28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 does not authorize district-court review of a nationally applicable Clean Air Act regulation when the Act grants exclusive review jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v. Costle · filed 1981-04-28

Neither the Mandamus Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, nor a district court’s federal question jurisdiction authorizes review of the Performance Warranty Regulation in the district court in light of the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

Section 1331 cannot displace the Atomic Energy Act’s exclusive administrative and court-of-appeals review scheme for federal statutory claims.

Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co. · filed 1981-07-22

Such statutes have been supplanted by 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) providing for exclusive jurisdiction of appellants’ statutory claims in the NRC with appeal to the United States Courts of Appeal.

Section 1331 does not bypass an exclusive federal administrative review route against federal defendants, but it supports a Section 1983 action against local defendants for alleged violations of federal law.

CONSORTIUM OF COM. BASED ORGANIZATIONS v. Donovan · filed 1982-01-11

I also find that this action must be dismissed against the federal defendants since CETA itself provides the exclusive remedy for its violation when the claim is asserted against the United States or its agencies and that plaintiffs' claims do not rise to the dignity of a constitutional violation. Finally, however, I find that plaintiffs' allege a violation of a federal law, CETA, which is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the local defendants, and that under the most recent teachings of the Supreme Court, this court has jurisdiction to consider the claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 cannot be used to bypass an adequate specific statutory procedure for reviewing agency action, and it does not authorize premature review of nonfinal agency action.

General Finance Corporation, Postal Finance Company, and Barclaysamericancorporation v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1983-02-10

You may not bypass the specific method that Congress has provided for reviewing adverse agency action simply by suing the agency in federal district court under 1331 or 1337; the specific statutory method, if adequate, is exclusive. ... Therefore the target of a section 6 investigation may not maintain a suit under sections 1331 or 1337 to enjoin the investigation but must wait till the government sues to enforce a subpoena or other compulsory process in aid of the investigation, since that is the method of judicial review of FTC investigations that Congress has prescribed. ... If a review proceeding is not authorized by section 10(c), because it is premature, general jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 cannot be used to confer jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not establish district-court jurisdiction over a federal personnel challenge when the plaintiff has not exhausted the Civil Service Reform Act's administrative remedy and has no viable constitutional claim.

Dugan v. Ramsay · filed 1983-03-29

The plaintiff claims that this litigation arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States and that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The plaintiff’s constitutional rights have not been violated since the criterion for evaluating ALJ applicants is rationally related to the legitimate goal of OPM. ... CSRA does not, for the reasons previously stated, afford an independent basis for district court jurisdiction. ... Plaintiff has, in the judgment of the Court, failed to establish jurisdiction on any theory.

Section 1331 cannot be used to bypass the Quiet Title Act’s exclusive procedure for challenging the United States’ title to real property.

Block v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Board of University & School Lands · filed 1983-05-02

As the jurisdictional basis for its suit, North Dakota invoked 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (federal question); ... North Dakota’s action may proceed, if at ... all, only under the QTA.

Federal employees cannot invoke Section 1331 to bypass the Civil Service Reform Act's exclusive remedial framework for discharges allegedly based on union activity.

Carter v. Kurzejeski · filed 1983-05-05

Even though Congress did not directly address every conceivable avenue of relief for federal employees discharged solely for union membership and participation, we are convinced that the comprehensive statutory framework created in the 1978 legislation was intended as an exclusive means of redress in this situation. Carter and Denson cannot totally avoid this framework by invocation of the general federal question jurisdictional statute.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over federal railroad hiring-preference claims is displaced when Congress assigns those disputes to mandatory administrative review and arbitration without preserving pending federal cases.

BROTH. OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS v. Burlington · filed 1984-02-27

Jurisdiction was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... I can only conclude that Congress did not intend jurisdiction to remain in this court after the passage of the 1982 amendments in the Pipeline Safety Act. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore granted.

Section 1331 cannot be invoked to avoid the exclusive forum Congress designated for judicial review of national mining regulations.

Virginia ex rel. Virginia Department of Conservation & Economic Development v. Watt · filed 1984-05-25

Nor do we accept the rationale that federal question jurisdiction can be invoked to avoid the forum for judicial review made available by Congress to challenge national mining regulations.

Section 1331 cannot be invoked to avoid an exclusive forum that Congress specified for judicial review of national administrative regulations.

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Watt · filed 1984-11-05

Nor do we accept the rationale that federal question jurisdiction can be invoked to avoid the forum for judicial review made available by Congress to challenge national mining regulations. We conclude that our interpretation of 30 U.S.C. Sec. 1276(a)(1) which we announced in Tug Valley gives effect to the logical purpose of specifying a single forum for review of the Secretary's rules.

Section 1331's general jurisdictional grant is displaced when a precisely drawn federal statute supplies an exclusive procedure for judicial review of the challenged agency action.

Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. American Oil Co. · filed 1985-11-18

In light of the Court’s finding that this action is, in substance and effect, a challenge to agency action, we hold that the general federal question statute on which the plaintiff relies is displaced by the “precisely drawn, detailed statute” which provides for judicial review of agency orders.

Section 1331(a) permits statutory and constitutional challenges to federal benefit-program guidelines when a statute confines only review of individual state-agency eligibility determinations to state processes.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock · filed 1986-06-25(a)

While the Act vested state courts with exclusive jurisdiction over claims challenging a state agency’s application of federal guidelines to the benefit claims of individual employees, there is no indication that Congress intended § 2311(d) to deprive federal district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331(a) (1976 ed.) to hear statutory or constitutional challenges to the federal guidelines themselves.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over agency action assigned by the Safe Drinking Water Act to exclusive court-of-appeals review.

Western Nebraska Resources Council v. Wyoming Fuel Co. · filed 1986-06-30

The plaintiff contends that the district court may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to ... general federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; ... Based upon a review of all the statutory and constitutional provisions raised by the plaintiff, I conclude that none confers upon this court jurisdiction for review. ... Thus, review cognizable in the court of appeals under § 300j-7 precludes jurisdiction in district court.

Section 1331 does not overcome FECA's bar on judicial review when a claimant adds only an insubstantial constitutional allegation designed to manufacture jurisdiction.

Riehl v. Brock · filed 1987-01-22

The FECA limits jurisdiction of the adjudication of FECA claims to the Secretary of Labor and prohibits review "of the action of the Secretary of Labor or his designee" by any court. ... Although the Court would have jurisdiction to decide whether defendants violated plaintiff's due process rights, ... the Court concludes that plaintiff's allegations in his amended complaint of a constitutional violation are insubstantial and designed to provide a jurisdictional base where none would otherwise exist.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a procedural challenge to the Veterans Administration’s benefits-entitlement process that is distinct from review of an individual benefits decision.

Mathes v. R.L. Hornbarger · filed 1987-06-10

... clearly renders Mathes’ procedural challenge to the VA’s benefits entitlement process a federal question fully cognizable in federal court.

Section 1331 does not permit district-court review of pesticide suspension orders when FIFRA supplies a comprehensive and exclusive judicial-review scheme.

Nagel v. Thomas · filed 1987-07-24

Plaintiffs also argue that there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. When the sovereign consents to be sued, it is well established that it can attach conditions to its consent and that such jurisdictional statutes are to be construed narrowly. Further, where a regulatory statute provides a comprehensive scheme for judicial review, those provisions are exclusive and preclude actions under general jurisdictional provisions. ... FIFRA, as we have seen, is just such a statute. Its provisions are exclusive and preclude district court jurisdiction to review suspension orders under the general federal question grant of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court jurisdiction over black-lung benefit liability because Congress's exclusive administrative and court-of-appeals review scheme supplants general federal-question jurisdiction.

