requirement that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity of the particular individual.

Ennis v. The National Association of Business and Educational Radio, Incorporated · filed 1995-05-15(h)(1)

This regulation does not eliminate (nor could it) the statutory requirement that the physical or mental impairment substantially limit a major life activity of the particular individual.

Section 1630.2(j) assesses a substantial limitation against the abilities of the general population; a ten-pound lifting restriction may present a triable disability issue.

Miller v. Cohen · filed 1998-07-13(j)

While a twenty-five pound lifting restriction may fall on the side of the commonplace, the ten-pound lifting restriction to which Plaintiff is subject may be characterized as severe when compared to the lifting abilities of the general population. Accordingly, the court finds that a triable issue of fact remains as to whether Plaintiff has been disabled since her August 1995 surgery.

An impairment qualifies as a disability under § 1630.2(g)(1) only if it substantially limits a major life activity; a diagnosis alone does not establish that limitation.

Moore v. Time Warner GRC 9 · filed 1998-08-18(g)(1)

An individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA if he or she suffers from a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ... In short, there simply is no evidence to suggest that Moore’s medical conditions substantially limited any major life activity, including his ability to work, in February and March 1995. Thus, I find that Moore has failed to demonstrate that he is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.

A lifting restriction must be assessed against the lifting ability of an average person in the general population to determine whether it is substantially limiting.

Reese v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 1998-10-07(j)(1)

Plaintiffs argument that his lifting restriction is sufficient to constitute a disability is unconvincing. First, plaintiff fails to offer any evidence comparing his lifting ability to the capabilities of an average person in the general population.

A substantial limitation requires evidence that an impairment prevents or significantly restricts a major life activity compared with the general population.

Thomann v. Lakes Regional MHMR Center · filed 2005-04-18(j)

Thomann must prove a substantial limitation with specific evidence that her particular impairment substantially limits her particular major life activity. ... We conclude Thomann failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence that she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

An impairment must substantially limit a major life activity; merely affecting that activity is insufficient.

Teeter v. LOFTHOUSE FOODS · filed 2010-02-11(j)(1)

In summary, the Court agrees with Lofthouse that Mr. Teeter has failed to set forth sufficient facts to place in dispute that he is substantially limited in any of his identified life activities so as to be disabled for purposes of the ADA.

An impairment substantially limits a major life activity when it limits a person’s ability compared with most people in the general population.

Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co. · filed 2011-06-28(j)(1)(ii)

That testimony, however, hardly portrays Bial-ko’s condition as atypical and thus fails to show impairment under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii) (“An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.”).

A substantial limitation on a major life activity is assessed under a less demanding standard after the ADA Amendments Act.

Mills v. Temple University · filed 2012-04-03(j)(1)

The EEOC has noted that under the ADAAA, “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and (iii). ... Under the less restrictive standard of the ADAAA, I find that Mills has offered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was disabled at the time she was removed from her position and placed on leave.

An impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to qualify as a disability.

Gonzalez v. Sears Holding Co. · filed 2013-10-15(j)(1)

In the instant case, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown that she suffers a disability under ADA based on her diagnosis of diabetes Type 1 and her use of insulin, however, plaintiff failed to show a prima facie case of impairment under ADA, as she failed to show that she suffers from an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity.

A physical condition substantially limits a major life activity when it restricts the person’s ability to perform that activity compared with most people in the general population.

Young v. McHugh · filed 2014-06-03(j)(1)(ii)

To be substantially limited, an employee must be either unable “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). ... However, although Young alleges that her physical conditions limit her working abilities, she provides no facts ... or explanation to support such a correlation.

An impairment need not severely restrict a major life activity to qualify as a disability, but it must substantially limit that activity compared with most people.

Wilson v. Iron Tiger Logistics, Inc. · filed 2014-10-16(j)(1)(ii)

[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. ... Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not produced any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that plaintiffs impairment substantially limits a major life activity the plaintiff has failed to establish that he is disabled under the first prong for qualifying as “disabled” under the ADA and ADAAA.

Section 1630.2(j)(4)(i) directs courts assessing a substantial limitation to consider the conditions, manner, and duration of a person’s performance of a major life activity.

Gilliss v. Dentsply, LLC · filed 2015-07-27(j)(4)(i)

In determining whether a substantial limitation exists, courts should consider “the condition under which the individual performs the major life activity; the manner in which the individual performs the major life activity; and/or the duration of time it takes the individual to perform the major life activity, or for which the individual can perform the major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(i). ... Here, plaintiff does not allege any facts that would plausibly lead to the conclusion that she was substantially limited in a major life activity.

