28 U.S.C. § 1331

The 1980 amendment eliminating Section 1331's amount-in-controversy requirement applies to cases pending on appeal.

Eikenberry v. Callahan · filed 1981-04-30

Appellant argues that the recent amendment to § 1331 applies to this case and requires this court to reverse the District Court’s order of dismissal. Appellee contests the applicability of the amendment to this case, but alternatively asks this court to affirm for failure to state a First Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. Because we hold that Pub.L.No. 96 — 486 applies to cases pending on appeal, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

The amended Section 1331 applies to actions already pending in federal court and supplies jurisdiction over federal statutory welfare claims.

Church v. Block · filed 1981-09-25

Originally, the plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4). The state defendants challenged this jurisdiction. Rather than deal extensively with this issue, the Court finds that there is jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as amended, which applies to all cases now pending in federal court.

Section 1331 supports federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising on a federal enclave, but not claims whose alleged harm occurred outside that enclave.

Meadows v. Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-01-29

Where, as here, removal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and not 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction), the court must determine as a threshold question whether the plaintiffs claims arise under federal law. ... Therefore, the court concludes that the defamation claims, Counts I and II, did not arise at the Radford Arsenal, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the wrongful termination claim arose at the Radford Arsenal, where the termination was effected, and this court has the subject matter jutisdiction to hear the claim.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising under state law assimilated as federal law in a federal enclave.

Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp · filed 2005-08-16

This assimilated state law is distinctly federal in nature, and its application establishes the basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over an injury action arising in a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within a state.

Strickland v. Royal Lubricant Co., Inc. · filed 1995-10-19

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the plaintiff alleges a civil action to recover damages for injuries sustained in a place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and within the exterior boundaries of a state.

Section 1331 federal-enclave jurisdiction exists only if the injury occurred on property purchased with state consent for one of the uses enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.

Willis v. Craig · filed 1977-06-14

Willis asserts federal enclave jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 17. ... Willis’ accident either occurred on property “purchased” for one of the enumerated uses, or it occurred on other property. If it occurred on the former, enclave jurisdiction is proper. If it did not, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law.

Fung v. Abex Corp. · filed 1992-10-26

... plaintiffs’ actions arise under the laws of the United States as stated in § 1331 and are properly the subject of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over toxic-exposure claims arising from chemical exposure on a federal enclave in the course of employment duties.

Akin v. Big Three Industries, Inc. · filed 1994-03-21

As a result, this court holds that in a toxic exposure case such as this, when the plaintiffs' claims arise out of exposure to chemicals on base in furtherance of their employment duties, enclave jurisdiction is properly invoked. The result of this holding is that the case presents a question arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over toxic exposure claims arising from work performed on a federal enclave.

Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co. · filed 1994-05-03

As a result, this court holds that in a toxic exposure case such as this, when the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of exposure to chemicals on base in furtherance of their employment duties, enclave jurisdiction is properly invoked. The result of this holding is that the case presents a question arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 1331 covers claims arising under state laws that were in force when the United States acquired a federal enclave because those laws become federal law there until superseded.

Sopena v. Colejon Corp. · filed 1996-03-06

Federal enclave jurisdiction, as a form of federal question jurisdiction, has been recognized in cases where a plaintiffs cause of action arises under the state law that existed at the moment in which the United States acquired the federal enclave. Until superseded, such existing state laws for the protection of private rights remain in force and are incorporated into federal law and become federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over personal injury actions arising from incidents on federal enclaves.

Akin v. Ashland Chemical Co. · filed 1998-08-21

Personal injury actions which arise from incidents occurring in federal enclaves may be removed to federal district court as a part of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over personal injury actions arising from incidents in federal enclaves.

Akin v. Big Three Industries · filed 1998-08-31

Personal injury actions which arise from incidents occurring in federal enclaves may be removed to federal district court as a part of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts federal-question jurisdiction over personal injury suits arising on a federal enclave.

Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc. · filed 2002-05-07

The court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because these suits arise out of a federal enclave.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over state law claims arising on a federal enclave with concurrent state jurisdiction when substantial federal interests are implicated.

Federico v. Lincoln Military Housing · filed 2012-10-18

Since this case involves substantial federal interests, the Court finds that the concurrent jurisdiction the United States holds over this federal enclave gives the Court federal question jurisdiction to hear this case.

Federal ownership of land alone does not establish federal-enclave jurisdiction over state-law claims under § 1331.

Parish of Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Refining USA, Inc. · filed 2014-12-01

It is clear that a “federal enclave,” as that term is used for purposes of § 1331 federal question jurisdiction over state law claims, is not merely land that the United States owns within a state.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over tort claims arising on a federal enclave when state tort law operates there as federal law, even if state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.

Louisiana United Business Ass'n Cas. Ins. v. J & J Maintenance, Inc. · filed 2015-09-24

However, the plaintiff cannot escape the fact that the federal enclave still grants this court federal question jurisdiction over the claim, by virtue of Louisiana tort law becoming operative as federal law within Fort Polk.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over tort claims arising on federal enclaves, but claims do not arise there when the plaintiff seeks no relief for contamination of federal territory.

Washington v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2017-07-28

Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on “federal enclaves.” ... The Court is satisfied that, because Washington avowedly does not seek relief for contamination of federal territories, none of its claims arise on federal enclaves.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law tort claims arising from activities on a federal enclave when resolving those claims requires direct interpretation of federal law.

Stultz v. Hp Enterprise Services, LLC · filed 2017-09-01

... from activities in a federal enclave, and because the Court must directly interpret federal law in order to resolve these claims, federal question jurisdiction is appropriate under § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over claims arising on a federal enclave when the events giving rise to the claims occurred there.

Chadd v. Trans Bay Cable, LLC · filed 2019-09-27

A federal district court has original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In short, because the weight of evidence shows that the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims primarily occurred outside defendant’s Presidio office, defendant failed to meet its burden to show the applicability of federal enclave jurisdiction. Absent such showing, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of this action.

Section 1331 permits federal enclave jurisdiction only when the claim arises on the enclave; a claim arising nearby or adjacent to it does not qualify.