Connors v. Tremont Mining Co. · filed 1987-12-23

Significantly, we noted that where black lung benefits are at issue, jurisdiction is not available under section 1331 because it was “supplanted by the provisions for exclusive Court of Appeals review.” ... Because this case involves the payment of black lung benefits as provided by the BLBA, we conclude that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal question statute to hear appellants’ claims.

Section 1331 independently vests district courts with jurisdiction over a federal challenge to Customs trademark regulations unless a specific exclusive grant to the Court of International Trade applies.

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. · filed 1988-03-07

Both the general federal-question provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and the specific provision regarding actions “arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . trade-marks,” § 1338(a), would, standing alone, vest the district courts with jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1331 permits a program-wide statutory or constitutional challenge to a benefits program even when another statute confines review of individual benefit determinations to state administrative and judicial processes.

Cosby v. Ward · filed 1988-03-14

The plaintiffs are not suggesting that the state erred in its computation of benefits and that a few people came up a few dollars short. Rather, they seek a declaration that IDES administered the EB and FSC programs in contravention of federal law, and an injunction ordering IDES to readjudicate their claims properly. ... In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2311(d), and the true nature of the plaintiffs' challenge, we believe that defendants' argument that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 is superseded by the less restrictive language in the EUC Act and the FSC Act is without merit. This is precisely the type of action for which federal review is appropriate.

Section 1331 does not permit a benefit plan to bypass the Black Lung Act’s administrative process and sue directly in district court to recover medical payments before any administrative determination of miners’ specific entitlements.

Connors v. Oglebay Norton Company · filed 1988-06-03

If the expenses paid on behalf of the six miners are com-pensable under the Black Lung Act, the 1950 Benefit Plan must proceed through the administrative processes established by the Act for the adjudication of individual claims for medical expenses. The 1950 Benefit Plan cannot proceed directly in United States District Court under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 30 U.S.C. § 921(d) to recover its payments to the miners under the Plan since it has never been determined administratively that the miners are entitled to any specific award.

Section 1331 does not supersede a more specific statute that assigns exclusive court-of-appeals review of disputes over black-lung medical expenses.

Joseph P. Connors, Sr. v. Amax Coal Co., Inc. · filed 1988-09-21

Even if the trustees’ claims did arise under ERISA or federal common law, section 1331 would not supersede the provisions of LHWCA, as incorporated by the BLBA, that call for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals over disputes concerning specific medical expenses.

Section 1331 cannot supply district-court review when the Clean Air Act expressly provides review of specified agency actions and denies all other review.

Solar Turbines Incorporated v. Seif · filed 1989-06-27

Because the Act explicitly provides for review of certain actions and explicitly denies review for everything else, we cannot look elsewhere for authority to justify the district court's review.

Section 1331 cannot bypass the Federal Power Act's exclusive court-of-appeals review scheme for challenges to conditions of a FERC license.

California Save Our Streams Council, Inc. v. Yeutter · filed 1989-10-04

... Given Congress's careful choice of words, there can be little room for argument over whether the statutory scheme vests sole jurisdiction over questions arising under the FERC licenses in the Courts of Appeals.

Section 1331 and the APA do not permit review of a federal agency decision when the suit substantively seeks money damages and the governing statute specifically precludes that judicial review.

Drake v. Panama Canal Commission · filed 1990-08-02

Appellants also assert jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, seeking federal court review of the Commission’s decision under the APA. ... because of our ruling ... that the substance of the complaints at issue is a claim for money damages, appellants’ case is not one covered by section 702, and, hence, sovereign immunity has not been waived. As a result, the APA does not afford jurisdiction over appellants’ suit. ... We conclude that it is “fairly discernible in the statutory scheme” that Congress intended to allow judicial review of the Commission’s rulings only in the case of claims brought under PCA §§ 3771(a) or 3772.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court jurisdiction over unionized federal employees’ FLSA overtime grievances when the Civil Service Reform Act and their collective-bargaining agreement make negotiated grievance procedures exclusive.

Carter v. Gibbs · filed 1990-10-01

They invoked both federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982), and the Little Tucker Act, id. Sec. 1346(a)(2), as bases for the district court's jurisdiction. ... The Civil Service Reform Act is unambiguous: "the procedures [set out in the collective bargaining agreement] shall be the exclusive procedures for resolving grievances which fall within its coverage." ... Here the union and the IRS committed overtime grievances to the exclusive province of the negotiated procedures.

Section 1331 permits district-court review of agency action only when Congress has not supplied a special review route; an exclusive court-of-appeals review provision overrides the general district-court grant.

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Skinner · filed 1991-04-26

In other words, unless Congress specifically maps a judicial review path for an agency, review may be had in federal district court under its general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The district court properly rejected this argument. “The courts uniformly hold that statutory review in the agency’s specially designated forum prevails over general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts.” ... Specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals override general grants of jurisdiction to the district courts.

Section 1331 does not confer district court jurisdiction over an employer’s claim to recover LHWCA advance payments when the LHWCA’s exclusive adjudication and review scheme governs that claim.

Ceres Gulf and Esis/ina v. Cleaster Cooper, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (u.s. Department of Labor · filed 1992-04-21

But, § 1331 jurisdiction is unavailable where, as here, Congress has created a specific, statutorily-defined scheme that clearly supplants the general jurisdictional statute.

Section 1331 does not provide an alternate basis for jurisdiction over a SMCRA citizen suit where SMCRA's exclusive forum provision requires suit in another district.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Lujan · filed 1993-01-11

Concerning the alleged alternate bases under Title 28 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361) for lodging this suit in the District of Columbia, see supra p. 377, it suffices to recall "that even where Congress has not expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is 'exclusive,' ... a statute which vests jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases covered by that statute." Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C.Cir.1984); see Drummond Coal Co., 735 F.2d at 475.

Section 1331 does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction when a specific statutory review scheme governs the dispute.

Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. v. WorldCom Technologies of Virginia, Inc. · filed 1999-07-01

Although Bell Atlantic asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court finds that its jurisdictional analysis is limited to the Telecommunications Act. The Supreme Court dictates that where Congress provides a specific and adequate means to seek review of an agency determination, alternative means of review are inapplicable.

Section 1331’s general federal-question jurisdiction is displaced when a more specific statute assigns exclusive jurisdiction over the claim to another forum.

Pejepscot Industrial Park, Inc. v. Maine Central Railroad · filed 1999-07-26

Section 10501(b) establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB over this type of action. By virtue of such a specific assignment, Congress abrogates district court jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over adverse agency action when Congress provides an adequate exclusive review procedure in another court.

La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. Federal Communications Commission · filed 2000-08-02

As numerous courts have recognized, "federal statutes frequently assign jurisdiction to a court other than the federal district courts," and when they do so, "Congress negates district court jurisdiction under § 1331." ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1998). There is no apparent reason why the method for review set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) is inadequate, and La Voz has not suggested any.

Section 1331 general federal-question jurisdiction yields to the Federal Power Act’s exclusive court-of-appeals review procedure for disputes concerning FERC hydroelectric licensing.

CITY OF TACOMA, WA v. National Marine Fisheries Service · filed 2005-08-11

Here the specific provisions of the FPA that govern review of disputes concerning the licensing of hydroelectric facilities, like the Cushman Project, must preempt the general procedures for ESA and APA claims brought under general federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to stay a FINRA disciplinary proceeding when the stay may affect the court of appeals’ exclusive future review jurisdiction.

McGinn, Smith & Co., Inc. v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority · filed 2011-05-15

Since Plaintiffs appear to be asserting a claim for violation of their constitutional rights, the Court would ordinarily have jurisdiction under the “federal question” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the relief requested by Plaintiffs may affect the future jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the rule in TRAC.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a reserve officer’s promotion-based claims is displaced by the exclusive administrative review scheme in 10 U.S.C. § 14502(g) until its requirements are satisfied.

