28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending and for 30 days after dismissal unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Hedrick v. University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences · filed 2019-09-05(d)

The period of limitations for the state law outrage claim is tolled consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which providers that “[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period on supplemental state law claims while the federal lawsuit is pending and for 30 days after dismissal.

Martinez v. Sullivan · filed 2019-09-18(d)

The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's state law claims shall be tolled for the period of time this lawsuit was pending and for 30 days after it is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state-law claims while the federal lawsuit is pending and for 30 days after dismissal.

Black v. CSQT Inc · filed 2019-11-15(d)

ORDERED that the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s state law claims is TOLLED for the period of time that this lawsuit was pending and for 30 days after it is dismissed.

Section 1367(d) tolls only an unexpired limitations period and does not revive claims whose limitations period expired before filing in federal court, even if Ohio’s savings statute permitted that filing.

Vogel v. Northeast Ohio Media Group, L.L.C. · filed 2020-03-09(d)

By its plain language, 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) only tolls a “period of limitations[.]” ... Accordingly, there was no “period of limitations” time for Section 1367(d) to toll during the pendency of that action.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows a longer period.

Gilfillan v. Bradley University · filed 2020-05-19(d)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides, in part, “The period of limitations for any [state] claim [joined with a claim within federal-court competence] shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594, 598 (2018). The Supreme Court has interpreted “tolling” in the supplemental jurisdiction statute to mean “to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock.” Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 598. On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff was dismissed from the DPT program at Bradley University, and she filed her amended complaint with this Court on August 10, 2018. In Illinois, the statute of limitations for a violation of a written contract is ten years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-206 (West 2007). The statute of limitations for a violation of an implied contract is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-205 (West 2012). Therefore, if so desired, Plaintiff has more than ample time to file her dismissed claim in state court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while the federal action is pending.

Continental 332 Fund, LLC v. Kozlowski · filed 2020-06-12(d)

Federal law tolled the running of the statute of limitations during this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for claims asserted under supplemental jurisdiction while they are pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

RAMIREZ v. GONZALEZ · filed 2020-06-24(d)

As the matter is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is important for the parties to know that the period of limitations for these claims was tolled during the pendency of this action and “for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”)."

Section 1367(d) stops the limitations clock for supplemental state-law claims while the federal case is pending and for thirty days after the dismissal order.

VALE-GUGLIUZZI v. LAYTON · filed 2020-06-29(d)

Pursuant to § 1367(d), the limitations periods for those state-law claims have been tolled—i.e., the limitations clock has been stopped—for the pendency of this case and shall be tolled for an additional thirty days from the entry of this order, so Vale-Gug- liuzzi will not be unduly prejudiced by dismissal.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state-law claims while they are pending in federal court under supplemental jurisdiction and for thirty days after dismissal.

B.G., a minor, by and through his next friend and special guardian Marion E. Grantham Jr. v. Rob Banks, Brad Carver, Jer · filed 2020-07-28(d)

The United States Code provides that state-law claims before a federal court pursuant to that court’s supplemental jurisdiction are tolled during the pendency of the federal action and for a period of thirty days after the claims are dismissed.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows a longer period.

Carey v. Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Department · filed 2020-08-03(d)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), any applicable statutes of limitations on Carey’s state law claims were tolled while this action was pending, and for an additional 30 days after this order of dismissal.

Section 1367(d) stops the clock on a state claim’s limitations period while the claim is pending in federal court under supplemental jurisdiction.

Ryan v. Streck, Inc. · filed 2021-04-29(d)

Although § 25-205 provides a 5-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Artis, § 1367(d) tolled the state statute of limitations on Ryan’s breach of contract claim during the time the claim was being litigated in federal court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows longer tolling.

Ingram v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2021-06-04(d)

When a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, however, a plaintiff need not fear his state claim will be barred by the statute of limitations, because “[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594, 598 (2018) (holding that “§ 1367(d)’s instruction to ‘toll’ a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock”).

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for supplemental state law claims during federal litigation and for thirty days afterward.

Beveridge v. City of Spokane · filed 2021-07-21(d)

The tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) has suspended the statute of limitations during the federal litigation and for thirty days thereafter.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitation period for state law claims while they are pending in federal court.

Mattis v. Pennsylvania Department · filed 2022-03-02(d)

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides that the limitation period for Mattis’s state claims was tolled while those claims were pending in federal court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state law claims while they are pending in federal court, allowing them to be refiled in state court after dismissal.

Howard v. St. John's County Sheriff · filed 2022-03-04(d)

Thus, § 1367(d) functions to toll the statute of limitations on those claims during the pendency of this action, and Howard may re-file them in state court if he wishes to do so.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while they are pending and for 30 days after dismissal.

Nachshen v. 53-55 West 21ST Owner LLC · filed 2022-03-09(d)

“The dismissal will not have any impact on the statute of limitations for these claims, because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the limitations period is tolled while the claims are pending and for 30 days after they are dismissed.”

Section 1367(d) does not toll limitations for state law claims in a federal case brought under diversity jurisdiction without a federal claim supporting supplemental jurisdiction.

Reshard v. Stevenson · filed 2022-05-13(d)

Here, however, § 1367(d) does not apply to the dismissal of Reshard’s two prior federal cases. In both cases, Reshard asserted diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and did not allege a federal claim that would permit the use of supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. law claims.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Melvin v. Troy University · filed 2022-06-29(d)

Accordingly, following the Court’s reasoning in Jinks, this court finds that § 1367(d) applies to state claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for a dismissed supplemental state-law claim for thirty days after dismissal.