Balderas v. Monsanto Company · filed 2020-04-09

Federal enclave jurisdiction exists only where the claim arises on the federal enclave–not nearby or adjacent to it.

Section 1331 ordinarily does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims arising on federal land unless the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over the place where the events occurred.

Hatten v. Grobet USA · filed 2020-07-27

Cases involving state law claims on federal enclave property subject to non-exclusive jurisdiction—be it concurrent state and federal jurisdiction or solely proprietary jurisdiction—do not, ordinarily, present a federal question.

Section 1331 confers federal enclave jurisdiction only when the removing party shows that the claims implicate substantial federal interests.

Carney v. City of San Diego · filed 2021-07-09

Defendants have also failed to show how the specific facts and claims in this case implicate substantial federal interests. Absent that showing, the Court declines to find there is federal enclave jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction based on asbestos exposure at a federal enclave when plaintiffs waive claims arising from that exposure.

Karmon v. California Institute of Technology · filed 2022-01-10

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ waiver of claims arising from Mrs. Karmon’s exposure to asbestos at the NIH deprives the Court of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over claims based on injuries stemming from conduct on a federal enclave.

County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp. · filed 2022-04-19

In sum, because conduct on a federal enclave is generally subject to federal law, a claim based on injuries stemming from such conduct arises under federal law, and a court has jurisdiction over such a claim under § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over tort claims arising in a federal enclave, but the party invoking jurisdiction must establish that the site is a federal enclave.

Franklin v. PacifiCorp · filed 2022-06-27

A district court has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. ... Defendant Has Not Shown that the Klamath National Forest Is a Federal Enclave.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a suit arising from an incident on a federal enclave.

Diltz v. Ashton · filed 2022-07-06

As a preliminary matter, this court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the incident in this case occurred on a federal enclave.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim arising on a federal enclave when the applicable state law became federal law upon cession.

Meade Communities, LLC v. Jones · filed 2022-07-21

As discussed, infra, the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s claim is cognizable as a federalized State law claim, and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Federal enclave status supplies § 1331 jurisdiction only when the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the enclave.

Wang v. University of Southern California · filed 2023-02-09

And because federal question jurisdiction arises only where the federal government retains exclusive jurisdiction—not concurrent—over a federal enclave, neither the CDCA nor the 1891 Statute can support Defendants’ removal in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction under the federal enclave doctrine over state-law claims arising on federal land subject to broad concurrent state legislative jurisdiction.

Burnes v. The Parks at Monterey Bay · filed 2024-01-29

Accordingly, the federal enclave doctrine does not alone permit a finding of original federal question jurisdiction over this action, in which only state law claims are asserted. See Lake, 14 F.4th at 1003.

Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction over a personal injury action arising from an incident in a federal enclave, even if decisions leading to the injury were made outside it.

McClanahan v. Perikin Enterprises, LLC · filed 2024-04-11

Because this is a personal injury action arising from an incident occurring in a federal enclave, the Court has federal question jurisdiction regardless of whether some decision made by Defendant outside of the enclave led to Plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1331 permits federal enclave jurisdiction only when the claims arise on the federal enclave itself.

Coronado v. General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. · filed 2024-07-01

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that her claims did not arise within the “federal enclave itself” and are therefore not governed by the federal enclave doctrine.

Section 1331 provides federal enclave jurisdiction only when the federal government exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the property.

Childs v. San Diego Family Housing, LLC · filed 2025-08-28

Federal enclave jurisdiction is dependent on the federal government’s exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-enclave jurisdiction only when all pertinent events underlying the claim occurred on a federal enclave.

Breathe Dc v. Swedish Match North America LLC · filed 2025-09-29

Federal-enclave jurisdiction also “requires ‘that all pertinent events take place on a federal enclave.’” ... Thus, Swedish Match’s claim that a “material amount of ZYN sales in the District occur on military establishments” is insufficient to invoke federal-enclave jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through federalized state law when the state retains concurrent jurisdiction over the federal land.

Sylvane v. Whelan · filed 1981-02-04

Once the state cedes concurrent jurisdiction (in this case, indeed, reserving unto itself exclusive civil jurisdiction) the rationale for applying “federalized” state law as the basis for § 1331 jurisdiction disappears.

Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction over tort claims arising from conduct on a federal enclave, even when the injury occurs elsewhere.

Adame v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, Inc. · filed 2025-02-27

“Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on ‘federal enclaves.’” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Having found that the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs stem from conduct on BHR and that BHR at the time of the conduct at issue was a federal enclave (1) due to its location within the boundaries of the Naval Base and independently (2) due to connection to the federal dockyard, federal jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the federal enclave doctrine.

Section 1331's former amount-in-controversy requirement is not satisfied when neither the complaint nor the appellate record indicates that $10,000 is in controversy.

Curtis v. Taylor · filed 1980-09-11

Although plaintiffs assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there is nothing in their complaint or in the record on appeal that indicates that the requisite $10,000 amount is in controversy.

Under Section 1331(a)'s former amount requirement, the amount in controversy is measured by the complaint rather than the verdict.

Kareem Abdul Jihaad A/K/A Mitchell X. Robinson, Jr., Cross v. Joseph O'brien, Cross-Appellee · filed 1981-04-09(a)

The defendant contends the district court did not have jurisdiction because the matter in controversy did not exceed “the sum or value of $10,000.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). However, the amount in controversy is measured by the complaint, not the verdict. There is no merit to defendant’s contention.

Section 1331’s former jurisdictional amount requirement was not satisfied when a permissive counterclaim’s recoverable costs and attorney fees were concededly below $10,000.

Morgan v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1984-01-31

It is therefore clear that Beers cannot recover the jurisdictional amount required under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, its High Commissioner, the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands, or its Resident Commissioner for acts committed in the Northern Mariana Islands.

RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. United States Department of Interior · filed 1977-07-25

The plaintiffs primarily base the jurisdiction of this Court on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... It is therefore the opinion of this Court that it has no jurisdiction over the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the High Commissioner, the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands and the Resident Commissioner for acts committed in the Northern Mariana Islands and that said parties are not subject to process pursuant to Rule 4(d)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a substantial federal question concerning the scope of an Indian tribe’s retained civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant.

UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally · filed 1981-05-08

This Court has jurisdiction over this aspect of the case because of the substantial federal question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising solely under District of Columbia law because Congress excludes locally applicable D.C. laws from references to federal laws and Acts of Congress.

Spivey v. Marion Barry, Jr., as Mayor of the District of Columbia, Louline Green, Intervenor · filed 1981-09-09

The usual federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is not available in cases arising under the laws of the District of Columbia. Congress has expressly embodied its agreement with this proposition in 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp.III 1979): ... For the purposes of this chapter, references to the laws of the United States or Acts of Congress do not include laws applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a substantial federal question concerning whether a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian party.

Rainbow Resources, Inc. v. Calf Looking · filed 1981-08-10

This court concludes that the plaintiff, Rainbow Resources, is correct in asserting that subject matter jurisdiction properly lies with this court and not with the Blackfeet Tribal Court.

Section 1331 does not cover claims based on laws applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia because § 1364 excludes those laws from Chapter 85’s references to federal law.

Thomas v. Barry · filed 1982-07-09

Plaintiffs’ statutory claims have their alleged jurisdictional basis in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which is, of course, part of the chapter ... referred to in section 1364. Thus, if the statutes upon which plaintiffs principally rely are laws “applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia,” there is no jurisdictional basis for this action in this Court.

Section 1331 gave the district court jurisdiction over a state's federal action against individual District of Columbia officials.

State of Md. v. Barry · filed 1985-02-28

The Court finds it has jurisdiction over Virginia’s action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to the individual defendants Mayor Barry and Chief Turner and does not reach the issue of its jurisdiction to entertain it as to the District of Columbia.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's administration of American Samoa so long as the plaintiff can make out a valid claim under the Constitution or a federal statute.

Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel · filed 1986-05-30

So long as plaintiff can make out a valid claim under the Constitution or a federal statute, jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 can independently support constitutional claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against territorial officials even when the availability of Section 1983 is uncertain.

General Offshore Corp. v. Farrelly · filed 1990-08-06

Although this court reads Ngiraingas and Will to allow declaratory and injunctive suits against territorial officials, the novelty of this point leads it to include an exhaustion of remedies section in this opinion, should this reading prove misguided. In any event, this court’s jurisdiction to hear these constitutional claims may rest upon the general federal question section, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A land dispute does not arise under § 1331 merely because a party derives title from a federal patent or an Act of Congress.

Arnold W. Hilgeford and Martha A. Hilgeford v. The Peoples Bank, Portland, Indiana · filed 1985-10-31

It is well settled, however, that a controversy regarding land has never been regarded as presenting a federal question simply because one of the parties to it has derived his title from a patent or under an act of Congress.

Section 1331(a) supplies federal-question jurisdiction over a controversy requiring construction of federal statutes and determination of the estate granted by them.

Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1977-08-11(a)

Jurisdiction is claimed both on the basis of diversity (28 U.S.C. Section 1332) and under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331(a) as a case arising under the laws of the United States. ... The Court concludes that it has diversity jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question because of this being a controversy respecting construction of federal acts and the nature of the estate granted to defendant by them.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a land dispute merely because ownership is claimed under a federal land grant.

Cycenas v. Stoner · filed 2004-03-05

Cycenas’s first asserted basis for jurisdiction fails because a dispute involving rights in a piece of land does not present a federal question simply because ownership of that land is claimed under a grant from the United States government.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over federal employees’ back pay claims against the United States exceeding $10,000.

Salla v. Califano · filed 1980-10-22(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide this court with jurisdiction. Although by its terms this jurisdictional provision applies to suits against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity, courts have consistently held that this jurisdictional provision does not allow the district courts to entertain claims against the United States for monetary relief in excess of $10,000. Back pay claims of federal employees in excess of $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and sovereign immunity acts as a bar to district court jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1331, together with 5 U.S.C. § 702, supplies jurisdiction to review a military records board’s timeliness ruling when success would only require the board to consider the correction request on its merits.

Bridges v. The Secretary of the Air Force the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records · filed 1992-02-07

Because a decision in Bridges' favor in this case at most would entitle Bridges to have the merits of his corrections request considered by the Board, he has not asserted a claim based on a statute that provides a substantive right to compensation at this stage of the case. See Guercio v. Brody, 884 F.2d 1372 (Fed.Cir.1989) (jurisdiction under Little Tucker Act is appropriate only if plaintiff identifies a substantive statutory provision entitling her to money damages). Therefore, we hold that federal court jurisdiction arose in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702; consequently, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over nonmonetary claims that a federal agency violated federal statutes, regulations, and a federal contract; such claims are not within the Claims Court’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel · filed 1991-02-11

We hold that plaintiff HSI's case was within the district court's Sec. 1331 jurisdiction and not within the exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction of the Claims Court over monetary claims.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over APA claims seeking specific nonmonetary relief when the APA waives sovereign immunity and the Tucker Act does not apply.

Robbins v. Reagan · filed 1985-08-19

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ APA claims are not precluded by the Tucker Act. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the APA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, only, assuming these APA claims are otherwise properly subject to judicial review.

Section 1331 does not authorize monetary relief against the United States for an essentially contractual claim that derives its remedial basis from the Tucker Act.

Wronke v. John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army · filed 1985-07-18

It asserted as grounds of jurisdiction only 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 — federal question jurisdiction, civil rights jurisdiction, and mandamus jurisdiction. ... But the statutes the complaint invoked do not authorize monetary relief against the United States. ... The suit was therefore “based ... in part” on § 1346, which places it within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.

The APA and § 1331 cannot bypass the Tucker Act’s exclusive jurisdiction over a government-contract claim exceeding $10,000.

Spectrum Leasing Corporation v. United States of America · filed 1985-06-18

The APA and section 1331 thus cannot confer jurisdiction upon the district court to hear this case, and the claim falls outside the district court’s concurrent Tucker Act jurisdiction under section 1346(a)(2) because the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.

