28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when an unrelated state law claim would substantially expand the litigation beyond the federal claims.

White Lake Caddis, LLC v. White Lake, Charter Township of · filed 2025-06-18(c)(2)

Were this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim, it would substantially expand the scope of the litigation, and the Court declines to do so.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction merely because state claims outnumber a related federal claim.

Suttles v. Raceland-Worthington Independent Schools · filed 2025-07-22(c)(2)

Although her state claims outnumber her federal claim, a simple “edge in numbers . . . does not necessarily mean that the state law claims ‘substantially predominate.’” Detroit Edison Co. v. Mich. Dep’t. of Env’t Quality, 29 F.Supp.2d 786, 793 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 1998).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction.

Williams v. Writer · filed 2025-07-28(c)(2)

State claims also substantially predominate over federal claims, another reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Shamburg v. Ayvaz Pizza, LLC · filed 2025-08-22(c)(2)

Given the broad range of state wage and hour statutes, state untimely payment statutes, state common law unjust enrichment claims, and issues implicated, the court finds that these claims would substantially predominate over the FLSA claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims that substantially predominate over the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dixson v. Supreme Touch Home Health Services Corp · filed 2025-09-22(c)(2)

Even assuming the Complaint and counterclaims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts, this Court would nonetheless decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the counterclaims substantially predominate over the Complaint. ... Accordingly, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Drahos · filed 2025-11-26(c)(2)

The Court finds the state law claims substantially predominate over Plaintiff’s federal claim, and, as a result, judicial economy favors declining to extend discretionary supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims in proof and scope.

Gocha · filed 2025-12-18(c)(2)

Even if the Court was not dismissing all the federal claims, it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the state-law claims “substantially predominate” over the claims arising under federal law in terms of proof and the scope of the issues raised. ... Consequently, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims is also warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) does not support remand merely because state employment claims differ in some respects from parallel federal claims when the state claims do not substantially predominate.

Brewster v. Maryland Department of Veterans · filed 2026-04-13(c)(2)

The bulk of Plaintiff’s state law claims are MFEPA claims that generally track their federal counterparts. ... Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that remand pursuant to § 1367(c) is proper here.

A discretionary remand of remaining state claims under § 1367(c) does not defeat the finality of the federal judgment merely because a state appeal is pending.

Cohon ex rel. Bass v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2011-05-09(c)

Because the remand to the state court was discretionary under Section 1367(c), the separate state appeal pending does not deprive us of jurisdiction to hear this appeal for lack of finality.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when the statutory factors and judicial economy weigh against remand.

Ledet v. Board of Trustees of Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana, Inc. Retirement Income Plan · filed 2022-12-12(c)

The 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) statutory factors weigh against a discretionary remand.

Section 1367 does not govern the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims or displace its use of ancillary jurisdiction for intervention as of right.

M.E.S., Inc. v. United States · filed 2011-06-30(b)

Section 1367, however, does not address the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Section 1367 does not apply to the Court of Federal Claims; its supplemental-jurisdiction grant applies to district courts.

Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States · filed 2011-10-31(a)

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not pertain to this court, ... constitutes a part of this court’s jurisprudence.

Section 1367 does not give a district court supplemental jurisdiction over a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.

United States Marine, Inc. v. United States · filed 2012-05-11

VT Halter’s counterclaim is styled as a tort but sounds in contract and, therefore, is under the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to the exclusion of any other court under any other jurisdictional statute, including § 1367.

Section 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction on federal district courts, not the Court of Federal Claims.

Rajapakse v. United States · filed 2013-10-23

Inasmuch as the Court of Federal Claims is not a federal district court, Ms. Rajapakse cannot rely upon any of the aforementioned statutes to establish this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) tolls a state limitations period only for a state-court claim that is the same as a claim asserted in the federal action.

Crest Construction II, Inc. and Metro Energy, Inc. v. Hartia · filed 2016-04-19(d)

A comparison of the federal complaint and the first amended state petition is required, because, for purposes of tolling, we must determine whether each claim filed in federal court is the same as each claim filed in state court.

Section 1367 does not give the Court of Federal Claims supplemental jurisdiction over related claims.

Hood v. United States · filed 2016-05-27(a)

As noted by another Judge of the Court of Federal Claims, "28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not confer any jurisdiction upon the United States Court of Federal Claims because only the United States District Courts are authorized to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." ... Therefore, this court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of plaintiff's claims.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction over certain state law claims to district courts, not to the Court of Federal Claims.

Maldonado v. United States · filed 2017-09-08

This too is unavailing. Section 1367 provides for supplemental jurisdiction over certain state law claims "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. §1367(b) (emphasis added).

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims on the Court of Federal Claims.

Farmer v. United States · filed 2019-10-31

Further, the statute that permits federal district courts to decide state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012), does not apply to this court.

Section 1367 does not support supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the accompanying federal claims.

Cay-Montanez v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company · filed 2021-09-17

Because we have no jurisdiction over the purported federal-law claims, we also have no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s corresponding state-law claims.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction to United States district courts, but not to the Court of Federal Claims.

Abdel-Malak v. United States · filed 2021-10-14

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction to United States district courts, and this Court is not a district court.

Section 1367(c) leaves a district court no discretion to adjudicate state-law claims when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims for want of Article III standing.

Washington Election Integrity Coalition United v. Kimsey · filed 2022-09-30(c)

Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims due to their lack of Article III standing, it has no discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining claims.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ. · filed 2024-06-24(a)

But when federal claims are dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “supplemental jurisdiction can never exist” because a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal indicates “that there never was a valid federal claim.”

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Davis v. Westlake Services, LLC · filed 2025-01-16(a)

Therefore, because I lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s TILA claims, I also lack supplemental jurisdiction over his related state-law claims.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the court dismisses the federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Shenzhen Yihong Technology Co Ltd. v. dbest products Inc · filed 2025-05-29(a)

Put differently, once a district court decides that it lacks jurisdiction, it has no authority under § 1367(a) and, therefore, does not reach the questions of judicial economy underlying § 1367(c).

