28 U.S.C. § 1367

In a diversity-only case, § 1367(b) denies supplemental jurisdiction over an intervenor’s claim when jurisdiction would conflict with § 1332 diversity requirements.

Damon J. Baldone, LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Company · filed 2024-05-30(b)

If the case is before the court based solely on diversity jurisdiction, the court will not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by Rule 24 intervenors when jurisdiction would be inconsistent with § 1332 requirements.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s intervention when exercising it would be inconsistent with diversity jurisdiction requirements.

Ramsey · filed 2026-04-29(b)

That deficiency, coupled with § 1367(b)’s limitation on supplemental jurisdiction when inconsistent with § 1332, demonstrates that Movants have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed intervention.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a private TCPA claim that forms part of the same case or controversy as an FDCPA claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Brown v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC · filed 2010-11-02(a)

This Court has authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over private TCPA claims when “they form part of the same case or controversy” as claims within the Court’s original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the complaint states no viable federal claim.

Stewart v. Canyon County Detention Center · filed 2020-06-29(c)(3)

Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim because the plaintiff lacks standing.

Strojnik v. B&L Motels Incorporated · filed 2020-12-15(a)

Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim, it cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and remand them when the sole federal claim is removed from the case.

RX Medical LLC v. Melton · filed 2022-09-01(c)(3)

Since the federal question is no longer present, the Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction over the five remaining state law claims and REMANDS this case to the District Court of Oklahoma County.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when it dismisses the federal claim arising from the same facts, even if another federal claim remains.

Megginson v. The City of New York · filed 2025-03-25(c)

Although the Court is not dismissing all of Megginson’s claims over which it has original jurisdiction in the instant action, it is dismissing the § 1983 claim that is premised on the same set of facts as the state law negligence claim: Defendants’ delay in providing Megginson with medical care. Having dismissed that federal claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declines to adjudicate the state law negligence claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when no federal claim remains.

Morgan v. Group Health Plan Inc. · filed 2025-04-10(c)(3)

And now that no federal claim remains, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the invasion-of-privacy claim and dismisses it without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a supplemental claim substantially predominates, but overlapping issues, damages, and evidence can defeat that ground.

United Disaster Response, LLC v. Omni Pinnacle · filed 2008-08-01(c)(2)

The actions are sufficiently intertwined so that one does not predominate over the other and the discovery, evidence, etc., will overlap in both the main demand and in the cross-claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims that would substantially predominate over the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Korrow v. Aaron's, Inc. · filed 2014-06-30(c)(2)

Accordingly, although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaims by virtue of 1367(a), it concludes that, in keeping with 1367(c)(2) it should not do so.

Section 1367(a) requires only a loose factual connection for supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims, but subsection (c) permits declining it when those claims substantially predominate or exceptional circumstances give compelling reasons.

Robledo v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-10-06(a), (c)(2), (c)(4)

All that is needed for supplemental jurisdiction of the City’s counterclaims is a “loose” factual connection and I find there is one here. ... This factual connection is enough to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a). ... However, supplemental jurisdiction over a claim otherwise allowed by § 1367(a) may be declined (1) if the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; or (2) in “exceptional circumstances” where there are “other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” ... I conclude the City’s counterclaims would clearly predominate over the plaintiff class’ due process claim and that there are exceptional circumstances that weigh heavily against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1367 generally favors retaining a supplemental state-law claim when the federal claim has been decided at trial.

Leister, Sandra C. v. Dovetail Inc · filed 2008-10-23(c)

The presumption is reversed when as in this case the federal claim is decided on the basis of a trial.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decide whether to retain related state-law claims after it resolves the federal claims against the same defendants.

Thurmond v. Wayne, County of · filed 2011-06-10(c)(3)

Therefore, since this case arrived in federal court by virtue of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court on the state-law claims and REMAND these claims for the district court either to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), or to remand them to the originating state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to retain related state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy favors retention.

Hyman v. Cornell University · filed 2011-07-01(c)(3)

Where the state-law claims arise out of the same facts as the federal-law claims and are without merit, federal courts have generally favored retaining jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy. ... In this case, the state and federal claims arise out of the same facts, and, as explained more fully below, Plaintiffs state-law claims are largely without merit.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain a state-law claim after the federal claims are dismissed when judicial economy favors deciding it.

Snead v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY · filed 2011-09-02(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court has discretion to retain or dismiss nonfederal claims where, as here, the federal basis of the action is no longer applicable. ... Because the time for filing such a claim has clearly expired, the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to retain a related state law claim after resolving the only federal claim when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor deciding it.

DeMont v. Bebber · filed 2012-05-22(c)

Whether the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is discretionary, determined by weighing considerations of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” ... However, the parties have completed discovery and have fully briefed and argued the issues. Considering factors such as judicial convenience and fairness, the Court sees no reason to delay resolution of the state law claim. ... Therefore, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction to decide DeMont’s state law claim.

Section 1367 allows a district court to retain related state law claims after dismissing the sole federal claim when the circumstances favor exercising its discretion.

Senra v. Town of Smithfield · filed 2013-05-03(c)(3)

For all of these reasons, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental state law claims after resolving the sole federal claim when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Oyebade v. Boston Scientific Corp. · filed 2013-06-28(c)

Comity does not weigh against retaining jurisdiction because the state law claims do not raise novel legal issues, and the Court is capable of applying relevant state law to those claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that these factors weigh in favor of it continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Oyebade’s state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Nelson v. Green · filed 2013-08-15(c)(3)

There is no open case in state court at this time, and I will exercise my discretion to retain jurisdiction over the following pendent state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain related state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity favor retention.

Smith v. Ciesielski · filed 2013-09-30(c)(3)

However, given the degree to which Plaintiffs state law and federal claims are interrelated and the significant federal resources that have already been expended on this case, we believe that it would be in line with the principles of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain a state-law claim after the federal claims are dismissed when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor deciding it.

Volek v. Redevelopment Authority · filed 2014-06-03(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the federal claims are no longer viable. ... In this case, those considerations counsel in favor of deciding the Pennsylvania whistleblower claim. ... The court, therefore, will exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state law claim, and enter judgment in favor of all defendants for the same reasons set forth in the court’s prior discussion of Volek’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain a related state claim after dismissing the federal claim when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity support doing so.