Torgerson v. Henderson County Facility · filed 2022-08-25(d)

The applicable statute of limitations is suspended for thirty days following the date of dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) does not toll an already expired limitations period when a plaintiff refiles in federal court under Ohio's saving statute.

Underwood v. Mercy Health Partners N., L.L.C. · filed 2022-12-02(d)

Where a plaintiff has already filed her claims once and utilizes Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), to refile in federal court after the original statute of limitations has expired, there is no period of limitations to toll and no 30-day grace period for refiling in state court, therefore, 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) is inapplicable.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Hardnett v. Potomac Heights Mutual Home Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2022-12-08(d)

The statute of limitations with respect to the state claims asserted here was tolled while the case . was in this Court and will remain tolled for 30 days after the case is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d); Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state law claim while it is pending in federal court and for at least 30 days after dismissal.

COOPER v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2023-02-07(d)

The statutes of limitations applicable to the Estate's state law claim was tolled while the claim was pending in federal court and for at least thirty (30) days after dismissal.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state-law claims properly brought under supplemental jurisdiction in federal court.

Williams v. Citigroup, Inc. · filed 2023-02-09(d)

Plaintiff's claim against defendant Citigroup, that it leveraged its relationship with Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP to terminate her employment, was not time-barred. The statute of limitations was tolled when plaintiff properly commenced the action in federal court pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(a), and her voluntary dismissal of her supplemental state claims "without prejudice" after filing this action permitted her to avail herself of the saving provision of CPLR 205(a) (see 28 USC[*2]§ 1367[d]; CPLR 205[a]; Bailey v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 292 AD2d 328, 329 [2d Dept 2002]).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for at least thirty days after dismissal.

DAVIS v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2023-02-13(d)

The applicable statutes of limitations were tolled while the claim was pending in federal court and for at least thirty (30) days after dismissal.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for at least 30 days after dismissal.

Holland v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services · filed 2023-04-21(d)

This limitations period should not prevent Plaintiff from pursuing his claims in state court because the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” Thus, since Plaintiff timely filed his Complaint in this Court, he has at least 30 days after this matter is dismissed to pursue state-court remedies.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations for claims within supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a), but not for claims within the court’s original diversity jurisdiction.

King v. The Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc. · filed 2023-04-24(d)

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a claim brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) during the claim’s pendency and for at least thirty days after its dismissal.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a timely filed state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and gives the plaintiff at least 30 days after dismissal to pursue it in state court.

Cozart v. Jeffrey · filed 2023-05-02(d)

While more than two years have now elapsed since the alleged professional negligence of Dr. Jeffrey occurred on November 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court within the two-year limitations period and the limitations period is tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” Thus, since Plaintiff timely filed her Complaint in this Court, she has at least 30 days after this matter is dismissed to pursue her claim in state court.

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for a supplemental state claim while it is pending in federal court and adds 30 days after dismissal.

Patel v. City of Long Beach CA2/1 · filed 2023-07-28(d)

However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d), this 90-day limitations period stopped running while the Patels’ writ petition was pending in federal court, along with an additional 30 days being added to the limitations period after the federal court ultimately dismissed the petition.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state claim during the federal case and for 30 days after dismissal, but does not set a 30-day deadline to transfer the claim to state court.

Quiah v. The Devereux Foundation, Inc. · filed 2023-09-18(d)

Neither Section 1367(d) nor 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b) imposes any particular time limitation on the period within which a transfer can be effected. The only time limitation is that mandated by case law, i.e., that it be done “promptly” in order to preserve the 30-day tolling period. To be clear, however, the tolling period remains 30 days, not whatever time period elapses before a prompt transfer is effected.

Section 1367(d) stops the limitations clock for a supplemental state law claim while it is pending in federal court and adds 30 days after dismissal.

Wilson v. Ohio Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services · filed 2023-11-28(d)

In addition to the six-year statute of limitations in state court, the filing of a federal complaint tolls the statute of limitations while the claim is pending in federal court and adds a period of 30 days to the limitations period after dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to mean that the pendency of the federal court claim “stop[s]-the-clock” of the state statute of limitations. Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 598 (2018).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while the federal suit is pending and for thirty days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

(PC) Cooks v. State of CA Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2024-01-16(d)

Plaintiff remains free to re-file these 11 claims in state court; and pursuant to § 1367(d), the statute of limitations with respect to these 12 claims shall be tolled while this suit has been pending and for thirty days following entry of any 13 district court order adopting the findings and recommendations, unless California law provides 14 for a longer tolling period.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows longer tolling.

Pegues, Norris v. Hoffmann, Karl · filed 2024-02-09(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [the court’s supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a dismissed claim for 30 days after dismissal unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Estate of Justin M Magleby v. United States of America · filed 2024-02-29(d)

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the period of limitations for any claim shall be tolled for a period 2|| of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Ravestein v. Douglas County, Nebraska · filed 2024-03-08(d)

Under § 1367(d), “[t]he period of limitations . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” ... That provision gives Ravestein ample time to file her state-law claims in the appropriate state court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Seymour, Peter v. Kostchyz, Georgia · filed 2024-06-05(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [the court’s supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for 30 days after a supplemental state law claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Brunson v. Benedict College · filed 2024-09-25(d)

In any event, the Court overrules this objection because the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), provides that any potentially applicable statute of limitations is tolled for 30 days after the dismissal without prejudice of the supplemental state law claim.

Section 1367(d) tolls pendent state-law claims brought in federal court; its tolling rule does not extend to federal claims raised in state court.

