28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law expropriation claim merely because federal aviation standards motivate the taking or federal funds support it, when the claim does not necessarily depend on resolving federal law.

City of New Orleans Ex Rel. New Orleans Aviation Board v. a Portion of Square 205 · filed 1994-09-12

While the FAA’s safety standards for the RPZ may be the impetus for the expropriation, and the funding grant may obligate NOAB to acquire the RPZ properties, NOAB’s claim for expropriation does not necessarily depend on resolution of any federal law.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a state-law claim involving federal aviation standards when no private federal cause of action to enforce those standards has been shown.

Casey v. Goulian · filed 2003-07-21

Even if FAA statutory or regulatory standards did provide a required element of plaintiffs’ state-law claims, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the FAA provides a private cause of action to enforce these standards. Under the weight of the caselaw, federal jurisdiction is not available absent such a showing.

Section 1331 does not give federal-question jurisdiction over a state negligence claim merely because it uses federal aviation regulations as a standard of care when hearing such claims would upset the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

West v. a & S HELICOPTERS · filed 2010-11-15

Because entertaining this suit in a federal forum based on federal question jurisdiction would disturb the “balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ negligence action against MD Helicopters.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state aviation-safety claims merely because they require applying federal aviation regulations, where the federal issue is not substantial and jurisdiction would conflict with Congress’ intended division of cases between state and federal courts.

O.S. Ex Rel. Sakar v. Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. · filed 2008-09-05

Because federal jurisdiction in the present case would not be “consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts”, the Court holds that there is no “federal question” jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law tort claim merely because federal aviation rules may supply the standard of care when the claim turns on applying those rules to case-specific facts rather than resolving a substantial disputed question of federal law.

Gonzales v. Ever-Ready Oil, Inc. · filed 2008-06-17

Even if federal law exclusively defines the standard of care to be applied in this suit, resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims will turn on the application of that law to fact. The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Bennett that in these circumstances, the federal issues are not substantial and disputed.

Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim if a federal statute completely pre-empts it; neither the Railway Labor Act nor the Aviation Act completely pre-empted this workers’ compensation retaliation claim.

Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-09-22

If either of these statutes completely pre-empt an article 8307c claim, federal question jurisdiction exists, and removal of this case was proper. However, if neither of these statutes completely pre-empt Anderson's article 8307c claim, no federal question jurisdiction exists, and removal of this case was improper. ... Since we have found that neither the RLA nor the Aviation Act completely pre-empts Anderson's state law article 8307c claim, Anderson's claim does not arise under federal law. Therefore, removal of this case was improper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because resolving them may require interpreting federal aviation statutes or regulations that provide no private right of action.

Fournier v. Lufthansa German Airlines · filed 2002-02-12

Thus, although a court may have to consider and interpret the Deregulation Act, the Federal Aviation Act or certain FAA regulations to resolve Dr. Fournier’s state claims, the federal questions involved are not “substantial” in the sense that they confer federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims merely because federal standards may be relevant to them.

A.B.O. Comix v. County of San Mateo · filed 2023-07-20

Even if the Turner standard is relevant to the state law claims, it does not support federal question jurisdiction or the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state tort claims based on FRSA regulations when the FRSA creates no private cause of action and the regulatory issue is not a substantial federal question.

Mead v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-03-24

Merrell Dow controls because the only federal issues here are violations of the FRSA regulations as an element of a “garden variety” state tort claim and the FRSA does not create a private cause of action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a state-law claim incorporates a federal standard when Congress provided no private right of action under the federal statute.

Matthews v. Guest Services, Inc. · filed 2025-07-29

The mere incorporation by state law of a federal standard for determining the existence of state liability does not create federal-question jurisdiction for removal when Congress declined to create a statutory private right of action based upon the violation of that federal standard. ... Thus, the court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law foreclosure claim merely because the petition cites federal servicing standards as defenses.

Gerard · filed 2026-05-18

A plain reading of the petition shows that it asserts no federal cause of action.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a state-law claim involving an airline’s failure to collect payment when that activity is not governed by the Warsaw Convention.

Professional Computer Consultants, Inc. v. Porter International, Inc. · filed 1988-04-08

There is nothing in the Warsaw Convention to suggest and neither party has cited any case which suggests, that the collection of money by an airline acting as an agent of another is an activity coming within the Warsaw Convention’s Article 18. ... There being no federal question jurisdiction, the Court concludes that this action was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law injury claims arising from ground transportation in an airline vacation package when the airline has not shown that federal law preempts those claims.

Chouest v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-11-30

But I do not believe that Congress intended to exempt from the application of state laws any “transportation” services American wishes to provide, including, e.g., tour bus services or car rental services. Therefore, I conclude that defendant has not carried its burden of showing preemption so as to provide the court with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over state-law claims made federal in character by complete preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act.

Chiodi v. Southwest Airlines · filed 1995-09-11

Thus, in this case, the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim when federal law completely displaces that claim, but ordinary conflict preemption supplies only a defense; the Federal Aviation Act did not completely displace the airspace trespass claim.

Vorhees Ex Rel. Last Will & Testament of Brach v. Naper Aero Club, Inc. · filed 2001-11-09

Only “complete” preemption affects federal subject matter jurisdiction. “Conflict” preemption relates to the merits of a claim. ... As such, according to the well-pleaded complaint rule, it does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction. ... In light of these principles, we hold that the district court should have remanded this case to state court for want of jurisdiction.

Section 1331 permits arising-under jurisdiction over state law claims only when complete preemption makes them federal claims; the Airline Deregulation Act does not completely preempt such claims.

Denzik v. Regional Airport Authority of Louisville & Jefferson County · filed 2005-03-22

The well-pleaded, complaint rule has long governed whether an action arises under federal law for the purposes of § 1331. ... This Court cannot recharacterize Plaintiffs state law claims as arising under federal law. Thus, removal is improper.

Section 1331 does not permit removal based on complete preemption when federal aviation laws provide no private right of action that displaces the plaintiff’s state tort claims.

Chau v. Air Cargo Carriers, LLC · filed 2019-11-14

Thus, because neither PRIA nor the FAA provide private rights of action that displace the state law claims asserted in this action, removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is improper and Defendants’ complete preemption theories must fail.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption clause, because the Act does not completely preempt those claims.

