28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant when it dismisses the federal claims against that defendant.

Grice, Regis v. Tapio, Nathan · filed 2019-09-30(c)(3)

Because I am dismissing the federal claims against B. Dittman, I am declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s proposed state law claims against them.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims while the viability of federal claims against other defendants remains unresolved.

Yazdi v. Lafayette Parish · filed 2019-09-30(c)

The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to replead certain of her federal claims against the Individual Defendants, and the resolution of those claims could impact the determination of retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state claims against LPSB. Consequently, the Court will at this point defer its determination of whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims against LPSB, and will continue to exercise jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims against a defendant after dismissing all federal claims against that defendant.

Rodriguez v. Baker · filed 2020-09-03(c)(3)

Additionally, where the Court has dismissed all federal claims against a Defendant—J. Baker (Lopez), B. Baker (Rodriguez), Westerfield, Gorton, and Weathers—it will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction solely because federal claims against some defendants were dismissed when federal claims against others remain pending.

East Coast Serv. Indus. Co. Inc., d/b/a Whiskeys 20, Thomas Svoleantopoulos, and Rosalie Sweeney v. N.H. State Liquor Co · filed 2020-09-17(c)

Because at this ... point federal claims remain pending, it is not appropriate to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims after it dismisses the federal claims against the same defendants.

JACKSON v. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND · filed 2020-12-14(c)(3)

As the Court is dismissing all the federal claims against the moving defendants, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Nine and Ten. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against defendants when the federal claims against them fail.

Edge v. Mahlman · filed 2020-12-28(c)(3)

Finally, having concluded that plaintiff has failed to state a federal constitutional claim against defendants Taylor or Harr, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over any state-law claim against these defendants and dismiss any such claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims against that defendant when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not justify retaining the state claim.

Espigh v. Borough of Lewistown · filed 2021-01-29(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal of Espigh’s three federal claims. Accordingly, we will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Espigh’s Count IV, the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367 gives a court discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim against a defendant who faces no pending federal claim.

Shehan v. Barrone · filed 2023-01-06

The court has dismissed these defendants from this action and therefore has discretion either to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim asserted against a defendant against whom there are no pending federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, with the early stage of the proceedings supporting that choice.

Torres v. Becton · filed 2019-10-31(c)(3)

Where a court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this instance, given the early stage of the proceedings, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, unless and until plaintiff pleads a viable federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when dismissal occurs early in the action.

Zellars v. Liberty National Life Insurance · filed 1995-10-19(c)(3)

The court also takes into consideration the fact that the federal claims are being dismissed early in this action. In accordance with the foregoing authority, because no claims remain from which the court had original jurisdiction, the court shall dismiss the state claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when dismissal occurs early in the proceedings.

Rivera v. Heyman · filed 1997-10-07(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that “the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....” As this motion has occurred at an early stage in the proceedings (by stipulation, the Government has yet to file its answer to the second amended complaint), this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Rivera’s tort action against Palau and Dolan, and the claim is dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims are resolved, particularly early in the case before discovery.

Nagel v. ADM Investor Services, Inc. · filed 1999-09-03(c)(3)

With all claims based on federal law resolved, I relinquish supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3). Discovery has not been held, and when the federal claim is eliminated early in the case it is almost always best to permit the parties to address their remaining differences in state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Levy v. City of Hollywood · filed 2000-03-31(c)

In cases where the court’s jurisdiction is based solely upon a federal question, the district court has discretion whether to hear or to dismiss any state claims that are pendant to the federal claim that provides the basis for jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (describing the broad discretion that district courts have to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). ... Therefore, the Court will remand Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed, including when dismissal occurs early in the case.

Thorp v. Kepoo · filed 2000-06-06(c)(3)

Although this statement is generally accurate, the Court notes that a federal district court may retain jurisdiction over state law claims even after all federal claims have been dismissed. A district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under certain circumstances, such as when the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C. · filed 2003-03-18(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims under the New York Human Rights Law and the New York state common law claim of prima facie tort. When the federal law claims have been dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state law claims remain, the federal court should decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims, with a strong presumption favoring dismissal when that occurs early in the case.

Leung v. Law · filed 2005-05-30(c)(3)

This case does not appear to present any circumstances that would require me to disturb the strong presumption that pendent state law claims should be dismissed where the federal cause of action has been dismissed in the preliminary rounds. Accordingly, I decline to exercise further jurisdiction over Leung’s remaining claims, all of which present issues of New York law.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed early in the suit.

MORALES v. Toledo · filed 2008-07-22(c)(3)

Because the federal claims are being properly dismissed, this Court does not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims asserted in the case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all federal claims early in the case.

DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis · filed 2010-07-23(c)(3)

Given the early stage dismissal of all federal claims, and especially the reasons for it, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental juris...diction over the pendent state claims alleged in the amended complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction early in the litigation.

Parra v. Pacificare of Arizona, Inc. · filed 2013-04-19(c)(3)

However, once the district court, at an early stage of the litigation, dismissed the only claim over which it had original jurisdiction, it did not abuse its discretion in also dismissing the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the only federal claim, particularly at an early stage of litigation.

Lorber v. Winston · filed 2013-07-03(c)(3)

Having dismissed the Plaintiffs only federal claim, and given the early stage of this litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, particularly at an early stage of litigation.

Kurian v. Forest Hills Hospital 10201 66th Rd Forest Hills · filed 2013-07-15(c)(3)

Having dismissed the Plaintiffs only federal claim, and given the early stage of this litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs state law claims is granted without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court that dismisses all federal claims early in litigation to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.