Bocci v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2024-09-27(d)

But as Judge Parker explained, the tolling principle adopted in Artis was based on the language of a specific federal statute, Section 1367(d), that requires tolling in the context of pendent state law claims brought in federal court. R&R at 20-21. The Court cannot “reverse appl[y]” Artis in the absence of a similar statutory provision that provides for the tolling of federal claims brought in state court, which Bocci appears to concede does not exist.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Lockridge, Adrian v. Garland, Merrick · filed 2024-10-30(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [the court’s supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Flemming, Jayvon v. Lavoie, Daniel · filed 2025-01-08(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [the court’s supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Obregon, Andrew v. Barker · filed 2025-04-17(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [the court’s supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Joseph v. General Conference Corporation of 7th Day Adventist · filed 2025-05-21(d)

First, as to his own state-law claims, the Court is unaware of any impediment to the tolling of any applicable statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Section 1367(d) explicitly provides that the limitations period for any claim asserted under a court’s supplemental jurisdiction “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a state-law claim while it is pending in a civil action.

Phillips v. Elkhart City of · filed 2025-06-30(d)

The statute of limitations will not have run on Ms. Phillips’ claim, as both federal and state law toll the relevant limitations period when claims are pending in a civil action (except in limited circumstances not present here).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Young v. City of Seneca · filed 2025-09-02(d)

The statute of limitations on these state law claims has been tolled while they were pending in federal court and remains tolled for a period of 30 days after they are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Brunson v. Benedict College · filed 2025-09-12(d)

The statute of limitations on these state law claims has been tolled while they were pending in federal court and remains tolled for a period of 30 days after they are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Williams, Billy v. Benzel, Jason · filed 2025-09-22(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Polzin v. Warden Chris Buesgen · filed 2025-10-28(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

JONES · filed 2026-01-29(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations "shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." Here, that means the statute of limitations has been tolled and Mr. Jones can refile the claim in state court during the tolled period if he chooses.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a state law claim asserted in a putative class action that fails certification.

LUTZ · filed 2026-02-19(d)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) simply does not apply to state law claims asserted in putative class actions that ultimately fail certification, like the PHRA claim asserted in Meinert.

Section 1367(d)’s 30-day tolling period does not apply when the action asserts only federal statutory claims and includes no claims under supplemental jurisdiction.

Salmon · filed 2026-03-06(d)

Both Salmon’s Middle District of North Carolina Complaint and her Complaint in this court assert solely federal statutory claims. She did not rely upon § 1367 to extend supplemental jurisdiction to any state law claims. Accordingly, the 30-day filing period in § 1367(d) does not apply in these circumstances, regardless of the MDNC’s dismissal of her Complaint without prejudice.

Section 1367(d)’s 30-day tolling period begins when the court enters the dismissal order, rather than when a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation.

Walker · filed 2026-03-25(d)

The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation did not trigger the 30-day period. The 30- day period begins to run on the date of the dismissal order in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Yauger v. Gray · filed 2026-03-31(d)

The statute of limitations for Mr. Yauger’s state law claims has been tolled while the claims were pending in this action, and the tolling will continue for a period of 30 days after the Court enters the dismissal order in this case “unless state law provides for a longer tolling period.”

Section 1367(d) tolls the state statute of limitations while state law claims are pending in federal court.

Scott v. Smith · filed 2000-05-01(d)

In addition, Scott’s concern regarding the statute of limitations is unfounded. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing for tolling of state statute of limitations during pendency of federal action); Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So. 2d 1246, 1256 (Miss. 1996) (holding that statute of limitations is tolled when state claims are brought with federal claims and that dismissal without prejudice does not affect tolling).

Section 1367(d) allows a dismissed supplemental claim to be refiled in state court within 30 days after dismissal.

Brown v. Fallon · filed 2022-09-08(d)

This state-law malicious prosecution claim is DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in New York State Court within thirty (30) days of this Decision and Order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations for state-law claims brought in federal court under supplemental jurisdiction, but it does not toll claims that were never brought there.

Pinder v. Duchesne · filed 2020-10-22(d)

Put simply, section 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations while state-law claims— ―brought along with federal claims‖ in federal court by virtue of the federal court‘s supplemental jurisdiction—are pending in federal court. ... And because they brought no state law claims, section 1367(d) does not apply.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period only for actions later refiled in state court.

Morisada Corp. v. Beidas · filed 1995-03-16(d)

Moreover, with the statute of limitations, contrary holdings may occur because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) only tolls those actions that are later refiled in state court.

Section 1367(d) does not provide a basis to revisit a federal court’s statute of limitations ruling on a federal claim that does not involve supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Loving v. Pirelli Cable Corp. · filed 1998-06-30(d)

Additionally, Stull’s argument that § 1367(d) provides a legal basis for reviewing this court’s statute of limitations determination is entirely misplaced. As noted above, § 1367 provides the basis for the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under specific circumstances. Loving’s claim for benefits does not implicate the court’s jurisdiction to keep state law elaims under § 1367.

Section 1367(d) tolls the effect of a state limitations period without stopping its progression, and its 30-day period begins at the end of federal district court proceedings.

Turner v. Kight · filed 2007-12-19(d)

Because we conclude that § 1367 tolls the consequence, but not the progression, of a state statute of limitations, and that the 30-day period provided by § 1367 begins to run at the end of the federal district court proceedings, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissing the instant case as time-barred.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a state law claim that is unrelated to the federal claim and therefore falls outside supplemental jurisdiction.

Krause v. TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORP. · filed 2009-04-17(d)

Because this claim against Textron was not “related to” the claim against Twin Eagles, it is not entitled to the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction and the tolling provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply.

Section 1367(d) tolls state claims dismissed from federal court only when they are subsequently refiled in state court.

Malone v. Vereinsbank · filed 2011-06-24(d)

That provision applies only to state claims dismissed from federal court and subsequently re-filed in state court.

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations clock for related state-law claims during federal litigation and for 30 days after dismissal, including claims of putative class members.