IRABOR v. Lufthansa Airlines · filed 2019-12-05

Based on the Supreme Court’s dicta in Wolens, decisions by three federal courts of appeals, and First Circuit law, this Court concludes that the ADA does not completely preempt state-law claims. Accordingly, the statute does not provide a basis for removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law aviation injury claims merely because federal aviation law supplies their standard of care; those claims are not completely preempted.

Burgess v. Novictor Aviation LLC · filed 2021-08-10

Thus, in Barnett, as here, the question before the court was whether the FAA and FARs completely preempt state law personal injury claims for the purpose of federal question jurisdiction. ... The same rule applies here: to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the field of aviation safety, federal law must supply the applicable standard of care. But Plaintiffs will still be able to pursue their case in state court and rely on state law for the other elements of these claims.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a state workers’ compensation retaliation claim when neither the Railway Labor Act nor the Aviation Act completely preempts it.

Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-11-03

Since we have found that neither the RLA nor the Aviation Act completely preempts Anderson’s state law- article 8307c claim, Anderson’s claim does not arise under federal law. Therefore, removal of this case was improper, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over an ERISA-based dispute when the employment agreement at issue is not an ERISA plan.

Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad v. Schieffer · filed 2010-06-16

Because ERISA does not govern the Employment Agreement, this Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction cannot rest on ERISA complete preemption when the employee benefit plan is a governmental plan exempt from ERISA.

No. 88-2594 · filed 1989-08-29

Nevertheless, in light of the above analysis and what Congress actually said in ERISA, we conclude that the plan in question was a governmental plan and thus exempt. ... Unless another basis for federal jurisdiction can be asserted, the district court shall remand the case to state court.

Section 1331 removal jurisdiction cannot rest on ERISA complete preemption when the employee benefit plan is a governmental plan exempt from ERISA.

Silvera v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York · filed 1989-08-29

Nevertheless, in light of the above analysis and what Congress actually said in ERISA, we conclude that the plan in question was a governmental plan and thus exempt. ... Unless another basis for federal jurisdiction can be asserted, the district court shall remand the case to state court.

State-law claims seeking benefits under an ERISA plan arise under Section 1331 and are removable when they fall within ERISA Section 502(a) and Congress clearly manifested complete preemption.

Meyer v. Employers Health Insurance · filed 1989-09-21

Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, “arise[s] under the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). ... The claims asserted by plaintiff Meyer fall under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) because she is a beneficiary of an employee benefit plan who is attempting to recover benefits she claims are due to her under the plan.

Section 1331 does not support removal when the complaint presents no direct federal claim and the asserted ERISA preemption defense fails.

Cuoco v. Nynex, Inc. · filed 1989-09-28

From the face of the complaint it is apparent, and no party disputes, that there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330. It is also apparent that there is no direct claim under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and consequently no obvious federal question that would give this court jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The only justification for the defendants’ petition for removal was their assertion that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by ERISA. Since there is no preemption there is no original jurisdiction in this court and hence no justification for removal.

A state-law claim arises under Section 1331 and is removable when Congress completely preempts the claim and makes it cognizable under ERISA’s civil-enforcement provisions.

Lister v. Stark · filed 1989-11-28

Federal question jurisdiction requires that the case arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Lister’s claims are thus cognizable under ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions and are therefore completely preempted. Since this complete preemption confers the necessary original federal jurisdiction, removal of Lister’s claims to federal court was proper.

A suit seeking benefits within ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) arises under Section 1331 and is removable even when the complaint pleads only state-law claims.

Peter Ramirez, Jr., Cross-Appellee v. Inter-Continental Hotels, D/B/A St. Anthony Hotel, and the Travelers Insurance Com · filed 1989-12-18

... though it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, “arise[s] under the laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). ... Hence, we conclude that removal was properly granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), and, like the district court, we find it unnecessary to determine whether diversity of citizenship provides an alternate basis of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1331 supports removal of state-law third-party-beneficiary claims within ERISA's civil-enforcement provision because complete preemption makes those claims exclusive federal questions.

Albert Einstein Medical Center v. National Benefit Fund for Hospital & Health Care Employees · filed 1989-12-19

Thus, plaintiffs’ preempted third-party beneficiary claims in the present case are claims that “arise under the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 1331, and are removable to federal court by the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

A state-law subrogation claim seeking benefits from an ERISA plan is completely preempted, arises under Section 1331, and is removable just like the plan participant’s own benefits claim.

Allstate Insurance v. Detroit Millmen's Health & Welfare Fund · filed 1990-01-24

Accordingly, this suit, although it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, “arise[s] under the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 USC § 1331 [28 U.S.C.S. § 1331], and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 USC § 1441(b) [28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(b)].... ... The fact that plaintiff in the case at bar seeks to collect these benefits by way of a subrogation action is immaterial. ... Consequently, plaintiff’s jurisdictional challenge must be rejected.

Section 1331 removal based on ERISA complete preemption fails when the employer’s vacation arrangement is not an ERISA plan, leaving the employee’s state-law benefit claims unpreempted.

Czechowski v. Tandy Corp. · filed 1990-02-14

If it is such a plan, ERISA would preempt any state law relating to the VEBA trust, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), and the action was removable on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. ... The VEBA trust, therefore, is not a plan covered by ERISA. ... For the reasons stated, the action is remanded to the California Superior Court in and for the City and County of San Francisco.

Section 1331 does not support ERISA-preemption removal of a health-care provider’s independent state contract claim when the provider lacks Section 502 standing and the claim does not fall within ERISA’s civil-enforcement provision.

Lifetime Medical Nursing Services, Inc. v. New England Health Care Employees Welfare Fund · filed 1990-02-23

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the laws, treaties, or Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... This Court agrees with the majority view that courts should construe the civil enforcement provision narrowly and only apply the preemptive powers of ERISA when a designated party brings suit. ... Since Lifetime Med’s contract claim neither falls within the civil enforcement provision nor “relates to” the ERISA benefit plan, plaintiff’s contract claim must be remanded to state court.

ERISA complete preemption does not create Section 1331 removal jurisdiction over claims by a nonparticipant or nonbeneficiary merely because damages may be measured using an employee-benefit plan's formula.

