28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when hearing it could let a plaintiff evade California’s requirements for high-frequency litigants.

Brooke v. HC Dana Point Hotel LLC · filed 2022-12-19(c)(4)

And the Ninth Circuit has found “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) when a plaintiff would be allowed to circumvent and render ineffectual California’s “procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high-frequency litigants” by filing an Unruh Act claim in federal court and invoking the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court therefore orders Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her Unruh Act claim based on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) allows a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim at an early stage when retaining it would undermine California’s litigation reforms and federal-state comity.

Gougis v. Beigelman · filed 2022-12-20(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim early in an ADA case to protect federal-state comity interests.

Garcia v. Levaton · filed 2022-12-23(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice his Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) may support declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim early in an ADA case to protect federal-state comity.

Delapaz v. Lakin · filed 2023-01-19(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim early in an ADA case to protect federal-state comity interests.

United African Asian Abilities Club On Behalf Of Itself And Its Members v. Lee · filed 2023-01-20(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice their Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect state-federal comity.

Hernandez v. Gardenhire · filed 2023-01-23(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice his Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) does not make joint federal and state consumer protection enforcement an exceptional circumstance warranting refusal of supplemental jurisdiction merely because the federal agency cannot seek monetary relief.

Federal Trade Commission v. Roomster Corp. · filed 2023-02-01(c)(4)

Defendants suggest that, even if the FTC claims survive, I should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims for exceptional circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); specifically, because the FTC should not be able to “bootstrap” Supreme Court precedent forbidding the FTC from seeking monetary relief. (Mot. to Dismiss at 20 n.3). This makes no sense because, as previously discussed, the FTC says it is not seeking monetary relief. And there is nothing improper about bringing an enforcement action with states whose own consumer protection statutes has been violated by allegedly unlawful conduct. There is nothing exceptional about these circumstances. This sort of thing happens all the time.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an early-stage Unruh Act claim when retaining it would threaten federal-state comity by circumventing California’s litigation reforms.

Hernandez v. Joe Baker Building Company of Glendale · filed 2023-02-02(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-based Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect comity interests arising from evasion of California’s litigation reforms.

Cuevas v. Stonehill · filed 2023-02-03(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when the claim presents extraordinary circumstances tied to California’s accessibility litigation requirements.

Whitaker v. Shahzad, Inc. · filed 2023-02-03(c)(4)

As the Ninth Circuit recognized, this situation presents “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4). ... This case presents the same considerations that were present in Quach and numerous similar cases in other California federal courts. Accordingly, the Court now ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause as to why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim in the complaint in this case.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when filing an ADA-based Unruh Act claim in federal court evades California’s restrictions and economy, convenience, comity, and fairness favor declining jurisdiction.

Sepulveda v. Guo · filed 2023-03-13(c)(4)

Here, Plaintiff’s case reflects the “exceptional circumstance” defined in Arroyo: by filing an ADA-based Unruh Act claim and related state claims in federal court, he has evaded the “critical limitations” on damages under the Unruh Act. ... Therefore, the Court finds that this case presents an exceptional circumstance under 1367(c)(4), and that the values of economy, convenience, comity, and fairness weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state accessibility claims when avoiding California’s procedural requirements creates exceptional circumstances and fairness and comity provide compelling reasons.

Gilbert v. Khinda · filed 2023-03-24(c)(4)

The Court begins with the first part of the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4)—whether the circumstances here are exceptional. ... Moreover, in light of the above discussion of California’s requirements for Unruh Act and Health & Safety Code claims, it would not be fair, nor would comity be served, by allowing these claims to proceed without the state court being able to enforce its policy interests as reflected in its various procedural requirements.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when California’s procedural requirements for high-frequency litigants create exceptional circumstances.

Gastelum v. Blue Diamond Hospitality LLC · filed 2023-06-12(c)(4)

The Court therefore finds that the California legislature’s clear goal of increasing the procedural requirements for bringing Unruh Act claims creates an “exceptional” circumstance in a federal court’s consideration of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a high-frequency ADA litigant’s related Unruh Act claim would evade California’s filing restrictions, creating exceptional circumstances and comity concerns.

Raglin v. Lichuan Pan · filed 2023-06-30(c)(4)

The Court finds Raglin’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). ... Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously discussed, both Raglin and his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Raglin’s Unruh Act claim results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons, including comity concerns from evading state filing restrictions, warrant it.

Valencia v. GNN Investments, LLC · filed 2023-06-30(c)(4)

The Court finds Valencia’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). ... Further, given the “unique configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Valencia’s Unruh Act claim results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when comity interests create exceptional circumstances.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales DIS AIS USA LLC · filed 2023-08-31(c)

Comity interests can create exceptional circumstances that caution against exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because Tennessee’s preference for adjudicating them in state court is an exceptional circumstance.

Parrish v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, The · filed 2023-09-26(c)(4)

Relevant here is the exceptional circumstances provision. ... The Act reserves exclusive original jurisdiction for the state circuit courts over TGTLA claims. ... The Court finds that to decline supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage when retaining it would undermine federal-state comity.

Meggs v. UHG LAX PROP, LLC · filed 2023-10-24(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an early-stage Unruh Act claim when comity concerns provide compelling reasons.

Ventura v. Candles for Life LLC · filed 2023-10-25(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. ... If Plaintiff fails to file a response within 14 days after entry of this Order, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her Unruh Act claim, and the Unruh Act claim will be automatically dismissed without prejudice without further order of the Court.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage when retaining it would threaten state comity interests, subject to an opportunity to show cause.

Brooke v. Hollywood Inn Inc. · filed 2023-10-25(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice her Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) allows a district court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims filed in federal court may circumvent California’s procedural limits on high-frequency litigants.

Walker v. McGuire and McGuire, Inc · filed 2023-10-26(c)(4)

And the Ninth Circuit has found “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) when a plaintiff would be allowed to circumvent and render ineffectual California’s “procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high-frequency litigants” by filing Unruh Act and other state law claims in federal court and invoking the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims based on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when evasion of California’s high-frequency litigant requirements creates exceptional circumstances and fairness and comity favor state court.

