28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant in a removed diversity class action merely because most claims are diverse.

Taylor v. American Tobacco Co., Inc. · filed 1997-11-03(a)

Defendants’ final argument urges this court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the state law claims between non-diverse defendants in this case. ... This court is unwilling to accept defendants’ argument in this case. ... This court likewise finds it unwise to bend over backwards to find subject matter jurisdiction in this way. As a result, this court will remand this case, in its entirety, to Wayne County Circuit Court.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related co-plaintiff claim that falls below the diversity amount in controversy when the plaintiffs brought their claims together outside Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24.

Sayre v. Potts · filed 1999-01-08(a)-(b)

The plain language of this statute clearly permits the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Sayre’s claim. His cause of action arises out of the same automobile accident that injured his wife; thus, it is part of the same case or controversy as his wife’s claim. Furthermore, although the Court’s original jurisdiction, in this case is grounded solely in Section 1332, the plaintiffs originally brought their claims together, not pursuant to Rules 14,19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members in a diversity class action when a named plaintiff’s claim satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Gibson v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 2001-08-20(a)

For the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the text of § 1367 is clear, and that it confers supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members in a diversity class action when named plaintiffs have claims with an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over diversity class members whose claims fall below the amount in controversy threshold when their claims form part of the same case or controversy as qualifying claims.

Olden v. LaFarge Corp. · filed 2001-10-24(b)

Because exercising supplemental jurisdiction over nonqualified class members is not expressly prohibited by section (b), it is therefore allowed.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of putative class members who do not meet the amount in controversy requirement when the court has original jurisdiction over a class member’s claims.

Chapman Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Linen Service · filed 2002-01-02(a)

Under the only reasonable interpretation of the statutory language passed by Congress, if the court has original jurisdiction over the claims of a class member, supplemental jurisdiction can be exercised over the claims of putative class members over whom the court lacks original jurisdiction because those putative class members failed to claim the requisite amount in controversy.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members whose claims fall below the diversity amount in controversy threshold when the named plaintiffs meet it.

Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2002-11-07(a)-(b)

I also join the majority of circuit courts to find that Zahn was superseded by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which confers supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs whose claims do not meet the .“amount in controversy” requirement.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over other named plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ claims when at least one named plaintiff meets the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement.

In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation · filed 2003-04-11

At least one named plaintiff must meet the $75,000 requirement, and if so, the court will have supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the claims of the other named plaintiffs and of the putative class members.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over diversity class members whose claims fall below the amount in controversy requirement if the district court has original jurisdiction over at least one class representative’s claim and the claims form part of the same case or controversy.

Allapattah Services, Incorporated v. Exxon Corporation · filed 2003-06-11(a), (b)

Thus, we find that § 1367 clearly and unambiguously provides district courts with the authority in diversity class actions to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members who do not meet the minimum amount in controversy as long as the district court has original jurisdiction over the claims of at least one of the class representatives.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ claims that do not independently satisfy the diversity amount requirement once the court has original jurisdiction over the class action.

Forest v. Penn Treaty American Corp. · filed 2003-06-26

Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 1367 supercedes the Supreme Court’s holding in Zahn. Once it is established that a district court has original jurisdiction in a class action suit, the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims for which it does not have original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over proposed class members’ claims only if at least one named plaintiff independently meets the amount in controversy required for original diversity jurisdiction.

Hudgins Moving & Storage Co. v. American Express Co. · filed 2003-11-19(a)

Without jurisdiction over a known plaintiff, presently before the court, whose claims are at the heart of the proposed action and from whom discovery is available, the court finds it has no foundation from which it may extend supplemental jurisdiction over any unknown class members’ claims.

Section 1367 allows supplemental jurisdiction over a diversity class action only if at least one named plaintiff’s claim meets the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Simard v. Lacrimedics, Inc. · filed 2004-08-12

Additionally, Lacrimedics has not demonstrated that at least one named Plaintiffs claims is greater than the jurisdictional amount, which would have allowed for removal of the class action based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of absent members of a diversity class action who do not individually meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, because Rule 23 claims are not excluded by subsection (b).

Julie Olden, Richard Hunter, Wilbur Bleau, and All Others Similarly Situated v. Lafarge Corp. · filed 2004-11-10(a), (b)

Today, we join with the majority of circuits which have considered the question and hold that Zahn has been overruled. ... The first part of the statute (§ 1367(a)) contains a sweeping grant of supplemental jurisdiction giving the courts supplemental jurisdiction over all claims not excluded by the second part (§ 1367(b)). The second part of the statute contains all of the exclusions.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over other class members’ claims when one named plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, even if the others do not.

Oshana v. Coca-Cola Company, a Delaware Corporation · filed 2006-12-29

Once one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, the other plaintiffs come in under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction regardless of whether their individual claims satisfy the requirements of § 1332.

Section 1367 permits remaining class members to join through supplemental jurisdiction when each class representative satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Olden v. LaFarge Corp. · filed 2007-01-29

At the hearing last September, the Court expressed concern that substituting class representatives might affect the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction because the class representatives would each have to show damages in excess of the amount-in-controversy requirement in order for the remaining class members to join under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... The Court is satisfied, therefore, that the proposed new class representatives will represent the class adequately, and their substitution will not destroy jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over other class members’ claims when the class representatives’ claims satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.

