29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

An accommodation is reasonable when it enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the job’s essential functions or to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.

Foster v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc. · filed 2025-06-24(o)(1)(ii)

An accommodation’s reasonableness turns on whether the accommodation “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position . . . or to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), (iii)). ... The accommodation itself was reasonable as it allowed Plaintiff to enjoy “equal benefits and privileges of employment.” Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 787 F.3d 89 at 94.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) includes accommodations that let employees with disabilities enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment, including access to meetings and training.

Cadoret v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. · filed 2018-02-09(o)(1)(iii)

The federal regulations promulgated by the EEOC further state that "[t]he term reasonable accommodation means ... [m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... Despite the fact that Plaintiff concedes he can perform the essential functions of his job, there is a triable issue of fact with respect to whether Plaintiff required an ASL interpreter to access meetings and trainings in the workplace in order to receive equal benefits and privileges of employment.

Section 1630.2 recognizes a record of disability when a person has a history of, or was misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; major life activities include performing manual tasks, lifting, and working, and “substantially limits” is construed broadly rather than as a demanding standard.

Quinn v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2018-09-07(k)(1), (i)(1)(i), (j)(1)(i)

“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged he was disabled based on a “record of” an impairment. “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). “An impairment substantially limits a major life activity when a person ‘is either unable to perform a major life activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which the individual can perform the major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population.’” Prince, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 893 (quoting Cassimy, 461 F.3d at 936). “Major life activities” are broadly defined and include, among other things, performing manual tasks, lifting, and working. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i); see also Pack v. Ill. Dep’t of Healthcare & Family Servs., No. 13 C 8930, 2014 WL 3704917, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2014) ... Likewise, the term “substantially limits” is to be construed “broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see also Jenkins v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 15 C 08415, 2017 WL 3531520, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2017).”

A record of disability retirement alone does not establish an ADA disability; the recorded impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.

Sink v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-06-08(k)

First, as the EEOC regulations state, “[t]he fact that an individual has a record of ... disability retirement ... does not guarantee that the individual will satisfy the definition of disability.”

The record-of-disability provision requires the impairment shown in the record to substantially limit one or more major life activities.

Doebele v. Sprint Corp. · filed 2001-08-06(k)

This information is critical, because “in order for an individual who has been classified in a record as ‘disabled’ for some other purpose to be considered disabled for purposes of [the ADA], the impairment indicated in the record must be a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the individual’s major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (Appendix).

Section 1630.2(k) treats having a record of an impairment as requiring a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; the court applied this to require a history of an actual disability.

Bender v. Safeway Stores, Inc. Specialized Distribution Management, Inc. · filed 1997-08-20(k)

The phrase "has a record of such impairment" means "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). The regulation indicates that Bender must have a history of an actual disability to have a record of such a disability.

Section 1630.2(k) treats an employee who has recovered in whole or in part from a disabling impairment as having a record of disability, with the impairment’s severity, duration, and long-term impact relevant to whether it was substantially limiting.

Downs v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1998-07-06(k)

The implementing regulations establish that an employee who has previously had a disabling impairment from which he has recovered in whole or in part has a record of a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). The nature and severity of an impairment, its duration or expected duration and its long-term or anticipated long-term impact (including any lingering effects) are all relevant to determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting.

Section 1630.2(k) requires medical documentation showing a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities to establish a record of disability.

Weber v. Strippit · filed 1999-07-29(k)

In order to have a record of disability under the ADA, a plaintiff’s medical documentation must show that he has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

Section 1630.2(k) treats an individual as having a record of disability only when the documented history is of an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Simonson v. Trinity Regional Health System · filed 2002-09-16(k)

The EEOC regulations state that “a record of such impairment” means “a history of ... a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... While Simonson’s injuries “are evidence of a history of an impairment, they are not evidence of a history of a disability.”

Section 1630.2(k) defines having a record of an impairment as having a history of, or having been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; permanence is not required, but duration, long-term effect, severity, and affected activities matter.

Lloyd v. East Cleveland City School District · filed 2002-11-14(k)

The EEOC regulations define “[h]as a record of such impairment” as meaning “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of one’s major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... This Court concludes that to establish a record of disability, the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that the impairment is permanent or long-term. However, it does not follow that any short-term or temporary conditions can qualify as a record of disability. The duration and the long-term effect of a condition is an important factor in evaluating whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. This evaluation is a case by case one. The nature of the impairing condition, the severity of the impairment, and the type of major life activities the impairment limits, are all important factors to consider.

Section 1630.2(k) covers a person who has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Wordekemper v. Western Iowa Homes & Equipment, Inc. · filed 2003-03-17(k)

To establish the existence of a record of a disability, an individual must show that she “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

The regulation treats a person as having a disability based on a record of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and the employer must rely on that record in making the employment decision.

Rivera-Mercado v. Scotiabank De Puerto Rico-International · filed 2008-03-06(k)

Subsection (B) of section 12102(2) qualifies an individual as having a disability if that person has a record of having a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Furthermore, to successfully establish an ADA claim the employer, in making the employment decision, must rely on the record indicating that the plaintiff has or had a substantially limiting impairment.

Section 1630.2(k) treats a person as having a record of disability when the person has a history of a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Phillips v. Pacificorp · filed 2008-12-18(k)

The magistrate judge was incorrect, however, in deciding that Mortensen failed to adduce that she had a record of a disability. In order to prove a record of a disability, Mortensen must prove she has a history of a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Mortensen claims a history of physical impairment by pointing to her diagnoses and testimony regarding the symptoms and effects of her sleep apnea. Mortensen’s diagnosis and testimony regarding symptoms from July 2004 to February 2005, prior to the mitigation of her impairment, create at least an issue of fact regarding whether Mortensen had a record of disability.

Section 1630.2(k) requires a record of impairment to reflect a history of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., Inc. · filed 2011-03-22(k)

In order for an individual to qualify as disabled under subsection (B) of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), she must have “a history of . . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) requires a history of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities to establish a record of disability.

Cochran v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-21(k)(1)

We next consider whether, under the second disability formulation, Cochran has established he has a “record of such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(ii). An individual has a record of a disability “if the individual has a history of . . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Id. at 1630.2(k)(1). ... This record does not establish a history of impairment that “substantially limit[ed]” Cochran’s hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2(k) treats a person as having a record of disability when the person has a history of, or was misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Furry v. Lehigh Valley Health System · filed 2012-09-28(k)

A person has a “record of’ disability under the ADA if that person “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

Section 1630.2(k) requires a plaintiff asserting a record-of-disability claim to show a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

DiGiosia v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. · filed 2014-09-24(k)

In any event, the claim would fail because “[t]o succeed under her "record of disability” claim, [Plaintiff] must again show that she had a ‘physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.' ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) requires a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; IOD status or a pending disability-retirement application alone does not establish that the employer misclassified the employee as having such an impairment.