Negative side effects of medication and burdens of treatment may be considered when deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Monce v. Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. · filed 2018-04-02(j)(4)(ii)

"In addition, the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen, may be considered when determining whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity."

A 25-pound floor-to-waist lifting restriction may substantially limit lifting when compared with the abilities of most people in the general population.

Jankowski v. Dean Foods Co. · filed 2019-04-25(j)(1)(ii)

At this point in the litigation, the court is not prepared to conclude that most people in the general population are unable to lift 25 pounds from floor to waist. Therefore, the court cannot conclude that plaintiff's lifting restriction does not substantially limit his ability to perform the major life activity of lifting. Consequently, Dean will not be granted summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA claims on this basis.

An impairment substantially limits a major life activity when it limits the activity compared with most people; it need not prevent or severely restrict the activity.

Greggory Blank v. Nationwide Corp. · filed 2021-08-06(j)(1)(ii)

Under the relevant regulations interpreting the ADA’s definitions, “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,” but the “impairment need not prevent, or ... significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... This conclusory statement is not sufficient to demonstrate that his fibromyalgia substantially limited his ability to complete a major life activity.

The threshold inquiry into whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.

Geronimo v. Pottsville Ford · filed 2021-09-14(j)(1)(iii)

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) (“The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.”). ... Given the interpretive guidance in the ADAAA, however, the Court finds that, though the pleadings lack specificity, Plaintiff has plead the qualifying disabilities of asthma and dyslexia for purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2 defines substantial limitation by the impairment’s severity, duration, and long-term impact, and defines record-of-impairment and regarded-as coverage through specified histories, misclassifications, or treatment by a covered entity.

Carlson v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. · filed 2003-01-14(j)(2001), (K), and (E)

In determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, the regulations instruct that the following factors should be considered: “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” ... The material facts bear out that Carlson’s walking impairment is not. severe, when measured against the walking abilities of the average person in the general population. ... I conclude that, taking all inferences in his favor, Carlson’s impairment does not qualify under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Section 1630.2(k) requires a documented history or misclassification of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, while section 1630.2(l) treats an individual as disabled when an employer makes an employment decision based on a perception of disability arising from myth, fear, or stereotype.

Crock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 2003-05-15(k), (l)

A plaintiff can alternatively show that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA if she has a record of such an impairment. “In order to have a record of disability under the ADA, a plaintiffs medical documentation must show that [she] has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... The record which indicates Plaintiff has or had a substantially limiting impairment must be one relied upon by the employer in making the employment decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Therefore, if an individual can show that an employer or other covered entity made an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on ‘myth, fear or stereotype,’ the individual will satisfy the ‘regarded as’ part of the definition of disability. If the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of ‘myth, fear or stereotype’ can be drawn.

The court held that disability determinations under § 1630.2(h)–(j) must assess the underlying impairment without considering mitigating measures such as insulin, while applying the definitions of impairment, major life activity, and substantial limitation case by case.

Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus · filed 1998-07-13(h), (i), (j), (m)

In the absence of controlling authority from this Circuit, we find the First Circuit’s analysis and conclusions compelling, and, adopt them here. ... As such, the fact that insulin may control some of the outward manifestations of diabetes does not changes its status as an impairment if diabetes meets the regulatory definition of “impairment” in its unmitigated state.

Section 1630.2 treats disability as a condition-specific inquiry focused on the impairment’s effects, so pregnancy-related complications may qualify even though pregnancy itself is not covered; limited duration is relevant but not dispositive.

Darian v. University of Massachusetts Boston · filed 1997-09-16(h), (j), (j)(2)

“The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment [which] may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others ...” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). By its terms,.though pregnancy per se is not covered by the ADA, the Act does not necessarily exclude all pregnancy-related conditions and complications. ... Arguably, the condition was of limited duration. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) provides that the duration of an injury is relevant to its coverage under the ADA. This factor favors the defendant, but, standing alone, is not dispositive.

A pregnancy-related impairment may constitute a disability, but the claimant must show that it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Webster v. Department of Energy · filed 2015-07-06(g)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (h)

The appellant may prove that she has a disability by showing that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). An impairment is considered to be a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Although correctly noting that pregnancy is not considered a disability under the ADAAA, the administrative judge erred in stating that any disabling conditions associated with the appellant’s pregnancy would not constitute disabilities under the Act. The Board recently recognized that pregnancy-related impairments may constitute disabilities under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires more than an inability to perform one particular job to show a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Andress v. National Pizza Co. Intern., Inc. · filed 1997-09-25(j)(3)(i)

In fact, the term “substantially limits” means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires a substantial limitation in working to involve inability to perform a broad range or entire class of jobs; inability to perform some duties or one particular job is not enough.