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Bond · filed 2025-11-04(a)

Finally, the Court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bond’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Because this dismissal was jurisdictional, the Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Bond’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all federal claims; early dismissal, a parallel state action, and novel state-law questions support that choice.

Martin v. Pearl Jean K. Kamalu-Staggs, Deldon James Staggs, and K & S Backhoe Service, Inc. · filed 1996-06-04(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Martin's state law claims after it dismissed her federal law claims. ... Here, where the district court dismissed Martin's federal claims during the early stages of litigation, and Martin had a simultaneous action in state court regarding the same underlying facts and bringing the same state claims, and those claims raised novel questions of state law (i.e., the powers of the HCRC), the district court's decision to dismiss Martin's state claims without prejudice was not an abuse of discretion.

A pending state suit between the parties is relevant to § 1367(c)(4), but without a showing that it constitutes exceptional circumstances, it does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction.

KIRBY v. BOROUGH OF WOODCLIFF LAKE · filed 2021-03-26(c)(4)

Kwilecki points out that there is already a pending state litigation between Kirby and Kwilecki. ... While this is certainly relevant, Kwilecki fails to provide authority demonstrating that it constitutes “exceptional circumstances” wherein the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a parallel, ongoing state court proceeding provides a compelling reason to do so.

Brooklyn Heights Ass'n v. National Park Service · filed 2011-07-12(c)(4)

Additionally and finally, the existence of the parallel, ongoing state court proceeding also provides a compelling reason for declining supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a parallel state proceeding makes exercising it contrary to judicial economy.

Frenchman Cambridge Irrigation District v. Heineman · filed 2013-09-24(c)(4)

Having found the claims against the Federal Defendants subject to dismissal, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining defendants. This issue involves novel and complex state law issues. The State and NRD Defendants have shown that the plaintiffs’ Irrigation Districts are presently litigating in an action pending before the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources. Under the circumstances, the court finds it prudent to decline jurisdiction. Judicial economy would be disserved by the exercise of this court’s supplemental jurisdiction, since a parallel and concurrent state court proceeding on an almost identical cause of action is proceeding.

Section 1367(c)(4) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for compelling reasons in exceptional circumstances, but overlapping parking garage allegations in a state case were not a compelling reason where the claims were not truly duplicative.

ADAMS v. DMG PARK, LLC · filed 2023-01-10(c)(4)

Although the purported problems with the parking garage are raised in both matters, this is not a compelling reason to decline jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a state-law claim’s limitations period during the pendency of a state court action.

PHH Mortgage Corporation v. Stuber · filed 2025-01-22(d)

So, under Tenth Circuit precedent, the court can’t toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of the state court action.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a substantially parallel state proceeding creates exceptional circumstances and economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor dismissal.

Spiezio v. Martinez · filed 2025-09-30(c)(4)

Thus, given the parallel nature of the proceedings, and Plaintiff’s desire to continue litigating this claim in state court, the Court finds dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claim is proper under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law accord integral to confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan when it forms part of the same case or controversy and none of the statutory grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

Dragnea v. Dragnea · filed 2019-10-29(a), (c)(1)–(4)

The integral nature of the state-law accord in plan Class 11 to confirmation also warrants exercise of § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction. ... It is part of the same case or controversy. ... The state-law accord raises no novel or complex issue of state law. ... The state-law accord does not predominate over issues within original bankruptcy subject-matter jurisdiction including the § 1141(a) “binding” effect of the confirmed plan. ... The Chapter 11 case is not being dismissed. ... There are no other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367 authorizes bankruptcy courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.

Montana v. Goldin (In Re Pegasus Gold Corp.) · filed 2003-04-29(a)

Appellants’ challenge to the bankruptcy court’s supplemental jurisdiction is equally unavailing because the law of this circuit authorizes the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to bankruptcy courts.

Section 1367's supplemental jurisdiction is included within a bankruptcy court's related-to jurisdiction over claims forming part of the same case or controversy.

In re Sasson · filed 2005-09-13(a)

Thus, at present, the bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction also includes the district court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."

Section 1367 permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising from the same core facts as claims already within its bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Prestige Realty Group of Ohio & Florida, LLC (In Re Prestige Realty Group of Ohio & Flori · filed 2009-11-13(a)

Since the Court has jurisdiction of Century 21’s claims against the Debtor, and since those claims arise from the same core facts as the claims Century 21 has filed against Ny-man, accordingly, “related to” jurisdiction exists by virtue of this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with claims within its bankruptcy jurisdiction.

McCarthy v. Radcliffe (In Re Radcliffe) · filed 2012-01-25(a)

However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to confer supplemental jurisdiction (sometimes referred to as pendent or ancillary jurisdiction) on the bankruptcy courts as well as the district courts. ... The Third Count is based upon the same facts and circumstances as the First and Second Counts, viz. the purchase of the residence, and does not present any of the considerations that would permit the court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. ... The court concludes that it has supplemental jurisdiction over the Thud Count.

Section 1367(a) permits bankruptcy courts in the Second Circuit to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims.

Cavalry Construction, Inc. v. WDF, Inc. (In re Cavalry Construction, Inc.) · filed 2013-05-13(a)

In sum, the Court finds that, though there is an inter-circuit conflict on this issue, this Court is bound by Lionel’s holding that bankruptcy courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims sharing a common nucleus of operative facts with claims within its related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Montana v. Goldin · filed 2005-01-10(a)

Here, the remaining claims involve a “common nucleus of operative facts” and would ordinarily be expected to be resolved in one judicial proceeding, and therefore the bankruptcy court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims sharing a common nucleus of operative facts with claims within a bankruptcy court’s related-to jurisdiction.

In re Pegasus Gold Corp. · filed 2005-01-11

This circuit has applied § 1367 to bankruptcy claims, even when the subject matter jurisdiction is based on "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Sec. Farms v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 n. 5 (9th Cir.1997). Here, the remaining claims involve a "common nucleus of operative facts" and would ordinarily be expected to be resolved in one judicial proceeding, and therefore the bankruptcy court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367 permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims that form part of the same case or controversy as claims within its original jurisdiction.