Section 1331 permits district-court review of an action against federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on restitution issues when the action is not grounded in contract and thus is not within the Claims Court’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction.

State of Tennessee v. Dole · filed 1984-11-29(a)

The present suit is likewise clearly not "grounded in contract" and therefore not subject to exclusive Court of Claims jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits district-court review of an action against federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on restitution issues when the action is not grounded in contract and thus is not within the Claims Court’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Dole · filed 1984-11-29(a)

The present suit is likewise clearly not “grounded in contract” and therefore not subject to exclusive Court of Claims jurisdiction.

Section 1331 covers a claim that federal officials lacked constitutional or statutory authority to take property, rather than a claim for just compensation within the Tucker Act.

De Arellano v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense · filed 1984-10-05

Rather, it asserts that there is no underlying authority for the taking in either the Constitution or statutes of the United States. The claim thus clearly "arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982).

Section 1331 cannot circumvent the Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over an essentially contractual claim by recasting it as arising under federal regulations or due process.

American Science and Engineering, Inc. v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and · filed 1978-02-23

A second attempt to bring this action within the purview of the district court is to ground its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff recites the enabling legislation of HEW and the agency’s regulations to claim that this action “arises under” them. As with attempts to found jurisdiction on the APA, efforts to ground it on the federal question statute have consistently been rejected by courts because the effect would be to undercut the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. ... Inclusion of an allegation that the agency deprived plaintiff of due process of law by failing to provide notice and a hearing before cancelling the license agreement and revoking the waiver of foreign rights does not establish § 1331 jurisdiction.

Section 1331 cannot be used to evade the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over a monetary claim against the United States by framing the requested relief as equitable or declaratory.

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. United States · filed 1979-03-21(a)

Conversely, under the authorities cited ... the District Court lacks jurisdiction of this action (even though framed purely in equitable or declaratory terms) which attempts, in direct impact, to obtain these monies from the Treasury.

Section 1331 does not permit a district court to retain Tucker Act damages claims against the United States as pendent to an original constitutional claim.

Kizas v. Webster · filed 1980-04-25

Neither would it be proper for the Court to retain jurisdiction over all the damage claims as pendent to the original constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff offers no authority for the proposition that damage claims against the United States can be adjudicated as ancillary to claims for which there is federal question or mandamus jurisdiction.

Together with Sections 1361 and 1346(a)(2), Section 1331 supports district-court jurisdiction over a federal employee’s reinstatement and back-pay claims only when the back-pay claim does not exceed $10,000.

Steinagel v. Jacobson · filed 1980-11-04

Therefore, upon amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint to plead jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1361 (in addition to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) as already pleaded), this Court concludes that it would have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims for reinstatement and back pay, ... back pay does not exceed $10,000 in amount.

Section 1331 covers a principally nonmonetary constitutional challenge seeking declaratory or injunctive relief even when the dispute involves government benefit payments.

University of Maryland v. Cleland · filed 1980-11-26

Viewed in this light, the plaintiff’s complaint presents constitutional challenges to the VA’s implementation procedures which could warrant either declaratory or injunctive relief and constitutes a cognizable non-monetary claim for relief which is properly within this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331(a) gives district courts jurisdiction without an amount threshold to review official federal agency action for nonmonetary relief, while the Tucker Act reserves claims exceeding $10,000 for money damages to the Court of Claims.

Rowe v. United States · filed 1980-11-28(a)

The district courts have jurisdiction, without regard to amount in controversy, over actions against the United States, its agencies or its officers acting in their official capacities. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... We hold that the district court had jurisdiction over this case, as a review of agency action, except to the extent that the plaintiffs claim damages in excess of $10,000. ... The Tucker Act, by its terms, applies only to claims for money damages. Therefore, it does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages.

Section 1331 permits a district court to retain an equitable reinstatement claim even when an incidental back-pay demand exceeds $10,000 and would otherwise fall within the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction.

Stanley v. COMMISSIONERS, US CIVIL SERV. COM'N · filed 1980-12-08

The plaintiff states in his petition that the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 through 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Jurisdiction over the issue of reinstatement properly lies with this Court, and defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. The transfer of plaintiff’s monetary claim to the Court of Claims is unnecessary in this instance because this Court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement, and, therefore, he is not entitled to back wages.

Section 1331 cannot displace the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over a nontort money claim exceeding $10,000 against the United States.

Graham v. Henegar · filed 1981-03-26

Since the ... instant suit plainly falls within the coverage of the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims is the sole forum for adjudication of this lawsuit ... if ... the firefighters’ claim exceeds $10,000 in amount, even though other jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 would otherwise allow the suit to be tried in district court.

Section 1331’s general jurisdictional grant must be read as subject to the Tucker Act’s specialized limitation on district-court jurisdiction over nontort damages claims against the United States.

Huddleston v. Donovan · filed 1981-09-02

In effect that means reading Sections 1331 and 1337 (and indeed any other generalized grants of jurisdiction) as though they said “except as otherwise provided in Section 1346” (a specialized grant of jurisdiction for suits in which the United States is defendant).

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and that exclusivity cannot be avoided by framing a money claim as equitable relief.

Alamo Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Andrus · filed 1981-11-13

The trial court also found that it had jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) because it involved a federal question. However, this statute does not give district courts jurisdiction of a suit that must be brought exclusively in the Court of Claims. ... Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of this case in accordance with the provisions of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1979) . The exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims cannot be avoided by framing a district court complaint to appear to seek only injunctive, mandatory, or declaratory relief.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a dispute lacking an Article III case or controversy and cannot be used to evade exclusive Court of Claims jurisdiction by styling a monetary claim as declaratory relief.

The Amalgamated Sugar Company and U & I Incorporated v. Bob Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture · filed 1981-11-24

U.S.C. § 1331, however, does not confer jurisdiction on the district court to determine matters which fail to meet the case or controversy requirements of Article III. ... For reasons above-stated, that controversy is not within the jurisdiction of the federal district court under either 28 U.S.C. § 2201 or § 1331. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims cannot be evaded by framing a complaint to seek only injunctive, mandatory, or declaratory relief against governmental officials.