In Re 1994 Exxon Chemical Fire · filed 2009-02-04

And, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the other class members.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related class members’ claims below the amount-in-controversy minimum when a named plaintiff meets that minimum and the other diversity requirements are satisfied.

Ullman v. Safeway Insurance · filed 2013-12-31

Safeway Insurance has demonstrated, and Ullman agrees, that Ullman’s claims likely exceed $75,000.00; thus, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the other putative class members’ claims as long as the other requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related class members’ claims below the diversity amount in controversy requirement when one named plaintiff satisfies original diversity jurisdiction, because subsection (b) does not exclude Rule 23 class actions.

Rosmer v. Pfizer Incorporated · filed 2001-08-23(a), (b)

Likewise, due to § 1367, federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of all class members whose claims do not exceed $75,000. Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over the "other" related "claims," and § 1367(b) does not except class actions from § 1367(a)’s application.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over other class members’ claims when a named plaintiff’s claim exceeds the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Besse v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2004-05-05

However, in Rosmer v. Pfizer, 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir.2001), the Fourth Circuit clarified that if a named plaintiff has a claim exceeding $75,000, then the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over all other class members based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Thus, under controlling Fourth Circuit law, the amount in controversy requirement is met in a class action if any named plaintiffs has a claim exceeding $75,000.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of absent class members who do not individually meet the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Olden v. LaFarge Corporation · filed 2004-09-07(a), (b)

Because we find that 18 U.S.C. § 1367 achieves its intended purpose without any absurd result and because we find that its statutory language is unambiguous, we hold today that Zahn has been overruled.

Section 1367 requires at least one class action plaintiff to independently satisfy the diversity amount in controversy before supplemental jurisdiction can reach the other plaintiffs.

Fountain v. Black · filed 1994-01-11

Under either the Zahn analysis or the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, Susan Fountain, the named plaintiff in the instant action, must claim individually an amount in controversy exceeding $50,000. Zahn requires such a showing of all class action plaintiffs; section 1367, if applicable, requires such a showing of at least one plaintiff, forming the entryway through which supplemental jurisdiction conveys the other plaintiffs.

Section 1367(a) cannot supply supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members’ claims unless the named plaintiff’s claim independently satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.

In Re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation · filed 1996-05-07(a)

But what those cases do not say (and what no other case says) is that supplemental jurisdiction can — like the Indian rope trick — attach itself to nothing. ... In sum, it is simply irrelevant (even if true) that any putative class member other than Feedstuffs may have more than $50,000 in controversy with Archer or any of the other defendants.

Section 1367 does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse class representatives merely because unnamed class members satisfy diversity jurisdiction and the amount in controversy.

Ren-Dan Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1997-01-23

They suggest that if some unnamed members of the putative class satisfy diversity jurisdiction and the amount in controversy, the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the class representatives. ... We find that the rule proposed by defendants, and adopted by the Arnold court, is an unauthorized and improvident expansion of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a class action when the named plaintiff fails to meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement, even if unnamed class members may meet it.

Amundson & Associates Art Studio, Ltd. v. National Council on Compensation Insurance · filed 1997-09-17

Accordingly, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that even though Amundson does not meet the jurisdictional amount, other class members have individual claims in excess of $50,000 and we may therefore exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the entire case under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over class members when the class representatives fail to meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement.

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. · filed 2001-05-29

In any event, because the class representatives here do not meet the jurisdictional amount, supplemental jurisdiction over class members would not be available.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members whose claims fall below the diversity amount in controversy when the class representatives meet that amount.

In Re Abbott Laboratories · filed 1995-04-24(a), (b)

We are persuaded that under Sec. 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, as did the class representatives.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over class members whose individual claims fall below the diversity amount-in-controversy threshold when the class representatives meet it.

Free v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1995-04-24(a), (b)

We are persuaded that under § 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they did not meet the amount-in- controversy requirement, as did the class representatives.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members’ claims in a diversity class action even when those members do not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement.

Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 1996-02-08(a), (b)

We reject this reasoning and conclude the plain language of § 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed class members, regardless of their ability to independently meet the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over diversity class members whose claims fall below the amount in controversy requirement when the class representative meets it.

Deep v. Manufacturers Life Insurance · filed 1996-10-23(b)

Accordingly, the Court holds that under Section 1367, a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they do not meet the amount-in-eontroversy requirement, as long as the class representative does.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related class members’ claims when at least one class representative satisfies the requirements for original jurisdiction.

Howard v. Globe Life Insurance · filed 1996-12-27(a)

The conclusion that Zahn has been overruled is based, in large part, on the fact that Section 1367(a) unambiguously grants federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. Thus, if one plaintiffs claim meets the jurisdictional requirements, then the other plaintiffs may be within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related class members’ claims that do not meet the amount in controversy requirement.

In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation · filed 1997-03-17(a)

Section 1367(a) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ claims that fail to meet the amount in controversy requirement, because section 1367(a) unequivocally confers jurisdiction on the district court over “all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the came case or controversy.”

Section 1367 lets other named plaintiffs and unnamed class members with claims below the diversity amount in controversy join when at least one named plaintiff satisfies that amount.

