28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c) permits dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed at screening.

Curry v. Advocate Bethany Hospital · filed 2006-11-02(c)

The district court properly dismissed the pendant state-law tort claims without prejudice because the federal claims were dismissed at screening.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed at screening.

Ruckel v. Police Department · filed 2020-01-30(c)(3)

However, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the claims at this time, in light of the dismissal of all federal constitutional claims at screening.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when no federal claim passes initial review.

Michelson v. Wellpath · filed 2020-11-12(c)(3)

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a negligence claim under State law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at this time because no federal claim has passed initial review.

Section 1367 does not support supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the plaintiff has no viable federal claim.

Vue, Kong v. Olsen, Brent · filed 2022-08-26

Vue does not have a viable federal claim so I cannot exercise jurisdiction under § 1367.

Section 1367 provides no supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the asserted federal claim fails to state a claim for relief.

Sliwinski v. Rhodes · filed 2025-08-19

However, given that Sliwinski fails to state a claim for federal relief, no supplemental jurisdiction lies.

Section 1367 does not provide jurisdiction over state law claims when no viable federal claim remains.

Vaughn · filed 2026-01-23

Absent a viable federal claim, the Court does not have jurisdiction over any purported state law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction at initial screening over state-law claims associated with alleged federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations.

Mendez v. Moonridge Neighborhood Association Inc. · filed 2020-01-28(a)

Construing pro se pleadings liberally and giving Mendez the benefit of any doubt, the Court finds the federal question criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 preliminarily met, and the state-law claims associated with the FDCPA violations are preliminarily contained under supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367).

Section 1367 permits related state law claims to proceed past initial screening when viable federal claims remain, leaving review of the state law claims for later motions.

Milner v. Bristol · filed 2019-08-21

If there are no facially plausible federal law claims against any of the named defendants, then the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356 F. Supp. 2d 157, 165-66 (D. Conn. 2005). On the other hand, if there are any viable federal law claims that remain, then the validity of any accompanying state law claims may be appropriately addressed in the usual course by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment after the defendants have been served.

Section 1367 permits related state law claims to proceed when viable federal claims survive initial review, with the state claims’ validity addressed later by motion.

Pena v. Stanley · filed 2020-11-17

On the other hand, if there are any viable federal law claims that remain, then the validity of any accompanying state law claims may be appropriately addressed in the usual course by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.

Section 1367(c) permits dismissal of state-law claims without prejudice when all federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations or the Heck doctrine.

Jones v. Carter · filed 2020-01-06(c)

Because Jones’s federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations or the Heck doctrine, and because it is most appropriate to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice in this instance, no further discussion is necessary.

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of a remaining count for lack of supplemental jurisdiction after the federal counts are dismissed under Heck.

Sneed v. Rodriguez · filed 2013-04-30

The District Court properly dismissed the first two counts of the complaint under Heck, given that the counts requested monetary damages, and properly dismissed -- without prejudice -- the third count for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over a related state negligence claim when the federal claim against that defendant is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Wand, Armin v. Kramer, Beckey · filed 2019-12-10(c)(3)

Wand’s deliberate indifference against McArdle will be dismissed without prejudice, and the court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over Wand’s related negligence claim against her as well.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Martinez v. DeLone · filed 2020-02-12(c)

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is DECLINED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Walker v. State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2020-03-17(c)(3)

I will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits retention of state-law claims after dismissal of the federal claim when substantial discovery, trial preparation, and an imminent trial make retention serve judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.

Back v. Commonwealth Of Virginia · filed 2019-11-27(c)(3)

The court acknowledges that its sole basis for jurisdiction over Back’s state-law claims is supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, the court may nonetheless retain jurisdiction and finds that the factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness weigh in favor of retaining Back’s claim.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy favors doing so, including when trial is near.

Bristow v. Clevenger · filed 2000-01-19(c)(3)

The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiffs state tort claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and false arrest. ... Furthermore, trial is scheduled to begin in a matter of weeks, and thus, judicial economy favors exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that raises a new issue of state law when the parties request it, trial is near, and a federal claim remains.

Strahan v. Frazier · filed 2001-08-01(c)(1)

Taking into account "concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like,” Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir.1996), this Court chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Strahan's claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, despite the fact that it raises a new issue of state law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), because the parties requested that the Court do so, trial is quickly approaching, and there is a remaining claim arising under federal law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when the duration of the litigation and an imminent trial favor retention.

Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 1996-11-25(c)(3)

Based upon the current duration of this lawsuit and the imminent trial, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction merely because a state-court trial date is imminent.

Jackson v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-09-27(c)(4)

Finally, the court does not find compelling the reasons identified by plaintiff for remand under § 1367(c)(4). The fact that the ease is scheduled for trial just weeks from now in state court does not warrant remand of this action.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of the sole federal claim when comity favors state court and little judicial effort has been spent on the state claims, even if trial is approaching.

Goon v. Coleman · filed 2020-01-21(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c)(3). ... Moreover, although this case is nearing its trial date, this case is not one where “substantial judicial resources have already been committed” to the state law claims, thereby causing a “duplication of effort.” ... Thus, in sum, this is a Washington-centered case on which the court has expounded little resources, which warrants exercise of the court’s § 1367(c) discretion to decline jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after resolving the federal claims when proceedings are well advanced and trial is near.