Klank v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1990-02-26

But the operative concept in the two cases is identical: the distinction between (1) claiming as an actual beneficiary or participant under an employee benefit plan and (2) claiming as a ... non ... beneficiary or non participant whose damages might be measured by the plan’s formula. No philosopher’s stone transmutes Klank’s state law claims into federal question claims for removal purposes.

Section 1331 does not support removal of a complaint pleading only state-law claims when the defendant concedes that the complaint states no ERISA claim and complete preemption does not apply.

Davis v. American General Group Insurance · filed 1990-03-22

“The Complaint fails to state a claim under ERISA.” This constitutes a concession of a lack of “federal question” jurisdiction. This court AGREES with American General, perhaps judicially estopping it from retreating from an assertion which may or may not have been an inadvertence. ... This well describes the complaint of Marty Davis and Pamela Ann Davis. Of course, the Third Circuit fully recognized the exception for cases in which there is “complete preemption,” an esoteric concept which the Third Circuit found not applicable in ... Allstate, ... and which is not applicable here, in that state courts most assuredly have concurrent jurisdiction under ERISA.

State-law claims that fall within ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions are completely preempted, necessarily federal in character, and removable under Section 1331 even when the complaint does not expressly plead ERISA.

Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc. · filed 1990-06-06

However, an exception to this general rule applies where, as here, the plaintiff’s claims are preempted by ERISA and fall within that statute’s civil enforcement provisions. ... This is so even where the complaint does not state an ERISA claim on its face. ... Because ERISA claims are “necessarily federal in character,” ... removal of the case from state to federal court was properly granted, and the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.

Ordinary ERISA preemption is only a defense and does not create Section 1331 removal jurisdiction; complete preemption supports removal only when the state claim falls within ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions.

McDonough v. Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania · filed 1990-06-06

In other words, simply because a state law claim is subject to a preemption defense does not somehow convert the state law claim into a federal question within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... In this case, because the first circumstance is not present, we conclude removal was improper.

A request to amend a divorce decree does not arise under federal law, but joining an ERISA plan administrator and seeking payment of plan benefits creates Section 1331 original jurisdiction over that benefits claim.

Samaroo v. Samaroo · filed 1990-07-17

Were this the only relief Robichaud sought, the Court would have little trouble concluding that the state action did not “arise under” federal law. Amendment of the Final Judgment of Divorce to reflect Robichaud’s right to survivor’s benefits is not a remedy expressly granted by federal law, nor would it require the interpretation of a federal statute or application of a distinctive federal policy. ... The Court therefore concludes that Robichaud’s joinder of AT & T-MPP transforms the state action, at least in part, into an action by an alleged beneficiary “to recover benefits due ... under the terms of [a] plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and as such is an action over which this Court has original jurisdiction.

A state-law insurance subrogation claim arises under Section 1331 and is removable when ERISA completely preempts it, it falls within ERISA Section 502(a), and the insurer has standing as the plan participant’s subrogee.

Allstate Insurance v. Operating Engineers Local 324 Health Care Plan · filed 1990-08-03

Arising “under the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court concluded that these suits were removable. ... As a subrogee of an ERISA participant, i.e., plaintiff’s insured, the insurer in this Court’s opinion has standing to sue under section 502(a). ... Removal was proper.

Section 1331 supports removal when ERISA completely preempts a nominal state-law employment-discrimination claim because the claim depends on whether an employee was forced into irrevocable early retirement with reduced pension benefits.

Van Camp v. AT & T Information Systems · filed 1991-03-19

Clearly, the amended complaint alleges wrongful acts by ... that involve not only violations of Elliott-Larsen, but a violation of ERISA as well, because it states that Van Camp was forced to accept early retirement at a lower level of benefits, a decision which, according to the terms of the pension plan, is irrevocable. ... The motion to remand is DENIED.

A state-law claim for benefits under an ERISA plan is necessarily federal, arises under § 1331, and is removable when Congress has clearly manifested complete preemption of that claim.

Beaumont Neurological Hospital v. Humana, Inc. · filed 1991-07-26

It is clear from Humana’s complaint that this is a lawsuit within § 1132(a)(1)(B). ... It, therefore “arises under the laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable to federal court by the defendant]] ], 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction over a claim for breach of an employee benefits package that ERISA preempts, even when the complaint does not plead ERISA.

Howard v. Indiana Michigan Power Co. · filed 1992-04-24

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Plaintiffs complaint in Count II alleges breach of contract in failing to maintain an employee benefits package. Such a claim is preempted by ERISA even where ERISA is not plead in the complaint.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims involving an ERISA plan when ERISA supplies no cause of action against the defendants for the alleged wrongs.

Zandi-Dulabi v. Pacific Retirement Plans Inc. · filed 1993-06-24

Federal question jurisdiction requires that the case “arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Because Defendants have failed to show that ERISA provides an alternative cause of action under which Defendants are amenable to suit, they have failed to sustain their burden of proof on the second prong of the removal test. Thus, the case is properly remanded to state court.

Section 1331 can provide jurisdiction over a claim under ERISA only if the benefit plan is governed by ERISA.

UIU Severance Pay Trust Fund v. Local Union No. 18-U · filed 1993-07-09

Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, therefore, if at all, under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or under ERISA itself. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). In either case, the existence of an "ERISA-governed plan" is an essential precursor to federal jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim subject to ERISA only when the claim falls within ERISA § 502(a); an ERISA preemption defense alone does not suffice.

Gavin North Sherwood Chiropractic Clinic, A.P.C. v. Brower · filed 1993-10-12

Thus, the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs’ cause of action falls within the purview of section 502(a) of ERISA. If so, the Court must treat the plaintiffs’ state law claims as arising under the laws of the United States for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If section 502(a) does not apply, there is no preemption and the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... Thus, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the facts of this case.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA, even when the complaint does not invoke federal law.

Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO · filed 1994-03-02

In the case now before this Court, Plaintiff asserts a number of state law claims to which the Defendants respond with a defense of ERISA preemption. Following the mandate of the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit, removal of this ease from state to federal court was properly granted. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs motion to remand must be denied as to the claims that are preempted by ERISA.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims by plaintiffs outside ERISA's civil enforcement provision because those claims are not completely preempted.