Section 1331 cannot displace the Claims Court's exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction over a claim against the United States that is essentially contractual and seeks more than $10,000.

Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Pierce · filed 1983-04-27

Although disposition of this claim necessitates adjudication of some questions of federal law, “efforts to ground [jurisdiction] on the federal question statute have consistently been rejected by courts because the effect would be to undercut the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.” ... forum for this action, whether it is characterized as one in contract or one to interpret provisions of the Constitution, federal statutes, or regulations pertaining to the contract.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a contract claim exceeding $10,000 against the United States where no waiver of sovereign immunity supports district-court relief.

Northrop University v. Harper · filed 1983-07-18

This is, in essence, a contract claim against the United States. The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Plaintiff suggests in its papers that such a claim is within the Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This argument is without merit.

Section 1331(a) gives district courts jurisdiction over claims seeking injunctive relief against a federal agency for an alleged regulatory taking, and the Tucker Act does not divest that jurisdiction when no monetary damages are sought.

1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson · filed 1983-09-28(a)

Because no issue of money damages or liability for monetary damages is presented in the instant case, the Tucker Act does not divest this Court of jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s regulatory “taking” claim. ... the court ... stated that 28 U.S.C. Section 1331(a) provides a federal district court with jurisdiction over claims against a federal agency for injunctive relief. ... Accordingly, this Court holds that it is not divested of jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s regulatory “taking” claim.

Section 1331 supports jurisdiction over nonmonetary claims whose prospective significance makes equitable relief primary, even when related monetary relief belongs in the Claims Court.

Minnesota v. Heckler · filed 1983-09-30

If the declaratory or injunctive relief a claimant seeks has significant prospective effect or considerable value apart from merely determining monetary liability of the government, the equitable relief sought is paramount and the district court may assume jurisdiction over the nonmonetary claims. ... The prospective, independent significance of the declaratory relief requested makes it, not the compensatory money payments, the primary relief sought by the State of Minnesota.

Section 1331(a) may cover a claim that a federal officer unlawfully impounded appropriated funds, but not a contract claim seeking payment, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court.

Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. Ruckelshaus · filed 1984-02-08(a)

Thus the question is not whether EPA can impound funds (a federal question under § 1331(a)), but whether under the contract it has to pay them (§ 1491(a) jurisdiction). First, plaintiff admits EPA does not have to pay. Second, this contract question is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over nominal constitutional or tort claims whose essence is a contract claim for monetary relief against the United States within the Claims Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Raines v. Block · filed 1984-12-06

This court could have jurisdiction over such independent claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346(a)(2). However, plaintiff’s attempts to allege independent claims sounding in tort and federal common law do not obviate the fact that the genesis of any wrongdoing by the United States was breach of contract. Just as framing the complaint in terms of administrative review cannot be used as a pretext to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, so to structure the claims as constitutional and common law torts cannot destroy the requirement of filing claims for monetary damages in the Court of Claims.

Federal common law is part of the laws of the United States for § 1331 purposes, but § 1331 does not itself waive the federal government's sovereign immunity.

North Side Lumber Co. v. Block · filed 1985-02-20

The impracticability claim also arises under federal law because federal common law of contracts applies to contracts with the federal government, Saavedra v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 496, 498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 236, 78 L.Ed.2d 227 (1983), and federal common law is part of the "laws ... of the United States" for the purpose of Sec. 1331 jurisdiction. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 1391, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972). ... Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 does not itself waive sovereign immunity.

A complaint's reliance on Section 1331 alone does not establish district-court jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States when it does not allege Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Hahn, Michael S. And Bradley, B. Shay and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. United States · filed 1985-04-16

The complaint alleged that the “amount in controversy” exceeded $10,000 and that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general “federal question” provision. There was no allegation of Tucker Act jurisdiction. These allegations ... are clearly not adequate to establish district court jurisdiction over the monetary claims.

Section 1331 permits adjudication of federal grant claims seeking equitable restoration of funds when the Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity and the claims fall outside both branches of Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1985-06-07

We therefore hold that Maryland’s claims do not fall within the non-eontractual branch of Tucker Act jurisdiction, because Title XX cannot fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the federal government in favor of an aggrieved state. Since, then, Maryland’s claims are not within either branch of Tucker Act jurisdiction, there is no doubt that section 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to Maryland’s claims and that those claims were properly adjudicated under the federal question jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 1331 permits a district court to consider a federal employee's constitutional declaratory-judgment claim even when the Tucker Act places her accompanying claim for more than $10,000 in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court.

Brown v. United States · filed 1986-03-04

In both her amended and original complaints, plaintiff alleges jurisdiction is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because her case raises federal questions, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which provides this Court with jurisdiction to hear certain cases where the United States is a defendant. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s monetary claims, but may consider her request for declaratory judgment.

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction over FLSA claims against a nonappropriated fund instrumentality itself, limited to the instrumentality's nonappropriated funds.

Angel M. Cosme Nieves v. Col. Robert C. Deshler, Etc. · filed 1986-03-18

We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled to proceed in the district court against their immediate employer, the NAFI itself, to the extent of its nonappropriated funds. ... In reaching this result, we agree with the Attorney General that jurisdiction for the district court to hear this action is to be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).

Section 1331 permits a district court to adjudicate equitable challenges to a military discharge even when a related claim for more than $10,000 in back pay must proceed separately in the Claims Court.

Gower v. John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy · filed 1986-09-04

He pled jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and stated that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. ... Under these circumstances, Gower’s case must be bifurcated.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over APA claims seeking nonmonetary review of federal agency action even when success may advance the claimant toward later federal funding.

Sarasota, Florida v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1986-09-15

Thus, given that review is available under the APA, we ordinarily would countenance Sarasota bringing its claims to the District Court for resolution under the general grant of jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... In a nutshell, the fact that Sarasota's victory on its present claim, if it occurs, may advance it along the path to the grant funding that it covets does not automatically transform every intervening controversy into a Tucker Act claim.

Section 1331 does not override the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States exceeding $10,000.