Harkness v. United States · filed 2013-07-11

The text of this provision expressly takes away the jurisdiction that other statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 1331, confer on the federal courts to hear promotion-based claims, at least temporarily. Congress thus established presentation to the Secretary as a predicate to judicial review for “any claim based in any way” on a reserve officer’s failed promotion—leaving no alternative avenue of review.

Statutory review in an agency’s specially designated forum prevails over general federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.

Schwartz Partners Packaging, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 2014-01-28

The plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that this Court has jurisdiction over its claims by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 is unavailing. Both are general federal jurisdiction statutes and “[t]he courts uniformly hold that statutory review in the agency’s specially designated forum”—here, the courts of appeal—“prevails over general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts.”

Section 1331 does not provide district court jurisdiction over environmental retaliation claims when Congress has prescribed exclusive administrative review followed by judicial review in the courts of appeals.

Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc. · filed 2014-11-18

Here, Congress’s intent to provide a single avenue of review is easily discernible from the statutory text. There is nothing about the statutes’ language, structure, purpose, or legislative history that suggests Congress intended claimants to have a concurrent review process in district court, and judicial review by the courts of appeals affords claimants meaningful review. We thus conclude that a claimant may not bring a claim under the environmental statutes’ retaliation provisions directly in federal district court.

Section 1331’s general grant of federal-question jurisdiction does not allow a district court to bypass an exclusive statutory process for reviewing a FERC order.

Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n · filed 2017-09-28

The general jurisdictional grant of § 1331, however, does not trump a specific jurisdictional provision adopted by Congress for review of an agency action. ... No matter how sweeping RFRA may be, plaintiffs simply may not bypass the specific procedure established by Congress in the NGA by bringing a RFRA suit against FERC in this Court.

Section 1331 does not allow a party to bypass an adequate, exclusive statutory process for judicial review of agency action.

Ohr v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO · filed 2019-05-15

Local 150’s arguments notwithstanding, the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not does not enable it to “bypass the specific method that Congress has provided for reviewing adverse agency action.”

Section 1331 does not confer district-court jurisdiction over claims subject to an exclusive administrative and appellate review scheme.

Alpine Securities Corporation v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority · filed 2021-09-07

Alpine also cites to three statutes arguing they grant this court jurisdiction: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), (2) 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory judgments), and (3) 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (enforcement of liability or duty under the Exchange Act). Free Enterprise forecloses Alpine’s arguments that the court has jurisdiction under these statutes. The key is whether application of the Thunder Basin test limits jurisdiction.80 If the Thunder Basin requirements are met, the statutes cannot overcome the preclusive effect of the administrative scheme.

Section 1331 does not permit a party to bypass the exclusive review forum for challenges to national surface-mining regulations by framing the challenge as a due process claim.

Pittston Co. v. Lujan · filed 1992-04-23

Under Fourth Circuit precedence, any attack on this action is tantamount to an attack on the regulations themselves which can be brought only in the District of Columbia. This result cannot be avoided by framing the question in terms of due process and asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction when a specialized statutory review scheme does not cover the claims at issue.

Wagafe v. Biden · filed 2024-05-20

In Thunder Basin, the Supreme Court set out a two-step framework for determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction under Section 1331. ... Even so, a review of the Thunder Basin factors does not indicate that the Naturalization Class’s claims are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed under the INA.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a claim covered by a special statutory scheme that assigns review to a court of appeals.

Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Railroad Retirement Board · filed 2024-07-12

Sections 231g and 355(f), which preclude district courts from exercising jurisdiction over challenges to agency action by RRB, a federal agency, create “[a] special statutory review scheme.” ... Thus, the Court concludes that Congress intended review by a court of appeals of UP’s claim that BMWED was improperly made a party to RRB’s Part 258 proceeding.

Section 1331 gives district courts federal-question jurisdiction over challenges that an exclusive administrative review scheme does not cover.

Vhs Acquisition Subsidiary Number 7, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 2024-11-17

In such a case, the district court retains its more general federal question jurisdiction given by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and it can hear the challenge.

Section 1331 does not confer district court jurisdiction over federal questions covered by a statutory scheme that reserves judicial review for a court of appeals.

Preston v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission · filed 2025-05-16

Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that this Court still retains federal question jurisdiction over his constitutional and ultra vires claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Doc. 23 at 5), the Court finds that the judicial review scheme provided by § 78y(a)(1) substitutes district court jurisdiction over such federal questions.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over constitutional challenges when a special statutory review provision assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the court of appeals.

Public Utility Commissioner Of Oregon v. Bonneville Power Administration · filed 1985-09-05

Sound policy considerations further support our conclusion that by assigning jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the court of appeals, section 9(e)(5) preempts district court jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction when a specific statutory scheme makes another review procedure exclusive.

Ceres Gulf v. Cooper · filed 1992-05-20

Restated, we lack jurisdiction because, under the facts of this case, § 1331 jurisdiction, if any, for this asserted right is preempted by the LHWCA.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction to determine black lung benefit liability when Congress has provided exclusive administrative procedures and court of appeals review.

Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co. · filed 1987-04-20

Because Congress has not invested this court with jurisdiction to determine black lung liability or damages, we shall dismiss the complaints. ... The Court of Appeals rejected this basis for district court jurisdiction in black lung benefit cases. In Compensation Department of District Five, supra at 339, n. 7, the court noted that jurisdiction was not available under section 1331 because it was “supplanted by the provisions for exclusive Court of Appeals review.”

Section 1331 generally provides district court jurisdiction to review BLM decisions, but a specific appellate review scheme can place related BLM actions in the court of appeals.

National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1993-07-07

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1988), and the general grant of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, review of BLM decisions .generally rests in the district courts. ... Given the statutory scheme in which the actions of the BLM arose and the analysis discussed above, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction to review the actions’ of the BLM.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s grant of original and exclusive review to the courts of appeals displaces district-court jurisdiction under § 1331.

Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Department of Energy · filed 1985-12-06

Due to uncertainty over the proper forum for seeking review of DOE’s rule, the utilities filed both a petition for review in this court and a complaint, based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. ... Thus, we hold, based on ... that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over agency delay when a statute places review of the agency's final action exclusively in the court of appeals.

Community Nutrition Institute v. Young · filed 1985-09-24

Under the law of this circuit, the District Court never had jurisdiction over the agency's delay in ruling on the request for a hearing, neither before nor after the FDA denied the hearing request. ... The jurisdiction to review agency inaction lies exclusively in this court.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over agency delay when a statute places review of the agency's final action exclusively in the court of appeals.

Community Nutrition Institute v. Young · filed 1985-09-24

We agree that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to review what had become a final order; by statute, such jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Court of Appeals. However, we find that the District Court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the case even before the FDA issued a final order; the FDA’s ruling had no effect on the District Court’s jurisdiction.

A special statute granting courts of appeals original and exclusive review jurisdiction displaces district-court jurisdiction under § 1331.

General Electric Uranium Management Corp. v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1985-06-18

Since we hold that we have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case, and therefore that the District Court did not have proper jurisdiction to decide the case, we vacate the District Court's opinion.

A special statute granting courts of appeals original and exclusive review jurisdiction displaces district-court jurisdiction under § 1331.

General Electric Uranium Management Corp. v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1985-06-18

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court of appeals has original and exclusive jurisdiction to review DOE’s one-time fee rule and that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the instant case.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to review agency regulations when a specific federal statute places exclusive review of their substance and promulgation procedures in a court of appeals.

EI DuPont De Nemours and Company v. Train · filed 1974-09-27

To summarize, the court concludes that the regulations herein challenged are effluent limitations established by the Administrator pursuant to section 301(b) and 304(b); and that review of both the substance of such limitations and the procedures utilized in establishing the same is exclusively in the Court of Appeals pursuant to section 509(b) (1)(E). Accordingly, for the reasons stated defendants’ motion to dismiss this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby granted.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court review when Congress places exclusive review of the challenged agency regulations in a designated federal court of appeals.