Delaney v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2014-09-05(c)(3)

That said, a district court does not abuse its discretion where the “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” support the exercise. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). In this case, Delaney’s federal and state claims are based on his employment and termination by BoA, and they clearly derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. Moreover, discovery is complete, and Delaney’s breach of contract claim does not turn “on novel or unresolved questions of state law.” Cf. Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We hold therefore that the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Delaney’s non-federal claim.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the sole remaining federal claim.

Houck v. Ferrari · filed 2014-10-22(c)(3)

Even though defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ sole remaining federal claim, the Court will continue exercising its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Parker v. Austin · filed 2015-04-28(c)(3)

Considering ‘“the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,’ ” however, the court will exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims because the court is already very familiar with the facts and legal issues presented in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retaining them.

McLean v. Pine Eagle School District, No. 61 · filed 2016-07-01(c)(3)

When a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original subject-matter jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law. ... The Court finds that the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs two common law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) lets a district court retain a state law claim after dismissing the federal claims, including when the litigation has been pending in federal court for a long time.

White v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2016-08-02(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may choose to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after federal claims are dismissed. ... The court finds, however, that given how long this litigation has been pending in federal court, this is not such a “usual case.” Id. Accordingly, the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining DCHRA claim for compensatory damages.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing federal claims when the age and complexity of the litigation, the relationship among the claims, and the possibility of repleading favor retention.

Saleh v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · filed 2018-01-04(c)(3)

At a minimum, this court has supplemental jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the court concludes that in light of the age and complexity of this litigation, and the interrelationship between the RICO and state law theories, and the possibility that the cross plaintiffs will replead their RICO claims, it is appropriate to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims.

Section 1367(a) permits a district court to retain related state law claims after dismissing federal claims when doing so avoids needless duplication and serves efficiency.

Melton v. Alaska Career College, Inc. · filed 2018-06-18(a)

A district court’s supplemental jurisdiction allows it to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact as the federal law claims even after the court has dismissed the latter claims. Id. at 350 n.7. The district court did not err when it retained jurisdiction because it was more efficient for the district court to resolve the state law claims itself than to remand them to a state court and because the duplication of effort would have been needless and unreasonable.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain related state-law claims after resolving federal claims when the stage of litigation and hardship to the parties favor exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

N.Y.S. Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82 v. Cuomo · filed 2018-09-24(c)(3)

In the present matter, considering the advanced stage of the litigation and the Court's familiarity with the issues in this case, combined with the likely hardship to both parties should Plaintiffs re-file in state court, the factors clearly weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain a state law claim after disposing of all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retention.

Palmer v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., Inc. · filed 2018-11-08(c)(3)

But, because the court has concluded that defendant SMMC deserves summary judgment against Ms. Palmer's EMTALA claim-the only federal claim asserted in this lawsuit-the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claim. ... Here, the court concludes that the governing factors favor the court exercising its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claim. ... Applying its discretion, the court thus decides to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retaining them.

Wade v. Electric Boat Corp · filed 2019-09-30(c)(3)

Because the Court grants summary judgment to defendant on all of plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court has discretion over whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. ... In this case, however, all four factors tip the balance toward exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims when economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor doing so.

Logan v. Saks & Company, LLC · filed 2020-09-28(c)

The Court is dismissing the FMLA claims, but nonetheless concludes that “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” are best served by exercising supplemental jurisdiction to rule on the state law claims as well, given the uncomplicated, settled law that applies, the extensive litigation that has already occurred before this Court, and the fact that no party has asked the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Griffin v. Salisbury Police Department · filed 2020-10-19(c)(3)

Although Plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, the Court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits a federal court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims when the state claims are straightforward and deciding them avoids needless state-court litigation.

House v. City of New York · filed 2020-11-24(c)

But, where, as here, the state law claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts, discovery is complete, and there are no novel or unresolved questions of state law, a federal court may, in the service of the “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,” exercise supplemental jurisdiction to decide the remaining state law claims. Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Here, because the Court finds that House’s state law claims are “easily rejected on well- established principles,” deciding these claims in this Court “will save future, needless litigation in state court.” Morales v. City of New York, 59 F. Supp. 3d 573, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain related state law claims after federal claims are dismissed, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Ibarra v. W&L Group Construction Inc · filed 2020-12-08(c)(3)

Although the defendant is correct that the Court is not required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after federal claims are dismissed if the state law claims are based on the same case and controversy. ... The values of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” would not be served by forcing this single plaintiff to bring a second lawsuit in state court when it is likely that his claims could be resolved in this Court. Accordingly, I will not dismiss Garcia’s NYLL claims.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental state law claims after resolving all federal claims when considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Sales v. Res-Care Inc · filed 2021-03-30(a)

The Court must next determine whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... Applying the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that the underlying considerations of whether to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims counsel the court to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain related state law claims after dismissing the federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Tanksley v. Rice County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-03-31

So, having considered the factors described by the Supreme Court in Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350, and by the Tenth Circuit in Wittner, 720 F.3d at 781, the court concludes that exercising its supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is appropriate in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Ray v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2021-04-20(c)(3)

Section 1367 affords a federal court the discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even where the court has disposed of all claims with original federal jurisdiction. ... In light of these factors, the court concludes that it should exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after all federal claims are dismissed when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retention.

Bridgewater v. Hilton Hotels Corporation · filed 2021-07-19(c)(4)

Here there is little question that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness are best served by retaining jurisdiction over the state law claims.

After dismissing all federal claims, a district court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity favor doing so.

Painter v. Midwest Health, Inc. · filed 2021-09-28(c)(3)

Having considered the factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350, and by the Tenth Circuit in Wittner, 720 F.3d at 78, the court concludes that exercising its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is the appropriate course.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when dismissal would waste substantial litigation resources and the claims arise from the same operative facts.

Crandall v. Miller & Stevens, P.A. · filed 2021-10-06(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Dismissal of Crandall’s state-law claims on this basis would be wasteful. The Parties have spent significant resources litigating this case. Their summary-judgment briefs are extensive. Their submissions include hundreds of pages of exhibits. And Crandall’s state-law claims arise from the same operative facts as her FDCPA claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental state law claims when federal claims remain pending.

