28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over common law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Stoddard v. District of Columbia Public Defender Services · filed 2008-03-03(c)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the federal claim and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs common law claims of legal malpractice and fraud developed in his opposition brief.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Commonwealth law claims after dismissing all federal claims, leaving those claims to be brought in Commonwealth court.

Arroyo v. FDIC · filed 2013-08-16(c)(3)

Accordingly, plaintiff Arroyo’s legal malpractice claim against defendants Velazquez and Morales, which is a Commonwealth law claim, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which permits plaintiff Arroyo to bring his malpractice claims against attorneys Velazquez and Morales in the Commonwealth Courts, not in Federal Court.

When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.

Gibson v. York · filed 2014-06-23(c)(3)

Finally, because her only federal claim was dismissed prior to trial, the district court was correct to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Gibson’s state legal malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

DM Arbor Court, Ltd. v. The City Of Houston · filed 2019-11-13(c)(3)

Because none of Arbor Court’s federal claims survives the motion to dismiss, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Arbor Court’s state law claims (see Dkt. 22 {| 66-79) for violations of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Texas Constitution, tortious interference, and violation of vested rights.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims.

EGH Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oregon · filed 1994-04-07(c)(3)

Having properly dismissed all of EGH's federal claims, the trial court properly exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c) in declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over EGH's state law tortious interference claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Prism Construction Company v. Montgomery County, Maryland John A. Battan Virginia A. Baxter David Frankel · filed 1994-10-07(c)(3)

We think that the District Court's dismissal of appellant's state law claim for breach of duty and interference with business relations was also proper. Congress has authorized district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the court has dismissed all other claims over which it had jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when the federal claim is no longer viable.

Shekerjian v. Pyramid Mouldings, Inc. · filed 1998-09-03(c)

Finally, because Shekerjian’s federal claim is no longer viable, the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over Shekerjian’s state law claim of tortious interference with his business relations.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Hensley Manufacturing, Inc. v. Propride, Inc. · filed 2008-06-19(c)(3)

Plaintiffs remaining claims — tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets — are brought under state common law, with supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal law claims, the Court dismisses the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims that supplied federal-question jurisdiction.

Parker v. Viacom International, Inc. · filed 2009-03-11(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs claims based on federal questions are dismissed, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Plaintiffs tortious interference claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses the federal claims early in the litigation and lacks diversity jurisdiction.

Contiguous Towing, Inc. v. New York · filed 2016-08-15(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law tortious interference claim. Under Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), a federal court should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if, as is the case here, the complaint’s federal claims are dismissed in the litigation’s early stages and there no diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir.1998) (“[W]hen all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation, the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice.”) (emphasis in original).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Baxley Equipment Company, LLC v. Hogue Industries, Limited Liability Company · filed 2018-06-12(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In the Eighth Circuit, the preference is for a court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed before trial. See Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minn., 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004). Because the Court has dismissed Baxley’s declaratory judgment claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law tortious interference claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when none of the federal claims survives dismissal.

DM Arbor Court, Ltd. v. The City Of Houston · filed 2019-09-18(c)(3)

Because none of Arbor Court’s federal claims survives the motion to dismiss, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Arbor Court’s state law claims (see Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 66–79) for violations of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Texas Constitution, tortious interference, and violation of vested rights.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims raise novel issues and all claims within original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Coates v. Hall · filed 2007-03-12(c)(1), (c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law tortious interference claims because the claims raise novel issues of state law and the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss remaining state law claims without prejudice after the claims supporting original jurisdiction are dismissed.

French v. US EX REL. DEPT. OF HUMAN HEALTH · filed 1999-02-25(c)(3)

The Plaintiff's claim under FTCA has not survived and thus, this Court's original jurisdiction no longer exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff's state law claims for intrusion into private affairs, for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the claim against Dugan alone for tortious interference with contract will be dismissed without prejudice to bringing these claims in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed.

DM Arbor Court, Ltd. v. The City Of Houston · filed 2020-02-11(c)(3)

Because none of Arbor Court’s federal claims survives the motion to dismiss, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Arbor Court’s state law claims (see Dkt. 22 66-79) for violations of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Texas Constitution, tortious interference, and violation of vested rights.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, guided by judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Freedom Watch Inc. v. Judicial Watch, Inc. · filed 2018-01-29(c)(3)

The factors to be considered under pendent jurisdiction-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-point toward declining jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining tortious interference with a prospective business advantage claim. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim (Count II) in the Amended Complaint and dismisses it without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims before trial.

Ghiles v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 2018-03-19(c)(3)

But because summary judgment is granted as to Ghiles’s federal claims, I relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over what remains of his tortious interference claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Al’s Service Center v. BP Prods. N. America, Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When all federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law claims.”).

A court may require a claimant to show cause supporting supplemental jurisdiction when it doubts whether a state-law fraud crossclaim forms part of the same case or controversy as an insurance-coverage dispute.

Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Bell & Arthur Condominium Association · filed 2020-04-09(a)

Alhomsi also invokes supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but there is reason to question whether the state law fraud claim that Alhomsi seeks to assert forms part of the same case or controversy as the contractual relationships governing the disputes about the duty to defend and indemnify. Accordingly, on its own motion, the Court will require Mr. Alhomsi to show cause why his crossclaim should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Lamont v. Proskauer Rose, LLP · filed 2012-08-08(c)(3)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims – the only federal claims before this court – are dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. ... With respect to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, ... the court declines to assert its supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses this case in its entirety. ... See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when all federal claims are barred.

