11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for a debtor’s willful and malicious injury from discharge; it does not make an otherwise nondischargeable debt dischargeable because of a creditor’s conduct.

Chase v. Chase (In Re Chase) · filed 2008-08-18(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) creates an exception to the general rule that debts are discharged. It does not provide a mechanism for converting a nondischargeable debt into a dischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a retaliation judgment from discharge when the debtor deliberately injures the creditor through actions targeted at her and certain to cause harm.

Sells v. Porter · filed 2008-08-26(a)(6)

The jury necessarily found that Porter maliciously injured Sells. Porter’s memo and threat were targeted specifically to Sells and were certain to cause her harm. ... Porter’s actions were willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused an injury both willfully and maliciously.

Hurrell v. Barker (In Re Barker) · filed 2008-09-03(a)(6)

Thus, under § 523(a)(6), the creditor must prove by a preponderance that the debtor’s conduct in causing the claimant’s injuries was both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful injury; reckless copyright infringement alone does not establish one.

Barboza v. New Form, Inc. · filed 2008-09-22(a)(6)

Even though recklessness is sufficient for a finding of willful copyright infringement, the Supreme Court has clearly held that injuries resulting from recklessness are not sufficient ... to be considered willful injuries under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code and are therefore insufficient to merit an exemption to dischargeability.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a breach of contract debt from discharge only if the breach is accompanied by conduct that would give rise to a tort action under state law.

Lockerby v. Sierra · filed 2008-08-06(a)(6)

A breach of contract is not “willful and malicious conduct” under § 523(a)(6) unless accompanied by conduct that would give rise to a tort action under state law.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the harm, not merely the act that caused it.

Citizens Union Bank v. Hayden (In Re Hayden) · filed 2008-10-07(a)(6)

To establish that a debt is nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must prove that the debtor not only intended the act that caused the harm, but intended the harm.

Section 523(a)(6)’s malicious injury requirement is not established by a finding of actual malice that could rest on reckless disregard for the truth.

Duvall v. Maxey (In Re Maxey) · filed 2008-10-17(a)(6)

Because the state court could have found “actual malice” based on Debtor acting recklessly with regard to the truth or falsity of the information he reported to the police, the finding of “actual malice” does not, without more specific facts, satisfy the heightened definition of “malicious” that is required under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of injury to another’s property and that the injury was both willful and malicious; a creditor’s property interest alone does not establish nondischargeability.

In re: James Setters v. · filed 2008-10-22(a)(6)

Nonetheless, summary judgment in favor of Chase should have been denied because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the other elements of § 523(a)(6): whether there was an injury to Chase’s property and, if so, whether that injury was both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires consideration of whether the debtor intended harm or believed injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.

Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gasbarro · filed 2008-10-24(a)(6)

In so holding, the bankruptcy court erred by failing to apply the proper legal standard for determining the dischargeability of debt under § 523(a)(6). It did not apply the second prong of the standard – that is, whether Gasbarro was substantially certain that his actions would harm Sanderson.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor caused an injury with a subjective motive to cause harm or an objective substantial certainty of harm.

Madison v. Williamson · filed 2008-11-21(a)(6)

The Court finds, independently and without applying collateral es-toppel, that the State Court Judgment represents an injury that was “willful and malicious” and is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contempt judgment debt from discharge when the debtor’s violation of a court order caused willful and malicious injury to another’s property interest.

Musilli v. Droomers (In Re Musilli) · filed 2008-11-25(a)(6)

Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Musilli and Baum-gardner, the state court’s determination that Musilli’s and Baumgardner’s misconduct of flagrantly violating the December 20, 2002 escrow order caused Droomers to incur $431,350.00 in damages satisfies the wilful and malicious injury to property requirement of § 523(a)(6) as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional interference with contract from discharge only if the debtor actually intended to cause injury.

Guerra & Moore, Ltd. v. Cantu (In Re Cantu) · filed 2008-11-26(a)(6)

For a debt arising from intentional interference with contract to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), actual intent to injure must be shown.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a simple breach of contract debt from discharge without sufficiently tortious conduct.

Prewett v. Iberg (In Re Iberg) · filed 2008-10-16(a)(6)

Prewett proved that the debtor breached a construction contract by constructing her home in a manner that resulted in a flawed and unsafe dwelling. In the context of a simple breach of contract action, Prewett did not prove that the debtor’s actions were sufficiently tortious as required by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured another entity’s property; a secured creditor’s interest in receivables can persist when their proceeds are paid toward trust fund taxes.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Zwosta (In Re Zwosta) · filed 2008-10-22(a)(6)

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Chase had an interest in the funds paid by the Debtors to the IRS. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court’s denial of the Debtors’ motions for summary judgment was appropriate. Nonetheless, summary judgment in favor of Chase should have been denied because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the other elements of § 523(a)(6): whether there was an injury to Chase’s property and, if so, whether that injury was both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a guilty plea can conclusively establish those elements when the offense requires them.

Hernandez v. Greene (In Re Greene) · filed 2008-12-10(a)(6)

In sum, issue preclusion applies under the facts of this matter, with the result that Greene’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction conclusively establish that he acted maliciously and willfully. Therefore, any debt for damages arising from the stabbing is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused injury to a person or property and acted both willfully and maliciously.

Harrold v. Raeder (In Re Raeder) · filed 2009-01-12(a)(6)

In sum, for a debt to be excepted from a debtor’s discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6), the plaintiff must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the defendant’s actions caused an injury to the plaintiffs person or property, (2) that the defendant’s actions were willful, and (3) that the defendant’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts attorney fees and costs arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious contemptuous conduct from discharge, even without a separate compensatory damages award.

Suarez v. Barrett (In Re Suarez) · filed 2009-01-16(a)(6)

We conclude that attorneys fees and costs awarded to a judgment creditor in relation to a debtor’s underlying willful and malicious contemptuous conduct, even when no compensatory judgment debt exists, constitute a nondischargeable debt under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury that the debtor intended or was substantially certain to cause; disputed facts about the debtor’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance preclude summary judgment.

Smith v. Botzet (In Re Smith) · filed 2009-02-10(a)(6)

Debtor and Mr. Bot-zet agree that for a debt to have arisen from a willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6), I must find that Debtor’s actions “either have a purpose of producing injury or have a substantial certainty of producing injury.” ... The preliminary and incomplete facts that I have on this record are insufficient for me to determine whether Debtor’s obligation to Mr. Botzet arose from a willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury and acted maliciously before a debt for that injury is excepted from discharge.

Duvall v. Maxey (In Re Maxey) · filed 2009-02-18(a)(6)

Given the opportunity in this proceeding, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the terms used in the Judgment actually describe the heightened level of conduct required to find the claim non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful injury requirement demands proof that the debtor intended harm or believed it was substantially certain to occur.