Ngiendo v. University Partners, LLC. · filed 2021-10-27(c)(3)

The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims because the Court has not dismissed all her federal claims.9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain related state law claims when the claims supporting original jurisdiction have dropped out of the case.

Day v. Chronister · filed 2022-03-10(c)

A court may dismiss supplemental claims only under four specific circumstances, one of which is where the claims over which the district court exercised original jurisdiction drop out of the lawsuit. ... Therefore, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over Day’s state law claims against Sheriff Chronister.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decide a related state claim on the merits after dismissing the federal claim when doing so is efficient.

Birch v. Wlody · filed 2022-05-10(c)

Finally, the district court properly dismissed Birch’s state claim on the merits. It could do so in the exercise of its discretionary supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c), and doing so was efficient, as the standard for adjudicating a housing discrimination claim under New York City Administrative Code § 8-107(19) is the same as under the FHA, see Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing federal claims when substantial judicial resources have already been spent on the case.

Garner v. City of Many · filed 2022-12-07(c)(3)

As an initial consideration, this Court elects to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See also Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that district court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after “a significant amount of judicial resources” have been expended on the litigation). Because the Garners seem to base the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the underlying Fourth Amendment violation, which was the basis for Claim Four above, and because of the time and resources already expended on this case, which was filed in federal court in January of 2021, the Court will address Claim Five here.

Section 1367 permits a court to decide a related state-law claim after the federal claims are disposed of when convenience and efficient resolution favor retaining it.

N.P. v. Kenton County Public Schools · filed 2023-02-08(c)(3)

In deciding this claim after the federal claims have been disposed of, the Court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as all claims in this lawsuit form the same case or controversy. The Court will adjudicate the remaining claim in the interest of convenience to the parties and a more expeditious resolution of the entire case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims when its familiarity with the litigation and the risk that dismissal would time-bar the claim favor retention.

Montgomery v. Whidbee · filed 2023-02-27(c)(3)

Because Montgomery’s asserted injury took place more than four years ago, his claim is likely to be found time-barred if this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) The court should exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over Montgomery’s state law negligence claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when delay and resulting prejudice favor keeping them.

Perez-Orench v. Kelly · filed 2023-05-01(c)

Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims, it has discretion on whether to “exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Given the circumstances of this case that have resulted in extended delays, through no fault of Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will be unduly prejudiced if the Court were to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss the state law claims at this time. Thus, in the interest of fairness and comity, the Court opts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after the federal claims fail at trial when economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Najera v. Atmi Junior Laundromat Inc. · filed 2023-07-13(c)

Here, the Court finds that the Gibbs factors weigh against dismissal of Najera’s state law claims at this late stage of the proceedings.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after resolving the federal claims when state law is settled and a clear immunity defense applies.

Baker v. Bentonville School District · filed 2023-07-27(c)

As the District therefore has a clear immunity defense to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the district court did not abuse its § 1367(c) discretion by exercising supplemental jurisdiction and dismissing this claim with prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain a related state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when the state-law claim is entwined with a federal claim.

Cunningham v. Stamford Health Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2023-07-27(c)(3)

Because I have concluded that Cunningham’s only federal-law claim fails, I may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claim, i.e., his claim that SHMG violated Section 31-51q because his speech was protected by the Connecticut Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (A district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [state law claims] if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."). Nonetheless, I will address the Connecticut constitutional claim under Section 31-51q because it is entwined with the First Amendment claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Amann v. Office of the Utah Attorney General · filed 2024-09-30(c)(3)

In the interest of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the court retains supplemental jurisdiction over this case and declines to remand the case to state court on the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy and convenience favor doing so.

Pearson v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2024-12-03(c)(3)

Here, there’s nothing efficient about relinquishing jurisdiction over plaintiff’s KAAD claims so that a Kansas state court could re-invent and re-apply the same analysis applied here to plaintiff’s federal claims. The court thus exercises its discretion and retains supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Hughes v. M&T Bank · filed 2024-12-18(c)(3)

Despite having long dismissed all of Hughes’s federal claims, (see generally ECF Nos. 19-20), the Court has, in its discretion, elected to retain its supplemental jurisdiction over the residue of Hughes’s case, including his now- standalone IIED claim.

Section 1367 gives district courts discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after the federal claims are resolved, considering comity, federal policy, convenience, fairness, and judicial economy.

Johnson v. Builders Firstsource Southeast Group, LLC · filed 2025-01-14(c)(3)

Here, the district court acknowledged the factors it was required to consider in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over the defamation claim, determined that the claim did not implicate concerns of comity or issues of federal policy, and determined that convenience and fairness to the parties and considerations of judicial economy warranted that it exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction over the claim. We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court and reject as without merit Johnson’s appellate arguments challenging these determinations.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain state law claims after resolving all federal claims when its federal ruling also decides issues dispositive of the state claims.

Mixon · filed 2026-03-23(c)(3)

The Court retains jurisdiction over Mixon’s state law claims because “[i]f the district court, in deciding a federal claim, decides an issue dispositive of a pendent claim, there is no use leaving the latter to the state court.” ... The Court’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude there was an absence of probable cause also disposes of his state law false arrest/wrongful imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims, as discussed in further detail below, so judicial economy and convenience favor resolving these claims in this federal suit.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction, but substantial judicial resources already invested in a case can make remand an abuse of discretion even if the remaining state-law issues are novel or complex.

Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Products · filed 2009-01-06(c)

Regardless, even if this case involved novel or complex state law issues, the significant amount of judicial resources invested by the district court would lead us to find that the district court abused its discretion in remanding this case.

Section 1367(a) permits pendent personal jurisdiction over related state law claims when the court has personal jurisdiction over an anchor claim; without personal jurisdiction over the anchor claims, the related state law claim must be dismissed.

Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Intern. Co., Ltd. · filed 2008-12-16(a)

Finally, because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over Aten International with respect to the patent and Lanham Act claims, it correctly dismissed Avocent’s state law claim for intentional interference with business or contractual relations.

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to an employer’s state-law counterclaim when the employment relationship is its only factual connection to employees’ federal wage claims.