Calvert v. Huckins · filed 1995-09-12(c)(3)

Because all of plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred by res judicata, the court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.G. § 1367(c)(3) without prejudice to refile them in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all federal claims before trial.

Brooks v. Arthur · filed 2009-04-14(c)(3)

Because the Plaintiffs’ federal claims should be dismissed on res judicata grounds and because the tortious interference claims involve substantial state law issues, I will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the tortious interference claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, and to dismiss the state law claim without prejudice.

Buhendwa v. Regional Transportation District · filed 2015-03-10(c)(3)

Because the Court has independently determined that plaintiffs federal statutory claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim, and dismisses this claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(a) permits a court to retain jurisdiction over related state-law claims when the federal claim fails to state a claim but remains sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.

Tucker v. Ron Hall's Famous Final Cleaning Company · filed 2025-04-30(a)

And because this Opinion and Order does not so much deal with the merits of Tucker’s claims (Ron Hall’s has essentially admitted liability by defaulting) as it does the proper amount of damages, the Court retains jurisdiction over Tucker’s well- pleaded state-law claims (which are based on the same conduct as the federal claims) under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over crossclaims related to surviving claims even when the crossclaims may not independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Fratelli bvba v. APM Music Services, LLC · filed 2021-09-27(a)

Although the sole claim against Stone has been dismissed and Stone’s crossclaims may not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court exercises its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Stone’s crossclaims against Keizer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Stone’s crossclaims are related to Fratelli’s surviving claims against APM Music and Keizer, and litigating these claims in one action would serve the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 13(g) cross-claim involving the same case or controversy as an interpleader action within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Continental Assurance Co. v. Davis · filed 1998-09-15(a)

Having established original jurisdiction over Continental’s interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, this court has supplemental jurisdiction over Combes’ 13(g) cross-claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Combes’ complaint involves the same ease or controversy as Continental’s interpleader action.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving separate representations merely because they share a theory of liability with claims already before the court.

Prudential Equity Group, LLC v. Ajamie · filed 2007-12-06(a)

The partnership cross-claims involve moneys that may be owed to Moscow from a number of entirely separate client representations that have nothing to do with the representation that is the subject of the interpleader action. The common theory of liability is not enough to provide a common nucleus of operative fact.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law crossclaims sharing a common nucleus of operative fact with an ERISA interpleader claim, but excludes claims concerning separate life-insurance and IRA benefits that lack that connection.

ESCO Employee Savings Investment Plan, The v. Walsh · filed 2020-04-14(a)

Daughters’ state law crossclaims are not part of the same case as the federal interpleader claim in this matter, because the two sets of claims are not bound by a common nucleus of operative fact. ... Spouse’ state law crossclaims, on the other hand, are part of the same case or controversy because they share a common nucleus of operative fact with the underlying interpleader complaint.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state claims arising from the same event as a federal claim.

Scroggins v. LTD, INC. · filed 2003-03-17(a)

Moreover, because it appears that Scrog-gins’ FCRA and state claims arise from a single event, namely Lustine's denial of financing for the purchase of a car from defendant, it follows that there exists supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) requires a state law claim to share a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim under federal jurisdiction for supplemental jurisdiction to exist.

Zeddrick White v. Deloitte & Touche · filed 2014-01-27(a)

The district court properly dismissed White’s state law claims against Gap, Inc. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because those claims did not share a common nucleus of fact with White’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, the only 2 13-55549 claim over which federal jurisdiction existed.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim when it shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim, even if the claims have different legal elements.

Cronin v. CitiFinancial Services, Inc. · filed 2009-09-09(a)

Both the FCRA claim and the breach of conti'act counterclaim share a common nucleus of operative fact because they both turn on the terms of the written loan agreement between CitiFinancial and Cronin.

Section 1367 gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Inetianbor v. Cashcall, Inc. · filed 2013-02-15(a)

Further, the Court has supplementary jurisdiction over the defamation and usury claims because they arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the FCRA claim.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state wage and hour claims lacking a common nucleus of operative facts with a federal employment-background-check disclosure claim, and permits declining jurisdiction when the state claims substantially predominate.

Del Toro v. Centene Corporation · filed 2020-04-02(a), (c)(2)

The Court here too finds that, without the requisite nexus between the state claims and the FCRA claim, the Court may not properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Finally, even if the Court agreed that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims, the Court would decline to do so under the discretionary factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Specifically, the Court finds that the state-law claims would “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed early in litigation or when state law claims would substantially predominate even if a federal claim were successfully repleaded.

Cotterell v. General Motors LLC · filed 2019-12-18(c)(2), (c)(3)

This case is still in the early stages of litigation, and I have dismissed Ms. Cotterell’s federal claims, so I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3). ... Even if she repleaded her FCRA claim, therefore, I would find that Ms. Cotterell’s state law claims substantially predominated. Based on both §§ 1367(c)(2) and (c)(3), I decline to address Ms. Cotterell’s state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice to her refiling them in state court.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain jurisdiction over a diversity case when later events reduce the amount in controversy below the statutory minimum, subject to the court’s discretion.