National Gold Exchange, Inc. v. Stern (In Re Stern) · filed 2009-02-23(a)(6)

Applying the Su standard to our case, plaintiffs would have to have proven that the debtor either intended to injure plaintiffs by giving over possession of the coins to Fox, or that debtor must have understood that damage was substantially certain to have occurred.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from reckless driving from discharge without evidence that the debtor intended injury or knew injury was substantially certain to occur.

Tso v. Nevarez (In Re Nevarez) · filed 2009-02-25(a)(6)

Here, even though it seems reasonable to expect that an accident is likely to occur when a driver speeds and runs a red light, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant knew the harm to Plaintiff was substantially certain to occur. Thus, even under the substantial certainty standard, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat Defendant’s Motion. Non-dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) was not intended to cover reckless or negligent behavior.

Section 523(a)(6) covers debts for willful and malicious economic injury to a corporation, even when the injury is not to its property.

Weidle Corp. v. Leist (In Re Leist) · filed 2008-12-16(a)(6)

Rather, this court finds the reference, “by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity”, by its plain language, is considerably more broad, and refers to an economic injury to a corporation just the same as a physical assault on an individual and the court finds no convincing argument to parse the language in the manner suggested by the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a judgment for knowing criminal conversion does not, by itself, establish that requirement.

Garoutte v. Damax, Inc. · filed 2009-03-03(a)(6)

The Indiana judgment that Garoutte committed criminal conversion is not necessarily the same as a determination that Garoutte willfully and maliciously injured Damax or its property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a discrimination judgment from discharge when the prior judgment establishes willful and malicious injury.

Petro v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 2009-03-06(a)(6)

As a result, I find that § 523(a)(6)’s “willful and malicious” elements are the same as the issues decided under the racial discrimination count and those issues were essential to the Oregon Judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a sanctions debt from discharge solely because the debtor failed to appear for trial; the creditor must prove a willful and malicious intent to injure.

Faruqi v. Anjum (In Re Anjum) · filed 2009-03-12(a)(6)

Neither the Missouri court orders nor the direct evidence of Anjum’s actions demonstrated that Anjum failed to appear at the scheduled trial date because she intended to injure Faruqi. Her failure to appear and the sanction order, without more, are insufficient for this Court to find that this debt should be excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when a prior judgment precludes the debtor from contesting those elements.

Smith v. Cornelius (In Re Cornelius) · filed 2009-04-03(a)(6)

In summation, the Court, having failed to receive a response from the Defendants, finds that the Plaintiffs have established, as set forth in their Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Defendant, Harold E. Cornelius, is collaterally estopped from contesting whether he acted ‘willfully’ and ‘maliciously’ for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Therefore, the Defendant’s liability to the Plaintiffs, as established by the state court order, is a nondischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person.

Caruso v. Harmon (In Re Harmon) · filed 2009-04-15(a)(6)

Because the judgment debt in the amount of $324,768.50 resulted from Debtor’s willful and malicious conduct, it is non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages attributable to a debtor’s willful and malicious injury from discharge, but damages attributable to breach of contract remain dischargeable.

Major Sports Fantasy, Ltd. v. Dowdell (In Re Dowdell) · filed 2009-04-24(a)(6)

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part, and the amount determined to be attributable to the willful malicious injury described shall be an exception from the provisions of the overall bankruptcy discharge. The amount ultimately found to be attributable to the breach of contract, shall be not within the exception and shall be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts attorney’s fees incurred to uncover and address intentional discovery fraud from discharge as a willful and malicious injury.

Staton Holdings, Inc. v. Mileski (In Re Mileski) · filed 2009-04-28(a)(6)

The attorney’s fees part of the Texas Ruling relating to the sanctions motion was clearly intended to compensate Staton for costs incurred ferreting out Mileski’s fabrication and responding to the false discovery. Clearly, this much of Sta-ton’s judgment is based upon a willful and malicious injury. Thus, there is no doubt that the $5,000 attorney’s fee award is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when a debtor deliberately withholds funds earmarked for payment, causing financial loss without just cause or excuse.

Alessi v. Alessi (In Re Alessi) · filed 2009-05-14(a)(6)

The resulting injury was willful, in that Ms. Alessi deliberately and intentionally refused to turn over the sale proceeds. By violating a contractual provision for use of committed funds, Amy Alessi inflicted a wrongful financial loss without just cause or excuse. Hence, she caused an injury that was malicious within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused both wilful injury and malicious injury.

United States v. Buck (In Re Buck) · filed 2009-05-20(a)(6)

Although at first reading, “wilful and malicious injury” may appear as a single statutory requirement, it is in fact two distinct requirements. A party seeking to avoid discharging the debt must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused both wilful injury and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for rental property damage from discharge when the debtor neglected the property but did not specifically intend to cause harm.

Knowles v. McGuckin (In Re McGuckin) · filed 2009-06-05(a)(6)

Consequently, while it cannot be disputed that the Debtor left the Plaintiffs property in a condition hardly befitting a man of his age and profession, the Court is unwilling to make the leap that the Debtor acted with the specific intent to damage the property so as to make the damages a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally and without justification injures another person’s property interest.

Muscarello v. Blackburn (In Re Blackburn) · filed 2009-06-11(a)(6)

Regarding Count IV, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Debtors’ actions in dissolving ECRM, forming Beacon and transferring ECRM’s business to Beacon was (1) a wrongful act, (2) done intentionally, (3) which caused injury to Muscarello, and (4) was done without just cause and excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts attorney fees from discharge when they arise from a willful and malicious injury established by the prior court’s findings.

Karl v. Stalnaker (In Re Stalnaker) · filed 2009-06-16(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment based on collateral estoppel on the ground that the attorney fees are a debt arising from willful and malicious injury. Consequently, the attorney fees are nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs arising from willful and malicious injury.

Symantec Corp. v. Mann (In Re Mann) · filed 2009-07-06(a)(6)

Symantec is entitled to a judgment against Mann for statutory damages in the amount of $865,000, reasonable attorneys’ fees of $85,942.50, and costs of court, which will be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury; a debt arising solely from breach of contract does not qualify.

Woo, Inc. v. Donelson (In Re Donelson) · filed 2009-07-20(a)(6)

The Court finds that Albers’ debt arises solely from a breach of contract. The Court concludes that Albers has failed to prove that her debt should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a prior judgment can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Muse v. Day (In Re Day) · filed 2009-07-30(a)(6)

WHEREFORE, the $75,000 judgment entered against the debtor/defendant Richard Ray Day in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland will be determined to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and shall not be discharged by the debtor’s discharge granted under 11 U.S.C. § 727.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor unjustifiably withholds money knowing that injury to the creditor is substantially certain.