Shafferman v. Queens Borough Public Library (In re JMK Construction Group, Ltd.) · filed 2013-12-20(a)

But the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplying jurisdiction “over all other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy"). While not free from doubt, there is authority, including in the Second Circuit, that bankruptcy courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits bankruptcy courts exercising district court jurisdiction to resolve related claims that are part of the same case or controversy, and jurisdiction continues when the issues narrow during the case.

In re Westinghouse Elec. Co. · filed 2018-08-01(a)

However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that bankruptcy courts do have jurisdiction under the principles of supplemental jurisdiction set forth in Section 1367. ... I concluded for these reasons, and I reaffirm here, that it was appropriate for me to hear and resolve all of the parties' disputes regardless of whether the nature of the issues might have changed somewhat as the case progressed, and regardless of whether the issues might have narrowed as the case progressed.

Section 1367(a) permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims sharing a common nucleus of operative facts with claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lee v. Ahne · filed 2020-12-18(a)

In thiscase, as discussed below, it is clear that Lee and Park's claims share a common nucleus of operative facts as the claims of the Debtor—i.e., the underlying Acquisition and Financing transactions (as defined below) with the Bank Defendants and seller Kim—and it would not be judicially economical to try these overlapping matters in different proceedings. As such, the Court concludes that it has supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate Lee and Park's claims against the Bank Defendants in this action.

Section 1367 does not give the Court of Federal Claims supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.

Diaz v. United States · filed 2021-10-14

However, Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims.

Section 1367 does not give bankruptcy courts statutory authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Cournoyer v. Elansari · filed 2022-04-22

Therefore, this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) does not give bankruptcy courts in the Fifth Circuit supplemental jurisdiction over claims outside their bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2026-04-16(a)

But the Fifth Circuit 58 and many other courts 59 reject the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by bankruptcy courts because § 1367 only expressly applies to district courts and § 157, the more specific statute governing bankruptcy jurisdiction, does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts. This Court is, of course, bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Haley Miller claims.

Section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction in federal district courts but does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims.

Hoag v. United States · filed 2011-07-06

As noted in Hall v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 51, 57 (2005), "28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not confer any jurisdiction upon the United States Court of Federal Claims because only the United States District Courts are authorized to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(a) permits a bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over one claim to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims sharing a common nucleus of operative facts, even when it lacks direct related-to jurisdiction over those claims.

WARD v. WHITE RIVER CONTRACTING LLC · filed 2021-09-10(a)

The Ninth Circuit has joined the minority of courts that have interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as conferring on bankruptcy courts “supplemental” subject matter jurisdiction. ... Although the Court concludes it lacks direct “related to” jurisdiction over the claims asserted against the Non-Debtor Defendants, it is not convinced that those claims fall beyond the extensive reach of supplemental jurisdiction described in Pegasus Gold because the claims are based on a common nucleus of operative facts. Accordingly, the Non-Debtor Defendants’ Motion must be denied.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over claims based on the same facts as claims within its original bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Hawkes v. Automated Recovery Systems Of New Mexico, INC. a N · filed 2022-11-22(a)

The claims against the San Juan Defendants are based on the same facts as those against Debtor, so the referring district court9 has supplemental jurisdiction over them. See § 1367(a).10 And because the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction is independent of § 1334, element #6 is not present.

Section 1367 does not give bankruptcy courts supplemental jurisdiction.

Porter v. NationsCredit Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Porter) · filed 2003-06-19

... but bankruptcy courts do not possess section 1367 jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) confers supplemental jurisdiction on district courts, but does not authorize bankruptcy courts to exercise it.

Fisher v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. (In Re Fisher) · filed 1993-03-09(a)

The only “other law” that might be applicable is 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But, as noted, that section confers authority only upon the district court. Therefore, there is no statutory basis for this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the class action.

Section 1367 does not give a bankruptcy court supplemental jurisdiction over claims against nondebtors that fall outside its limited subject matter jurisdiction.

Wilcox v. Houghton (In Re Houghton) · filed 1994-02-15

Accordingly, the Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not give it subject matter jurisdiction over the Boylans.

Section 1367 does not give bankruptcy courts an additional or expanded basis of jurisdiction beyond their limited bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Walker v. Cadle Co. (In Re Walker) · filed 1994-04-15

It seems counterintuitive, then, that Congress, having given bankruptcy courts only limited judicial power over “non-core” or “related to” proceedings, would have intended for bankruptcy courts to nevertheless look to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as an additional or expanded basis of jurisdiction. This Court holds that it should not1 be so used.

Section 1367 does not authorize a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party state-law claim.

Halvajian v. Bank of New York, N.A. · filed 1995-12-15(a)

The Fifth Circuit first noted that § 1367 addressed the power of a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and was silent on the question of a bankruptcy court’s authority in this area. ... The Court holds that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over BNY’s third-party claims against Nelson.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over claims in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding that are insufficiently related to the bankruptcy case to invoke federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Romar International Georgia, Inc. v. Southtrust Bank of Alabama (In Re Romar International Georgia, Inc.) · filed 1996-07-12(a)

Since the claims of Mr. Penn and Mr. Cave-Bigley against Defendant are not sufficiently related to Debtor’s bankruptcy ease to invoke federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, there is no power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. What Mr. Penn and Mr. Cave-Bigley ask this Court to do is not what was intended through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction to district courts but does not authorize bankruptcy judges to hear proceedings unrelated to a bankruptcy case.

Adams v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (In Re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy) · filed 1996-10-15(a)

By its express terms, however, section 1367 is applicable only to the district court; it makes no reference to the bankruptcy court (nor does the legislative history surrounding its enactment).

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction to district courts but does not itself authorize bankruptcy courts to hear supplemental claims.

Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields, P.C. (In Re Simmons) · filed 1997-02-03(a)

The 1990 enactment did not grant bankruptcy courts the power to hear matters over which the district court gained jurisdiction under this supplemental jurisdiction statute.