Harris v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company · filed 1994-06-07

We similarly hold that the Harrises' remaining state law claims do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. ... Accordingly, because the Harrises are not plan participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries, their remaining state claims are not within the scope of Sec. 1132(a) and therefore not completely preempted.

Section 1331 supports federal jurisdiction over state law claims that are completely preempted by ERISA and fall within its civil enforcement provision.

Tabron v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1995-03-20

The rule provides that federal question jurisdiction exists only when the federal question appears on the face of plaintiffs complaint. ... The requirement for removal is only that the state law claims fall within ERISA’s civil enforcement provision. ... In this case, therefore, ERISA clearly provides a civil action for the claims which plaintiff asserts. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs motion to remand will be denied.

Section 1331's federal-question jurisdiction does not reach state-law employment claims that fall outside ERISA's civil enforcement provision, even when the requested damages include the value of lost benefits.

Sears v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1995-04-28

Federal courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Moreover, Plaintiffs claim for the value of lost benefits should not be construed, as Defendants argue, as a request for clarification of her rights to future benefits. ... In conclusion, because Plaintiff is not a plan participant and does not seek clarification of the terms of any employee benefit plan, the Court finds that Plaintiffs state law claims do not fall within the scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, and, therefore, should not have been removed to federal court.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over a state-law claim when ERISA preempts the state law and the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Romney v. Lin · filed 1996-08-27

Although “[i]t is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law,” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 68, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), a state-law cause of action arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, if (1) the cause of action is based on a state law that is preempted by ERISA, and (2) the cause of action is “within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions” of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a participant’s claim to adjudicate an ERISA plan’s reimbursement lien when resolving the claim requires construing the plan.

Speciale v. Seybold · filed 1996-12-19

Unlike the facts of Scholtens, jurisdiction exists in this case because adjudication of Wal-Mart’s subrogation lien “require[s] construing [the ERISA plan].”

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim completely preempted by ERISA when the claim falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Romney v. Lin · filed 1997-01-16

Such a situation plainly constitutes complete “conflict preemption” conferring federal jurisdiction under ERISA.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when a state-law suit alleging an ERISA violation falls within ERISA § 502(a), even if the defendant is not liable under ERISA.

Romney v. Lin · filed 1997-01-16

We think a suit that alleges an ERISA violation can be within the scope of ERISA, even though it is directed against a defendant not liable under ERISA, and that Romney's suit is within the scope of § 502(a).

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a removed suit merely because its claims relate to an ERISA plan when jurisdiction would neither further ERISA’s goals nor fill a gap in its jurisdictional provisions.

Central Laborers Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1998-11-30

Moreover, the present case is not one in which invoking § 1331 jurisdiction to bring the case within ERISA’s grasp would further ERISA’s overall goals and functions or be consistent with its administration. Premising federal jurisdiction over this case through § 1331 would not fill a gap left by Congress; nor would it be consistent with the Congressional rationale for giving federal courts jurisdiction over all ERISA-related matters. Accordingly, the Court finds that it does not have federal question jurisdiction over this case under either § 502(a) of ERISA or 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that is preempted by ERISA and falls within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.

Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare · filed 2001-09-28

Therefore, Defendants have shown that a federal question exists in this action, and accordingly, this case has been properly removed.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims through ERISA complete preemption only when the claims fall within ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.

Fillmore v. Brush Wellman, Inc. · filed 2003-02-05

As the Court has determined that the instant claims are not properly characterized as § 1132 claims, the action is not subject to complete preemption and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Federal-question jurisdiction does not arise from speculative ERISA preemption when state-law claims exclude ERISA beneficiaries and a motion for class notice does not yet implicate ERISA.

Jewel v. UnumProvident Corp. · filed 2005-01-06

It may well be the case that the various hypothetical materialize in such a way that ERISA is indeed implicated, but at this stage of the proceedings plaintiffs’ motion is not sufficient to trigger ERISA preemption. Accordingly, this Court does not have federal-question jurisdiction over this case, and removal is not proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a removed state-law claim based on ERISA complete preemption when the claim does not seek relief available under ERISA § 502(a).

James P. Cotton, Jr. v. Massachusetts Mutual Life · filed 2005-03-16

Our determination that Mass Mutual is not a fiduciary for any purpose implicated by the amended complaint is reinforced by our additional conclusion that the plaintiffs’ original state-law claims were not completely preempted; thus, removal was improper, as federal question jurisdiction was lacking, and the plaintiffs’ motion to remand should have been granted at the outset.

Section 1331 jurisdiction based on ERISA complete preemption cannot rest solely on an unsupported assertion that an insurance policy is an ERISA plan.

Stanley v. Life Ins. Co. of North America · filed 2006-03-31

The availability of ERISA’s preemption as a basis of federal question jurisdiction cannot be triggered by calling a particular insurance policy an ERISA plan and alleging that Plaintiffs claim relates to it.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state law claims against an independent insurance agent when ERISA does not completely preempt those claims.

Gulf Coast Plastic Surgery, Inc. v. Standard Insurance · filed 2008-06-03

Because plaintiffs’ claims against Hillyer do not implicate ERISA they do not raise a federal question. Therefore, the Court has no basis to exercise jurisdiction over this case and must remand it to state court.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law benefits claim merely because it relates to an ERISA plan; the claim must seek relief available under the plan.

Evans v. Infirmary Health Services, Inc. · filed 2009-06-12

In other words, federal question jurisdiction does not attach here unless Evans seeks to recover benefits due under the terms of the Policy, to enforce rights under the terms of the Policy, or to clarify future benefits under the terms of the Policy.

Section 1331 gives a federal court jurisdiction over a state-law ERISA benefits claim when ERISA completely preempts the claim; defensive preemption alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Davis v. Reliastar Life Insurance · filed 2009-10-19

In ERISA cases, where there is no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts only have subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims that have been “superpreempted” or completely preempted, but not necessarily those that are “defensively preempted.”

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law insurance claim when ERISA § 502(a) completely preempts it; an ordinary ERISA preemption defense does not suffice.