Humility of Mary Health Partners v. Garritano (In Re Garritano) · filed 2009-08-13(a)(6)

For the reasons given above, the Court finds that (i) Debtor is personally liable on the debt to HMHP and (ii) HMHP proved by a preponderance of the evidence that $49,383.82 of the debt Debtor owes HMHP is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) as a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person or that person’s property.

Bauer v. Colokathis (In Re Colokathis) · filed 2009-09-21(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the debt arose from the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff, and the debt resulting from these acts is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits issue preclusion for a punitive damages award based on an intent to harm, but an ambiguous compensatory damages award cannot be declared nondischargeable on that basis.

Budner v. Weiner (In Re Weiner) · filed 2009-09-23(a)(6)

Thus, the punitive damages component of the Final Judgment satisfies both the “identity of issues” and “actually litigated” prongs of the collateral estoppel test. ... Because compensatory damages could have been awarded based on proof of intent different from that required under section 523(a)(6), this Court cannot give issue preclusive effect to the compensatory damages portion of the Final Judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury before the debt can be excepted from discharge.

Rucker v. Kercheval (In Re Kercheval) · filed 2009-09-24(a)(6)

Further, because Plaintiff did not show that the transfers of accounts were for anything other than reasonably equivalent value, and did not prove that any harm to Plaintiff by the transfer of the Policy was done willfully by Defendant Kercheval, his objection to the dischargeability of the debt owed to him by Defendant Kercheval under § 523(a)(6) must be denied.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require an intentional tort; intent to cause injury can make a debt nondischargeable.

Hughes v. Arnold (In re Hughes) · filed 2009-10-08(a)(6)

Hughes’s contention that nondischarge-ability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is conditioned on an intentional tort, rather than a general intention to cause injury, is equally unavailing.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the harm caused by the act.

Issacs Cars, Inc. v. Woods (In Re Woods) · filed 2009-10-29(a)(6)

To establish that a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must prove that the debtor not only intended the act that caused the harm, but- intended the harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a complaint to allege facts making it plausible that the debtor intended the injury or that injury was certain or almost certain to result from the debtor’s acts.

Puzzo v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 2009-12-03(a)(6)

While the requisite state of mind to satisfy “willful and malicious” has not been precisely defined, a complaint for discharge-ability under § 523(a)(6) must at least allege facts lending to the plausibility that an injury was inflicted with the intent to cause the harm, or in circumstances in which the harm was certain or almost certain to occur from the Defendant’s acts.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to an entity from discharge, including injuries that cause economic loss.

NATIONAL SIGN AND SIGNAL v. Livingston · filed 2009-12-28(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) is not limited to debts arising from noneco-nomic injuries. The plain language of the statute creates a dischargeability exception for all willful and maliciously-imposed injuries (1) to an entity or (2) the entity’s property.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt for willful and malicious injury when the debtor directs another person to cause it, even if the debtor does not physically cause the damage.

H. Park Partners, LLC v. Frick (In Re Frick) · filed 2010-01-05(a)(6)

At the same time, there is no requirement in § 523(a)(6) that a debtor actually be the one who physically occasions damage to a creditor or to a creditor’s property. ... Instead, liability for a “willful” and “malicious” injury may be imposed under § 523(a)(6) when the debt- or directs or actively encourages another person to commit a wrongful act.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct meets both the willful and malicious injury requirements.

Ormsby v. First American Title Co. · filed 2010-01-08(a)(6)

Based on these facts found by the state court, Ormsby’s conduct meets both the willful and malicious prongs of section 523(a)(6); accordingly, we affirm the non-dischargeability of the judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from malicious acts intended to injure a creditor’s property interest from discharge.

Centier Bank v. Young (In Re Young) · filed 2010-01-21(a)(6)

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is directed at acts intended to cause harm to a property interest, maliciously undertaken.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the creditor fails to establish willfulness or malice.

Moore Automotive Group, Inc. v. Lewis (In Re Lewis) · filed 2010-01-22(a)(6)

Assuming facts in the light most favorable to Moore, Moore did not sufficiently allege willfulness or malice so as to grant an exception from discharge under Section 523(a)(6). There is no genuine issue of material fact as to willfulness and maliciousness.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a Rule 11 sanction alone does not establish one.

Bracken v. Powers (In Re Powers) · filed 2009-12-17(a)(6)

The fact that Rule 11 sanctions might have been issued against an attorney is thus, of itself, insufficient to conclude that the conduct sanctioned must have been willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of a creditor’s collateral.

Ocean Equity Group, Inc. v. Wooten (In Re Wooten) · filed 2010-01-05(a)(6)

As a result, all of these circumstances indicate Wooten’s conversion of the equipment pledged as collateral to Ocean Equity was not an innocent, negligent, or reckless conversion, but rather was done willfully and maliciously and intended to deprive Ocean Equity of the benefit of its equipment collateral when Wooten’s Auto Service failed.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a nondischargeability claim based on a fraudulent transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor; constructive fraud alone is insufficient.

Mutual Management Services, Inc. v. Fairgrieves (In Re Fairgrieves) · filed 2010-01-25(a)(6)

A fraudulent transfer which is merely constructively fraudulent will not satisfy Section 523(a)(6), which requires proof of intent to harm and proof of malice. However, a fraudulent transfer based on actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor can support a Section 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts derivative damages from discharge when injury to those claimants was certain to result from a willful and malicious act against someone else.

Jendusa-Nicolai Ex Rel. Dunphy v. Larsen (In Re Larsen) · filed 2010-01-29(a)(6)

Injury to the derivative plaintiffs was foreseeable and certain to occur as a direct result of the debtor’s malicious act. That is enough to except the damages from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor caused injury with a subjective motive to harm or with an objective substantial certainty of harm.

Wallace v. Perry (In Re Perry) · filed 2010-02-03(a)(6)

This Court concludes that the actions described supra, and throughout this opinion, satisfy the willful and malicious requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because Perry’s acts evidence a subjective motive to cause harm or, in the alternative, his actions had an objective substantial certainty of harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires separate proof of willful and malicious injury to except a conversion debt from discharge.

Lucas v. Becker (In Re Becker) · filed 2010-02-22(a)(6)

“Willfulness” and “maliciousness” are two separate elements which must be proven separately to meet the statutory requirements of § 523(a)(6). ... Accordingly, § 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge the debt based on the conversion of the $6,500.00; and no debt to Plaintiff or Decedent’s Probate Estate exists pertaining to the Vehicle for which an exception to discharge may apply.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for intentional sexual misconduct that is substantially certain to injure the patient.

Taylor v. Fechnay (In Re Fechnay) · filed 2010-03-05(a)(6)

The Debtor’s conduct was deliberate and amounted to an intentional tort that had a substantial certainty of causing injury to the Plaintiff. Therefore, his liability for his conduct is a nondis-chargeable debt for “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a malpractice debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct was negligent or reckless rather than wilful.