In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation. Appeals of Robert A. Huggins · filed 1997-10-08

At least one named plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional minimum. If he does, the other named plaintiffs and the unnamed class members can, by virtue of the supplemental jurisdiction conferred on the federal district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, piggyback on that plaintiffs claim. That is, they remain plaintiffs, or unnamed members of the class, as the case may be, even though their own claims are for less than the jurisdictional minimum amount.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of named class members that do not independently meet the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Leszczynski v. Allianz Insurance · filed 1997-12-08(a)

Section 1367(a) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the “other claims” of named class members, namely those claims that fail to meet the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members’ claims that do not independently satisfy the diversity amount in controversy requirement when the representative plaintiff satisfies it.

Williams v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc. · filed 1998-09-30

As stated in Bowers, the Court concludes that it may assert supplemental jurisdiction over claims of unnamed class members, regardless of their independent ability to meet the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related diversity class claims below the amount-in-controversy threshold when at least one class member meets that threshold.

Chiartas v. Bavarian Motor Works, AG · filed 2000-08-03(a), (b)

Exceptions to the broad language contained in § 1367(a) are noted in § 1367(b). No exception applies, however, where additional plaintiffs are joined pursuant to Rule 23, the rule governing class actions. The unambiguous terms of § 1367 thus permit exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members who do not meet the jurisdictional minimum, as long as one fellow class member satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members whose individual claims do not meet the amount-in-controversy minimum, assuming the other requirements for class status are met.

Williams v. Potomac Electric Power Co. · filed 2000-09-08

Assuming that the other requirements for class status are met, the Court holds that it has supplemental jurisdiction over all other prospective members of Plaintiffs’ class whether or not each individual member meets the minimum amount in controversy.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over class members whose claims fall below the diversity amount in controversy when one class member’s claim exceeds it.

Poore v. American-Amicable Life Insurance Co. of Texas · filed 2000-12-20(b)

Having concluded that the claims of one of the named plaintiffs exceeds the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court holds that § 1367 authorizes it to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the other class members whose claims do not exceed $75,000.

Section 1367 gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over unnamed class members’ claims regardless of their amounts in controversy when a named plaintiff’s diversity claim exceeds $75,000.

Susan Kanter Sharon Plunk v. Warner-Lambert Co. And Pfizer Inc. · filed 2001-09-10

For the reasons given in that opinion, we hold that if a named plaintiff in a diversity class action has a claim with an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over claims of unnamed class members irrespective of the amount in controversy in those claims, and that under California law punitive damages cannot be aggregated and counted as a single amount for purposes of amount in controversy.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney fee dispute arising from litigation before the court and related counterclaims.

Harrison Conference Services, Inc. v. Dolce Conference Services, Inc. · filed 1992-11-13(a)

The court exercises supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over this attorney fee dispute and any related counterclaims.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction to decide a fee dispute between a party and its attorney over work done in a case properly before the court.

Sado v. Ellis · filed 1993-03-19(a)

The jurisdiction of this court to decide a fee dispute flows from the District Court’s supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III____ Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a post-settlement fee dispute between attorneys when the dispute forms part of the same case or controversy as the underlying federal litigation.

Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Incorporated, Appeal of Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, P.C. v. James R. Ant · filed 1995-12-27(a)

Under these circumstances, we hold that this dispute was part of the same “case or controversy” as the underlying litigation. The district court, therefore, had supplemental jurisdiction to hear this dispute.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over attorney fee disputes related to the main action, including authority to determine the amount of an attorney’s lien.

Woralak Kalyawongsa Udo Liell, Philip P. Durand E. Michael Morris, Attorneys-Appellees v. Moffett · filed 1997-01-23(a)

We have held above that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over this question as a matter of federal law and that jurisdiction includes the authority to determine the amount of the lien.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law attorney lien dispute when the underlying federal claim has been fully resolved, state-law claims substantially predominate, and compelling reasons favor declining jurisdiction.

Ryther v. KARE 11 · filed 1997-09-16(c)(2), (c)(4)

LHDL’s motion concerns a tangential issue grounded in state law that is presented to the court after the claim giving rise to federal jurisdiction has been fully and finally litigated. In such a situation, the court believes the claims grounded in state law substantially predominate over the federal question, if one still remains, and there is a compelling reason for this court to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney fee dispute arising from a federal case when the court retained jurisdiction over the dispute after settlement.

Avery v. Manitowoc County · filed 2006-04-28(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, I have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are so related to a claim over which I have original jurisdiction that they are part of the same case or controversy. ... Thus, I have jurisdiction over the fee dispute under § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute between firms that represented the same plaintiff when an attorney’s lien claimed in the underlying action connects the dispute to that action.

Capron & Edwards P.C. v. Holden & Carr, P.C. · filed 2009-05-20(a)

The fee dispute here forms part of the same case or controversy as the plaintiff’s personal injury litigation because it involves the two firms that represented the plaintiff in that action and involves an attorney’s lien claimed in that action.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney-client fee dispute when the fees concern work performed in the suit within the court’s original jurisdiction.

United States v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of the Cty. of Dona Ana · filed 2010-07-15(a)

As such, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction, because Mr. Gayle-Smith’s claims are with respect to work he did for the suit which gave the Court original jurisdiction.

In a diversity action, § 1367(b) does not bar jurisdiction over a related attorney fee dispute merely because the lawyer and client are nondiverse when the lawyer seeks payment through a charging lien without joining or intervening as a plaintiff.

Exact Software North America v. Infocon Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-05-23(b)

First, the words of § 1367(b) themselves suggest that the carve-out does not apply. ... DeMoisey neither joined the case as a plaintiff under Rule 19 nor intervened as a plaintiff under Rule 24. ... By its terms, the statutory limitation does not apply.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney-client fee dispute concerning representation in a case still pending before the district court.