McNulty v. Casero · filed 2020-06-09

Instead, the court held that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, “should apply when the amount in controversy falls below the [statutory minimum] threshold, just as it does when a federal question or a diverse claim falls out of a case.” ... Proceeding to the second part of the Shanaghan analysis, this Court concludes that the five factors largely counsel in favor of retaining jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a diversity case after the amount in controversy falls below the statutory minimum, based on a discretionary assessment of the circumstances.

Holcim (US) Inc. v. BC Concrete of Cumberland, Inc. · filed 2021-05-10

Accordingly, the facts and circumstances of this case, viewed in light of Shanaghan, cause this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and retain this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits retaining supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of all federal claims when an anticipated amendment supporting those claims makes retention conserve judicial and party resources.

Icenhour v. The Town of Abingdon · filed 2020-02-03(c)(3)

Because I have dismissed Icenhour’s § 1983, ADA, Title VII, and Equal Pay Act claims, which provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction, I could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her two state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). I exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and II, however, because plaintiff’s counsel indicated several times during oral argument that he intends to move to amend the Complaint to add further factual allegations in support of the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the only federal claim.

Lifrak v. New York City Council · filed 2005-08-22(c)(3)

The Equal Pay Act claim is Lifrak’s only claim brought pursuant to federal law and the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed.

Keyes v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2018-08-16(c)(3)

As Keyes's TCPA claims will not survive Ocwen's motion for partial summary judgment, no federal claims remain in this litigation. Consequently, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the MRCPA claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Gorss Motels Inc. v. Land's End, Inc. · filed 2020-01-16(c)(3)

Because the sole federal claim—the TCPA claim—has been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage and minimal effort has been invested in the litigation.

Deutsch v. Human Resource Management, Inc. · filed 2020-04-15(c)(3)

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a federal cause of action under the CFAA, and minimal effort has thus far been invested in this litigation, the Court will not retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Continental Group, Inc. v. KW Property Management, LLC · filed 2009-04-22

Although the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to prove the jurisdictional amount of $5,000 means Plaintiff’s CFAA claim must be dismissed, this Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction and proceed to rule upon the motion for preliminary injunction regarding the state court claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even if it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

NCMIC Finance Corporation v. Artino · filed 2009-07-28(c)(3)

The Court has discretion to and would exercise supplemental jurisdiction even if the Court dismissed NCMIC's CFAA claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a federal court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even if the federal claims are later dismissed.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein · filed 2013-06-10(c)

The Court notes that even if the CFAA claims are dismissed at a later date, the pendant state law claims need not be remanded to state courts.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of the federal claim on which its jurisdiction was premised.

Vazquez-Santos v. El Mundo Broadcasting Corp. · filed 2003-09-19(c)(3)

Because our jurisdiction was premised on Plaintiffs Federal Wiretap Act claim, we decline to entertain Plaintiffs supplemental claims under local law.

Once a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), it cannot decide the merits of the dismissed state law claims, including preemption and choice of law issues.

Axess International, Ltd. v. Intercargo Insurance Company · filed 1999-07-29(c)

We conclude that once the district court chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Axess’s supplemental state law claims, it lacked the power to adjudicate the merits of these claims, including Intercargo’s affirmative defense of preemption ... and the issue of choice of law.

Once a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, it lacks jurisdiction to decide that claim’s merits, including a preemption defense.

Echevarria v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2020-08-03(c)

The district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA claim divested it of jurisdiction to decide the preemption issue.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss state law claims without prejudice after granting summary judgment on all federal claims, even when discovery is complete, where no trial date has been set.

Dunbar v. Avigdor · filed 2020-02-11(c)(3)

I have granted summary judgment for defendants on all Mr. Dunbar’s federal claims, and no other independent basis for federal court jurisdiction was alleged. While the parties have completed discovery, there is no trial date set. Therefore, under § 1367(c)(3), I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Dunbar’s state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice to his refiling those claims in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state and local claims after dismissing the federal claims, even when discovery is complete.

Murray v. Visiting Nurse Services of New York · filed 2007-10-31(c)(3)

In the instant case, although the Court recognizes that dismissal of plaintiffs pendent state claims is “not absolutely mandatory,” ... the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims. While discovery has been completed and the instant case has proceeded to the summary judgment stage, it does not appear that any discovery would need to be repeated if plaintiffs ... pendent claims were brought in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when it gives good reasons, even if the parties have spent substantial resources litigating the state claims.

Foxfield Villa Associates v. Robben · filed 2020-07-31(c)(3)

But a district court does not abuse its discretion just because it defies an appropriate and advisable suggestion—at least as long as it gives good reasons for doing so. See id. We believe that the many state law claims—twenty-three, to be exact—are a good enough reason under the abuse-of- discretion standard to send this case to the Kansas state courts despite the significant resources that the parties have expended in federal court.

Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction does not extend to a collateral request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, Texas · filed 2020-08-13(a)

Consequently, Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction would not extend to a Section 1988 fee request.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an appeal of a state agency decision that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with surviving federal claims when no subsection (c) ground warrants declining jurisdiction.

Wong v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2016-10-26(a), (c)

The appeal of the HSJ Decision and Mr. Wong’s ADA and RA claims are part of the same case and controversy. ... Thus, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the appeal. Furthermore, the claim does not appear to raise “novel or complex issue[s] of State law,” the appeal does not “predominate[ ] over” the federal claims at issue, federal claims remain pending after this order, and no other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction have been presented.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state administrative appeal when it and the federal claims share a common nucleus of operative facts.