Uriarte-Limon v. J Morgan Oil LLC · filed 2023-11-02(c)(4)

The Court finds Uriarte-Limon’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim at an early stage when retaining it would threaten federal-state comity by circumventing California’s litigation reforms.

Garcia v. El Toreo · filed 2023-11-07(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that may circumvent state procedural requirements.

Garcia v. Davila · filed 2023-11-27(c)(4)

And the Ninth Circuit has found “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) when a plaintiff would be allowed to circumvent and render ineffectual California’s “procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high-frequency litigants” by filing Unruh Act and other state law claims in federal court and invoking the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims based on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim at an early stage when retaining it would threaten the comity interests protected by California’s accessibility-litigation reforms.

Luna v. El Rey Mexican Grill Inc · filed 2023-11-30(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when California’s heightened procedural requirements create exceptional circumstances and the relevant fairness and comity concerns favor declining jurisdiction.

Hernandez v. Amidron Energy, LLC · filed 2023-12-04(c)(4)

Here, the Court finds that the California legislature’s clear goal of increasing the procedural requirements for bringing Unruh Act claims creates an “exceptional” circumstance in a federal court’s consideration of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related Unruh Act claim when exceptional comity concerns justify doing so, including at an early stage before the merits have been decided.

Orosco v. Perez · filed 2023-12-07(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. ... If Plaintiff fails to file a response within 14 days after entry of this Order, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim, and the Unruh Act claim will be automatically dismissed without prejudice without further order of the Court.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when uncertainty about the scope of a prior state-court class certification order presents an exceptional circumstance favoring resolution in state court.

Bramblett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2024-03-29(c)(4)

And second, as discussed above, the issue of class certification presents an exceptional circumstance that favors this Court’s declination of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons, including concerns about fairness and comity.

Luna v. E-1 Investments, LLC · filed 2025-03-04(c)(4)

The Court finds Luna’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when hearing it would evade California’s filing restrictions and undermine comity.

Williams v. Catcafe Lounge · filed 2025-03-04(c)(4)

Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously discussed, Williams and/or her counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’s Unruh Act claim results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons, including fairness and comity concerns arising from evasion of state filing restrictions, justify doing so.

Garcia v. Danessi · filed 2025-06-03(c)(4)

The Court finds Garcia’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). ... Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously discussed, Garcia and/or his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s Unruh Act claim results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons, including fairness and comity concerns arising from evasion of state filing restrictions.

Harris v. 851 West Front Enterprise LLC · filed 2025-06-05(c)(4)

The Court finds Harris’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons favor doing so, including when exercising jurisdiction would let a high-frequency litigant evade state filing restrictions.

Taruc v. Auto Collision Group Covina Inc · filed 2025-06-10(c)(4)

The Court finds Taruc’s state law claims unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). ... Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not authorize remand of a case that includes a properly removed federal claim.

SMITH v. WEBSTER · filed 2025-08-29(c)(4)

Plaintiff's argument that there are “exceptional circumstances” that warrant remand under §1367(c)(4) is meritless because (1) as the magistrate judge explained, $1367(c) does not authorize the Court to remand a case to state court where the case includes a properly removed federal claim, and (2) the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, does not have CM/ECF filing access, and lives 60 miles from the courthouse has no bearing on whether the case should proceed in this Court.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction based solely on a routine issue of state law.

Enfield · filed 2026-03-11(c)(4)

Defendant identifies no “exceptional circumstances” other than its argument that Plaintiffs’ OTCA notices were deficient. The Court finds no persuasive argument of exceptional circumstances or discussion of the relevant principles in Defendant’s motion, which rests on a routine issue of state law.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not treat the routine joinder of a § 1983 claim with a state law claim arising from the same facts as an exceptional circumstance for declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park · filed 1995-02-22(c)(4)

We initially note that § 1983 actions are routinely joined with state law claims arising out of the same facts. ... In that sense, then, the present action is anything but "exceptional." To the extent that the Village is merely rehashing its earlier arguments under a different rubric, they are rejected for the reasons discussed above.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to pendent-party as well as pendent-claim matters, so a party need not face a remaining federal claim for a related state-law claim to remain potentially within federal jurisdiction.

Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 1992-03-09(a)

Because that provision embraces pendent-party as well as pendent-claim jurisdiction, it is not necessarily fatal to plaintiffs' state law claims that some of the defendants may no longer be subject to any federal claim.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims against additional parties in an FTCA action commenced on or after December 1, 1990, while its diversity exception applies when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Douglas C. Wood Diane L. Wood v. United States of America, & Third Party v. Ralph M. Parsons Aar Associates, Incorporate · filed 1992-03-27(a), (b)

Since commencement of this action, Congress has passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650. The Judicial Improvements Act effectively overrules Finley, as it provides that district courts have "supplemental jurisdiction" over "all other claims that are so related ... that they form part of the same case or controversy," including claims involving "the joinder or intervention of additional parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This provision does not apply where original jurisdiction is based solely on the diversity of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Since this case involves the FTCA, pendent party jurisdiction would have attached over AAR in the federal court had this action commenced on or after December 1, 1990, when the Judicial Improvements Act became effective.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to related claims involving additional parties.

Leith v. Lufthansa German Airlines · filed 1992-05-22(a)

The statute makes clear that not only pendent claims (same parties, related claim), but also pendent parties (different parties, related claims), are meant to be included.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims involving additional parties, despite prior limits on pendent-party jurisdiction.

Sollars v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1992-06-05(a)

Because this new law redefines the contours of “pendent” and “ancillary” jurisdiction, the cases cited by Defendants prohibiting jurisdiction over “pendent parties” are inapplicable.

Section 1367(a) authorizes pendent party jurisdiction over related claims against additional defendants in Federal Tort Claims Act cases.

Zambrana v. United States · filed 1992-07-07(a)

The Act confers authority upon federal courts to exercise “pendent party” jurisdiction in Federal Tort Claims Act cases such as Finley.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a claim against an additional party when it forms part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

United States v. Tazzioli Construction Co. · filed 1992-08-17(a)

In sum, CBR’s claim against Tazzioli and Washington forms part of the same case or controversy as between CBR and Pickus and National. Accordingly, the court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over CBR’s claim against Washington in Count II of the second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related maritime law claims, including claims involving additional parties, when the court has original federal question jurisdiction.