South Commons Condominium Ass'n v. City of Springfield · filed 2013-09-06(c)(3)

Given the early stage of litigation, the court will exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction, especially early in the litigation.

Chen v. Major League Baseball · filed 2014-03-25(c)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims; the early stage of litigation supports that choice.

Sewell v. Bernardin · filed 2014-08-02(c)(3)

Having dismissed the Plaintiffs federal claims, and given the early stage of this litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when it dismisses all federal claims early in the action.

Anthony v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2015-09-08(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs federal claims have been dismissed at this early stage of the action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs breach of contract claim and it is accordingly dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, particularly when the case is at an early stage and state law issues are unsettled.

Skipper v. Clark · filed 2015-12-03(c)(3)

This case is at its outset arid no discovery has been conducted, so there has been no expenditure of time or resources to develop the .state-law claims. ... Accordingly, the 'Court will decline to . exercise supplement jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and will remand this matter to Casey Circuit Court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior University · filed 2016-08-30(c)

When all of the federal claims are dismissed early in a case, “the district court ‘may,’ under section 1367(c), decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction ... and ordinarily ‘should’ dismiss the state law claims.” ... Plaintiff offers no reason why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims if the federal claims, are dismissed. Accordingly, the court, in its discretion, dismisses counts 4-7 of the complaint.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they substantially predominate and all federal claims have been dismissed, especially when litigation is in its early stages.

Mapp v. UMG Recordings, Inc. · filed 2016-09-21(c)

In this case, the Court finds the statutory and common law factors favor declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. First, the state law claims substantially predominate over the dismissed federal claims, as all federal claims have been dismissed. Thus, the second and third statutory factors are satisfied, and it is immaterial whether the first factor has been satisfied.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction at an early stage of litigation.

Zitter v. Petruccelli · filed 2016-09-30(c)(3)

Because the Court is dismissing every claim over which it had original subject matter jurisdiction at an early stage in the litigation it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly at an early stage of litigation.

Sklodowska-Grezak v. Stein · filed 2017-02-21(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” and because of the early stage at which those claims are being dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

After all federal claims are dismissed, Section 1367 presumptively favors declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims, especially early in litigation.

Metz v. Herbert · filed 2017-03-20(c)(3)

First, there is a strong presumption against the exercise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, of supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims, once all federal claims have been dismissed, and residual supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, including when litigation is at an early stage.

Bentz v. City of New York · filed 2017-04-06(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the remaining claims are state law claims for recklessness and negligence. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This case is in the early stages of litigation; no discovery has been exchanged, and the parties are far from trial or summary judgment.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when litigation is at an early stage.

Northbay Healthcare Grp., Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2018-03-30(c)(3)

If a court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ... In light of these facts, and given that the litigation is at its earliest stages, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of NorthBay's claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage.

Rasheen v. Adner · filed 2019-01-28(c)(3)

Because Toliver's federal claims for deliberate indifference are being dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claims at this early stage of the case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state and local claims when it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, including at an early stage of litigation.

Glaser v. Upright Citizens Brigade, LLC · filed 2019-03-28(c)(3)

Here, because all of Glaser's federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage of this litigation, the Court declines in its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glaser's remaining city- and state-law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the case is still in its early stages.

Parsons v. Heartland Regional Medical Center · filed 2019-07-23(c)

Accordingly, in the instant case, considering that all federal-law claims have been dismissed and that this case is in the very early stages of litigation, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the case is still at an early stage.

Harper v. Professional Probation Services Inc · filed 2019-08-05(c)(3)

But the court has now “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, the court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Two, and WILL DISMISS that claim as well.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims, particularly when the case remains early in its proceedings.

Osawe v. Tinsley · filed 2019-08-08(c)(3)

The Court dismisses these remaining causes of actions for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, since no federal cause of action remains, and the case is early in its proceedings.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the sole federal claim, particularly when proceedings are at an early stage.

Conner v. Cleveland County Emergency Medical Services · filed 2019-08-21(c)(3)

With the dismissal of the sole federal claim, and given the early stage of these proceedings, the Court in its discretion declines to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when it dismisses the federal claims, especially early in the case.

Teixeira v. Wainwright · filed 2019-09-04(c)(3)

However, that same statute provides that, if the district court dismisses the claims upon which federal court jurisdiction was originally based, especially at the onset of a proceeding, it is prudent to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims and to dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Feliz v. City of New York · filed 2019-09-13(c)(3)

Fourth, on the state law claims, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie- Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Report at 19— 20. Here, the Court declines to exercise such jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses all claims supporting original jurisdiction at an early stage.

JIHAD v. POSITIVE HEALTH CARE, INC. · filed 2019-10-02(c)(3)

Here, at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, the Court is dismissing Plaintiff's Title VII claims, which provided the Court with federal question jurisdiction. Asa result, the Court will use its discretion pursuant to Section 1367(c), and declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction at this time.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed at an early stage of the case.

Little v. CSRA (MAG+) · filed 2019-10-08(c)(3)

Because each of Little’s federal claims is due to be dismissed, in light of the relatively early stage of these proceedings the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Little’s state law claims.

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at an early stage of litigation.