Section 1367 does not give bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over non-core cases, even when the parties consent.

Davis v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc. (In Re Davis) · filed 1997-11-07

Nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supply a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by a bankruptcy court in non-core cases, even with consent.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction beyond the bankruptcy jurisdiction conferred on it by the district court.

Banc of America Investment Services, Inc. v. Fraiberg (In Re Conseco, Inc.) · filed 2004-01-16(a)

The bankruptcy court has no grant of authority from the district court beyond the three types of jurisdiction identified in § 157(a). Therefore, although the district court in Wieboldt could properly exercise ancillary jurisdiction (which it now would probably refer to as supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a)), the court concludes that a bankruptcy court may not.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize bankruptcy courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc. v. Desnick (In Re Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc.) · filed 2004-02-26(a)

LaSalle next argues that the court can assert supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As discussed above, bankruptcy courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not give bankruptcy courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Murphy (In Re Selheimer & Co.) · filed 2005-01-20(a)

However, bankruptcy courts do not possess section 1367 jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts.

Scully v. Danzig (In Re Valley Food Services, LLC) · filed 2008-12-09

As discussed in detail below, the Court does not believe that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts or that the exercise of that jurisdiction is warranted here, even if they have such jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not give a bankruptcy court supplemental jurisdiction over an otherwise unrelated FDCPA claim merely because it shares facts with a discharge-injunction claim.

Harlan v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC (In Re Harlan) · filed 2009-03-25(a)

Therefore, this Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Debtors’ otherwise unrelated FDCPA claims on the sole grounds that it shares a common factual background the Debtors’ claim under section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 1367 does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts.

Moffitt v. America's Servicing Co. (In Re Moffitt) · filed 2009-05-21

Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not extend to bankruptcy courts.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction to district courts, but does not authorize bankruptcy courts to exercise it.

Vienneau v. Saxon Capital, Inc. (In Re Vienneau) · filed 2009-08-12(a)

This Court has previously rejected the idea that a non-article III court, such as the bankruptcy court, could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction to district courts, not bankruptcy courts.

Schatz v. Chase Home Finance (In Re Schatz) · filed 2011-07-25

In Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, the Schatzes argues the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, § 1367 has been held in the Third Circuit to apply only to District Courts; not to Bankruptcy Courts.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize bankruptcy courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Miller v. Bruemmer (In re Bruemmer Development, LLC) · filed 2014-07-18(a)

This Court has reviewed cases on both sides of this issue, and agrees with the majority view, that bankruptcy courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize bankruptcy courts to hear claims that fall outside their jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157.

Cave v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-12-06(a)

Federal bankruptcy courts cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) in order to hear claims that do not otherwise qualify for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1334(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 1367 does not authorize a bankruptcy court to hear claims within a district court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Herman v. Sonier · filed 2020-07-06

That authority does not include matters for which subject matter jurisdiction might exist in the district court under the supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 does not permit a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a contract claim within the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.

Vandervelden v. United States · filed 2021-08-30

Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “cannot override” the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the Tucker Act to the Court of Federal Claims.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by a plaintiff intervening under Rule 24 in a diversity case when those claims would violate § 1332’s requirements.

Kelly v. Linn · filed 2021-09-15(b)

Thus, section 1367 prohibits the court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over NTCO’s claim as, for the reasons discussed above, to do so would be inconsistent with § 1332’s requirements.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not permit a district court to decline jurisdiction and remand a claim within its original federal-question jurisdiction.

In Re: Cotter Corporation v. · filed 2022-01-07(c)(2)

Because the PAA provides federal question jurisdiction over the claims against Cotter and a “district court has no discretion to remand a claim that states a federal question,” Gaming Corp. of Am., 88 F.3d at 542, the district court abused its discretion.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims before a federal court but does not authorize the court to retrieve remanded claims from state court on its own initiative.

Ploof v. Arizona, State of · filed 2023-06-15

28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants federal jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims brought before federal courts; it does not permit federal courts to reach out and assert jurisdiction over such claims on their own prerogative.

Section 1367(b) limits supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) when adding third-party insurers would destroy diversity jurisdiction.

Sterigenics U.S., LLC v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA · filed 2023-07-25(b)

Anticipating this issue as it relates to its Rule 14 motion, National Union stated on the other hand that its “motion to implead the other insurers will not destroy diversity jurisdiction because the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).” Id. n. 1. National Union does not cite authority for this proposition. And the language of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and the case law compels a different result.

Section 1367(b) limits supplemental jurisdiction over a proposed third-party insurance claim in a diversity case when joinder of the additional insurers would defeat diversity.

Griffith Foods International Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA. · filed 2023-07-25(b)

Anticipating this issue as it relates to its Rule 14 motion, National Union stated on the other hand that its “motion to implead the other insurers will not destroy diversity jurisdiction because the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).” Id. n. 1. National Union does not cite authority for this proposition. And the language of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) and the case law compels a different result.

Section 1367(b) restricts supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs, including intervening plaintiffs, when original jurisdiction rests on diversity; the restriction does not apply when original jurisdiction rests on a federal question.

Gonzales Sr. v. Serrato · filed 2023-08-02(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), a court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs, including intervening plaintiffs, that would be inconsistent with the requirements of diversity jurisdiction if the civil action is based on diversity jurisdiction. Because this case does not involve diversity jurisdiction, the § 1367(b) exception to supplemental jurisdiction is inapplicable.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction when original jurisdiction is founded on § 1330.

Hamilton Reserve Bank Ltd. v. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka · filed 2024-04-23(b)

Because jurisdiction over Hamilton’s claims against Sri Lanka is founded on § 1330, the bar raised by § 1367(b) does not apply.

Section 1367 cannot override the Tucker Act’s exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional claims against the United States seeking more than $10,000.

Pershing Division of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, a Delaware Corporation v. United States · filed 1994-04-27

Section 1367 cannot override this exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not override a federal statute that expressly bars removal of a workers’ compensation action.