Broussard v. John E. Graham & Sons · filed 1992-09-09(a)

Since the Court finds it has federal question jurisdiction based on the claim brought under the OCSLA, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over all pendant maritime law claims including those that involve additional parties.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state claims against an additional party when they share a common nucleus of fact with the federal claims.

First Interregional Equity Corp. v. Haughton · filed 1992-10-28(a)

Here, to the extent that the state claims do derive from a common nucleus of fact, it will be fair and convenient to all parties to include Gateway.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional defendants when they form part of the same Article III case or controversy as a claim within original jurisdiction.

Zakutansky v. Bionetics Corp. · filed 1992-11-05(a)

In that respect, what was formerly the problematic concept of “pendent party jurisdiction” has now been supplanted by the “supplemental jurisdiction” enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, under which this Court is granted such jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” That is certainly an apt description of both Counts III and IV, thus confirming the appropriateness of retaining those claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims against a party even after all federal claims against that party are dismissed, when federal claims remain against other defendants.

Klein v. Goetzmann · filed 1993-01-25(a)

Thus, pursuant to section 1367, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Touche as to these common law claims despite the fact that the court has dismissed all of the federal claims alleged against Touche.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to impleaded insurer claims for indemnity and a duty to defend when they arise from the same facts as the underlying federal claim.

LaSalle National Trust, N.A. v. Schaffner · filed 1993-03-24(a)

However, Chieagoland’s claim against Insurers seeks indemnity for liability arising from the same facts as the underlying complaint. Chicago-land’s duty to defend claim is based on the complaint, an allegation of the facts in the underlying case. Therefore, Chieagoland’s claims “form part of the same case or controversy” for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant seeking to intervene under Rule 24 when the court’s original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Lumber Insurance v. Allen · filed 1993-04-02(b)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute. Title 28 U.S.C. §1367, changed this practice in cases where the primary basis for jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship of the parties. ... Because there is no diversity of citizenship between Lumber and the Moores, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to permit them to intervene as defendants.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by nondiverse persons proposed to join as plaintiffs under Rule 19 in diversity cases.

Patricia M. Krueger, and American States Insurance Company, Intervening v. Cartwright · filed 1993-06-24(b)

This Act, otherwise known as the “supplemental jurisdiction” statute, authorizes the assertion of federal jurisdiction over additional claims and parties, but specifically prohibits the exercise of that jurisdiction in diversity cases over non-diverse persons joined to the action under Rule 19.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims arising from the same case or controversy as a claim within original jurisdiction, without a separate amount-in-controversy requirement.

Allendale Mutual Insurance v. Triple-S Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-09-14(a)

I find that the third-party claims form part of the same case or controversy raised by the original lawsuit in this case, and therefore it is proper for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. As a result, there is no need for the Court to reach Securitec’s arguments about why Triple-S cannot meet the amount in controversy requirement. In this situation, there is none.

In a diversity case, § 1367(b) excludes supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against persons joined under Rule 19.

Lederman v. Marriott Corp. · filed 1993-10-15(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), however, in cases where jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, supplemental jurisdiction is inapplicable to claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 (which governs additions of further parties to a complaint).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of a plaintiff needed under Rule 19 when hearing those claims would conflict with the diversity requirements of § 1332.

Paglin v. Saztec International, Inc. · filed 1993-10-28(b)

However, § 1367 prevents a Court ... from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff who is a necessary party under Rule 19 when exercising such jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements under § 1332.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive intervenor’s claim unless it forms part of the same Article III case or controversy as the action supporting original jurisdiction.

Yorkshire Partnership, Ltd. v. Pacific Capital Partners · filed 1993-11-02(a)

As to permissive intervention, ... 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) does not grant federal district courts supplemental jurisdiction over permissive intervenors’ claims because such claims do not “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution” ... with the main action which provides the basis for the Court’s original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s intervention in an action based solely on diversity when the intervenor’s claim does not satisfy diversity requirements.

Deere & Co. v. Diamond Wood Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-11-03(b)

In light of § 1367(b), the Court finds that it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the complaint in intervention.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity action over an original plaintiff’s claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant joined under Rule 14, even when the plaintiff impleads that party while defending a counterclaim.

Guaranteed Systems, Inc. v. American National Can Co. · filed 1994-01-27(b)

The terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) prohibit the court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s third-party claim. Guaranteed Systems is clearly a plaintiff in a diversity suit asserting a claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant made a party under Rule 14.

Section 1367(a) gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims against an additional party when they are so related to claims within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.

Perry v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1994-03-01(a)

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) gives district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy” including “claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” The plaintiffs’ claims against the Red Cross and St. Francis Hospital are so related as to be part of the same case.

Section 1367(b) excludes from supplemental jurisdiction a party who voluntarily intervenes in a diversity action to assert its own affirmative claims as an intervening plaintiff.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Logan Group, Inc. · filed 1994-03-30(b)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that an intervening “plaintiff’ within the terms of section 1367(b) is a party who ... voluntarily chooses to intervene in an ongoing federal action to assert its own affirmative claims.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over claims of a person joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19 when that jurisdiction would be inconsistent with diversity requirements.

Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas · filed 1994-03-31(b)

Moreover, if Nike had filed this suit as the sole plaintiff, it could not have relied on the district court's supplemental jurisdiction to add NIL and NIL's claims. Prior to the assignment, NIL was an indispensable party, see Harrell & Sumner Contracting v. Peabody Peterson, 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir.1977) (joint obligees are indispensable parties to action for enforcement of that obligation), whose presence, as we have just demonstrated, would have defeated diversity. 7 Supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used to create jurisdiction over an action that does not satisfy the requirements of the diversity statute.

Section 1367(a) permits a federal court to hear a related state tort claim despite a state statute assigning exclusive jurisdiction to state courts, once the state has waived sovereign immunity.

Luncsford v. Nix · filed 1994-04-08(a)

Therefore, this state tort action may be maintained under the supplemental jurisdiction powers of this court. Although the federal district court would not have original jurisdiction to hear Iowa State Tort Claims Act eases, it is clear that once the State has created a statute limiting its sovereign immunity it cannot limit the federal court’s power to hear this case.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 in a diversity action.