HURLEY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2019-12-19(c)

When a court has dismissed all claims over which it had original federal-question jurisdiction, it has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims. ... A fortiori, where the court never had federal-question jurisdiction in the first place, it may dismiss any supplemental state claims. This case is in its early stages, and discovery has yet to commence. The federal claims have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The supplemental state tort claims asserted against Mr. Patel (Counts 2 and 3 in both actions) are therefore dismissed without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice when all federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage.

Shepler v. City of New York · filed 2020-02-13(c)(3)

Having disposed of all of Shepler’s federal claims at such an early stage, it would be inappropriate to adjudicate his state law claims. Therefore, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.

Under § 1367(c)(3), dismissal of all federal claims early in the litigation ordinarily weighs strongly in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Reeves v. Town of Hingham · filed 2020-02-14(c)(3)

“Where, as here, the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage of the litigation, ‘the balance of competing factors ordinarily weigh strongly in favor of declining jurisdiction over state law claims.’” Dew v. City of Bos., 405 F. Supp. 3d 294, 304 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting Camelio v. Am. Fed’n, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims; for that reason, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims is ALLOWED.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when the case remains at the pleading stage, no discovery has occurred, and judicial economy, fairness, and comity favor dismissal.

Rosario v. Town of Mount Kisco · filed 2020-02-14(c)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Town/Village of Mount Kisco’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs federal claims against it is GRANTED. Additionally, the Court exercises its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and, in turn, DISMISSES the remainder of Plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice so that Plaintiff may re-file in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state and municipal claims after all federal claims are dismissed early in litigation when doing so does not disserve judicial economy, convenience, or fairness.

Williams v. New York City Department Of Education ("DOE") · filed 2020-02-25(c)(3)

Here, declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state and municipal claims would not disserve the principles of judicial economy, convenience, or fairness. The Court has addressed and dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims under the ADA and HIPAA and done so early in the litigation.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss state-law claims without prejudice when the federal claim has been dismissed at an early stage.

Williams v. Camden Old Creek · filed 2020-02-26(c)(3)

Thus, the Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Here, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims, without prejudice, as a result of dismissal of the FHA claim.

A court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the sole federal claim when the proceedings are at an early stage and judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor dismissal.

CGB Diversified Services, Inc. v. Adams · filed 2020-04-13(c)(3)

Here, the proceedings are at an early stage and the remaining causes of action—following dismissal of CGB’s DTSA claim—are purely state-law claims. Considering the various factors, therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) creates a strong presumption favoring declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissal of the federal claims, particularly when the litigation remains at an early stage.

Valhalla Investment Properties, LLC v. 502, LLC · filed 2020-04-27(c)(3)

With the dismissal of Valhalla’s FDCPA claim, the Court will not retain jurisdiction over Valhalla’s state law claims against 502, LLC, Kantz, and Scarborough. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), there is a “strong presumption in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims after dismissing federal anchor claims[.]” Martinez v. City of Cleveland, 700 F. App’x 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2017). This presumption is not a strong, however where the case has been pending for a long time, discovery has been completed, the record is voluminous, a court has spent significant time on the litigation, and there are pending motions for summary judgment, Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 211 (6th Cir. 2004), none of which applies here. The case is barely a year old, an answer has yet to be filed, and discovery has been stayed pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when the case remains at the pleading stage.

Brooke v. Hyatt Corporation · filed 2020-05-13(c)(3)

In this instance, as the case remains at the pleading stage and there are no apparent considerations weighing in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state law claim, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to Brooke’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, especially when dismissal occurs early in the litigation.

Grandpa Bud LLC v. Chelan County Washington · filed 2020-05-26(c)(3)

Because the Court dismissed the claims over which it had an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, and because it did so early in the litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when the case remains at the pleading stage and no considerations favor retaining jurisdiction.

Wilson v. Leigh Law Group, P.C, (LLG) · filed 2020-07-14(c)(3)

In this instance, as the case remains at the pleading stage, and there are no apparent considerations weighing in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the sole federal claim early in the litigation.

Ochoa v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2020-07-20(c)(3)

Because Ochoa’s single federal 12 || claim has been eliminated early in the litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 13 || jurisdiction and remands the remaining claims to state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it dismisses all federal claims at the pleading stage.

Lopez-Ramos v. Enersys Enginering Corporation · filed 2020-09-01(c)

Since the federal claims are being dismissed at the pleadings stage, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and all of Mr. López-Ramos’ supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses the only federal claim at an early stage.

Richardson v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2020-09-11(c)(3)

Here, this Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s TILA claim against Defendant Caliber. Thus, it is dismissing the only federal claim in this action at a very early stage of the case (ie, before the Court has even held a scheduling conference). As such, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and shall dismiss them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction; the early stage of the case may favor declining jurisdiction.

Haughie v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-09-17(c)(3)

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and the factors set forth in Carnegie–Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the medical malpractice claim in the Amended Complaint. Although this case has been pending in this Court since December 2018, it has not progressed beyond the motion to dismiss stage.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state and municipal claims after dismissing all federal claims early in the litigation, when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor that choice.

Ikedilo v. Statter · filed 2020-09-30(c)(3)

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and state common law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the claim over which it had original jurisdiction, especially early in the case.

Brown v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-10-26(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s FCRA claim and because this case is still in its early stages, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims against Defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when the case is still in its early stages.

Smith v. Wellsville, Kansas, City of · filed 2020-11-19(c)(3)

Because the court dismisses Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... There are no compelling circumstances that justify this court retaining jurisdiction. In addition, this case is in the early stages as a scheduling order has not been entered and no formal discovery has been exchanged. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when it dismisses the only claim within its original jurisdiction at an early stage.