In Re: Vertrue Inc. Marketing v. · filed 2013-04-16(d)

We are persuaded that the suspension approach properly gives effect to both § 1367(d) and the state statute of limitations. ... Because we find no indication that Congress intended to exclude putative class members from the tolling available through operation of § 1367(d), we hold that the plaintiffs here properly articulated state law “claims” for purposes of § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) gives a claimant thirty days after a federal district court dismisses a supplemental claim to file it in state court.

Adedje v. Westat, Inc. · filed 2013-09-06(d)

As we previously denoted, the editor’s note of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) asserts that time should accrue at a federal district court’s dismissal. Relating to the instant case, the Maryland U.S. District Court “dismissed” the action on November 2, 2010. Immediately after this, appellant could have filed a complaint in Montgomery County, and would have received a thirty day period pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and Md. Rule 2-101(b), as the filing deadline, based on three years from her Westat employment’s end date, would have been tolled.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations only for claims pending in the federal action, so it does not toll claims first asserted against a defendant after the federal proceedings ended.

Zak v. City of Arab (Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc.) · filed 2017-12-01(d)

As discussed in detail above, however, Zak's claims against HVCM had not been asserted at the time the case was removed to federal court; therefore, those claims were not pending "in the same action that [was] voluntarily dismissed at the same time" as the other pending federal and state-law claims that were dismissed by the federal district court's July 24, 2015, opinion.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations for a supplemental state-law claim while that claim is pending in federal court and for at least 30 days after its dismissal, even if the federal action continues.

KIM VS. DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC · filed 2019-06-13(d)

Therefore, we conclude that, pursuant to § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for a state- law claim filed in federal court stops running only while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after the state-law claim's dismissal.

Section 1367(d) suspends the statute of limitations on supplemental state law claims during the federal lawsuit and for 30 days after dismissal.

Glenn v. Dodd · filed 2019-09-23(d)

ORDERED that the Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their refiling in state court, with the statute of limitations suspended on these claims during the pendency of this lawsuit and for 30 days after it is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state-law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, but a Pennsylvania claimant forfeits that protection by failing to perfect transfer under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b).

T.M. Bolick & E.B. Bolick v. Northeast Industrial Services Corp. · filed 2021-08-18(d)

Because the Bolicks never perfected the transfer by complying with Section 5103(b), they cannot avail themselves of the tolling protections afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims only if the plaintiff asserted or joined those claims in federal court.

Kenneth Taylor Curry, V. Vancouver Housing Authority · filed 2022-06-14(d)

In order for section 1367(d)’s tolling provision to apply, a plaintiff must have asserted or joined state law claims in federal court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a state law claim against defendants who were not named on that claim in the federal action.

STANLEY GREEN v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2022-10-12(d)

If Green had sued those same individual defendants in superior court in Green II, then the tolling provision of 28 USC § 1367 (d) would apply. But that is not what he did. Green instead filed his state law tort claims in Green II against different defendants—DOC and BOR.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims for 30 days after dismissal, but does not revive claims already barred when the suit was filed.

Peel v. Cobern · filed 2022-12-21(d)

ORDERED that the statute of limitations on any state law claims which Plaintiff may have against Defendants be tolled for a period of 30 days following the entry of the judgment of dismissal, thereby allowing Plaintiff the possibility of refiling state law claims in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see also Docket No. 28 at 27, n.5. The tolling of the limitations period should have no effect upon any claims which were already barred by limitations at the time the present lawsuit was filed.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations for refiled state-law claims only when the same claims were asserted in federal court; it does not toll different claims or claims against new defendants.

Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of the Estate of Carlos Lens Fernandez v. City of Chickasaw, Michael E. · filed 2023-03-17(d)

However, the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply to circumstances in which the claims asserted in a refiled action differ from those asserted in the dismissed federal-court action or in which the claims are asserted against new defendants.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations while a supplemental state law claim remains pending through an appeal from the judgment, but not during later Rule 60(b)(6) proceedings.

Feliz v. County of Orange · filed 2023-05-19(d)

We conclude section 1367(d)’s tolling period does not extend to the duration of rule 60(b)(6) proceedings.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for related state law claims for 30 days after dismissal of the federal action.

KING v. RODRIGUEZ · filed 2023-08-30(d)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), however, the limitations period for any such state law medical malpractice claim is therefore “tolled... for a period of 30 days” after the date on which this Court’s dismissal in this matter is entered.

Section 1367(d) does not toll limitations for state-law claims against nonconsenting States dismissed from federal court on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

Murray v. State of Tennessee · filed 2023-12-13(d)

We therefore determine that subsection 1367(d) does not apply in this case, where state law claims against nonconsenting State defendants were dismissed from federal court on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Wand, Barbara v. Lafayette County Sheriffs Department · filed 2024-03-28(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides longer tolling.

Stinson, Deyontae v. Anderson, Theodore · filed 2025-02-07(d)

Those limitations periods have been tolled while this case has been pending, but they will begin again 30 days from now.

Section 1367(d) continues to toll a pending state-law claim despite the filing of a defective amended complaint in federal court.

Fletcher v. City Of Madison · filed 2025-04-08(d)

The defective second amended complaint had no impact on section 1367(d)’s tolling provision because the federal litigation, including the wrongful death claim, was already pending at that time.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a theory that was never presented as a claim in the federal action.

Nicholsen v. Dennery · filed 2025-04-16(d)

This court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply to alternative theories that were not presented as claims in the action filed in District Court or with FEMA.

Section 1367(d) tolls a state law claim while it is pending in federal court but does not extend the deadline to file it there for the first time.