Goyal v. Gas Technology Institute · filed 2013-06-03

Because the case remained before the district court and the motion to quash concerned a dispute over fees for representation in the dispute before the court, the district court properly exercised its supplemental juris- diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in deciding Goyal’s motion to quash Gomberg’s lien.

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a private fee dispute between attorneys that is only tangential to the underlying federal claims.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Council 79 v. Scott · filed 2013-06-13(a)

Similarly, disputes which arise from a private contract between attorneys are wholly tangential to the federal question claims raised by AFSCME and, thus, are not integral to the main proceeding and do not provide a basis for ancillary jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney’s lien claim arising from work connected to the lawsuit before the court.

Davis v. Kutak Rock · filed 2014-03-26(a)

The lien had a direct connection to the lawsuit. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. King’s related attorney’s-lien claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute between a party and its attorneys when the dispute shares a common nucleus of operative fact with the underlying federal action.

Shukla v. Sharma · filed 2014-10-07(a)

For a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute, the dispute must form part of the same “case or controversy” as a dispute over which the district court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Because the district court indisputably had jurisdiction over the underlying litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the fee dispute.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to an attorney’s lien dispute that forms part of the same case as claims within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

Guy v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government · filed 2015-08-20(a)

The Morrises’ filing of an attorney’s lien in accordance with Kentucky procedure was appropriate under Kentucky state law and was “so related to claims in the action within . . . original jurisdiction that they form[ed] part of the same case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. Demoisey, 718 F.3d 535, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides broad supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that encompasses resolution of attorney’s fees disputes integral to the litigation).

Section 1367(b) does not bar ancillary jurisdiction over an attorney-fee dispute even when the dispute involves non-diverse parties.

Gomez v. Lopez · filed 2018-10-26(b)

For this reason, § 1367(b) does not prohibit the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, even when non-diverse parties are implicated in the ancillary dispute.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney-client fee dispute arising from representation in an underlying diversity action.

Anderson v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceutica · filed 2020-01-14

And in this case, federal law granted the district court diversity jurisdiction over Anderson’s suit against Bayer, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and supplemental jurisdiction over the fee dispute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits ancillary jurisdiction over a collateral fee dispute between law firms that represented a party in the underlying action.

Coleman v. The City of Niagara Falls · filed 2020-03-04(a)

Because the present dispute over attorneys’ fees is collateral to the original case, this Court will exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the fee dispute between the law firms which represented the plaintiff in the underlying action.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney fee dispute when the dispute is part of the same case or controversy as the underlying action.

Byrd v. Kalamazoo, County of · filed 2020-08-04(a)

The attorney’s fee dispute presently before the court is part of the same case or controversy as the above-captioned case.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney-client contingency fee dispute raised after the underlying federal case has been terminated and the court has relinquished jurisdiction.

Nichols v. Illinois Department Of Transportation · filed 2021-04-29(a)

For the reasons explained above, the contingency fee dispute between Nichols and Longo is not within the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court.

Section 1367(a) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney’s charging lien arising from representation in a case before it.

Cruz v. Landrum · filed 2021-07-16(a)

The Court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to decide the validity of the attorney’s charging lien and the amount to be disbursed pursuant to it.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney fee dispute related to an action within its original jurisdiction.

Rios v. Agwara · filed 2022-04-22(a)

Here, the district court had original jurisdiction over Rios’s slip-and-fall action against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and the accompanying fee dispute was an action “related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction.” Id.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorneys’ fee dispute arising from a case within the court’s original federal question jurisdiction.

United States of America ex rel. v. Guardian Pharmacy of Atlanta, LLC · filed 2025-02-21

Because the Court had original federal question jurisdiction over the underlying False Claims Act suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it has supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the underlying suit, including any resulting dispute over attorneys’ fees.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney’s lien dispute arising from representation in the underlying case when the dispute is part of the same case or controversy.

United States ex rel. Lorine LaGatta v. Reditus Laboratories · filed 2026-01-30(a)

The lien dispute thus falls inside the same “case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as LaGatta’s underlying case—if only the outer permitter of it.

Section 1367 permits ancillary jurisdiction over an attorney fee dispute that is part of the same case or controversy as the underlying litigation.

O'Donnell v. Saul · filed 2020-12-29(a)

And while we naturally “hesitate to permit … attorneys to go forward in their clients’ names,” id., “[u]nder these circumstances, we hold that this dispute was part of the same ‘case or contro- versy’ as the underlying litigation,” Baer, 72 F.3d at 1301; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin · filed 2001-03-30(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that arise under foreign law where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because plaintiffs only federal claim have been dismissed, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining copyright infringement claims arising under foreign law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a foreign law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Baig v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 2014-09-24(c)(3)

Here, the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that arise under foreign law” because it “ ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction’ ” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining foreign-law claims against defendants after dismissing all federal claims against them.

Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2013-08-20(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims against BSI and BSPLC, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining Israeli law claims against these defendants.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims after it resolves the claims within its original jurisdiction, taking account of whether foreign law and a foreign forum are better suited to the remaining dispute.