The Lubrizol Corporation v. Russell E. Train, Administrator, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1976-11-30

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss holding that it had jurisdiction to review the regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Because we conclude that Congress intended that jurisdiction to review registration requirements promulgated under § 211(a) lies exclusively in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, we reverse.

Section 1331(a) does not give a district court jurisdiction to issue preliminary relief or review agency action when a specific statute vests exclusive judicial-review jurisdiction in the court of appeals.

Isothermics, Inc. v. U. S. Energy Research & Development Agency · filed 1977-08-01(a)

On May 12, 1977, without leave of court, ISO filed a Second Amended Complaint. In this version jurisdiction is asserted under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 through 706, in combination with 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... If any kind of ancillary injunction may be issued by any court before the ERDA action becomes final, it seems clear that the only court having jurisdiction is the Court of Appeals, not this court. Remember, as noted above, that the complaint seeks no final judgment but only a preliminary injunction. While it purports to reserve the right to request plenary review of ERDA’s final action, it cannot have that review here because the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction.

Although a federal agency challenge falls within Section 1331’s broad arising-under coverage, a specific statute vesting exclusive review in a court of appeals precludes district-court jurisdiction.

Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1977-09-23

The question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the administrative action at issue does not turn on whether the subject matter of this .dispute comes within the broad jurisdictional coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Assuredly it does, and without more the matter at hand would properly be before the Court as arising under federal law. ’ Rather, the question here is whether a more specific jurisdictional provision divests this Court of jurisdiction by providing that administrative action of ... the kind involved in this case is to be reviewed exclusively in another forum. ... It effectively precludes the District Courts from reviewing agency action undertaken in the process of promulgating noise control regulations. Exclusive review is vested in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to review EPA permit action when a specific statute vests original and exclusive review jurisdiction in the court of appeals.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1978-02-10

Plaintiffs assert that jurisdiction over this action lies with this court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (general federal question), 1337 (cases arising under the commerce clause) and 1361 (mandamus). ... Because the court of appeals has jurisdiction over this case by virtue of 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), this court does not.

Section 1331 does not authorize district-court intervention in the Clean Air Act administrative process when the Act makes review of final EPA action exclusive in the court of appeals.

Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle · filed 1979-08-21(a)

It is a difficult question whether Dow can assert § 1331 jurisdiction in the District Court on a question regarding the EPA and the Clean Air Act. The Court, however, believes that intervention by the district court would be an improper interference with the administrative process and with ■ the judicial review set forth in the statute. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 cannot supply district-court jurisdiction over a postal-rate challenge that is inextricably intertwined with litigation committed exclusively to a court of appeals.

Reader's Digest Ass'n v. United States Postal Service · filed 1980-10-17

This would draw the Court into territory reserved exclusively to the Court of Appeals and in addition violate the “well-settled” principle that “bifurcated jurisdiction between District Court and Court of Appeals over identical litigation is not favored.” ... The Court will therefore dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over an interlocutory NRC licensing claim when Congress placed review in the court of appeals through a special statutory scheme.

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Hendrie · filed 1981-01-15

Moreover, this court concludes that, even if this case presented the rare circumstances in which interlocutory appeal were appropriate, jurisdiction would not lie in the district court.

Section 1331 does not authorize district-court review of a Clean Air Act regulation when Congress has granted exclusive review jurisdiction to the court of appeals.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association Of The United States, Inc. v. Costle · filed 1981-04-28

Such review or any other review of the Performance Warranty Regulation is entrusted solely to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by section 307(b)(1).

A specific statute giving the court of appeals exclusive review of an agency’s final order supersedes § 1331, even when the challenge is framed as constitutional.

City of West Chicago v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission · filed 1982-04-05

The action is framed primarily as a mandamus action, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, although federal question jurisdiction is also asserted. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Of course, a specific grant of authority to the court of appeals supersedes the more general grants of federal question or mandamus jurisdiction upon which West Chicago bases this case. ... Although the plaintiff is raising a constitutional claim, it is directed to, and arises from the NRC’s grant of a license amendment under the AEA. Therefore, this constitutional challenge pertains to the final order issued by the NRC and must be reviewed by the court of appeals.

Section 1331 is unavailable to review agency action when Congress has created an adequate exclusive review procedure, and Black Lung Benefits Act disputes must proceed administratively and then to the court of appeals.

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor · filed 1983-08-12

The same principle which limits jurisdiction under sections 1337 and 1361 applies with equal force to the general federal question jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... We are convinced that with respect to the BLBA, Congress has conferred upon this court such sole and exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 1331 cannot be used to bypass a statute granting courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review FCC orders.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Arkansas Public Service Commission · filed 1984-07-03

It is well established that where a statute specifically provides for exclusive jurisdiction in one court, as 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2342 does, the specific grant of jurisdiction takes precedence over a general grant of jurisdiction. ... In addition to section 401(b), Southwestern Bell brought its action under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1337, 2201 and 2202 (1983). ... Our disposition of its argument under section 401(b) applies with equal force to each of the remaining statutes.

Section 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act cannot displace a court of appeals' exclusive initial jurisdiction over review of an FAA order, even when consent-decree violations are asserted.

Suburban O'Hare Commission v. Dole · filed 1985-02-28

Indeed, even Suburban O’Hare’s assertions that this Court must exercise its jurisdiction under § 1331 and the APA to decide its claims that the defendants violated the Consent Decree cannot vitiate the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in the first instance.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court jurisdiction when a special statutory review scheme assigns constitutional and related agency challenges exclusively to the court of appeals.

Public Utility Commissioner v. Bonneville Power Administration · filed 1985-08-01

Sound policy considerations further support our conclusion that by assigning jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the court of appeals, section 9(e)(5) preempts district court jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A specific statute placing review of an agency decision exclusively in the court of appeals displaces district-court jurisdiction otherwise asserted under Section 1331.

Suburban O'Hare Commission v. Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Secretary of the Department of Transportation · filed 1986-04-03

When an agency decision has two distinct bases, one of which provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, the entire decision is reviewable exclusively in the appellate court.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court review when a specialized federal statute vests exclusive review of the agency decision in a court of appeals.

Central Montana Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration · filed 1987-02-13

Plaintiffs invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1336, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 7192. ... Having considered the merits of the arguments advanced by the parties in support of their respective positions, the court is compelled to conclude that the present controversy is subject to the jurisdictional prescription of section 9(e)(5), which precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits district-court review of agency action or delay when the governing statute does not commit review of that action exclusively to a court of appeals.

Mimi Cutler, Stephen D. Annand and National Council of Senior Citizens v. Dr. Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr. · filed 1987-05-05

Agency action taken under sections silent in this respect are directly reviewable in a district court under some appropriate head of its jurisdiction, for courts of appeals have only such jurisdiction as Congress has chosen to confer upon them.

Section 1331 cannot provide district-court jurisdiction to challenge an ICC order when Congress places review exclusively in the courts of appeals, even if the complaint characterizes the challenge as asserting Railway Labor Act rights.

United Transportation Union v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co. · filed 1987-06-30

The Union’s challenge to the arbitral award is a challenge to the Commission’s authority, through its delegate, to diminish rights said otherwise to be conferred by the RLA. ... Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the challenge. The proper avenue of appeal is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a) and 2342(5), although immediate access to that avenue depends upon the further question whether the arbitral decision was a “final order” of the Commission within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2342.

Section 1331 permits a district court to hear a FOIA unreasonable-delay challenge when no statute commits review of final agency action exclusively to a court of appeals.

Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States of America · filed 1988-01-19

In this case, however, the claim of "unreasonable delay” was properly raised in the District Court in the first instance because this court does not have initial or exclusive jurisdiction over final agency actions under the FOIA.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a challenge to a final Bonneville Power Administration action that Congress placed within the court of appeals’ exclusive original jurisdiction.