6247 Atlas Corp. v. Marine Insurance · filed 1994-04-26(b)

Thus, as 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) bars the Defendants from joining the absent memohold-ers as party-plaintiffs under Rule 19(a), it would appear that the Court need not address, at this time, the second level of inquiry under Rule 19(b) — as to whether the absent parties are indispensable — in the absence of a formal motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving additional parties when they form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Del Valle v. Gobierno De La Capital · filed 1994-06-23(a)

Even if the FSIA did not affirmatively grant jurisdiction over pendant-parties, we could exercise such jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the claims against Monroig and El Fénix form part of the same ease or controversy as the claims against Lagoven.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim against an individual when the same alleged conduct supports a related federal claim against the individual’s employer, even though no federal claim remains against the individual.

Yeager v. Norwest Multifamily, Inc. · filed 1994-09-27(a)

Although MeSween’s alleged conduct did not give the plaintiff a federal claim against him individually, it gave rise to a federal claim against his employer which is now before the court. Jurisdiction exists over McSween on the state law claim against him, since it is so related as to form a part of the same ease or controversy as the plaintiffs Title VII claim against Crop Hail Management, and the court will not decline to exercise it.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims against an additional defendant even when that defendant faces no viable federal claim.

Fisher v. Somerville School District · filed 1995-01-09(a)

It is clear from the mere recitation of the statute that because one set of events gave rise to all of Susan Fisher’s claims, both those against her employer and those against Vozella, the state law claims against Vozella, including defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, may be adjudicated in this action even if Vozella violated no federal law.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs as well as defendants.

Xuncax v. Gramajo · filed 1995-04-12(a)

§ 1367 on its face contains no distinction between defendants and plaintiffs for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party defendant, whether as to the claims or as an additional party.

McClenahan v. Paradise Cruises, Ltd. · filed 1995-05-19(a)

At minimum, there is supplemental jurisdiction over third-party defendant SNUBA, either as to the claims or as a supplemental party.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a new cause of action and a new party added to a case removed to federal court.

Johnson v. State · filed 1995-08-11(a)

Moreover, while case law precluded the use of supplemental jurisdiction as a basis to add parties to an action (see, Finley v United States, 490 US 545), such case law was expressly overruled by Congress in subdivision (a) of 28 USC § 1367. It is thus apparently permissible to amend a complaint removed to Federal court to add both a new cause of action and a new party, even when the jurisdiction over the new party is based on supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over related common law claims against a party even when no federal claim is asserted against that party.

Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co. · filed 1995-09-22(a)

In 1990, however, Congress granted the district courts supplemental jurisdiction over common law claims against parties, even if no federal claim is asserted against them, as long as they are related to claims over which the court has jurisdiction.

In diversity cases, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an original plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse third party impleaded under Rule 14, even when the plaintiff is defending a counterclaim.

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Aldridge · filed 1995-09-22(b)

Although it is true that Chase functions as a defending party on the counterclaim, Chase remains the original plaintiff subject to the jurisdictional limitations of § 1367(b).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party claim arising from the same events as the federal claim when the claims would ordinarily be tried together.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc. · filed 1995-12-08(a)

We believe that the third party complaint satisfies the prerequisites 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, and 1337 confer subject matter jurisdiction over MCI's cl action and Teleconcepts' third-party action both arise out of the fraudulent activity which purportedly resulted in exorbitant long distance charges. Mo and prudent use of judicial resources dictate that these claims be tried in proceeding. Accordingly, the third-party action meets the test for suppleme jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) supports supplemental jurisdiction over another plaintiff’s state law claims when the claims share sufficiently common operative facts with a federal claim.

Choroszy v. Wentworth Institute of Technology · filed 1996-01-22(a)

Ordinarily, supplemental jurisdiction would suffice to keep Hudgens in federal court, if his claim was so related to Choroszy’s “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Nonetheless, the collection of operative facts are sufficiently common for the purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a) that, when coupled with the interest in judicial economy, the Court concludes it has an adequate basis for jurisdiction over Hud-gens’ state law claims and will resolve the motions presented.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over an additional party when no claim is asserted against that party.

Hammond v. Thomas Clayton, Bill Clayton and Jim Clayton, Surviving Heirs of Velma A. Clayton, Deceased · filed 1996-05-08(a)

In this case, Hammond has not even attempted to present a claim against the Claytons. The district court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what is, in essence, a nonexistent claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim against an additional party when the claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Board of Education of Community High School District No. 218 v. Illinois State Board of Education · filed 1996-10-07(a)

Inasmuch as this court has clear jurisdiction under the IDEA to review the administrative order entered against the School District, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), it need only determine whether the School District’s state claim against the DMHDD is so closely related to its federal claim that it may be said to derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and to constitute part of the same case or controversy under Article III. ... The court concludes, then, that it has supplemental jurisdiction over the School District’s claim for an order requiring the DMHDD to pay for J.B.’s residential care.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against additional defendants when those claims and the federal claims share a common nucleus of operative fact.

Sickinger v. Mega Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-12-04(a)

The issues and facts of this case are intertwined around the same, short time frame and a core group of supervisors engaged in conduct which the Plaintiff claims is discriminatory and harassing as well as violative of state law. Therefore, the Court may properly continue to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claims and the individual defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to claims against additional parties, but courts still apply prudential considerations when deciding whether to exercise it.

Golas v. Homeview, Inc. · filed 1997-02-10(a)

The codification of the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine in 1990, which makes clear that such jurisdiction includes the joinder of additional parties, 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), does not change the prudential analysis.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims against defendants who face no federal claim when a federal claim remains against another defendant.

Lentz v. Mason · filed 1997-04-14(a)

Since the amendment, therefore, it is clear that this court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving defendants against whom no federal cause of action is stated, as long as a federal cause of action is stated against another defendant, and the state law claims satisfy the “same case or controversy” requirement of Article III.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over pendent parties as well as pendent claims.

Duhaime v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1997-12-31(a)

Additionally, the court may take jurisdiction over pendent parties as well as pendent claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (“Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim against an additional party.