Villareal v. El Chile, Inc. · filed 2009-02-25(a)

The duty of loyalty counterclaim does not arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact as Plaintiffs’ overtime and minimum wage claims under the FLSA and the IMWL. ... The only connection between Plaintiffs’ claims and the counterclaim is the parties’ employment relationship.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over employer counterclaims that share disputed payroll records with FLSA overtime claims and do not substantially predominate over those claims.

Lopez v. Lonch, Inc. · filed 2020-03-24(a), (c)(2)

The Court concludes that at least two issues—(1) whether Lonch maintained accurate records; and (2) whether Ms. Lopez Lima took and destroyed those records—illustrate the substantial factual overlap between the federal overtime claims and the common-law counterclaims. ... The Court therefore finds that the FLSA claim and Defendants’ counterclaims share a common nucleus of operative fact to support supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... The Court therefore finds that Defendants’ counterclaims do not substantially predominate over the FLSA claims, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, for purposes of Section 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367 does not cover employer contract counterclaims unrelated to the economic realities underlying an FLSA claim and permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over those counterclaims for compelling reasons.

Cruz v. 3F Technologies, LLC d/b/a Progressive Technologies, LLC · filed 2020-04-03(a), (c)(4)

Counterclaimants’ causes of action are not part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. ... The provisions in the MTA relevant to Counterclaimants’ claims have no bearing on the economic reality test and are thus unrelated to resolution of Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. ... Even if supplemental jurisdiction existed, the Court finds compelling reasons why the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaims is not warranted.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after disposing of the sole federal claim when the federal ruling effectively resolves the state claims and refiling them would waste judicial resources.

Field v. Tonawanda City School District · filed 2009-03-05(c)(3)

However, although the instant action remains in an early stage based on the absence of extensive pre-trial discovery, and therefore warrants dismissal pursuant to § 1367(c) of Plaintiffs’ pendent NYHRL claims, because granting Defendant’s motion directed to Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims, as recommended, effectively disposes of the merits of Plaintiffs’ NYHRL claims, ... the court finds dismissal of Plaintiffs’ pendent state claims with the consequence of refiling such claims in state court would result in judicial inefficiency and an unnecessary burden on the New York Supreme Court. ... Accordingly, it is recommended, based on this exceptional circumstance, if Defendant’s motion, directed to Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims is GRANTED, that the Chief District Judge retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ NYHRL claims and address the merits of Defendant’s motion directed to such claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related settlement agreement claims, but enforcing those claims against the federal government also requires a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.

Hajro v. Uscis · filed 2015-10-23

Conversely, if the district court here wished to avail itself of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it would need a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity to enforce the 1992 Agreement against the federal government.

Section 1367 does not waive federal sovereign immunity; enforcing a settlement agreement against the federal government through supplemental jurisdiction requires a congressional waiver.

Blajro v. Citizenship · filed 2015-10-23

Conversely, if the district court here wished to avail itself of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it would need a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity to enforce the 1992 Agreement against the federal government.

Section 1367 does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, so its grant of supplemental jurisdiction cannot itself support a claim against the United States.

United States v. Park Place Associates, Ltd. · filed 2009-04-22

However, we need not definitively decide this issue because § 1367, like § 1345, does not constitute a waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity and thus cannot support the district court’s decision to confirm the arbitration award.

Section 1367 does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, so its grant of supplemental jurisdiction cannot itself authorize a claim against the United States.

United States v. Park Place Association · filed 2009-04-22(a)

However, we need not definitively decide this issue because § 1367, like § 1345, does not constitute a waiver of the United States’ sovereign ... immunity and thus cannot support the district court’s decision to confirm the arbitration award.

Section 1367 does not waive federal sovereign immunity.

Sherman v. Kendall · filed 2021-11-24

Section 1367, however, does not waive federal sovereign immunity.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law corporate fiduciary-duty counterclaim tied to whether ERISA plan benefits may be paid.

In Re Ullico Inc. Litigation · filed 2009-03-31(a)

The “case or controversy” analysis is significantly broader, and can conceivably capture more claims, than the preemption question. ... The same holds true here, and therefore Count VI falls within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law fiduciary duty counterclaim that shares a factual nexus with ERISA benefits claims.

Ullico Inc. Litigation · filed 2009-03-31(a)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." ... The same holds true here, and therefore Count VI falls within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over proposed claims after it has resolved all claims within its original jurisdiction, making an amendment to add those claims futile.

Harrison v. Oakland County · filed 2009-05-01(c)(3)

Having resolved all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court finds that Plaintiffs proposed amendments would be futile, where the Court would in any case decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiff seeks to assert.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims against private defendants are substantively identical to FTCA claims against federal defendants.

Jacobs Ex Rel. Jacobs v. Castillo · filed 2009-04-23(c)(2)

Instead they argue that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims against the private defendants because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (“Section 1367”), plaintiffs’ claims against the non-federal defendants “substantially predominate[ ]” over the claims against the United States. ... Here the “federal” claims are really common law claims asserted against federal defendants pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity. The so-called “federal” claims are identical in substance to the state law claims. ... Therefore, it is appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here.

Section 1367 permits a plaintiff to assert state-law claims alongside FTCA claims against the United States.

Ressel v. United States · filed 2025-09-29(a)

Further, governing authority ... supports the general proposition that a plaintiff may assert state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in a case where federal jurisdiction is premised upon claims against the United States arising under the FTCA.

In a diversity action, § 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule 20, even when their joinder would otherwise defeat complete diversity.

Gemini Investors, Inc. v. Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC · filed 2009-06-29(b)

Thus, supplemental jurisdiction would not exist as to any defendant sought to be joined pursuant to Rule 20, but it would exist as to “persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs” under Rule 20 but not as to such “persons proposed to be joined under Rule 19.”

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim by a permissively joined Rule 20 plaintiff even when that plaintiff’s claim does not meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement.

Smith v. Avila · filed 2025-01-30(b)

And because Mrs. Smith was permissively joined in this action in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claims.

Section 1367 permits federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claims despite Tennessee courts having original jurisdiction over them.