Merhav Ampal Group, Ltd. v. Merhav (M.N.F.) Ltd. (In re Ampal-American Israel Corp.) · filed 2016-02-29(c)

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is not appropriate, assuming that it is present. ... In addition, it seems that the Tortious Interference Claims will be governed by Israeli law, which the parties have ignored, and their resolution is best left to an Israeli court. ... Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Tortious Interference Claims, and they are dismissed.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign-law claims when novel and complex issues of that law weigh against hearing them.

In Re Chiquita Brands International, Inc. · filed 2011-06-03(c)(1)

Even if the Court were competent to interpret and rule upon a foreign nation’s common law, the novel and complex issues inherent in such in endeavor balance against exercising supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Colombian-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a claim raises complex issues of foreign law, as well as state law.

Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha · filed 1993-06-10(c)(1)

As the principles embodied in subsection (c)(1) are implicated by complex issues of foreign as well as state law, subsection (c)(1) suggests that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Mars’, Japanese patent claim.

Section 1367(a) does not preserve supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once they are severed from the claim supplying original federal jurisdiction.

Jonas v. Conrath · filed 1993-06-24(a)

Assuming federal question jurisdiction is appropriate as to Prudential, the parties seemingly agree the state law claims against Dr. Conrath and Vision Care fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If the claims against Prudential and the other Defendants are severed, supplemental jurisdiction would evaporate and an independent jurisdictional basis for the state law claims against Dr. Conrath and Vision Care would be lacking.

Section 1367(b) does not prevent remand when joining an indispensable party destroys diversity jurisdiction.

Duke & Benedict, Inc. v. Wolstein · filed 1993-07-15(b)

In examining cases subsequent to the statutory amendment, there is evidence that, despite the language and the legislative notes accompanying it, the district courts have held that where there is an indispensable party which destroys diversity the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ... Therefore, like Whalen, joining of University as an indispensable party destroys diversity and requires this court to remand this action to the state court.

Section 1367 does not alter the traditional rule requiring complete diversity.

Virgin Islands Housing Authority v. Coastal General Construction Services Corp. · filed 1994-06-24

That contention was an erroneous interpretation of section 1367 because that statute does not affect the traditional rule of complete diversity.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a party joined under Rule 19 when exercising it would violate the diversity requirements of § 1332.

Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-09-18(b)

Under the supplementary jurisdiction statute, if federal jurisdiction is predicated solely on diversity, a district court cannot have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 19 “when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims requiring joinder under Rule 19 when that joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction.

ALPVEX, Inc. v. ACIA, LLC · filed 2019-11-26(b)

Though Alpvex has not requested it, this Court additionally notes that it cannot maintain supplemental jurisdiction over these claims because it would have to join Acia as a party under Rule 19, which it is prohibited from doing because that would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a trust controversy requiring joinder of a United States citizen domiciled abroad whose presence defeats diversity, even when a separate trust controversy satisfies diversity jurisdiction.

HEDGER v. BAR HARBOR TRUST SERVICES · filed 2020-02-10(b)

Moreover, even though the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the Nathalie Trust controversy, the Court cannot ... exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Frank Trust controversy because the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not allow it.

Section 1367 does not supply supplemental jurisdiction to preserve a diversity action when an indispensable party would destroy subject matter jurisdiction if joined.

Lubovich v. Byrnes, as Trustee of the Yife Tien Irrevocable Dynasty Trust · filed 2024-06-03

The Court finds unpersuasive Petitioners’ last-ditch argument that the Court simply needs to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (4) permit a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state mandamus claim involving a state administrative agency because federalism and comity favor state court resolution.

Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified School District · filed 1994-01-25(c)(1), (c)(4)

Subsections (1) and (4) of section 1367, cited above, both provide reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ciernes’ state mandamus claim. Mandamus proceedings to compel a state administrative agency to act are actions that are uniquely in the interest and domain of state courts. It would be entirely inappropriate for a federal court, through exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction, to impose itself upon such proceedings. Considerations of federalism and comity, not generally present with typical “pendent” state claims, loom large in the case of state mandamus proceedings. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.

State law claims dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims are dismissed must be dismissed without prejudice when their merits were not decided.

Richter v. Connor · filed 1994-04-08

The District Court did not rule on the merits of these claims, but rather, dismissed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction upon dismissal of the federal claims. Thus, as Defendants/Appellees acknowledge, the dismissal should have been without prejudice.

Section 1367(a) covers state-law claims sufficiently related to claims within original jurisdiction to form part of the same case.

Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc. · filed 1994-10-31(a)

These state law claims fall under this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction since they “are so related to claims in the action within [the Court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as a federal claim.

Zimmerman Group, Inc. v. Fairmont Foods of Minnesota, Inc. · filed 1994-11-17(a)

This court finds that it has supplement jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same general controversy as a surviving federal claim, including claims against parties not subject to the federal claim.

Davis v. Courington (In Re Davis) · filed 1995-02-02(a)

Supplemental jurisdiction extends over state claims brought against a party even when that party was not subject to the federal claim primarily at issue. Therefore, if Appellant's state law claims are sufficiently related to the federal claims, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over those claims under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. Appellant's complaint alleges a pattern of wrongful refusal to accept tender of payments on various deeds of trust, misapplication of payments, wrongful foreclosure proceedings, and wrongful interference with Appellant's real estate investment activities both before and after Appellant filed for bankruptcy. We conclude that the federal and state claims arise out of the same general controversy and that the bankruptcy court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over Commonwealth claims that depend on the same facts as claims within the court’s original federal-question jurisdiction.