Agullard v. Principal Life Insurance · filed 2010-01-13

In this case, the Complaint asserts only breach of contract and bad faith insurance practices, two state-law claims that provide no basis for federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, unless Plaintiffs claims are completely preempted under section 502(a) of ERISA, there is no federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over a provider’s state-law rate-of-payment contract claim when the removing party fails to show that the claim challenges an ERISA coverage denial.

Miami Beach Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Center v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. · filed 2013-05-30

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction exists when a plaintiffs cause of action “arises under” federal law. ... Because there is no affidavit, declaration, or other record evidence identifying claims at issue in the case which were denied by Blue Cross, the Court finds that Miami Beach Cosmetic is asserting a “rate of payment” claim under its verbal contracts with Blue Cross, rather than a- “right to payment” claim under the terms of an ERISA beneficiary’s plan. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing that Plaintiffs state law claim is completely preempted by ERISA and has thus failed to show that this Court has jurisdiction over this action.

Section 1331 confers federal-question jurisdiction when at least one state-law claim is completely preempted by ERISA.

Grimmett v. Dace · filed 2014-07-28

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court is satisfied that at least one of Grimmett’s claims against the Defendants is completely preempted by ERISA, and therefore this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on duties independent of an ERISA plan when those claims are not completely preempted by ERISA.

John Muir Health v. Cement Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund · filed 2014-09-24

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff John Muir Health’s claims are not completely preempted by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). Because Plaintiffs claims are not completely preempted, the Court lacks federal jurisdiction over this matter and it is rightfully remanded to state court for further adjudication.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA when the plaintiff could bring them under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision and no independent legal duty supports them.

Gables Insurance Recovery, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. · filed 2015-01-06

As such, both prongs of Davila are met, and Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to complete preemption by ERISA. Plaintiffs Motion to Remand must therefore be denied because federal question jurisdiction exists.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because they seek plan benefits and implicate no independent legal duty.

Filler v. Blue Cross of California · filed 2015-02-13

Filler’s state law claims for negligent entrustment, conversion, and interference with contractual relations were completely preempted under § 502(a)(1)(B). ... Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims for denial of ERISA plan benefits when ERISA’s civil-enforcement provision completely preempts those claims.

Milby v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. · filed 2015-04-30

The Court concludes that § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA completely preempts Plaintiffs asserted state law claims, permitting the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. Liberty properly removed this action from state court, and Plaintiffs motion to remand (DN8) will be denied.

Section 1331 does not supply federal-question jurisdiction over a health care provider’s state-law payment claims based on an agreement independent of an ERISA plan, even when the provider could assert assigned ERISA claims.

Crescent City Surgical Centre v. UnitedHealthcare of Louisiana, Inc. · filed 2019-11-18

Where, as here, there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, a proper removal requires the existence of a federal question– that is, plaintiff's claims must “arise under” federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... These independent claims based upon an alleged contract between Crescent City and United are based on a legal duty independent of an ERISA plan. Accordingly, under Davila, these direct claims are not completely preempted by ERISA.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction when ERISA supplies only defensive preemption rather than complete preemption.

University of South Alabama v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2020-07-20

“As an affirmative defense, defensive preemption does not furnish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” ... In reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties, despite the continued representation by O’Reilly that “complete preemption exists,” the Court finds rather that the matter falls under “defensive preemption.”

Section 1331 gives federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim involving ERISA only when ERISA completely preempts the claim; conflict preemption alone is insufficient.

Caulley v. Interprise/Southwest Interior & Space Design Inc · filed 2021-06-10

Only complete preemption would give this Court federal question jurisdiction over the Estate’s claim.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when state-law claims arise from duties independent of the ERISA plan.

LHC Group, Inc. v. Bayer Corp. · filed 2022-03-14

Even if the first prong of the Davila test were met, the Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims are based on independent legal duties and thus fail Davila’s second prong.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when the plaintiffs could not have brought their claims under ERISA.

Clayton v. Elite Restaurant Partners, LLC · filed 2022-08-19

Because the Plaintiffs could not have brought their claims under ERISA, the first prong of the Davila test is not met. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims are not completely preempted, and remand is appropriate.

Section 1331 provides no federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when the state-law claim falls outside ERISA’s civil enforcement provision and can be resolved without interpreting the benefit plan.

Garnes v. Encova Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2023-06-28

Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim having none of the three essential requirements of a claim subject to the complete preemptive force of ERISA’s civil enforcement provision under Sunoco, the court concludes it is not so preempted and provides no basis for this court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not supply federal question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when the plaintiff cannot sue under ERISA § 502(a) and its state law claims rest on independent duties.

PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES-LOWER BUCKS, LLC v. CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2023-10-19

Accordingly, Prime’s claims are not completely preempted because Prime lacks standing to pursue these claims under § 502(a) and because Prime’s claims are premised on Cigna’s state law duties that are independent of any ERISA plan. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and removal was improper.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when the removing defendant fails to establish that the medical provider received an assignment of benefits.

ABIRA MEDICAL LABORATORIES, LLC v. NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN AND THEIR AFFILIATES · filed 2024-07-31

And other than referencing Plaintiff’s inadequate pleadings, Defendant has not provided anything to support a finding that Plaintiff has in fact obtained an assignment of benefits for purposes of ERISA from the alleged insureds. For example, no copy of any assignment has been proffered. This would be necessary here for the Court to find that it has subject-matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims based on ERISA complete preemption when the claims implicate legal duties independent of the ERISA plans.

CEP America-Illinois v. Cigna Healthcare · filed 2024-08-21

Section 1331 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." ... The Court concludes that CEP's claims do not meet the second part of the test in Davila because they implicate legal duties independent of the ERISA plans at issue. ... There is thus no jurisdictional basis for CEP to pursue them (or any attendant attorney's fees) in federal court.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims that are completely preempted by ERISA.

SANCHEZ v. METLIFE, INC. · filed 2024-09-03

In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Hammer and finds that Plaintiffs’ claims relating to short-term disability benefits are subject to complete preemption under ERISA, such that the Court can exercise jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims when complete ERISA preemption has not been established.

Abira Medical Laboratories, LLC v. Wellmed Medical Management, Inc. · filed 2024-11-12

Because the Court finds there is no complete ERISA preemption at this stage, the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption when the removing party fails to establish that the plaintiff can bring a claim under ERISA § 502(a).