Conteers LLC v. City of Akron, Summit County, Ohio · filed 2020-09-15(a)

As such, Conteers’ state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts and form part of the same case or controversy sufficient to create supplemental jurisdiction over Conteers’ appeal.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment counterclaim that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original diversity jurisdiction.

Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company v. Midwest Crane Repair, LLC · filed 2020-09-14(a)

The Court finds that ... Midwest Crane’s declaratory judgment counterclaim derives from the same common nucleus of operative facts as Crossland’s negligence claim over which this Court exercises diversity jurisdiction. It therefore has an independent basis for jurisdiction over the counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims supplying original jurisdiction are dismissed as time-barred under Rule 12(b)(6).

Cangemi v. United States · filed 2021-09-07(a)

Accordingly, because there was no jurisdictional defect with those initial federal claims against the Town (as there was with Plaintiffs’ tort claims against the United States that were barred by the discretionary function exception), the district court was not precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the Town.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed as time-barred.

Cox v. Fort Lee · filed 2005-11-04(c)

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Cox’s federal claims as time-barred, as well the District Court’s refusal to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Cox’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims as time-barred.

Martin v. Shannon · filed 2019-08-21(c)

Because the Court finds that to the extent the complaint and amended complaint assert claims under § 1983 such claims must be dismissed as time-barred, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state construction-related accessibility claims when filing them in federal court evades California’s pleading and fee restrictions and creates exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Fernandez v. O Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC · filed 2021-03-04(c)(4)

The Court therefore concludes that “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” support the Court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and other construction-related accessibility state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when state restrictions on construction-related accessibility claims and the burden of those claims on federal courts present exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Heras v. MJ's Pinoy Fiesta Inc. · filed 2021-07-18(c)(4)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that California’s enactment of laws restricting construction-related accessibility claims, combined with the burden the ever-increasing number of such cases poses to the federal courts, presents “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim when evasion of California’s accessibility-claim rules and the resulting burden on federal courts provide exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

Fernandez v. Orange Walker, LLC · filed 2021-09-28(c)(4)

This situation, as well as the increased burden on federal courts due to the increasing number of these cases, presents the type of “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify a court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any Unruh Act or other state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim sharing a common nucleus of operative fact with the existing claims despite a lack of complete diversity.

Rosewood Apartments Corp. v. Perpignano · filed 2002-03-20(a)

The absence of complete diversity is not a bar to proceeding here. Having found that the accounting is essential to determination of the adequacy of the plaintiffs proposed cash distribution to the defendants, we find that there exists a common nucleus of operative fact between defendants’ counterclaim for an accounting and the resolution of the issues arising out of the December 1998 transactions'. Therefore, we will exercise our discretion to find supplemental jurisdiction over defendants’ counterclaim for an accounting, as this is the only way to accurately ascertain the damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over a related counterclaim against an additional party despite a lack of diversity between that party and the original counterclaimant.

Zagaruyka and Associates v. HealthSmart Benefit Solutions Inc · filed 2020-08-10(a)

Further, the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) did not destroy the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, despite any lack of diversity between HealthSmart (the original counterclaimant) and Ms. Proctor (an additional counterclaim defendant joined pursuant to Rules 13(h) and 20(a)(2)).

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state claims linked to federal claims only by but-for causation when the claims lack common operative facts.

Bradley v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 2003-10-07(a)

While the all of these causes of action do share some common facts, since the facts relevant to the state actions are irrelevant to the federal actions, one cannot say that the actions have common “operative facts.” ... Therefore, there seems to be little reason for bringing these actions in one judicial proceeding, and the claims are not part of the same case or controversy. As such this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Bradley’s claims against the Defendant Moore or the Buncombe County Defendants.

Section 1367(a) requires a state-law claim to form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within original jurisdiction; possible relevance of requested records to the federal claim does not alone establish that connection.

Ford v. City of Oakwood, Ga. · filed 1995-09-22(a)

Although plaintiffs claims under section 1983 are clearly within this court’s original jurisdiction, his Open Records Act claim is not so related to the section 1983 claims as to form part of the same case or controversy. The documents at issue in the Open Records Act claim may be relevant to plaintiffs federal claims. Nonetheless, the determinations which must be made regarding the documents’ status and accessibility under Georgia law are not related to the issues underlying plaintiffs section 1983 claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs Open Records Act claim is not within the subject matter jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1367 makes judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity govern whether to remand after a post-removal disclaimer or amendment removes the federal basis for jurisdiction.

MARTINCIC v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION · filed 2020-10-01(c)

Even if a pre-removal disclaimer intended to preclude federal officer removal is ineffective under the fine sliver of federal common law that has percolated on that topic, the propriety of a post-removal action either in the form of an express disclaimer or an amendment to a complaint removing allegations triggering federal liability is controlled by the discretionary principles of supplemental jurisdiction: judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims.