Schroeder v. De Bertolo · filed 1995-03-23(a)

Whether or not plaintiffs are able to support these allegations will depend on the same facts which sustain plaintiffs’ federal claims. Therefore, this Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Commonwealth law as well.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim whose issues and facts are intimately bound with a federal ERISA claim.

Farrie v. Charles Town Races, Inc. · filed 1995-08-16(a)

While Eatz would require that such a cause of action be tried in a state forum, this Court sees no reason that it cannot accept supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claim where the issues and facts are intimately bound with the federal law question under ERISA, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and decide the issue as a collateral one under the authority of Connell Construction, supra.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain jurisdiction over state law claims while a federal claim remains pending.

Polite v. Casella · filed 1995-10-18

Because plaintiff still maintains this federal claim, the Court presently will retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims related to federal claims that form part of the same action.

Graves v. Tru-Link Fence Co. · filed 1995-11-07(a)

The court finds that it has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs ICFA claims alleged in Count V pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the subject matter in Counts I, II and V are related claims that form part of the same action.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that arise from the same facts and circumstances as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Brown v. City of Oneonta · filed 1996-01-03(a)

The same facts and circumstances giving rise to the claims on which the jurisdiction of this court is based, also form the basis for the state claims. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(a) requires supplemental jurisdiction over adequately related state-law claims when the court has original jurisdiction, unless an exception applies.

Southern Council of Industrial Workers v. Ford · filed 1996-05-14(a)

Where original jurisdiction exists, exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over all adequately related claims is mandatory, absent certain exceptions that are inapplicable here.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain jurisdiction over related state claims when the federal claim survives summary judgment.

Bowles v. City of Camden · filed 1998-02-02

Because we have denied the City’s and Webster’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs federal question claim under § 1983 and the First Amendment, we will retain pendent jurisdiction over his state claims against the City and Webster for defamation and his N.J.S.A. 40:69A-43(c) claim for termination without a hearing.

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of remaining state claims after the federal claims have been resolved.

Gonser v. Twiggs County · filed 2002-01-09

Any remaining state claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law mandamus claims.

Franceschi v. Franchise Tax Board · filed 2016-07-08(a)

While federal courts are properly cautious about exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a state law mandamus claim, there is no iron rule prohibiting the exercise of such jurisdiction. Indeed, the opposite is true—Congress has given federal courts the discretion to hear mandamus claims.

Section 1367(a) requires a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims within its Article III jurisdiction unless another federal statute bars it or section 1367(b) or (c) applies.

Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District · filed 1994-01-27(a)

Under section 1367(a), unless expressly precluded by a federal statute, a district court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims within its Article III jurisdiction unless section 1367(b) or one of the categories specifically enumerated in section 1367(c) applies.

Section 1367 requires a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when none of the statutory grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

Habiger v. City of Fargo · filed 1995-01-23

28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). Since this court concludes that none of the exceptions listed above apply to the circumstances of this case, it must accept jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged by plaintiffs.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not govern remand when the district court lacked original jurisdiction at the time of removal.

RMP Consulting v. Datronic Rental · filed 1999-08-16(c)(3)

CMU is not relevant because there were no federal claims here over which the district court had jurisdiction at the time of removal. Thus, our case involves remand under § 1447(c) rather than § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(a) requires an asserted nonfederal claim against a defendant before a court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that defendant.

HAYNE BLVD. CAMPS PRESERVATION ASS'N v. Julich · filed 2001-06-08(a)

Inherent in the concept of supplemental jurisdiction is the overarching essential that there must be a nonfederal claim before the Court before it can exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Here, however, the plaintiffs have asserted no claim whatsoever against the state defendants, and as such, there is no claim over which this Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits discretionary dismissal of state-law claims after claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed; when original jurisdiction never existed, dismissal of the state-law claims is mandatory.

Ashby Ex Rel. M.A. v. Dyer · filed 2006-04-14(c)(3)

Although the defendants suggest that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), that section only applies when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In this case, original jurisdiction was never acquired because no actionable federal claim was pleaded in any version of the complaint.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant when no claim against that defendant has been brought that could support its exercise.

Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Elicker · filed 2009-02-10

The Court also concludes it does not have jurisdiction under § 1367 because Plaintiffs have not brought a claim against State Defendants over which this Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(1) does not authorize a court to decline jurisdiction over a claim within its original jurisdiction merely because that claim raises state-law issues; supplemental jurisdiction requires a separate claim.

Voketz v. Decatur, Alabama, City of · filed 2020-09-15(c)(1)

To be sure, the defendants’ pending motions implicate state law issues. But that does not establish a separate state law claim triggering supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, because the court has not exercised supplemental jurisdiction in this case, it cannot “decline to exercise” that jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to defer deciding whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction while a claim within its original jurisdiction remains pending and to decide the issue if that claim is later dismissed.

Bill & Ted's Riviera, Inc. v. Cuomo · filed 2020-10-13(c)(3)

With regard to Plaintiffs' Article 78 claim, there is no need for the Court to consider whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over that claim at this time. If, at some point during this litigation, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, then, at that time, the Court can decide, in its discretion, whether to "decline to exercise [its] supplemental jurisdiction over" their Article 78 claim because the court "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Article 78 claim.

A district court may postpone deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims while it remains unclear whether the plaintiff can state a federal claim.