Campbell v. Raley's, a California Corporation Charles O'Bear and Dan Abfalter · filed 1998-02-06(j)(3)(i)

Campbell argues that she is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The record shows, however, that her carpal tunnel syndrome only prevented her from performing some data entry duties. Thus, she was not incapable of performing a broad range or entire class of jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir.1997) ("To establish a substantial limitation, [plaintiff] must demonstrate that she is 'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.' The inability to perform one particular job does not constitute such a limitation.").

The regulation identifies mental impairments and major life activities, requires a substantial limitation of a major life activity, and recognizes an interactive process for determining reasonable accommodation.

Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc. · filed 1997-09-16(h)(2), (i), (j)(l), (o)(3)

A mental impairment includes “any mental or psychological disorder, such as ... emotional or mental illness.... ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ... The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the ADA list functions “such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working” as major life activities. ... To show substantial limitation, the plaintiff must show he is “[ujnable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform,” or “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). ... The regulations provide that in order to determine the appropriate accommodation, “it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... Reasonable accommodation may include “[j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; ... and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2 treats a broken leg and blood clots as physical impairments, applies an individualized and flexible standard for substantial limitation, and requires an interactive process after a reasonable-accommodation request.

HONAUER v. NORTH JERSEY TRUCK CENTER · filed 2020-09-10(h)(1), (j)(1)(iv), (o)(3)

The complaint alleges that Honauer experienced a broken leg, specifically a broken fibula and tibia, and blood clots, both of which qualify as physical impairments under the regulations implementing the ADA. ... Whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity is a case-by-case determination. ... The complaint’s allegations of a broken leg requiring prompt surgery, as well as the existence of blood clots described as “severe” (see Compl. ¶¶ 13-17), suffice to survive dismissal given the flexibility and breadth of the standards embodied by the regulations. ... Once an employee has ... requested a reasonable accommodation, the employer and employee are to engage in an interactive process to reach an appropriate accommodation. ... Taking Honauer’s allegations as true for purposes of this motion, NJTC “can be fairly said to” have known of Honauer’s purported disability and his desire for an accommodation. Thus, the Court rejects NJTC’s argument that count 2 must be dismissed because Honauer did not request an accommodation.

The regulation limits an employer's accommodation duty to limitations resulting from the employee's disability, rather than unrelated impairments.

Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. · filed 1998-09-11(o)(3)

Accordingly, the regulations and the EEOC Guidelines instruct employers to make accommodations for the disability or for limitations resulting from the disability, not for other unrelated conditions. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (employer "should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations " (emphasis added)); ... Since a neurogenic bladder condition neither is nor results from the only impairment here alleged to be a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and since it is the neurogenic bladder condition that Con Edison refused to accommodate and that led to the termination of Buckley's employment, we conclude that Buckley has not stated a claim under the Act.

Section 1630.2(k)(3) provides that a person with a record of a disability may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, when the accommodation is needed and related to the past disability.

Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2015-03-27(k)(3)

Finally, plaintiff relies on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3), which states that a person with a record of a disability “may be entitled, absent undue hardship, to a reasonable accommodation if needed and related to the past disability.” Plaintiff has not shown that restrictions based on his being weaned off opioids are or could be related to his record of a neck injury. Nor has he shown that indefinitely changing the essential functions of a job constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(o)(4) requires reasonable accommodation for qualified individuals with an actual disability or a record of disability, but not for individuals covered solely by the regarded-as prong.

Patz v. Sureway Supermarket · filed 2019-07-30(o)(4)

A covered entity is required, absent undue hardship, to provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual who meets the definition of disability under the “actual disability” prong (paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section), or “record of” prong (paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section), but is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the “regarded as” prong (paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this section).

Section 1630.2(k)(3) permits a person with a record of a substantially limiting impairment to receive a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, when it is needed and related to the past disability.

EEOC v. M&T Bank · filed 2019-09-10(k)(3)

McCollin took leave only because of her disability. And, while she was on leave, she was replaced; her position was filled. Accordingly, when she was ready to return to work, she lacked a position to which she could return, and needed a reassignment. That reassignment was necessary ... because of the past disability. It is of no consequence that McCollin’s impairment “no longer substantially limits[] a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3).