ABIRA MEDICAL LABORATORIES, LLC v. IATSE NATIONAL BENEFIT FUNDS OFFICE - LOCAL 1 AND THEIR AFFILIATES · filed 2025-01-30

In other words, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff is not a “participant” or “beneficiary” of an ERISA plan, nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged that it has derivative standing through an assignment from an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction through ERISA complete preemption only if the removing party satisfies both prongs of the Davila test.

Gessford · filed 2026-06-25

The Sixth Circuit applies the conjunctive two-part Davila test to determine whether complete preemption is proper in an ERISA-related case, and the removing party must satisfy both prongs to establish federal jurisdiction. ... Thus, July has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Davila test. ... July has failed to satisfy the second prong of the Davila test.

When removal rests on ERISA complete preemption, Section 1331 jurisdiction requires the plaintiff to have standing to sue under ERISA.

Nicholson v. National Accounts, Inc. · filed 1999-12-15

There is, however, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: whenever Congress completely preempts, or “super-preempts,” an area of law, “any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character” and thereby provides federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. ... The court therefore lacks federal question jurisdiction under ERISA to hear Nicholson’s claims.

A state-law claim completely preempted by ERISA arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes and is removable to federal court.

Cantrell v. Great Republic Insurance Company · filed 1989-04-24

Because ERISA preempts Cantrell's state law causes of action, Cantrell's action was removable to federal court.

A state-law claim completely preempted by ERISA arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes and is removable to federal court.

Cantrell v. Great Republic Insurance · filed 1989-04-24

Because ERISA preempts Cantrell’s state law causes of action, Cantrell’s action was removable to federal court.

A state-law claim arises under Section 1331 when Congress has completely preempted the relevant field, including state usury limits on federally related manufactured-home loans.

Draper v. Castle Home Sales, Inc. · filed 1989-05-15

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. ... In the present case, Congress has attempted to completely preempt state usury laws which limit the amount of interest that can be charged on a federally-related loan secured on a residential manufactured home. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim arises under federal law.

A state-law claim completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA arises under federal law and is removable despite the complaint's failure to plead a federal cause of action.

Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corporation · filed 1989-06-14

Thus, state-law claims preempted by section 301 are properly removable to federal court despite a plaintiff's failure to plead explicitly a federal cause of action.

Section 1331 permits removal when Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act completely preempts a state-law contract claim that requires interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement.

Magerer v. John Sexton & Co. · filed 1990-01-02

In this ease, Magerer’s claim for breach of employment contract is completely preempted by federal labor law creating jurisdiction for removal to federal court.

Section 1331 does not support removal under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act when a state-law discrimination claim does not require interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement, even if the agreement may be consulted to calculate damages.

Gonzalez v. Dynair Service Co. · filed 1990-01-16

The elements of his claim do not require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. ... While the court might have to refer to the agreement to calculate damages, this is not enough to preempt the claims. ... The state-law claims are not “completely preempted” by § 301(a) and thus are not removable to this court.

Section 1331 removal based on Section 301 complete preemption fails when the collective-bargaining agreement had expired and no new agreement was formed, leaving only unpreempted state-law claims.

Dosier v. Burns International Security Services · filed 1990-01-31

Where a claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, section 301 completely preempts state law, ... and the action is removable on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). ... Since for purposes of section 301, the expired agreement no longer existed, state law claims that might implicate its terms are not preempted by section 301. ... In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement covering plaintiff, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the action will be remanded to the Superior Court in and for the City and County of San Francisco.

Section 1331 permits removal when Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act completely preempts a state-law contract claim whose resolution requires interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement, despite artful pleading that omits the federal statute and union.

Winick v. United Engineering Co. · filed 1991-03-01

Plaintiffs allegation of breach of contract is a federal cause of action because it involves interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement between United Engineering Company (United) and ERC. ... Such omissions and artful drafting do not, however, permit Plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction. The Motion to Remand is denied.

Section 1331 does not support removal when a state-law individual-employment-contract claim is independent of a collective-bargaining agreement and therefore is not completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

McDaniel v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1991-06-13

Whether federal question jurisdiction exists is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule” which provides that jurisdiction exists where a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiffs complaint, when properly pleaded. ... It is well-settled that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption. ... Thus in spite of defendant’s attempt to recharacterize plaintiff’s complaint to allege violations stemming solely from the collective bargaining agreement, I find that the essence of the state court contract allegations need not look to the collective bargaining agreement as the source of the rights or a description of the parameters of those rights. ... With no basis for jurisdiction, then, it is proper for me to remand this matter to Kalamazoo Circuit Court.

Section 1331's then-existing amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied unless it appears to a legal certainty that the value of the right to an equal educational opportunity is no greater than $10,000.

Ross Ex Rel. Ross v. Disare · filed 1977-06-08

As far as the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is concerned, it does not appear “to a legal certainty,” ... that the right to be protected, here the right to an equal educational opportunity, is of a value no greater than $10,000.

Section 1331 gives federal courts authority to issue an injunction in appropriate cases involving a federal question.

Kourani v. Sproul · filed 2022-04-21

Section 1331 vests this court with equitable powers that include the authority to issue an injunction in appropriate cases.

Section 1331 does not authorize personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Norman's on the Waterfront v. West Indies Corp. · filed 1974-07-17

Paragraph 1 of the complaint states that jurisdiction and venue are founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1391(b), 1391(d) and 15 U.S.C. § 15. It is true that none of these provisions authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

When Section 1331 supplies subject-matter jurisdiction, it does so for every federal district court; objections based on the parties' residences or where events occurred concern venue rather than jurisdiction.

Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation v. Diversified Packaging Corporation · filed 1977-03-25

Several federal statutes clearly establish jurisdiction over this cause. ... All of these statutes establish jurisdiction. When these statutes confer subject matter jurisdiction, they do so simultaneously for all federal district courts. The choice among courts is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction.

Section 1331(a) confers subject-matter jurisdiction over arising-under controversies but does not confer personal jurisdiction over any party.

Duplantier v. United States · filed 1979-12-12(a)

While section 1331(a) grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases and controversies “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” it does not confer personal jurisdiction over any party to those controversies. The concepts of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are separate and distinct.