Bell v. City of New York · filed 2021-01-07(c)(3)

Because it is not clear at this stage whether Plaintiff can state any federal claims, the Court will determine at a later time whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff seeks to raise.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to defer deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims while the viability of the federal claim remains unresolved.

Howard v. 3,6 Mafia · filed 2021-07-23(c)(3)

The Court declines, however, to consider Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim at this time. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because it is not clear that Plaintiff can state a valid federal claim, the Court will determine at a later time whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff seeks to raise in the complaint.

Section 1367(c) calls for the court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after finding that it has the power to hear a related state-law claim; absent a reason under its factors to decline, the court may exercise that jurisdiction.

Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas · filed 2021-11-18(c)

The Court’s inquiry does not end upon finding power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Court must also decide whether it should exercise such jurisdiction under § 1367(c). ... Under these factors, the parties do not offer, and the Court does not find, any reason to decline to exercise jurisdiction over Baker’s state law claim.

Section 1367(c) factors need not be applied to state law claims before an amended pleading is filed when the current pleading is subject to dismissal with leave to amend.

Mula v. Mula-Stouky · filed 2022-08-15(c)

The Court cannot apply the § 1367(c) factors to a pleading that has not yet been filed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; the court may defer that decision while federal claims remain possible.

Narowski-Trippitola v. Westchester County Gov. Office · filed 2022-12-19(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “ has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because it is not clear whether Plaintiff can state any federal claims, the Court will determine at a later stage whether or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff seeks to raise in this complaint.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when a state claim rests on the same alleged violation as a federal claim and involves nearly identical facts, witnesses, and evidence; a website accessibility claim does not warrant declining jurisdiction merely to enforce state procedures limited to construction-related claims.

Jimenez v. R Inn Napa Inc. · filed 2023-09-20(c)

There is no compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The state claim does not predominate over the federal one, because both rest on the same alleged violation and involve “nearly identical facts, witnesses, and evidence.”

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction but is not an independent source of original subject matter jurisdiction.

Rodi Marine, LLC v. Lighthouse Marine, LLC · filed 2024-06-25

It is black letter law that “[t]he supplemental-jurisdiction statute [28 U.S.C. § 1367] is not a source of original subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over claims, but does not authorize remand of claims within its original jurisdiction.

Stephens v. LJ PARTNERS · filed 1994-05-17(c)

Because this Court must exercise federal question jurisdiction, Buchner, 981 F.2d at 820, the Court concludes that § 1367(c) does not authorize remand of any claims within the original jurisdiction of the Court.

Section 1367(c) does not authorize a district court to decline or remand a claim within its original jurisdiction.

No. 94-3025 · filed 1995-01-31(c)

First, nothing in Sec. 1367(c) authorizes a district court to decline to entertain a claim over which is has original jurisdiction and, accordingly, that section clearly does not sanction the district court's remand of this entire case, including the civil rights claims, to the state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) prevents a court from retaining a supplemental claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Mulligan v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1995-10-11(c)(3)

It is statutorily mandated that this Court cannot retain jurisdiction over a supplemental claim when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit dismissal of supplemental state-law cross-claims on the ground that all original-jurisdiction claims have been dismissed when an original-jurisdiction claim remains unresolved.

NYLife Distributors, Inc. v. Adherence Group, Inc. · filed 1995-12-21(c)(3)

It necessarily follows and we further conclude that the district court erred when it also dismissed Gerasolo's cross-claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1993) on October 26, 1994, believing that all claims over which it had original jurisdiction had been eliminated from the case.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit dismissal of supplemental claims on the ground that all original-jurisdiction claims have been dismissed when an unresolved stage of an interpleader action remains within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Nylife Distributors, Inc. v. The Adherence Group, Inc. · filed 1996-02-02(c)(3)

We thus hold that the district court's conclusion that all federal claims had been dismissed by virtue of its May 19, 1994 order was in error, and that its October 26, 1994 decision to terminate the case in favor of TAG's pending state court action on this basis was as well erroneous. It necessarily follows and we further conclude that the district court erred when it also dismissed Gerasolo's cross-claims under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3) (1993) on October 26, 1994, believing that all claims over which it had original jurisdiction had been eliminated from the case.

Section 1367(c) does not authorize a district court to dismiss or remand a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Hickerson v. City of New York · filed 1996-06-27(c)

Nothing in section 1367 authorizes a district court to dismiss or remand any claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction, including claims arising under the United States Constitution.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit a district court to remand a claim that still presents a federal question.

Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney · filed 1996-06-27(c)(3)

Count IX was properly removed; it stated a federal question, and it could therefore not be remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Conlon v. United States · filed 1997-03-26(c)(3)

The district courts, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under § 1367(a) when the court has, as here, dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to remand a supplemental claim when no claims within its original jurisdiction remain.

Garcia v. Rainbo Baking Co. of Houston · filed 1997-08-28(c)(3)

Since there are no remaining claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, this Court may remand the case to state court.

Section 1367(a) does not sustain supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party state-law claim after dismissal of the complaint supplying original jurisdiction; jurisdiction must then rest on diversity.

Fell v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-01-20(a)

The question of jurisdiction over CAL’s third-party complaint remains, however. Here, jurisdiction was asserted as supplemental pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Having dismissed Fell’s complaint and having determined that the third-party complaint presents a simple breach of contract claim under Colorado law, jurisdiction, if it exists, must rest on diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to remand state claims over which it declines supplemental jurisdiction, but does not authorize remanding the entire action when federal claims remain.

