28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims through complete preemption, but the FCRA does not completely preempt these claims.

Johnson v. Discover Card · filed 2026-04-20

For all these reasons, Plaintiff's “claims are not completely preempted by federal law and’ remand remains appropriate.”

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law complaint when complete preemption converts its claims into federal claims.

Hansen · filed 2026-05-04

That said, there are exceptions to this rule: a defendant may remove a case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction “by virtue of complete preemption.”1 , 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). ... Because Mr. Hansen has brought only state- law claims, and they are not preempted by federal law, this Court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption when the Pipeline Safety Act does not displace an employee’s state-law wrongful-discharge claim.

Barnhill · filed 2026-05-11

Applying this test, defendants have failed to demonstrate plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction when complete preemption converts a state-law claim into a federal claim.

Cultured Natural Thin Veneer Stone, LLC v. Chicago · filed 2026-05-11

Where, as here, “an area of state law has been completely pre- empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises un- der federal law.”

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state claim based on Medical Device Amendments preemption when the Act creates no parallel federal cause of action.

Brett Strong Lauri Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. Thomas S. Martin · filed 1996-04-18

We decline defendants’ invitation to add MDA § 360k(a) to this list and instead hold that count I of the complaint does not present a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and was therefore not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when federal law completely displaces it; an ordinary preemption defense does not establish jurisdiction.

Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club · filed 2001-11-09

Only "complete" preemption affects federal subject matter jurisdiction. "Conflict" preemption relates to the merits of a claim. ... For present purposes, however, the key point is this: ordinary or conflict preemption is merely a defense to the merits of a claim. As such, according to the well-pleaded complaint rule, it does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law usury claim against a national bank when the National Bank Act completely preempts that claim.

Landry v. Cross Country Bank · filed 2003-09-16

Given this clear statement of new law, the case as pleaded in Plaintiffs Original Petition became removable under federal question jurisdiction on June 2, 2003.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).

Regency Hospital Company of South Atlanta, L.L.C. v. United HealthCare Insurance Company · filed 2005-11-21

Thus, removal to this Court was permissible based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.5 The motion to remand is denied.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law complaint when federal law completely controls the remedy sought.

Citizens Alliance to Save the Southline v. Montana Rail Link, Inc. · filed 1987-08-27

In view of the regulatory scheme established by Congress governing the transfer of rail lines, and the remedies provided within that scheme, federal law clearly and completely controls the remedy sought by plaintiffs herein. When examined within its four comers, the complaint raises a substantial federal question; i.e., whether proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission may be enjoined because of a state law. violation. Federal law leaves no room for a state court to decide this issue.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a federal cause of action completely preempts it.

Holt v. Tonawanda Coke Corp. · filed 1991-03-22

It is also clear that “... if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law.” ... The Complaint alleges a denial of a benefit under an employee- disability plan, a cause of action which is pre-empted by ERISA and thereby arises under federal law.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim when complete preemption converts it into a federal claim; ordinary preemption does not suffice.

Fritts v. Khoury · filed 1996-08-02

The inquiry of whether there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331: ... A corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the “complete preemption” doctrine, holds that when Congress intends the preemptive force of a statute to be so extraordinary that it completely preempts an area of state law, “any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” ... For all of these reasons, plaintiffs’ action was improperly removed to this Court, necessitating remand to WCCC.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law insurance-premium claims that the National Bank Act does not completely preempt.

Giddens v. Hometown Financial Services · filed 1996-09-24

This court merely has held that there is not such “complete pre-emption” as would support removal to federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims about a carrier’s rates and billing practices merely because federal common law may preempt them.

Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. At&t, Michael Gilmartin and Richard Stotts · filed 1998-03-10

That its claims concern the rates and billing practices of a carrier does not afford a basis for removal by the defendant. In sum, complete preemption removal was not available to AT&T.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state tort claims when the federal statute preserves tort liability and does not completely preempt those claims.

Stutler v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. · filed 1998-03-20

We do not have federal question jurisdiction via complete preemption and, since we have no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction over this action, remand to the state court is required.

Section 1331 permits removal of a state-law action on federal-question grounds when federal law completely preempts the claim, but a federal defense alone does not suffice.

Lewis v. Nextel Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-09-04

Thus, the removal statute permits a defendant to remove to federal court whenever the action is one “arising under” federal law within the meaning of § 1331. ... Lewis’s action is not completely preempted.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when federal law completely preempts it, but a claim based on an independent legal duty does not qualify.

Magrath v. Marsh and McLennan Companies, Inc. · filed 2019-08-16

At a minimum, Marsh & McLennan has failed to establish that the relief Barbara seeks in the Motion for Order to Show Cause 1s completely preempted because that Motion seeks relief as a result of Marsh & McLennan’s alleged violation of its “independent legal duty” to comply with the Family Court’s injunction. ... For these reasons, the Court concludes that Marsh & McLennan has not established this Court’s federal question jurisdiction based on ERISA’s complete preemption provision and therefore fails to establish its right to remove the divorce proceedings to this Court.

Section 1331 supports federal-question jurisdiction over removed state-law claims under the complete preemption doctrine only when federal law supplies a replacement cause of action for those claims.

Beatty Group LLC v. Great Western Railway of Colorado LLC · filed 2020-03-26

Because the complete preemption doctrine does not apply to plaintiff’s claims, defendant improperly removed this case to federal court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims through PREP Act complete preemption because the Act supplies no exclusive federal cause of action.

Rae v. Anza Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2021-06-04

The PREP Act therefore does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims here.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when complete preemption makes the claim arise under federal law.

PIH Health Hospital-Whittier v. CIGNA Healthcare of California Inc · filed 2021-08-16

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts determine the existence of federal question jurisdiction by looking at the plaintiff’s claims rather than the defendant’s defenses. ... Cigna fails to persuade the Court that no other independent legal duties are implicated. ... The above analysis dictates that remand is required.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when the asserted federal law does not completely preempt them.