Johnson v. Dollar General · filed 2012-07-30(c)(3)

Because proceedings are well advanced in this court and trial is set to begin relatively soon, on September 24, 2012, I will not sua sponte decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

A third-party plaintiff invoking supplemental jurisdiction must allege facts sufficient to show that its claims form part of the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Eastgate Investments I, LLC v. MW Builders, Inc. · filed 2020-03-20(a)

Additionally, to the extent MW Builders relies on supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, it must allege facts sufficient to show that its claims against the Third-Party Defendants “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a three-judge court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over regulatory challenges that share substantial factual and legal overlap with the statutory challenge and do not predominate over it.

Ted Cruz for Senate v. Federal Election Commission · filed 2020-03-30(a), (c)(2)

Plaintiffs’ core constitutional challenge to the statute and its implementing regulations is identical: Both the statute and the regulations are alleged to impose the same unconstitutional burden on the rights of Plaintiffs, other candidates, and potential post-election donors to engage in protected First Amendment activity. For that reason, as Plaintiffs point out, the regulatory claims will not “predominate” over the statutory challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed even if state review is now untimely, where the plaintiff previously had an opportunity to obtain that review.

Brown v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-03-23(c)(3)

Brown also challenges the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over his state administrative-law claim. But we see no abuse of discretion here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-court claims when it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). As we suggested in the first appeal, there was no compelling reason for a federal court to resolve these paradigmatic issues of state law involving actors other than Gunnell. Brown, 771 F.3d at 416. To be sure, Brown objects that it is now too late for him to procure administrative review in state court—but what matters is that at one time, he could have. Illinois law permits an administrative-review action to be joined to a discrimination lawsuit like the one Brown filed in 2011. See Durgins, 272 F.3d at 843. We see no obstacle to Brown’s having done so in his first lawsuit once the Board issued its decision. And although Brown’s later, separate administrative-review action was dismissed, Brown appealed that decision but then failed to prosecute his appeal, which led to its dismissal. None of this required the district court to channel his state-law claim into a federal forum.

After dismissing all federal claims, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims consistent with judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity when the case remains at the pleading stage without discovery, even after two years.

Jelen v. United States Marshall Service · filed 2020-03-30(c)(3)

The Beth Israel Defendants also contend that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Jelen’s medical malpractice claim. Having dismissed all of Jelen’s federal claims, this Court agrees. ... Here, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction will not run afoul of those factors. Although this action has been pending for approximately two years, it has not advanced beyond the pleading stage, and the parties have not conducted any discovery.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Silver v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. · filed 2017-11-15(c)(3)

Having determined that Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be dismissed, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining NYSHRL claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the only federal claim.

C.G. v. Redding Christian School · filed 2020-03-17(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action, for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, is the only claim asserted under federal law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as to Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims in their Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action, and those claims are accordingly dismissed, without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Mckinney v. Ramsey · filed 2019-09-20(c)(3)

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court declines to consider, under its supplemental jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s claims under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Ryan v. VERMONT STATE POLICE · filed 2009-06-01(c)

Dismissal of the ADA/Rehabilitation Act count leaves this case without any federal claims. ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Count 5 and therefore ... that Count is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1998-12-14(c)(3)

Since plaintiffs § 1981 claim was the only claim raised in the amended complaint over which the court had original jurisdiction, and since the court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the remaining state law claims are properly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all federal claims, absent extraordinary circumstances warranting retention.

Jordan v. Staffing Plus, Inc. · filed 2018-06-20(c)(3)

Once a district court has dismissed all federal claims in a case, the court may, at its discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining claims. ... Because the Court is not aware of any "extraordinary circumstances" that justify retaining jurisdiction over these claims after dismissing Plaintiff's § 1981 claim, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted with respect to Claims Two through Four of the Amended Complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Rose v. Mendon Leasing Co. · filed 1997-07-18(c)(3)

Since the sole source of federal jurisdiction over this case was Rose and Sterling’s Title VII and § 1981 claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, considering federal policy, judicial economy, and fairness to the parties.

Streno v. Shenandoah University · filed 2017-09-30(c)(3)

With Stténo’s Title IX and § 1981 claims dismissed, his only remaining claims are state law claims that raise no underlying issues of federal policy. Moreover, at this early stage in the case, dismissing this action to be pursued in state court will not waste judicial resources or result in unfairness to either party. Thus, the.court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Streno’s remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Smith v. Roane County Commission · filed 2019-03-21(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims because Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts regarding his federal § 1983 and § 1985 claims to permit the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

McFadden v. Apple Inc. · filed 2019-08-26(c)(3)

Finally, to the extent that McFadden asserted state law claims against Apple, in light of the dismissal of McFadden’s claims under §1983 and § 1985, the District Court justifiably declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims, and to dismiss those state-law claims without prejudice.

Moore v. Nelson · filed 2005-07-22(c)(3)

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims. Plaintiffs remaining claims arise under Georgia law. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over those claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

McArdle v. Hufnagel · filed 2014-10-16(c)(3)

However, they may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once all claims over which they have original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice McArdle’s state-law claims once it dismissed his § 1985(3) claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claim.