Central Montana Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration · filed 1988-03-01

According to the language of section 9(e)(5), district court jurisdiction is established only over "other actions" that do not lie within this Court's original jurisdiction. Although the district court has exclusive jurisdiction "over nonconstitutional suits challenging actions taken pursuant to the Act by agencies other than BPA or the Northwest Power Planning Council," it has "no jurisdiction over challenges to BPA or Northwest Power Planning Council actions under the Act."

Section 1331 permits a district court to hear a constitutional challenge to a federal statute but does not override a statutory scheme giving the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review an agency's implementing regulations and orders.

Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. · filed 1988-05-10

The Court has jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' challenge to § 1247(d) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a). However, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider their challenge to the ICC's regulations implementing § 1247(d) and to its order of March 6, 1987 applying § 1247(d) and the implementing regulations to the M-K-T right-of-way.

Section 1331 does not keep a Clean Air Act challenge to final EPA action in district court when the Act places review of that action in the court of appeals.

Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif · filed 1988-05-26

The court finds the EPA’s action constitutes “final agency action.” Therefore, as noted earlier, jurisdiction is properly in the courts of appeals. The court will grant defendants’ motion to vacate and to dismiss.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over agency proceedings when Congress has assigned exclusive review, including review of interim unreasonable-delay claims, to a court of appeals.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas · filed 1988-06-22

District courts possess no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor jurisdiction over actions arising under an act of Congress regulating commerce via 28 U.S.C. § 1337, where Congress has provided for exclusive review in the appellate courts. ... Accordingly, while EPA’s delays in addressing an issue which is literally one of life and breath remain troubling to this court, I conclude that the statutory scheme vests exclusive jurisdiction over interim claims of unreasonable delay in the court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Section 1331 permits district-court constitutional review before an agency acts, but once the ICC issues an order, the specialized review statute places exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals.

Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission · filed 1988-08-04

Indeed, district courts do have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to statutes where no administrative action has yet been taken. ... But after the ICQ has issued an order, as it has done here, éxclusive jurisdiction lies in the circuit court to modify or rescind the order.

Section 1331 does not authorize a district court to hear a collateral attack on an ICC-backed arbitration award when Congress assigns exclusive review of ICC actions to the courts of appeals.

Brotherhood Railway Carmen, Division of Transportation Communications International Union (Tcu) v. Csx Transportation, I · filed 1988-09-19

Congress has provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to review actions by the ICC. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2342(5).

General federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331 cannot bypass a specific statutory scheme making the courts of appeals the exclusive forum for judicial review of federal regulations.

Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Skinner · filed 1989-05-09

Although the statutes do preserve all remedies already available to plaintiffs, these remedies do not include judicial review in forums other than the court of appeals. The statutes in no uncertain terms explicitly provide that judicial review of the regulations can only be sought in the court of appeals.

A statute committing review of final agency action exclusively to a court of appeals displaces the district courts’ general agency-review jurisdiction under Section 1331.

Redman v. Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1991-03-21

While, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts possess general jurisdiction to review federal agency actions as “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” the mandate of the exclusive appellate review route in § 1486 precludes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A specific statute assigning exclusive review of agency regulations to a court of appeals overrides Section 1331’s general grant of district-court jurisdiction.

Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association Of America, Inc. v. Skinner · filed 1991-04-26

Specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals override general grants of jurisdiction to the district courts. ... Challenges to motor carrier safety regulations must be filed with the courts of appeals, rather than with the district courts.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over claims, including constitutional claims, that can be reviewed directly by a court of appeals under the Clean Air Act’s exclusive review provision.

Commonwealth Of Virginia v. United States · filed 1996-02-02

Thus, Sec. 307(b)(1) displaces district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 as to claims, including constitutional claims, that can be taken directly to a court of appeals.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over claims, including constitutional claims, subject to exclusive direct review in a court of appeals under Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1).

Commonwealth of VA v. United States · filed 1996-02-05

Thus, § 307(b)(1) displaces district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to claims, including constitutional claims, that can be taken directly to a court of appeals.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction to review agency action when a special review statute assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals.

Chiron Corp. v. United States National Transportation Safety Board · filed 1998-12-02

Additionally, the court in Telecommunications Research and Action Center and Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. held that in the case of a special review statute neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides jurisdiction to district courts. ... Applying the rationale of the D.C. Circuit in City of Rochester, Telecommunications Research and Action Center and Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., the court concludes that the United States Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Chiron’s and PerSeptive’s claim involving NTSB’s decision not to share information obtained during its investigation of FedEx Flight 1406.

Section 1331 does not give a district court federal-question jurisdiction when another statute channels review exclusively to the courts of appeals.

American Road & Transportation Builders Association v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 2012-06-07

And if the statute providing the adequate remedy channels review to the courts of appeals, it eliminates the federal question jurisdiction that the district courts would otherwise enjoy.

Section 1331 gives way when Congress assigns exclusive review of a controversy to a court of appeals.

Bold Alliance v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · filed 2018-09-28

When Congress provides for exclusive review in a court of appeals that specific grant ofjurisdiction displaces the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331’s general federal-question jurisdiction does not override a statute that assigns review of an agency decision to a federal court of appeals.

Adu-Beniako v. Reimann · filed 2021-09-22

But he has not provided any reason why the Court’s general federal question jurisdiction would control over the specific requirement in Section 877 that Adu-Beniako must raise his challenge in an appropriate federal circuit court of appeals.

Section 1331 gives district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law; it does not confer jurisdiction on courts of appeals.

Office of the Governor, Territory of Guam v. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration on Development Disa · filed 1993-06-25

28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives the district courts original jurisdiction of civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. It does not refer to courts of appeals.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction to review an agency order when an adequate statutory procedure assigns review to a court of appeals.

Rhode v. City of West Lafayette, Ind. · filed 1993-04-21

General jurisdiction was not intended to vest in district courts without a showing of the inadequacy of the prescribed statutory procedure.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over JTPA funding disputes for which Congress committed judicial review exclusively to the courts of appeals.

Tennessee Department of Employment Security v. Secretary of Labor · filed 1986-09-15

Appellant contends that the district court erroneously concluded that jurisdiction over this action lay exclusively in the court of appeals, and therefore erred by refusing to exercise its own jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal questions) and 5 U.S.C. § 702 (review of agency actions). ... Because we find that the replacement of 29 U.S.C. § 817(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 1578(a) evidences plain congressional intent to continue the policy of committing to the courts of appeals review of decisions to deny funds to CETA or JTPA participants, we affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a claim that requires review of a Federal Reserve Board decision under the Douglas Amendment, when 12 U.S.C. § 1848 reserves judicial review to the court of appeals.

State of Idaho, Dept. of Finance v. Clarke · filed 1992-03-13

The statutes cited by the Department, both in its original complaint and in its proposed amended complaint, do not override Section 1848 of Title 12 which vests with the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to judicially review the Board’s decisions. ... In addition, the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not provide this court with jurisdiction in this case because even though the Department cites the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21, et seq., as the federal statute in question, the Department’s claim for relief is based upon the Douglas Amendment, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d), and its relation to the National Bank Act.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over claims subject to exclusive court of appeals review under section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act.

Clark v. James B. Busey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1992-03-25

Clark is mistaken in his assertion that the district court had jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The district court’s federal question jurisdiction is preempted by section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act as to those classes of claims reviewable under section 1006.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over damages claims that collaterally challenge a final FAA order subject to exclusive review in a court of appeals.

Green v. Brantley · filed 1993-01-21

Green’s complaint asserted that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Where Congress has provided in the courts of appeals an exclusive forum for the correction of procedural and substantive administrative errors, a plaintiff may not bypass that forum by suing for damages in district court.