Ayon v. Zero Waste Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-09-07

Federal-question jurisdiction is generally governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, which allows for federal jurisdiction “only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” ... Removing Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim through ERISA complete preemption only when the claim seeks plan benefits and alleges no independent legal duty.

Gardi v. OptumRx Administrative Services, LLC · filed 2022-04-29

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases that “aris[e] under” federal law. Id., § 1331. ... Based on the record as it stands, the Court determines that Defendants have not established that ERISA completely preempts Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law negligence claims through complete preemption by the PREP Act.

Booker v. St. Joseph of Harahan, LLC · filed 2022-06-02

Therefore, the PREP Act does not completely preempt the Bookers’ state law claims.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a federal statute completely preempts the claim.

Nemeth v. Montefiore · filed 2022-09-21

A district court has federal question jurisdiction when the action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... One relevant exception is the complete preemption doctrine. ... The PREP Act does not completely preempt state law.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because a defendant invokes a collective bargaining agreement as a defense.

Russell v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2023-03-09

Defendants’ argument fails because asserting Section 514 as a defense is not a ... basis for preemption.

Section 1331 generally requires a federal question on the face of the complaint; complete preemption can make a state-law claim a federal claim.

Tona v. Coca-Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc. · filed 2023-11-03

In the absence of diverse parties, federal courts only have original jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. This statute is “governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule’.” ... Turning to the case before this court, nothing on the face of the Complaint expressly implicates section 301 or suggests that the court would need to interpret the CBA. ... Therefore, section 301 does not preempt the plaintiffs’ tort claims. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when ERISA completely preempts it.

Mercy Hospital of Folsom v. Health Care Service Corporation · filed 2024-07-02

A federal court has jurisdiction over claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The above analysis confirms the Court has jurisdiction over Mercy’s claims regarding Patient No. 5.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption by the Montreal Convention because the treaty does not clearly displace state law entirely.

Traynor v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2025-04-24

This language suggests that although the Montreal Convention may limit remedies available for such claims, it does not provide clearly “that state law be entirely displaced” as a matter of federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because an LHWCA claim might be viable; the LHWCA does not completely preempt those claims.

Palermo v. Letourneau Technologies, Inc. · filed 2008-03-26

Thus, the LHWA does not provide LTI with a basis for removal of the plaintiffs’ purely state law claims. The fact that the plaintiffs assert state law claims which are allegedly not viable does not serve to transform those claims into federal LHWCA claims. ... LTI has not met that burden as to federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law wrongful-death claim merely because defendants assert that the LHWCA supplies the exclusive remedy.

Long v. Oakley Fertilizer, Inc. · filed 2014-01-15

Only where an area of state law has been “completely preempted” by federal law does the federal law provide a basis for removal of an action to federal court. ... Here, of course, the matter at hand is a wrongful death claim against defendants plaintiff says is responsible for the death of her son. The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim unless diversity jurisdiction is present.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreements through LMRA complete preemption, but a LHWCA preemption defense does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Genusa v. Asbestos Corp. · filed 2014-05-08

If BRMC’s third-party claims require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Unions’ removal of this action was proper and the court has subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete preemption. ... Here, BRMC seeks contribution or indemnification from the Unions on the basis that the Unions breached a contractual duty to warn both Genusa and BRMC of the dangers of asbestos. The court must interpret the collective bargaining agreement between BRMC and the Unions to determine whether such a duty existed. ... The Fifth Circuit has foreclosed the argument that this court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on a theory of complete preemption under the LHWCA.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on FCRA complete preemption because Congress did not intend FCRA to completely preempt state law.

Williams v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC · filed 2020-11-10

Here, the defendants have not shown, and this court’s review has not found, any indication that Congress intended FCRA to completely preempt state law so as to grant removal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on the FCRA or FDCPA because neither statute completely preempts those claims.

Torres v. Bay Area Credit Services · filed 2021-02-05

The Court therefore joins courts around this circuit and holds that the FCRA and FDCPA do not completely preempt state law claims. Accordingly, the complete preemption doctrine does not confer federal question subject matter jurisdictionhere.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on FCRA preemption when the claims are not completely preempted.

Sylvester v. USAA Federal Savings Bank · filed 2022-03-29

Because the face of the Complaint alleges only state law claims that are not completely preempted by the FCRA, the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1331 requires a federal issue necessary to the well-pleaded complaint, so a federal preemption defense cannot supply substantial-federal-question jurisdiction over state claims.

Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2014-01-06

As a result, even if a federal question in this case is substantial, it must appear on the face of the Dillons’ well-pleaded complaint. Put differently, a federal issue must be among the allegations necessary for the Dillons initially to plead their state causes of action. Other federal issues governing whether their claims ultimately entitle them to relief are irrelevant. Since federal preemption is a defense, it forms no part of the Dillons’ causes of action and thus does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. For this reason the defendants’ claims of preemption cannot provide the substantial federal question needed for removal.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim merely because it embeds FDCA standards when the federal issue is not substantial to the federal system.

West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2013-05-13

The Court concludes that although FDCA standards may be embedded in this claim, that does not constitute a substantial federal issue sufficient to confer jurisdiction, especially where the FDCA confers no private cause of action.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a Class III, premarket-approved medical device when they necessarily raise a disputed, substantial federal issue and jurisdiction preserves the state-federal balance.

Jenkins v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2013-11-21

The Court will confer federal question jurisdiction under the substantial-federal-question doctrine when: (1) the state law has necessarily raised a disputed federal issue; (2) the federal interest in the issue is substantial; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction does not threaten the state-federal law jurisdictional balance. ... Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ claims would be more suitably decided by federal question jurisdiction under the substantial-federal-question doctrine.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a state consumer-protection claim based in part on alleged FDCA labeling violations when the federal issue is insubstantial and exercising jurisdiction would upset the federal-state judicial balance.

Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2013-10-16

This Court similarly concludes that exercising federal jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s action here would upset the balance of judicial responsibilities. ... In this case, when all the factors are considered, it seems clear to the Court that Defendants have failed to prove that there is a disputed, substantial federal question — or that the resolution of the question in federal court will not upset Congress’s balancing of judicial responsibilities. The Commonwealth’s motion to remand is thus GRANTED.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state product-liability claims based solely on a Medical Device Amendments preemption defense, because those amendments do not completely preempt the claims.

Goldstein v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-05-19

No such intent can be gleaned from the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA. ... I conclude only that Gore’s pre-emption argument is a potential federal defense, which cannot support removal “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state claims involving the Food and Drug Act’s preemption provision because that provision does not completely preempt those claims.

Almeda Zolia Green and Edmond Allan Green v. Dr. Eugene I. Sacks · filed 1996-08-02

In this case preemption under the Food and Drug Act was cited as a basis for rendering plaintiff's complaint "necessarily federal in character" and thus removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This circuit recently held in Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 78 F.3d 256 (6th Cir.1996), however, that the complete preemption doctrine does not apply to claims involving the Food and Drug Act's preemption provision. See id. at 260-61 (" § 360k(a) preemption cannot convert a state cause of action into a federal question under the well-pleaded complaint rule"). Therefore removal on that basis was improper for lack of original jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption of state-law claims by the FDCA because the FDCA provides no private right of action.

Dawson Ex Rel. Thompson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA · filed 2001-05-23

This Court declines to extend the doctrine of complete preemption to the FDCA, in light of Congress’ determination that no private right of action exist for violations of that statute.

Section 1331 does not permit removal of facially state-law claims based on a federal preemption defense unless federal law completely preempts those claims.

Phillips v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2010-12-01

Nevertheless, where a complaint on its face raises only state-law claims, the defense of preemption does not support removal unless there is “complete preemption”.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over state law challenges to credit card late fees when federal law arises only as a defense and the National Bank Act does not completely preempt the claims.

Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A. · filed 1993-05-07

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions “arising under” the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The presence of a defense based on federal law will not support jurisdiction, “even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” ... Therefore, complete preemption cannot provide the basis for federal jurisdiction over Copeland’s claims.

A state-law usury claim against a national bank arises under federal law and supports Section 1331 jurisdiction when the National Bank Act completely governs and preempts the claim.

M. Nahas Co. v. First National Bank · filed 1990-06-08

The Court finds that although the complaint is premised upon the violation of Arkansas law,' the real nature of the claim is federal and governed by the National Bank Act. ... Involvement of the National Bank Act also raises a federal question for purposes of § 1331. .Finding that the Court has jurisdiction over this action, plaintiffs motion to remand will be dismissed.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims challenging national banks’ credit-related late fees when the National Bank Act completely preempts those claims.

Goehl v. Mellon Bank (DE) · filed 1993-04-21

Undef 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” ... this court finds that sections 85 and 86 of the NBA subsume the interests for which Plaintiffs seek vindication under state law. Additionally, this court finds that there is a clear indication of Congressional'intent to permit removal in cases implicating sections 85 and 86 of the NBA. Accordingly removal was proper in this case based on federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims against national banks challenging credit card overlimit fees when National Bank Act sections 85 and 86 completely preempt those claims.

Watson v. First Union National Bank of South Carolina · filed 1993-11-03

Accordingly, the plaintiffs state-law action falls within the ambit of sections 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act. Because these provisions of the NBA completely preempt state usury laws with regard to national banks, the plaintiffs action is truly federal in nature, and the case was properly removed.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over state law claims challenging a national bank’s excessive credit card late fees when the National Bank Act completely preempts those claims.

Hunter v. Rich's Department Stores · filed 1995-08-31

In light of the great weight of the authority, complete preemption and thus federal question jurisdiction applies.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state-law bank-fee claims when the federal banking statutes do not completely preempt those claims.

Spellman v. Meridian Bank · filed 1995-12-29

Therefore, we will reverse the judgments of the district courts that found complete preemption. Jurisdiction cannot rest on 28 U.S.C. §1331.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state-law fraud claims about misrepresented payment amounts, including interest, when the complaint does not allege an excessive interest rate and complete preemption does not apply.

Mason v. Fidelity Federal Bank, FSB · filed 1999-02-24

In this case, the Plaintiffs have only asserted state law claims so that, on the face of the Complaint, there is no federal question jurisdiction. ... The Plaintiffs have consistently maintained that the appropriate interpretation of their Complaint is that they have claimed that the amount that they were told they would have to pay to purchase their vacuum cleaners, including interest, were fraudulent representations, and have not claimed that the interest rate charged by the Defendants was excessive. Accordingly, the court finds that the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply in this case.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law usury claim against a national bank when the National Bank Act completely preempts that claim.

Anderson v. H & R BLOCK, INC. · filed 2000-12-14

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have brought a claim which is completely preempted by the NBA, creating federal question jurisdiction in this court.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because they implicate federal antitying law when that law does not completely preempt the claims.

Dubose v. Merchants and Farmers Bank · filed 2003-03-21

Complete preemption is not present in the instant case. Nothing in the Antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 provide as much.

Federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption requires a federal statute that provides an exclusive cause of action; possible preemption of state law alone does not suffice.

McKenzie v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB · filed 2004-01-09

However, notwithstanding that HOLA may preempt the state-laws on which Plaintiff relies, the HOLA provisions on which Defendant’s complete preemption argument is based do not provide an exclusive cause of action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption when the complaint alleges state usury claims only against nonbank defendants and no claim against the bank.

Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc. · filed 2004-02-03

The Court agrees with the Magistrate’s finding that Defendants’ reliance on Beneficial and Krispin is misplaced. ... Similarly, the Magistrate correctly found Plaintiffs petition only asserted claims against EZPawn and EZCorp, which are separate entities from County Bank.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through complete preemption under DIDA when state-law claims challenge improper interest charges without alleging an unlawful interest rate.