Fritz v. City of Corrigan · filed 2001-06-25(c)

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim is GRANTED. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and DISMISSES those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Showalter v. Brubaker · filed 2007-06-22(c)

Because Showalter’s complaint fails to allege state action, her Section 1983 claim asserting First and Fourth Amendment deprivations must be dismissed. I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant tp 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Reyes v. Central New Mexico Community College · filed 2011-01-31(c)(3)

The applicable statute clearly permits district courts to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). We have concluded the district court properly dismissed Reyes’s Fourth Amendment claim. Although Reyes argues the district court had original jurisdiction over his contract claim, we agree with the district court that he has failed to allege any facts to support that assertion. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reyes’s contract claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Rhoten v. Werholtz · filed 2007-06-20(c)(3)

Because the district court correctly dismissed Rhoten’s Eighth Amendment claims, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Exum, 389 F.3d at 1138-39.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the complaint fails to state any federal claim.

Stinson, Deyontae v. Schueler, Renee · filed 2019-10-28(c)

And without Eighth Amendment claims, I will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state-law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed before trial when no exception to the usual practice justifies retaining jurisdiction.

KING v. GEO GROUP, INC. · filed 2019-12-06(c)(3)

With all Eighth Amendment claims now dismissed, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. King’s state-law claims and dismisses them without prejudice. ... The Court finds no reason to deviate from the usual practice in this case. ... For these reasons, the Court exercises its discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claim.

Murray v. Memarsadeghi · filed 2019-12-04(c)(3)

The Court will therefore grant summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim asserted by Murray. To the extent that Murray’s Complaint is construed as raising state law claims of medical malpractice and negligence, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and thus will dismiss such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining local-law claims after summary judgment disposes of the sole federal claim.

Richardson v. Smith · filed 2018-08-24(c)(3)

But courts generally exercise supplemental jurisdiction only so long as one federal claim remains live. Id. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). ... And, Count Four being her only federal claim, the Court will remand Richardson’s remaining claims—Counts One, Two, and Three—to the District of Columbia Superior Court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Leyh v. Property Clerk of the City of New York Police Department · filed 1991-10-01(c)(3)

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....” Here, the malicious prosecution claim of the plaintiff — founded as it is on state law and brought against non-diverse defendants — comes within the supplemental jurisdiction of this court. However, the defendants in this action are entitled to summary judgment on the constitutional claims of the plaintiff; thus, only the state law claim would be left for adjudication. As such, the matter should be relegated to the state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental state law claims when the federal claims against the same defendants are dismissed.

Martinez v. Simonetti · filed 2000-02-04(c)(3)

Because the federal claims against them must be dismissed, we also direct dismissal of the supplemental state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it disposes of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Marshall v. Buckley · filed 2010-03-19(c)(3)

Although Plaintiffs state law claims for IIED and malicious prosecution remain, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss these remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Deyo ex rel. D.N. v. Tomball Independent School District · filed 2015-11-11(c)(3)

To the extent Plaintiff alleges a state law action against the Individual Defendants for malicious prosecution, the Court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismisses that state law claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dorobanov v. Caesars Entertainment Corporation · filed 2018-02-27(c)(3)

Indeed, this presumption is statutorily expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which provides for the discretionary relinquishment of jurisdiction over state claims when the claims providing original jurisdiction (here, federal-question jurisdiction) have been dismissed. ... So the usual presumption will be followed here: this Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state law malicious prosecution claim, without prejudice to refiling in state court.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim, taking account of the case’s early stage and the state-law nature of that claim.

Elan Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Sexton · filed 2019-10-01(c)(3)

Having disposed of Plaintiffs’ only claim arising under federal law, and having found no basis for diversity jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim arising under state law. ... Because this case is in its infancy and Plaintiffs’ remaining malicious prosecution claim “raise[s] questions of purely state law,”62 the Court sees no compelling reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and, therefore, dismisses those claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all federal claims.

Turner v. Lowen · filed 2019-10-01(c)(3)

Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as asserting a malicious prosecution state law claim, the Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over that claim, because the Court is dismissing all federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim and dismiss it without prejudice when the federal claim fails.

Holmes v. Dabrowski · filed 2020-03-12(c)(3)

Since the remaining claim, malicious prosecution, is based on state law and Plaintiff’s federal claim fails, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over it and dismisses the claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Rouse v. Ard · filed 2020-01-08(c)(3)

As a result, § 1367(c)(3) applies, and the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim of malicious prosecution and vicarious liability.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after the federal claims are withdrawn, particularly when the state law is unsettled.

Thomas v. Lamanque · filed 1997-11-14(c)(3)

Having granted plaintiff’s motion to withdraw Count I, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s common law claim of malicious prosecution for two reasons. One, only a state law claim remains in the case, which claim would be more appropriately addressed in a court of the Commonwealth.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims.

Carmack v. Trombley · filed 2005-03-31(c)(2)

This Opinion and Order disposes of the federal claims before this Court. I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for malicious prosecution and assault and battery and therefore DISMISS these claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bonds v. Fizer · filed 2010-05-20(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court has granted summary judgment on Bonds’ federal claim, there are no claims remaining over which we have original jurisdiction. ... Although Bonds’ state law claim for malicious prosecution remains, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss Count II.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction; it may dismiss those state law claims without prejudice.