The Social Security Act’s jurisdictional bar prevents claimants from using Section 1331 as an alternative route for claims against the Secretary arising under the Act.

Schoolcraft v. Sullivan · filed 1991-01-03

The plaintiffs’ attempt to maintain their suit on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, however, is barred by the provisions of the Social Security Act itself.

Section 405(h) expressly bars § 1331 jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act.

Green v. Heckler · filed 1984-09-24

Jurisdiction under section 1331 for matters arising under the Social Security Act is expressly precluded, however, by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which states, “No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under sections 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”

Section 405(g) does not preclude § 1331 jurisdiction over a due process claim seeking a constitutionally adequate hearing when no adequate alternative means exists to obtain judicial review.

Dealy v. Heckler · filed 1984-10-16

Generally, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) precludes federal jurisdiction under § 1331 with respect to claims involving Social Security claims. ... The Eighth Circuit has concluded, however, that § 405(g) does not preclude jurisdiction under § 1331 where a due process claim has the primary goal of obtaining a constitutionally adequate hearing before the Secretary, and where there is no adequate alternative means of obtaining judicial review of a due process claim. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that jurisdiction lies pursuant to § 1331, as the plaintiff has challenged the res judicata effect of the Secretary’s regulations.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over actions seeking to recover Social Security benefits and is more than a mere exhaustion requirement.

Weinberger v. Salfi · filed 1975-06-26

On its face, this provision bars district court federal-question jurisdiction over suits, such as this one, which ... seek to recover Social Security benefits. ... The District Court's reading of § 405 (h) was, we think, entirely too narrow.

Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act withdraws Social Security claims from Section 1331 jurisdiction, leaving Section 405(g) as the sole jurisdictional basis.

Moss v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1976-01-15

The suit could not be maintained under 28 U.S.C. ... § 1331 because it was an “ ‘action’ seeking ‘to recover on [a Social Security] claim,’ ” and thus withdrawn from federal question jurisdiction by § 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). ... Since the Court is unable to find any meaningful distinction between this action and ... jurisdiction must be predicated solely on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Section 405(h), as applied to Medicare provider disputes, bars § 1331 jurisdiction over a provider's claim against the Secretary.

St. John's McNamara Hospital Organization v. Associated Hospital Service, Inc. · filed 1976-02-09

Therefore, plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations must fail insofar as they are based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act, so a refusal to reopen that is unreviewable under Section 405(g) cannot be reviewed through another jurisdictional source.

Williams v. Weinberger · filed 1976-06-01

“No action shall be brought under section 41 [§ 1331] of Title 28 on any claim arising under this subchapter.” ... We take this to mean that anything which is judicially reviewable is only reviewable under § 405(g). ... Since refusals to reopen have been held non-reviewable under Section 405(g), we conclude that judicial review of those decisions is foreclosed, since “other sources” of jurisdiction to consider such claims are unavailable.

Section 1331 permits nonstatutory review of a Medicare regulation when the Act supplies no mechanism for challenging the regulation's legality, and no exhaustion of an unavailable remedy is required.

Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Mathews · filed 1976-06-07

The Court therefore holds that the Act does not provide any mechanism for review of ... plaintiff’s challenge for the period prior to June 30, 1973, that no exhaustion is therefore required, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act grant the Court jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s challenge as to that period.

Section 1331 does not permit claims requiring construction of the Social Security Act against state or federal defendants before exhaustion of the Act's administrative remedies.

Roane v. F. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1976-07-22

Inasmuch as appellants’ claims require construction of the relevant provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and in view of the admitted fact that appellants did not, prior to the institution of this litigation, seek an exhaustion of their administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), (h), we agree with the district court that it had no jurisdiction to consider the claims. ... For the reasons just stated, we conclude that the district court had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to entertain a claim against either State or Federal appellees.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over an action challenging the denial of Medicare benefits when the Social Security Act governs review.

Simoncelli v. Weinberger · filed 1976-07-07

In light of that holding, and the applicability of Section 405(h) to the instant action, this Court’s jurisdiction may not be based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims seeking Medicare payments, although it does not completely bar judicial consideration of a collateral due-process claim.

Behlen Community Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross · filed 1976-09-16

Inasmuch as Counts II, III and IV seek to obtain payments pursuant to the Medicare Act, Section 405(h) precludes the federal courts from assuming jurisdiction under § 1331. ... Count I alleges that plaintiff was denied a meaningful appeal and a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal under the due process clause of the fifth amendment and Medicare statutes and regulations. ... The Court therefore has jurisdiction over Count I.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over a provider's reimbursement claim even when the Act's special review procedure does not cover the claim.

Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hospital v. Weinberger · filed 1976-09-23

However, the plaintiff alleged and the district court presumably found federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While such jurisdiction would ordinarily be available for a question not reviewable under the special statutory procedure, the Medicare Act has incorporated the following additional provision of the Social Security Act: ... We conclude that this same language, incorporated into the Medicare Act, similarly precludes federal question jurisdiction in the instant case.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over any claim arising under the Medicare Act even when Medicare provides no route for judicial review.

American Association of Councils of Medical Staffs of Private Hospitals, Inc. v. Mathews · filed 1976-10-12

Accordingly, we find that plaintiff lacks jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over provider payment claims not reviewable under the Medicare Act's own procedure.

Hillside Community Hospital of Ukiah v. Mathews · filed 1976-11-09

Thus, the claim presented here is not one for which the Medicare Act specifically authorizes judicial review. ... In addition, the court recognizes that the language of section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), ... as incorporated into the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395Ü, would preclude federal question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331) in the instant case.

Section 405(h) does not foreclose Section 1331 review of a Medicaid claim because Congress did not incorporate that jurisdictional bar into the Medicaid Act.

Springdale Convalescent Center v. F. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1977-01-20

Central to the resolution of this jurisdictional issue is our determination that Springdale’s action falls under the Medicaid rather than the Medicare Act. Accordingly, since the Medicaid Act does not incorporate Section 405(h), we are not precluded from exercising our federal question jurisdiction over this suit.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over actions seeking recovery on Social Security claims.

Hodges v. Weinberger · filed 1977-03-07

That case made clear that jurisdiction here does not lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 405(h) does not bar Section 1331 jurisdiction over a Medicare-related suit seeking injunctive relief against the Secretary when the plaintiff seeks no benefits or damages and has no statutory review route.

Mid Atlantic Nephrology Center, Ltd. v. Califano · filed 1977-03-31

This court concludes that although the question is a close one, jurisdiction under § 1331 exists over a suit such as this against the Secretary for injunctive relief where no statutory review of the challenged action is available to the plaintiff.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare provider's constitutional reimbursement claim when the incorporated third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bars that general federal-question jurisdiction.

Lincoln Park Nursing Home v. Califano · filed 1977-04-22

Despite the plaintiffs’ assertion of the constitutional claim, which would ordinarily have provided a basis for general federal jurisdiction under § 1331, the Court construed the third sentence of § 405(h) as barring such jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, I must hold I lack subject matter jurisdiction over the Recapture Regulation claim and the complaint, to that extent, is dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiff’s proceeding with its suit in the Court of Claims.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 review of Medicare Part B payment determinations, although Section 1331 remains available for independently alleged constitutional due-process and equal-protection claims.

Drs. Russi, Griffin & Snell, Ltd. v. Matthews · filed 1977-05-18

§ 405(h) precludes judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but also that it prevents review or any decision of the Secretary except as provided in the Act, ... e. through § 205(g) above. ... The Court accepts for purposes of this case, and apparently the government does not contest, that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 invokes the jurisdiction of this Court with regard to the constitutional allegations of denial of Due Process and Equal Protection.

Section 1331(a) does not provide federal-question jurisdiction to review Medicare determinations because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), as applied to the Medicare Act, precludes general and alternate jurisdictional sources outside the Act.