Saxton v. Capital One Bank · filed 2005-09-29

The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims are not in fact usury claims, that is claims challenging the “rate of interest” charged by an FDIC-insured state bank within the meaning of DIDA. Because this error alone is enough to take the case outside the ambit of this court’s federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331, the court need not, and will not, analyze subsequent steps in defendant’s logic.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law electronic-fund-transfer claims on a complete-preemption theory because the EFTA preserves compatible state-law claims.

Bernhard v. Whitney National Bank · filed 2008-04-03

The clear language of the EFTA indicates that Congress did not intend for the Act to provide the exclusive cause of action for claims relating to unauthorized electronic fund transfers. The Act contemplates the application of state law that is not preempted by its provisions. It does not completely preempt claims relating to electronic fund transfers and does not, therefore, provide federal question jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law usury claim against a nonbank when the FDIA does not completely preempt that claim and no federal question appears on the complaint’s face.

West Virginia v. CashCall, Inc. · filed 2009-03-11

I FIND that the State’s usury law claim is directed against CashCall, which is not a bank, and therefore, the claim does not invoke and cannot be completely preempted by the FDIA. Accordingly, I FIND that the State’s Complaint does not raise any federal questions on its face and that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 permits federal question jurisdiction over state law usury claims that the National Bank Act completely preempts.

Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2012-11-30

This Court therefore CONCLUDES that the National Bank Act completely preempts such claims and that there is federal jurisdiction, based upon Beneficial National, over the Attorney General’s usury claims against the national banks and their related defendants.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over state-law claims on complete-preemption grounds when federal law supplies no private cause of action.

Dutcher v. Matheson · filed 2013-08-13

We therefore conclude that—even assuming that federal law preempts Utah law—the absence of a federal cause of action precludes us from relying on complete preemption as a jurisdictional basis for the district court to act.

A state-law claim supports federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA § 502 complete preemption only when both prongs of the Davila test are met.

Ramin M. Roohipour, M.D., Inc. v. ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan · filed 2020-01-28

Defendant has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing federal question jurisdiction because it has not shown that Plaintiff’s case meets both prongs of the two-prong complete preemption test set forth in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over state-law negligence claims that the PREP Act does not completely preempt.

Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor · filed 2022-07-07

The Manyweathers asserted state-law claims for negligence. Under Mitchell, the PREP Act does not preempt those claims, so they cannot support original federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a claim to recover ERISA pension benefits when complete preemption makes the claim federal in character.

Birmelin v. Verizon Pension Plan for Associates · filed 2025-09-16

Upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the court concurs with defendant’s position.’ Hence, this action “arise[s] under the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction when the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state-law claims arising from loss or damage to goods shipped by an interstate carrier.

Orlick v. J.D. Carton & Son, Inc. · filed 2001-05-02

All of Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from the contractual relationship between common carriers and shippers of goods that were allegedly lost and/or damaged such that the Carmack Amendment applies. The matter therefore presents a federal question, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction when the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state-law breach of contract and negligence claims, converting them into federal claims.

Stephenson v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. · filed 2002-11-15

Further, the Court finds the preemptive force of the Carmack Amendment is so extraordinary that it converts plaintiffs state law claims of breach of contract and negligence into claims arising under federal law. Defendants therefore properly removed this case to federal court.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely pre-empted by an exclusive federal cause of action, including Carmack Amendment claims for loss or damage to goods in interstate carriage.

Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines · filed 2003-09-10

We are persuaded by the preceding decisions and analysis offered by the Supreme Court, and this Court, that Congress intended for the Carmack Amendment to provide the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier. Accordingly, we hold that the complete pre-emption doctrine applies.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims for lost or damaged goods when the Carmack Amendment completely preempts those claims.

Marks v. Suddath Relocation Systems, Inc. · filed 2004-05-19

Such claims are completely preempted and therefore involve a federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a claim to enforce a settlement of interstate shipment damage claims because the Carmack Amendment does not completely preempt that settlement claim.

Lexington Insurance v. Daybreak Express, Inc. · filed 2005-06-24

Because this is not a suit to recover for loss or damage to property against a carrier but rather one to enforce a settlement agreement, the case will be remanded to state court.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law freight damage claim when the complaint states a Carmack Amendment claim and that federal claim completely preempts the state-law claim.

M.I.S. Engineering v. U.S. Express Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2006-06-26

However, I must disagree with the district court’s holding in Lauder that the Carmack Amendment does not completely preempt state-law claims for purposes of federal removal jurisdiction. ... A Carmack Amendment claim is therefore stated, and any state-law causes of action that might be asserted by M.I.S. based on these same facts are completely preempted.

Section 1331 reaches a state-law contract claim for damage to goods in interstate shipping when the Carmack Amendment completely preempts it.

Steiner v. Horizon Moving Systems, Inc. · filed 2008-07-25

Plaintiffs contract claim therefore is completely preempted and presents a federal question.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when resolving them requires only reference to a collective bargaining agreement, rather than substantial interpretation of it.

May v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. · filed 2021-07-20

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not present an essential question of federal law. ... However, Defendant fails to show that substantial interpretation of the CBA is required. ... Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

Section 1331 requires a colorable claim arising under federal law; a wholly insubstantial or frivolous constitutional claim does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Said I. Hakki, M.D. v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2021-08-03

The requirement that a plaintiff raise a colorable constitutional claim is a part of our inquiry into whether the district court had federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide for service of process; a federal-question court therefore looks to the forum state’s long-arm statute and the Constitution for personal jurisdiction.

Growcentia, Inc. v. Jemie B.V. · filed 2021-08-10

And the Court sees no provision for service in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1367. Therefore, given that the federal statutes are silent as to service of process, the Court must analyze the application of personal jurisdiction under both Colorado’s long-arm statute and the Constitution. See id.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over state constitutional claims; those claims require supplemental jurisdiction.