Guerrero v. Albany Med Health System · filed 2025-09-15(d)

If the federal court declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses the state law claim, the § 1367(d) toll may allow the plaintiff to refile the claim in state court. See Artis, 583 U.S. at 74. The toll does not extend a plaintiff's time to file her claim for the first time in federal court. See id. at 74-75. Accordingly, the IIED claim is dismissed for untimeliness, not for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a claim never raised in the federal action under supplemental jurisdiction.

Williams v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2009-06-10(d)

The District Court could not exert supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that were never raised. Case law would have supported Williams’ position if he had indeed raised state law claims and the District Court had considered asserting supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. This was notthe case. Consequently, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) is inapplicable to this case and Williams cannot take advantage of its 30-day tolling provision.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations only for state-law claims expressly asserted in federal court; it does not toll a new cause of action first asserted in state court.

Rounds v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission · filed 2015-01-29(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), “in order to benefit from tolling, the claim must have been expressly asserted in federal court.”

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations only for state law claims expressly asserted in federal court; it does not toll a new claim first asserted in state court.

Rounds v. M-NCPPC · filed 2015-01-29(d)

Accordingly, where Petitioners failed to assert a claim for wrongful interference with easement rights in their federal suit, and did not file their state suit including the wrongful interference claim until more than four years after the latest possible accrual date, that claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Count XII.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the twelve-month filing deadline for claims under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

Lynn v. City of Jackson · filed 2000-11-27(d)

We believe the same logic applies to Plaintiffs’ claim that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) applies to toll the statute of limitations in an action under the TGTLA. As we noted above, the TGTLA is a state- sanctioned exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and, as such, must be strictly construed. The twelve-month limitation for filing TGTLA claims is a condition precedent to the right to file a claim under the statute, and therefore serves as both a statute of limitation and a statute of repose for TGTLA claims.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims against municipalities, and its application to those claims is constitutional.

Jinks v. Richland County · filed 2003-04-22(d)

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period with respect to state-law causes of action brought against municipalities, but we see no reason why that represents a greater intrusion on “state sovereignty” than the undisputed power of Congress to override state-law immunity when subjecting a municipality to suit under a federal cause of action.

Section 1367(d) does not save a state action filed more than thirty days after the federal action ends when the state limitations period has otherwise expired.

Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP · filed 2007-05-30(d)

Because Binder commenced the state action more than thirty days after dismissal of the federal action by the Third Circuit, relief under § 1367(d) is not available to him.

Section 1367(d) gives a plaintiff thirty days after dismissal of the federal action to file a state action despite expiration of the state statute of limitations.

Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2006-11-16(d)

As provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), plaintiff had thirty days after dismissal of the federal action to file his state action, notwithstanding the expiration of the State statute of limitations.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period on a supplemental state-law claim for 30 days after dismissal of the federal claims.

Hill v. Barbour · filed 1992-04-10(d)

Hill will not be prejudiced by this since under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations on his battery claim is tolled for 30 days after his federal claims are dismissed.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state law claim while the federal claim is pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows a longer period, provided the limitations period had not expired before filing.

Sharpe v. Long · filed 1992-10-20(d)

The court notes that upon dismissal of the state law claims Sharpe will not be barred by any state statute of limitations from asserting these claims in state court, provided such limitations period did not run before this lawsuit was filed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), Sharpe's state law claims "shall be tolled while the [federal] claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and permits a timely state action within 30 days after dismissal.

Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · filed 1999-08-03(d)

The limitations period was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), and the state action was commenced within 30 days after the federal court dismissed the MHRA claim without prejudice. Therefore, the claim is not barred by the one-year limitations period.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim during the federal action and for 30 days after the court dismisses it.

Birmingham v. Ogden · filed 1999-10-08(d)

The statute of limitations has been tolled during the pendency of this action, and continues to be tolled for a period of 30 days from the daté of this Order.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows longer.

Hedges Ex Rel. C.D. v. Musco · filed 2000-02-22(d)

When it codified the law of supplemental jurisdiction, Congress expressly provided: The period of limitations for any claim asserted under section (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. 28 U.S.C. S 1367(d); ... Plaintiffs' state claims were, therefore, not time-barred at the time the District Court dismissed them.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Verbeek v. Teller · filed 2000-09-29(d)

Notably, Verbeek’s time to commence an Article 78 proceeding has not yet run. Although an Article 78 proceeding must be commenced “within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding,” CPLR § 217, Verbeek filed this action within that four-month period, and the statute of limitations “is tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) allows 30 days after dismissal of a supplemental state-law claim to file it in state court, even when less time remains under the state limitations period.

Guevara v. Ventura County Community College District · filed 2008-12-16(d)

Guevara filed his state court action on June 19, 2007, which was within the 30-day tolling period of section 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) gives a party 30 days to refile dismissed supplemental state law claims in state court without a limitations bar; the window covers theories fairly within the notice supplied by the federal complaint.

Estate of Belden v. Brown County · filed 2011-08-26(d)

Following dismissal of the complaint, Plaintiffs filed their petition in this case within the 30-day window created by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) permitting a party to reassert state law claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in federal court without facing a statute of limitations bar. Accordingly, any theories of state law liability fairly within the notice provided to Brown County in the federal complaint should be treated as timely for limitations purposes.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations from the date the federal action was filed but does not revive a state claim whose limitations period had already expired by then.

Davis v. Commonwealth · filed 1995-06-02(d)

Both 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103 only toll the statute of limitations as of the date the action was filed in the first tribunal, here the District Court. ... However, because their action accrued on June 28,1991 when they were dismissed from their jobs, the six-month statute of limitations for an action before the Board had run and could not be tolled by the federal actions.

Section 1367(d) tolls a state claim only if its limitations period was still running when the claim was first filed in federal court.