Mancini v. City of Providence · filed 2017-10-10(k)(1)

Knowledge that Mancini was on IOD status or that he had a pending disability retirement application, without more, however, does not establish that the City misclassified Mancini as having a physical impairment substantially limiting one or more of his major life activities.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) defines having a record of a disability as having a history of, or being misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Chimis v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company · filed 2018-07-30(k)(1)

“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2(k) broadly construes a record of disability and includes a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities or a misclassification as having such an impairment.

Gruttemeyer v. Transit Authority of the City of Omaha · filed 2020-02-28(k)

A “record of disability” is to be broadly construed under the ADA: Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive analysis. An individual will be considered to have a record of disability if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). The Court finds the defendant’s motion should be denied. Expert testimony is not required to establish a record of disability.

Section 1630.2(k) treats an individual as having a record of disability when the individual has a history of, or was misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Goldstine v. FedEx Freight, Inc. · filed 2021-03-11(k)

An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats an individual as having a record of a disability only when the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

May v. Special Administrative Board of the School District of the City of Saint Louis · filed 2021-07-30(k)(1)

Under the ADA, an individual has a “record” of a disability if he “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). As discussed supra, Plaintiff fails to establish that his skin condition has limited any major life activity. Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s limited interaction with medical personnel and infrequent use of prescription medications fail to establish that he has a record of suffering from such an infirmity. Plaintiff thus fails to demonstrate that he suffers from a disability, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) covers a person with a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, even if the impairment no longer limits those activities.

Hale v. Murfreesboro Housing Authority · filed 2021-09-27(k)(1)

“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... “The Court finds that, under this standard, MHA has not carried its initial burden to show the absence of a genuine question of material fact regarding whether Hale has a record of a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities within the meaning of the ADA.” ... “Construing the relevant statutory terms broadly, as it must, the Court finds that these undisputed facts are sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact regarding whether Hale has a record of disability and is therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA.”

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a person as having a record of disability when the person has a history of, or was misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Lewis-Davis v. Baltimore County Public Schools Infants & Toddlers Program · filed 2021-10-13(k)(1)

A plaintiff has a “record of disability” if she can show that she “‘has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” Foore v. Richmond, 6 F. App’x 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1)).

Section 1630.2(k)(2) treats a person as having a record of disability when the person has a history of an impairment substantially limiting major life activities compared with most people, or was misclassified as having such an impairment.

Shklyar v. Carboline Company · filed 2022-07-21(k)(2)

To state a claim for disability discrimination based on a record of a disability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she has “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2); see also Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)) (“Having a record of a qualifying impairment means that an employee ‘has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’”).

Section 1630.2(k)(2) covers a person with a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities compared with most people, or who was misclassified as having such an impairment.

(PS) Lundstrom v. Contra Costa Health Services · filed 2022-11-29(k)(2)

To state a claim for disability discrimination based on a record of a disability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she has “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2).

Section 1630.2(k)(2) requires a record-of-disability claim to plausibly allege a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities compared with most people in the general population, or misclassification as having such an impairment.

Cunningham v. University of Hawaii · filed 2023-02-14(k)(2)

To state a claim for disability discrimination based on a record of a disability, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that he has “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant recorded him as unvaccinated, which classified him as “impaired by a contagious disease” and “impaired by a suppressed or weak immune system or respiratory system” that made him susceptible to COVID-19. (Compl. at p. 30, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s “record of” theory fails because Plaintiff provides no basis to conclude that Defendant classified him as having “an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant ever classified him as having a COVID-19 infection that was severe enough to substantially limit one of his major life activities. Defendant instead classified him as refusing to follow the COVID-19 policy that applied to all employees. See Miller v. Segerstrom Ctr. for the Arts, 2022 WL 18284992, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022). “Refusing to get a vaccine required by an employer is not itself an ‘impairment’ of any sort.” Speaks v. Health Sys. Mgmt., Inc., 2022 WL 3448649, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2022).

Section 1630.2(k)(2) requires a record-of-disability claim to involve a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities or a misclassification as having such an impairment.

West v. Scott Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2023-03-24(k)(2)

Second, West’s “record of” theory also fails to satisfy the ADA. To state a claim for disability discrimination based on a record of a disability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they have “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Here, West alleges that Scott Labs “made a record of impairment by imposing its policy,” and that it misclassified West as having or being “vulnerable” to contracting COVID-19. Compl. ¶¶ 115, 117. But a record that an employee has a condition that is not a disability does not satisfy the ADA requirements for disability discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). There simply is nothing to suggest that Scott Labs ever classified West as having an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities. See id.

Section 1630.2(k)(2) treats an individual as having a record of disability only when the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.

Brode v. Xeris Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2023-03-30(k)(2)

Under the “record of” definition of disability, the impairment “must have substantially limited one or more major life activities, as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). ... She has not alleged a record of disability, and any claim under that definition of disability is dismissed.

Section 1630.2(k)(2) treats an individual as having a record of disability if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.

Linne v. Alameda Health System · filed 2023-04-28(k)(2)

Although she avers that Defendant misclassified her as disabled, a notation that Plaintiff is “unvaccinated” does not indicate that Defendant recorded Plaintiff as having a disability. See West v. Scott Lab'ys, Inc., No. 22-CV-07649-CRB, 2023 WL 2632210, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2023) (dismissing claim that Defendant misclassified Plaintiff “as having or being ‘vulnerable’ to contracting COVID-19” as “[t]here simply is nothing to suggest that [Defendant] ever classified [Plaintiff] as having an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities”) (citations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2) (“An individual will be considered to have a record of a disability if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.”) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) defines having a record of a disability as having a history of, or having been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Williams-Moore v. Quick International Courier, LLC · filed 2023-09-26(k)(1)

EEOC regulations provide that a plaintiff has a record of disability if the plaintiff has “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a person as having a record of disability when the person has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Evans v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-11-20(k)(1)

EEOC regulations provide that a plaintiff has a record of disability if the plaintiff has “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

Section 1630.2(k)(1) defines a record of disability as a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

GRAZIOSI v. INSPIRITEC · filed 2024-03-18(k)(1)

To state a “record of” claim under the ADA’s second definition of disability, a plaintiff must allege that he had a “history of, or had been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.” ... A careful review of the allegations in the Complaint supports that Graziosi has not plausibly stated that he had a “record of” a disability because he has alleged no facts from which one could infer that the mental health conditions he disclosed to Inspiritec substantially burdened a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a person as having a record of a disability when they have a history of, or were misclassified as having, a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Parker v. Solis Mammography · filed 2024-09-20(k)(1)

“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... “That defendant approved leave under FMLA does not establish plaintiff’s history of a mental impairment, or that defendant misclassified her as having a mental impairment, or that the purported mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”

Section 1630.2(k)(2) defines a record of disability as a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity compared with most people, or a misclassification as having had such an impairment.