RADCLIFF v. RADCLIFF · filed 2020-12-04(c)(3)

In this case, as the Court is dismissing the only claim over which it may have had original subject matter jurisdiction at an early stage in the litigation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including at the pleading stage.

King v. Ecumenical Housing Corporation · filed 2021-01-11(c)(3)

Although a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). ... Given the court’s dismissal at the pleadings stage, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when dismissal occurs early in the case.

Cason v. Corizon Health Services · filed 2021-01-25(c)(3)

To the extent that Cason also brings medical negligence claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (stating that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). “When, as here, the federal claim is dismissed early in the case, the federal courts are inclined to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice rather than retain supplemental jurisdiction.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal claims were dismissed at the pleading stage, before discovery or trial.

Yany's Garden LLC v. The City of New York · filed 2021-01-27(c)(3)

Therefore, dismissal under Section 1367 is appropriate where, as here, the federal claims were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage, well before discovery or trial.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the only federal claim, particularly when the case is still at an early stage and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity do not favor retaining them.

TRB Acquisitions LLC v. Yedid · filed 2021-01-28(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of the only claim under federal law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the case is still in its early stages.

Dos Bowies LP v. Ackerman · filed 2021-01-29(c)

Because the federal claims are dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims, particularly when the case remains at an early stage.

Eagle Equity Funds, LLC v. Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S/A - Eletrobras · filed 2021-02-03(c)(3)

In light of the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all federal claims, especially when the case is still at the pleading stage and little judicial effort has been spent on the state claim.

Seegers v. Jasper County Indiana · filed 2021-02-05(c)(3)

For all these reasons, the Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.

Section 1367 allows a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim to issue a writ of mandamus that a state court could grant.

Rancho del Oso Pardo, Inc. v. New Mexico Department of Game and Fish · filed 2021-03-09(a)

In Vary, the court held that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction “acts as any other court of the state, and can issue writs that the state courts are empowered to grant.” Id. at 1277. The same is true for a court exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims to weigh judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Frazier v. Slauson Oil, Inc. · filed 2021-04-15(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). ... In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act, California Disabled Persons Act, California Health and Safety Code, and negligence claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), a court weighs judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity at every stage of the case.

Bouyer v. Mabek Co. · filed 2021-04-19(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court therefore orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) calls for a court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to weigh judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Garcia v. Radnia · filed 2021-04-19(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court therefore orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court considers judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity at every stage of the case.

Bouyer v. Omnidyne LLC · filed 2021-04-16(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’1 Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988)). The Court therefore orders plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state wage claim when differences from a federal FLSA claim risk jury confusion and judicial economy and comity outweigh convenience.

Mata v. STA Management, LLC · filed 2021-09-21(c)

Even though convenience may weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction, considerations of judicial economy and comity weigh in favor of declining to exercise that jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over parallel state wage claims; the difference between FLSA opt-in and state-law opt-out procedures alone does not require a court to decline it.

MELECIO v. NESHAMINY SW LLC · filed 2025-04-23(c)

Furthermore, the distinction between opt-in/opt-out class functions, on its own, is not enough to defeat supplemental jurisdiction as the Third Circuit has held that the FLSA opt-in procedure is not inherently incompatible with state-law opt-out class actions. ... For these reasons, the Court will continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands wage claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with FLSA claims.

OJEDA V. LOUIS BERGER GROUP (DOMESTIC), INC. · filed 2021-04-12(a)

Any court would also have supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ wage claims under Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands law, because those claims share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the FLSA claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state wage claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with federal FLSA claims.

Romero v. Mountaire Farms, Inc. · filed 2011-06-09(a)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ state law claims under the NCWHA share a common nucleus of operative fact with the claims raised under the FLSA.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state wage claims that arise from the same underlying operative facts as an FLSA claim.

Bobryk v. Durand Glass Manufacturing Co. · filed 2014-09-29(a)

Thus, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state wage claims because the underlying operative facts concerning the state law claims are the same as the FLSA claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law compensation claim when it shares operative facts about pay with a federal FLSA claim.

Cortez v. Bravo Restaurant Group, Inc. · filed 2020-05-20(a)

The Court finds that Cortez’s FLSA claim and his breach of contract claim are sufficiently related to form part of the same case or controversy; therefore, the Court has, and chooses to exercise, jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state wage claims arising from the same work as FLSA claims when none of the grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

DE-PAZ-EACOBAR v. Muskevitsch · filed 2008-04-22(a), (c)

The allegations of Oregon wage and hour violations are “so related” to the FLSA claims against Nor-thridge and AB & KH “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). All the claims seek payment for the work the framing crew did constructing single-family housing. Furthermore, none of the exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction apply here: plaintiffs do not raise a “novel” issue of state law, their claims against Rosebud and Muskevitsch do not “substantially predominate[ ]” over the FLSA claims, I have not dismissed the FLSA claims, and there are no “other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state wage claim that shares operative facts with a federal wage claim when the state claim does not substantially predominate and judicial economy favors hearing them together.

ALESIUS v. PITTSBURGH LOGISTIC SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2021-04-15(c)(2)

Because the WPCL and FLSA claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and district courts have discretion to hear supplemental claims, the Court will exercise its discretion over the Plaintiffs’ WPCL claim in the interests of judicial economy.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain related state law claims alongside surviving federal claims even when the state claims predominate.