Abdulkadir v. Peterson · filed 2020-07-16

Because a plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983, this court’s ability to entertain Abdulkadir’s due process and separation of powers challenges to the Nebraska statute based on provisions of the Nebraska Constitution cannot be predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (original jurisdiction),2 but instead must depend on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state constitutional claims merely because related federal constitutional claims could have been asserted.

Khandelwal v. King County · filed 2021-09-13

And a plaintiff’s assertion of state constitutional claims without federal constitutional claims does not automatically trigger federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a claim alleging only a violation of a state constitution.

Stitzel v. Veiga · filed 2004-05-25

Because he has not alleged a violation of the United States Constitution or a federal statute, Mr. Stitzel has failed to state a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor has he provided an alternative basis for federal ... jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, but not claims under a state victims’ rights act or state constitution.

TYLER v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY · filed 2021-03-30

However, Petitioners have premised the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter solely upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over only those claims in the Petition that “arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because neither the PaCVA nor the Pennsylvania Constitution, “arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” id., the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this claim.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim, but a related state constitutional claim falls under supplemental jurisdiction rather than § 1331.

Preston v. City of Pleasant Hill · filed 2011-06-21

The district court clearly had federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate Count I, a § 1983 claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... A plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983, so if Count II states a plausible claim, our jurisdiction is predicated on § 1367(a), not § 1331.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a claim based entirely on a state constitution because such a claim presents no federal question.

Bullock v. State of Minnesota · filed 1979-12-28

We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the district court properly dismissed the separation of powers claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs’ claim is based entirely upon the Minnesota constitution, and does not, therefore, present a federal question.

A state constitution does not become federal law for § 1331 purposes merely because Congress approved it as a condition of statehood.

Bruce Hanson and Irene C. Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound · filed 1982-07-02

Plaintiffs also argue that the question whether the Town is organized in violation of the Texas Constitution ... presents a federal question because the treaty by which Texas became part of the Union conditioned the state’s entry on the United States’ approval of its constitution. Thus, plaintiffs argue, the Texas Constitution is federal law. We decline the plaintiffs’ invitation to transform most state law into federal law.

Section 1331 requires a substantial, disputed federal question on the face of the complaint; a state constitutional free-speech claim does not arise under federal law merely because it parallels a federal claim or draws on federal precedent.

Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School District · filed 1995-02-15

Generally, under section 1331, a suit arises under federal law if there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of federal law. ... In short, regardless of its formative reliance on federal law, the Texas constitutional right to free speech is not essentially federal, and to present a Texas constitutional claim is not necessarily to present a federal claim.

Section 1331 does not give original federal question jurisdiction over a claim arising under a state constitution.

World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane · filed 2002-09-11

Plaintiffs Washington State Constitution claim does not fall within this court’s original federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331 and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3))... but instead falls within its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state constitutional claim merely because compliance with federal law conditions the state constitution’s enforceability; federal law must be an element of the claim or otherwise necessarily raised.

Common Cause v. Lewis · filed 2019-01-07

The premise of Legislative Defendants' argument is flawed, however, because federal law is not an "affirmative element" of plaintiffs' claim or a prima facie case under the North Carolina Constitution.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over claims arising under a state constitution or state tort law.

Jones v. Carter · filed 2019-07-30

This court’s ability to entertain Jones’ claims arising under the Nebraska Constitution and Nebraska tort law cannot be predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (original jurisdiction),3 but instead must depend on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).

Section 1331 does not confer federal question jurisdiction over state constitutional claims merely because their protections are coextensive with federal constitutional protections.

Vlaming v. West Point School Board · filed 2020-08-19

The relationship between the Virginia and U.S. Constitutions, therefore, does not support federal question jurisdiction in this case. Thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Vlaming’s claims under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that can rest solely on state constitutional rights and therefore does not necessarily raise a federal issue.

Grant v. Norwich Free Academy · filed 2020-05-21

On its face, Section 31-51q does not “necessarily” raise a federal issue; employers are liable under Section 31-51q for relation against employees for exercising rights guaranteed by either the United States Constitution or the Connecticut State Constitution.

Section 1331 supports jurisdiction over federal First Amendment claims but not a claim arising solely under a state constitution, and pendent jurisdiction is unavailable when the federal and state claims lack a common nucleus of operative fact.

Young v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1990-05-10

It seems clear that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' First Amendment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. However, the constitutionality under the New York State Constitution of a New York Penal Law provision presents no federal questions. Consequently, the district court's adjudication of this issue would only be permissible if the issue properly fell within the court's pendent jurisdiction. ... The fact that the TA's prohibition on begging is unconnected to the New York Penal Law deprives the claims of the requisite "common nucleus of operative fact" for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state constitutional claim that does not necessarily depend on resolving a substantial federal question.

Stephenson v. Bartlett · filed 2001-12-20

Upon close examination, plaintiffs’ complaint does not necessarily depend on the resolution of a substantial federal question.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over fraudulent assignment and transfer claims arising from a state foreclosure action when the claims do not arise under federal law.

Alexander v. Medley · filed 2022-04-12

Plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent assignment and transfer relate to a state foreclosure action and do not arise from a specific statutory grant, see PTA-FLA, Inc., 844 F.3d at 1305 (citation omitted), nor do they arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a workplace injury compensation claim governed by state workers’ compensation law when the plaintiff identifies no federal basis for jurisdiction.

MOHAMED v. BAGOLIE · filed 2023-05-03

Third, Plaintiff’s claims, which seek to recover additional compensation for injuries he sustained during a workplace accident and thus appear to be governed by the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, do not “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction to enforce a state public records law.

Morrison v. MTA New York City Transit · filed 2024-10-09

However, federal courts do not have independent jurisdiction to enforce state laws granting public access to official state records.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over claims based on a state constitution alone.