Briscoe v. Jackson · filed 2014-02-24(c)(3)

In the present case, summary judgment has been granted on all constitutional claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. The interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity will not be served by extending supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining assault and battery and malicious prosecution claims brought under state law. Therefore, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and will dismiss these state-law claims without prejudice, so they may be refiled in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss remaining state-law claims in its discretion after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

McCoy v. Carter-Jones Timber Company · filed 2009-11-09(c)(3)

To the extent that Appellants raised a state-law false imprisonment claim, the district court was also in its discretion to dismiss that claim once it dismissed all other claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (authorizing a federal court, in its discretion, to dismiss remaining state-law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Smith v. Tolley · filed 1997-04-04(c)(3)

As described above, all claims over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction have been dismissed. Therefore, pursuant to Section 1367(c)(3), Smith’s false arrest and false imprisonment common law tort claims (Count VI) are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Rudkin v. Sedgwick County, Kan. · filed 2007-01-10(c)(3)

“The district court[ ] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if — (c) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The Court finds no compelling reasons to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to decide the merits of Plaintiffs state law claim. ... In the interest of comity and federalism, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs state law claim for false imprisonment without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

Dominguez v. METROPOLITAN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY · filed 2004-11-23(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims for battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence because the only claim in Plaintiffs complaint over which the Court has original jurisdiction is dismissed as a result of this order.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim and dismiss it without prejudice.

Goines v. Valley Community Services Board · filed 2015-05-04(c)(2)

As to the false imprisonment claim, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and will instead dismiss it without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Byford v. Stephens · filed 2003-11-07(c)(3)

The Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), hereby declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims for false arrest and negligent training and supervision (Counts II and IV).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Mooney v. County of Monroe · filed 2007-09-11(c)(3)

Because plaintiff has discontinued this action as against the state defendants and the Court has dismissed plaintiffs sole federal claim against Strong, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law false imprisonment claim.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims and to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice.

Baker v. Smiscik · filed 2014-09-24(c)(3)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law tort claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment contained in Counts I and II, and dismisses them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the litigation has not advanced far enough for dismissal to prejudice the plaintiff.

Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Ass'n · filed 1995-08-11(c)(3)

In this case, litigation has not proceeded to the point that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if this claim was dismissed. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the court declines jurisdiction over plaintiff Pratt’s wrongful termination claim, which is grounded in a state-law-based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction, taking account of prejudice to the parties.

Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association · filed 1996-09-06(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district court may decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed claims over which it had original jurisdiction). ... In this case, litigation has not proceeded to the point that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if this claim was dismissed. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the court declines jurisdiction over plaintiff Pratt's wrongful termination claim, which is grounded in a state-law-based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, with discretion to consider the state issues involved.

Salmon v. Miller · filed 1996-12-05(c)(3)

However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Because the plaintiffs remaining state law claim involves issues of local government and wrongful discharge, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing the only federal claim.

Vercos v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2017-04-25(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs only federal claim, the Court also dismisses Plaintiffs claims under Colorado law, without addressing their merits, including her claims for wrongful termination, for interference with contract, and — to the extent such a claim has been pled — for civil conspiracy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Wien all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Battle v. Master Security Company LLC · filed 2018-02-09(c)(3)

And, having dismissed Battle’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claim for wrongful termination, which arises under District of Columbia law.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims raise novel issues of state law or all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Carroll v. Acme Truck Line, Inc. · filed 2014-01-21(c)(1), (c)(3)

In this case, Plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim involves a novel issue of state law, as the Pennsylvania courts have not heretofore recognized a viable exception to the at-will employment doctrine under the circumstances raised in Plaintiffs complaint. Moreover, as previously explained, summary judgment will be granted to Defendant on all of Plaintiffs federal claims. Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs PHRA and wrongful discharge claims, and such claims will be dismissed without prejudice to her ability to refile in an appropriate Pennsylvania court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the state claims present novel or complex state law issues.

Holmes v. Clover, Town of · filed 2019-09-10(c)

However, as for reasons to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court observes that it has granted summary judgment on all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... The court is further persuaded by Holmes that his remaining state law claims raise novel and/or complex issues of state law because they require interpretation of the statutory law of municipalities in relation to an alleged violation of public policy and a determination regarding the first-time application of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Angus to a claim for tortious interference with contract. ... Therefore, after balancing the relevant factors, the court finds that they weigh in favor of it declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Holmes’ remaining state law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and tortious interference with contract.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, considering whether dismissal would prejudice the plaintiff.

Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Ass'n · filed 1996-07-02(c)(3)

Id.; see also, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district court may decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed claims over which it had original jurisdiction). In this ease, litigation has not proceeded to the point that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if this claim was dismissed. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the court declines jurisdiction over plaintiff Pratt’s wrongful termination claim, which is grounded in a state-law-based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, and it usually should do so.

Kinney v. Blue Dot Services of Kansas · filed 2012-12-18(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kinney’s state-law whistleblowing and wrongful discharge claims. Rather, “[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the sole federal claim.

Click v. Thompson · filed 2014-05-06(c)

Having dismissed the sole federal claim in this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Click’s state-law claim of wrongful discharge.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

In Re American Express Co. Shareholder Litigation · filed 1993-12-22(c)(3)

The sole basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims against the defendants is this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A court may decline to exercise such jurisdiction when the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lakonia Management Ltd. v. Meriwether · filed 2000-07-27(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because all of plaintiffs federal claims are dismissed, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and therefore dismiss those claims as well.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Luzerne County Retirement Board v. Makowski · filed 2007-11-27(c)

Given that the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs federal law claims, which formed the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over: (1) Plaintiffs state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count VIII); (2) the third-party claims and counterclaims against Morreale, Flood and Plaintiff for contribution, indemnification and breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Kugelman v. PVF Capital Corp. · filed 2013-09-09(c)(3)

Having found that the federal claims are subject to dismissal, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims (breach of fiduciary duty).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Champions League, Inc. v. Woodard · filed 2016-12-15(c)(3)

Given the dismissal of Plaintiffs federal securities fraud claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Alford v. Mecklenburg County Clerk of Superior Court · filed 2019-07-02(c)

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff purports to bring any supplemental state law claims, such as breach of fiduciary duty, this Court declines to address those supplemental claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claim fails.