Eicherly v. O'Leary · filed 2018-01-03(a)

Even though the district court appears to have dismissed the remaining state law claims on Rooker-Feldman grounds, we may affirm the dismissal on the alternative ground that the district court should have relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

Snelling v. Segbers · filed 2020-08-03(a)

As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. It therefore cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, to the extent those claims are not also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Niles v. Wilshire Investment Group, LLC · filed 2012-03-21(c)(3)

Additionally, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s recommendation that it ... should decline, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any new state law claims because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims under Rooker-Feldman and the claims are being dismissed on the various grounds discussed supra.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Austin v. Tansey · filed 2020-01-14(c)(3)

Finally, the Magistrate Judge Found that, “[b]ecause this action violates Rooker-Feldman and because the complaint fails to state a claim against any defendant under § 1983, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.” ... Having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds no clear error and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction after all federal claims are dismissed before trial when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not justify retaining the state law claims.

JONES v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION · filed 2020-04-17(c)(3)

Having found that Rooker-Feldman divests this court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. The Third Circuit has held that where all federal claims are dismissed before trial, “the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Here, particularly considering the early stage in the litigation, these justifications are not present.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after its federal anchor claims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

April P. Fox v. Florida Department of Children and Families · filed 2020-09-29(c)(3)

Finally, the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Fox’s remaining state claims because her federal anchor claims were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state law claim raises a novel issue of state law, even if that issue arises through a defense.

Younker v. Board of Education of the Lorain City School District · filed 2020-10-05(c)(1)

The well-pleaded complaint rule is clearly irrelevant in these circumstances, and Younker cites no support for her contention that merely because a novel issue of state law is involved in a defense, it cannot support a court’s decision to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(1).

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state-law claim raises a novel issue of state law.

Hawranek v. Law Office Of the Public Defender · filed 2021-03-18(c)(1)

Moreover, Hawranek’s claim against AFSCME “raises a novel . . . issue of State law.” PFRD at 7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim arising from the same restaurant visits and alleged access violations as an ADA claim.

Johnson v. Monterey & Rancho Plaza · filed 2020-10-05(a)

Moreover, Mr. Johnson’s claim for relief pursuant to the Unruh Act is related to the ADA claim because it arises out of the same “case or controversy,” namely Mr. Johnson’s visits to the Restaurant where he encountered alleged violations of both laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant in a diversity case, including a claim to enforce a settlement agreement.

District of Columbia for the Use of Dulles Plumbing Group, Inc. v. Selective Insurance Company of America · filed 2020-10-07(b)

Following that logic, the Court holds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enforcement the settlement agreement between Dulles and Moseley. Nothing in that agreement permits the Court to deviate from the clear rule that Owen Equipment and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) establish.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s indemnity and contribution claims against nondiverse third-party defendants in a diversity action.

Minchin v. Tony Sanchez Ltd · filed 2025-05-15(b)

The defendant, in turn, has joined several third-party defendants and asserted state-law claims for indemnity and contribution against them as joint tortfeasors;4 we have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... The defendant’s joinder of the third-party defendants and its assertion of indemnification and contribution claims against each of them as joint tortfeasors does not deprive this court of diversity jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiff’s original claims, brought against the defendant alone.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a related, novel state-law claim when the claim is easily dismissed.

Strojnik v. Driftwood Hospitality Management LLC · filed 2021-01-06(c)(1)

Furthermore, the Court will continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the brand deceit claim and the rest of Mr. Strojnik’s state-law claims because they are easily dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(1) leaves the court discretion to retain a novel state-law claim that can be easily dismissed.

Strojnik v. Xenia Hotels and Resorts Incorporated · filed 2021-01-06(c)(1)

Furthermore, the Court will continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the brand deceit claim and the rest of Mr. Strojnik’s state-law claims because they are easily dismissed.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims remain pending.

Tucker 132271 v. Miller · filed 2022-08-16(c)

Because Plaintiff continues to have pending federal claims against Defendants, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims against Defendants.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain related state-law claims when they share facts with federal claims that remain pending, even after the federal claim against one defendant is dismissed.

Thomason v. Dallison · filed 2023-08-31(c)(3)

The Court notes that it shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims at this time, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), in light of the fact that these state law claims involve the same facts giving rise to the claims remaining in this lawsuit, and that these claims also name two other Defendants who remain in this lawsuit.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when federal claims remain pending.

Mathey 709065 v. Crompton · filed 2024-02-16(c)

Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Because Plaintiff continues to have pending federal claims against Defendant Crompton, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims against Defendant Crompton.

Section 1367(a) gives courts supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising from the same aggregate set of operative facts as an original claim, without a separate amount-in-controversy requirement.

Gonzalez v. US Human Rights Network · filed 2021-01-11(a)

As discussed, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this compulsory counterclaim pursuant to § 1367(a). There is no amount-in-controversy requirement in this circumstance.

Section 1367(a) gives a federal court jurisdiction over a supplemental claim, and a state law’s jurisdictional label for a presuit requirement does not divest that jurisdiction.

Ward v. LiNA Medical USA, Inc. · filed 2021-01-05(a)

The court has jurisdiction over Count II because of the supplemental jurisdiction statute,2 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and only an act of Congress may divest that jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when no cognizable federal claim remains.

(PC) Lipsey v. Hand-Ronga · filed 2019-11-05(c)(3)

In this instance, the court has not found any cognizable § 1983 claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint against any of the Defendants. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Mountain Home Flight Service, Inc. v. Baxter County · filed 2014-07-15(c)(3)

After the § 1983 claims were dismissed, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Weslowski v. Zugibe · filed 2015-03-31(c)(3)

Because the Court again has dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal claims, the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law claims arising under common law and New York’s Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);. Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir.2008) (“[I]f [the plaintiff] has no valid claim under § 1983 against any defendant, it is within the district court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims.”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental medical-malpractice claims once all claims over which the court has jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Kelly v. Ambroski · filed 2015-03-31(c)(3)

To the extent the plaintiff may be attempting to assert medical-malpractice claims against Defendants Hood and Ambroski as supplemental claims to his § 1983 action, such claims would be subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) once all other claims over which this court has jurisdiction have been dismissed, as recommended herein.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the sole claim supporting federal jurisdiction has been dismissed.