Greenwood v. Dickhaus (In Re Dickhaus) · filed 2010-03-16(a)(6)

However, based on the facts, this Court concludes that Debtor’s actions constitute negligence and perhaps recklessness — which undoubtedly makes Debtor liable for legal malpractice — but Debtor did not act wilfully within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a judgment debt for conversion of property that constitutes willful and malicious injury.

Kasishke v. Frank (In Re Frank) · filed 2010-03-05(a)(6)

Conversion of property clearly falls within the misdeeds contemplated in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) — willful and malicious injury to persons or property. For these wrongs, the state court awarded Mr. Kasishke a judgment in the amount of $419,074.85, plus interest. For the reasons given in this opinion, that Judgment is entitled to issue-preclusive effect, and warrants a declaration from this court that the debt represented by the Judgment should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury to another’s property when the injury is willful and malicious.

Lou Robustelli Marketing Services, Inc. v. Robustelli (In Re Robustelli) · filed 2010-04-06(a)(6)

Consequently, the Court concludes that Jim’s breach of fiduciary duties in retaining the telephone number and address book and in copying the client list constituted a willful and malicious injury to the property of LRMS and that its claim for damages, as described above, is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor intended the injury or was substantially certain it would occur.

Fultz v. Wings (In Re Wings) · filed 2010-04-16(a)(6)

Thus, to prove willfulness under Section 523(a)(6), Plaintiff is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Debtor either desired for Plaintiff to suffer injury, or that Debtor was substantially certain that Plaintiff would suffer injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except rental property damage from discharge without a willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

Ward v. West (In Re West) · filed 2010-04-27(a)(6)

At the same time, under the circumstances as they exist in this case, the Debtor’s disrespectful treatment of the Plaintiffs property cannot be said to rise to the level of a willful and malicious injury for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another, and findings from a state court judgment may establish those elements.

Lopez v. Emergency Service Restoration · filed 2010-04-29(a)(6)

Although we do not decide whether a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation of trade secrets under California law will always meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), it is clear that the requirements were met in this case.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury the debtor intended or knew was substantially certain to occur, if the debtor had no just cause or excuse.

Hermosilla v. Hermosilla (In Re Hermosilla) · filed 2010-05-26(a)(6)

Therefore, construing Geiger and Printy together, I find that for a debt to be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the creditor must show that: (1) the creditor suffered an injury; (2) the injury was the result the debtor’s actions; (3) the debtor intended to cause the injury or that there was a substantial certainty that the injury would occur; and (4) the debtor had no just cause or excuse for the action resulting in injury.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a contempt debt when the debtor’s violation of a court order was substantially certain to injure the creditor.

Musilli and Baumgardner v. Droomers · filed 2010-06-03(a)(6)

The appellants directly violated the court order and have offered no legitimate justification that might explain why their actions were not willful and malicious. Therefore, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment for Droomers on her claim that the debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury the debtor intended to cause.

Farm Credit Services of Mid-America, PCA v. Marklin (In Re Marklin) · filed 2010-06-04(a)(6)

The Marklins’ intentional actions in using the crop proceeds for their own benefit meet the standard for a willful and malicious injury to Farm Credit. Accordingly, the debt is nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for conversion of collateral when the debtor did not intend to injure the creditor and injury was not substantially certain to result.

Bazemore v. Lovvorn (In Re Lovvorn) · filed 2010-06-07(a)(6)

These facts alone persuade the Court that the Loworns did not intend to injure Plaintiff and that injury was not substantially certain to result from their actions. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to prove the willful prong of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another’s property, including by knowingly removing fixtures that belong to another.

West Michigan Community Bank v. Wierenga (In Re Wierenga) · filed 2010-06-14(a)(6)

Having reviewed the facts and law presented before the court, there is no genuine issue of fact as to Mr. Wierenga’s liability under § 523(a)(6), and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The removal of the various Improvements qualified as a willful and malicious injury to the property of another, and the uncontested evidence in support of the Motion permits the court to find that the Plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of $25,000.00.

Section 523(a)(6) requires malicious as well as willful conduct to except an injury debt from discharge.

Kay Berry, Inc. v. Pearman (In Re Pearman) · filed 2010-06-23(a)(6)

Kay Berry has not sustained its burden; it has demonstrated that Ms. Pearman’s actions were willful, but not that they were malicious within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Judgment is denied on Count I of the Complaint.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable as to a debtor whose conduct was merely reckless and who did not knowingly participate in the injury.

Acuity, & Columbia Eye Consultants Optometry, Inc. v. Rodenbaugh (In Re Rodenbaugh) · filed 2010-07-15(a)(6)

Thus, to prove wilfulness under Section 523(a)(6), Plaintiffs are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that Darren desired for Plaintiffs to be harmed and thus conspired with Lisa to this end or that Darren knew of Lisa’s crimes and schemed with her to this end despite substantial certainty that Plaintiffs would suffer harm as a result of Lisa’s actions. The facts do not support a conclusion in the affirmative in either of these scenarios.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence of the debtor’s state of mind before an unauthorized sale of collateral can be found malicious.

GMAC Inc. v. Coley (In Re Coley) · filed 2010-07-29(a)(6)

Some evidence regarding the circumstances in which the asserted misappropriation took place is essential to support a finding of malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury beyond intentional interference with a contract; that tort finding alone does not establish a willful and malicious injury.

Guerra & Moore Ltd., L.L.P. v. Cantu · filed 2010-08-04(a)(6)

We think that Cantu’s tortious “interference” with Guerra & Moore’s contract is not, by itself, a sufficient “injury” for purposes of the § 523(a)(6) analysis. Thus, though the jury found that Cantu intentionally interfered with Guerra & Moore’s contract, that finding, standing alone, does not establish a “willful and malicious injury” so as to except the state court judgment from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes a willful and malicious injury.

In re: Nicole Phillips v. · filed 2010-08-20(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court’s holding after trial that the debt reflected in the state court judgment arose from the willful and malicious conduct of Appellant Mrs. Phillips, and is therefore nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), is AFFIRMED.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a debtor's willful and malicious injury to another person or property.

Phillips v. Weissert (In Re Phillips) · filed 2010-08-20(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court's holding after trial that the debt reflected in the state court judgment arose from the willful and malicious conduct of Appellant Mrs. Phillips, and is therefore nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), is AFFIRMED.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes an injury with an objective certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.

ExpressDrop, Inc. v. Mateyko (In Re Mateyko) · filed 2010-09-27(a)(6)

An injury is willful and malicious within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) where there is either an objective certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523 does not except damages for simple negligence from discharge.

Hutchinson v. Republic Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Hutchinson) · filed 2010-08-13

None of the subsections contained in that provision of the Code would make the damages for simple negligence non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt from discharge even when the creditor is not the person directly injured by the debtor’s willful and malicious act.