Pointer Ex Rel. Pointer v. Western Heights Independent School District · filed 1996-06-18(d)

Section 1367(d) can only operate to save a claim that initially comes before the federal court while the statute of limitations controlling that claim is still running.

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to a permissive counterclaim arising from events unrelated to the original claim; that counterclaim requires an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.

Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Therkildsen · filed 2000-03-30(a)

As a permissive counterclaim, it is outside the supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. sec.1367(a) covers only "claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution") and requires an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims that lack a common nucleus of operative facts with a federal claim.

Carvalho v. DOOR-PACK, INC. · filed 2008-05-23(a)

Defendants’ state law claims do not derive from a common nucleus of operative facts with Carvalho’s FLSA claim.

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over malicious-prosecution and defamation counterclaims arising from an employee’s discrimination complaints without a common nucleus of operative fact, and complex state-law issues independently justify declining jurisdiction.

Sanders v. New World Design Build, Inc. · filed 2020-04-23(a), (c)(1)

Therefore, I conclude that Defendants’ counterclaims are not compulsory, and further find that they do not satisfy Gibbs’ “common nucleus of operative fact” test. ... Even if Defendants’ counterclaims could be construed as satisfying the “common nucleus of operative fact” test sufficient to warrant the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, I find in my discretion that exercising jurisdiction over Defendants’ counterclaims would be inappropriate under § 1367(c). Defendants’ counterclaims raise “complex issue[s] of State law” regarding the extent to which New York common law malicious prosecution and defamation actions may be brought based on an employee’s charge of race and sex discrimination against an employer.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, while permissive counterclaims require an independent jurisdictional basis.

Shamblin v. City of Colchester · filed 1992-04-16

A federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims; however, permissive counterclaims require their own jurisdictional basis.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties joined to a counterclaim when the claims form part of the same Article III case or controversy.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Bathgate · filed 1994-05-05(a)

Thus, we conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Bathgate defendants' claims against the Bank directors.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims against additional counterclaim defendants when they form part of the same Article III case or controversy.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Bathgate · filed 1994-05-05(a)

Moreover, in In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236-37 (3d Cir.1994), we held that the district court had "[a]ncillary subject matter jurisdiction ... over additional party defendants to a compulsory counterclaim, or over third party defendants," and that Congress "confirmed the principle of ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaim defendants in the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367." Section 1367 provides in pertinent part that district courts "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all ... claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). 15 Thus, we conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Bathgate defendants' claims against the Bank directors.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but permissive counterclaims require an independent jurisdictional basis.

Hart v. Clayton-Parker and Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-06-29(a)

Defendant’s argument, however, overlooks the fact that even under section 1367(a), courts must still distinguish between compulsory and permissive counterclaims: federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but permissive counterclaims require their own jurisdictional basis.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claims.

Centennial School District v. Independence Blue Cross · filed 1994-07-08(a)

Following this reasoning, I find that the counterclaim arises from the same transaction or occurrence to come within the purview of Rule 13(a) and confer jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence as a claim within original jurisdiction.

Naranjo v. County of Rio Arriba, State of NM · filed 1994-07-28(a)

For a counterclaim to be “so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case of controversy,” and therefore fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, it must be a compulsory rather than a permissive counterclaim. ... The state law counterclaims set forth by the Counterplaintiffs appear to arise directly out of the lease agreement, and therefore constitute compulsory counterclaims. This Court shall therefore maintain jurisdiction over said claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an after-acquired counterclaim that satisfies the test for a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a).

Skaro v. Eastern Savings Bank · filed 1994-09-27(a)

In this instance, ESB’s counterclaim did not “arise” until (at the earliest) July 25, 1990, when plaintiffs allegedly failed to make a semi-annual payment on the Side Agreement, long after the original defendant filed the original answer in December 1989. Nevertheless, if it meets the test for a compulsory counterclaim pursuant to Rule 13(a), the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising from the same transactions as adequately pleaded federal claims, even when the counterclaims lack an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

North Central F.S., Inc. v. Brown · filed 1996-12-23

Thus, the court can hear the Elevator’s claims under Rule 13(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 if the Elevator’s claims are asserted or reasserted as counterclaims to the Producers’ federal claims, if the Producers’ federal claims are in turn adequately pleaded.

Section 1367(a) supplies supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the original federal claim.

Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine · filed 1997-05-05(a)

Supplemental jurisdiction exists for all of the counterclaims in this case.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory or permissive counterclaims that form the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rothman v. Emory University and Richard W. Riley, Secretary of the Department of Education · filed 1997-07-23(a)

This language now permits district courts to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, so long as the counterclaims “are so related to” the original claims that they form the same case or controversy.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim that is logically related to the opposing party’s claim.

Waterloov Gutter Protection System Co. v. Absolute Gutter Protection, L.L.C. · filed 1999-09-28(a)

A decision to label a counterclaim as compulsory is a decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that counterclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory or permissive counterclaims when they are sufficiently related to the original claims.

Directv v. Edwards · filed 2003-11-17(a)

However, the language of § 1367 now permits district courts to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, so long as the counterclaims are so related to the original claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim that forms part of the same Article III case, even without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Joyce Jones, Martha L. Edwards, Lou Cooper and Vincent E. Jackson, Individually and as Class Representatives v. Ford Mot · filed 2004-02-05(a)

We share the view that section 1367 has displaced, rather than codified, whatever validity inhered in the earlier view that a permissive counterclaim requires independent jurisdiction (in the sense of federal question or diversity jurisdiction). ... The counterclaims and the underlying claim bear a sufficient factual relationship (if one is necessary) to constitute the same “case” within the meaning of Article III and hence of section 1367.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim sufficiently connected to the original claim, including a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction.