CANNOM v. Elk Horn Bank and Trust · filed 2002-10-25(c)(3)

If Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to state a federal anti-trust claim, the Court will decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the other state law claims for tortious interference with a contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and the entire case will be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims against the same defendants.

Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct · filed 2014-03-12(c)(3)

Summary judgment was properly granted for them on Shields’ § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the district court also did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for medical malpractice against these defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses the federal claim.

Jacks v. Annucci · filed 2019-07-18(c)

To the extent the Complaint may be construed as alleging state law claims such as medical malpractice or negligence, (see Compl. ¶ 31), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims at this time. Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claim, the Court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Langer v. The County Of Suffolk · filed 2019-08-08(c)(3)

The Court has weighed the relevant factors in exercising its discretion in this regard--i.e., the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--and in light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Maines v. Fender · filed 2019-12-11(c)

To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a state law claim for medical malpractice and/or medical negligence, and having dismissed Plaintiffs federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law medical malpractice and negligence claims and dismiss them without prejudice after resolving the federal claim.

Singfield v. Buck · filed 2020-03-13(c)(3)

To the extent Singfield intends to raise state law claims for medical malpractice and negligence, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss such claims without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(a) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over common-law negligence and medical-malpractice claims after the federal claim fails.

Bennett v. FENTY · filed 2009-08-27(a)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's common law claims of negligence and medical malpractice, for which the Superior Court of the District of Columbia provides the "proper forum.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims fail and to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice.

Giles v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2020-01-29(c)(3)

To the extent that Giles’s Complaint is construed as raising state law claims of medical malpractice and negligence, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and thus will dismiss such claims, without prejudice.

Supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law medical-malpractice claim may be declined when the accompanying federal claims fail to state a claim.

Earl v. Jackson General Hospital · filed 2020-02-06(a)

To the extent Earl intends to allege a claim under Tennessee law for medical malpractice, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Darby v. May · filed 2020-03-30(c)(3)

To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a state law claim for medical malpractice and/or medical negligence, and having dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of all federal claims when substantial discovery remains outstanding and the remaining claims involve quintessential state law issues best resolved in state court.

Colon v. Griffin · filed 2019-10-17(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of all federal claims from this action, the substantial discovery that remains outstanding, and the fact that Plaintiff’s “medical malpractice claims against [Medical Defendants] involve quintessential state law issues best resolved in a state forum,” Weathers v. Millbrook Central Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed, without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing the same claims in state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law medical malpractice claims and dismiss them without prejudice after resolving the federal claims against the plaintiff.

DePaolis v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2019-11-13(c)

Because I herein conclude that the other defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to DePaolis’ § 1983 claims of deliberate indifference and excessive force, I will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims of medical malpractice. Accordingly, I will summarily dismiss his claims against Dr. Hollyfield and Cheri Dickenson without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of all federal claims.

Mathis v. Hague · filed 2020-01-09(c)(3)

To the extent that Mathis’s Complaint is construed as raising state law claims of medical malpractice and negligence, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and thus will dismiss such claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after granting summary judgment on the federal claim.

Foord v. Memorial Hospital at North Conway NH · filed 2020-01-27(c)(3)

As the court now grants Concord Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on Dr. Foord’s EMTALA claim, only his state law claims for medical malpractice and loss of consortium would remain. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses Dr. Foord’s state claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claims supporting original jurisdiction.

La Bri v. Finn · filed 2019-07-23(c)(3)

The Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when no actionable federal claim remains.

(PC) Anderson v. California Medical Facility · filed 2019-08-06(c)(3)

Lastly, plaintiff asserts state law claims for negligence, medical malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the absence of an actionable federal claim, though, the court declines to consider these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss remaining state-law claims without prejudice after granting summary judgment on the sole federal claim.

William D. Foord, MD, individually and as Trustee and Executor of the Estate of Carol C. Foord v. Capital Region Health · filed 2020-01-27(c)(3)

As the court now grants Concord Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on Dr. Foord’s EMTALA claim, only his state law claims for medical malpractice and loss of consortium would remain. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses Dr. Foord’s state claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, particularly when the case is at an early stage.

Estate of Lacko ex rel. Griswatch v. Mercy Hospital, Cadillac · filed 2011-11-03(c)(3)

A district court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissal of the federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Given the early stage of these proceedings, this Court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after judgment is entered on all federal claims.

Henderson v. Camphill · filed 2019-09-05(c)(3)

Because judgment will be entered against Henderson on all federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Costales v. City and County of Maui · filed 2019-07-16(c)(3)

Thus, pursuant to § 1367(c), the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law wrongful death and negligence claims and DISMISSES them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court, in its discretion, to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims have been dismissed.