Dillingham v. Millsaps · filed 2011-08-10

Even if Tennessee courts have original jurisdiction to review claims brought under the TGTLA, that does not defeat federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits jurisdiction over related claims, but it does not supply Article III standing for a claim or party that lacks it.

Solis v. Emery Federal Credit Union · filed 2020-05-11(a)

The language in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 thus merely provides statutory jurisdiction consistent with the scope of constitutional jurisdiction under Gibbs. ... In other words, a party cannot combine a justiciable claim with a non-justiciable claim, and then argue that the court’s power over the former likewise gives power over the latter.

Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 does not dispense with Article III standing for state-law claims in federal court.

Hagy v. Demers & Adams · filed 2018-02-16

But the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction does not alter Article III’s standing requirements.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over a claim for which the plaintiff lacks constitutional standing.

Genesee County Employees' Retirement System v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust · filed 2011-11-12(a)

Thus, because Genesee County did not have standing to assert claims regarding any offering other than the 2007-4 offering, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims relating to the other nine offerings.

Section 1367 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed for lack of standing.

LeMaster v. Ditech Financial LLC · filed 2020-04-15(a)

But even if the claims are not barred by the injunction, we affirm the dismissal of LeMaster’s federal claims for lack of standing, see LeMaster v. Ditech Fin. LLC, 782 F. App’x 519 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), and thus lack supplemental jurisdiction over LeMaster’s state law claims against Fannie Mae and Ditech, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367; ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the district court has no subject-matter jurisdiction.”); 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction to cure a lack of Article III standing for a particular form of relief.

Buscema v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP · filed 2020-04-16

Nor can this Court cure Plaintiff’s lack of standing by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the class claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because doing so would effectively invalidate the requirement that she demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought.

Section 1367(c) discretion over state law claims does not prevent abstention principles from requiring a stay or dismissal of those claims.

Zoom Electric, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 595 · filed 2013-02-08(c)

However, even where a court has already considered its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to weigh the values of judicial economy, comity, convenience and fairness and has determined that those interests would be best served by exercising jurisdiction over the claims, principles of abstention still may oblige a district court to stay or dismiss state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim and dismiss it without prejudice.

Routh v. University of Rochester · filed 2013-11-05(c)(4)

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), and dismisses the claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim for compelling reasons.

Mullen v. Vill. of Painted Post · filed 2019-01-25(c)(4)

Moreover, Defendants are correct that it is generally inappropriate for a federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim even when a federal claim remains.

Bens BBQ, Inc. v. County of Suffolk · filed 2020-07-07(c)

Distinct from the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, most district courts decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction Article 78 proceedings in an exercise of discretion. ... Despite the fact that Plaintiff has a federal cause of action remaining in this case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action.

Section 1367 gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a New York Article 78 claim.

Pierro v. Hudson City School District · filed 2023-03-31

... court, nonetheless, has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to decline to hear an Article 78 claim. Thus, Pierro’s Article 78 claim is dismissed.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over Article 78 claims related to federal claims despite New York’s requirement that standalone Article 78 petitions be filed in state court.

Garofalo v. City of New York · filed 2023-06-02(a)

The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s argument that, because N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804 mandates that stand-alone Article 78 petitions be filed in state court, federal courts cannot have supplemental jurisdiction over them when (as here) a plaintiff’s cause of action also includes federal claims.

Section 1367 does not apply to state-law claims over which a state court has original jurisdiction.

Early v. Baker · filed 2013-12-05

This statutory section addresses the supplemental jurisdiction of federal district courts over claims related to a civil action of which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, and it sets out the period of limitations for such supplemental claims. Here, the trial court is a state court with original, not supplemental, jurisdiction of the assault-and-battery claims, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is not applicable.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not require a state court to accept a claim after a federal court declines supplemental jurisdiction over it.

Weir, N. v. Allegheny Health Network · filed 2025-04-22(c)(3)

Second, we reject the implicit premise in Weir’s argument — that a federal district court’s dismissal of a claim under Section 1367(c)(3) permits, or even mandates, the acceptance of the same claim by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. By its plain language, Section 1367 makes no reference to a state court’s jurisdiction over any claim.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving a plaintiff-intervenor when exercising it would be inconsistent with § 1332’s diversity requirements.

Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P. v. Buffco Production, Inc. · filed 2014-05-07(b)

Second, § 1367(a)’s supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction provision does not afford jurisdiction over the Geisler Unit claims because Harleton’s participation as a plaintiff-intervenor would be inconsistent with the requirements of § 1332.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by a Rule 24 plaintiff-intervenor when exercising it would violate Section 1332’s diversity requirements, including claims between two aliens.

MCDP Phoenix Services PTE, LTD v. First Finance International Bank Corp. · filed 2021-05-17(b)

Yet, Section 1367(b) expressly precludes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in these circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). As noted above, this Section provides in the relevant part that there is no supplemental jurisdiction over claims by persons “seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” Id. As shown in the preceding section, actions by one alien against another are inconsistent with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1332.

A remand under § 1367(c)(3) does not deprive a district court of authority to consider a post-judgment motion.

Booker v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections · filed 2014-08-28(c)(3)

Contrary to the district court’s apparent determination, it retained authority to consider Booker’s post-judgment motion despite remanding under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012).

Section 1367(b) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against an additional diverse defendant even when those claims do not independently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement; it precludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant.

Aguayo v. AMCO Insurance · filed 2014-10-31(b)

Although subsection (b) has been interpreted by some courts to forbid the joining of defendants in diversity cases who do not individually satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, the better reading of “when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332” is that it prohibits only the joining of nondiverse parties.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, but does not require dismissal of the state-law claims.

Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC · filed 2015-08-19(c)(3)

Section 1367(c) does not obligate district courts to dismiss state-law claims after dismissal of all federal claims, nor does it require that they retain jurisdiction either except in a few circumstances.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim after the federal claim supporting original jurisdiction disappears.

Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC · filed 2018-06-25(c)

The mere fact that any prospect of complete preemption had dissipated by the time that the cross-motions for summary judgment were filed did not deprive the district court of its supplemental jurisdiction over the Wage Act claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to dismiss a state-law claim without prejudice when it substantially predominates over the federal claim.