Drewes v. Levin (In Re Levin) · filed 2010-09-03(a)(6)

There is nothing in section 523(a) requiring that the injured individual be the person whose debt is excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a contempt judgment nondischargeable only if the debtor’s conduct was both willful and malicious, as determined from the surrounding circumstances.

Liddell v. Peckham (In Re Peckham) · filed 2010-09-13(a)(6)

This Court concludes that in the absence of collateral estoppel, the contempt judgment must be based on conduct of the debtor that is both willful and malicious for that judgment to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), and that the surrounding circumstances will determine the true nature of the debtor’s conduct, without regard to whether the contempt order was compensatory or imposed to uphold the dignity of the court.

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful and malicious injury exception applies to individual debtors, not corporate debtors.

Jones v. PILGRIM'S PRIDE, INC. · filed 2010-09-28(a)(6)

However, as Pilgrim’s Pride has clarified multiple times, controlling authority confirms that the willful and malicious injury exception contained in § 523(a)(6) applies to individual debtors, not corporate ones. ... Therefore, as a matter of law, § 523 cannot save Mr. Jones’s ADA lawsuit.

An injury caused by cybersquatting trade names can amount to willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Panda Herbal International, Inc. v. Luby (In Re Luby) · filed 2010-09-30(a)(6)

So any finding of an injury caused by cyber-squatting the Plaintiffs’ trade names would also constitute a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except debts based on fraud from discharge; those debts must qualify under section 523(a)(2).

Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Jahelka (In Re Jahelka) · filed 2010-10-27(a)(6)

Count V is based on the same fraud allegations as the rest of the amended complaint, and section 523(a)(6) does not apply to debts based on fraud.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of an intended injury; spending funds subject to a citation is insufficient without proof that the debtor understood he was spending non-exempt funds in violation of it.

Crowell v. Porayko (In Re Porayko) · filed 2010-12-07(a)(6)

To constitute “willfulness” Porayko must have intended to violate the Citation’s prohibition on the transfer of non-exempt assets. “Intent to injure” assumes that Po-rayko understood the exemptions to which he was entitled. Porayko could only have deliberately violated the Citation if he understood he was spending non-exempt money.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when deliberate, unjustified conduct is substantially certain to cause injury.

Estate of DiSabato v. DiGiovanni (In Re DiGiovanni) · filed 2011-01-20(a)(6)

The existence of the successive CP Court Orders, two of which held the Debtor in contempt of court, coupled with the evidence of his neglectful behavior prior to the entry of those Orders, leads me to conclude that the Debtor knew with substantial certainty that his deliberate, ongoing inaction and delay, for which he had no justifiable excuse, would result in adverse financial consequences to the Estate. Therefore, I find that his debt to the Plaintiffs is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both a willful injury and malicious conduct; a willful injury alone does not except a debt from discharge.

Hidy v. Bullard (In Re Bullard) · filed 2011-01-21(a)(6)

Because there was not sufficient evidence for the Court to find that the Defendant’s actions were malicious, the requirements of § 523(a)(6) are not satisfied, and the debt is not excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person or that person’s property.

Zamora v. Jacobs (In Re Jacobs) · filed 2011-01-25(a)(6)

In addition to the requisite intent under section 523(a)(6), the undisputed facts establish that the Defendant acted “in conscious disregard of [his] duties” and “without just cause or excuse,” thus satisfying the malice element of the statutory exception. Accordingly, the court concludes that the portion of the debt in connection with the unpaid wages, the deductions for health insurance, and the withdrawal of funds from the Plan is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a secured creditor by selling real property collateral without the creditor’s consent or knowledge.

Fidelity National Title Insurance v. Garcia (In Re Garcia) · filed 2011-02-09(a)(6)

The Court now slightly extends this reasoning to the sale of real property collateral without notice to the secured party. Garcia’s sale of Fidelity’s collateral, without first providing notice to Fidelity, was deliberate, harmed Fidelity, and was willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor intended to cause an injury, not merely that the debtor intentionally acted in a way that caused one.

First Weber Group, Inc. v. Horsfall (In Re Horsfall) · filed 2011-03-01(a)(6)

As explained by the Geiger Court, to fall within § 523(a)(6) there must be evidence that the Defendant intended to cause an injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a willful and malicious injury, even if the creditor owed the debt is someone other than the injured person.

Larsen v. Jendusa-Nicolai · filed 2010-12-30(a)(6)

There is nothing in section 523(a) requiring that the injured individual be the person whose debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). Section 523(a)(6) requires only that there be a debt owing by the debtor and that such debt be “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion of another person’s property when the conversion is a willful and malicious injury.

Hoffman Ex Rel. Estate of Hoffman v. Anstead (In Re Anstead) · filed 2011-01-12(a)(6)

As such, the Defendant’s conversion of the Plaintiffs property rises to the level so as to constitute a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). As such, the two judgments entered against the Defendant are nondischargeable debts for purposes of bankruptcy law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor intends the injury and acts with knowing disregard for the injured person’s rights.

Reed v. Owens (In Re Owens) · filed 2011-03-17(a)(6)

Therefore, all three elements required to deem a debt nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Code are met. The debt Defendant Stephen R. Owens owes to Plaintiff David C. Reed is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when admitted facts establish intent to cause harm and actual injury.

Hermosilla v. Hermosilla · filed 2011-03-21(a)(6)

It boggles the mind to think that Alex could admit, as a fact not requiring proof, that he “intended to cause and did cause Cristina physical harm and pain,” and then later argue that there were questions as to injury and intent precluding summary judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor neither intended the injury nor knew it was substantially certain to occur.

Bordelon v. Boring (In Re Boring) · filed 2011-03-22(a)(6)

In combination, the evidence establishes that the debtor’s actions leading to Bordelon’s claim against him were not willful and malicious within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and so the debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s property, including by deliberately impairing its lien rights.

Community Schools Credit Union v. Nolen (In Re Nolen) · filed 2011-04-11(a)(6)

One type of debt that is excepted from discharge is debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... For reasons discussed above, Nolen owes the entire debt to Community, and that debt will be declared nondischargeable by separate Judgment order.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor knowingly sells a creditor’s collateral and fails to remit the proceeds, causing willful and malicious injury.

Automotive Finance Corp. v. Rigoroso (In Re Rigoroso) · filed 2011-04-25(a)(6)

Clearly, Debtor actively participated both in the sale of the vehicles under lien to Plaintiff and the subsequent failure to repay Plaintiff for those vehicles. Debtor presented no evidence or argument that he should not be held personally liable for Old Towne’s debt. Debtor is personally liable for the debt owed to Plaintiff, and that debt is nondischargeable in his chapter 7 case under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly misappropriates a customer’s project funds for personal expenses in conscious disregard of his duties.