Section 1630.2(k)(3) permits a person with a record of a substantially limiting impairment to receive a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, when the accommodation is needed and related to the past disability, even if the impairment no longer substantially limits a major life activity.

EEOC v. M&T Bank · filed 2019-10-02(k)(3)

An individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment may be entitled, absent undue hardship, to a reasonable accommodation if needed and related to the past disability. For example, an employee with an impairment that previously limited, but no longer substantially limits, a major life activity may need leave or a schedule change to permit him or her to attend follow-up or “monitoring” appointments with a health care provider. ... It is of no consequence that McCollin’s impairment “no longer substantially limits[] a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3).

Section 1630.2(o)(4) requires reasonable accommodation for an otherwise qualified individual with an actual disability, absent undue hardship, but not for an individual whose disability exists solely under the regarded-as prong.

Amedee v. Shell Chemical, L.P. · filed 2020-03-30(o)(4)

“A covered entity is required, absent undue hardship, to provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual who meets the definition of disability under the ‘actual disability’ prong . . . , but is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong . . . .”

The regulation explains when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, requires broad coverage of that standard, and identifies workplace modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified employee to perform essential functions as reasonable accommodations.

Mulcahy v. Cook County Department of Corrections · filed 2020-11-25(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i), (o)(1)(ii)

To establish that an impairment is a disability under the Act, plaintiff must show that it “substantially limits [her ability] to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). ... Courts should construe the term “substantially limits” “broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA . . . [the term] is not mean to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... As to the third element, reasonable accommodations include, “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

The regulation treats an impairment as substantially limiting even if it does not prevent or significantly restrict a major life activity, recognizes accommodations that enable performance of essential job functions, and requires an informal interactive process to identify accommodations after an employee communicates a disability and desire for accommodation.

Hampton v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education · filed 2021-06-10(j)(1)(ii), (o), (o)(3)

Rather, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... For purposes of the ADA, “reasonable accommodations” may compromise “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B), and “permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (Appendix) (2011). ... A reasonable accommodation is one that “enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [a] position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( )(1)(ii). ... As to the fourth element of a reasonable accommodation claim, “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation” that “identif[ies] the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); Haneke v. Mid–Atlantic Capital Mgmt., 131 Fed.Appx. 399, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (finding that “[i]mplicit in the fourth element is the ADA requirement that the employer and employee engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation”); Wilson, 717 F.3d at 346 (employers have a good-faith duty “to engage [with their employees] in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation.”). This duty is triggered when an employee communicates her disability and desire for an accommodation—even if the employee fails to identify a specific, reasonable accommodation. Wilson, 717 F.3d at 346.

Section 1630.2(g) allows depression to qualify as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity, and § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) identifies job restructuring, modified schedules, and reassignment to a vacant position as possible reasonable accommodations.

Schneider v. United States Postal Service · filed 2022-01-28(g), (o)(2)(ii)

So long as it substantially limits one or more major life activities, 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(g), depression can constitute a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. ... A “reasonable accommodation” may include measures like “job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; [or] reassignment to a vacant position. . . .” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(2)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) directs courts to focus on covered entities’ compliance and discrimination rather than extensively analyzing substantial limitation; § 1630.2(o) recognizes treatment leave as a possible accommodation, and § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) requires an accommodation to address disability-related limitations and be effective.

Wedderburn v. Baltimore County Public Schools · filed 2022-02-18(j)(1)(iii), (o)(1)(ii), (o)

This is so because “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). ... The provided accommodation must be effective—that is, address the disability-related limitations identified by the employee as an inhibitor to performing the essential functions of her job. See Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 736 (D. Md. 1996); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... Leave requests, to be sure, may constitute reasonable accommodation when needed for necessary treatment or rehabilitation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (Appendix) (2011) (“[O]ther accommodations could include permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”); Moore v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. Patuxent Inst., No. CCB-11-0553, 2013 WL 549864, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2013).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires an individualized, broad assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and § 1630.2(o)(3) recognizes that reasonable accommodation may require an employer to initiate an informal interactive process.

KISSINGER v. THE MENNONITE HOME · filed 2021-11-17(j)(1), (o)(3)

Whether an individual is substantially limited in performing a major life activity is a question of fact and an individualized assessment. ... “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” ... “‘Reasonable accommodation’ further includes the employer’s reasonable efforts to assist the employee and to communicate with the employee in good faith. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] in need of accommodation.”).