Thermuthis Lee v. Petrolichio · filed 2017-09-21(c)(3)

And because her § 1983 claim was the sole basis for federal jurisdiction, the District Court properly declined jurisdiction over her pendent state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claim is dismissed.

Basista Holdings, LLC v. Township · filed 2017-10-11(c)(3)

Once the § 1983 claim was dismissed, however, the district court had the discretion to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after all federal claims are dismissed, especially when the state claims raise substantial unsettled questions of state law.

Saunders v. Town of Hull · filed 2017-10-27(c)(3)

But given our decision to affirm the entry of summary judgment as to Saunders's § 1983 claim, there is no longer a federal claim in this case. Accordingly, "the balance of factors to be considered under pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity" all "point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims."

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Doe v. Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 · filed 2017-12-29(c)(3)

Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title [IX and § 1983 claims, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and thus declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr. · filed 2018-08-30(c)(3)

Having disposed of the § 1983 claims, the only remaining claims before the Court are Manzanares' negligence and/or gross negligence claims. ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it dismisses the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Powell v. Oklahoma County of · filed 2019-05-23(c)(3)

Having found that the BOCC and Whetsel are entitled to dismissal on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the Court declines, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim for negligence.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Wheatley v. Ford · filed 2019-07-09(c)(3)

Having determined that the federal § 1983 claims over which this Court has jurisdiction should be dismissed, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law negligence claims Plaintiff may be trying to assert.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it disposes of the federal claims and to remand the state law claims to state court.

Brewer v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-23(c)(3)

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants. The court declines to address the merits Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s state law claims against SCDC. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice in part to allow Plaintiff to pursue his remaining causes of action in state court. Accordingly, the state law claims against SCDC are remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County, South Carolina, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ratcliff v. Baltimore County Police Department · filed 2019-08-06(c)(3)

Here, because the Court will dismiss all of Ratcliff’s § 1983 claims—the claims over which it has original jurisdiction—the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the complaint states no cognizable federal claim.

(PC) Lipsey v. Hand-Ronga · filed 2019-08-07(c)(3)

Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this instance, the court has not found any cognizable § 1983 claims in the Third Amended Complaint against any of the Defendants. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff=s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

COOMBS v. MOREHEAD · filed 2019-08-16(c)(3)

The § 1983 claims were the only claims over which this Court had original jurisdiction. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against Morehead in his individual capacity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after resolving all federal claims.

Coles v. County of Monroe · filed 2020-02-03(c)(3)

For the above stated reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with regard to Coles’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

After dismissing all federal claims before trial, a court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it is absolutely clear that they fail to state a claim.

Wang v. University of Illinois Board of Trustees · filed 2020-03-30(c)(3)

Having dismissed the § 1983 claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction, it is within this Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law defamation and false-light claims. ... (3) when it is absolutely clear how the pendent claims can be decided. ... Nonetheless, the Court believes that the third circumstance applies, as it can quickly conclude that the state-law claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims without prejudice after all viable federal claims have been dismissed.

Keavney v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-05-27(c)(3)

Therefore, in the absence of any viable federal claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted, the Court exercises its discretion and DISMISSES all Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hammler v. Alvarez · filed 2020-06-16(c)(3)

Therefore, in the absence of any viable federal claim upon 1 || which § 1983 relief may be granted, the Court exercises its discretion and DISMISSES 2 Plaintiff's supplemental state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims when judicial economy, fairness, and comity favor dismissal.

Buckham v. Downs · filed 2020-07-06(c)(3)

To the extent Buckham wished to plead state law claims regarding his injury in addition to or instead of a § 1983 claim, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over those claims at this time. The Court has no independent basis for jurisdiction over the state claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and the balance of judicial economy, fairness, and comity all point toward declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the case is still at an early stage.

McCreary v. State of Mississippi · filed 2020-07-10(c)(3)

Because McCreary’s federal claims filed pursuant to § 1983 will be dismissed and this case is still in its infancy, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McCreary’s pendent state-law claims, and they will be dismissed without prejudice to his right to refile them in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Foster v. State of Washington · filed 2020-07-21(c)(3)

Given the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal § 1983 claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, which will be remanded to the King County Superior Court for further adjudication.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Keavney v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-07-21(c)(3)

Therefore, in the absence of any viable federal claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted, the Court exercises its discretion once again and DISMISSES all Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Gibson v. Unknown Male patients & Social Workers, Doctors, Administrators, Nurses etc of Lawrence Nursing · filed 2020-09-21(c)(3)

If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint with regard to his claims under § 1983 against Downstate, Five Points, and Elmhurst staff members in their individual capacities, the Court will dismiss those claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see id., and will decline to consider, under its supplemental jurisdiction, Plaintiff's claims under state law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Thornton v. Lymous · filed 2020-09-25(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) specifically grants a district court the discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, such as Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Jones v. Westchester County · filed 2020-09-25(c)(3)

If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Sotak v. Bertoni · filed 2020-11-04(c)(3)

There are no exceptional circumstances present in this case. Because summary judgment will be granted as to the § 1983 claims, the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Sotak's state law claims will be declined. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Stafford v. Argo, City of · filed 2021-01-21(c)(3)

Because the § 1983 claims asserted against Officer Hughes and the City of Argo are due to be dismissed, the undersigned declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted against these defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Stevens v. J&F Gourmet Deli · filed 2019-11-13(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ purported constitutional claims brought under Section 1983, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiffs may be asserting.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after it has dismissed the federal claims.