Peitrowski v. ACIA · filed 1999-09-29(a)

Nevertheless, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim against ACIA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), under what formerly would have been termed the Court's “pendent party” jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim against another party when it arises from the same set of facts as an anchoring federal question claim.

Kirschner v. Klemons · filed 2000-09-26(a)

We have previously observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) responds to the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) and thereby makes pendent party jurisdiction possible where the claim in question arises out of the same set of facts that give rise to an anchoring federal question claim against another party.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against additional parties when federal claims remain against other defendants and all claims arise from the same nucleus of operative fact.

Gagliardi v. Universal Outdoor Holdings, Inc. · filed 2001-04-02(a)

In this case, however, federal law claims remain against the three other defendants. Furthermore, the state law claims against Universal Holdings and Eller Corp. are identical to those against the other three defendants. As such, the inclusion of Universal Holdings and Eller Corp. will probably not place any new legal issues before the court. Finally, all of the charges involve the same nucleus of operative fact. Trying them together would further the interests of judicial efficiency and economy. The court therefore retains pendant party jurisdiction over the state law claims against Universal Holdings and Eller Corp.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties when those claims form part of the same case or controversy as a federal claim.

Sullivan v. Metro-North Railroad · filed 2002-01-08(a)

Therefore, supplemental jurisdiction can be exercised over the Town Defendants if the requirements of § 1367(a) are met, namely that the claims form part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a claim against an additional party when that claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction against another party.

First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Brickellbush, Inc. · filed 2002-07-29(a)

Here, plaintiffs' fraudulent conveyance claims against Ahmed arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with their substantive RICO claim against Sohrab in Count Five of the amended complaint and thus are subject to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties in a federal-question case when those claims form part of the same case and controversy.

Torres v. Hospital Ryder Memorial, Inc. · filed 2004-03-17(a)

Since the instant case is not a diversity claim but a federal question under 28 U.S.C.A. 1331, the court may exercise jurisdiction over parties even though that party was not subject to the federal claim, if the claims form part of the same case and controversy.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a party with no surviving federal claim when the state claim forms part of the same case or controversy as a federal claim against another party, subject to the exceptions in § 1367(c).

United States Fire Insurance v. United Limousine Service, Inc. · filed 2004-07-28(a)

Thus, I am required to hear Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim against the Moving Defendants if (1) under § 1367(a) that claim is part of the same case or controversy as the RICO claims against the non-moving defendants, and (2) none of the § 1367(c) criteria are present.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against an additional party when they arise from the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Green Hills (USA), L.L.C. v. Aaron Streit, Inc. · filed 2005-03-23(a)

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by federal courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This case raises the particular question whether “pendent-party jurisdiction” obtains over plaintiffs claims against CEI given the lack of any independent basis of federal jurisdiction for those claims. ... Section 1367 answers this question in the affirmative.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against parties who face no federal claim when those claims form part of the same case or controversy as a remaining federal claim against another party.

Millan v. San Pablo · filed 2005-09-08(a)

Since the instant case is not a diversity claim but a federal question arising under 28 U.S.C.A. 1331, the court must exercise jurisdiction over parties even though said parties were not subject to the federal claim when said parties’ claims form part of the same case and controversy and there exists at least one party with a federal claim remaining.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against additional parties when those claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim.

Doe v. Liberatore · filed 2007-03-19(a)

Consequently, this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims against the Diocesan Defendants and Brother Antonucci so long as these claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with Plaintiffs federal law claim against Liberatore such that Plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties when those claims share a common nucleus of facts with federal claims against other parties.

Fezzani v. BEAR, STEARNS & COMPANY INC. · filed 2008-09-23(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a court can exercise pendent-party jurisdiction “where the claim in question arises out of the same set of facts that give rise to an anchoring federal question claim against another party.” ... Here, the state-law claims against the Wolfson Defendants arise out of the same underlying fraudulent scheme that Plaintiffs alleged against all the Defendants. Even though the claims against the Wolfson Defendants stem from their alleged conduct as Baron investors, rather than as brokers or bankers, the underlying allegations share a common nucleus of facts. Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction over the state-law claims and will rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ assertions.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against non-diverse parties.

Godin v. Schencks · filed 2010-12-22(a)

That § 1367(a) confers on federal courts jurisdiction over state-law claims against non-diverse parties--often termed "pendent party jurisdiction"--is particularly clear in light of that statute's origins.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim against a party with no surviving federal claim when that claim shares a common nucleus of operative facts with a federal claim against another party.

Spiker v. Allegheny County Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2013-01-30(a)

This means the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims brought against Kelly although all federal law claims will be dismissed against him because the federal law claims against Whit-taker and the state law claims against Kelly arise from a common nucleus of operative facts, i.e., Spiker's July 1, 2009 and July 2, 2009 arrests and subsequent detention.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against parties with no remaining federal claims when those claims arise from the same facts as federal claims pending against other parties.

Jones v. Nickens · filed 2013-08-20(a)

It is proper for the Court, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims against the Southampton Hospital defendants, the Stony Brook Hospital defendants, the Hollywood Nursery defendants, Rubin, Scriven, West and Grossman, even though there are no remaining federal claims against any of them, because the Court shall exercise pendent party jurisdiction when the claims against additional parties arise out of the same set of facts as the federal claims in a particular case.

Section 1367(a) does not sustain pendent-party jurisdiction over state-law defendants once the claims against the defendant supporting federal jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Trivedi v. BD 112A LLC · filed 2020-02-13(a)

However, given the claims against the pendent party defendant (Bruck) have been dismissed, this Court no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction over the landlord defendants and Northern.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against an additional party when those claims arise from the same operative facts as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Berry v. Dunn · filed 2021-02-05(a)

However, the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction over claims against “pendent parties” like Dunn where, as here, the claims against him arise from the same set of operative facts as the claims over which the Court does possess subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff’s state-law claims despite that plaintiff’s lack of timely federal claims when the state claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with other plaintiffs’ federal claims.

Shibetti v. Lgmaloney LLC · filed 2022-01-11(a)

Notwithstanding that Ruiz has no timely FLSA claims, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his NYLL claims. This is because the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 continues the pre-statutory principle of pendent party jurisdiction. ... That principle allows the Court to assert jurisdiction as to a plaintiff’s claim over which it would not otherwise have original jurisdiction as long as it has original jurisdiction over other plaintiffs’ federal claims arising from the same nucleus of operative fact.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against one defendant when they arise from the same facts as federal claims against another defendant.