Subsection (j)(iii) directs that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity does not demand extensive analysis, while subsection (o)(3) requires the employer and employee to engage in a flexible, informal interactive process to identify possible accommodations.

HONAUER v. NORTH JERSEY TRUCK CENTER · filed 2023-05-25(j)(iii), (o)(3)

That determination does “not demand extensive analysis,” as “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iii). ... “Once an employee makes a request for an accommodation, the employer and employee must engage in a flexible, informal interactive process to determine the possibility of accommodation.” Decree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 3055382, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2009) (Kugler, J.); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). “In this interactive process, both employer and employee must communicate with each other to identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodation that could overcome those limitations.” Gomez v. Con-Way Cent. Exp. Inc., 2009 WL 799243, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2009) (Sheridan, J.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). ... Defendants ask the Court to find, as a matter of law, that NJTC participated in the interactive process in good faith until Honauer’s termination, which cut the interactive process short. ... However, a reasonable jury could reach the opposite conclusion.

Section 1630.2(o)(4) does not require an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual whose disability exists solely under the regarded-as prong.

Hurd v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2024-05-22(o)(4)

Defendants correctly point out that an employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the “regarded as” prong. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4).

Section 1630.2 recognizes disability through the listed impairment categories, defines a qualified individual as one who can perform essential functions with or without accommodation, and treats undue hardship as significant difficulty or expense in providing the accommodation.

Laney J Bare v. Department of Defense · filed 2025-02-21(g), (m), (g)(1), and (p)(1)

The appellant showed that he is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). An appellant may prove that he has a disability by showing that he: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ... The appellant showed that he is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). A qualified individual with a disability is a person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of a position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... Thus, we find that the appellant showed that he is a qualified individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... To the extent that the agency argues that the appellant’s flexible telework would have imposed an undue hardship on the agency’s business operations, we find that the record does not support such a position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1) (stating that, in general, an undue hardship exists when provision of the requested accommodation would cause the employing agency significant difficulty or expense).

Section 1630.2(o)(4) means that an employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual whose disability status rests solely on the “regarded as” prong.

Goebel v. Brown & Brown of CT, Inc · filed 2025-03-06(o)(4)

But individuals who only are regarded as impaired are not entitled to request accommodations for disabilities they do not have. Dufresne v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc., No. 3:14CV21 WIG, 2015 WL 3746349, at *5 (D. Conn. June 15, 2015); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4) (“A covered entity is . . . not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong . . . .”).

The regulation treats “substantially limits” as a nondemanding standard, defines reasonable accommodations as workplace modifications enabling qualified individuals to perform essential functions, and limits essential functions to fundamental rather than marginal duties.

Harris · filed 2026-02-02(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(iii), (n)(1), (o)(1)(ii)

Now, “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred,” rather than “whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(iii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(i) (“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”). ... Based on the record, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Harris satisfies the first element of his disability discrimination claim because his physical impairment substantially limited his ability to complete the duties and physical requirements of his job as a Nuclear Worker Technician. ... Reasonable accommodations include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). “Essential functions” cover the “fundamental” duties of a job, but they do not extend to the “marginal” responsibilities of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

The regulation identifies factors for deciding whether a job function is essential and defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Robertson v. Neuromedical Center · filed 1997-10-10(n)(2), (n)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

The regulations define reasonable accommodations as “[mjodifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(l)(ii) (1996).

Section 1630.2(o) describes reasonable accommodations as modifications or adjustments that allow qualified applicants to be considered, employees to perform essential functions, and employees with disabilities to enjoy equal employment benefits and privileges.

Lamb v. John Umstead Hospital · filed 1998-09-01(o)

Reasonable accommodations include modifications or adjustments that: 1) are required to ensure that a qualified applicant with a disability can be considered for the position she desires; 2) enable employees with disabilities to perform essential job functions; and 3) enable employees with disabilities to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employees without disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). An employer or State entity may avoid making such accommodations, however, by showing that the requested accommodation would impose upon it an undue burden or hardship.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to consider specified evidence in identifying essential job functions, while § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines reasonable accommodations as changes enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform those functions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Picture People, Inc. · filed 2012-07-10(n)(3); (o)(1)(ii)

Therefore, based on the factors outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), we must conclude that verbal communication is an essential function of the performer position. ... Reasonable accommodations are defined as “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position” or “[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii). ... Given that verbal communication is an essential job function, requiring Employer to eliminate this function cannot be a “reasonable accommodation” required under the ADA.

The regulation treats essential functions as fundamental rather than marginal duties, requires a case-by-case review of specified factors, and permits reasonable accommodation through modifying duties or identifying accommodations through an interactive process.