Ballard v. Jabbar · filed 2020-02-12(c)(3)

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert state-law claims, including a wrongful death claim under Missouri state law, the Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over them. Where federal claims in an action have been dismissed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over state claims as a "matter of discretion." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hassett v Lemay Bank and Trust Co, 851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the sole federal claim as time-barred, dismiss those claims without prejudice, and toll their limitations periods.

Spainhour v. Jones · filed 2020-03-18(c)(3), (d)

Because Fred Spainhour’s complaint states only one federal claim under § 1983 which the Court dismisses as time-barred, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims raised in the complaint, including the Arkansas wrongful death claim, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court dismisses those remaining claims without prejudice and tolls the period of limitations consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of remaining state-law claims without prejudice after all federal claims are dismissed when comity, convenience, fairness, and judicial economy favor a state forum.

Estate of Cesar Rodriguez v. City of Long Beach · filed 2020-03-30(c)(3)

The Court agrees that declining jurisdiction, and dismissing the remaining state law claim without prejudice, is the sounder approach in this case. Following the plaintiffs’ concessions, all that remains of this case is a California state law claim for wrongful death pled against California state law enforcement agents. Comity, convenience, fairness, and judicial economy counsel in favor of allowing these formerly ancillary California state law issues involving California state actors to be decided in a California court.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that raises complex issues of Colombian law.

Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc. · filed 2008-12-22(c)(1)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute permits district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction when “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). The district court concluded that the Colombian law claim met that requirement. After extensive briefing of this issue, the district court was unable to reconcile conflicting translations of Colombian legal precedents, to “navigate the complexities of the parties’ submissions,” or “to discern . . . the Colombian law requisites for a wrongful death claim.” The conclusion of the district court that the claim raised complex issues is supported by the record, and the court was well within its discretion to decline jurisdiction over that claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when none of its grounds for declining jurisdiction is present.

Thomas v. Cnty. of Chester · filed 2018-05-15(c)

Here, Plaintiff's state law wrongful death and survival actions against Dr. Paroya share a common nucleus of operative fact with her § 1983 claims against Pocopson Home, as all claims arise from Defendants' alleged improper care and treatment of Mr. Thomas while at the nursing home. Furthermore, as none of the circumstances to decline jurisdiction are present, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against Dr. Paroya.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claim is withdrawn when no judicial resources have been expended and judicial economy favors adjudication in state court.

White v. Buchanan · filed 2020-02-26(c)

In this case, judicial resources have not been expended at this point in the litigation. Judicial economy weighs heavily in favor of having the state law claims for wrongful death and negligence adjudicated by the state court. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the issues remaining in the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Pollock v. Pollock · filed 1997-05-22(c)(3)

A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Therefore, we will also dismiss the plaintiffs’ state-law privacy claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after disposing of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Carrasquillo v. Pharmacia · filed 2005-08-15(c)(3)

Because we grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding the federal claims and federal preemption, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ non-preempted Commonwealth law claim for invasion of privacy.

After dismissing all federal claims, a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims when limitations pose no barrier, little judicial effort has been expended, and their disposition is unclear.

DASILVA v. INDIANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES · filed 2020-03-02(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims from this lawsuit, it must consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims for sexual battery, battery, defamation, and false light invasion of privacy against Attorney General Hill in his individual capacity. ... The first factor is not at issue in this case because “Indiana’s savings statute, Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1, and the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) foreclose any concerns related to the statue of limitations.” Plaats, 2015 WL 5773724 at *4; see also Wozniak v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2007 WL 869165, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (stating that the “first factor is not here, or even normally, a concern because the Indiana ‘journeys account statute,’ Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1, generally gives plaintiffs three years to refile claims not dismissed adversely or because of the plaintiff’s negligence in prosecuting”). As to the second factor, discovery has not yet commenced, and this litigation is in its infancy. Finally, it is not clear how the state law claims should be decided.6 Based on the factors set forth by the Seventh Circuit, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ battery, defamation, and false light invasion of privacy claims7 and DISMISSES those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-file them in state court.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only when a listed ground applies.

Kelley v. Troy State University · filed 1996-05-02(c)

The court does not believe that it possesses the discretion to dismiss the Plaintiffs claims for assault and battery and invasion of privacy because the claims do not satisfy one of the grounds for which the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (3) favor declining supplemental jurisdiction over an unsettled, novel and complex state law privacy claim after the federal claims have dropped out.

Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc. · filed 1997-09-02(c)(1), (c)(3)

We feel that § 1367(c)(1) and (3) both apply here, favoring remand to the state court of the privacy claim made under Restatement § 652B principles; the claim raises a novel and complex issue of state law that is undecided by the Colorado courts and there are other compelling reasons for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction since this delicate privacy law area is in transition.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when its complexity and available defenses warrant doing so.

Shotz v. City of Plantation, FL · filed 2003-09-08(c)

Last, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Shotz’s state law invasion of privacy claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after all original-jurisdiction claims are dismissed, especially when the remaining state claims raise novel issues of state law.