Batista-Acevedo v. Presbyterian Community Hospital, Inc · filed 2023-10-23(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Courts may exercise “pendent party jurisdiction” to exercise supplemental jurisdiction between federal claims brought against one defendant, and state claims brought against another defendant, when they arise out of the same facts.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving additional parties when they share a common nucleus of operative facts with claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Lessard v. City of Allen Park · filed 2003-02-25(a)

In 1990, Congress drafted 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the supplemental jurisdiction statute, to include pendent party jurisdiction. ... Since the declaratory judgment actions all arise out of the 2000 rainstorms, they arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts as the state law claims brought by the basement flooding plaintiffs.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations when a court dismisses a supplemental claim under § 1367(c) so it can be refiled in state court, but a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) does not trigger that tolling.

Parrish v. HBO & Co. · filed 1999-08-11(d)

Rather, the Court concludes that, for § 1367(d) to be applicable, the supplemental claim brought pursuant to § 1367(a) must have been dismissed by the court pursuant to § 1367(c).

Section 1367(d) does not toll claims dismissed from a diversity action when the plaintiff did not invoke supplemental jurisdiction and the federal court did not decline it.

Long v. Forty Niners Football Co. · filed 2019-03-26(d)

This statute has no application here. Long filed a diversity suit in federal court. He did not appeal to the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction, nor did the federal court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of his claims.

Section 1367(c) gives a district court no discretion to adjudicate state-law claims when lack of Article III standing leaves it without subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims.

Washington Election Integrity Coalition United v. Hall · filed 2022-09-30(c)

Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims due to their lack of Article III standing, it has no discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining claims.

Section 1367(d) does not extend the limitations period for state law claims dismissed by a federal court for failure to comply with its orders.

Drake v. Consumers County Mutual Insurance, and Travelers Indemnity Company · filed 2015-05-08(d)

Section 1367(d) does not, on its face, clearly extend state law limitations periods that would otherwise bar claims that have been dismissed by a federal court for failure to comply with the federal court’s orders.

Section 1367(d) gives a plaintiff at least 30 days after dismissal of a supplemental state-law claim to file it in state court, if the claim was timely when originally filed.

Varnell v. Dora Consolidated School District · filed 2014-07-01(d)

In that event, § 1367(d) provides: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” Thus, Plaintiff has at least 30 days after dismissal of the state-law claims to bring suit in state court (assuming that the claim was originally timely filed).

Section 1367(d) gives a claimant thirty days after federal dismissal to file a supplemental claim in state court, unless state law allows a longer tolling period.

Sanders v. SCDC · filed 2011-04-19(d)

Additionally, Sanders failed to timely file after the District Court dismissed his initial complaint on February 11, 2004. In fact, he did not file his second state complaint until almost eighteen months after the District Court dismissed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1990) (noting the statute of limitations for a claim asserted under this section is tolled for thirty days after it is dismissed by the federal courts unless state law provides for a longer tolling period). Accordingly, Sanders's action under the Act was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1367(d) tolls a state limitations period while a claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Ervans v. The City of Venice, Florida · filed 2015-07-10(d)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012) "requires state statutes of limitation to be tolled for the period during which a . . . cause of action is pending in federal court as well as 30 days after the claim is dismissed." Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 830 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Because the face of the complaint does not include the date his federal action was dismissed, "it is impossible to determine from the four corners of the instant complaint the length of time during which the matter was tolled by reason of the fact that the matter was pending in federal court." Id. at 831.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law claims brought in federal court under supplemental jurisdiction, allowing a timely state court filing after those claims are dismissed.

Roden v. Wright · filed 1992-12-04(d)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which provides for a tolling of the limitations period in a case such as this, Roden's filing in the state court was timely.

Section 1367(d) tolling alleged in a complaint can defeat a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.

Black v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 1995-04-24(d)

Because appellant’s complaint alleged a tolling of the statute of limitations based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (Supp.1992), the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations claim should have been denied.

Section 1367(d) preserves the benefit of a longer state savings period when a supplemental claim is voluntarily dismissed in federal court.

Naragon v. Dayton Power & Light Co. · filed 1996-07-13(d)

If Plaintiff moved for dismissal under Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) and the dismissal were granted, Plaintiff would still have the benefit of § 2305.19 by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) which provides: ... In this case, of course, Ohio provides a one-year tolling period. Thus this statute, in comity to Ohio public policy, protects Plaintiffs savings statute rights.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a state claim asserted in federal court even if that court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim.

Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc. · filed 1996-12-17(d)

The federal court need not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim for the statute of limitations to be tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state law claims while they are pending in federal court.

Gainor v. Douglas County, Georgia · filed 1998-09-30(d)

Section 1367(d) is applicable in this case. As such, plaintiffs state law claims are not barred by Georgia’s applicable statute of limitations, as the limitation period has been tolled while those claims have been pending before this Court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants dismissed from federal court on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota · filed 2000-01-11(d)

We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state claims through a federal appeal and for thirty days after the appeal ends, unless state law provides a longer period.

Harter v. Vernon · filed 2000-07-18(d)

Thus because, in the case before us, the federal court gained supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims not due to diversity, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(d) applies and the limitations period for plaintiffs’ supplemental claims was tolled for 30 days after the action was dismissed because “a voluntary dismissal under the Federal Rules in a nondiversity case in federal court does not toll the statute of limitations or invoke a savings provision.”

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period on state-law claims while they are pending in federal court when the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Neubert v. Bolt · filed 2001-09-07(d)

Both federal law and Texas law provide for suspension of the limitations period on state-law claims during the pendency of the action in federal court when the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state claims refiled after federal dismissal even when the federal court dismissed those claims without expressly declining supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (c).

Hanson v. State of Maine · filed 2001-10-23(d)

As the commentator notes, the tolling provision in the federal statute could be subject to different interpretations due to its wording. This factor, plus the clear intent of the plaintiff to refile in state court at the time the federal complaint was dismissed, leads this court to conclude that a technical interpretation of the statute results in an injustice. Granting the State’s motion to dismiss would be a harsh result for a possible misreading of antbiguous federal statutory language. Denying the motion as to the state claims avoids this harsh result without serious damage to either state or federal law.