Rorrer v. City of Stow · filed 2014-02-26(o), (n)(1), (n)(2), (n)(3)(iii)-(vii), (o)(3)

Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.” ... “The employer’s determination about what functions are essential is certainly given weight, but it is one of seven factors the court should consider, including “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function” and “[t]he consequences of not requiring the [employee] to perform the function.” ... The district court appears not only to have given deference to the City’s position, but to have considered only the City’s position, failing to consider all of the § 1630.2 factors while drawing all reasonable inferences in Rorrer’s favor as required at the summary-judgment stage.

Section 1630.2(n) treats fundamental job duties as essential and directs consideration of specified factors, while §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) and (o)(2)(ii) define reasonable accommodations and identify job restructuring as a possible accommodation.

Swann v. Washtenaw County · filed 2016-11-22(n), (n)(3)(iii), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(2)(ii)

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)-(vii). ... Thus, even if lifting is seldom required, other factors — namely the employer’s judgment, the written job description, and the consequences of not requiring performance — illustrate that lifting is an essential function of plaintiffs position. ... Reasonable accommodations are “[m]od-ifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(l)(ii). ... The regulations accompanying the ADA state that reasonable accommodations may include job restructuring and acquisition or modification of the responsibilities of an employee’s existing job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). ... Here, lifting is an essential function of plaintiffs position. As such, job-restructuring is not applicable. Furthermore, plaintiffs proposed accommodation eliminating this essential function is per se unreasonable. Thus, plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden on the second prima facie element of its claim.

Section 1630.2 treats an essential function as a fundamental job duty rather than a marginal one, identifies factors relevant to deciding whether a function is essential, and defines reasonable accommodations as modifications or adjustments to the work environment or how the position is performed.

Mason v. United Parcel Service Co Inc. · filed 2017-01-10(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

An essential function is a fundamental job duty of a position, and does not include marginal functions of the position. Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 2000), see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In determining if a task is an essential function, relevant evidence may include: (1) the employer’s judgment as to what functions are essential, (2) a written job description, (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function, (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, (6) the work experience of past employees in the position, and (7) the current work experience of employees in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position . . . is customarily performed . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines an essential job function by whether the reason the position exists is to perform it, and § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified individual to perform the position's essential functions.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Advanced Home Care, Inc. · filed 2018-04-10(n)(1), (o)(1)(ii)

A job function is essential when 'the reason the position exists is to perform that function.' ... A reasonable accommodation is "one that 'enables [a qualified] individual with a disability ... to perform the essential functions of [a] position.' " ... The EEOC has also alleged sufficient detail about the requested accommodation and how Pennell could have performed the essential functions of her position.

The regulation defines essential job functions and the factors for identifying them, distinguishes accommodations to the application process from accommodations to job performance, and describes an interactive process for identifying limitations and potential accommodations.

Rogers v. Claxton Poultry Company, Inc. · filed 2019-09-27(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(1)(i), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position” but do not include “the marginal functions of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... ADA regulations provide a number of considerations including but not limited to: ... (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Thus, after analyzing the factors for which evidentiary support has been offered, the Court finds as a matter of law that weighing, measuring and mixing seasoning and ingredients, operating machinery, and monitoring the operation of the machinery were essential functions of the marination mixer position. ... However, having a third party come to the plant and observe the marination mixer job in action does not comport with the second definition of a reasonable accommodation because a site visit would not constitute a “modification[] or adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position . . . is customarily performed, that [would] enable [Plaintiff] to perform the essential functions” of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (emphases added). A site visit by the vocational counselor would not, in and of itself, enable Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job despite his vision issues.

Section 1630.2 defines disability to include an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment, and requires substantial limitation in working to be shown through disqualification from a class or broad range of jobs.

Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-01-27(g), (j)(1), (j)(3)(ii), (k), (l)

The term "disability" encompasses the following: (1) a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual, (2) a record of such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Under the regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the term "substantially limits" means: (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). ... Although a plaintiff need not submit evidence of each factor listed in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), the evidence presented by Sherrod regarding the nature and severity of her injury fails to establish her disqualification from a broad range or class of jobs. ... Thus, Sherrod has failed to adduce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. ... Although Sherrod's evidence tends to prove she has a record of impairment, the evidence fails to show that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. ... Consequently, Sherrod has failed to raise a genuine issue regarding whether she has a record of impairment limiting a major life activity. ... Under the regulations promulgated by the EEOC, the "regarded as" language means: (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1) or (2) of [§ 1630.2] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.6 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l ). ... Thus, we hold that American did not regard Sherrod as disabled.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities such as walking, seeing, breathing, and working, while § 1630.2(j) defines substantially limiting a major life activity; the court used those definitions to determine ADA coverage.