Kristensons-Petroleum, Inc. v. Sealock Tanker Co., Ltd. · filed 2004-02-23(a)

Moreover, even assuming there was no absolute identity of factual backgrounds, there is sufficient connection that the Court would choose, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction exists over Blanc’s counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) can provide supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim when it is related to the federal claim as part of the same case or controversy.

Campos v. Western Dental Services, Inc. · filed 2005-11-28(a)

Thus, there will be some permissive counterclaims over which the court has supplemental jurisdiction and some it does not. The reason is that the standard for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than the standard for a counterclaim to be compulsory.

Section 1367 permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a non-core counterclaim that is directly related to claims within its core jurisdiction.

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc. · filed 2006-07-31(a)

Mesa’s Counterclaim is directly related to, and inextricably intertwined with, the claims in HAL’s Complaint over which the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction. ... As such, the bankruptcy court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mesa’s Counterclaim, a non-core proceeding.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim lacking an independent jurisdictional basis unless it arises from the same transaction or common nucleus of operative fact as the original federal claim.

Williams v. Long · filed 2008-06-11(a)

This result follows from the Fourth Circuit’s reasonable conclusion that Fed.R.Civ.P. 13’s requirement that the claim and counterclaim “arise[] out of the [same] transaction or occurrence” is equivalent to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)’s requirement that the claim and counterclaim be "so related ... that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” In other words, if a court determines that a counterclaim that lacks an independent jurisdictional basis did not arise from the same transaction as the original federal claim (and thus is not compulsory), it is also concluding that the claim and counterclaim did not “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” (and thus that the court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim closely related in fact to the complaint.

Kuschner v. Nationwide Credit, Inc. · filed 2009-03-31(a)

The close factual relationship between the allegations of the complaint and of the counterclaim also provides the basis for the court to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim per 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but permissive counterclaims require an independent basis of jurisdiction.

Plymouth Yongle Tape (Shanghai) Co. v. Plymouth Rubber Co. · filed 2009-12-29(a)

Pursuant to this statute, federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but permissive counterclaims must be "supported by an independent basis of jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(a) gives a court supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims because they arise from the same case or controversy as the original claims.

Long v. Welch & Rushe, Inc. · filed 2014-06-30(a)

There is no dispute that compulsory counterclaims are, by definition, within the supplemental jurisdiction of the court.

Section 1367(a) gives a court supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim whose facts significantly overlap with the original claim.

Horton v. Calvary Portfolio Services, LLC · filed 2014-07-24(a)

This Court finds defendant’s proposed counterclaim is compulsory, in that the facts concerning plaintiff’s alleged breach of contract for failure to pay his debt and defendant’s alleged wrongful acts occurring when defendant sought to recover plaintiffs debt clearly overlap significantly. Thus, this Court finds there is a clear logical relationship between the claims, requiring this Court to exercise jurisdiction over defendant’s proposed counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim for breach of release and indemnity provisions related to the claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Hernandez v. Stringer · filed 2016-09-29(a)

Although defendants fail to cite any legal authority in response, their argument is, in essence, that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their counterclaim to the extent it alleges that plaintiff breached the release and indemnity clauses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § l367(a), which provides for supplemental jurisdiction over claims that “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). l agree.

Section 1367 allows supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim only when it is compulsory and sufficiently related to the original federal claim.

Heckler v. Reeds Spring R-IV School District · filed 2018-09-26(a)

The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to” the Title VII claim that “they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... The Court find, after applying the four tests, that Defendant’s counterclaim is not a compulsory counterclaim. Accordingly, the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims related to the original claim when judicial economy favors doing so.

Cordero v. Torres · filed 2019-07-22(a)

Given that the counterclaims are related to the original claim and that the interests of judicial economy would be served here, the Court may (and does) exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims arising from the same dispute as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Sherry Pritchett d/b/a Professional Counseling & Medical Associates v. Prosser · filed 2019-09-20(a)

In an action over which the district court has original jurisdiction, it also has “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Counter-Defendant also asserted these claims against S. Prosser, which stemmed from the same series of transactions and occurrences, (see id.), and Counter-Plaintiffs’ counterclaims arise from the same dispute, (see D.E. 17, 18; supra Part I).3 Moreover, the parties have undertaken significant discovery to date, and trial is set for this October. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Counter-Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same dispute as a complaint within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Ammons v. Sentry Insurance · filed 2019-12-31(a)

Defendant’s request for declaratory judgment arises out of the same dispute as Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The Court thus has subject- matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) makes supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim turn on its relation to the original claim, without distinguishing compulsory from permissive counterclaims.

United of Omaha Life Insurance Company v. Womack-Rodriguez · filed 2020-05-15(a)

Although, prior to the passing of § 1367, courts distinguished between types of counterclaims when determining whether to exercise ancillary jurisdiction, § 1367 “does not draw a distinction between compulsory and permissive counterclaims.”

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive abuse-of-process counterclaim; that counterclaim needs an independent jurisdictional basis.

Fiore Industries, Inc. v. Ericsson · filed 2020-06-23(a)

In short, the Court agrees with Judge Browning in Walker that abuse-of-process counterclaims are permissive, not mandatory. Therefore, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over this counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory state law counterclaim tied to an issue central to a federal claim.

Harney v. Surexpress Delivery Services, LLC · filed 2020-08-10(a)

Therefore, Surexpress was required to assert its conversion claim as a counterclaim in this action, and the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims sufficiently related to claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

McElroy v. Courtney Ajinca Events LLC · filed 2021-01-12(a)

Defendants’ counterclaims are sufficiently related to Plaintiffs’ copyright claims for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over state law counterclaims that are compulsory because they share operative facts with federal employment claims.