Lackey v. Gateway Homes, Inc. · filed 1996-11-01(a)

Defendants in this civil action appear to have totally ignored the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) that some actions are barred from removal to federal district court if “expressly provided by Federal Statute.” 28 U.S.C. § 1445 [entitled “Nonremovable Actions”] lists actions that are expressly non-removable — workers’ compensation claim actions [§ 1445(c)] are among those listed as nonremovable.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons to do so.

Johnson v. LMT Foods, Inc. · filed 2022-06-29(c)(4)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim and finds that exceptional circumstances warrant declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when a frequent ADA and Unruh Act filer uses federal court to circumvent California's procedural barriers and the case's early stage weighs against retaining jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Right Crons Inc. · filed 2022-06-27(c)(4)

Regardless of whether Defendant chooses to pursue jurisdictional discovery or an evidentiary hearing, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and finds that exceptional circumstances warrant declining jurisdiction. ... And the facts of the case—“a frequent filer of ADA and Unruh Act claims seeking federal jurisdiction to circumvent California's procedural barriers to such suits—present the type of exceptional circumstances contemplated by section 1367(c)(4)” to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect federal-state comity interests.

Benford v. 2118 Highland, LLC · filed 2022-06-14(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim in exceptional circumstances.

Garcia v. Singh · filed 2022-05-12(c)(4)

A federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in ... exceptional circumstances.”

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state disability claims when comity and state verification requirements provide exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Strojnik v. Kamla Hotels, Inc. · filed 2021-01-08(c)(4)

The Court finds that this case presents “exceptional circumstances” and that “there are compelling reasons,” primarily based on comity, for declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

A plaintiff’s frequent ADA litigation and choice of federal forum do not, without more, supply exceptional circumstances under § 1367(c)(4) for declining jurisdiction over a related Unruh claim.

Johnson v. Medvill 1, LLC · filed 2020-12-28(c)(4)

Second, no ground for declining jurisdiction applies here. Defendant raises only one ground, which is that “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if— . . . in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(4) (emphasis added); see Mot. at 13–14. Defendant argues that the Unruh claim meets this strict standard because Plaintiff is a “high-frequency litigant[]” who has “cherry-pick[ed] [his] forum.” Mot. at 14. ... At this time, the Court declines to depart from the reasoned decisions of its sister courts. Thus, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act accessibility claim when evasion of California’s filing restrictions and the resulting burden on federal courts provide exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Perri v. CA 199 Arcadia Owner LLC · filed 2020-11-24(c)(4)

This situation, as well as the increased burden on federal courts due to the increasing number of these cases, presents the type of “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify a court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any Unruh Act or other state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction merely because a state legislature prefers that its governmental tort claims be heard in state court.

Brown v. City of Memphis · filed 2006-07-07(c)(4)

Even if the Tennessee legislature had stated a clear preference that GTLA claims be heard in state court, such a preference would not create a sufficiently exceptional circumstance to warrant dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state claims under § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c) permits remand of remaining state-law claims when substitution of a private assignee for the FDIC ends the basis for original jurisdiction and compelling reasons favor remand.

Mill Investments, Inc. v. Brooks Woolen Co., Inc. · filed 1992-06-23(c)

Although the Court has jurisdiction over Mill Investments’ claims, it has the discretion under section 1367(c), as it had before the enactment of the statute, see Merit Systems Protection, 762 F.2d at 133; IMFC, 676 F.2d at 159, to remand the case to state court. ... While the court has not dismissed the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the effect of the substitution of Mill Investments for the failed bank is essentially the same. The basis for original jurisdiction no longer exists since the FDIC is no longer in the case as receiver. This being so, the Court finds compelling reasons why the case should be remanded.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state contribution claims during a federal tax collection action when hearing those claims would prolong and complicate collection.

Carlucci v. United States · filed 1992-06-16(c)(4)

The grant of supplemental jurisdiction is not absolute but is instead vested in the sound discretion of the court. ... First, permitting these various third party actions to continue during the pendency of the Government’s § 6672 proceedings against Carlucci and Magnotta would interfere with the efficient collection of the taxes owed on behalf of the Davenport employees because it would simply prolong and complicate the proceedings. ... The reasons for declining jurisdiction over the contribution claims of Magnotta and Carlucci are as compelling today as they were prior to the passage of § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when identical claims are pending in state court and retaining them would waste judicial resources.

Hays County Guardian v. Supple · filed 1992-09-04(c)(4)

We find such “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” here. Adjudicating state-law claims in federal court while identical claims are pending in state court would be a pointless waste of judicial resources. The district court’s decision to dismiss the state-law claims entirely, rather than retain jurisdiction over the individual-capacity claims while the official-capacity claims were being adjudicated in state court, was within the court’s discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances, including a substantial risk of jury confusion and prejudice and parallel litigation of the same claims in state court, provide compelling reasons to do so.

Lewis v. United States · filed 1993-01-20(c)(4)

There are “other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction” in this case. ... However, under the somewhat unusual facts giving rise to this action, there is the substantial risk of confusion and prejudice which strongly overrides any benefit that might flow from proceeding in that fashion. ... It would serve neither the interests of judicial economy nor fundamental fairness to require Lockwood to defend itself simultaneously in two different courts on the same claims. ... For these reasons, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lewis’ general maritime claims against Lockwood in Civil Action 408.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances when a Rule 14(c) tender threatens a plaintiff’s right to pursue a state-court jury trial.

Lewis v. United States · filed 1993-03-30(c)(4)

Accordingly, the only possible jurisdictional basis over a claim by Lewis against Lockwood would be supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 which, for reasons previously stated, the court declined to exercise. ... To the contrary, the action of the United States in tendering Lockwood under Rule 14(c), Lockwood’s acceptance of an untimely impleader and tender, as well as the efforts of Lewis to preserve his right to trial by jury, present additional exceptional circumstances warranting the declination of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a pending state insurance receivership supplies a compelling reason grounded in comity, even if abstention is unwarranted.