Bereznak v. Arrow Electronics, Inc. · filed 2024-09-20(k)(2)

A record of a disability requires “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2).

A history of injuries and a workers’ compensation disability award do not, by themselves, establish a record of disability under the ADA.

Buchanan v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-12-24(k)

In fact, Buchanan has no "record of disability" which would render him disabled under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

A record of disability requires a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Sanders v. FMAS CORP. · filed 2001-12-21(k)

Thus, Plaintiff must show that she has a record of an impairment that actually substantially limits her in a major life activity or that she was misclassified as having such an impairment. Plaintiff produces no evidence of such a record.

An employee’s vaccination status alone does not establish a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Apuzza v. NYU Langone Long Island · filed 2025-03-11(k)(2)

We also reasoned that the “record of” theory of disability failed because “[a] record that an employee is not vaccinated does not imply that the employee has ‘a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population.’” Id. at 170 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(k)(2)). ... These theories of disability are substantively identical to those we rejected in Sharikov, and they fail for the same reasons.

Section 1630.2(k) requires a history of an actual disability or a mistaken classification as having one to establish a record of disability.

Brown v. Verizon Directories Sales Corp. · filed 2005-10-05(k)

Finally, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) requires that Brown have a history of or have been miselassified as ... having an actual disability to have a record of such a disability.

A record of head trauma alone does not establish a record of disability; the impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.

Meier v. Family Dollar Services, Inc. · filed 2006-08-04(k)

A record of disability means that a plaintiff “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... A record sustaining past head trauma does not, without more, offer a finding of substantial life activity restriction.

A record of disability requires a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Chappell v. BUTTERFIELD-ODIN SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 836 · filed 2009-11-17(k)

But it is not enough to have a record of an impairment; instead, a plaintiff must have “a history of, or ... been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Nothing in Chappell’s medical history demonstrates that her impairments substantially limit any major life activities.

A record of a disability requires a past impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Scott v. Kaneland Community Unit School District 302 · filed 2012-08-31(k)

For a record of a disability claim, a plaintiff must have actually previously had a “ ‘physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’ ” Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 556-57 (7th Cir.2011) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)). Since, as indicated above, the undisputed facts do not indicate that Scott was substantially limited in a major life activity, the record of a disability claim cannot succeed.

A record of disability requires a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity compared with most people, or a misclassification as having had such an impairment.

Kelly v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2016-08-09(k)(2)

To show a record of impairment, a plaintiff must establish that she “has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2).

Section 1630.2(k)(3) gives follow-up appointments as one example of an accommodation for a record of disability, not an exhaustive list.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fluor Federal Global Projects, Inc. · filed 2025-04-14(k)(3)

The language in the regulations concerning accommodating a need for follow-up appointments concerns only one “example” of the possible reasons an employee may need an accommodation for a record of disability.

The regulation provides that inability to perform one particular job alone is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working; the court applied that rule but found the plaintiff disabled based on a substantial limitation in seeing.

Fallacaro v. Richardson · filed 1997-06-06(j)(3)(i)

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides that inability to perform one particular job does not substantially limit the major life activity of working; the court applied that rule because the plaintiff could be retrained for another position.

Bute v. Schuller International Inc. · filed 1998-02-27(j)(3)(i)

The Court notes, however, that “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Here, plaintiff complains only that he was not permitted to , return to his position as a Machine Attendant during the time in which he was restricted from lifting in excess of fifty pounds. Plaintiff concedes, however, that defendant offered to retrain plaintiff for another position. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was “substantially limited” in the major life activity of working.

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not substantially limit the major life activity of working.

Real v. City of Compton · filed 1999-08-09(j)(3)(i)

The fact that Mr. Real was terminated from a particular law enforcement agency is not sufficient to demonstrate that he was perceived as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2 treats modifications or adjustments that enable essential job functions as reasonable accommodations, defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce, and requires an individualized assessment of that risk.

Diane Lovejoy-Wilson, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant · filed 2001-08-31(o)(1)(ii), (n), and (r)

ADA regulations further state that an employer is required to make "[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... We therefore conclude that a rational jury could find that the plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of the assistant manager position at S-44 with a reasonable accommodation. ... Expanding on the “direct threat” language, the EEOC has stated that it “means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... NOCO has failed to provide any evidence that the plaintiff poses a significant risk of substantial harm. ... We decline to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to essential functions, § 1630.2(o)(ii) defines reasonable accommodation as workplace modifications enabling essential-function performance, and § 1630.2(r) defines direct threat and requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment.

Rooney v. Sprague Energy Corp. · filed 2007-04-10(n)(3), (o)(ii), (r)

Under the EEOC framework, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), the first factor weighs in favor of Sprague, since it included both tank gauging and caustic soda loading as major job duties or responsibilities. ... The term “reasonable accommodation,” as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, means: “Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.... ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii). ... The EEOC regulations define “direct threat” to mean “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... Here, the Court has already considered the direct threat issue in the context of whether Mr. Rooney is a qualified individual, and determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact. For the same reason, Sprague is not entitled to summary judgment based solely on this affirmative defense.

Section 1630.2(g)(1) recognizes disability through an actual substantially limiting impairment, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) compares substantial limitation with the ability of most people in the general population.

Ciguzis v. Department of Labor · filed 2015-07-24(g)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

The appellant may prove that she has a disability by showing that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. ... An impairment is considered to be a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and treats disability as a threshold determination requiring functional limitation without imposing an onerous burden.

Esparza v. Foods · filed 2013-02-12(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(iv)

The federal implementing regulations also indicate that “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and that this term is not meant to impose a “demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i). ... That said, the interpretive guidelines for the federal regulations do envision some threshold consideration of whether a person’s medical condition, as alleged, plausibly states a “disability.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“the ADAAA and these regulations establish a degree of functional limitation required for an impairment to constitute a disability that is consistent with what Congress originally intended ... This will make the disability determination an appropriate threshold issue but not an onerous burden for those seeking to prove discrimination under the ADA.”).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and permits impairments lasting or expected to last fewer than six months to be substantially limiting.

Hodges v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-08-12(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ix)

New regulations issued pursuant to the ADAAA similarly provide that the term “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard” and “shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” ... And “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting” for purposes of establishing a disability under the ADA. ... Because the conduct alleged in Hodges’s complaint occurred in 2010, the ADAAA and the new regulations apply. ... Hence, the fact that Hodges’s impairment was expected to be temporary is not a bar to his ADA or DCHRA claims. ... Taking Hodges’s allegations as true, and giving the term “substantially limits” a broad construction, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), the Court concludes that Hodges has pled factual matter sufficient to show that he had a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

The regulation defines a direct threat as a significant risk requiring an individualized assessment based on current medical knowledge or the best objective evidence and four specified factors; it defines reasonable accommodations as modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified applicant or employee with a disability to perform the job, with the accommodation duty ending when the person is no longer employed.