Thrope v. State of Ohio · filed 1998-08-28(i) (j)

“Major life activities” is defined broadly to include such things as walking, seeing, breathing' and working. ... “Substantially limits” is defined as being unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or being significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he ór she can perform a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines “substantially limits” by comparing an individual's ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person, and section 1630.2(l) covers a person treated as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Ahrens v. Perot Systems Corp. · filed 1999-02-03(j)(1), (l)

“Substantially limits” generally means that an individual is (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. ... An individual is “regarded” as disabled under the ADA if (i) she has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by the employer as constituting such limitation; (ii) she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (iii) she has none of the impairments set forth in the regulations but is treated by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Section 1630.2(h) defines disability to include mental or psychological disorders, including emotional or mental illness.

Hargrave v. Vermont · filed 2003-08-01(h)

For purposes of the ADA, the term "disability" includes "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as ... emotional or mental illness." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001); see also E.E.O.C. v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 321 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir.2003).

Section 1630.2(g) covers impairments that substantially limit major life activities, and § 1630.2(j) defines substantial limitation by comparing the person's ability with that of the average person.

Whetzel v. Mineta · filed 2005-04-11(g), (j)

Additionally, the limitation of plaintiffs major life activities must be “substantial,” meaning that plaintiff is “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform,” or that she is “[sjignifieantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.”

Section 1630.2(h) includes mental or psychological disorders, such as emotional or mental illness, within the definition of disability.

Goonewardena v. New York · filed 2007-02-14(h)

The term “disability” includes “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as ... emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001). Under the statute, a “ ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, ..., meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

Section 1630.2(h) defines a disability to include a physiological disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that substantially limits a major life activity.

Khaleel v. Metro One Loss Prevention Services Groups · filed 2007-01-08(h)

A disability is defined in the regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA as any “physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss” that substantially limits a major life activity, such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h), (i).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability through three alternatives: a substantially limiting impairment, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Benko v. Portage Area School District · filed 2007-07-17(g)

The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Because Benko fails to demonstrate that he has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or that Portage regarded him as having such an impairment, he is not disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Martinez v. Astrue · filed 2007-11-26(g)

An individual has a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act where he (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such impairment.

Section 1630.2(f) describes an ADA disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Pough v. SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. · filed 2008-08-06(f)

A plaintiff is considered “disabled” for purposes of the ADA if she: (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity, such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, or sleeping; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f).

Section 1630.2(g) means that an inability to work for a particular supervisor or at a particular location is not, by itself, a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

Hawkins v. Merit Systems Protection Board · filed 2008-12-04(g)

Although the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, requires that an agency accommodate a qualified disabled employee, Hawkins is not disabled under the Act. Hawkins agrees that he is not disabled. Even if Hawkins claimed to be disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, his inability to work for a particular supervisor or at a particular location would not be a disability within the meaning of the Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); Miller v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 23 M.S.P.R. 128, 134-35 (M.S.P.B. 1984).

Section 1630.2(g)(1) defines a disability as an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Hawkins v. Social Security Administration · filed 2010-03-05(g)(1)

As for her ADA argument, a request for an accommodation must include proof that the requestor suffers from a disability that “substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). As discussed above, Hawkins has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish such a disability.

Section 1630.2(g) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Griffin v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2011-10-19(g)

A disability is “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Griffin’s restrictions on what and how much to eat are at the moderate end of the diabetes spectrum and do not amount to a significant restriction on his eating. Accordingly, this case is closely analogous to those in which our sister circuits have concluded that modest dietary restrictions concomitant with an employee’s diabetic condition do not amount to substantial limitations under the ADA. ... As Griffin’s diabetes treatment regimen requires only modest dietary and lifestyle changes, no genuine issue exists as to whether his impairment substantially limits his eating.

Section 1630.2 defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and not every impairment qualifies.

Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance · filed 2012-03-05(g)(1)(i)

The regulations applicable after January 1, 2009 still state that, to constitute a disability, a physical or mental impairment “must substantially” limit “one or more ... major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(f).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability by substantial limitation of a major life activity, and § 1630.2(h)(1) defines physical impairment as a physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems.

Howard v. Steris Corp. · filed 2012-08-17(g), (h)(1)

A person has a disability if he “has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ... major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2000) (amended 2008); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011). ... The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has defined a “physical impairment” as “any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more body systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2011).

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not substantially limit the major life activity of working.

Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hosp. of Rhode Island · filed 1998-05-28(j)(3)(i)

While the applicable regulations indicate that working is a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c), they also indicate, however, that the “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

An impairment does not substantially limit the major life activity of working merely because it prevents a person from performing one particular job; the person must show that it substantially limits access to a broader range of jobs.

Adams v. Strombecker Corp. · filed 1998-07-06(j)(3)(i)

Mr. Adams’ inability to do the job from which he was terminated is insufficient to constitute a substantial limitation on his ability to work, and he made no showing that he was precluded from doing other jobs. See id. at 943. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides that being unable to perform a single, particular job is not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Muthler v. Ann Arbor MacHine, Inc. · filed 1998-07-31(j)(3)(i)

As noted in the regulations, the impairment must limit employment generally, ... and “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

For the major life activity of working, being unable to perform one particular job is not a substantial limitation.

Toll v. American Airlines · filed 1998-10-01(j)(3)(i)

“The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). Accordingly, Toll cannot support her claim that she is “disabled” under the ADA.

An inability to perform only one particular job is not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Hoppes v. Pennsylvania, Fish & Boat Commission · filed 1998-12-15(j)(3)(i)

In determining whether a person is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the term “substantially limited” is defined as “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Thus, the mere “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires courts assessing substantial limitation in working to compare the individual's ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs with that of an average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.

Joseph A. Mondzelewski, Rebecca Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., Supermarkets General Corp. · filed 1998-12-23(j)(3)(i)

We conclude that the District Court’s legal analysis was flawed because, as the ADA regulations explicitly provide, a court should consider the individual’s “training, skills and abilities” in determining whether the individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats inability to perform a single particular job as insufficient, by itself, to establish a substantial limitation in working.

Monroe v. Cortland County, NY · filed 1999-02-22(j)(3)(i)

Simply because this restriction prevents Plaintiff from working as a Recycling Foreman, it does not mean he is substantially limited in working at all.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats exclusion from a single position or narrow range of jobs as insufficient to substantially limit the major life activity of working.

Talk v. Delta Airlines Inc · filed 1999-04-22(j)(3)(i)

Evidence of disqualification from a single position or a narrow range of jobs will not support a finding that an individual is substantially limited from the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) measures substantial limitation in working by considering whether an impairment disqualifies a person from other jobs using similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities.

Barber v. Pepsi-Cola Personnel, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(j)(3)(ii)

In order to show that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must prove that he is ... significantly restricted in ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... Plaintiffs have simply not shown that Barber is or was disqualified from performing other “jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), that is, jobs which do not require overhead work. ... Because plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the claim that Barber is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, as a matter of law he is not considered disabled for purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats inability to perform one particular job as insufficient to establish a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Hoffman v. Town of Southington · filed 1999-07-09(j)(3)(i)

The term “substantially limits” means unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which- an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. Major life activities mean functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 CFR § 1630.2 et seq. ... “The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” ... Applying the mandates of Sutton, the present plaintiff has not stated a claim with regard to Subsection (A) of the disability definition, that is, whether he has alleged that he possesses a physical impairment that substantially limits him in one or more major life activities. ... The only effect on plaintiffs life is that he is medically required not to plow or shovel snow. The Court finds that plaintiff is not disabled under the statutory definitions, the EEOC interpretations thereof, Sutton, and Murphy v. United Parcel Service Inc., — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (plaintiff not “disabled”; inability to perform one particular job insufficient as matter of law to prove plaintiff regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working).

An impairment that eliminates an individual's ability to perform a class of jobs substantially limits the major life activity of working, even if the individual can perform jobs in another class.

Duty v. Proppants · filed 2002-06-18(j)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the relevant EEOC regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), states that [a]n individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs. This would be so even if the individual were able to perform jobs in another class, e.g., the class of semi-skilled jobs. ... As a result, the jury reasonably could conclude that Duty met his burden of showing that he was "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484 (8th Cir.1996). Consequently, we hold that the district court did not err in determining that sufficient evidence existed regarding Duty's inability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

Under § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), being unable to perform one particular job is not, by itself, a substantial limitation on working; the inquiry concerns a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc. · filed 2002-08-29(j)(3)(i)

The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... The Court finds that a restriction as narrowly drawn as Wood’s prohibition against driving ready-mix trucks would not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.