U.S. Financial Corp. v. Warfield · filed 1993-08-16(c)(4)

The court, however, is inclined to agree with Warfield that the pendency of the receivership proceedings in state court provides a compelling reason for declining jurisdiction pursuant to section 1367(c)(4), even if, as discussed infra, the pendency of the proceedings is not a sufficient reason for this court to abstain from exerting jurisdiction pursuant to the Burford doctrine.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances and other compelling reasons warrant it.

Holt v. Lockheed Support Systems, Inc. · filed 1993-10-20(c)(4)

Even assuming that supplemental jurisdiction is viable in this scenario, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when exceptional circumstances exist, and when there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. We think that the circumstances of this case provide ample reason for declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction based solely on speculation about juror prejudice.

Qualcomm, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 1997-11-10(c)(4)

Subsection (c)(4) of § 1367 provides the district court with the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under “exceptional circumstances” where “other compelling reasons” exist for not exercising jurisdiction. ... Mere speculation as to juror prejudice does not constitute an “exceptional circumstance” warranting the exercise of this Court’s, discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not treat speculative prejudice from being tried alongside alleged international conspirators as an exceptional circumstance warranting refusal of supplemental jurisdiction.

Local 875 I.B.T. Pension Fund v. Pollack · filed 1998-01-26(c)(4)

Rather, he argues that, pursuant to Section 1367(c)(4), I may decline subject matter jurisdiction upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” Altman’s only assertion of exceptional circumstances, however, is the supposed prejudice that will result from teaming him — a purported “poor sehnook”— with “international conspirators.” Altman Mem. at 8-9. On the facts alleged, this speculative claim of prejudice does not constitute an exceptional circumstance.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when separate federal and state classes could have different members and confuse a jury.

Zelaya v. J.M. MacIas, Inc. · filed 1998-02-13(c)(4)

Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) permits the court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). The distinct possibility of two separate sets of plaintiffs is such an exceptional circumstance. The inclusion of a state law claim involving over 100 plaintiffs with a separate federal law claim involving a separate, distinct and smaller class cannot be permitted. Such claims would undoubtedly confuse a jury, and such confusion is another valid reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction merely because state law assigns exclusive jurisdiction and venue to state courts, where doing so would cause wasteful parallel litigation.

Malone v. Fayette County, Tenn. · filed 2000-02-15(c)(4)

Absent truly exceptional circumstances, the Courts should avoid needless inefficiencies. The exclusivity provisions of TGTLA do not create sufficient exceptional circumstances, to warrant dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over TGTLA claims when Tennessee’s clear preference for hearing those claims in its own courts supplies an exceptional circumstance.

Gregory v. Shelby County · filed 2000-07-12(c)(4)

In this instance, the Tennessee legislature' expressed a clear preference that TGTLA claims be handled by its own state courts. This unequivocal preference of the Tennessee legislature is an exceptional circumstance for declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a related state case is pending and the state has a strong interest in administering its own pension system.

Ernst v. Roberts · filed 2002-09-30(c)(4)

The pendency of this related case in the Michigan court system, coupled with the strong interest a state has in providing a pension plan for state employees without federal interference, constitute “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4) which further convince the court that it would be inappropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the combined confusion and inefficiency of overlapping opt-in and opt-out classes present exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons to do so.

De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Grower's Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2004-09-30(c)(4)

While none of these concerns standing alone may merit “exceptional circumstances” to decline to exercise jurisdiction, all of these concerns combined lead this court to believe that the court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a debt-collection counterclaim when trying it alongside an FDCPA claim would chill enforcement of the FDCPA.

Sparrow v. Mazda American Credit · filed 2005-08-26(c)(4)

Strong policy reasons exist to prevent the chilling effect of trying FDCPA claims in the same case as state law claims for collection of the underlying debt. This policy satisfies the exceptional circumstances requirement to support an order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s state law claims to enforce the debt.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because Tennessee’s preference for adjudication in its own courts is an exceptional circumstance.

Parker v. Henderson County, Tennessee · filed 2006-08-29(c)(4)

A federal district court may, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under § 1367(a). ... The Court declines to accept jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs claims for assault, battery and false arrest brought pursuant to Tennessee law in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) does not allow a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction based solely on a conclusory assertion of potential jury confusion.

Lynch v. United States Automobile Ass'n · filed 2007-11-08(c)(4)

A conclusory assertion of potential jury confusion, without more, does not amount to a compelling reason for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ California state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because Tennessee’s preference for state court adjudication is an exceptional circumstance.

Conner v. City of Jackson, Tenn. · filed 2009-06-09(c)(4)

The Court declines to accept jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the TGTLA in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a debt collector’s counterclaim in an FDCPA action when exceptional circumstances exist.

Martin v. Law Offices of John F. Edwards · filed 2009-10-06(c)(4)

This Court finds that exceptional circumstances exist here to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reliable’s counterclaim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because Tennessee’s preference for hearing those claims in its own courts is an exceptional circumstance.

Heyne v. METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2009-11-03(c)

This unequivocal preference of the state legislature is an exceptional circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) for declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to retain related state-law claims despite a state-law preference for state court when separate proceedings would waste the parties’ and courts’ resources.

BIRGS v. City of Memphis · filed 2010-02-18(c)(4)

In the present suit, to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs TGTLA claims would waste the resources of the parties and the state and federal courts. ... The Court, therefore, finds that exercising supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate and DENIES the City’s Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, including when a party’s inconsistent positions about federal jurisdiction would give it an unfair advantage.

UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence · filed 2018-01-31(c)(4)

Accordingly, § 1367(c)(4) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "in exceptional circumstances." ... This flip-flopping of positions and the unfair advantage it would give the Tribe supports the court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) does not make a relatively small amount at stake an exceptional circumstance justifying refusal of supplemental jurisdiction when that amount is also at issue in the federal claim.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Guerrera · filed 2018-03-13(c)

The relatively small amount of money at stake, however, does not constitute an "exceptional circumstance[ ]" that would justify the court's declining jurisdiction; the small amount of money is what is at issue in the federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when parallel state proceedings involving the same claims present exceptional circumstances.