Section 1367(d) does not toll claims against parties who were not named in the federal lawsuit.

Estate of Fennell Ex Rel. Fennell v. Stephenson · filed 2001-11-09(d)

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not toll claims against the Highway Patrol, which was never named as a party in the original federal complaint.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

Lynn v. City of Jackson · filed 2001-11-14(d)

We agree with the City and the Court of Appeals that neither the federal statute nor Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-115 tolls the GTLA statute of limitations.

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal; any time remaining when the federal action was filed then resumes running.

Bonifield v. County of Nevada · filed 2001-12-07(d)

In sum, section 1367(d) operated to toll the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ state claims from June 28, 1997, when plaintiffs filed their federal lawsuit, through March 18, 2000, the 30th day after the federal action was dismissed. Only then did the remaining 77 days left on the statute of limitations start to run.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

Lynn v. City of Jackson · filed 2001-12-20(d)

The plaintiffs also argue that the supplemental jurisdiction section of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of the action in federal court and for thirty days following dismissal by the federal court. ... We agree with the City and the Court of Appeals that neither the federal statute nor Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-115 tolls the GTLA statute of limitations.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Adler v. Pataki · filed 2002-05-10(d)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations "is tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” Since Plaintiff commenced this action within the four-month limitation period for Article 78 claims, he will still have an opportunity to pursue a remedy under Article 78 in state court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for thirty days after a supplemental state claim is dismissed in federal court, permitting timely filing in state court.

Dahl v. Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc. · filed 2003-04-16(d)

When the federal district court dismissed her complaint, the two-year statute of limitations period under the private-sector act did not lapse because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) operated to toll the matter for thirty days so that she could timely file in state court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, including when the case was removed from state court.

Oleski v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 2003-04-23(d)

Under Section 1367(d) the period of limitations was tolled from the July 2, 1998 removal to federal district court until the October 21, 1999 dismissal plus thirty days.

Section 1367(d) does not preserve a state claim filed in state court nearly two years after the federal lawsuit was dismissed.

Thompson v. Keith Wilson, Ted Como, Becky Campbell and Michelle Wilder · filed 2004-01-26(d)

While we do not believe that the federal or state tolling statutes would apply to these facts, plaintiff did not refile in state court until nearly two years after his federal lawsuit was dismissed. Thus, his action is barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §1367 and Tenn. Code Ann. §28-1-115.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court and allows at least 30 days after dismissal to refile the claim.

Meng v. Schwartz · filed 2004-02-06(d)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiffs’ action is not time-barred because actions dismissed pursuant to the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), will not be barred by a statute of limitations because of time lost in federal court. The statute expressly tolls the statute of limitations while the claim is pending and provides a period of at least 30 days, more if allowed by state law, after dismissal in which the claim may be refiled in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period while a qualifying claim is pending in federal court, so the federal dismissal date matters when deciding whether a later state action is timely.

Simon v. Celebration Co. · filed 2004-06-04(d)

Since the instant complaint fails to set forth with particularity the date when the matter was dismissed from federal court, it is impossible to determine from the four corners of the instant complaint the length of time during which the matter was tolled by reason of the fact that the matter was pending in federal court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations periods for supplemental state law claims against a municipality and its officers.

Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Commission · filed 2005-04-25(d)

Plaintiffs state law claims are brought against a municipality and its officers. Thus, § 1367(d) lawfully tolls the applicable statutes of limitation periods.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for pendent state-law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer period.

Tommy Dukes v. State of Georgia · filed 2006-12-28(d)

Furthermore, under § 1367, the statute of limitations of the remaining pendent claims “shall be tolled while the claim[s are] pending and for a period of 30 days after [they are] dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides a longer tolling period.

Weinrib v. Duncan · filed 2007-01-12(d)

Because Duncan did not refile her action in the state court within the time frame afforded by federal law and Alabama law does not provide for a longer tolling period, her subsequent attempt on August 30, 2005, to have the action reinstated is time-barred, and the trial court's order reinstating her case is contrary to the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period only for state-law claims asserted in federal court and then refiled as the same claims in state court.

Rester v. McWane, Inc. · filed 2007-01-12(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for state-law claims is tolled only when a party seeks to refile in the state court the same state-law claims the party asserted in the federal court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a claim under supplemental jurisdiction while the federal case is pending and for thirty days after dismissal, making transfer to state court unnecessary to preserve the claim.

Hoai v. Hien · filed 2008-01-07(d)

We find that transfer of such claims was not necessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000) (tolling limitation period for claim asserted under supplemental jurisdiction while case is pending in federal court and for a period of thirty days after dismissal under § 1367).

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for a state claim while it is pending in federal court and for thirty days after dismissal, after which the remaining time resumes.

Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. · filed 2008-09-02(d)

Because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000) suspends the running of the limitations period, the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and we reverse and remand.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state claims for 30 days after the district court dismisses them.

Huertas v. City of Camden · filed 2008-10-06(d)

The state claims, however, were not time-barred at the time the District Court dismissed them. See id. (noting that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations is tolled for 30 days after the district court’s dismissal).

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after final district court judgment or, if appealed, the appellate disposition.

Turner v. Kight · filed 2008-10-07(d)

Upon this analysis, we conclude that § 1367(d) serves to suspend the running of a State statute of limitations from the time the State-law claim is filed in U.S. District Court until 30 days after (1) a final judgment is entered by the U.S. District Court dismissing the pendant State-law claims, or (2) if an appeal is noted from that judgment, issuance of an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal or a mandate affirming the dismissal of those claims by the District Court.

Section 1367(d) allows a state savings statute that gives a plaintiff more than 30 days to refile supplemental claims to extend the limitations tolling period.

Willis v. Shelby County, Tennessee · filed 2009-06-08(d)

We find that where Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 provides a plaintiff more than 30 days to commence a new action, it will, appropriately, toll the statute of limitations beyond that thirty day period.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state law claims during the pendency of the federal action.