Johnson v. Rikers Island OBCC · filed 2025-11-04

Plaintiff’s claims based on the New York State Constitution do not arise under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide original jurisdiction over state constitutional claims.

Stamm v. Cnty. of Cheyenne · filed 2018-06-11

Thus, the court does not have original jurisdiction over these state constitutional claims under § 1331, but may only exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when an ambiguous complaint could allege a violation of either the federal or a state constitution.

Bezy v. Floyd County Plan Commission · filed 2001-03-08

From the face of the complaint we cannot determine whether Bezy alleges a violation under the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, or both. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule such ambiguity prevents federal jurisdiction over the initial complaint.

Section 1331 requires a federal question on the face of the complaint; ambiguous due-process allegations that may rest on state constitutional law do not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Rogers v. Von Nida · filed 2020-10-22

Because of this ambiguity, it does not appear that a question of federal law necessarily appears on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction based on a treaty that is no longer in force.

Houston v. Houston · filed 2021-09-21

A treaty no longer in force cannot be considered a "treat[y] of the United States" under § 1331's federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over private claims created and governed by federal law, including TCPA claims, unless Congress divests that jurisdiction.

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC · filed 2012-01-18

In the absence of direction from Congress stronger than any Arrow has advanced, we apply the familiar default rule: Federal courts have § 1331 jurisdiction over claims that arise under federal law. Because federal law gives rise to the claim for relief Mims has stated and specifies the substantive rules of decision, the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing Mims’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over private TCPA claims arising under federal law unless Congress expressly or by fair implication excludes federal-court adjudication.

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC · filed 2012-01-18

Accordingly, the District Court retains §1331 jurisdiction over Mims’s complaint unless the TCPA, expressly or by fair implication, excludes federal-court adjudication.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act actions despite the Act’s reference to state courts.

Targin Sign Systems, Inc. v. Preferred Chiropractic Center, Ltd. · filed 2010-01-21

This Court is of course bound by Brill... so it must perforce retain this action on its calendar, rather than remanding it to the Circuit Court (as would have been compelled in all of those other circuits because the removal would have been invalid for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

Section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over private TCPA claims because the TCPA does not exclude federal-question jurisdiction.

Ashland Hospital Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 575 · filed 2011-07-19

Federal district courts possess federal question jurisdiction over private causes of action arising under the TCPA.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims because Congress has not expressly made state jurisdiction exclusive.

Raitport v. Harbour Capital · filed 2010-03-04

Congress has not expressly stripped the federal courts of federal question jurisdiction over TCPA claims, and the statute’s reference to state jurisdiction over such claims is a reference to concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over private TCPA actions even though the TCPA also permits those actions in state court.

Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc. · filed 1995-11-08

Likewise, we will not assume that the language in the TCPA providing for a private right of action in state court was meant to repeal federal question jurisdiction which exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, we find that state court jurisdiction over actions under the TCPA is concurrent, not exclusive.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over private TCPA actions because the TCPA does not clearly make state-court jurisdiction exclusive.

Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc. · filed 1997-04-10

After carefully considering the International Science decision, we respectfully disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the TCPA and stand by our conclusion that, had Congress intended to supersede the federal question jurisdiction provided by § 1331 and instead provide for exclusive state court jurisdiction, it could and would have done so with clear language to that effect.

Section 1331 gives federal courts original jurisdiction over private TCPA suits, including suits removed from state court.

Escano v. Concord Auto Protect, Inc. · filed 2021-07-13

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over claims arising under the U.S. Constitution or federal law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Given the weight of authority from other districts, as well as this District’s routine exercise of jurisdiction over TCPA cases removed from state court and Justice Ginsberg’s footnote in Mims, the Court finds that Liberty Mutual has established by a preponderance of the evidence that removal of this case from state to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction was proper.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims because they arise under federal law and Congress has not expressly excluded federal jurisdiction.

Holster, III v. BNA Subsidiaries · filed 2010-03-09

A claim arising under federal law is a claim over which federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction, unless Congress has explicitly stripped that jurisdiction. Congress has not expressly stripped the federal courts of federal question jurisdiction over TCPA claims, and the statute’s reference to state jurisdiction over such claims is a reference to concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims even though the Act permits suit in state court.

Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC · filed 2010-12-30

Statutory permission to litigate a federal claim in state court does not expressly remove a district court’s federal-question (or for that matter diversity) jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims even though that Act expressly permits private suits in state court.

Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC · filed 2010-12-30

We need not resolve the point, however, because the district court had federal- question jurisdiction over the claims under the Telephone Act and pendent jurisdiction over the rest of the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; id. § 1367.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims in the Seventh Circuit.

Vigus v. Southern Illinois Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc. · filed 2011-03-11

Vigus invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held otherwise in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir.2005), and this Court is bound by that precedent.

Section 1331 gives federal courts federal-question jurisdiction over private claims arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

APB Associates, Inc. v. Bronco's Saloon, Inc. · filed 2011-06-07

The only issue presented in this case is whether a federal court has federal-question jurisdiction to hear an action arising under the TCPA. That question was squarely answered, after briefing was concluded, by another panel of this court in Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court had federal-question jurisdiction over the claims under the Telephone Act and pendent jurisdiction over the rest of the claims.”). It is well settled that a “panel of this [c]ourt cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this [c]ourt sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.” Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985). We therefore REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over private claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Charvat v. NMP, LLC · filed 2011-08-30

Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in concluding that federal courts lack federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims.

Section 1331 gives district courts federal-question jurisdiction over private claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Compressor Engineering Corp. v. Manufacturers Financial · filed 2011-11-15

Intervening precedent from this court compels the conclusion that there was federal-question jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims despite the Act’s permission to sue in state court.

Countrywide Home v. Brill, James · filed 2005-10-20

Likewise the proviso that actions may be filed in state court “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” implies that federal jurisdiction under §1331 or §1332 is available; otherwise where would victims go if a state elected not to entertain these suits?

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over private Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims even though the Act also permits those claims in state court.