Griffith v. Fenrick · filed 2007-05-04(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... In addition to the § 1367(c)(3) presumption of dismissal under the circumstances of this case, declining to exercise jurisdiction furthers the intent of § 1367(c)(1) which separately authorizes dismissal if the state claim presents a novel or complex issues of state law. The remaining claims present interesting and novel issues concerning the relationship between Wisconsin’s right of privacy and name change statutes.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Corbin v. Supreme Court of Florida · filed 2007-05-21(c)(3)

Furthermore, while the district court did not specifically address Corbin’s state law claims of privacy infringement, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, third party contract breach, and wrongful injunction, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hunt v. Branch Banking & Trust Company · filed 2012-05-16(c)(3)

However, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hunt’s state law claim for violation of privacy.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing the claim within its original jurisdiction, taking account of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Doe v. Minnesota Department of Public Safety Does · filed 2018-03-12(c)(3)

Because the court has dismissed Doe’s federal claim, the only claim for which original jurisdiction existed, the court must consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim for invasion of privacy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minn., 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004). ... Based on consideration of the pendent jurisdiction factors, the court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim for invasion of privacy.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving all federal claims by summary judgment.

Ward v. United Parcel Service · filed 2013-12-16(c)

Having determined that summary judgment is appropriate on all of Mr. Ward’s federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent and/or malicious retention, supervision, and training, and invasion of privacy, consistent with its discretion to do so under § 1367(c)(1) and/or (3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, ordinarily absent extraordinary circumstances.

SMITH v. NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2019-08-06(c)(3)

The Court does not find that there are extraordinary circumstances that justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Smith’s invasion-of-privacy claim under Pennsylvania law. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss Smith’s invasion-of-privacy claim.

Section 1367(a) permits jurisdiction over a cross-claim arising from the same subject matter as an action within the court’s original jurisdiction without an independent basis for jurisdiction over the cross-claim.

Garot v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-01-05(a)

Further, the cross-claim at issue arises out of the same subject matter as Plaintiff’s claims as it is a claim seeking a declaration of responsibility for indemnity or contribution to the County as to Plaintiff’s underlying claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Pilavskaya, 2012 WL 3279517, at *4. (See Doc. No. 64 ¶¶ 38-39.) As such, the Court has jurisdiction over the cross-claim, and the cross-claim for declaratory relief need not present an independent basis for jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits a bankruptcy court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-core claims that share operative facts with claims within its core jurisdiction.

McChristian v. Ditech Holding Corporation Mortgage, LLC · filed 2021-11-09(a)

The Court has core jurisdiction over the claims asserted against the Ditech Defendants in the Complaint. The Plaintiff is asserting the claims in Counts 1, 7, 8 and 9 against Breckenridge and the Ditech Defendants. Thus, those claims derive from the same operative facts, are part of the same controversy, and ordinarily would be tried together in state court. In resolving the Motion, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Breckenridge Claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an intervenor’s claim in a federal-question case when the claim meets the standards for intervention.

Gonzales v. City of Austin · filed 2024-02-20(a)

Because HFL’s claim meets the standards for intervention, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the other claims.

Henry Searcy, Jr. v. DeMaurice Smith · filed 2024-08-06(a)

However, because the District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Searcy’s other claims, it cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his FAA claim.

Section 1367(a) does not require an independent basis of original jurisdiction over state law claims for a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Silverii · filed 2025-12-19(a)

As Silverii points out in his surreply, original jurisdiction over the state law claims is not required because the Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that form part of the same case or controversy when the court has original jurisdiction over another claim.

Timberline Mountain Operations, LLC v. County Commission of Tucker County · filed 2026-03-17(a)

Where “the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the Court has denied the motion to dismiss Count Two, the motion is also denied with respect to the remaining claims.

Section 1367(a) gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy as a bankruptcy claim.

Edge Petroleum Operating Co. v. GPR Holdings, L.L.C. · filed 2007-03-28(a)

It follows that district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy with bankruptcy claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related cross-claim even when the cross-claim parties lack diversity.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Camelback Canyon Investors · filed 1991-11-12(a)

Based upon the statute, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to hear defendant Chick’s cross claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when local government issues are better resolved by state courts.

Youngblood v. City of Galveston, Tex. · filed 1996-03-20(c)(3)

Youngblood’s state law claims, particularly his Open Meetings Act and Whistleblower claims, involve issues of local government that are more properly resolved by the Texas courts. Thus, the Court exercises the discretion granted to it by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3) and declines to exercise jurisdiction over Youngblood’s remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims supporting original jurisdiction.

Pearson v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-07-23(c)(3)

When the federal-law claims on which a court’s original jurisdiction is based have been dismissed, the court has discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. ... In light of the dismissal of plaintiffs federal claims, the Court sees no reason to retain jurisdiction over the remaining claims under the D.C. Whistleblower Act and under the common law (Counts IV and V).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad · filed 2015-03-09(c)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claim, this Court ultimately has discretion over whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims for violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Count IV) and the Illinois. Whistleblower Act (Count VI). ... This Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction on enumerated grounds, including dismissal of all original-jurisdiction claims, novel or complex state-law issues, or substantial predominance of state-law claims.

Hauge v. Brandywine School District · filed 2001-02-13(c)

Defendants cannot avail themselves of any of these exceptions. First, this court has denied the motion to dismiss Hauge’s federal constitutional claims. Second, although it is a preference of federal courts to reach statutory claims before constitutional claims, the court may ultimately have to decide this case by interpreting the Delaware Whistleblower Statute. The facts of this case, however, do not provide “novel or complex issues of State law;” nor. do the state law claims dominate the First Amendment claims. Thus, the court will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss the counts of Hauge’s complaint based on Delaware law.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims presenting unresolved state-law questions after it resolves the claim within its original jurisdiction, and to remand those claims when the case was removed.