Leclair v. Donovan Spring Co., Inc. · filed 2018-11-30(c)(4)

On the other hand, however, the exceptional circumstance of parallel proceedings, which is presented here, supports an exercise of the court’s discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when evasion of California’s filing restrictions and the burden on federal courts provide exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Whitaker v. Mac · filed 2019-10-01(c)(4)

The Court therefore concludes that “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” support the Court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Whitaker’s Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

An early-stage federal action and a plaintiff-created parallel state action involving the same parties, facts, and discovery do not constitute exceptional circumstances for declining supplemental jurisdiction over related counterclaims.

Bullard v. Drug Policy Alliance · filed 2019-12-30(c)(4)

The allegedly “exceptional circumstances” cited by Bandele are that: (i) this case is still in its early stages; (ii) she has a state case, in which DPA can bring its counterclaims, that may proceed faster; (iii) the state case includes the same parties as the parties to the counterclaims; (iv) the state case involves the same questions of fact as the counterclaims; and (v) discovery in the state case will mirror discovery for the counterclaims. (See Pl. Br. 21- 22). These circumstances are far from exceptional. ... Accordingly, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over DPA’s counterclaims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over claims under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act because Tennessee’s preference for adjudication in its own courts is an exceptional circumstance.

Arbuckle v. City of Chattanooga · filed 2010-03-08(c)(4)

The Sixth Circuit has determined that “the Tennessee legislature expressed a clear preference that TGTLA claims be handled by its own state courts. This unequivocal preference of the Tennessee legislature is an exceptional circumstance for declining jurisdiction.” ... Because the TGTLA provides that exclusive jurisdiction for claims arising under the Act rest with Tennessee state courts, this Court will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Plaintiffs state law claims against the City and Officers Buttry and Campbell in their official capacities.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because the state legislature’s preference for state court adjudication is an exceptional circumstance.

Smith v. Shelby County, TN · filed 2010-06-14(c)(4)

Therefore, the Court declines to accept jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the GTLA in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances when inconvenience, expense, and fairness provide compelling reasons.

Estate of Amergi Ex Rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Authority · filed 2010-07-27(c)(4)

Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(4) under these unusual circumstances did not constitute an abuse of the district court’s considerable discretion.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign trademark infringement claims when international treaty obligations, comity, judicial economy, and other exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons.

Benihana of Tokoyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc. · filed 2011-12-13(c)(4)

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to its authority, for reasons of international treaty obligations, comity, judicial economy, and other exceptional circumstances.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not make a state law claim exceptional or supply a compelling reason to retain supplemental jurisdiction merely because a defendant might later raise a state law defense that the plaintiff would challenge on federal constitutional grounds.

Lopez v. Contra Costa Regional Medical Center · filed 2012-10-10(c)(4)

The possibility that CCRMC may eventually assert state law defenses that Plaintiffs would like to challenge under federal law does not render this medical malpractice action exceptional or compelling under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law medical malpractice claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand when exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons, including the prompt dismissal of an improperly named federal party from a case involving only state-law claims.

Rogers Mantese & Associates, P.C. v. Corp One, Inc. · filed 2013-03-12(c)(4)

Pursuant to New Rock, the Court concludes that, with FDIC’s dismissal, the Court no longer has jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2), and that its jurisdiction is limited to supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, thereby allowing the Court to exercise its discretion whether to remand the case. ... Here, the Court concludes that the exceptional circumstances of this case militate strongly in favor of remand. ... Because FDIC should never have been named as a Defendant in this case, the Court concludes that remand is the most appropriate course of action.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand claims when exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons, including the absence of class claims against those defendants and overlapping state court litigation.

In Touch Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2013-06-04(c)(4)

But the claims asserted against the non-Verizon defendants are differently situated. It is appropriate to remand them to the state court from which they were removed, even under the higher standard contemplated by § 1367(c)(4) because there are exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons to decline exercising jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because Tennessee’s preference for its own courts to hear those claims is an exceptional circumstance.

Holloran v. Duncan · filed 2015-03-18(c)(4)

The district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction, however, if, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” ... This provision indicates a “clear preference that [GTLA] claims be handled by [Tennessee’s] own state courts.” ... Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state claims against the Defendants.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims because the state legislature’s clear preference for state court adjudication is an exceptional circumstance.

Epperson v. City of Humboldt · filed 2015-10-21(c)(4)

A district court may, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under § 1367(a). Section 1367(c)(4) allows' a district court to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are' other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” ... Consequently, district courts in Tennessee have regularly declined to exercise, supplemental jurisdiction over GTLA claims, and this Court finds no compelling reason to act differently in this case. ... Therefore, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining GTLA and state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an employer’s contract counterclaim to an FLSA claim when exceptional circumstances, including limited factual overlap and poor judicial economy, favor declining jurisdiction.

Gonzalez v. Batmasian · filed 2017-02-24(c)(4)

Because the FLSA claim and contract Counterclaim involve different, facts, the Court finds that judicial economy would not be served by the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. ... In sum, in light of the exceptional circumstances, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendants’ Counterclaim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when parallel state probate proceedings concern the same alleged misconduct and federal adjudication could affect the probate court’s determination of estate assets.

Singer v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2018-08-15(c)(4)

Section 1367(c)(4) grants district courts the discretion to "decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if in exceptional circumstances, there are ... compelling reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction." ... Federal and state courts would be engaged in parallel proceedings concerning the same alleged acts of malfeasance, with the only difference being the remedy sought. Indeed, were this case to conclude first, it could divest the probate court of the ability to determine whether the transferred assets should become part of the estate. To avoid that outcome, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Rochelle's claim against Nolan.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction based on jury confusion or prejudice that limiting instructions can address.

Tardif v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-10-01(c)(4)

These circumstances are not exceptional. Any potential for juror confusion or prejudice can be negated by appropriate limiting instructions.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances when trying related state and federal claims together would risk jury confusion, inefficiency, inconvenience, and unfairness.