James Brill, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Defendant-Petitioner · filed 2005-10-20

Likewise the proviso that actions may be filed in state court “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” implies that federal jurisdiction under § 1331 or § 1332 is available; otherwise where would victims go if a state elected not to entertain these suits?

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state antitrust and unfair business practice claims when the alleged conduct is not governed by federal law and the claims do not depend on resolving a federal question.

Team Design v. Reliant Energy, Inc. · filed 2004-11-18

A case presenting a federal question on the face of the well-pleaded complaint is within the federal court’s jurisdiction, and is therefore removable. ... Defendants’ core conduct in these claims is not governed by federal law. Rather, they are state law claims of anti-competitive and unfair business practices.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a complaint pleading only state-law antitrust claims merely because the plaintiff could have brought a federal antitrust claim or the defendant might raise federal defenses.

Delta Dental of Rhode Island v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island · filed 1996-09-26

Accordingly, removal of this case to federal court could only be based on the “arising under” federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In that light, the case seems to call for a straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule and its corollaries: Delta Dental, as the master of the claim, has chosen to rely exclusively on state law and to litigate in state court— a choice that Blue Cross cannot defeat, notwithstanding that the case could have been brought under the Sherman Act or that federal defenses might be available.

A request to interpret another court’s decree construing federal antitrust laws does not itself arise under federal law when the plaintiff seeks no federal statutory remedy and its claim does not require determining those laws’ validity, construction, or effect.

Standard Riverside Co. v. Loew's, Inc. · filed 1952-07-18

It seems clear also that this is not an action arising under any law of the United States, nor is the Constitution or a treaty here involved. Plaintiff does not seek the remedies provided in the Sherman or Clayton Acts, nor does the cause which it asserts require a determination of the validity, construction or effect of such laws.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction when a complaint sufficiently pleads a Sherman Act claim, even without expressly citing that Act.

Native American Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco, Co. · filed 2007-06-05

Accepting these allegations as true, and in the absence of any argument by Defendants to the contrary, the Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to plead a cause of action under Sections 1 and 13a of the Sherman Act. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint presents a federal question, such that the Court has an ... independent basis for jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

When § 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a federal antitrust action, a court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim lacking an independent federal jurisdictional basis.

Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, INC. · filed 1962-11-06

Since this case arises under the anti-trust laws of the United States, Sections 1, 2, 15 and 26 of Title 15 U.S.C.A., this Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may, therefore, exercise its ancillary jurisdiction over defendant’s counter-claim, which plaintiffs have conceded to be compulsory (R.T. 260-1), even though that counter-claim alleges no independent grounds of federal jurisdiction.

A specific federal jurisdictional statute governing an antitrust claim controls over Section 1331's general federal-question grant even when Section 1331's requirements could also be satisfied.

Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1970-04-07

The total pattern of federal jurisdictional statutes indicates that this particular provision (15 U.S.C. § 15), rather than the more general jurisdictional grants of title 28, controls actions based upon the antitrust laws. ... This is true even as to cases where diversity or a federal question, coupled with a claim in excess of $10,000 in damages, exists in satisfaction of the more general jurisdictional requirements. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is determined from the federal allegations in the complaint rather than the evidence or ultimate merits, so pleaded federal antitrust violations confer jurisdiction unless they are jurisdictionally insubstantial or frivolous.

Truck Treads, Inc. v. Armstrong Rubber Co. · filed 1988-06-08

Jurisdiction in this case was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is determined by reviewing the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, and not by reviewing the evidence underlying or the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. ... Plaintiffs’ pleadings undeniably allege Robinson-Pat-man Act violations, and therefore conferred subject matter jurisdiction on this Court.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a nonfrivolous claim that a contractual restraint violates the Sherman Act, even when the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief concerning the contract.

John X. Wegmann, III v. London · filed 1981-06-26

We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs stated a claim cognizable under the Sherman Act and hence 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a federal antitrust action does not reach a settlement issue governed solely by state law that was not part of the original action.

Levinson v. Maison Grande, Inc. · filed 1982-12-23

The issue adjudicated in the present case involved an alleged violation of federal antitrust law. Jurisdiction was conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337. One of the issues which the parties now want this Court to consider, the legali...ty and reasonableness of the sale of the recreation lease, is governed solely by state law; this issue was and is not part of the subject matter of the original action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state antitrust claim merely because state law directs courts to construe it in harmony with federal antitrust law; the claim must necessarily turn on federal law.

Hunneman Real Estate Corp. v. Eastern Middlesex Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. · filed 1994-07-21

With the Supreme Court’s caveats in the Merrell Dow case in mind, the Court concludes that the above language in the Massachusetts Antitrust Act does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts. The plaintiffs’ cause of action under state law does not “necessarily turn on” a construction of federal law.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state antitrust claims solely because resolving them requires applying federal antitrust statutes.

In Re Potash Antitrust Litigation · filed 1994-08-22

The Coleman plaintiffs contend that this action comes within this Court's "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; that is, it "arises under" the law of the United States because "resolution of the claims [in this litigation] requires the application of the federal antitrust statutes." ( Coleman Mem., at 2, 10-11.) This argument is unpersuasive.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over state-law antitrust claims merely because resolving them requires applying federal antitrust statutes.

Neve Bros. v. Potash Corp. · filed 1994-08-22

The Coleman plaintiffs contend that this action comes within this Court’s "federal question” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; that is, it "arises under” the law of the United States because "resolution of the claims [in this litigation] requires the application of the federal antitrust statutes.” ... This argument is unpersuasive.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over pleaded state antitrust claims merely because the state statutes are patterned on federal antitrust laws, absent complete preemption.

Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2001-01-03

The Tobacco defendants do not allege that the Mississippi antitrust statutes are completely preempted by federal law and this court is unaware of any such authority holding that position. Accordingly, this court concludes that federal subject matter jurisdiction does not here exist for any of the claims as they are presently pleaded.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law antitrust claims that can be resolved independently of federal law and raise no substantial federal issue despite references to federal antitrust violations.