Section 1331 confers subject-matter jurisdiction but cannot, without a separate basis, establish personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.

Stephens v. Coleman · filed 1989-04-04

In paragraph four plaintiff alleges jurisdiction under the First and Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 giving the district court original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States; and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 under diversity of citizenship. However, these allegations relate only to subject matter jurisdiction and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over the persons of non-resident defendants.

Section 1331 gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over federal-question cases but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Scherer v. Curators of the University of Missouri & Law School Admission Council · filed 2001-07-18

Section 1331, however, addresses the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts ... not personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant.

Section 1331 confers subject matter jurisdiction in federal question cases and does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Situation Mgt. v. ASP · filed 2006-08-15

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338 do not subject ASP Group to personal jurisdiction. They confer subject matter jurisdiction in federal question and intellectual property cases.

Section 1331 subject matter jurisdiction does not dispense with the separate requirement of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Lance v. Wilson · filed 2011-09-09

Lastly, plaintiff claims that he need not establish personal jurisdiction because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The Court must have both personal jurisdiction over all the parties and subject matter jurisdiction, and “[t]he fact that the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction is entirely irrelevant to the question of whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the [d]efendant[ ].”

A contention that a federal constitutional claim fails to allege a rights violation challenges the merits, not federal-question jurisdiction.

Mendoza v. Round Rock Independent School District · filed 2020-08-26

RRISD contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs fail to allege a violation of a constitutional right. This argument, however, goes to the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, not the Court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, RRISD’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) should be denied, and RRISD’s arguments assessed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1331 concerns subject-matter jurisdiction and does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Patterson v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2023-01-20

Plaintiff responds by pointing to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, which, she claims, “makes this Case a Federal Question,” Dkt. 20 at 2; Dkt. 21 at 3, and by arguing that because she has effected service upon these defendants, she has “establish[ed] personal jurisdiction” over them, Dkt. 20 at 2; Dkt. 21 at 3–4. But the statutes Plaintiff cites speak to subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than personal jurisdiction, and although courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants “based on the fact of in-state service of process,” Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (emphasis added), Plaintiff nowhere alleges that the defendants who have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction were served while physically present in the District of Columbia.

Section 1331 addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Patterson v. Florida Department of Children and Families · filed 2023-04-05

But 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 speak to subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than personal jurisdiction, and although courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants “based on the fact of in-state service of process,” Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (emphasis added), Plaintiff nowhere alleges that Orange County or its representatives were served while physically present in the District of Columbia (if that were possible).

Section 1331 gives a district court jurisdiction over a claim arising under a federal statute that creates a cause of action; a dispute over whether the plaintiff can prove the claim does not defeat that jurisdiction.

Secretary of Labor v. Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. · filed 2023-11-20

Whether the Fairfield Plant should be characterized as a mine does not affect the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear DOL’s complaint. ... The subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry is satisfied because DOL has asserted an Article III injury arising under a federal statute that creates a cause of action for DOL.

Section 1331 concerns subject matter jurisdiction over federal questions and does not establish personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Cole v. Garner · filed 2026-05-08

But even accepting that generous reading of their brief, the fact that Plaintiffs have alleged that this case involves “the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, concerns this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, not its personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 1331’s general grant of federal-question jurisdiction does not authorize a district court to hear a claim when a more specific statute assigns that claim exclusively to another court.

Erienet, Inc. Sandra MacKenzie John Knauer Frank Mezler, Jr. v. Velocity Net, Inc. Thomas Dylewski Chad Ferenack · filed 1998-09-25

Thus, regardless of the presence of a substantial federal question, Congress’ intent to preclude consumer suits under TCPA in federal court trumps the general grant of federal question jurisdiction in § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide an alternate forum for a SMCRA citizen suit when SMCRA confines jurisdiction to the district where the mining operation is located.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Lujan · filed 1992-05-22

Concerning the alleged alternate bases under Title 28 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361) for lodging this suit in the District of Columbia, ... it suffices to recall “that even where Congress has not expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is ‘exclusive,’ ... a statute which vests jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases covered by that statute.”

Section 1331 does not allow agricultural producers to bypass the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act’s prescribed review scheme absent a recognized exception permitting outside review.

Pescosolido v. Block · filed 1985-07-09

Because we conclude that the facts of this case demonstrate no ... or other exception which would allow judicial review outside the statutory scheme of the Act, we need not pass upon the issue of whether the Growers have standing pursuant to such an exception.

Section 1331 does not permit district-court review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority General Counsel’s discretionary decision not to issue an unfair-labor-practice complaint when Congress made the statutory review scheme exclusive.

Martinez v. Smith · filed 1984-10-05

As to the Authority’s Statute and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress did not intend for review of the General Counsel’s decisions regarding issuance of unfair labor practice complaints.

Section 1331 does not bypass conditions imposed on an adequate statutory remedy for enforcing the asserted federal rights.

City of Highland Park v. Train · filed 1975-06-10

Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief requested against the Administrator under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute, and the revised Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702— 705. ... There is no need for a new remedy, because, as we have said, an adequate statutory remedy for protecting rights of the kind asserted by plaintiffs is provided by the very statute that creates the rights. ... We conclude, for the reasons stated above, that the conditions imposed by existing law upon the right to seek relief under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 5 U.S.C. § 704 have not been met.

Section 405(h) bars Section 1331 jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act, leaving Section 405(g) as the relevant jurisdictional route after administrative exhaustion.

Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1975-07-28

Jurisdiction was initially asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, the clear holding by the Supreme Court in ... that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bars § 1331 jurisdiction, negates plaintiffs’ § 1331 jurisdictional claim.

Sections 405(g) and 405(h) provide the exclusive source of judicial review for the covered Social Security claim, making Section 1331 and other asserted jurisdictional bases inapplicable.

Mansfield v. Weinberger · filed 1975-07-30

As indicated therein, the only source of judicial review in this case is 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) -(h), which is made applicable herein by 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (c) (3). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ other jurisdictional premises, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361; and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, are inapplicable.

Section 1331 is unavailable to review Medicare or Social Security benefit decisions when Section 405(g) supplies both the source of jurisdiction and the limits on its exercise.