Linder v. Richmond County, Ga. · filed 1994-02-11(c)(3)

Since I have granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the federal constitutional claims against them, there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. I decline to retain discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim on Sheriff Webster’s bond. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Mazur v. Woodson · filed 1996-06-24(c)(3)

In this ease, the Court has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, that is, the constitutional claims against the Circuit Court. Because Plaintiffs’ state law claims so centrally address the wisdom and appropriateness of the Circuit Court’s judgment in appointing a guardian for Betty Mazur, this Court believes that resolution of this issue should be made in the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia. This Court will not extend its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, including when the plaintiffs are pursuing a related state court action.

Dewick v. Village of Penn Yan · filed 1997-07-14(c)

Because I have concluded that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims must be dismissed and because plaintiffs are currently pursuing a related state court action, I decline to exercise jurisdiction over their remaining state and common law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Macri v. King County · filed 1997-09-17(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. The district court had dismissed all federal and constitutional claims, and did not abuse its discretion in remanding the state claim to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

D'ANGIO v. Borough of Nescopeck · filed 1999-01-29(c)(3)

Moreover, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Here, we are dismissing plaintiffs federal constitutional claims and, accordingly, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all remaining federal claims.

Stutchin v. Town of Huntington · filed 1999-09-28(c)(3)

However, even if the plaintiffs had not abandoned this New York State law claim, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the Court has dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ remaining Federal and Constitutional claims.

Section 1367(a) does not provide jurisdiction over related state claims when the plaintiff cannot sustain the federal claims on which supplemental jurisdiction depends.

Vukelic v. Bartz · filed 2003-02-24(a)

In this case, the Court’s jurisdiction over Vukelic’s state claims is predicated on her ability to sustain her claims involving a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the plaintiff cannot sustain her federal constitutional claims, the Court does not possess jurisdiction over the state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed.

Jones v. Maher · filed 2005-05-17(c)(3)

Finally, because all the federal constitutional claims were properly dismissed, the District Court properly declined jurisdiction over Johnson’s supplemental state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims after all federal claims are dismissed.

Cole v. Montague Board of Education · filed 2005-08-26(c)(3)

Finally, because all the federal constitutional claims were correctly dismissed, the District Court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Coles’ pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lemmons v. Georgetown University Hospital · filed 2006-05-04(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs federal and constitutional claims, the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining pendent state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Finnin v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF FREDERICK CTY · filed 2007-07-31(c)(3)

Thus, this Court declines, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ non-constitutional claims for relief.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims that supplied original jurisdiction.

Chase v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-07-13(c)(3)

Even if the argument had not been conceded, the Court would dismiss Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, as discussed infra, each of plaintiffs' constitutional claims will be dismissed. ... The Court would so decline here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

View Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. Town of Schererville Board of Zoning Appeals · filed 2015-01-22(c)(3)

That’s generally a state court’s function, and although I could exercise supplemental jurisdiction here since this claim is based on the same “nucleus of operative fact” as the constitutional claims (City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 164-65, 118 S.Ct. 523), I decline to do so since all of the federal claims have been dismissed, leaving only state law claims before me. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction where only state law claims remain); ... I therefore remand this claim, and any other remaining state law claim, back to my colleagues in the Lake Superior Court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Coleman v. County of Suffolk · filed 2016-03-31(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a state law claim when the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Having dismissed plaintiffs federal constitutional claims, there is no longer any independent basis for federal jurisdiction in this action. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after it dismisses the claims supporting original jurisdiction.

Beaulieu v. Orlando, et al. · filed 2018-03-12(c)(3)

All of the constitutional claims, which are brought against the state defendants, are resolved on summary judgment against Beaulieu. As a result, the claims that were the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in this case, along with related state law claims against the state defendants, have been dismissed. The only remaining claim is a separate state law claim against a separate defendant, Matthew C. Rodier. The state law claim against Rodier involve different issues and evidence than have been considered for purposes of the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Rodier (Claim 7). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) & (c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Munt v. Schnell · filed 2020-02-28(c)(3)

As stated above, the Court finds no reason to depart from the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail. Consequently, the Court also finds no reason to depart from her recommendation that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

DEGENNARO v. GRABELLE · filed 2020-05-31(c)(3)

Here, because the Court dismisses Plaintiff's federal Constitutional claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's common law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against defendants when it dismisses the federal claims against those defendants.

Perry v. Warden Warren Correctional Institution · filed 2020-06-19(c)(3)

Finally, having concluded that plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims against defendants ODRC, ODRC Director, BOSC, John Doe of BOSC, WCI, WCI Investigator’s Office, Chamblin, and Bullock should be dismissed, the Court should DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over any state-law claims against these defendants and DISMISS any such claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Smith v. Tapio · filed 2020-07-08(c)(3)

Because the plaintiff has not stated constitutional claims against the defendants, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims, which arise under state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ruckel v. Police Department · filed 2020-11-04(c)(3)

Plaintiff’s remaining claims arise under Illinois state law, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over them in light of the dismissal of all federal constitutional claims at screening. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (c)(3) (district court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over supplemental claims or dismiss them when it dismisses the claims over which it had original jurisdiction).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental state-law claims when the federal claims against the defendant are dismissed.