Roe v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1998-11-02(c)

However, the plaintiffs request that the entire action be remanded to state court will not be granted. Nothing in the language of § 1367(c) authorizes that result, nor has the plaintiff identified any case law supporting that proposition.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a claim whose facts and legal questions are intertwined with claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. GTE Northwest, Inc. · filed 1999-04-21(a)

Finally, the court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), given the extent to which the facts and legal questions regarding this claim are intertwined ... with those claims over which the court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Zandhri v. Dortenzio · filed 2002-10-31(c)(3)

The Court further declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Zandhri’s remaining state law claims on the ground that it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not provide a basis to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the claims within original jurisdiction have been reinstated.

Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Company Inc. · filed 2003-12-30(c)(3)

Because the FLSA claims are now reinstated, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction over the § 345-a claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, but does not authorize remand of a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Baker v. Kingsley · filed 2004-10-27(c)(3)

Section 1367(c)(3) grants district courts authority to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand a case "if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Accordingly, the authority to remand pursuant to § 1367 extends only to claims that are not within the district court's original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, but does not authorize remand of a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Baker, James A. v. Kingsley, Alfred D. · filed 2004-10-27(c)(3)

Accordingly, the authority to remand pursuant to § 1367 extends only to claims that are not within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

MacKenzie v. Donovan · filed 2005-06-29(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, as all federal claims have been dismissed, we exercise our discretion and dismiss plaintiffs remaining state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Alvarado v. Bratton · filed 2007-05-03(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims because the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not give a district court discretion to decline jurisdiction over state law claims that independently fall within its original diversity jurisdiction.

Shonk v. Fountain Power Boats · filed 2009-07-16(c)(3)

The district court possessed original jurisdiction over all claims in this case pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, when the district court declared that it “obtained supplemental jurisdiction over Shonk’s state law claims based upon his MMWA claim,” (J.A. 621 n.7), the district court was mistaken. Concomitantly, the district court was mistaken in believing that it possessed discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss Shonk’s claims under the Maryland UCC and the Maryland CPA against Fountain.

Section 1367 gives a district court discretion over supplemental claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, but SLUSA’s remand provision removes that discretion when both statutes apply.

Proctor v. Intertchnolog · filed 2009-10-09(c)(3)

Should both apply, we read the SLUSA remand provision as a limitation on the discretion accorded the district court by § 1367, in effect taking away the discretion that § 1367 grants.

Section 1367(c) leaves a district court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Del-Ray Battery Co. v. Douglas Battery Co. · filed 2011-03-14(c)

Nor did the district court’s dismissal of the SREA fees claim divest it of supplemental jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claims.

Section 1367(a) is unnecessary for a claim over which the district court already has original federal question jurisdiction.

Marshall v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Marshall) · filed 2012-09-24(a)

Accordingly, since the district court has original jurisdiction over the FDCPA Claim, the district court does not need to look to the supplemental jurisdiction statute to bring the FDCPA Claim within its jurisdiction, rendering the concept of supplemental jurisdiction irrelevant in this case.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, but the dismissal does not itself eliminate supplemental jurisdiction.

Mocek v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2015-12-22(c)

But the fact that the district court could decline to exercise jurisdiction does not mean there was no jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law legal malpractice claim without a related claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rembold v. Lettau · filed 2019-10-23(a)

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) grants district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the courts’] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” These grounds do not apply here.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over interference proceedings involving solely pending patent applications because federal law reserves exclusive jurisdiction to the USPTO.

AIRPORT SURFACE TECHNOLOGIES v. Fieldturf, Inc. · filed 2003-06-23(a)

35 U.S.C. § 135 expressly provides that the USPTO has exclusive jurisdiction over interference proceedings involving solely pending patent applications. See Consolidated World Housewares, Inc., 831 F.2d at 265. The court will not usurp the exclusive power of an administrative agency once Congress has spoken on the issue. As such, § 1367(a) is not applicable to Plaintiffs' Count VII.

Section 1367(c) does not authorize remand when the court has original diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Schumacher v. Sunrise Senior Living · filed 2021-01-11(c)

However, Section 1367(c) does not provide a basis for remand. It is true that “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See Section 1367(c)(3). However, Plaintiff’s “argument misses one key point: the [Notice of Removal] expressly alleges . . . diversity jurisdiction” and thus, the Court has “original jurisdiction over the [state law claims] if diversity jurisdiction exists.” Hooper v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 18-CV-1706, 2019 WL 4888651, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019); Morris v. City of Buffalo, No. 97-CV-0134, 1999 WL 307683, at *1 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 1999) (“Section 1367(a) makes clear that ‘original jurisdiction’ is a prerequisite to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction”). Accordingly, the Court declines to remand this action under Section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(4) does not permit a district court to decline jurisdiction over a claim within its original diversity jurisdiction.

ALLIED WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY v. KEATING · filed 2022-03-11(c)(4)

Section 1367 does not apply. Although it grants the district court discretion to remand claims over which it has supplemental jurisdiction, it does not authorize remanding claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims forming part of the same case or controversy even if they also fall within admiralty jurisdiction.

Marolda v. Tisbury Towing & Transportation Co., Inc. · filed 2022-04-26(a)

Even though Marolda’s third-party claims also fall within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.