Hunter v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc. · filed 2020-02-03(r), (o)

A direct threat “means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). A determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be based on an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of a job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id; Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). Factors to be considered are: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Hutton, 273 F.3d at 893. ... If reasonable accommodations are “modifications or adjustments” that allow an employee with a disability to perform the functions of his job, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), then naturally the employee must have a job for the employer to accommodate.

Section 1630.2 requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and contemplates an employer-initiated informal interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and reasonable accommodations.

Cloutier v. GOJET Airlines, LLC · filed 2018-05-15(j)(iv) (o)(3)

Although an individualized assessment is required to determine whether a given impairment substantially limits a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iv), "[g]iven their inherent nature," certain types of impairments "will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity." Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). The EEOC has specifically named diabetes as one such impairment, because it necessarily "substantially limits endocrine function." Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). ... The Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could find that Cloutier's symptoms—though certainly not the most severe symptoms associated with uncontrolled diabetes—nonetheless serve as an indication that his endocrine function is substantially limited by his diabetes. Because the ADAAA defines "major life activity" to include endocrine function, it follows that a reasonable jury could find that Cloutier's diabetes constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA. ... The burden of exploring possible reasonable accommodations for an employee with a disability typically lies with the employer. Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) ("To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.").

Section 1630.2 requires broad, lower-threshold analysis of substantial limitation, identifies the consequences of not requiring a function as relevant to whether it is essential, and defines reasonable accommodations as workplace modifications that enable a qualified individual to perform essential functions.

Cruz v. R2Sonic, LLC · filed 2019-09-26(j)(1)(iii), (n)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

Under the current ADA, “the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis,” and the term “shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied” previously. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)-(iv). ... All of this evidence is relevant to whether a job function is essential. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (including, in a nonexhausive list of relevant types of evidence, the “consequences” of not requiring performance of a function). ... Regulations implementing the ADA clarify that employers must make “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

The regulation defines covered impairments, substantial limitation, and essential functions, and the court applied those standards to find that the plaintiff's fatigue did not establish an actual disability and that call duties and eight-hour shifts were essential functions of a surgical RN position.

Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc. · filed 2012-01-05(h)(1), (j)(l)(ii), (j)(3)(i), (n)

The EEOC regulations define a physical or mental impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine____” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... The EEOC Regulations provide that an impairment is a disability if it “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). ... The Court concludes that call responsibilities and 8-hour shifts were essential functions of a surgical RN. ... Accordingly, the call responsibilities and 8-hour shifts are not merely marginal to the surgical RN position, but are fundamental to the position in order to provide adequate staffing levels for patient care at all times.

Section 1630.2 defines perceived disability and the relevant major life activities and substantial-limitation standard, and it defines a qualified person as one who can perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Lee v. Trustees of Dartmouth College · filed 1997-01-07(g)(1), (l), (j)(2), (j), (m)

The phrase “regarded as having such an impairment” can mean that the individual “has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0(1). ... The EEOC’s implementing regulations define “major life activities” to include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” ... The Appendix to this regulation states that an impairment is substantially limiting if it significantly restricts a major life activity as compared to the average person. ... Federal regulations define a “qualified handicapped person” as one who, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).

Section 1630.2(j) identifies factors for substantial limitation, while §§ 1630.2(m) and (n) define qualification and essential job functions, including fundamental rather than marginal duties.

Reese v. BARTON HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS · filed 2010-03-03(j), (m), and (n)

“Courts must consider the nature and severity of the plaintiffs impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, as well as the permanent or long term impact of the impairment.” ... “Under these facts, plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact that she is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting.” ... “In general, the “term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with the disability holds or desires.” ... It does not include the marginal functions of the positions. ... A function may be essential if (1) the position exists to perform that function; (2) there is a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that function can be distributed; or (3) it requires specialized expertise or ability to perform. ... Therefore, in light of the evidence submitted, plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job.

The regulation requires the substantial-limitation inquiry to be broad and not demanding, and treats a person as qualified when the person can perform the job's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Nache v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2024-03-05(j)(1)(i) (m)

“[W]hether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is ‘not meant to be a demanding standard,’ and ‘shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.’” Frazier-Hill v. Chi. Transit Auth., 75 F.4th 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). ... Courts look to whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he “(1) satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of his employment position, and (2) can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Budde v. Kane Cnty. Forest Pres., 597 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).

Section 1630.2 assesses whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity by its condition, manner, and duration, and defines a qualified individual as someone able to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Lewis v. SF Bay Area Rapid Transist District (Bart) · filed 2025-06-27(4) and (m)

Whether Plaintiff’s impairment constitutes a substantial limitation depends on its “condition, manner, or duration.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(4). Relevant facts point to the “difficulty, effort, or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; and/or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function.” Id. § 1630.2(4)(ii). ... A “qualified individual with a disability,” is a person “able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.” Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). An essential function is “fundamental” and “does not include marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Evidence that a function is essential includes “written job descriptions”, “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function”, “[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement”, “[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job”, and more. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3). Plaintiff provides two task lists of responsibilities he alleges he could perform. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 22. However, he does not allege how or why these tasks are fundamental or essential to his position. Without additional facts to support that these tasks indeed constitute “essential functions,” Plaintiff’s allegation is merely a conclusory statement. His lists alone are not sufficient plausibly to allege he may perform the “fundamental job duties” of a BART electrician. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“recitals of . . . . mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a facially plausible claim for relief).

Section 1630.2 directs courts to disregard ameliorative effects when measuring substantial limitation, compare the limitation with that experienced by most people, and determine a direct threat through current medical knowledge, objective evidence, and an individualized assessment.

Fulbright v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2022-03-31(j)(1)(vi), (j)(1)(ii), (r)

“The direct threat defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.’”

Section 1630.2(q) covers medical requirements used as qualification standards, while § 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment of the person’s present ability to perform the job safely.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murray, Inc. · filed 2001-11-13(q), (r)

“On its face, the defendant’s medical parameters appear to be medical qualification standards.” ... More directly relevant in this case, ”[t]he determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... The direct threat provision is inapplicable in this case because the defendant did not engage in an individualized assessment of employees with the specified medical conditions before removing them from their positions as forklift operators.

Subsection (r) requires an employer to make an individualized assessment of an employee’s present ability to safely perform the essential job function when determining whether the employee poses a direct threat.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · filed 2007-03-01(r)

The employer must make an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential function of the job.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2053 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)); see also Rodriguez, 436 F.3d at 484; Kapche, 304 F.3d at 498. Here, too, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Barrios was not a direct threat to herself or her co-workers.

Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, objectively supported assessment using four specified factors.

Jarvis v. Potter · filed 2007-08-30(r)

An EEOC regulation defines direct threat as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2®. It further provides: The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm. Id. ... The evidence relied upon by the Postal Service satisfies the regulation. By its interviews, consideration of M s. Hales’s letter, and the due-process meeting, the Postal Service conducted an individualized assessment of M r. Jarvis that relied on the best available objective evidence. W e disagree with M r. Jarvis’s contention that the Postal Service should have sought further medical advice or conducted a fitness-for-duty examination. No further medical evidence was necessary after his own therapist provided the letter that he had voluntarily solicited, and which was endorsed by his own statements. The Postal Service could reasonably rely on the evidence it already had.

Subsection (r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and the specified risk factors.

Onken v. McNeilus Truck & Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2009-07-10(r)

First, Adam and Rymer correctly performed an individualized assessment of the factors contained in § 1630.2(r). ... This information satisfied the § 1630.2(r) factors.

Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment based on objective medical evidence before an employer determines that an applicant poses a direct threat.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hussey Copper Ltd. · filed 2010-03-12(r)

In light of the foregoing facts and the relevant federal guidelines and regulations as interpreted by the courts, this Court cannot say as a matter of law that the physical examination by Salyards and review by Dr. Nackley constituted an individualized assessment, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r), such that Hussey’s decision that Teaford was a direct safety threat was objectively reasonable.

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to be based on an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to safely perform essential job functions, considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the potential harm.

Allen v. Baltimore County · filed 2015-03-17(r)

The County’s direct threat defense also fails because the record shows that the County failed to base its determination “on an individualized assessment of [Alenj’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of [his] job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... Such an assessment must consider factors such as: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). No such individualized assessment occurred here.

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment based on reasonable medical judgment and objective evidence, considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm.

Searls v. Johns Hopkins Hospital · filed 2016-01-21(r)

JHH’s direct threat defense also fails because the record shows that JHH failed to base its determination “on an individualized assessment of [Searls’] present ability' to safely perform the essential functions of [her] job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... Such an assessment must “be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence” and must consider factors such as: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). No such individualized assessment occurred here.

The direct-threat determination must be based on an individualized assessment supported by reasonable medical judgment relying on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Adduci v. Yankee Gas Services Co. · filed 2016-09-14(r)

The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Yankee Gas’s determination that Adduci was not able to perform the essential functions of a Field Supervisor— Operations was based on “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2 treats physiological disorders affecting body systems as covered impairments, identifies major life activities, requires a record of an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, and defines regarded-as disability by the covered entity's mistaken belief in such an impairment.

Gage v. Midwestern University · filed 2022-01-18(H), (J), (k), (l)(1)

The ADA covers any disorder or condition affecting body systems such as the respiratory systems. ... A major life activity is a function “such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(J). To have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity means to have a history of “a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... A person may be regarded as disabled under the ADA if “a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major activities[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).

Section 1630.2 treats epilepsy as a substantially limiting impairment and does not exclude intermittent or medication-controlled seizures from disability protection.

Lareau v. Northwestern Medical Center · filed 2019-07-08(c)(1)(i)(ii), (j)(1)(vii)

Major life activities under the ADA regulations include walking, standing, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, as well as the functioning of neurological and musculoskeletal systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(c)(1)(i)(ii). Federal regulations state that epilepsy should “easily” be considered as a substantially limiting major life activities because it “substantially limits neurological function.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). Moreover, the evidence in this case establishes that at the time of her seizures, Lareau experienced loss of consciousness, delayed memory recovery, delayed mobility, lack of coordination, and anxiety. While her seizures may have been intermittent or controlled by medication, that does not disqualify them from being considered a protected impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). The Court therefore finds that Lareau has met her prima facie burden of showing a qualifying disability.

Sections 1630.2(h) and (j)(1) treat ADHD as potentially an impairment and require an individualized, broadly construed, non-demanding inquiry into whether it substantially limits a major life activity; § 1630.2(m) requires a person seeking reassignment to satisfy the desired position’s educational requirements.

Murphy v. County of New Hanover · filed 2019-07-18(h), (j)(1)(i)-(ii), and (m)

ADHD may be an impairment under the ADA. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (defining physical or mental impairment). ... “[W]hether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment” into plaintiff’s ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii), (iv). “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B). ... The court infers plaintiff has alleged disability. ... Transfer to the after-hours position is not a reasonable accommodation because plaintiff was not qualified for the job. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (defining “qualified” to include educational requirements of the employment position an individual desires to hold); Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant’s requirements with respect to a Title VII plaintiff’s academic degree does not constitute invidious discrimination.”).

The regulation treats major depressive disorder and PTSD as impairments that should easily be concluded to substantially limit brain function, and the regarded-as provision requires proof that the employer knew of or erroneously perceived an impairment, without requiring substantial limitation of a major life activity.

Williams v. Tarrant County College Dist · filed 2018-01-18(j)(3)(iii), (l)(1)

Additionally, two of the conditions Williams chronicles in her declaration—major depressive disorder and PTSD—are included in the implementing regulations’ list of impairments that should “easily be concluded” to substantially limit brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). ... As noted supra, for a regarded-as claim, plaintiff is not required to establish her employer believed her impairment was substantially limiting; all that is required is proof the employer knew of an impairment or erroneously perceived one. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).

Section 1630.2(g)(2) allows an individual to receive ADA coverage by qualifying under any one of the alternative definitions of disability.

Martin v. Huron Valley Ambulance, Inc. · filed 2016-12-28(g)(2)

The parties focus primarily on the “regarded as” prong under the ADA,'but Martin need only demonstrate he qualifies under one of the definitions to receive coverage under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). Martin argues that he suffered from an acute stress reaction on June 15, 2014, which affected his ability to concentrate and think. He stated that he had a similar reaction 20 years ago and has continued to suffer PTSD-like symptoms since that time. His evidence, although thin, is sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment on whether he has an actual disability. “[A] reasonable finder of fact could find that [the plaintiff] has an episodic disability that substantially limits a major life activity when active, and therefore he meets the definition of disabled.”

Section 1630.2(g)(1) recognizes disability through an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one; § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) compares substantial limitation with most people in the general population, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) directs broad, non-demanding construction of that term.

Peters v. Department of the Interior · filed 2017-01-06(g)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i)

The appellant may prove that he has a disability by showing that: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). An impairment is considered to be a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, eating, lifting, bending, concentrating, communicating, and working; major life activities also include the operation of major bodily functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted under the ADA, and is not meant to be a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Sections 1630.2(i), (j)(2), and (k) define major life activities, provide factors for determining substantial limitation, and include a history or misclassification of a substantially limiting impairment within the record-of-impairment category.

Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co. · filed 2001-11-21(i), (j)(2), (k)

Major life activities are those that are basic to human existence and interaction, such as walking, talking, hearing, seeing and working. ... The Court determines if impairment is substantially limiting by analyzing the nature and severity of the impairment; its duration or expected duration; and its permanent or long-term impact. ... The “record of impairment” category of disability refers to plaintiffs who have a history of, or have been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. ... It tortures the phrase “history of substantial limitation” to suggest Plaintiffs admittedly brief incapacitation, marked by mitigating measures, places him within the “record of impairment” category of disability.

Section 1630.2(i) concerns impairment-related limits on major life activities, and § 1630.2(k) covers a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Glidden v. County of Monroe · filed 1997-01-02(i), (k)

An individual is considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA if she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) has been regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). If an individual meets any one of these three criteria, she is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of ADA coverage. ... An individual also may be considered disabled if she has “a record of such impairment.” This means that the individual “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

A cosmetic disfigurement may be a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity, and working is a major life activity.

Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. · filed 1997-02-07(h)(1), (i)

Therefore, plaintiffs scar can constitute a “disability” if it has the effect of substantially limiting his major life activities. The regulations define work as a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996), so the parties’ real dispute centers around the meaning of “substantially limiting”.

Section 1630.2(g) requires a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; illiteracy caused solely by lack of education is not, by itself, a disability.

Macleroy v. City of Childersburg · filed 2020-04-09(g)

A person has a disability if he “has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2000) (amended 2008); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011). The ADA defines a “mental impairment” as “any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ... Macleroy claims that he is functionally illiterate. However, “while illiteracy is a serious problem, it does not always follow that someone who is illiterate is necessarily suffering from a physical or mental impairment.” Morisky, 80 F.3d at 448. Macleroy’s alleged illiteracy is not a disability (i.e., a mental impairment) in itself. Rather, it may result from a disability. ... But Macleroy does not claim to suffer from a diagnosable condition such as a learning disorder. On the contrary, Macleroy admits that his alleged inability to read or write is due simply to his lack of education. ... Under the ADA, however, “impairments do not include ‘environmental, cultural or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record.’” Shehab v. Chas. H. Sells, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21808 (S.D. New York 2004) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1997)) (citing 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(h)), aff’d, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Macleroy presents no evidence to support a claim of mental impairment or disability as required by the ADA. As a result, Macleroy’s disability discrimination claim is due to be dismissed.

Section 1630.2 directs courts to focus on whether ADA-covered entities complied with their obligations and discrimination occurred, rather than extensively analyzing whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

HOLLINGSWORTH v. R HOME PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2020-10-27

The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis. ... Accordingly, a reasonably jury could find that Plaintiff’s diagnosis of acute stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder qualifies as a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(g)(1) defines disability to include an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one.

Boden v. Crop Production Services, Inc. · filed 2021-02-02(g)(1)

The ADA definition of “disabled” requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that either (1) he has a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting at least one major life activity; (2) there is a record of his impairment; or (3) he is “regarded as” having a physical or mental impairment.

Section 1630.2(g)(2) allows an individual to establish ADA disability coverage under any one or more of the three prongs of the disability definition.

Hill v. Life Line Screening of America, LLC · filed 2021-09-27(g)(2)

“Disability” under the ADA means that the individual (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). “An individual may establish coverage under any one or more of these three prongs of the definition of disability. . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). ... Liberally construed, Plaintiff plausibly alleges facts indicating that she had a disability within the meaning of the ADA (a back injury/condition that affected her musculoskeletal system and substantially limited her ability to perform manual tasks, stand, lift, carry, and work); she received a reasonable accommodation for such disability (a month of medical leave); and she was discriminated against for having a disability or for taking advantage of the accommodation by being terminated from her job within one day of returning from such leave.

Section 1630.2 recognizes disability through any of three alternatives—an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one—and does not require official documentation or that the disability be apparent to others.

Segura v. DeJoy · filed 2022-04-12

Plaintiff’s alleged PTSD may also “substantially limit one or more of [Plaintiff’s] major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged that she was disabled beginning immediately after her encounter with Hamilton left her traumatized. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, there is no requirement that Plaintiff’s disability be officially recorded or apparent to others. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (using “or” to list the three ways a person may be considered disabled).

Section 1630.2(m) treats a person as otherwise qualified when the person can perform the position’s essential functions with or without a reasonable accommodation.

El Kouni v. Trustees of Boston University · filed 2001-10-17(m)

In determining whether or not an individual is “otherwise qualified,” the law also takes into consideration the availability of any reasonable accommodation that would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of the program. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k). If a plaintiff can show the existence of a reasonable accommodation that, if granted by the defendant, would have enabled him to meet all of the position’s requirements, then he is “otherwise qualified.”

Section 1630.2(m) treats an individual as otherwise qualified when the individual can satisfy a program’s requirements with or without reasonable accommodation.

Roggenbach v. Touro College of Osteopathic Medicine · filed 2014-03-13(m)

Finally, in order to be “otherwise qualified” under the Acts, Plaintiff must be able, with or without a reasonable accommodation, to complete all of a program’s requirements.

Section 1630.2(j) defines when an impairment is substantially limiting and lists relevant factors, while § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential.

Flores v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2002-01-29(j)(1)(i), (j)(2), (n)(3)

The term “substantially limiting” comprises either: (1) the inability to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or (2) a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to that of the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Factors to consider when determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting include: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; (3) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... The regulations further provide that evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, without limitation, the following: (1) the employer’s judgment as to whether a function is essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents on the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Based on these facts, the Court finds that the essential functions of the cabin cleaner position include depth perception in order to drive and position vehicles up to aircrafts.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people, while § 1630.2(n)(1) treats fundamental rather than marginal job duties as essential functions.

ALBRIGHT v. THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2019-10-18(j)(1)(ii) (n)(1)

EEOC regulations provide that an individual’s impairment constitutes a disability if it “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Reasonable jurors could find that his disability impacted his sleeping and brain activity more severely than as compared to an average member of the population. Albright therefore has established a triable issue of fact as to whether he suffered from a disability, but his discrimination claim fails because he was not qualified to perform the essential functions of his job. ... EEOC regulations indicate that a job’s “essential functions” are those that are “fundamental,” not “marginal.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... The facts of this case align more closely with those in Miller and Johnson. A clinical audiologist works in the healthcare industry and has direct patient contact. He must arrive to work predictably and promptly in order to care for scheduled patients. ... Albright is unable to establish his prima facie case for intentional discrimination under the ADA, PHRA and PFPO because he fails to establish that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.

The regulation directs courts to compare an impairment with the abilities of most people in the general population when assessing substantial limitation and lists factors for deciding whether a job duty is essential.