St. Mary's Regional Medical Center v. Renown Health · filed 2014-08-01

Because Plaintiffs need not establish a Clayton Act violation to claim that Renown violated the UTPA, this state-law claim is not within the “special and small category” of cases in which federal issues are embedded in state-law claims. ... Even if the parties dispute whether Renown violated the Clayton Act, the allegation is merely an insubstantial element of a state-law claim, the “mere presence” of which does not confer federal question jurisdiction on this action.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state antitrust claims merely because federal antitrust law may provide a defense; removal based on preemption requires complete preemption.

Hudgins Moving & Storage Co. v. American Express Co. · filed 2003-11-19

The plaintiffs own statement of his or her action must show that it is based on or arises under federal law. ... Antitrust is not one of the limited areas in which the Supreme Court has recognized complete preemption of state law by federal statute.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state antitrust and unfair competition claims when those claims do not require resolving a substantial federal question.

In Re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Anti. · filed 2004-11-18

Defendants' core conduct in these claims is not governed by federal law. Rather, they are state law claims of anti-competitive and unfair business practices.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over state antitrust claims involving patent issues when the findings would not affect patent validity, bind future courts, or affect the administration of federal patent law.

Time Insurance v. AB · filed 2014-10-01

If the necessity of litigating the validity of the patents were the sole issue in deciding remand, the issue could be considered a close one. But Plaintiffs further argue that any finding as to the validity of the patents would not have a substantial impact on federal law, or at least not substantial enough to support federal question jurisdiction. I agree. ... A jury’s factual findings on causation in this case will not invalidate the consent judgments in effect in'the District of New Jersey; it will not invalidate the patents; it will not serve as binding precedent; and it will not affect the administration of federal patent law.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction through artful pleading when a state antitrust claim has enough potential merit under state law, even if similar federal claims face a federal defense.

In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation. Appeals of Robert A. Huggins · filed 1997-10-08

But insofar as it challenges sales from other states to pharmacies in Alabama, it is within the intended and permissible scope of the statute, and, since there may well be a nontrivial number of such sales, the suit has enough potential merit as an Alabama antitrust suit to defeat the application of the “artful pleading” doctrine.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction for a reverse Freedom of Information Act suit seeking to prevent the government from disclosing information to third parties.

Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. United States · filed 1985-06-26

The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This section has been held to provide a jurisdictional basis for a reverse Freedom of Information suit such as this, in which a company having supplied information to the government seeks to prevent disclosure of that information to third parties.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction for a reverse-FOIA action challenging a federal agency’s disclosure as unauthorized by federal law, whether the action arises under FOIA itself or more broadly under federal law.

Planning Research Corporation v. Federal Power Commission · filed 1977-03-10

We hold that appellant properly invoked the District Court’s federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. ... We believe that, under the present circumstances, federal question jurisdiction may be sustained whether the action is viewed as “arising under” FOIA itself or whether it is conceived more broadly as the assertion of a private party’s right “to be free from agency action which adversely affects him and is not authorized by federal law.”

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA action seeking to prevent disclosure of a Medicare cost report as confidential commercial information.

Westchester General Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health Education & Welfare · filed 1977-06-27

Plaintiff contends that the 1975 Medicare Cost Report which it submitted to Blue Cross is exempted from required disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), ... and that disclosure of the report would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1905. ... The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331(a) supplies subject-matter jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA suit by a business seeking to prevent a federal agency from disclosing submitted commercial information.

Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger · filed 1977-09-26(a)

The district court’s opinion correctly holds that there is subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). ... This case is one of a burgeoning number growing out of the conflict between the demands of federal regulatory agencies ... for the submission by private businesses of detailed financial, commercial and employee information, which would not voluntarily be disclosed to competitors, and the public access to most information in federal agency files which is mandated by the FOIA. It is, however, the first occasion which requires this Court to consider a reverse FOIA case, in which a corporate plaintiff (the submitter) seeks to enjoin an agency from disclosing submitter-generated business information.

Section 1331(a) supplies subject-matter jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA action by a business seeking to prevent federal agencies from disclosing submitted commercial information.

Chrysler Corporation v. Schlesinger · filed 1977-10-18(a)

The district court’s opinion correctly holds that there is subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction for a reverse-FOIA action seeking to prevent federal officials from disclosing information allegedly protected by federal law.

WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP., ETC. v. Brown · filed 1977-12-30(a)

Both such grounds would rest on a federal statute and qualify under § 1331. ... The principle is plainly applicable in actions such as these under review and affords federal subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1331(a).

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA action against the United States or its officers or agencies without an amount-in-controversy requirement.

United Technologies Corp. v. Marshall · filed 1979-02-08

Since a reverse FOIA case involves the interpretation of a federal statute, and because the federal question statute has been amended to eliminate the minimum jurisdictional amount requirement when the defendant is the United States or one of its officers or agencies, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 together with APA Section 706 provides jurisdiction to review agency action in a reverse-FOIA case even though FOIA itself does not provide jurisdiction.

Artesian Industries, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1986-10-28

Review nonetheless may be grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).

Section 1331(a) confers jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA action, while APA Section 702 supplies the cause of action.

Cna Financial Corporation v. Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor · filed 1987-09-29(a)

“Reverse-FOIA” actions are now a common species of FOIA litigation. Jurisdiction over these cases is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982), while § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), supplies the cause of action.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state whistleblower and constructive-discharge claims that require only a reasonable belief that federal aviation law was violated, rather than a determination that it was violated.

Robinson v. Airbahn Inc · filed 2021-10-01

Plaintiffs’ claims and prayer for relief do not present an essential question of federal law. ... Nothing in Plaintiffs’ cases-in-chief necessitates the examination of whether federal aviation law was violated; instead, it only requires that Plaintiffs’ reasonably believed that such a violation existed.