Monde v. Howard · filed 2021-05-03(c)

Both causes of action arise from the common nucleus of facts, from Michael’s incarceration and suicide. While there are no extraordinary circumstances for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the First Cause of Action predominates over the Second Cause of Action. Given that portions of the Second Cause of Action remain after this motion, this Court will exercise its discretion and consider the First Cause of Action.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction even if state claims substantially predominate when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness justify doing so.

BAUTISTA v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC. · filed 2025-08-28(c)(2)

Here, assuming without deciding that Bautista’s state law claims substantially predominate over the Temple Defendants’ third-party federal claims, “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties” nevertheless provide an “affirmative justification” for exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the need to exhaust state post-deprivation remedies supplies a compelling reason.

Outley v. Moir · filed 2021-05-21(c)(4)

Because Plaintiff’s post-deprivation remedies must be exhausted in state court before he can present his § 1983 claims to this Court, there are other compelling reasons to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related Article 78 proceeding when no compelling reason to do so exists.

Cedar Development East,LLC v. Town Board of Hurley · filed 2021-08-05(c)(4)

Although some courts have found "compelling reasons" to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, none exist here.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when comity and California’s interest in regulating those claims provide compelling reasons.

Dalfio v. S & K Investors LLC · filed 2021-11-08(c)(4)

The Court finds that comity and deference to California’s interest in monitoring and regulating Unruh Act complaints present compelling reasons to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when exercising it would undermine a maritime plaintiff’s choice to proceed in state court under the Saving to Suitors Clause.

Finney v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans · filed 2021-12-14(c)(4)

Alternatively, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the in rem claim has been dismissed and Plaintiff's invocation of the savings to suitors clause is a “compelling reason” to decline jurisdiction under § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state-law claim raises sensitive privacy concerns in a developing area of law.

Unified System Division BMWED-IBT v. Biden · filed 2022-06-17(c)(4)

Moreover, there are “other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Specifically, the case raises delicate privacy concerns governed by an evolving area of state law.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when filing in federal court circumvents California’s stricter state filing requirements, creating exceptional circumstances and a compelling reason to decline jurisdiction.

Bedwell v. Fallbrook Plaza LP · filed 2022-07-19(c)(4)

The Court agrees with other district courts that California’s statutory changes to Unruh Act claim litigation and the subsequent circumvention of these changes by filing Unruh Act claims in federal courts is an exceptional circumstance under Section 1367(c)(4). Therefore, the Court finds an exceptional circumstance exists in this action compelling the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Further, California’s interest in enforcing these changes via litigation of Unruh Act claims in state courts is a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a litigant uses federal proceedings to delay an ongoing state eviction case.

Colvin v. Tako, LLC · filed 2022-12-05(c)(4)

Thus, I find Colvin’s pattern of using the federal court system as a loophole to delay the ongoing eviction proceedings brought against him by Tako in the Las Vegas Justice Court as a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims forming part of the same case or controversy as independently cognizable FTCA cross-claims, even after the plaintiffs’ claims against the United States are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

YOUNG v. United States · filed 2019-10-28(a)

In turn, I may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the Temple Defendants in Young I because they are part of the same case or controversy and derive from a common set of facts.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when an FTCA cross-claim supplies an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, even after the plaintiff’s FTCA claims are dismissed.

YOUNG v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL · filed 2019-10-28(a)

In turn, I may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the Temple Defendants in Young I because they are part of the same case or controversy and derive from a common set of facts.

Section 1367 allows supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim arising from the same case or controversy as federal claims.

Calonge v. City Of San Jose · filed 2021-03-05(a)

The Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CPRA claim because it arises out of the same case or controversy as her federal law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state public records claims concerning a search warrant affidavit when they share the same core facts as federal claims challenging the search and seizure authorized by that affidavit.

Dupard v. Lopinto · filed 2020-03-30(a)

Here, both the federal and state claims on the face of the pleadings concern the same core factual issue: the allegedly unlawful search and seizure which was authorized, in part, by the affidavit Plaintiff claims the clerk of court should have maintained under Louisiana Public Records Law. Therefore, the claims are sufficiently related for purposes of section 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a quiet title claim arising from the same core of operative facts as a foreclosure action and defenses to it.

MorEquity, Inc. v. Naeem · filed 2000-10-25(a)

Obviously, the quiet title action arises out of the same core of operative facts as the foreclosure action and the ... Naeems’ defenses to that action. Accordingly, the court accepts supplemental jurisdiction over the Naeems’ claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state ejectment claim intertwined with federal claims challenging the foreclosure underlying that ejectment claim.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Morris · filed 2015-07-31(a)

Penny’s federal and state-law claims against Wells Fargo are intertwined with Fannie Mae’s ejectment action insofar as Penny’s federal and state claims against Wells Fargo and her demands for declaratory relief are all designed to defeat Fannie Mae’s ejectment action by undoing the foreclosure on the Morrises’ home and the ensuing sale. Such allows the ejectment action to be deemed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims for purposes of § 1367.

Section 1367(a) requires a common nucleus of operative fact between state claims and claims within original jurisdiction; similar claims arising from separate loan transactions do not qualify.

Hernandez v. Hilltop Financial Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2007-10-22(a)

In the instant case, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims against Ameriquest do not share a common nucleus of operative facts from which their claims against other defendants arise. Although Ameriquest and the other defendants face similar state court claims and the scenarios of both loans are similar, the claims arise out of two different instances.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a fraudulent inducement counterclaim concerning an auto loan when the counterclaim and the borrower’s TCPA claim do not share a common nucleus of operative fact.