Stephens v. Morrison (In Re Morrison) · filed 2011-05-27(a)(6)

From the moment he began spending Stephens’s money on expenses other than for the job, he had to have known, with substantial certainty, that he was misappropriating Stephens’s funds for his own use. ... When he failed to work on the project and then spent Stephens’s money on his personal expenses, he acted in conscious disregard of his duties without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the debtor intended harm or harm was objectively substantially certain, unless the conduct was sufficiently justified.

Wise v. Peterson · filed 2011-06-08(a)(6)

Under either test, the Debt- or’s conduct was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Van Daele Bros. v. Thoms (In Re Thoms) · filed 2011-06-08(a)(6)

In summary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that Debtor committed deliberate or intentional acts which were substantially certain to cause Plaintiff harm or targeted at Plaintiff. ... Willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) is difficult to establish. This record does not reach the required level of proof.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove maliciousness.

Hidy v. Bullard (In Re Bullard) · filed 2011-06-14(a)(6)

Because we affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision that collateral estoppel was inapplicable and we do not see clear error in the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Debtor did not act with maliciousness for the purposes of § 523(a)(6), the debt owed by the Debtor to the Creditor is not excepted from the Debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when debtors willfully and maliciously injure a secured creditor by spending its collateral proceeds on personal expenses without just cause or excuse.

Farm Service Agency v. Jackson (In Re Jackson) · filed 2011-05-10(a)(6)

Thus, Jacksons’ use of the $7,000 in FSA security proceeds was malicious and FSA is entitled to judgment excepting that amount from Debtors’ discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the injury was objectively substantially certain or the debtor intended to cause it.

Lytle v. Weber (In Re Weber) · filed 2011-07-06(a)(6)

The evidence supports a finding that Kim Weber knew with substantial certainty that her actions would harm the plaintiffs. The evidence also shows that Kim Weber intended this harm. The plaintiffs have proven that the Kim Weber’s debt to them is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except unpaid wages from discharge merely because the debtor violated a wage law; the creditor must establish willful and malicious injury.

Orr v. Marcella (In re Marcella) · filed 2011-07-06(a)(6)

A breach of contract, or in this case, the violation of a strict liability statute, without conduct akin to an intentional tort, is not sufficient to render a debt nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to result.

Musich v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 2011-07-11(a)(6)

For a debt to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), “the debtor must desire to cause the consequences of his act or believe that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes an attorney’s fee award nondischargeable when it arises from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Jan S. Weinstein & Associates, Ltd. v. Lymberopoulos (In Re Lymberopoulos) · filed 2011-07-13(a)(6)

The debt in issue herein arises out of the underlying conduct of the Debtor which caused a willful and malicious injury. Because the judgment is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury, the attorney’s fee award is also nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the creditor or its property; a passing reference in a complaint does not preserve an unsupported claim.

Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz (In Re Ritz) · filed 2011-08-04(a)(6)

The record is wholly devoid of any proof that the Debtor willfully and maliciously injured Husky or Husky’s property. While Husky’s complaint makes a glancing reference to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), that alone is not enough to preserve a claim under this provision — no exhibits were introduced, no testimony was adduced, and no briefing was done relating to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) allows a willful and malicious injury claim when a debtor knowingly spends funds earmarked for another’s project for personal benefit.

Wilson Family Foods, Inc. v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 2011-08-04(a)(6)

Mrs. Brown’s spending money for her personal benefit (an intentional or deliberate act) she knew to be earmarked for a Wilson construction project (wrongfully and without just cause) fits the elements for nondischargeability due to willful and malicious injury. Thus the Court cannot dismiss this count for failure to state a claim.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a property damage debt from discharge only when the creditor proves willful and malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tompkins v. Rogowski (In Re Rogowski) · filed 2011-08-19(a)(6)

The elements of § 523(a)(6) having failed to be established by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court concludes that the debt arising out of the state court default judgment, and as a result of the property damages underlying the controversy, is not excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) except debts for actual fraud and willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Guttman v. Fabian (In Re Fabian) · filed 2011-09-13(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

The judgment in favor of Guttman as Chapter 11 Trustee is nondis-chargeable as to Count 1, for fraud and misrepresentation against the Chapter 11 Trustee, the estate of SPI and its creditors, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A); and as to Count 4, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), for willful and malicious injury to SPI, its bankruptcy estate and its creditors.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for conversion from discharge when the creditor had no property interest in the payments allegedly converted.

Structured Investments Co. v. Dunlap (In Re Dunlap) · filed 2011-09-13(a)(6)

Thus, because SICO had no property interest in the Pension Payments at the time the parties entered into the Agreement, SICO cannot maintain a claim of nondischarge-ability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and Count Five also must be dismissed.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury or was substantially certain it would occur; possible transmission of HPV without that intent does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Cragen v. Maxwell (In Re Maxwell) · filed 2011-09-14(a)(6)

Even if it could be scientifically proven that Debtor indeed caused Plaintiff to contract HPV, as articulated by the court in In re L.F.S., without Debtor acting with the intent to do so, or acting with substantial certainty that Plaintiff would contract HPV, the wilfulness requirement of Section 523(a)(6) cannot be met.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally takes another’s funds knowing the taking will harm the rightful beneficiaries.

Guzick Ex Rel. Estate of Nyberg v. Nyberg (In Re Nyberg) · filed 2011-10-12(a)(6)

He knew that he would be reducing George’s trust and estate by as much as he took from it, and he knew that the proper beneficiaries and heirs of George’s trust and estate would be harmed in kind. And, Louis knew that he was not a beneficiary or heir of George’s trust and estate. All of the elements of § 523(a)(6) are satisfied with respect to the $226,524.39 removed from George’s accounts within days of his death.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages and attorney’s fees from discharge when prior essential findings establish a willful and malicious injury.

Rigoni Di Asiago S.P.A. v. Mucci (In Re Mucci) · filed 2011-10-14(a)(6)

Accordingly, the court concludes that the foregoing establishes that both the Damages Award and the Attorney Fee Award were for “willful and malicious injury” within the purview of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful injury; a Michigan conversion judgment does not by itself establish that requirement.

McCallum v. Pixley (In Re McCallum) · filed 2011-10-18(a)(6)

For all of these reasons, the issue of whether Pixley’s injury to McCallum’s property was “willful” was not “necessarily determined” by the default judgment against Pixley. As a result, the Court cannot grant summary judgment for McCallum on her non-dischargeability fraud claim under § 523(a)(6), based on collateral estoppel.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment establishes that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

McCurdie v. Strozewski (In Re Strozewski) · filed 2011-10-18(a)(6)

Thus, the state court judgment for intentional infliction of emotional distress necessarily compels the conclusion that the elements of “willful and malicious” injury under § 523(a)(6) are met.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor subjectively intended to cause injury or harm.

Terhune v. Houser (In Re Houser) · filed 2011-10-29(a)(6)

A non-dischargeability determination under § 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to have a subjective intent to cause injury or harm. The record does not support such a finding, and Plaintiff has failed to establish that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor intended to injure the creditor before a debt arising from missing collateral can be excepted from discharge.

Van Daele Bros. v. Thoms (In Re Thoms) · filed 2011-12-22(a)(6)

The record is devoid of any affirmative evidence that Thoms sold or otherwise disposed of the missing cattle with the intent to harm Van Daele (personally or Van Daele Bros., Inc.), which evidence is necessary to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes sanctions nondischargeable when state court findings establish that the debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

Hayes v. Kanouff (In Re Hayes) · filed 2012-01-10(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly concluded that the sanctions imposed by the Washington state court constituted nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), given the state court findings that Hayes’s actions were willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts resulting from willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Smith v. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. (In Re Smith) · filed 2012-01-10(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly determined that the debt in question resulted from a willful and malicious injury and therefore was not subject to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor caused willful and malicious injury; preclusive state court findings can establish those elements.

Clearview Designs, Inc. v. Angelilli (In re Angelilli) · filed 2012-01-11(a)(6)

Based on the findings by the Mahoning Court, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As a consequence, the Mahoning Judgment is not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes debts for willful and malicious injury by a debtor to another entity nondischargeable.

Cagney v. Smith (In Re Cagney) · filed 2012-01-23(a)(6)

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court properly determined that the debt to Smith resulting from the aggravated assault was nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when an intentional breach of contract is accompanied by tortious conduct that causes willful and malicious injury.

Whited v. Galindo (In Re Galindo) · filed 2012-02-01(a)(6)

However, Galindo’s breach of contract was accompanied by tortious or unlawful conduct that resulted in willful and malicious injury. In these circumstances, the resulting debt is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Shriners Hospital for Children v. Bauman (In re Bauman) · filed 2012-02-08(a)(6)

Even if the Plaintiff had identified specific acts committed by the Defendant which resulted in injury to the Plaintiff, there has been nothing offered to show that the Defendant actually intended to harm the Plaintiff, knew that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct, or intentionally committed a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Because the Plaintiff failed to make any showing at all on any of the elements of its claim under section 523(a)(6), summary judgment was entered for the Defendant on Count II. That Judgment was properly entered.

Section 523(a)(6) can except litigation costs from discharge when a debtor’s bad-faith claim causes willful and malicious injury to a creditor.

Rapid Settlements Ltd v. Shcolnik · filed 2012-02-09(a)(6)

Viewed in light of our precedents, there is a genuine, material fact issue for trial. Shcolnik’s behavior resulted in willful and malicious injury if his claims of ownership were made in bad faith as a pretense to extract money from the Appellants.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s property rights, including by intentionally diverting earmarked funds without just cause.

Bello Paradiso, LLC v. Hatch (In re Hatch) · filed 2012-02-12(a)(6)

Mr. Hatch also acted “maliciously” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and the case law interpreting that statute. To find that a debtor acted “maliciously” the court must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused the injury which gave rise to the debt at issue “in conscious disregard of one’s duties or without just cause or excuse.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure or substantial certainty of injury; a judgment that may rest on reckless disregard does not establish willfulness.

In Re Bradley · filed 2012-03-07(a)(6)

In order for collateral estoppel to compel entry of a judgment in her favor under § 523(a)(6), it was incumbent on B.B. to introduce a record demonstrating that the California court finally and necessarily determined that Bradley either intended to cause her injury or that he was substantially certain his intentional acts would cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a fraudulent transfer debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s property interest in collecting a judgment.

Maxfield v. Jennings · filed 2012-02-22(a)(6)

Because Maxfield satisfied the elements of § 523(a)(6) by showing that Janice willfully and maliciously injured his property, the district court properly concluded that the fraudulent transfer was not dischargeable as part of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from conversion from discharge only if the conversion causes a willful and malicious injury.

AgChoice Farm Credit, ACA v. Glenn (In Re Glenn) · filed 2012-03-20(a)(6)

An act of conversion that injures a party is excepted from discharge only if the act produces a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, including liability for trademark infringement that meets that standard.

Partners for Health & Home, L.P. v. Seung Wee Yang · filed 2012-03-30(a)(6)

Because Yang’s infringements were willful and malicious, and because Yang did not notify Plaintiff of his bankruptcy petition and Plaintiff did not know about Yang’s bankruptcy until after his bankruptcy case was closed, Yang’s liabilities as found herein are non-dis-chargeable, and could not have been, and were not, discharged by his 2009 bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury; legal fees caused by a debtor’s delay do not qualify without intent to harm the creditor.

Lafarge North America, Inc. v. Poffenberger (In re Poffenberger) · filed 2012-03-30(a)(6)

Any legal fees incurred by La-farge as a result of the Debtor’s dilatory actions was a consequence of the Debtor’s actions, but not the intended purpose of his actions. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to prove that the Debtor’s actions constitutes a willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor’s willful and malicious injury, including a knowing refusal to divide marital assets that causes economic injury.

Shankle v. Shankle (In re Shankle) · filed 2012-03-30(a)(6)

In the proceeding before this court, there is no question but that the defendant willfully refused to divide the three marital accounts with the plaintiff. The defendant is a well educated individual and obviously knew that his failure to comply with the chancery court divorce decree and the other state court orders would cause the plaintiff economic injury. As such, the defendant’s conduct amounts to a willful and malicious injury as contemplated by § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for an injury the debtor inflicted knowing there was no legal justification and either intending the injury or knowing it was highly likely to result.

Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen · filed 2012-04-18(a)(6)

But whatever the semantic confusion, we imagine that all courts would agree that a willful and malicious injury, precluding discharge in bankruptcy of the debt created by the injury, is one that the injurer inflicted knowing he had no legal justification and either desiring to inflict the injury or knowing it was highly likely to result from his act.

Section 523(a)(6) allows a claim for willful and malicious injury to proceed when the alleged conduct was wrongful, without just cause, and substantially certain to cause the identified injuries.

Collins v. Ryckman · filed 2012-04-19(a)(6)

To survive the Motion to Dismiss in this adversary proceeding, the factual allegations, separated from all legal conclusions, in the Complaint must be sufficient to demonstrate willful and malicious injury pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Accepting as true that the Debtor participated in the illegal scheme, this Court concludes the allegations are sufficient to demonstrate conduct that was (1) wrongful and without just cause and (2) substantially certain to result in the specific injuries identified.

For financial injuries under § 523(a)(6), substantial certainty is assessed subjectively: the debtor must have known the act was substantially certain to cause injury.

Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. v. Kane (In Re Kane) · filed 2012-05-10(a)(6)

There is some disagreement among the courts as to whether the substantial certainty standard is a subjective standard, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew the act was substantially certain to cause injury, or an objective standard, requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s act was substantially certain to cause injury without regard to the defendant’s actual belief or knowledge in this regard. ... For this reason, the Court applies the subjective standard in the present case.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except property damage from discharge when the debtors neither caused the damage nor intended to allow another person to cause it.

First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n v. Hansen (In re Hansen) · filed 2012-04-06(a)(6)

The court finds that there was significant damage done to the residence, but that it was not done by the Debtors. Further, the court finds there was no intention on the part of the Debtors to allow Mr. Hixon to injure the property; therefore, the Bank’s request to deny the discharge-ability of the losses caused by manufacture of methamphetamine in the residence will be DENIED.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended to cause the injury; a failure to meet a duty of care is insufficient.

Blosser v. Boggus (In re Boggus) · filed 2012-05-21(a)(6)

Stated differently, Section 523(a)(6) addresses only those situations in which a debtor desired the injury caused by his conduct. It does not reach a debtor’s failure to meet a duty of care that results in injury to someone else.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury; inaction or recklessness alone does not establish willful and malicious injury.

Richards v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2012-05-23(a)(6)

Without evidence from which the Court may reasonably conclude that the Defendant intended that the Plaintiff should suffer those injuries, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs State Court judgment against the Defendant is a debt for willful and malicious injury as required under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and it is appropriate to grant the Defendant’s Rule 52(c) motion for judgment on partial findings.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from an assault nondischargeable when the assault caused willful and malicious injury.

Savage v. Murphy (In Re Murphy) · filed 2012-06-05(a)(6)

Accordingly, this Court concludes it must give full faith and credit to the default judgment obtained in Jefferson Circuit Court finding this debt resulted from the Defendant’s willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff. The debt is therefore nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make an existing debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor later takes actions that make collection more difficult.

Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian) · filed 2012-06-07(a)(6)

Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Adalian’s debt to Jou is for willful and malicious injury; rather, the debt was created when Adalian borrowed money from Jou in 1991 and 1992. Actions taken later which may have made repayment of the initial debt more difficult cannot make the debt itself one for willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes the entire debt nondischargeable when a debtor’s participation in a conspiracy to convert stolen property causes willful and malicious injury.

In re: Thomas Cottingham v. · filed 2012-06-15(a)(6)

Thomas Cottingham’s conspiracy in the conversion of Plaintiff’s assets constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff and the entire debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes the entire debt nondischargeable when a debtor’s participation in a conspiracy to convert stolen property causes willful and malicious injury.

Ewers v. Cottingham (In re Cottingham) · filed 2012-06-15(a)(6)

Thomas Cottingham’s conspiracy in the conversion of Plaintiffs assets constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff and the entire debt is nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sexual harassment judgment from discharge when the debtor intentionally caused an injury that was wrongful and without just cause or excuse.

Basile v. Spagnola (In re Spagnola) · filed 2012-06-18(a)(6)

The debt should be excepted from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code because the Debtor caused the Plaintiff “willful and malicious” injury.

Section 523(a)(6) covers an intentional transfer of funds when the debtor necessarily intended the resulting injury.

Fabian v. Guttman (In re Fabian) · filed 2012-07-19(a)(6)

Here, however, Fabian could not intend the act without not also intending the consequences of that act. The Bankruptcy Court found, based upon the Plea Agreement and other evidence, that Fabian intentionally transferred funds from SPI to himself with no intention to repay those funds. Those intentional acts, by necessity, would harm SPI and its creditors. Intending the act in this context is intending the injury and to argue otherwise is pure sophistry.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury; negligence is insufficient.

Morris v. General Brown · filed 2012-07-23(a)(6)

At most, Brown’s liability with respect to Morris and Lynch is grounded in negligence, which is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an unpaid debt from discharge when the creditor identifies no intentional tort causing injury.

Montgomery Bank, N.A. v. Steger · filed 2012-06-14(a)(6)

Bank did not identify–and indeed has yet to identify–a tort on which its § 523(a)(6) claim might be predicated.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury caused by a debtor’s knowing diversion of a creditor’s collateral.

Enterprise Bank v. Hannan (In re Hannan) · filed 2012-08-24(a)(6)

The injury to Enterprise was willful and malicious pursuant to § 523(a)(6). ... Therefore, in the alternative to denial of discharge under § 727, the amount of $22,285 owed to Enterprise is otherwise nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires separate findings of willfulness and maliciousness; a copyright judgment that did not determine maliciousness does not establish nondischargeability by collateral estoppel.

Sailor Music v. Walker (In re Walker) · filed 2012-09-13(a)(6)

Nonetheless, even if this Court were to conclude that the District Court’s considerations of willfulness were sufficiently similar so as to constitute willfulness under Section 523(a)(6), there was no determination as to maliciousness by the District Court as it was not required to make any such determination. Willfulness and maliciousness are two distinct elements of Section 523(a)(6). As such, the federal collateral estoppel requirements cannot be met and Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on that basis.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures another’s property through a wrongful act done without justification or excuse.

Sonny Penix v. Parra (In re Parra) · filed 2012-09-18(a)(6)

This Court concludes that the “malicious” component of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires an intentional, wrongful act, done without justification or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Rodrigues v. Osorno (In re Osorno) · filed 2012-09-19(a)(6)

Similarly, the Plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence that would support a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), which requires proof of a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s security interest by diverting collateral proceeds.

Thompson v. Barbee (In re Barbee) · filed 2012-09-25(a)(6)

I find contrary to his agreement with Plaintiffs, Debtor intended to permanently deprive the Plaintiffs of their property interest in the collateral. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case and observing Debtor’s demean- or, I find Debtor acted willfully and maliciously intending to injure Plaintiffs and therefore $44,462.27 is excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge statutory damages and attorneys’ fees traceable to a debtor’s willful and malicious injury, even without proof of the amount of actual damages.

HER, Inc. v. Barlow (In re Barlow) · filed 2012-09-26(a)(6)

Second, despite the Plaintiffs’ decision not to prove the extent of their actual damages, the statutory damages and attorneys’ fees that the District Court awarded them constitute a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the willful and malicious injury gave rise to the debt.

Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian) · filed 2012-11-05(a)(6)

The injury must give rise to the debt, not vice versa. Since the debt was incurred prior to the alleged injurious actions by the Defendant, it is not rendered non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

A prior jury’s findings can establish willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Gerard v. Gerard (In re Gerard) · filed 2012-11-05(a)(6)

Although Michael’s assertions about the jury’s conclusions have some merit, and the Court commends the efforts of both counsel, the Court holds that the findings of the jury correspond to the elements of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court will therefore grant Kevin and Margaret’s Motion for Summary Judgment.