Gan v. The City Of New York · filed 1993-06-01(c)(3)

The court should also, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990), dismiss the state-law claims asserted against him, as it apparently dismissed such claims against Morgenthau.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants after dismissing all federal claims against them.

Perdue v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc. · filed 1996-08-07(c)(3)

All federal claims against the Hospital Defendants having been dismissed, the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the Hospital Defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants when all federal claims against those defendants have been dismissed, even if federal claims remain against others.

Dietrich v. Bauer · filed 1999-03-04(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims — the Ninth Claim through the Fifteenth Claim, inclusive — to the extent that they are asserted against Defendants Dawson, Bear Stearns, Oppenheimer, PaineWebber, Schwalb, and Witz, all of the federal question claims against such Defendants having been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental state law claims against defendants when all federal claims against those defendants have been dismissed.

Hoffman v. County of Delaware · filed 1999-03-12(c)(3)

Having dismissed all federal claims against Whitten, Moon, Talarico, and the County of Delaware, there remains no independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction over those defendants and, accordingly, the pendent state law claims against them must be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims against a defendant after dismissing all federal claims against that defendant.

Wilson v. City of Chanute · filed 1999-02-23(c)(3)

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to Beagley in her individual capacity on all federal claims. Further, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against Beagley.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants after dismissing the federal claims against them.

Thomas v. Zinkel · filed 2001-07-26(c)(3)

Because we will dismiss all of the federal claims against CPS, Beken and Botto, we must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over state law claims] if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs potential state law claims against Medical Defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims against those defendants.

Channer v. Murray · filed 2003-02-20(c)(3)

Because the court has dismissed all of the federal claims against Reno and Blumenthal, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims against them.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against defendants when the federal claims against them have been dismissed.

New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 2003-04-28(c)(3)

In the absence of federal claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State’s remaining state law claims against the NRG Defendants and will therefore dismiss them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not support dismissal of supplemental state law claims when the federal claims against the same defendants are reinstated on appeal.

Chambers v. St. Louis Cty., Missouri · filed 2007-08-06(c)(3)

Because Chambers’s state law claims against the agents were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we reverse the dismissal of those claims as well.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims against one defendant only if no claims within its original jurisdiction remain against any defendant in the action.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 2009-11-12(c)

While section 1367(c) gives a district court discretion to decline to hear state law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” that discretion may only properly be exercised where no claims over which it has original jurisdiction remain against any defendant in the action.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court that has dismissed the federal claims against a defendant to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against that defendant.

Beeler-Lopez v. DODEKA, LLC · filed 2010-05-07(c)(3)

However, having dismissed Plaintiffs federal claims against Defendant, the Court must decide whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. ... Therefore, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims against Defendant.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims against a defendant even after all federal claims against that defendant are dismissed, when other federal claims remain and the state claims form part of the same case or controversy.

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg · filed 2012-03-07(a)

In short, “The fact that all federal claims against NYMC are being dismissed is insufficient to permit the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over pendent state law claims] inasmuch as other federal claims remain in the case and the state law claims ‘form part of the same case or controversy.’ ”

Section 1367 permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant after dismissing the federal claims against that defendant.

Falk v. Perez · filed 2013-09-12(c)(3)

“As a general matter, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims.” ... the Court relinquishes jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against the Department and dismisses Defendant Perez.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims against the defendants.

Grant v. Alperovich · filed 2014-01-03(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all federal claims against that defendant.

Williams v. Rosenblatt Securities Inc. · filed 2015-10-07(c)(3)

Having disposed of the plaintiffs only claim under federal law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental -jurisdiqtion over the sole surviving state law claim against Dr. Henricks.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant after dismissing the federal claims against that defendant, even when federal claims remain against other defendants.

Medlin v. City of Algood · filed 2019-01-16(c)(3)

This holds true even where, as here, federal claims remain against other defendants.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a defendant after dismissing all federal claims against that defendant before trial.

Armas v. St. Augustine Old Roman Catholic Church · filed 2019-07-08(c)(3)

Although this court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in this circuit “[t]he general rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.” Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009). Having dismissed plaintiffs’ federal-law claims against Old Roman, the ... court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims against this defendant.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice after resolving all federal claims against the same defendants when no diversity jurisdiction exists.

Pantastico v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii · filed 2019-07-24(c)(3)

Because the Court grants summary judgment on all the federal claims asserted against the State Defendants, and because there is no diversity jurisdiction, there is no basis for the Court’s continued jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367 bars supplemental state-law claims against defendants when the related federal claims against them are dismissed.

Ready for the World Inc., d/b/a Ready for the World v. Riley · filed 2019-09-09(c)(2)

Consequently, the Court must also grant Defendants Eaton and Riley’s Motions to Dismiss (Doc # 24; Doc # 26) as to Counts VII-VIII because they can no longer be brought forward under supplemental jurisdiction since Eaton and Riley’s claims based on the Lanham Act are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).