Conille v. Pierce · filed 1986-12-16

Plaintiff argues that she can avoid the limitations of the Tucker Act, and can therefore assert claims in excess of $10,000 in this court, because she has a separate waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1702 and a separate grant of subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction. ... Plaintiff has not offered any compelling reason that the rationale of ... should not be followed in this case. I therefore hold that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of plaintiffs claims in excess of $10,000.

Section 1331 does not override the Claims Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over claims seeking more than $10,000 from the federal government.

District of Columbia Retirement Board v. United States · filed 1987-04-06

Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims seek more than $10,000 from the federal government, they must be brought in the Claims Court, even if they could be brought under another jurisdictional grant such as § 1331.

Section 1331, together with APA Section 702, supplies district-court jurisdiction over a nonmonetary claim seeking review of federal agency action, distinct from Tucker Act jurisdiction over monetary claims.

Chabal v. Reagan · filed 1987-06-15

Chabal's non-monetary claim against all defendants for reinstatement in effect seeks review of an agency action as authorized by the APA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702, and the district court's jurisdiction over this claim is founded on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, not the Tucker Act.

Section 1331 does not preserve district-court jurisdiction over a Tucker Act monetary claim exceeding $10,000.

Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States · filed 1987-12-02

We determine that the district court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the LTA claims.

Section 1331 and the APA’s sovereign-immunity waiver give district courts jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim seeking specific payment of statutory entitlements rather than compensatory money damages, when the claim is not within the Tucker Act.

National Association of Counties v. James A. Baker, Iii, Secretary of the Treasury · filed 1988-03-11

We believe that the relief sought by the local governments is not a claim for money damages within the meaning of the APA, notwithstanding the fact that the claim, if successful, may require the payment of money by the federal government. Therefore since the APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for the local government’s claims the district court properly exercised its general federal question jurisdiction over these claims. ... This case does not involve a Tucker Act claim and the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for claims seeking relief other than money damages was appropriately invoked by the district court. This case involves a substantial federal question and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 conferred jurisdiction on the district court.

Section 1331 permits district-court review of federal agency action outside the Tucker Act, but does not extend to a claim whose real object is monetary damages within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court.

Adamson v. Radosevic · filed 1988-03-21

For matters outside the scope of the Tucker Act, section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction to review agency action. ... For all these reasons, the court finds that we have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and that plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the Tucker Act.

Section 1331 can support district-court jurisdiction over an equitable claim seeking specific monetary relief, such as back pay and benefits, because monetary relief is not necessarily money damages reserved to the Claims Court.

Ulmet v. United States of America John O. Marsh, Jr., in His Capacity as Secretary of the Army · filed 1989-10-31

In essence he seeks specific monetary relief as defined in ... Bowen. ... The district court properly determined that it had jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1331 cannot retain an action that is substantively a government-contract claim for more than $10,000 when declaratory pleading merely disguises a monetary claim within the Claims Court’s exclusive Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Department of the Navy · filed 1990-08-13

To summarize, despite the ingenuity of plaintiff’s pleading, alleging the controversy to be noncontractual and to involve administrative regulations and budgetary statutes, the court believes the factual basis of the controversy to be the terms of the contract and the application of statutes or regulations concerning contracts with the United States. Obviously the amount in controversy—millions of dollars—greatly exceeds the Tucker Act maximum upon which federal district court jurisdiction may be based. Therefore, the court concludes that the present action is founded upon an express contract with the government. Plaintiff’s claim is a disguised claim for money damages in an amount in excess of $10,000. This court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction.

Section 1331 covers well-pleaded constitutional claims seeking declaratory and mandamus relief against federal action when the suit’s thrust is not to obtain money under a government contract.

Sheridan Square Partnership v. United States Ex Rel. United States Departments of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1991-04-08

Sheridan’s claim, however, is not merely a disguised contract dispute with the government. ... Sheridan’s claims are properly alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint and within the “well-pleaded complaint rule” ... Hence, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is satisfied.

Section 1331 does not independently provide district court jurisdiction over FLSA money damages claims against the United States; the Tucker Act governs jurisdiction over those claims.

Saraco v. Hallett · filed 1993-08-04

Thus, the Court concludes that the express provisions of the Tucker Act control over the general jurisdictional statutes relied upon by plaintiffs—28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

Section 1331 does not give a district court jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim against the United States that is governed by the Tucker Act.

Wagner v. United States, Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1993-09-16

Count IV of the complaint asserts a breach of contract claim against HUD under the APA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 claiming that HUD violated the settlement agreement of May 9, 1991. ... However, the complaint itself not only designates Count IV as a “Breach of Contract,” but the language contained therein identifies the claim the same way. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to address Count IV, a breach of contract claim against the United States.

Section 1331 does not itself imply a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action against a state transportation agency that is not amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Lewis v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1977-09-16

Second, no cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment will be implied against SEPTA through 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not supply a damages action directly under the Eighth Amendment against a state, its agencies, or state officials in either their official or individual capacities.

Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections · filed 1978-05-19

This Court now holds that the Eighth Amendment likewise does not create an independent cause of action for money damages which can be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 against the State, its agencies, or any of its officials in either their official or individual capacities.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction when the federal statute creates no express or implied cause of action.

Jaillet v. Hill & Hill · filed 1978-11-16

In addition, we find that the Plaintiff has no cause of action, express or implied, under the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act and that the Court thus lacks federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Claims against private defendants in an FTCA action require a separate and independent basis of federal jurisdiction, which may be supplied by Section 1331.

Bates v. Tenco Services, Inc. · filed 1990-09-24

This court has federal jurisdiction over the two private defendants under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. There must be a separate and independent basis of federal jurisdiction to support the claims asserted against private defendants in a suit against the United States under the FTCA.

The amendment to Section 1331(a) removes the amount-in-controversy requirement for a federal agency defendant but not for a private codefendant, which cannot be joined pendent to the federal defendant without an independent jurisdictional basis.

Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc. · filed 1977-09-23(a)

The amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) removes the amount-in-controversy requirement as to the federal defendant but it has no effect on the HSA. ... The HSA may not be brought into the suit as pendent parties unless an independent basis of jurisdiction over it exists.