Reynolds v. City of Eugene · filed 2013-03-22(c)(1), (c)(3)

Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand plaintiffs whistleblower claims to the state circuit court. ... Here, no Oregon court has resolved whether a “disclosure” must be reported to someone other than the alleged wrongdoer, and no Oregon court has held whether § 659A.199 applies to public employers. ... However, given that this case was removed to federal court, remand is appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against defendants for whom it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bradley v. West Chester University of the Pennsylvania State System Higher Education · filed 2016-04-19(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2015), this Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Plaintiffs Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claims cannot be heard in this Court due to the Eleventh Amendment, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her common law tort claims as against any Defendant except, for Mixner.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims that supplied original jurisdiction.

Douglas v. District of Columbia Housing Authority · filed 2013-10-25(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of plaintiff’s federal-law claims, and the Court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add Counts VI and VII, there is no reason for the Court to retain jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law claim under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act. The Court will therefore dismiss Count IV without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims still at an early stage after dismissing the sole federal claim.

Dowdall v. Downs Racing, L.P. · filed 2020-01-16(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... As just explained, the sole federal law claim in this action will be dismissed with prejudice. The remaining claims, counts one and two, breach of contract and promissory estoppel respectively, originate under state law and come before me through supplemental jurisdiction. Given that these state law claims have not progressed beyond the filing of a single motion to dismiss by Downs Racing, L.P. (see Doc. 13), I see no reason that I should retain jurisdiction over the state law claims. Matters of state law are best left to the state courts. Therefore, I decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when no federal claims remain.

Brown v. United Parcel Service · filed 1996-10-08(c)

The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary to the extent permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Here, Brown’s only outstanding claim is based on state promissory estoppel law. No issues of federal law remain. Thus, I decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Brown’s second claim for relief.

Section 1367 permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice when the federal claim is dismissed before trial.

Pickelhaupt v. Jackson · filed 2010-02-04(c)(3)

Although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is discretionary, when a federal claim is properly dismissed before trial, it is customary to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice. See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l., Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004). Dismissal of Pickelhaupt’s state-law promissory estoppel claim for resolution in the state courts is in the best interests of both the federal and state courts here. See id.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to leave a supplemental state-law claim unaddressed after rejecting the federal claim.

Al Ghashiyah v. WI Parole Commission · filed 2007-07-26(c)(3)

And because the district court properly rejected the claim, it did not err by not addressing al Ghashiyah’s pendent state-law claim that Grahl, Muraski, and Garro committed abuse of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Estate of Keys v. Union Planters Bank, N.A. · filed 2008-09-29(c)(3)

If a court dismisses all claims over which it has original federal jurisdiction, however, it may also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims based solely on state law. ... Given that plaintiffs only remaining claim is abuse of process, a state law claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses this claim as well.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when the parties have expended little time and energy and no discovery would need to be repeated in state court.

Macgowan v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado · filed 2020-01-10(c)(3)

Based on these principles, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim for abuse of process. The Court stayed discovery in this matter on July 31, 2019. Courtroom Min. Ord., ECF 17. Therefore, it is clear the parties have not expended a great deal of time and energy. Furthermore, if Plaintiff were to reassert this claim in state court, the parties would not be required to repeat any discovery. A balance of the factors in this case does not favor retaining jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Eke v. Florida · filed 2011-03-11(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim of abuse of process in Count III.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Taylor v. Sedgwick County Board of Commissioners · filed 2019-09-30(c)(3)

Instead, exercising its discretion, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law abuse of process claim because it is the only remaining claim in this lawsuit now that the court has dismissed all of plaintiff’s federal claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after resolving the federal claims.

Smith v. Lafollette · filed 1994-04-20(c)

Once the district court resolved Smith's federal claims, it could "bypass" his state legal malpractice claim against Herrling, Myse, Swain & Dyer, Ltd., and dismiss it for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of a supplemental state-law claim after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Williams v. Ruth Horner, Postmaster · filed 1996-05-13(c)(3)

Finally, the legal malpractice claim against the former defense counsel for Williams was properly dismissed after all of the federal claims were dismissed.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims.

Winters v. Bascom · filed 2019-12-19(c)

To the extent that plaintiff wishes to sue Mr. Bascom and his law firm for legal malpractice, a state law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over such a claim and will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a potential state-law malpractice claim when no federal claim supplies original jurisdiction.

Davis v. Sarles · filed 2015-09-29(c)(3)

As to plaintiffs’ claim that defendant Dorsey’s counsel was inadequate, those allegations do not state a federal claim over which this. Court would have original jurisdiction, and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what amounts to a potential common law claim of legal malpractice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims.

Townsend v. Missouri Public Defender System · filed 2019-12-18(c)

To the extent that plaintiff wishes to sue Ms. Iberra and the Missouri Public Defender’s Office for legal malpractice, a state law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over such a claim and will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law legal malpractice claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Taylor v. Miles · filed 2020-01-08(c)(3)

Furthermore, to the extent Taylor seeks to assert a claim of legal malpractice under Tennessee state law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims at an early stage.

Brewster v. Nassau County · filed 2004-12-13(c)(3)

Judge Spatt’s reasoning is persuasive. This Court similarly declines to extend its supplemental jurisdiction to cover any potential legal malpractice claims that Brewster might have against Legal Aid. For the same reasons, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over any other state law claims that Brewster might inferably allege against any other Defendant would be imprudent and is hereby declined.