Doerfler-Casner v. Placer County Department of Public Works · filed 2009-11-20(d)

We note that the statute of limitations on the supplemental state law claims is tolled during the pendency of the federal action.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for claims asserted under supplemental jurisdiction while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Jensen v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority · filed 2009-12-10(d)

Since Jensen first asserted his territorial law claims in his District Court complaint, and argued that the District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over those claims due to their relationship to his federal causes of action, the District Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing his federal claims compelled Virgin Islands local courts to toll the statute of limitations on those causes of action “while the claim[s] [are] pending and for a period of 30 days after [they] are dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) suspends the running of the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, leaving the claimant the time that remained when tolling began.

Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. · filed 2010-02-04(d)

We reject the approach suggested by Best Buy and conclude that section 1367(d) suspends the running of a limitations period during the time a state-law claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after the claim is dismissed, and does not merely suspend the expiration of the limitations period.

Section 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

In Re Vertrue Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2010-04-16(d)

On its face, Section 1367(d) must have a tolling effect on all supplemental state law claims. The suspension approach is the only approach that comports with the plain meaning of the statute. By essentially “stopping the clock” during the pendency of the federal lawsuit, all claims receive a tolling benefit and the statute can be uniformly applied.

Section 1367(d) does not toll limitations periods when the prior claims were neither dismissed under supplemental jurisdiction nor reasserted in state court.

Peters v. Board of Trustees of the Vista Unified School District · filed 2011-11-01(d)

Contrary to Peters’s contention, the district court properly concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not toll the statutes of limitations because no claims in ... Peters’s previous case were dismissed under the supplemental jurisdiction statute or reasserted by Peters in state court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state-law claims asserted under supplemental jurisdiction while the federal action is pending.

Barnett v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. · filed 2012-09-28(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations as to the Plaintiffs claims was then tolled for the duration of the pending suit.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state law claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Hayes v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-02-25(d)

This Court adds that “dismissal will not have any impact on the statute of limitations for these claims, because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the limitations period is tolled while the claims are pending [in federal court] and for 30 days after they are dismissed.”

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state law claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal.

Wittner Ex Rel. Wittner v. Banner Health · filed 2013-06-24(d)

Their concern, however, is obviated by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which provides: “[t]he [state] period of limitations for any claim asserted under [supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). If plaintiffs filed their state court action within thirty days after the district court’s dismissal, they should not face a statute of limitations bar in state court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a claim against a defendant that the plaintiff did not assert in the earlier federal action.

Barnett v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. · filed 2013-09-09(d)

Plaintiff did not assert a nuisance claim against Defendant UI in Barnett I. Thus, the three year statute of limitations on Plaintiffs nuisance claim against UI could not have been tolled pending the outcome of Barnett I.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state-law claim from the filing of the federal case until 30 days after judgment when the court declines supplemental jurisdiction, unless state law allows a longer period.

Moore v. Philander Smith College · filed 2014-06-06(d)

The period of limitations on Dr. Moore’s breach of contract claim under Arkansas law is tolled under' 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) from the time of the filing of this case until 30 days after entry of judgment in this case, unless Arkansas gives a longer tolling period.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for state-law claims against nonconsenting state defendants immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.

Couram v. Davis · filed 2015-02-04(d)

We find the tolling provision is inapplicable because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, who were nonconsenting parties immune from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims for thirty days after summary judgment on the federal claims.

Martinez v. Southwest Cheese Co. · filed 2015-06-18(d)

but the limitations period was tolled for thirty days following the grant of summary judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014).

Section 1367(d) gives a litigant thirty days after federal dismissal to refile a supplemental claim in state court when the state limitations period expired while the claim was pending in federal court.

ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA · filed 2016-04-07(d)

As such, we hold that the tolling provision of § 1367 (d) applies a thirty-day “grace period” to allow litigants to re-file claims that otherwise would have become barred in Superior Court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for claims asserted under a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction while they are pending and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law allows longer; claims not asserted in that action receive no tolling from it.

Harris v. Tietex International Ltd. · filed 2016-06-29(d)

The limitations period for any claim asserted under a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction is “tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012). ... Accordingly, Harris’s defamation claim in the first action was obviously not based on these “statements,” and the limitations period for a claim based on these “statements” was not tolled by the first action.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations only for state law claims actually asserted in the federal action, not unasserted claims arising from the same facts.

Radcliffe v. Avenel Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2016-08-02(d)

The tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), however, applies only to state law claims that were actually asserted in a federal lawsuit. It does not apply to claims arising out of the same set of facts that could have been brought in the federal lawsuit but were not. Instead, the statute of limitations for such claims continues to run during the pendency of the federal action.

Under the suspension approach to § 1367(d), the state limitations period resumes 30 days after dismissal of the federal suit, and a claim filed after the remaining time expires is time-barred.

Jackson v. City of Cleveland · filed 2016-08-22(d)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations began running again 30 days after the federal complaint was dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiff had approximately nine months from the dismissal of the federal complaint in which to file the state complaint. However, she did not file the state complaint until August 12, 2014, almost twelve months after her federal complaint was dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the suspension approach if they accrued on September 12, 2011.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a timely state-law claim brought under supplemental jurisdiction while the federal action is pending and for 30 days after dismissal.

Williams v. Mann · filed 2016-10-17(d)

Because Plaintiff brought her timely NMHRA claim against Defendant Four Corners Family Dental, LLC in federal court, the statute of limitations on that claim was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) through the pendency of her federal action and for 30 days after the federal district court dismissed it pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim while it is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, but does not apply when the state court dismisses the claim for lack of jurisdiction rather than on limitations grounds.

Hernandez v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2018-04-18(d)

Section 1367(d) provides that, if a federal district court dismisses a claim over which it had supplemental jurisdiction, the period of limitations for that claim is tolled while the claim is pending in the district court and for a 30-day period after the claim’s dismissal unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. ... Because the trial court disposed of Hernandez’s claim by granting DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction, and not on the basis of limitations, section 1367(d) is not applicable.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for claims in a federal diversity suit that never invoked supplemental jurisdiction and in which the federal court did not decline to exercise it.

Long v. Forty-Niners Football Co., LLC · filed 2019-04-08(d)

This statute has no application here. Long filed a diversity suit in federal court. He did not appeal to the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction, nor did the federal court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of his claims.