The amendment to Section 1331(a) removes the amount-in-controversy requirement for a federal defendant but has no effect on a private health systems agency, regardless of whether joinder is argued through pendent jurisdiction or legislative history.

Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems · filed 1978-01-06(a)

First, as we stated in our initial opinion, “(t)he amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) removes the amount-in-controversy requirement as to the federal defendant but it has no effect on the HSA.” 559 F.2d at 1023. This is so whether appellees cast their argument in terms of pendent jurisdiction or in terms of the legislative history of the amendment to § 1331(a).

Section 1331 requires a private federal remedy for a statutory violation before that violation can support federal question jurisdiction.

Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc. · filed 1994-07-01

A private federal remedy for violating a federal statute is a prerequisite for finding federal question subject matter jurisdiction. ... We hold, therefore, that plaintiffs have brought their grievances before the wrong forum because they lack a private cause of action under the Interstate Commerce Act to complain of such conduct in federal court.

Amended Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over an action against a United States Attorney acting in his official capacity without requiring an amount in controversy.

In Re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel · filed 1977-12-01

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction in this matter under the recent amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in that the United States Attorney is clearly an officer of the United States acting in his official capacity.

Section 1331(a) provides jurisdiction over a constitutional claim against a federal officer without regard to the amount in controversy.

Westcott v. Califano · filed 1978-04-20(a)

This court has jurisdiction to hear the federal constitutional claim against the federal defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) without regard to the amount in controversy.

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction over a Fourth Amendment suit challenging a search conducted by federal officials.

Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo · filed 1979-10-03

This Court has jurisdiction of such a suit against official defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 has no amount-in-controversy requirement for an official-capacity suit against the United States, a federal agency, or a federal officer or employee.

Silver v. United States · filed 1980-09-18

Jurisdiction is proper under section 1331 without regard to the amount in controversy in cases against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officers or employees thereof in his official capacity.

Section 1331 permits constitutional civil-rights suits against federal officers in their individual capacities, but sovereign immunity bars official-capacity claims absent federal consent to suit.

Anderson v. Luther · filed 1981-03-11

Federal officers may be sued directly under the Constitution for violating an individual’s constitutional or other civil rights, with jurisdiction being asserted under the general federal questions jurisdiction statute, § 1331. However, officials may not be sued in their official capacities unless the United States has consented to suit. Suing a federal official in his official capacity is the same as asserting a claim against the United States itself, which cannot be done without consent of the sovereign.

Section 1331 supplied jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s mandamus and constitutional-damages claims against IRS employees.

Kiley v. Kurtz · filed 1982-03-08

He seeks writs of mandamus compelling the defendants to withdraw the notice of deficiency which they sent him, to establish ... that he is subject to taxation before assessing him, and to remove his name from an alleged list of illegal tax protestors. He also seeks damages from the defendants, who are IRS employees being sued in both their official and their individual capacities. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all of these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 alone does not establish jurisdiction against a federal agency when the plaintiff has not satisfied the precise terms of the United States' consent to suit.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1985-07-26

It is not enough for Lilly to rely simply on § 1331 to establish subject matter jurisdiction against the EPA as to this count; when consent to sue the United States is granted, the precise terms, conditions, and qualifications of such consent must be scrupulously followed.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over nonmonetary suits by federal employees challenging allegedly unlawful employment decisions once 5 U.S.C. § 702 supplies the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity.

Allen Sharp, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force Reserves v. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense · filed 1986-08-22

Although it is unclear what constituted the waiver of sovereign immunity necessary to the entertainment of such suits prior to the passage of the 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub.L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982)), it is clear that § 702 now constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity from such nonmonetary suits, and that district courts have jurisdiction over them under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (general federal question), 1361 (action in the nature of mandamus), & 2201-2202 (declaratory judgment).

Section 1331 does not by itself provide jurisdiction over a suit against a federal agency; the claim needs a separate statutory basis for suit against the agency.

Washington v. Shulkin · filed 2018-08-02

Mr. Washington initially invokes 28 U.S.C. §1331, federal question jurisdiction, as the source of jurisdiction over his claim. That provision, however, is not source of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a suit is against a federal officer.

Art Johnston v. Hugh Earle, Collector of Internal Revenue, Walter S. Shanks, Irwin Borthick and Irving H. Curran · filed 1957-02-28

It is clear that the mere fact that a suit is against a federal officer does not support original jurisdiction thereof in the United States district courts on the ground that it is a case arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of this section.

Section 1331(a) can provide jurisdiction over federal-law claims seeking nonmonetary relief against a federal agency, but it does not waive sovereign immunity.

Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service, an Instrumentality of the Departments of the Army and of t · filed 1980-06-27(a)

In this instance, nonmonetary relief is available under a jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), and that statute is not a waiver of sovereign immunity and contains no express or implied interdiction against nonmonetary relief.

Section 1331 supports district court jurisdiction over a trademark challenge to Customs regulations governing imports despite a claim of exclusive Court of International Trade jurisdiction.

Olympus Corporation v. United States, K Mart Corporation, Intervenor-Appellee, 47th Street Photo, Inc., Intervenor-Appel · filed 1986-06-09

The continuing trademark jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a) (1982) gives the district courts jurisdiction not only over the respective rights between private parties under section 526, see Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560, but also over the matter presented here.

Section 1331 supports district-court jurisdiction over a customs-related matter when no adequate remedy is available in the Customs Court.

Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal · filed 1978-05-25

When this situation occurs, jurisdiction over a customs matter which presumptively inheres in the Customs Court reverts to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1337. ... The Court therefore finds that jurisdiction lies with the District Court in the instant case.

Section 1331 permits review of final Customs agency action arising under federal trademark-importation law.

Rolex v. Snyder · filed 1983-09-14

And the district court clearly had jurisdiction to review Rolex’s challenge to East’s final determination under § 1331 as an action arising under § 1526(e).

Section 1331 permits district court review of Foreign Trade Zones Board orders under the APA only if the Court of International Trade lacks jurisdiction under § 1581.

Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Board · filed 1994-03-15

If jurisdiction lies in district courts for review of these orders, it must he there because of the general grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) over causes of actions created in § 10(c) of the APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). ... Only if no jurisdictional grant can be found in the Court of International Trade would it be appropriate to invoke the general administrative review function of the district courts in such cases.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over federal-question challenges to consular visa decisions; consular nonreviewability limits judicial review without removing that jurisdiction.

Allen v. Milas · filed 2018-07-24

We conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not strip the district court of that jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to review a consul’s handling of visa applications when the visa-issuance process is judicially nonreviewable.

Ubiera v. Bell · filed 1978-05-26

And even if it were concluded that we are here concerned with action pursuant to Section 221 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1201, (in the second subchapter) which deals with the grant or denial of visas, we understand the cases and the legislative history to preclude any interference by the courts in the visa issuance process. For the same reasons, we also reject plaintiff’s contention that there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction to review a consular officer’s denial of a visa.

Aggarwal v. Secretary of State of the United States · filed 1996-12-31

Although it is well settled that consular decisions denying visas to aliens are immune from judicial review, Plaintiff attempts to circumvent this established principle of law by relying on numerous statutes. However, the courts have also rejected jurisdictional claims on each of the statutes cited by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Perales, 903 F.2d at 1047-48 (jurisdiction is not provided by the Administrative Procedure Act); Kummer, 578 F.Supp. at 341 (visa decisions are not within the reach of the federal question and mandamus statutes). Furthermore, exercising jurisdiction over this case based on any of these statutes would violate the well established principle of nonreviewability of a consul’s decision to grant or deny a visa, and the court declines to do so.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction to review a consular visa denial when no underlying federal right supports the claim.

Khanom v. Kerry · filed 2014-07-15

In sum, because there is no federal right upon which to predicate the Court’s federal question jurisdiction,... the Court lacks ... subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides subject-matter jurisdiction over all suits against the wholly federally owned Tennessee Valley Authority, without an amount-in-controversy requirement, and § 1349 does not withdraw that jurisdiction.

Jackson v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1978-06-19(a)

These decisions clearly establish that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 constitutes a grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction over all suits against TVA. ... Accordingly, the court finds that it has jurisdiction over defendant Ickes-Braun under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and over defendant TV A under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 and that its jurisdiction over TVA is not abrogated by 28 U.S.C. § 1349.

Section 1331 may provide jurisdiction over a claim against the Postal Service if the complaint states a cognizable federal claim.

Neal v. United States Postal Service · filed 1979-03-06

Although the court does not have jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, there can be little doubt that the court has jurisdiction of plaintiff’s claim, if one has been stated, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1339 and 39 U.S.C. § 409(a).

A state mortgage-foreclosure action does not arise under section 1331 merely because the plaintiff is a federally chartered land bank when federal law is not an essential element of the claim.

Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Keiser · filed 1986-02-14

As stated above, this claim arises under Illinois law, not federal, and the bank is making no constitutional claims. ... Since there is no claim upon which the original jurisdiction of this Court can rest, the case must be remanded to the Illinois circuit court.

A suit involving a federally chartered and federally owned corporation arises under federal law within Section 1331 and falls within federal district courts' original jurisdiction.

McManus v. Glassman's Wynnefield, Inc. · filed 1989-06-12

Since Amtrak is a federally-chartered and federally-owned corporation, this suit arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and thus is one over which federal district courts have original jurisdiction.

Actions involving a federally chartered and federally owned corporation arise under federal law within Section 1331.

Nero v. Amtrak · filed 1989-06-13

It is well established that actions involving federally chartered and federally owned corporations arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a suit involving a federally chartered corporation when the United States owns more than half its capital stock.

Estate of Wright Ex Rel. Johnson v. Illinois Central Railroad · filed 1993-10-01

Jurisdiction in this matter is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which provides that: ... is a limitation on the federal question jurisdiction set forth in section 1331: ... In reading these two statutes together, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction in, this matter. Amtrak was created by an Act of Congress, ... and at all relevant times the United States owned and owns greater than fifty percent of the capital stock of Amtrak.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over an action involving a federally chartered corporation when the United States owns more than half its capital stock, even if the claims are otherwise nonfederal.

Landman v. Borough of Bristol · filed 1995-07-21

Since Amtrak is a federally-owned and federally-chartered corporation, it does not run afoul of § 1349, and its presence as a party gives rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over an action by Amtrak because its status under § 1349 supplies an independent jurisdictional basis.

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission · filed 2001-05-10

The Third Circuit, and courts in this district have repeatedly held that Amtrak’s status under 28 U.S.C. § 1349 provides an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Consequently, the Court concludes it has subject matter jurisdiction over Amtrak’s Complaint, and will not address the defendants’ remaining arguments that the Court lacks jurisdiction here.

Section 1331 supplies original federal-question jurisdiction over a suit against a federally chartered corporation when § 1349 permits jurisdiction.

Rodriguez v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2007-04-11

Because Amtrack is a federally chartered corporation, Plaintiffs lawsuit “arises under” federal law. ... The Court’s original jurisdiction over Amtrack in this matter thus derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a claim against Amtrak because suits involving federally chartered corporations arise under federal law and the United States owns more than half of Amtrak’s capital stock.

Stark-Romero v. National Railroad Passenger Co. · filed 2011-01-12

The Court therefore has federal-question jurisdiction over the Esquibels’ claim against Amtrak under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, and the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a suit against a federally created corporation such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 2015-09-29

TVA’s status as a wholly-owned corporate agency and instrumentality of the United States created pursuant to an act of Congress places subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as opposed to the diversity statute.

Section 1331 generally provides federal-question jurisdiction over congressionally incorporated corporations, subject to § 1349’s majority federal ownership requirement.

Moore v. County of Merced · filed 2019-12-02

Federal question jurisdiction extends generally to congressionally incorporated corporations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Union Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885). However, in 1925, Congress restricted the reach of federal question jurisdiction to federally chartered corporations in which the United States owns more than one-half of the capital stock.

Section 1331 gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against a corporation created by Congress.

KURZWEIL v. AMTRAK · filed 2020-09-28

First, the District of Columbia would have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Defendant was created by an act of Congress, 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101, et seg.