Wehby v. Springer Equipment Co. · filed 2016-01-08(c)(2)

On these facts, the court concludes that Plaintiffs section 25-5-11.1 claim will substantially predominate over the federal claim in this case — the Rehab Act cause of action. ... Based on the foregoing, the court holds that while it appears to have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs section 25-5-11.1 claim, it also has discretion, in exercising that jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), to dismiss that claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when its corresponding federal claim is resolved before trial.

Grice, Regis v. Tapio, Nathan · filed 2020-12-30(c)

Because Grice’s corresponding federal claim has been resolved before trial, I will relinquish jurisdiction over this claim.

A court’s relinquishment of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) makes its discussion of the dismissed state-law claims’ merits gratuitous.

Neita v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-07-19(c)

That discussion was gratuitous in light of the decision to relinquish jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

When a case is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court has broad discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP · filed 2017-01-31(c)(3)

Finally, as we indicated at the outset, the district court has broad discretion over claims brought under its supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Typically, when a case is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court will relinquish jurisdiction over these claims and allow the state courts (or possibly in this case, the foreign court) to take over if that is proper under their rules. That is the choice the district court made here, and it is one that was comfortably within its discretion.

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction to a severed claim once it becomes an independent action with no claim under the court’s original jurisdiction to supplement.

Von Bernuth v. Herklotz · filed 2017-02-14(a)

It can no longer rely on the supplemental jurisdiction afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), for there is nothing left to supplement.

When federal claims drop out before trial, Section 1367 generally favors relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims, but the court may decide them when their outcome is absolutely clear.

TURNER v. MIKE RAISOR BUICK GMC CADILLAC, INC. d/b/a MERCEDES-BENZ OF LAFAYETTE · filed 2020-09-22(c)(3)

The Court's jurisdiction on those claims is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are closely related to the federal claims in a case. However, “[w]hen the federal claim in a case drops out before trial, the presumption is that the district judge will relinquish juris- diction over any supplemental claim to the state courts.” Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2008). One exception to rule is when it is “absolutely clear” how the state law claims should be decided. Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008). ... The remaining state law claim against these entities should therefore be dismissed.

Section 1367(a) no longer supplies supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party claim after the claim is severed into an independent action.

Velazquez v. Allied Plstc · filed 2021-12-29(a)

But that supplemental jurisdiction ceased once the district court severed the third-party claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state law claim to continue after the claim is severed, when jurisdiction was properly exercised before severance.

Simon Property GRroup, L.P v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2022-07-06(a)

Taking account of the respect due these decisions of Circuit Courts, this Court concludes that where federal question jurisdiction is properly invoked in an action and supplemental jurisdiction is properly exercised over a state law claim that is part of the same case or controversy, the subsequent severance of that claim does not extinguish supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) cannot support supplemental jurisdiction after an amended complaint removes the claims that supplied original federal jurisdiction.

Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2023-07-31(a)

The original complaint is “without legal effect,” Atlas Van Lines, 209 F.3d at 1067, meaning that the possibility of supplemental jurisdiction vanished right alongside the once-present federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c) favors relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed before trial when no exception warrants retaining them.

GEFT OUTDOOR LLC v. CITY OF FISHERS, INDIANA · filed 2024-01-22(c)

Here, the factors weigh in favor of the Court's relinquishing jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over an entire claim, not just the remedy sought.

West v. Hoy · filed 2025-01-22(c)

But that provision only authorizes a district court, in its discretion, to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a “claim.”

Section 1367 permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after resolving the federal claim.

Wagner v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2025-03-06(a)

The Court relinquishes its supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over Plaintiff's state law negligence claim and dismisses that claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the related federal claims are resolved when proof of those state claims does not overlap with proof of the remaining claims.

Cooper v. Wesner · filed 2025-08-25(c)(3)

Further, because the proof necessary for Cooper’s state law claims against these Defendants will not overlap with the proof necessary for his claims against the remaining Defendants, the Court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Wesner, Bassuener, Hosfelt, Laning, and Vick.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when a post-removal amended complaint eliminates all federal claims and no other basis for original jurisdiction exists.

Bryant · filed 2026-03-11

Because 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “contemplates that when an amended complaint is filed, the jurisdictional basis for the suit is reviewed anew,” “[i]f nothing in the amended complaint now falls within the federal court’s original jurisdiction, then neither does anything fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.” /d. at 34 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). As an amendment to “cut[] out all” federal claims is precisely what has been effected by Plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint, and the record does not reflect that the parties are completely diverse, the case must “return to state court.” Jd. at 26, 39; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Section 1367(c) allows a court to retain related claims even if they may predominate when severance would create parallel litigation and unfairly burden a party.

Rhodes v. MCIC, Inc. · filed 2016-09-29(c)

However, even if the portion of Plaintiffs’ suit against the non-Crane Co. Defendants can be said to predominate over the portion against Crane Co., that would not be the only determinative factor in the Court’s exercise of discretion as to retention of jurisdiction in the rest of the case. ... The obvious result of severance and remand is that two cases would be proceeding simultaneously in two different courts, which is antithetical to economy, either as to judicial resources or the litigants’ resources. Nor is it fair to Crane Co. to litigate its defense simultaneously in two fora. ... For that reason, the motion in the alternative for severance and remand of all non-Crane Co. claims will be denied.

Section 1367(b) limits supplemental jurisdiction over claims by original plaintiffs, but a defendant does not become a plaintiff under that exception by asserting a claim against joined parties.

PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc. · filed 2016-12-15(b)

ZTE USA, the defendant in the original action, does not become a plaintiff by merely asserting a claim against the Joined Parties. ... We join our sister circuits on this point. The claims at issue are not “claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties” and do not fall under the exception found in § 1367(b); the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over them in this case.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against newly joined defendants when diversity is the sole basis of original jurisdiction and joining them would violate the diversity requirements of § 1332.

Capitol Indemnity Corporation v. BES Design/Build, LLC · filed 2019-02-20(b)

Because allowing non-diverse defendants to be joined after the filing of the initial complaint “would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332,” the Court must assure itself that the newly joined defendants are indeed diverse from the Plaintiff.

In diversity cases, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a defendant joined under Rule 19 or 20 when that jurisdiction would conflict with § 1332’s requirements.