Ruiz v. Woodward, Inc. · filed 2019-12-18(j)(v), (n)(2), (n)(3)

Although such comparisons “usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis,” see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(v), the Court cannot conclude that there is a well-recognized consensus among the general population as to how many times per night people are regularly awakened to urinate. Factors such as age, sex, body size, eating and drinking habits, and general overall health are among many that could affect whether a person will routinely be awakened to urinate during the night at all, much less whether such awakenings will usually occur repeatedly. ... The “essential functions” of a position are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position,” standing in juxtaposition to “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also Milton, 53 F.3d at 1123 (essential functions are those that “bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue”). Functions might be essential for many reasons, including: (i) the position exists for the very reason of performing that function, (ii) the function is highly specialized such that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her particular expertise or ability in performing the function; or (iii) that there are only a limited number of employees capable of performing the function such that the function can only be distributed among that limited number. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Other factors that influence the determination of whether a function is essential include the amount of time the employee spends performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function, the employer’s own judgment of the importance of the function, and the experiences of employees past and present who perform that function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether occasional travel to suppliers’ locations was an essential function of the job of GSM.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) says that deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis, while § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies job descriptions, time spent, and the employer’s judgment as relevant evidence of an essential job function.

McMullen v. The Gardens at West Shore · filed 2023-04-25(j)(1)(iii); (n)(3)

The ADA’s broad definition of disability is further supported by the regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) (“The threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis”); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (A “substantial limitation” is measured “as compared to most people in the general population” and “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity.”); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (“The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.”). ... Relevant evidence for assessing whether a job function is essential may include “written job descriptions,” the “amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” and “the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... The Gardens’ judgment that lifting individuals is an essential function for a CNA is entitled to due consideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Nevertheless, its viewpoint on the matter must be balanced against evidence suggesting that CNAs need not as a matter of policy, and generally do not as a matter of practice, carry out the function singlehandedly.

Section 1630.2(j) defines “substantially limited” by comparing an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person.

Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp. · filed 2006-05-04(j)

“Substantially limited” means that an individual is either unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which the individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

A temporary restriction on working around food pending an HIV test does not substantially limit working because it does not restrict a class or broad range of jobs.

Iduoze v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2003-06-16(j)(3)(i)

Being told she could not work around food for a limited period of time, until she took an AIDS test, is not a significant restriction in the ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs.

A substantial limitation in working requires evidence that an impairment excludes a person from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

Hansen v. Seabee Corp. · filed 2004-10-06(j)(3)

By failing to present evidence regarding the relevant class of jobs, Hansen failed to prove either that he was substantially limited in working or that Seabee regarded him is substantially limited in working.

A restriction on working near water does not substantially limit a person’s ability to work when it does not preclude a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

James v. James Marine, Inc. · filed 2011-08-04(j)(3)(i)

The restriction that prevented him from working near water did not preclude him from working in a “class of jobs” or “broad range of jobs in various classes.”

An impairment substantially limits working when it limits a person’s ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared with most people.

Culotta v. Sodexo Remote Sites Partnership · filed 2012-03-29(j)

The allegations in the complaint fail to establish that Culotta’s fear of water substantially limited her ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to most people, ... which is a requirement that continues to apply even after the amendments to the ADA.

An impairment substantially limits working only if it significantly restricts a person’s ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared with people of similar training, skills, and abilities.

Croons v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2014-05-12(j)(3)(i)

While these limitations obviously prevented him from working as a full duty SHTA at CNYPC, there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that he was unable to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes compared to an average person. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (“A person is only ‘substantially limited’ in working if he is ‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.’ ”).

Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer to engage in a good-faith interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations once it has notice of an employee's disability and desire for accommodation.

Rowe v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2002-02-13(o)(3)

The implementing regulations of the ADA state that in determining the appropriate reasonable accommodation, “it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” ... By this point, if not in early May, the interactive process had been triggered, and defendant had a good faith duty to process plaintiffs request for a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(o)(3) recognizes that, when determining an appropriate reasonable accommodation, a covered entity may need to initiate an informal, interactive process with a qualified individual with a disability.

Johnson v. Foulds, Inc. · filed 1997-02-19(o)(3)

Generally, it will be the employee's burden to initiate the process--but not always. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) ("To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation")

Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires employers to engage in an interactive process with a disabled employee when identifying a reasonable accommodation.

Hannah P. v. Coats · filed 2019-02-19(o)(3)

In identifying a reasonable accommodation, employers are required to engage in an interactive process with the disabled employee.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires a limitation on working to affect a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs; inability to perform one particular job is not enough.

Gaul v. AT & T, INC. · filed 1997-02-21(j)(3)(i)

When the activity impaired is working, the term “substantially limits” means ... significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... Plaintiff apparently believes his impairment significantly restricts his ability to perform jobs which are unduly stressful. However, such a classification' is not adequate to render the plaintiff substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The regulations advise that the definition above refers to “general employment demographics and/or recognized occupational classifications that indicate the approximate number of jobs from which an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(j). The examples provided in the regulations refer to classes of jobs such as manual labor or office work. Clearly, “unduly stressful” jobs do not constitute a recognized occupational classification. Therefore, the plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. He is not significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. An employee who fails to establish such inability is not disabled under the Act.

Under § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), being unable to perform one particular job does not substantially limit the major life activity of working; the limitation must affect a class or broad range of jobs.

Jerina v. Richardson Automotive, Inc. · filed 1997-03-17(j)(3)(i)

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) treats a person as substantially limited in working only when the disability disqualifies the person from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

Kalekiristos v. CTS Hotel Management Corp. · filed 1997-03-18(j)(3)(ii)

An individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working if his disability disqualifies him from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides that inability to perform a single particular job is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.

Parker v. Geneva Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1997-08-06(j)(3)(i)

According to the regulations implementing the ADA, the inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job.

In evaluating whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working, the regulation compares the person with others having comparable training, skills, and abilities rather than with the general population.

Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners · filed 1997-08-15(j)(3)(i)

The only question is whether the Department of Justice regulations under Title II forecloses application of the EEOC’s interpretation that substantial limitation in the context of the major life activity of working should be measured by a different reference population — by a comparison to “the average person with comparable training, skills and abilities” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii) rather than “the average person in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). ... Here, the Title I regulation merely determines the appropriate characteristics—comparable training, skills, and abilities—of the persons within the general population against which a substantial limitation is measured in the context of the major life activity of working. ... Thus, the Court’s invocation of the Title I regulations as a meaningful interpretive tool was consistent with general rules of statutory interpretation.

Section 1630.2(o)(3)’s interactive process does not require an employer to act until the employee requests a reasonable accommodation.

Conneen v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. · filed 2002-01-23(o)(3)

An employer’s duty to participate in the interactive process does not arise until the employee requests a reasonable accommodation. ... The court, therefore, finds that MBNA had no duty to initiate (or reinitiate) the interactive process.