Cervoni v. United States Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1977-05-17(a)

Plaintiff has asserted jurisdiction on alternate grounds, and particularly under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. ... With respect to federal question jurisdiction, ... clearly held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which applies to the Medicare Act, precludes the same. Moreover, the aforecited section forestalls all alternate jurisdictional sources for review excepting those provided by the Act itself.

Before Medicare supplied an adequate statutory review procedure, Section 405(h) did not preclude Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction over a provider's otherwise unreviewable Medicare claim.

Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc., D/B/A Doctors' Hospital, Etc. v. F. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Educatio · filed 1977-06-23

We therefore hold that during the period before it provided adequate statutory review within the Medicare Act, and during that period only, Congress did not intend § 405(h) to preclude federal-question jurisdiction over such matters as this.

Section 1331 does not provide general federal-question jurisdiction over a Medicare provider reimbursement claim because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, bars such jurisdiction.

Chelsea Community Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n · filed 1977-06-03

The Supreme Court has recently interpreted this statute as an absolute bar to actions based on ... against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. ... Accordingly, the ... decision applies to the instant case and bars the exercise of jurisdiction under the general federal question statute.

Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare reimbursement claims arising under the Social Security Act.

Medical Center of Independence v. Califano · filed 1977-07-28

“On its face, this provision bars district court federal question jurisdiction over suits, such as this one, which seek to recover Social Security benefits,” ... plaintiff’s claim of jurisdiction under that section in this action is without merit.

The Social Security Act’s Section 405(h) bar does not foreclose Section 1331 review of a Medicare provider’s due-process challenge seeking an adequate hearing rather than recovery of benefits when the Medicare Act provides no adequate alternative review.

Daytona Beach General Hospital, Inc. v. Weinberger · filed 1977-08-19

Section 405(h) forbids any action under Section 1331 ‘to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.’ ... In the present case, the due process claim has as its primary goal obtaining a constitutionally adequate hearing. ... Secondly, and more importantly, the Medicare Act does not provide the University an adequate alternative means of obtaining judicial review of its due process claim. ... Adopting the above-quoted reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, this Court concludes that it had — and has — jurisdiction of the due process claim.

Section 1331 does not independently grant jurisdiction to review adverse Medicare provider-reimbursement determinations because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes that federal-question jurisdiction.

Pacific Coast Medical Enterprises v. Califano · filed 1977-08-16

The provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361 and 2201, and ... do not provide independent grants of jurisdiction for judicial review of adverse administrative determinations of provider ... reimbursement claims under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act.

Section 1331 permits review of a colorable constitutional challenge to Medicare agency action when Congress has not clearly and convincingly foreclosed review and the Act lacks an adequate alternative review provision.

Pacemaker Monitor Corp. v. United States Government · filed 1977-10-26

Plaintiff has raised a colorable due process claim. Therefore, this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the reasoning of the ... Salfi-Sanders-MacDonald ... triumvirate delineated above. Whether, in fact, plaintiff has a right to a hearing before the agency is a matter that this court need not determine at present.

The Social Security Act’s Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over a Medicare provider reimbursement action.

Trinity Memorial Hospital of Cudahy, Inc. v. Associated Hospital Service, Inc. · filed 1977-12-16

We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis for Trinity’s action.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over pre-1973 Medicare provider reasonable-cost claims because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) allows review only as specifically provided by the Medicare statute.

St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Califano · filed 1977-11-16

This result is consistent with the language contained in Title 42. Section 405(h) manifests an intent that decisions of the Secretary be final and that review of them shall be allowed only as specifically provided by statute. Section 1395Ü provides that § 405(h) applies to the Medicare Act with the same force as it does to the Social Security Act. The limited review set out in the Medicare Act (42 U.S.C. § 1395ff), therefore, is the only judicial remedy available to providers whose claims arose prior to 1973.

Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, as incorporated into Medicare, precludes Section 1331(a) jurisdiction over suits seeking eventual Medicare provider-cost reimbursement, even when the administrative board cannot invalidate the challenged regulation.

Association of American Medical Colleges v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welf · filed 1977-12-01(a)

the “sweeping and direct” language of Section 205(h) ... precludes Section 1331(a) jurisdiction of suits seeking eventual realization of provider-cost reimbursement under the Medicare Act. It cannot be gainsaid that the case at bar arises under the Medicare Act, for it supplies “both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of [appellant’s] . . . contentions.”

Sections 1331 and 1361 cannot provide jurisdiction to review cases arising under the Social Security Act; judicial review is available only through the Act's own jurisdictional provisions and to the extent they authorize it.

Cleveland Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Califano · filed 1978-01-18

Two recent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that judicial review of actions arising under the Social Security Act is available only under the jurisdictional provisions of that Act and only to the extent that the Act provides for such review. ... Therefore, Section 1331 and Section 1361 cannot provide the basis for judicial review of cases arising under the Act.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into Medicare, bars Section 1331 review of pre-1973 provider reimbursement claims because Medicare then supplied no judicial-review route.

Trustees of Indiana University v. Blue Cross Ass'n · filed 1978-02-17

The Act did not provide for judicial review prior to 1973 so the Court is without jurisdiction in this instance. ... § 405(h) states no action shall be brought under § 1331. Therefore no constitutional or statutory judicial review is provided for by the Act.

Section 405(h) does not bar Section 1331 review of constitutional or ultra-vires rulemaking challenges that do not seek recovery of Social Security benefits.

Schupak v. Califano · filed 1978-04-11

Contrary to defendant’s argument, this section is limited in scope to the assertion of claims for recovery of social security benefits; ... Since the action before us does not seek judicial review of a denial of benefits, “ . . . non-statutory judicial review continues to be available under [the Federal Question Statute], 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into Medicare, precludes Section 1331 district-court review of all decisions on Medicare claims, including constitutional challenges.

Dr. John T. Macdonald Foundation, Inc. v. Califano · filed 1978-04-17

We therefore hold that § 405(h), incorporated into § 1395ii of the Medicare Act, precludes all review of the Secretary's decisions by federal district courts brought under § 1331.

Section 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act by Section 1872, precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare claims even though review may be available in the Court of Claims.

Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Califano · filed 1978-05-30

The language of Section 405(h), which bars all actions based on “Section 41 of Title 28,” does not support this contention. In addition, Hazelwood does have an alternate avenue in an action in the Court of Claims. ... I therefore hold that this Court does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not support jurisdiction over a Medicare claim challenging agency procedures unless the plaintiff presents a colorable constitutional claim.

Dr. Walter A. Cervoni v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1978-06-27(a)

Since Dr. Cervoni possessed no protectable property interest, the Secretary was not required to give him a hearing before making the classification. Appellant therefore has made out no colorable due process claim such as would support federal jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over constitutional claims against a state official when the Medicare Act’s jurisdictional bar for actions against federal officials does not encompass the suit.

Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal · filed 1978-09-29

Accordingly, we find that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) to hear Town Court’s claims against Secretary Beal.

Section 1331 does not permit review of a refusal to reopen a Social Security benefits claim when the governing statute precludes review and no constitutional claim is raised.

Carney v. Califano · filed 1978-08-30

The only exception to the nonreviewability of the Secretary’s refusal to reopen a benefits claim occurs where constitutional claims have been raised. In this case the Court is not aware of any constitutional claims that need to be considered. Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in ... the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s refusal to reopen plaintiff’s claim for benefits.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare claims is barred by Social Security Act § 205(h).

Rhode Island Hospital v. Joseph A. Califano, Etc. · filed 1978-10-27(a)

... bar the finding of § 1331 jurisdiction in this ease.

Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over a claim arising under that Act unless the claim is reviewable under Section 405(g) after a hearing.

Byrd v. Harris · filed 1981-03-23

No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [28 U.S.C. § 1331] to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter. ... § 405(g) clearly limits judicial review to a decision of the Secretary “made after a hearing.”