Acevedo v. Teupen North America, Inc. · filed 2021-02-23(a)

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the counterclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is DENIED.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim because it necessarily satisfies the same-case-or-controversy requirement.

Ten Bridges LLC v. Midas Mulligan LLC · filed 2021-02-25(a)

Thus, because the court has found that Madrona’s CPA counterclaim was compulsory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, see supra § III.C.1, that counterclaim must necessarily satisfy the “same case or controversy” test for supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims.

LeBarron v. Interstate Group, LLC · filed 2021-03-26(a)

The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to state law counterclaims sharing the underlying facts of the original claims, even when the counterclaims add parties.

Silberman v. Premier Beauty and Health LLC · filed 2021-09-22(a)

While Counter-Plaintiffs introduce two new parties to the litigation—Counter-Defendants Salomon and Sarita—the underlying factual allegations remain the same and the claims are closely related to those alleged in the Amended Complaint. ... Therefore, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim when resolving it substantially overlaps with the factual inquiry into defenses to the original claims.

DAVIS v. FOX & ROACH TRIDENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP · filed 2022-07-14(a)

Even if the counterclaim was merely permissive, I would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. ... This independent ground may be provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which specifies that a district court has supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are “so closely related to [the plaintiff’s claims] that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Here, resolution of Fox & Roach’s counterclaim against Davis requires much of the same factual inquiry as does an assessment of Fox & Roach’s defenses against Davis’ claims for backpay and frontpay damages.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim when it shares a common nucleus of operative fact with claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

RN Wellness LLC v. Essentials Hero LLC · filed 2022-11-22(a)

Even if Defendant didn’t bring a counterclaim for breach of contract, the Defendant would still be entitled, at this point, to assert that the information was not secret based on the prior transaction. Therefore, a common nucleus of operative facts exists.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive defamation counterclaim arising from statements about the same employment conditions underlying federal discrimination claims.

Davis v. Dawgs of St. John Inc., d/b/a Sun Dog Cafe · filed 2022-12-16(a)

Applying the reasoning of our sister Third Circuit court, the Court finds that it has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Defendants’ defamation claim in Count II of their Counterclaim.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim.

Amaru Entertainment Inc v. Heritage Capital Corporation · filed 2023-05-19

Here, the Court finds that Brent’s counterclaim is compulsory and therefore subject to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim that arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim.

Incident Catering Services LLC v. Nance · filed 2023-06-26(a)

Based on its review of the record, the Court finds that Nance’s counterclaim against Lackey satisfies the logical relationship test and is therefore a compulsory counterclaim, such that the Court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim that is logically connected to the original claim.

Saravia v. Hunter · filed 2023-09-15(a)

As applied to counterclaims, “a compulsory counterclaim falls within the supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts, while a permissive counterclaim requires an independent jurisdictional basis.” ... The Court agrees with the Defendant that the events are logically connected such that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim that does not arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact as the original claim.

Houweling v. Miltner-Vaitys · filed 2023-10-27(a)

The Court concludes it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s First Amended Counterclaim because it does not arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact as does Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Section 1367(a) requires a permissive counterclaim to share a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim under the court’s original jurisdiction.

Cassone v. Black · filed 2024-05-07(a)

For similar reasons to its Rule 13 analysis, the Court finds that the claims are not sufficiently related to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising from the same subject matter as a claim already before the court.

DJCBP Corporation v. City of Baldwin Park · filed 2024-05-28(a)

Because the City’s counterclaims arise out of the DA, which is the subject matter of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the Court agrees that they are compulsory and are thus subject to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim arising from the same contractual relationship and events as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Block Mining Inc v. Hosting Source LLC · filed 2024-06-14(a)

The court has little trouble concluding that Hosting Source’s breach of contract counterclaim shares a common nucleus of operative facts with Block Mining’s claims, such that they form the same case or controversy sufficient to establish supplemental jurisdiction. All claims arise out of the same contractual relationship and the same series of events that caused the relationship to fall apart.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Doresca v. Onewest Bank, FSB · filed 2024-06-14(a)

PHH’s compulsory counterclaim also satisfies the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims related to claims already within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

DJCBP Corporation v. City of Baldwin Park · filed 2024-06-24(a)

Because Willoughby’s counterclaims relate to the commercial cannabis license—the subject matter of plaintiffs’ fraud claim—the Court agrees that they are compulsory and are thus subject to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim when it shares a material factual issue with claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Ewing v. Freedom Forever, LLC · filed 2024-08-21(a)

Plaintiff, however, conveniently ignores an obvious factual connection between his TCPA/CIPA claims and Defendant’s counterclaims—one that renders them sufficiently related to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim.

Cinar v. R&G Brenner Income Tax, LLC · filed 2024-09-18(a)

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaims, as they arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact” with plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a civil assault counterclaim arising from the same incident as the claims already before the court.

DIAMOND v. ODEDERE · filed 2024-12-09(a)

Accordingly, the Court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to allow Defendant to bring his counterclaim of civil damages for an alleged assault along with Plaintiff’s civil damages claim for battery. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims that form part of the same case or controversy as the original claim.

Hansen Reynolds LLC v. Blazer · filed 2025-03-05(a)

First, as Blazer contends, his counterclaims are compulsory under Rule 13(a) and, as such, are within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing federal claim.

Mundia v. Premier Luxury Realty LLC · filed 2025-09-10(a)

If a counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) because it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s federal claim, it necessarily qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 because it arises from the same common nucleus of operative fact as the opposing federal claim and therefore is part of “the same case or controversy.”