Section 1630.2(j)(3) provides that diabetes substantially limits the major life activity of endocrine function, so it ordinarily qualifies as an actual disability.

Hughes v. Southern NH Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-26(j)(3)

For example, applying the principles set forth [in this section], it should easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated: . . . diabetes substantially limits endocrine function; . . . .

Section 1630.2(h)(1) includes physiological disorders affecting the endocrine system within the ADA definition of an impairment, so thyroid disorders qualify as impairments.

Harris v. H & W Contracting Company · filed 1996-12-31(h)(1)

It is common knowledge that the thyroid gland is an integral part of the endocrine system, as can be verified by turning to an ordinary dictionary. ... Therefore, disorders of the thyroid gland fit squarely within the meaning of impairment, as that term is defined by the applicable federal regulations.

For diabetes, the regulation treats substantial limitation of endocrine function as readily established, requires an individualized assessment, and says to ignore ameliorative effects such as medication.

de Ruiz v. Almanza Villarreal Forwarding, LLC · filed 2024-02-05(j)(3)(iii), (j)(4)(iv)

Federal regulations further explain that for purposes of creating “more generous coverage and application of the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination” in a way that is “predictable, consistent, and workable for all individuals and entities” covered under the ADA, “it should be easily concluded” that diabetes “will, at a minimum, substantially limit” the major life activity of endocrine function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has referred to diabetes as “a condition covered by the [ADA].” Gosby v. Apache Indus. Servs., Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 524–25 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii)). ... This logic is flawed on its face, particularly because the relevant federal regulations instruct that diabetes, by its “inherent nature should be easily found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity,” making the individualized assessment “particularly simple and straightforward.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(iv). At the pleadings stage, Ruiz alleged that she has diabetes, and her condition exposes her to high risk from COVID-19 and has substantially limited major life activities, including to her endocrine system. Such allegations are comfortably sufficient for the pleadings stage, and Almanza is not entitled to partial judgment on the pleadings as to Ruiz’s ADA claims on this basis.

A job function may be essential when only a limited number of employees are available to distribute it among.

Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp. · filed 1997-01-21(n)(2)(ii)

The Kinney managers repeatedly testified that maintaining store security was an essential function of a Kinney salesperson's job. Martinson offered no evidence to the contrary. Thus, the undisputed evidence demonstrated and the district court properly recognized that this was "an inherent part of a shoe salesperson's job given that Kinney does not hire security guards." Kinney, 917 F.Supp. at 426. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (explaining that a job "function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed").

Section 1630.2(h)’s definition of physical or mental impairment did not clearly establish that obesity was covered by the ADA.

Torcasio v. Murray · filed 1995-06-29(h)

28 C.F.R. § 35.104; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (ADA regulations promulgated by EEOC) (substantially same definition); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i) (Rehabilitation Act regulations) (substantially same definition). The regulations thus do not clearly establish that an obese individual is covered by the acts.

Section 1630.2 treats episodic impairments as disabilities when they would substantially limit a major life activity when active, defines a qualified individual by the ability to perform essential functions with or without accommodation, and requires an interactive process while obligating the employee to participate in good faith.

Carter v. Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2015-05-11(h)(1), (j)(1)(vii), (m), (o)(3)

We assume, for purpose of our analysis, that these conditions constitute impairments under the ADAAA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... Thus, even though the appellant’s conditions appear episodic, we further assume that she is disabled. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (stating that an impairment that is episodic is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active). ... Next, even assuming that the appellant has one or more impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, she must still show that she is “qualified” within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). A “qualified” individual with a disability is one who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... The appellant correctly noted that the agency was required to enter into the interactive process to identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations, RFR File, Tab 7 at 42-43 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). However, the appellant also has an obligation to assist in the search for an appropriate accommodation in good faith, see Collins v. U.S. Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R. 332, ¶ 11 (2005). ... Because we cannot conclude that the appellant clearly communicated the nature of the flexible work schedule that she was seeking, we also cannot conclude that the agency improperly denied her a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(i)(l) identifies major life activities whose substantial limitation can establish disability, and § 1630.2(o) treats a person as qualified when they can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Eisenberg v. Permanente Medical Group · filed 2012-01-20(i)(l), (o)

Major life activities include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(l). ... An individual is considered a “qualified individual with a disability” if the individual can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired with or without reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).

Section 1630.2 explains when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, identifies major life activities, defines a qualified individual and essential job functions, and gives examples of reasonable accommodation.

Gonsalves v. JF Fredericks Tool Co., Inc. · filed 1997-03-12(j)(l), (i), (m), (n)(l), (o)(2)(ii)

The phrase “substantially limits” comprises either the 1) inability to perform a major life activity or 2) a severe restriction on the ability to perform a major life activity as compared to the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). Major life activities include but are not limited to “earing for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... A qualified individual with a disability is someone with a disability, who with or without accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job that individual holds. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). This person must have the requisite skill, education, and experience requirements for the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The essential functions of the job are those that are fundamental to the position, not marginal. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). ... While the ADA does not define the term “reasonable accommodation,” it may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules and reassignment to a vacant position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).

Sections 1630.2(m), (n)(3), and (o) require that a qualified individual be able to perform essential job functions, identify evidence relevant to whether functions are essential, and do not require eliminating or reallocating essential functions as an accommodation.

Rios v. Indiana Bayer Corp. · filed 1997-06-03(m), (n)(3), (o)

A person with a disability is “qualified” for a job if that person “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires” and “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996). ... Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience or past incumbents on the job; and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1996). ... The ADA does not require an employer to eliminate or reallocate essential functions of a position in order to provide accommodation. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1996).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual with a disability as one who meets the job’s skill, experience, education, and other requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Rosell v. Kelliher · filed 2006-03-31(m)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) regulations define “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... Thus, this Court finds that plaintiff is not a “qualified individual” for Rehabilitation Act purposes because he simply could not have performed the essential functions of his position with or without reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who meets the position’s skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Bright · filed 2025-10-20(m)

Bright nowhere describes his job, the essential functions of the position, or facts supporting a reasonable inference that he “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of” the job at issue. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); see Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305. Thus, Bright fails to state a claim under the ADA.

Anxiety can qualify as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity.

Bueno v. Arhaus, LLC · filed 2024-09-20(h)(2)

Anxiety can qualify as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).

Section 1630.2(h)(2) treats mental or psychological disorders, including emotional or mental illness, as mental impairments under the ADA.

Woodard v. Community Health Centers Incorporated · filed 2024-08-02(h)(2)

Although the ADA does not define “physical or mental impairment,” an EEOC regulation specifies that the term encompasses “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). Anxiety and depression are recognized mental impairments under the ADA.