Milo Community Hospital, Etc. v. Weinberger · filed 1975-11-14

In this case it would seem irrelevant to analyze each of the heads of jurisdiction alleged by appellant. Some, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, are clearly not available. But whether other bases of jurisdiction are present or not, § 405(g) is both a source of jurisdiction and a limitation on its exercise.

Section 1331 does not supply district-court jurisdiction to review issuance of an NPDES permit when the Water Act makes court-of-appeals review exclusive.

Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train · filed 1976-03-12

The appellees respond, and we agree, that there is a strong presumption against the availability of simultaneous review in both the district court and the court of appeals. Review of the Administrator’s actions in issuing or denying a permit must, by the explicit terms of § 509, be sought in the court of appeals whose jurisdiction is, absent extraordinary conditions, exclusive. ... Thus the alternate bases for jurisdiction urged by appellants are of no avail.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare reimbursement action governed by Medicare's exclusive administrative-review scheme.

Aristocrat South, Inc. v. Mathews · filed 1976-05-25

Accordingly, this Court finds that there is no basis for jurisdiction in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

When a customs dispute can never satisfy the statutory prerequisites for Customs Court review, jurisdiction reverts to the district court under Sections 1331 and 1337.

Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter · filed 1977-11-10

There is, however, an exceptional class of cases which, while arising under the Tariff Act of 1930, is for practical or jurisprudential reasons, barred from the Customs Court by statute. In these cases, and in these cases alone, jurisdiction is vested in the District Courts by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. ... The case at bar is among these exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court. ... When this situation occurs, jurisdiction over a customs matter which presumptively inheres in the Customs Court reverts to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

Section 1331 cannot be used to bypass the Railway Labor Act’s exclusive, mandatory grievance and arbitration process for a minor labor dispute.

Hendley v. Central of Georgia Railroad · filed 1977-12-28

The jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board and its remedial processes is exclusive, primary and mandatory in the case of minor disputes under collective bargaining agreements. The statutory procedures represent a comprehensive system for resolving such controversies and a party may not turn to the courts for relief before the administrative body has first evaluated and decided the dispute. ... Finding neither a clear and specific grant of federal jurisdiction nor any statutory overriding of the remedies established in labor disputes, the injunctive relief sought must be and is denied and the complaint dismissed.

Section 1331 does not support district-court review when the Clean Air Act provides its own review procedures.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle · filed 1978-03-15

Nor does § 1331 support jurisdiction, since the Clean Air Act provides its own review procedures.

Section 1331 cannot overcome the Medicare Act’s specific limitation of judicial review to the cost-reporting periods covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo.

Lodi Memorial Hospital v. Califano · filed 1978-05-22

However, examination of those cases reveals that they all relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on the Administrative Procedure Act, or on both. ... Jurisdiction in this case is limited by section 1395oo, and this court is, therefore, precluded from reviewing the 1970-72 claims.

Section 1331(a) supplies jurisdiction over claims challenging federal agency conduct under statutory and constitutional provisions independent of a statute that restricts review of decisions made under that statute.

Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare · filed 1978-07-11(a)

Hence, for controversies (1) premised upon statutory and constitutional provisions other than the Medicare Act, and (2) concerning agency and officer conduct based upon statutes other than the Medicare Act, the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Section 1331 does not provide nonstatutory review of agency action when Congress has supplied an adequate, specific statutory procedure for review in another court.

Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · filed 1978-09-22

General federal question jurisdiction under Title 28 of the United States Code is not available to the bank under the facts of this case.

Section 1331 cannot supply district-court jurisdiction to review agency action when Congress provides an exclusive review mechanism in another court.

Honicker v. Hendrie · filed 1979-01-12

This exclusive statutory review mechanism also prevents plaintiff from following other avenues of so-called “nonstatutory review” of administrative action in this court by invoking general jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1361.

The Customs Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to Customs decisions overrides the general district-court jurisdiction granted by § 1331.

Ingram Contractors, Inc. v. United States · filed 1979-04-04(a)

Thus, the exclusive jurisdictional grant of section 1582 overrides the general grant of jurisdiction conferred on district courts by sections 1331 and 1355 and any other statute.

Section 1331 does not permit district-court review when Congress’s statutory scheme provides another exclusive avenue for review.

United States Steel Corp. v. Marshall · filed 1979-06-11

It is clear that it was the legislative intent of the United States Congress that the United States District Courts are not to exercise jurisdiction in this type of case where other avenues for review have been provided.

Section 1331 cannot provide an alternative jurisdictional route for claims governed by § 1383(c), whose statutory judicial-review procedure is exclusive.

Gilchrist v. Califano · filed 1979-07-03

It is, however, well established that where judicial review is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), that section is the exclusive basis of jurisdiction, and that if a plaintiff does not meet the jurisdictional requisites of that section he may not bring his claim under general federal question or mandamus jurisdiction.

Section 1331's grant of arising-under jurisdiction may be precluded by another statute or a doctrine of judicial administration.

First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen · filed 1979-08-29

The same can be said for 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This statute grants jurisdiction to the district court for cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, but it does not mean that jurisdiction is not precluded by another statute or doctrine of judicial administration.

Section 1331(a) district-court review is displaced when the Clean Air Act makes nationally applicable final EPA action reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit.

Dow Chemical USA v. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1980-06-03(a)

The action which the plaintiffs ask this Court to review is, therefore, “final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter”; and since it is nationally applicable, a petition for review of that action “may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

The Tucker Act’s specific exclusive jurisdiction over non-tort monetary claims exceeding $10,000 overrides Section 1331’s general jurisdictional grant.

Armor Elevator Co., Inc. v. Phoenix Urban Corp. · filed 1980-06-30

In short, even if 12 U.S.C. § 1702 were a general waiver of sovereign immunity and even if a basis might be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1442 or elsewhere supporting jurisdiction in the district courts, the more specific policy of exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims overrides the more general jurisdictional grant found elsewhere.

Section 1331 does not provide district-court review when Congress has created a specific statutory review procedure that is the exclusive means of review.

Amusement and Music Operators Association, a Corporation v. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal · filed 1980-09-09

Only the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguably confers jurisdiction on the District Court. However, where “there exists a special statutory review procedure, it is ordinarily supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies,” notwithstanding section 1331.