Beery Advisors, LLC v. Strategic Aviation, LLC · filed 2019-07-01(b)

Because Airworthy is necessarily joined as a defendant under either Rule 19 (required joinder) or 20 (permissive joinder), this Court cannot have supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against it.

Section 1367(b) does not exclude a related claim against a party brought into a diversity case through Rule 22 interpleader.

Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, et · filed 2019-09-20(b)

Both a literal reading of the 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) exclusion and a practical view of Weaver’s claim against Perry show that supplemental jurisdiction was proper.

Section 1367(b) does not treat an original defendant asserting counterclaims as a plaintiff, so its diversity restriction does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over related counterclaims against nondiverse parties.

Construction Management, Inc. v. Platinum Hospitality, LLC · filed 2020-10-02(b)

Platinum did not become a plaintiff for purpose of § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 when hearing those claims would conflict with the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

City of Issaquah v. ORA Talus 90, LLC · filed 2021-02-23(b)

Section 1367 provides that in actions where original jurisdiction lies solely in diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, district courts “shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Accordingly, the City’s position is unsupported by current law.

Section 1367(a) and (b) permit supplemental jurisdiction over same-transaction claims against additional parties joined by a defendant, regardless of those parties’ citizenship.

Stroh Die Cast LLC v. Stoneridge Control Devices, Inc. · filed 2021-04-02(a), (b)

Specifically, § 1367(a) and (b) allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over “claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties” if those claims are part of the same transaction as the original claims and the new parties are added by the defendant rather than the plaintiff.

In a diversity-only action, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over an original plaintiff’s Rule 14 claims against nondiverse third-party defendants.

GT Leach Constructors, LLC v. Arel River Oaks, LLCCase remanded to the 269th District Court of Harris County, Texas. · filed 2022-04-29(b)

Exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would plainly be—in the words of section 1367(b)—inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.

In a diversity action, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined under Rules 19 or 20 when those claims do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Payton v. National Continental Insurance Company · filed 2023-06-05(b)

Accordingly, under the plain language of § 1367(b), the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over M.B.’s claims against the Defendants because they are “claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims against defendants joined under Rules 19 or 20 when the plaintiffs’ claims do not meet the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Spencer v. Arch Insurance Company · filed 2023-10-02(b)

Accordingly, under the plain language of § 1367(b), the Court is precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Spencer and Lewis’s claims against the Defendants because they are “claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Section 1367(b) excludes a plaintiff’s claims against a party who intervenes under Rule 24 from supplemental jurisdiction.

Murtagh v. Americas Insurance Company · filed 2024-05-03(b)

While the addition of LIGA as a defendant through intervention rather than amendment might in some cases support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), supplemental jurisdiction is exercised over claims, not parties, and the claims LIGA has intervened to litigate are brought by plaintiff. ... Thus, supplemental jurisdiction of plaintiff's claims against LIGA is foreclosed.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against a defendant who intervenes under Rule 24 when original jurisdiction rests on diversity.

Bergeron v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2024-06-26(b)

The Court further finds that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is foreclosed. ... Section 1367(b) provides that “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule . . . 24 of the Federal Rules.”

Section 1367(b) does not exclude supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims brought by a person permissively joined under Rule 20.

Hedge Lane Shawnee, LLC v. CTW Transportation Services, Inc. · filed 2024-11-12(b)

This Section does not expressly exclude claims brought by persons made parties under Rule 20. The counterclaims therefore do not fall within any of the exclusions from supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases set forth in Section 1367(b). The Court thus finds that it has supplemental jurisdiction over newly joined CTWAH’s proposed Fraud Counterclaims and new breach counterclaims.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant-intervenor’s third-party claim against a party with the same citizenship.

INSTITUTIONAL CASEWORK, INC. v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA · filed 2025-03-13(b)

E.E. Austin plainly intervenes as a Defendant, and its common citizenship with CommCab, a putative third-party defendant, does not violate Section 1367(b).

In a diversity case, § 1367(b) limits supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims involving parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24.

Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. Instagram, LLC · filed 2025-05-27(b)

After Chubb is realigned as a plaintiff, under 28 U.S.C. §1367(b), a district court does not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims made by persons under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In diversity cases, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims against permissively joined defendants that do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Hadrovic · filed 2025-10-16(b)

Because exercising jurisdiction over the claims against Wells Fargo would be inconsistent with diversity jurisdiction’s amount-in-controversy requirement, section 1367(b) forecloses supplemental jurisdiction here.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law replevin claim even when a state statute directs that the action be brought in a court in a particular county.

Routhier v. Goggins · filed 2017-01-18(a)

The court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the replevin action. ... There is no question that the re-plevin action is part of the same case or controversy as Donald’s constitutional claims. And state statutes that limit venue to state courts in particular counties do not bar a federal court’s exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim to avoid jury confusion.

Allen v. Fluxtrol, Inc. · filed 2023-10-11(c)(4)

Because the parties in this case are nondiverse, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ELCRA claim so as to avoid jury confusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); Moor v. Cty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973); Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1994).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim to avoid jury confusion.

Kelly v. Life Secure Insurance Company · filed 2023-06-15(c)(4)

Because the parties in this case are nondiverse, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ELCRA claim so as to avoid jury confusion.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims to avoid jury confusion.

Gonzalez-Hall v. Dearborn, City of · filed 2020-11-25(c)(4)

Since the parties to this matter are non-diverse, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims so as to avoid jury confusion.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims to avoid jury confusion.

Bryant v. Detroit Thermal Systems, LLC · filed 2019-10-23(c)(4)

Accordingly, the parties in this case appear to be nondiverse, and this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims so as to avoid jury confusion.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (4) permit dismissal without prejudice of a supplemental state-law claim when divergent elements and remedies would cause state-law issues to predominate and create a substantial risk of jury confusion.

Armstrong v. Nan, Inc. · filed 2017-03-03(c)(2), (4)

The court concluded that because of the divergence of elements and remedies available under federal versus Hawaii state law, state law remedies would predominate and there was a substantial risk of jury confusion in evaluating and applying the divergent law to the two age discrimination claims. Because this was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims to avoid jury confusion.