Ammons v. Ally Fin., Inc. · filed 2018-04-05(a)

In short, both parties would be required to allege facts and produce evidence that is chronologically separate and unique to each cause of action. Ammons's TCPA claim and Ally's Counterclaim can succeed and do not share a common nucleus of operative fact dependent on the other. Ally's Counterclaim on the car loan has a truly tangential relationship to Ammons's TCPA action. Accordingly, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the Counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) does not support supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims about hospital billing and collection practices when the federal EMTALA claim concerns disparate emergency treatment; the claims are not part of the same case or controversy.

Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp. · filed 2004-12-29(a)

The state law claims relating to the hospital defendants’ tax status are fundamentally different from the EMTA-LA claim and not part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim alleging appropriation of patients’ Medicaid allowances when federal claims concern unnecessary medical services and manipulation of patient stays, because the claims do not form part of the same case or controversy.

Bell v. Cross · filed 2019-12-03(a)

Bell’s FFCA claim is based on Defendants’ alleged appropriation of patients’ Medicaid allowance in order to purchase furniture for their facilities and their reluctance to perform services not covered by Medicare. (Dkt. 81 89-93). Despite her vague conclusion that the claims “overlap,” this conduct does not constitute the same transaction or occurrence as the allegations giving rise to the FCA claim, such as unnecessary medical services and maximizing and resetting 100-day patient stays. Nor is it “so related to the [FCA] claims .. . that [it] form[s] part of the same case or controversy under Article Ill of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) does not give supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims about payments for medical care when the federal claims concern the medical care received.

STEWART v. WEXFORD · filed 2021-01-13(a)

The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act claim challenges monetary payments while the Eighth Amendment claims proceeding in this case relate to the medical care the plaintiff has received. Accordingly, this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act claim or any other state law claims based on monetary payments for medical care.

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to claims involving separate insurance policies merely because some parties also participated in the original action; the claims must form part of the same case or controversy.

Kramer v. LOCKWOOD PENSION SERVICES, INC. · filed 2009-09-01(a)

The fact that one or more Defendants in the main action may have been involved in other policies Lincoln issued does not extend the subject of the litigation to include all potential SOLI policies. Therefore, because the claims relating to Leon Lobel do not form the same case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution as the original action, the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1367(a) does not support supplemental jurisdiction over malpractice crossclaims that lack a sufficient factual and legal connection to an insurer’s coverage action.

Alps Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Kalicki Collier, LLP · filed 2020-04-10(a)

While the Coverage Action is undisputedly precipitated by the Trustee’s Claim against KC Defendants, the Court does not find that the two set of claims here are logically or substantially connected to give rise to supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a medical malpractice claim that is so related to a federal EMTALA claim that both form part of the same Article III case or controversy.

Ortega-Santos v. San Francisco Health System, Inc. · filed 2020-10-14(a)

This claim is “so related” to plaintiffs’ federal claim “that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law malpractice claims arising from the same case or controversy as an EMTALA claim when no subsection (c) ground for declining jurisdiction applies.

Martinez-Rosado v. Del Norte · filed 2001-05-21(a), (c)

Thus, we find that the federal and state claims in Plaintiffs’ federal complaint form pai’t of the same case or controversy for section 1367 purposes. ... We also find that none of the situations justifying dismissal of state law claims, which are envisioned by section 1367, is present in the case before us.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law judicial foreclosure counterclaim sufficiently related to the borrower's RESPA claims to form part of the same case or controversy.

Meppelink v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB · filed 2020-03-10(a)

The Plaintiff’s RESPA claims and Wilmington’s counterclaim for judicial foreclosure are sufficiently related to “form part of the same case or controversy.” The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367 and can consider Wilmington’s counterclaim for judicial foreclosure.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims concerning the same foreclosure as a federal RESPA claim because they share a common nucleus of operative fact.

Perez v. Wells Fargo USA Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-12-06(a)

Plaintiff’s Texas law claims concern the same foreclosure alleged in his RESPA claim, therefore Defendant is correct in its assertion that in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 does not create an independent cause of action.

Foster v. Sullivan · filed 2021-07-19

Section 1367 does not create an independent cause of action.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction but does not independently create a cause of action.

Robinson v. Winburn · filed 2025-05-07

Robinson also cites 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction), but neither of those statutes independently create a cause of action.

Section 1367 contains no provision authorizing service of process on a defendant.

AMBI Distribution Corp v. Doe · filed 2021-07-28

And the Court sees no provision for service in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related Unruh Act claim despite an argument that hearing the claim would burden federal courts.

Whitaker v. Ramon Bravo, Inc. · filed 2021-09-10(c)(4)

As discussed in those cases, a plaintiff need not sacrifice their right to a federal forum for their ADA claim to pursue a parallel Unruh Act claim, nor must they litigate these two nearly identical claims in separate forums. Bravo’s argument that exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims increases the burden on federal courts is not a sufficient reason to alter this conclusion.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim parallel to an ADA claim even when the plaintiff would face heightened procedural requirements in California state court.

Whitaker v. Surf and Turf, LLC · filed 2021-08-05(c)

As discussed in that case, a plaintiff need not sacrifice their right to a federal forum for their ADA claim to pursue a parallel Unruh Act claim, nor must they litigate these two nearly identical claims in separate forums.

A request to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) based on dismissal of all federal claims is moot when a federal claim survives summary judgment.