Section 1331 does not permit Medicare claimants to bypass the Social Security Act’s finality and exhaustion requirements by characterizing their requested procedural relief as collateral to their benefits claims.

Mercer v. Birchman · filed 1981-03-05

The plaintiffs’ attempted avoidance of the exhaustion requirements of the Social Security Act in such collateral claims should not be allowed to succeed, because such avoidance would fly in the face of the relevant statutes, would be contrary to existing case law, and would frustrate the wise policies that underpin the exhaustion requirement.

Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act precludes Section 1331 and Administrative Procedure Act jurisdiction to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen a benefits claim.

Kapp v. Schweiker · filed 1981-11-09

The Supreme Court found that section 1331 of Title 28 and section 205(h) of the Social Security Act read together expressed the Congressional intent as to the contours of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act did not provide an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs complaint bases jurisdiction on the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C. section 1331, ... requires this Court to find that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action.

Section 1331 does not provide a means to avoid Social Security Act administrative-exhaustion requirements when the agency's procedures can effectively correct the alleged procedural deficiencies.

Mercer v. Birchman · filed 1982-03-11

As noted above, procedures set out by the Secretary of the SSA for hearing appeals from denials of benefits can and do work very effectively as illustrated in this case where the allegedly inadequate procedures were corrected administratively and where the plaintiffs received the benefits they had originally sought. Thus there is no reason to utilize § 1331 as a means of avoiding the requirement of administrative exhaustion contained in § 405(g).

The Social Security Act’s § 405(h) bars § 1331 jurisdiction over a claim nominally against a state administrator when the real dispute is with the federal Secretary’s directives.

Aldrich v. Schweiker · filed 1982-04-14

Plaintiffs in the instant case do not allege that defendant Allen is misapplying procedures and regulations established by defendant Schweiker; Allen’s allegedly illegal conduct is his adherence to the Secretary’s directives. Since plaintiffs’ dispute is with the Secretary, § 405(h) bars jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 405(h) does not bar § 1331 jurisdiction over declaratory and injunctive relief concerning a Medicaid disallowance that is not subject to administrative review under § 405.

Woodstock/Kenosha Health Center v. Schweiker · filed 1982-06-22

... Because of the unique procedural posture of this action, the cases cited by the federal defendant in support of the proposition that this Court has jurisdiction only under 42 U.S.C. § 405, and not under its federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, are not on point. ... Thus, § 405(h) does not limit the jurisdiction this Court has to consider this case under its federal question jurisdiction.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 actions challenging Social Security disability determinations, including claims nominally brought against state officials whose determinations legally constitute those of the Secretary.

Ostroff v. State of Fla., Dept. of Health · filed 1983-01-31

Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) prohibits any non-§ 405(g) action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof from being brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1346 to recover on any claim arising under Title II of the Social Security Act. ... Although Ostroff has brought this action against various state defendants, at the time of the events in question 42 U.S.C. § 421(a) provided that any disability determination made by a state agency pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary “shall be the determination of the Secretary” for ... purposes of Title II. ... Hence, Ostroff’s claim against the state defendants is merely a disguised dispute with the Secretary and is barred by § 405(h).

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act because that Act makes Section 405(g) the exclusive avenue for judicial review.

Darby v. Schweiker · filed 1983-01-19

Plaintiff’s assertion of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is incorrect. ... that the Social Security Act ... preempts federal question jurisdiction. However, a look at that Act, also raised by plaintiff as a grounds for jurisdiction, ... indicates that § 405(g) of the Act provides plaintiff with jurisdiction. ... the only avenue for judicial review of the Social Security Act was § 405(g) thereof.

Section 405(h) bars actions under Section 1331 to recover on Social Security claims, although mandamus may provide jurisdiction for an otherwise unreviewable procedural dispute unrelated to benefit merits.

Dietsch v. Richard Schweiker, as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1983-02-14

In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides that no action to recover on a claim may be brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1346. ... we have found that 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which authorizes an action in the nature of mandamus, provides jurisdiction to review otherwise unreviewable procedural issues not related to the merits of a claim for benefits. ... We conclude that the district court had mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to consider his claim.

Section 405(h) forecloses Section 1331 jurisdiction over Social Security Title II claims and is implicitly incorporated into Title XVI.

Smith v. Schweiker · filed 1983-06-01

The district court properly rejected jurisdictional claims as to the federal defendants based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1976), or on mandamus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361 (1976), and as to the state defendants based on a civil rights claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 (1976). Federal question jurisdiction has been specifically foreclosed for claims brought under Title II of the Act, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(h), and this exclusion has been implicitly incorporated into Title XVI, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1383(c)(3).

Social Security Act Section 205(h) precludes review of a Social Security attorney-fee decision under Section 1331.

Pepe v. Schweiker · filed 1983-06-13

In addition, Section 205(h) precludes review of the fee decision under the general grant of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Social Security Act precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims arising under that Act.

Jensen v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary, Health and Human Services Dept. · filed 1983-06-22

Nor does § 1331, the general federal question statute, provide jurisdiction; the Social Security Act precludes jurisdiction under that statute.

The Social Security Act’s Section 405(h) bar on Section 1331 jurisdiction extends to state officials acting as the Secretary’s agents when the plaintiffs’ real dispute is with the Secretary.

Rivera v. Heckler · filed 1983-06-29

We find this logic persuasive. Since plaintiffs’ dispute is with the Secretary, § 405(h) bars jurisdiction over the state defendants under § 1331.

A claim to establish rights to future Social Security benefits arises under Title II and is barred from Section 1331 jurisdiction by Section 405(h); pendent jurisdiction cannot invert an independently jurisdictional fallback claim to support it.

Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Supreme Court v. Schweiker · filed 1983-08-11

The only possibility for upholding jurisdiction of this suit under section 1331, therefore, would be that the plaintiffs’ claim did not arise under Title II. But it does. ... The claim of a right to future Title II benefits is a claim under Title II; it can have no other provenance. A contrary conclusion would merely invite claimants to evade the limitations on suit in section 205(h) by bringing declaratory judgment actions before their claims actually accrued. ... However, the plaintiffs in this case cannot be allowed to get around section 205(h) by joining with a claim for (future) benefits over which a federal district court has no jurisdiction under section 1331 a pendent claim — contingent on the failure of their main claim — over which the district court has jurisdiction under another statute.

The Social Security Act’s Section 405(h) precludes Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims for benefits, leaving Section 405(g) as the exclusive jurisdictional route.

Herron v. Heckler · filed 1983-10-31

Plaintiff also invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 2201 (declaratory judgment), and 2202 (injunction). Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act precludes resort to federal question jurisdiction for the adjudication of claims for social security benefits. ... Accordingly, § 405(g) provides the only jurisdictional basis for the relief requested herein.

Section 405(h) does not limit Section 1331 jurisdiction over federal claims against state officers except as its text specifies.

Kuehner v. Schweiker · filed 1983-11-28

Section 405(h) refers only to actions against “the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof.” It cannot be construed as a limitation of state court jurisdiction over suits against state officers, or as a limitation of the general jurisdictional grant in section 1331 except as specified.

Section 405(h) does not displace § 1331(a) jurisdiction over a Medicare regulatory challenge when no alternative route of judicial review is available.

College of American Pathologists v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1984-05-11(a)

Applying that standard here, we conclude that section 405(h) does ... not ... override the federal question jurisdiction otherwise conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 405(h) bars § 1331 jurisdiction over Medicare claims that are inextricably intertwined with claims for benefits, even when framed as procedural or declaratory challenges.

Heckler v. Ringer · filed 1984-05-14

With respect to the other three respondents, we hold today that all their claims — identical to Ringer’s— are inextricably intertwined with what we hold is in essence a claim for benefits and that § 1331 jurisdiction over all their claims is barred by § 405(h).