Hines v. Sherwood Food Distributors · filed 2019-11-20(c)(4)

Since the parties in this matter are nondiverse, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims so as to avoid jury confusion.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law conspiracy claim that would predominate over narrow federal claims and could cause juror confusion.

Reid v. City of Detroit · filed 2019-11-25(c)(4)

Moreover, this Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such a state-law claim in this particular case in any event, as it would predominate over the narrow federal claims in this action and could cause juror confusion if it were presented to a jury along with Plaintiff Reid’s federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) and (4) permits courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims substantially predominate and likely jury confusion and judicial inefficiency constitute exceptional circumstances.

Doe MC-19 v. The University of Michigan · filed 2020-04-01(c)(2), (c)(4)

In addition, under 1367(c)(4), exceptional circumstances are present because of the likelihood of jury confusion and judicial inefficiency: any advantages to be gained by trying all the claims together here are outweighed by the potential for confusion about the issues, legal theories, defenses, and possible relief. The state law claims in this action would predominate over Plaintiff’s federal claims. ... Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2) and (4), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims, and claims V-XVIII are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims and exercising jurisdiction would risk jury confusion.

Doe MC-14 v. The University of Michigan · filed 2020-04-02(c)

Here, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because they substantially predominate over the few federal claims and in order to avoid jury confusion about the issues, legal theories, defenses, and possible relief. So pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Claims V–XVIII, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that substantially predominate over federal claims and whose differing evidence and legal theories would likely cause jury confusion.

Burkacki v. BIRKENSHAW · filed 2020-04-06(c)

In Burkacki’s case, the 11 state-law claims clearly predominate over the two federal claims. ... So pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Claims VI, VII, X, XI, and XII(2), which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when trying them with a federal claim would risk jury confusion.

Mackey v. Rising · filed 2022-11-29(c)(4)

And even if Plaintiff’s remaining constitutional claim was going to survive summary judgment, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims due to the risk of jury confusion.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction solely for possible jury confusion when instructions can address the differences between related federal and state claims.

Hinton v. Grieco · filed 2023-03-28(c)(4)

Thus, although the possibility of jury confusion is a relevant consideration, this case is not the “exceptional circumstance[]” that presents a “compelling reason” for declining jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims to avoid jury confusion.

Smith v. University of Michigan · filed 2023-04-18(c)(4)

Because the parties in this matter are nondiverse, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims so as to avoid jury confusion.

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations periods but does not overcome a state rule limiting how many times a claim may be refiled when timeliness is undisputed.

Buschle v. Coach, Inc. · filed 2017-12-18(d)

Pursuant to § 1367(d), a voluntary dismissal may trigger a tolling period. But tolling is not at issue here because Defendants do not raise any defenses of timeliness. ... No amount of tolling will help Buschle because the timeliness of the case is not at issue but rather than the amount of times the case has been filed.

Section 1367(d) preserves time to refile a supplemental state law claim in state court, but does not save a claim refiled in federal court.

Schwab v. Kobach · filed 2019-09-25(d)

Section 1367(d) operates as a savings statute for re-filing a case in state court. It does not “act as a savings statute, allowing a plaintiff to refile in federal court.”

Section 1367(d) suspends the state limitations period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court, leaving the remaining time available after dismissal.

Baylon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-03-29(d)

Because § 1367(d) operated to stop the New Mexico limitations clock until this Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law claims on October 30, 2015, Plaintiffs' refiling of those claims in the instant action on November 8, 2016 was within the applicable three- and four-year limitations periods.

Section 1367(d) stops the state limitations clock while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal, after which the clock resumes with the time that remained when the claim was filed.

Artis v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-01-22(d)

Section 1367(d) is phrased as a tolling provision. It suspends the statute of limitations for two adjacent time periods: while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days postdismissal.

A party may waive a challenge to the discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by expressing a wish to remain in federal court while seeking to add state-law claims.

Breitling v. LNV Corporation · filed 2018-03-23(c)

Likewise, the Breitlings’ express wish to remain in federal court coupled with their attempts to amend their complaint to add ad- ditional state-law claims operated to waive any challenge to the district court’s discretionary exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a state-law claim asserted in federal court and then dismissed, but does not toll a claim first brought in state court or revive a limitations period that expired before the federal action began.

Anderson v. Herbert · filed 2018-08-02(d)

Section 1367(d) preserves a state-law claim that is asserted in a federal proceeding and then is dismissed. It does not indefinitely suspend the limitations period for a state-law claim that first is brought in a state-court action. Further, Section 1367(d) provides no support for Mr. Anderson’s position because the state limitations periods had expired before Mr. Anderson brought this federal action. Thus, there was nothing left of the limitations periods for § 1367(d) to toll.

In a diversity case, § 1367(b) bars an original plaintiff from using supplemental jurisdiction for claims against defendants impleaded under Rule 14.

Rocky Aspen Mgmt. 204 LLC v. Hanford Holdings LLC · filed 2019-01-30(b)

Thus, in a case where the court has jurisdiction premised on diversity, plaintiffs cannot rely on supplemental jurisdiction to bring claims against defendants impleaded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 (" Rule 14").

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse party added under Rule 24 when doing so would violate complete diversity in an action based solely on diversity jurisdiction.

James McHugh Construction Co. v. The Great American Insurance Company · filed 2019-05-21(b)

Nevertheless, with the addition of CHG, an Illinois corporation, under Rule 24, this Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over CHG because the jurisdictional requirements mandate complete diversity.

In a diversity case, § 1367(b) requires the court to consider whether supplemental jurisdiction over a proposed intervenor’s claim would be inconsistent with § 1332’s jurisdictional requirements.

Vareen v. Martin Transport Inc. · filed 2019-10-02(b)

Because subject matter jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the undersigned must consider whether allowing Proposed Intervenor to intervene “would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse defendant-intervenor’s claim arising from the same facts as the underlying diversity action.

Castleberry v. Fanuc America Corporation · filed 2021-12-03(a)

The Intervenors’ claim to the recovery in this lawsuit “ar[ose] out of the same facts as the underlying tort claim” and joinder of a non-diverse intervenor would not destroy the court’s subject matter jurisdiction because supplemental jurisdiction would apply under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).