Nevarez v. O'Connor Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 2004-02-05(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a .claim if the district court has dismissed all claims, over which it has original jurisdiction-. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). As set forth above, however, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgement on Count II — Plaintiffs’ ECOA claim. Thus, Defendants’ request to dismiss the state law claims is moot.

Section 1367 permits federal courts hearing federal claims to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims when some federal claims survive summary judgment.

Ferreira v. Westchester County · filed 1996-01-19

Federal Courts sitting in federal question jurisdiction have pendent jurisdiction over state claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the federal claims upon which original jurisdietion is based. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because we grant summary judgment only as to some of the federal claims, the Court retains pendant jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims.

Section 1367 allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when federal claims survive summary judgment.

Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-08-06

Because I have not granted summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s federal claims, this court will retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental state and city law claims when it denies summary judgment on the federal claims.

Steven Weissman, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Dawn Joy Fashions,inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 2000-06-05

To the extent that Dawn Joy argues that the District Court should not have exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over the NYHRL . and Administrative Code claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, we disagree. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not dismissing those claims, particularly where it denied Dawn Joy’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the federal ADA 'claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims survive summary judgment.

Torres ex rel. Estate of Torres v. Amato · filed 2014-05-16

Since the Court has denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs federal claims, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not call for relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims survive summary judgment.

Lasalvia v. City of Evanston · filed 2011-04-15(c)(3)

Because the Court denies Defendants’ summary judgment motion concerning LaSalvia’s constitutional claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court also denies Defendant Officers’ request that the Court relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over LaSalvia’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; when federal claims survive summary judgment, the court may retain jurisdiction over related state claims.

Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz · filed 2015-06-23(c)(3)

Here, the SM Medical defendants’ plea for the dismissal of the state-law claims assumes the dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ federal-law claims. Most of the federal-law claims against the SM Medical defendants, however, survive summary judgment.. The Court thus elects to retain supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits retaining supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims when the federal claims survive summary judgment, defeating a request premised on dismissal of all claims within original jurisdiction under subsection (c)(3).

RUIZ v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2020-03-09(a), (c)(3)

The success of Defendant Reeves’ next argument, that the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state tort claims, depends on dismissal of all of the claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As the Court denies summary judgment on the federal claims, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a district court to consider state law claims when federal constitutional claims against some defendants survive summary judgment.

Lolli v. County of Orange · filed 2003-11-21

Given that Lolli’s federal constitutional claims against some of the individual officers survive summary judgment, the district court has jurisdiction to consider the state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state and city law claims after the federal claim becomes moot and to dismiss those claims without prejudice to reassertion in state court.

Grinblat v. Speedway LLC · filed 2021-03-25

Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s ADA claim as moot and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state and city law claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice to reassert them in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claim as moot.

Johnson v. Inn · filed 2020-01-22(c)

Moreover, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over Plaintiffs state-law claim and dismisses this state-law claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if the federal ADA claim becomes moot and is dismissed early in the case.

Marquise Bailey v. Cloud 9 · filed 2024-07-12(c)

If an ADA claim is mooted and dismissed at an early stage, the Court has the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

After the federal claim becomes moot, a court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when the advanced stage of litigation and considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retention and comity does not weigh against it.

Johnson v. Baird Lands, Inc. · filed 2020-02-28(c)(3)

Given the advanced stage of this action and the parties’ efforts to brief and argue the merits of Mr. Johnson’s motion for summary judgment, the Court concludes that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to all parties support the Court’s exercise of its discretion to retain jurisdiction of Mr. Johnson’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law request to stay enforcement of judgments when it shares a common nucleus of operative fact with claims within original federal jurisdiction.

Omni Elevator Corporation v. International Union of Elevator Constructors · filed 2021-08-27(a)

Plaintiffs’ request in the Amended Complaint to have the state court stay enforcement of the Funds’ and Crane-Hogan’s judgments “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact[,]” Shahriar, 659 F.3d at 245, as the claims over which this Court has original federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court properly may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law request to stay the judgments.

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a separate state-court case that has not been removed and over which the district court lacks original jurisdiction.

Lett v. City of Rio Rancho · filed 2021-08-25(a)

This Court has no original jurisdiction over Roskos’ state court case, and so Plaintiff cannot invoke §1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction when a state-law claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim, even if the state-law conduct occurred after the federal-law conduct.

Kass-Hout v. Community Care Network Inc · filed 2021-08-20(a)

Nonetheless, these claims are sufficiently related to permit the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, the fact that the alleged defamation occurred after Plaintiff’s separation does not preclude factual overlap between the claims.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a settlement breach claim that lacks a common nucleus of operative fact with the original federal claims.

Go New York Tours, Inc. v. Tour Central Park Inc. · filed 2021-08-20(a)

The Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim because the claim does not share a common nucleus of operative fact with the trademark claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the remaining claim raises a novel issue of territorial law and all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Motylinski v. Glacial Energy VI, LLC · filed 2021-09-03(c)

Among other reasons, “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim … if the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law … [or] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction… .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Each of these bases are satisfied here.

Section 1367(c)(3) leaves it to the district court to decide whether to remand remaining state claims after all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Platt v. Moore · filed 2021-10-04(c)(3)

Because the nominal damages claims revived by this opinion remain justiciable, § 1447(c) does not apply, and the district court’s decision whether to remand to the courts of Arizona remains a matter of discretion under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s related claim against an original defendant who was not made a party under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Eco Environmental Services · filed 2021-10-08(b)

Morris also is not a party under Rules 14, 19, or 20 so § 1367(b) does not prevent the Court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Sunbelt’s claim against Morris.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims only when they share a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction; independent business disputes between the parties do not qualify.

Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America v. Charbonnet · filed 2021-10-05(a)

The Court agrees that the following counterclaims by Casey fall outside the reach of supplemental jurisdiction: Count V (failure to repay a loan), Count VI (recovery of 50% of expenses incurred), Count VII (breach of a non-compete agreement), and Count VIII (error induced by fraud in executing a Resignation Agreement). Those claims are damages claims that exist completely independent of the Travelers Casualty indemnity agreement that forms the basis of the main demand; they are completely outside of that case or controversy and share no common nucleus of operative fact.

A court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when hearing them together with federal claims serves judicial economy and avoids duplicative discovery and inconsistent rulings.

Hartman v. United States · filed 2021-10-20(c)(4)

Here, judicial economy is best served by granting jurisdiction over the state law causes of action in this matter because the facts arise from a common nucleus of facts, namely the collision that injured Mr. Hartman.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only when it invokes one of the statutory categories for doing so.

Maslic v. ISM Vuzem d.o.o. · filed 2021-10-26(c)

Although Plaintiffs are correct that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, in the Ninth Circuit, a court’s discretion to remand may only be exercised if that court invokes a section 1367(c) statutory category.

Section 1367 requires Article III standing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim.

Kislov v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2021-10-08

The parties did not brief whether supplemental jurisdiction is available for Plaintiffs’ Section 15(a) claim. The court nonetheless concludes that Article III standing is a prerequisite to exercising federal subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law claims, even where a state supreme court has rejected federal standing principles.

Section 1367 does not allow supplemental jurisdiction over a general maritime negligence claim that is not a state law claim.

Campbell v. Delma Ann, LLC · filed 2021-10-14(a)

Because Plaintiff’s general maritime negligence claim is not a state law claim, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff’s claims when another plaintiff’s claim establishes diversity jurisdiction.

Smith v. Domilise · filed 2021-10-08

Walker’s claims are also properly removed through supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction, including when the state claims raise broader issues and require broader proof.

Hicks v. Michigan Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-10-27(c)(2)

Here, the state-law claims against both Caesar and Brown substantially predominate over the federal claim. ... Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims as to both defendants.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when a federal ADA claim can proceed.

Strojnik v. R.F. Weichert V, Inc. · filed 2021-11-02(c)

Having concluded that Mr. Strojnik’s proposed SAC alleges his Article III standing to pursue his ADA claim regarding alleged physical barriers, the Court in its discretion exercises supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 does not govern whether to retain remaining claims after the claims supporting federal officer removal under § 1442(a)(1) are eliminated.

Healthcare Venture Partners, LLC v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield · filed 2021-11-08

However, § 1367 does not apply in cases where the basis of a court’s initial jurisdiction is § 1442(a)(1).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s crossclaim against a coplaintiff in a diversity action.

Motameni v. Adams · filed 2021-11-08(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) prohibits supplemental jurisdiction over crossclaims by plaintiffs against other plaintiffs.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Wilder v. Caliber Home Loans · filed 2021-12-08(a)

Further, supplemental jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because original jurisdiction was based on the Wilders’ federal constitutional claim and because that claim—which sought to thwart foreclosure under Rule 736.11—and the Counterclaim seeking that foreclosure arose from the same nucleus of operative facts.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law wage claim when it and the federal claims arise from the same compensation policies and practices, giving them a common nucleus of operative facts.

Davis v. 2192 Niagara Street, LLC · filed 2023-01-26(a)

Accordingly, based on the precedent set out in Shahriar and the allegations indicating Plaintiffs’ Gratuity Claim and FLSA claims arise from the same compensation policies and practices, the Court finds that these claims arise from the same common nucleus of operative facts. Therefore, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Gratuity Claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that share a common nucleus of operative facts with federal claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Commercial Roofing Specialties, Inc. v. CRS Roofing Company · filed 2023-02-13(a)

CRS’s state law claims share a common nucleus of operative facts with its federal law claims. Through their default, Defendants admitted facts supporting CRS’s federal causes of action. Accordingly, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over CRS’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction when the state and federal claims have only a tangential overlap in facts.

KRAEMER v. ROSTRAVER TOWNSHIP · filed 2023-02-24(a)

This is merely a “tangential overlap” in facts “insufficient” to confer supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.

Section 1367(a) requires a supplemental claim against another defendant to share a common nucleus of operative facts with the claims under original jurisdiction and to be one a plaintiff would ordinarily try in the same proceeding.

West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser · filed 2023-03-14(a)

In no way do these sparse allegations derive from the common nucleus of operative facts comprising West Shore’s federal claims against Fitzpatrick and Graeser. If anything, they are the factual nucleus of a different atom. We would not ordinarily expect a plaintiff to try in the same judicial proceedings a state-law claim involving a peripheral defendant with no relation to the principal action. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. That is Penn’s station in these proceedings. Accordingly, West Shore may not bootstrap its breach-of-contract claim against him to secure our jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that share a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Alexander v. Bio-Pacific, LLC · filed 2023-03-20(a)

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims relate to the same Defendants and share the same ... nucleus of operative facts related to Plaintiffs’ wages, hours, and working conditions ... during the same period of time.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction only over claims sharing a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Kleiman v. Wright · filed 2023-03-20(a)

Here, the question of who controls W&K does not arise from the same common nucleus of facts as the underlying dispute among W&K, the Estate, and Dr. Wright.