Elite Medical & Rehabilitation Group v. Esurance Insurance Company · filed 2019-08-07(c)(4)

Exceptional circumstances are present in this case because of the likelihood of jury confusion, judicial inefficiency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and potential unfairness in an outcome that could result if Plaintiff’s state law claims were tried together with his federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a debt-collection counterclaim when hearing it would chill FCRA claims.

Tillman v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC · filed 2020-08-05(c)(4)

That congressional policy is not advanced by allowing a marginally related counterclaim on an underlying debt in an action that challenges only the way that obligation is reported. Exceptional circumstances weigh in favor of declining the invitation to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons arise from circumventing California’s restrictions on construction-related accessibility suits and burdening federal courts.

Bouyer v. Rockys Racquet World · filed 2021-03-25(c)(4)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” exist to support the Court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim merely because the plaintiff chose federal court to avoid California pleading requirements; the plaintiff’s motive is generally immaterial, and parallel proceedings would be inefficient.

Johnson v. Garden Court Inn LLC · filed 2021-07-29(c)(4)

Myriad courts in this district have considered and rejected this argument because a party’s motive in seeking federal jurisdiction is generally immaterial, and having parallel proceedings in two different fora would be needlessly inefficient. ... The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive and adopts it here. ... The Court therefore exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim based on its monetary relief and the case’s early stage when parallel proceedings would be needlessly inefficient.

Whitaker v. Nguyen · filed 2021-11-04(c)(4)

Myriad courts in this district have considered and rejected such arguments because having parallel proceedings in two different fora would be needlessly inefficient. ... The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive and adopts it here. Id. The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion on this basis, and exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when evasion of California’s filing restrictions and the volume of ADA-Unruh suits supply exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Whitaker v. Ben Bridge-Jeweler, Inc. · filed 2022-03-18(c)(4)

This, in combination with the burden of the “ever-increasing number” of these ADA-Unruh cases through a minority of plaintiffs poses “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim joined with an ADA claim when a high-frequency litigant’s filing presents exceptional circumstances.

Whitaker v. Grill Kebabs and Gyros, Inc. · filed 2022-04-19(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) typically permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when brought by a high-frequency litigant.

Johnson v. Prince Fen Guizhou Cuisine Service LLC · filed 2022-04-19(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) typically permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when a high-frequency litigant brings them.

Johnson v. Wong · filed 2022-04-19(c)(4)

When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) generally permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when a high-frequency litigant brings them.

Johnson v. V.O. Limited Partners · filed 2022-04-19(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) generally permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim brought alongside an ADA claim by a high-frequency litigant because that combination typically constitutes exceptional circumstances.

Gomez v. Domaine Carneros, Ltd · filed 2022-04-19(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, which typically arise when a high-frequency litigant pairs a California Unruh Act claim with an ADA claim in federal court.

Gomez v. Elegance Properties, LLC · filed 2022-05-12(c)(4)

When a “high-frequency” litigant such as plaintiff asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court with an ADA claim, this typically constitutes an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect comity interests implicated by California’s litigation reforms.

Cleveland v. Loh · filed 2022-05-23(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Satisfying § 1367(c)(4)’s exceptional-circumstances requirement alone does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Whitaker v. Reeder · filed 2022-06-13(c)(4)

While this alone is not sufficient to affirm the district court, under Arroyo it is enough to satisfy the “exceptional circumstances” requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit dismissal of a supplemental Unruh Act claim for exceptional circumstances based on a high-frequency ADA litigant when the alleged inaccessibility concerns a website rather than a construction-related accessibility claim.

Gomez v. Vintage Wine Estates, Inc. · filed 2022-06-29(c)(4)

However, such exceptional circumstances only exist where the plaintiff has filed a “construction-related accessibility claim.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206. The plaintiff’s claim in this case—alleging that a website is inaccessible—is not a construction-related accessibility claim. There are therefore no exceptional circumstances that would justify dismissal of the Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, which typically include a high-frequency litigant’s Unruh Act claim alongside an ADA claim.

Johnson v. Rotisabjiinc · filed 2022-07-29(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exceptional circumstances warrant doing so.

Whitaker v. Oak and Fort Enterprise (U.S.), Inc · filed 2022-08-01(c)(4)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) because the Court finds that exceptional circumstances warrant declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) may warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim early in an ADA case to protect federal-state comity interests.

Gonzalez v. Salazar · filed 2022-08-12(c)(4)

This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.

Section 1367(c)(4) ordinarily permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when the plaintiff is a high-frequency litigant.

Garcia v. Kim · filed 2022-08-22(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim by a high-frequency litigant because that pairing typically constitutes an exceptional circumstance.

Whitaker v. Ngin · filed 2022-08-26(c)(4)

Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim “in exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) generally permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim brought with an ADA claim by a high-frequency litigant because that pairing typically presents exceptional circumstances.

Gastelum v. Blue Diamond Hospitality LLC · filed 2022-09-16(c)(4)

When a “high-frequency” litigant asserts a California Unruh Act claim in federal court alongside an ADA claim, this will typically constitute an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when a high-frequency litigant’s filing presents exceptional circumstances.

Whitaker v. Jeong · filed 2022-10-11(c)(4)

When a “high-frequency” litigant such as plaintiff in this case asserts an Unruh Act claim in federal court with an ADA claim, this constitutes an exceptional circumstance that justifies dismissal of the Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim paired with an ADA claim when high-frequency litigation creates exceptional comity concerns.

Johnson v. Fischer · filed 2022-11-16(c)(4)

For this reason, the same comity concerns that were present in Arroyo and in Vo exist here and constitute an exceptional circumstance for declining supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) can permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an ADA-related Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect federal-state comity.

Le v. ADIRC Capital, LLC · filed 2022-11-30(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice his Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim at an early stage to protect federal-state comity.

Zendejas v. West Coast Winery, Inc. · filed 2022-12-14(c)(4)

Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo.