11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor claiming conversion of money to show a possessory right or property interest in that money.

Maguire Bros., LLC v. Bellamy (In re Bellamy) · filed 2012-12-07(a)(6)

For there to be “conversion” of money under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff first must demonstrate that it has a possessory right or property interest in the money.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a spoliation sanction nondischargeable when the debtor deliberately destroys evidence knowing that doing so is substantially certain to injure the creditor.

Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates (In re Kates) · filed 2012-12-18(a)(6)

The Debtor voluntarily and deliberately destroyed evidence when he was aware of both his duty to preserve the evidence and the substantial certainty that his conduct would injure the Plaintiffs (by depriving them of access to relevant evidence). It follows that the debt for the injury suffered by the Plaintiffs, which includes the attorney’s fees and costs they incurred in obtaining a judicial remedy, is a nondis-chargeable debt for willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional interference from discharge when a prior verdict necessarily establishes willful and malicious injury.

PLM Lake & Land Management Corp. v. Duy (In re Duy) · filed 2012-12-28(a)(6)

With those conclusions, Duy Sr. is es-topped from denying that his debt to PLM was “for willful and malicious injury,” to the extent that it was established by the Crow Wing County District Court’s award of damages for intentional interference. That component of the judgment-evidenced debt is excepted from discharge, by direct operation of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury or an injury substantially certain to result from the debtor’s actions; a genuine factual dispute about that element prevents summary judgment.

Smith Warehouse Holdings, Inc. v. Jaynes (In re Jaynes) · filed 2013-01-16(a)(6)

This dispute of fact is material as to whether Debtors intended to injure SWH or whether the injury was substantially certain to result from the Debtors’ sale of the collateral to Port City, which is a necessary element in a finding of willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. · filed 2013-01-18(a)(6)

Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in finding that the State Court Judgment was excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(6) because it arises from Appellants’ willful and malicious injury to Appel-lees.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the facts underlying a prior judgment establish willful and malicious injury.

Rocco v. Goldberg (In re Goldberg) · filed 2013-01-29(a)(6)

Absent such just cause or excuse, and for all of the other reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious and satisfies section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously converts payments assigned to a creditor.

Farmers Exchange Bank v. Roden (In re Roden) · filed 2013-01-30(a)(6)

The Court further finds after carefully reviewing the facts of this ease that Roden, serving as the managing member and sole employee of Lease Line, willfully and maliciously converted the lease payments assigned by Lease Line to FEB.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove both a willful injury and a malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Van Daele Bros., Inc. v. Thoms · filed 2013-02-04(a)(6)

For a debt to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), a creditor must show both a willful injury and a malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Johnson v. Weihert (In re Weihert) · filed 2013-02-06(a)(6)

The plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) on both their first and second causes of action.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; a finding of willful or knowing misconduct under Chapter 93A alone does not establish that requirement.

Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp. v. Swasey (In re Swasey) · filed 2013-02-14(a)(6)

An award of damages under Chapter 93A may stem from intentional or reckless conduct, and while the District Court laced its decision with derisive descriptions of the Debtor’s conduct, his intent to injure the Plaintiffs remains illusive because § 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not just an intentional or deliberate act that leads to injury (or a deliberate act that is unfair or deceptive).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a sanctions debt nondischargeable when a state court’s preclusive findings establish that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the creditor.

Cadles of Grassy Meadows, II, LLC v. Guthrie (In re Guthrie) · filed 2013-03-20(a)(6)

Because all four elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied, the Court finds that it is estopped from relitigating these issues. Consequently, the defendant’s $15,663.70 debt, by way of the state court’s order is not dischargeable in this case under section 523(a)(6).

Under § 523(a)(6), reliance on counsel’s advice need not be objectively reasonable to negate willful intent, though the advice’s reasonableness may help show whether the debtor actually relied on it.

Southeast Pennsylvania Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Gotwald (In re Gotwald) · filed 2013-03-26(a)(6)

The conclusion I draw from this analysis is that the reasonableness of the debtor’s reliance on that advice is not properly part of any “test” as to the viability of an advice of counsel “defense” in § 523(a)(6) proceedings under the “subjective” Conte test.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a fraudulent-transfer judgment from discharge even when the creditor’s claim began as a contract debt.

Desmarais v. Jhelum Enterprises, LLC · filed 2013-05-01(a)(6)

Debtor argued to the District Court that Florida’s fraudulent transfer statute is remedial and does not create an independent cause of action—that Creditor had nothing more than a debt arising from a breach of contract, and that such debts is not excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The court properly rejected his argument, holding that while Creditor’s claim originally arose out of contract, by virtue of Debtor’s wrongful conduct it ripened into a judgment for fraudulent transfer. Debtor now contends that the court erred in this holding, and we disagree.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to another person’s property from discharge; a pending separation or divorce does not excuse that conduct.

Roodhof v. Roodhof (In re Roodhof) · filed 2013-05-13(a)(6)

I follow this line of cases and hold that a pending separation or divorce is not an excuse for conduct that otherwise would satisfy § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury.

Suarez v. Barrett · filed 2013-06-20(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly determined that the debt in question resulted from a willful and malicious injury and therefore was not subject to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended or substantially certain injury; an admission to reckless assault and battery alone does not establish that requirement.

Cowart v. Elias (In re Elias) · filed 2013-07-03(a)(6)

Simply stated, “high degree of likelihood” and “probable harmful consequences,” as articulated by Correia above, are lower thresholds than the “substantial certainty” of harm required for willful injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when an intentional breach of contract is accompanied by willful and malicious tortious conduct.

Figueroa v. Barreto (In re Barreto) · filed 2013-07-12(a)(6)

As such, the breach of contract claim was accompanied by the willful and malicious conduct required for a finding of nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor’s willful and malicious diversion of proceeds subject to a creditor’s security interest.

Nakonetschny v. Rezykowski (In re Rezykowski) · filed 2013-06-19(a)(6)

Based on the evidence presented at trial, I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: the Debtor’s appropriation of the sale proceeds was wrongful; she caused a willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiffs property rights; and the debt to the Plaintiff arising therefrom is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debtor’s subjective intent to injure, or a belief that injury is substantially certain, for a debt arising from willful injury to be nondischargeable.

Coe v. Fanday (In Re Fanday) · filed 2013-08-16(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting Coe’s claim that the default judgment he secured against Fanday was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Coe presented no facts in support of a finding that Fanday’s decision to halt participation in the business was motivated by a subjective intent to injure him.

Section 523(a)(6)'s malice element is satisfied when debtors intentionally transfer collateral without just cause or excuse and thereby injure the creditor.

In re: Robert B. Manning and Jana D. Manning · filed 2013-08-19(a)(6)

LBS does not appeal that ruling and, in any event, we agree. Mannings admitted to selling the Vehicle to a third party in violation of the Contract, they did it intentionally without any just cause or excuse, and LBS was injured by the loss of the payments and the Vehicle.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property.

Condon Oil Co. v. Wood (In re Wood) · filed 2013-08-19(a)(6)

The court having made the findings of fact and reached the conclusions of law contained in the memorandum decision filed on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant-debtor’s obligations to the plaintiff are nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to the extent of the defendant-debtor’s liability for injury to the plaintiff as a result of the handwritten signs being taped over the credit card readers.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge only if the creditor proves a willful and malicious injury.

Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Schupbach (In re Schupbach) · filed 2013-09-10(a)(6)

Bank’s evidence is insufficient to find that Debtors caused injury to Bank by converting Bank’s property and, even if the evidence were sufficient to find such an injury, Bank has not proven that any damages it suffered were the result of a willful and malicious injury, as required for denial of discharge of its claim under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct for a debt arising from a breach of contract to be nondischargeable.

On v. Seokjun Hong (In re Seokjun Hong) · filed 2013-07-17(a)(6)

This court concurs with Judge Zagel’s conclusion that tortious conduct is required for a breach of contract to result in a nondischargeable debt, especially as the opposite line of cases may discourage efficient breaches of contract.

Section 523(a)(6) makes assault and battery damages nondischargeable when the state-law elements establish willful and malicious injury.

Link v. Mauz (In re Mauz) · filed 2013-08-28(a)(6)

I find that the state law elements for assault and battery satisfy the willful and malicious standard for non-dischargeability. Therefore, the Links’ Summary Judgment Motion is partially granted, in the amount of William Link’s damage claim of $1,500.00 for assault and battery.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when false accusations of a crime create an objective substantial certainty of harm and thus cause a willful and malicious injury.

McClendon v. Springfield · filed 2013-09-16(a)(6)

Upon de novo review, the Court finds that the false statements published by McClendon accusing Springfield of a crime created an objective substantial certainty of harm to — and thus inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon — Springfield.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of fraud, intent to deceive, justifiable reliance, and resulting loss; § 523(a)(6) requires actual intent to cause injury.

CNA Financial Corp. v. Flood (In re Flood) · filed 2013-09-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Looking first at the criteria in finding a willful and malicious injury (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)), the Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time the action was taken, there was actual intent to cause injury, and mere negligence is not sufficient. ... Moving next to the Plaintiffs fraud count (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)), the Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence four components, including that: (1) Defendant obtained money through false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud; (2) Defendant intended to deceive the Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff justifiably relied on the false representation or fraud; and (4) Plaintiffs reliance was the proximate cause of the loss.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contempt judgment debt from discharge when it results from a willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

Field v. Hughes-Birch (In re Hughes-Birch) · filed 2013-10-09(a)(6)

For all of the above stated reasons, the Court finds that Field has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt owed to the Estate, as determined by the Probate Court in the Contempt Judgments, is the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury to the Estate. Accordingly, the debt owed to the Estate, in the amount set forth in its proof of claim and in the Complaint, is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a conversion debt nondischargeable when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures the creditor.

Outlander Gravel v. Nietert (In re Nietert) · filed 2013-10-10(a)(6)

Because the debtor both willfully and maliciously injured Carrick Trucking, the Court further finds that the debt owed by the debtor to Carrick Trucking in the amount Of $115,885.00 is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts sanctions and damages from discharge when they arose from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Lowry v. Croft (In re Croft) · filed 2013-10-22(a)(6)

While the Court recognizes that it has already denied Defendant his discharge for multiple reasons under § 727, the Court finds that in the alternative that the sanctions awards are non-dischargea-ble under § 523(a)(6). ... Likewise, the damages awarded to the Plaintiff in the FCRA action are non-dis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove injury, intent to cause it or substantial certainty it would occur, and lack of justification or excuse.

Romano v. Defusco (In re Defusco) · filed 2013-10-29(a)(6)

To establish the elements of “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6), a creditor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) he suffered injury; 2) the debtor intended to cause the injury or there was substantial certainty the injury would occur [willfulness]; and 3) the debt- or had no justification or excuse for the action causing the injury [maliciousness].

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a negligence judgment and later property transfers that do not injure the creditor’s legal rights do not qualify.

Walker v. Alama (In re Alama) · filed 2013-10-29(a)(6)

As an initial matter, the Judgment itself, which was grounded on negligence, is not based upon any malicious and willful injury to the Plaintiffs. The fact that the Alamas sold the Bryan Road Property, their Florida Property, or that Ms. Alama purchased the Topside Drive Property and later transferred it to herself and her daughter do not satisfy the requirements of § 523(a)(6) because these actions occurred independent of the basis for the Judgment and occurred after the Judgment was entered.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and prior judicial findings can establish that the injury was willful and malicious.

In re: David Barlow v. · filed 2013-11-14(a)(6)

After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, the Panel concludes that the bankruptcy court properly gave the district court’s findings preclusive effect as to whether the district court judgment was the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Her, Inc. v. Barlow (In re Barlow) · filed 2013-11-14(a)(6)

After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, the Panel concludes that the bankruptcy court properly gave the district court’s findings preclusive effect as to whether the district court judgment was the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another’s property.

Gateway One Lending & Finance LLC v. Raziyan (In re Raziyan) · filed 2013-11-19(a)(6)

Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Raziyan should be held liable to Plaintiff on a nondischargeable basis under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury suffered by the $20,000 loss of Plaintiffs property.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willfulness and malicious intent for claims and related attorneys’ fees to be nondischargeable.

Ellison v. Hawthorne · filed 2013-11-26(a)(6)

Nor did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Counts 8 and 9 (non-dischargeability of claims, and non-dischargeability of attorneys’ fees, respectively, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)). Viewed in the light most favorable to Ellison, there is no genuine issue of material fact relevant to Hawthorne’s willfulness and malicious intent with respect to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor owes a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Vision Bank v. Harless (In re Harless) · filed 2013-11-27(a)(6)

To establish a prima facie case under § 523(a)(6), Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) there is a debt owed to Plaintiffs; (2) the debt owed is one for willful injury; and (3) the debt owed is one for malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from an injury that is both willful and malicious.

Woods v. Alexander (In re Alexander) · filed 2013-12-06(a)(6)

Therefore, to be non-dischargeable within the context of section 523(a)(6), a debt must arise from an injury that is both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a fraudulent transfer when the debtor intended to hinder a creditor’s collection and the conduct was malicious.

In re: Dennis Adrian Vazquez · filed 2013-12-13(a)(6)

The state court’s fraudulent transfer determination and its associated findings established both willfulness and maliciousness for purposes of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires facts showing that the debtor intended the injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct.

Heredia v. Enriguez (In re Enriguez) · filed 2014-01-23(a)(6)

Neither do the facts alleged suggest that the Debtor believed with substantial certainty that Heredia, or anyone else, would be injured as a result of his failure to maintain the dog’s enclosure and the fence around his yard.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, including related treble damages and attorney fees.

McCallum v. Pixley (In re Pixley) · filed 2014-01-24(a)(6)

The Court agrees with McCallum’s argument that, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998), the entire judgment amount, including the treble damages and attorney fee portion, is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended both the act and the resulting injury for a debt to be excepted from discharge.

Woodman v. Carroll (In re Carroll) · filed 2014-01-27(a)(6)

As was the case with Plaintiffs claim under § 523(a)(2)(A), there are not sufficient undisputed material facts to support a judgment on Plaintiffs § 523(a)(6) claim. Plaintiff has to prove that Defendant engaged in a “willful and malicious” act in which Defendant intended his actions and the resulting injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an attorney’s fee debt from discharge when the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct caused the creditor’s injury.

Tenet South Fulton, Inc. v. Demps (In re Demps) · filed 2014-01-27(a)(6)

The Court therefore concludes the attorney’s fees claim of South Fulton in the amount of $87,109.77 awarded by the arbitrator under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the creditor proves a willful and malicious injury.

Lewis v. Long (In re Long) · filed 2014-01-29(a)(6)

The Court must look at the evidence presented in the particular case to determine whether the plaintiff has proved the elements to a sufficient degree to except the debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In this case, the facts presented by Ms. Lewis were not sufficient to determine that the debt owed to her by Mr. Long was for a willful and malicious injury. Therefore, the debt Mr. Long owed her is not excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6).

A civil theft judgment can establish willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) when its findings necessarily establish the debtor’s intent to injure and malice.

C-Ball Ventures, LLC v. Oltmann (In re Oltmann) · filed 2014-02-06(a)(6)

The County Court’s judgment against the Defendant for civil theft necessarily establishes the Defendant’s willful and malicious injury to the property interest of the Plaintiff for the purposes of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor’s willful and malicious conduct causes an injury that is objectively substantially certain to occur.

Shankle v. Shankle · filed 2014-02-07(a)(6)

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court correctly exercised its discretion in finding that Michael’s repeated refusal to transfer marital assets, despite multiple contempt orders, constituted an objective substantial certainty of harm to Dianne and, as a result, a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury caused by a debtor’s knowing, unauthorized use of another person’s name and forged signature when the injury is substantially certain.

Salehsari v. Aalam (In re Aalam) · filed 2014-02-24(a)(6)

For the reasons stated above, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), any injury resulting to the Plaintiff from the Defendants’ unauthorized use of his name and the forgery of his signature on the Renewal Application will not be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury, including loss of property, from discharge.

Tucker v. Ellis (In re Ellis) · filed 2014-02-25(a)(6)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), debts arising from “willful and malicious injury” are excepted from § 727 discharge. ... Loss of property is among the types of “injury” contemplated by § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from conversion from discharge when the debtor’s conduct is willful and malicious.

American Asset Finance, LLC v. Feldman (In re Feldman) · filed 2014-03-06(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Count II states a claim for a non-dischargeable debt arising out of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the creditor proves that it resulted from a willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

deBenedictis v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty) · filed 2014-03-11(a)(6)

For all of the above stated reasons, the Court finds that deBenedictis failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt owed to her is the result of willful and malicious injury by the Debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Brown v. Ausley (In re Ausley) · filed 2014-03-18(a)(6)

In consideration of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this court that Brown has carried her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the required elements for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful and malicious when the debtor's conduct creates an objective substantial certainty of harm or the debtor has a subjective motive to cause harm.

Goaz v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. (In Re Goaz) · filed 2014-03-19(a)(6)

Under our case law, “[t]he test for willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6) . . . is condensed into a single inquiry of whether there exists either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm on the part of the debtor.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes damages from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of proceeds subject to a creditor’s security interest nondischargeable.

Kraus Anderson Capital, Inc. v. Bradley (In re Bradley) · filed 2014-03-26(a)(6)

Debtor converted the proceeds of the sales of collateral which were subject to Lender’s security interest. Lender’s damages are a debt that is the result of a willful and malicious injury. Accordingly, it is non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a determination of the debtor’s mental state to establish that an injury was willful and malicious.

Bowe v. Kilmartin (In re Kilmartin) · filed 2014-03-27(a)(6)

Because § 523(a)(6) uses the words “willful and malicious,” any analysis of the statute must address the debtor’s mental state when he or she caused the injury for which the debt was incurred.

Section 523(a)(6) can make litigation sanctions nondischargeable when they arise from willful and malicious injury.

Metropolitan Health Corp. v. Scott · filed 2014-04-02(a)(6)

... sanctions award in its favor was nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders awarding summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a copyright infringement debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes willful and malicious injury.

Sailor Music v. Walker (In re Walker) · filed 2014-04-18(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court concludes that by a preponderance of the evidence, Debtor’s failure to proactively obtain an ASCAP license, and then intentionally ignore AS-CAP’s several attempts to communicate with Debtor regarding the same, was willful. ... The Court now concludes that Debtor’s actions rise above the requisite level of malice and thus, by a preponderance of the evidence, Debtor acted maliciously within the meaning accorded to Section 523(a)(6) in the Eighth Circuit.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that injury was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct; a high probability of harm is insufficient.

Nevada Property 1 LLC v. D'Amico (In re D'Amico) · filed 2014-04-23(a)(6)

Substantial certainty therefore requires more than a realization that there is a strong probability that harm may result.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge the full debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury caused by repeated violations of court orders.

Benzaquen & Classic Restoration Enterprises, Inc. v. Rabinowitz (In re Rabinowitz) · filed 2014-05-12(a)(6)

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs here have satisfied their burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt in question should be excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a vexatious litigation judgment from discharge when the prior jury’s necessary findings establish willful and malicious injury.

Mexico Construction & Paving v. Thompson (In re Thompson) · filed 2014-05-22(a)(6)

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled as a matter of law to a determination that the judgment debt they are owed in connection with Count Three of the Superior Court Complaint is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a customer-deposit debt from discharge as willful and malicious conversion when the deposits became the business’s property and were used for its expenses.

Fiandola v. Moore (In re Moore) · filed 2014-04-16(a)(6)

The Engagement Letter did not provide that their deposits would be segregated or that Moore Pizazz would be restricted with its use of their deposits. There was no evidence that Mrs. Moore used Plaintiffs’ deposits for anything other than Moore Pizazz’s business expenses. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof on this issue.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful when the debtor acts to cause it or knows the conduct is substantially certain to cause it.

BankUnited, N.A. v. Lehmann (In re Lehmann) · filed 2014-06-06(a)(6)

Thus, actions taken either for the purpose of causing injury or that have a substantial certainty of producing injury are deemed “willful” under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a defamation debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury and acted without just cause or excuse.

Zaretsky v. Berlin (In re Berlin) · filed 2014-06-19(a)(6)

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have proved that the Debtor’s actions were “willful and malicious” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ awards against the Debtor in the amounts set forth in the State Court judgment are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require a separate showing that the debtor committed a tort under state law.

Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi PA · filed 2014-06-26(a)(6)

Nothing in Kawaauhau requires us actually to determine whether a debtor technically committed a tort under applicable state law.

A prior conversion judgment can preclude relitigation of conversion in a § 523(a)(6) proceeding.

American Asset Finance, LLC v. Feldman (In re Feldman) · filed 2014-07-23(a)(6)

In the adversary proceeding, conversion is the factual predicate for the claim of willful and malicious injury in Count II. ... Principles of preclusion appropriately apply here to bar re-litigation of the question of whether Defendant is liable for conversion. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property.

Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum (In re Birnbaum) · filed 2014-07-29(a)(6)

In order to establish that a debt should not be discharged under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must show that the debt at issue resulted from a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires injury or damages caused by willful and malicious conduct for a debt to be excepted from discharge.

In re: Joan Borsten Vidov and Oleg Vidov · filed 2014-07-31(a)(6)

Unless the willful and malicious conduct leads to injury or damages, there can be no exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury and intends the resulting harm.

Sailor Music v. Doug Walker · filed 2014-08-08(a)(6)

The debtor’s actions were both willful and malicious, therefore, the appellee’s claim is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; an unauthorized conversion that leads to injury does not alone make a debt nondischargeable.

Bank of America v. Killgrove · filed 2014-08-22(a)(6)

Ultimately, the remainder of Appellant’s arguments and authorities are unpersuasive; even if there had been an unauthorized conversion that led to injury, and not just a “relocation,” as the bankruptcy court found, a willful.and malicious act would be required.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contract debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly breaches a clear obligation and injury is substantially certain to result.

Karr Plex, Ltd. v. Hollier (In re Hollier) · filed 2014-08-22(a)(6)

The court concludes that Hollier’s actions in January 2007 amount to a knowing breach of a clear contractual obligation that was certain to cause injury. ... The court, therefore, concludes that $43,264 of the $70,900 judgment entered by the state court ($70,900 minus the $27,636 of payments reflected on the Form 1099) results from willful and malicious conduct by Hollier and is excepted from the discharge under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Wann v. Sosso (In re Sosso) · filed 2014-08-25(a)(6)

However, for purposes of this proceeding, Mr. Wann must prove “willful and malicious injury by the debtor” under § 523(a)(6). As it was Mark Sosso who controlled Sosso Homes, the Court finds that much of the evidence was not relevant. While the Court acknowledges that, based upon the evidence presented, Mr. Wann was likely defrauded by certain individuals involved in the transaction, Mr. Wann did not meet his burden with respect to the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an independent finding of willful and malicious injury when a defamation verdict could rest on recklessness.

McClendon v. Springfield (In Re McClendon) · filed 2014-08-26(a)(6)

Although the state court judgment was entered upon a jury verdict finding defamation, the jury’s determination could be sustained either on intentionality or recklessness. It ... did not necessarily determine the federal question of a willful and malicious injury necessary under § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court therefore conducted an independent inquiry into the willful and malicious character of McClendon’s defamatory statements, conducting a trial of its own into questions not determined by the state court jury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from diverted collateral proceeds nondischargeable when the diversion necessarily causes, or is substantially certain to cause, injury to the secured creditor.

Barvié v. Broadus (In re Broadus) · filed 2014-08-26(a)(6)

The Court finds that these actions either necessarily caused, or were substantially certain to cause, the injury suffered by Barvié. Accordingly, Barvié has met the requirements of § 523(a)(6). To the extent Broadus misapplied the proceeds of the sale of his interest in the good will and inventory of the gas station, which was pledged as collateral and should have gone to Barvié, the misappropriated proceeds constitute a non-dischargeable debt within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor caused the injury through negligence rather than willful and malicious conduct.

Johnson v. Hampton (In re Hampton) · filed 2014-08-26(a)(6)

However, debts that arise from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within section 523(a)(6), and so may be discharged. ... The evidence established only that Hampton acted negligently, as the state court jury found. Therefore, Hampton’s debt to Johnson is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Meikle v. Olsen (In re Olsen) · filed 2014-08-28(a)(6)

In sum, the Court finds and concludes that Meikle failed to show both requirements under § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury by the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a fraud judgment from discharge when the debtor’s abusive litigation conduct willfully and maliciously injures the creditor.

Purser v. Scarbrough (In re Scarbrough) · filed 2014-08-29(a)(6)

Debtor’s pursuit of a scorched earth litigation strategy led to a debt that bankruptcy cannot discharge. Therefore, the Court finds Helen Purser’s entire judgment against Debtor for fraud is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove willful and malicious injury; this debt was discharged because that burden was not met.

Pioneer Construction, Inc. v. May (In re May) · filed 2014-08-29(a)(6)

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, judgment is ORDERED entered for the defendant, Jeffery A. May, finding the debt due to the Plaintiff, Pioneer Construction, Inc., discharged in the defendant’s bankruptcy case # 12-60371.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a subjective inquiry into whether the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to occur.

Margulies v. Hough · filed 2014-09-09(a)(6)

This Court joins in endorsing the subjective standard. ... An objective standard, by contrast, looks past the actual will or intent of the debtor, and instead considers an objective observer’s understanding of whether the injury was substantially certain to occur. This inquiry sounds more in recklessness than intent.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from breach of contract from discharge when the debtor’s intentional conduct is substantially certain to injure the creditor.

Weatherall Radiation Oncology v. Caletri (In re Caletri) · filed 2014-09-10(a)(6)

Thus, Dr. Caletri’s actions surrounding his breach of contract were substantially certain to cause injury to WRO and the debt is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional act that causes intended harm and is wrongful, without justification or excuse.

Duff v. Ayala (In re Ayala) · filed 2014-09-12(a)(6)

The Court adopts Parra’s reasoning and holds that, to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the debt must, inter alia, be the result of an intentional act and intended harm (willful), and also the result of an intentional, wrongful act, done without justification or excuse (malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury; a civil assault and battery judgment that does not establish that intent cannot alone establish nondischargeability.

Vyshedsky v. Soliman (In re Soliman) · filed 2014-09-04(a)(6)

As explained below, intent to cause injury is an essential element of the denial of discharge claim under section 523(a)(6). Because elements of the claims are not identical, collateral es-toppel could not be given to the default judgment for assault and battery to support granting judgment here in favor of Vyshedsky.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts obtained by fraud from discharge, while § 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury.

Burks v. Bailey · filed 2014-09-30(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Finally, the Court will clarify that it finds no error in the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that (1) the debtor’s conduct was fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), and (2) the debtor’s conduct was “willful and malicious” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepted this debt from discharge because the debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious.

United States v. Shelmidine (In re Shelmidine) · filed 2014-09-30(a)(6)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant’s conduct was willful and malicious within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; an intentional act that causes injury is insufficient.

All Trades Temporary Services, LLC v. Coates (In re Coates) · filed 2014-09-30(a)(6)

At bottom, the Coateses committed an intentional act that led to All Trades’ injury. But such an act, without the intent to cause injury, falls outside the scope of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury; conversion of collateral alone does not suffice.

Herman v. White (In re White) · filed 2014-10-06(a)(6)

The Court finds that, although Herman suffered a technical conversion of property subject to a secured interest, he has not met his burden to show that White’s actions were willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) did not except this debt from discharge because the creditor failed to prove intent to injure.

Lewis v. Long · filed 2014-11-24(a)(6)

In the absence of any evidence that Long intended to injure Lewis, the court concludes that Lewis failed to meet her burden of proving that the debt owed to her by Long arose from a willful and malicious injury. Accordingly, the debt is not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and the bankruptcy court did not err in granting Long’s Rule 52(c) motion.

A wrongful conversion judgment alone does not establish a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Swenby v. Swenby (In re Swenby) · filed 2014-12-22(a)(6)

The conclusion of law that a person is liable for wrongful conversion does not indicate to a subsequent court whether a judge relied on facts which would also constitute a willful and malicious injury. Still, even if the state court had clearly indicated the facts it relied on to determine Kevin wrongfully converted funds from Opal, those facts might not match the requirements of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

A state court’s unnecessary finding of fraudulent intent did not establish willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) by issue preclusion.

Bank of Kentucky, Inc. v. Nageleisen (In re Nageleisen) · filed 2014-12-30(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court holds that the state court’s finding of fraudulent intent was not necessary to the state court’s judgment under Kentucky law, and that finding will not be given preclusive effect. As a result, it is unnecessary to consider whether other elements of Kentucky’s test for issue preclusion are met. Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the question of willful and malicious injury, and therefore not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the nondis-chargeability count of its complaint.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of an intentional injury; a contempt order establishing wrongful possession alone does not establish willfulness.

FNA Group, Inc. v. Arvanitis (In re Arvanitis) · filed 2015-01-08(a)(6)

Likewise here, willfulness required under § 523(a)(6) to prove a willful and malicious injury has not been established by the state court’s contempt order. What has been established is only that at some point, Arvanitis gained possession of some of plaintiffs property, and at some point that possession was determined by court order to have become wrongful. The language in the contempt order did not find that Arvanitis acted with the intent to injure FNA, nor did the contempt order find that Arvanitis took or kept FNA’s property knowing that he did not have authorization at any time prior to entry of the TRO.

Section 523(a)(6) can make a debt nondischargeable when a debtor intentionally harms a creditor’s contractual right to repayment, even if the creditor does not hold secured collateral.

Galaz v. Monson (In re Monson) · filed 2015-01-09(a)(6)

Although § 523(a)(6) requires an intentional tort, it is not limited to claims based on an injury to a secured creditor’s collateral. ... Based on the evidence in this case, the Court finds that the Debtor’s conduct constitutes a willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor injured Segundo’s right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the Debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; failing to open a bathroom window when showering does not meet that standard.

McLane v. Bostater (In re McLane) · filed 2015-01-21(a)(6)

If the failure to leave the window open was the cause of the peeling wallpaper, the failure to open the window every time the debtors or their children showered simply does not rise to the level of “willful and malicious” conduct necessary for non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based on a prior verdict of recklessness, oppression, and malice when the verdict did not necessarily establish intent to cause injury.

Diamond v. Vickery (In re Vickery) · filed 2015-01-26(a)(6)

None of these findings meets the standard of “willful and malicious injury” set forth under § 523(a)(6). Debts arising from reckless injuries do not fall within the scope of willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intentionally injures another without justification.

Loucas v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham) · filed 2015-03-04(a)(6)

This Code section requires, above all else, a particular state of mind. The Debtor must have acted with the specific purpose of harming the creditor. It must also have been done without justification. Given that Plaintiffs are deemed to have been admitted that they have no evidence as to the Debtor’s state of mind when they suffered their injuries, it is perforce impossible for them to establish that the Debtor acted with the requisite state of mind. Accordingly, their request to except their claim from discharge must be denied.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful injury; a verdict that could rest on negligence does not establish that a debt is excepted from discharge.

Gerard v. Gerard · filed 2015-03-12(a)(6)

We hold that these courts erred in concluding that the state court jury’s slander of title findings preclusively established that Michael acted “willfully” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because the jury’s verdict could have been based on Michael’s negligence.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately causes injury in knowing disregard of another’s rights.

LeCann v. Cobham (In re Cobham) · filed 2015-03-18(a)(6)

In conclusion, the court finds that the Business Court’s findings establish that the debt is for willful and malicious injury, that such findings shall be accorded collateral estoppel effect, and that the debt is therefore nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge only if the creditor proves the conversion was willful and malicious.

Webb v. Webb (In re Webb) · filed 2015-02-06(a)(6)

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to prove that Defendant’s actions were willful and malicious when he claimed the proceeds of Rebecca’s life insurance policy after he executed a Disclaimer that by reference included the proceeds.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury or conduct the debtor believes is substantially certain to cause injury; even gross recklessness is insufficient.

Schmeckpeper v. Lewis (In re Lewis) · filed 2015-03-25(a)(6)

After considering the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, the Court concludes that the Debtor did not act with the specific intent to injure Douglas. Because he did not think the gun was loaded, the Debtor could not have believed that waving the gun was substantially certain to injure Douglas. Although his conduct was unacceptably reckless with tragic consequences, even gross recklessness does not qualify as a willful injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor causes an injury willfully and maliciously.

One American Bank v. Jacobson (In re Jacobson) · filed 2015-03-27(a)(6)

The Debtors violated the legal rights of the Bank, but there were no additional aggravating circumstances. The Court finds that the Debtors certainly did not act with malice on the facts before the court. Therefore, § 523(a)(6) will not bar their debt from being discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge sanctions debts arising from litigation deliberately used to injure a creditor.

Helvetia Asset Recovery, Inc. v. Kahn (In re Kahn) · filed 2015-03-27(a)(6)

Therefore, Kahn’s debts arising from the sanctions award in the Kahn Suit are non-discharge-able under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a violation of California’s elder financial abuse law does not necessarily meet that requirement.

Van Zandt v. Mbunda · filed 2015-04-13(a)(6)

The BAP correctly concluded that even if Van Zandt could allege a § 15610.30 violation, that offense is not a categorical match to § 523(a)(6) because § 523(a)(6) requires a higher mental state. Section 523(a)(6) requires a showing of willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to cause the injury; intent cannot be inferred solely from a strict liability offense.

Lewis v. Long (In re Long) · filed 2015-04-22(a)(6)

Thus, the statute expressly requires, without qualification, the moving party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that any resultant injury stems from the debtor’s willful and malicious intent to injure. ... Although the Court acknowledges such intent may be established in certain situations by collateral estoppel, ... when the underlying cause of action does not necessitate a finding of intent to injure, the Court does not believe it is able to imply such intent based on the public policy considerations of the antecedent action.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove that the debtor intended injury or knew injury was substantially certain to result.

R & J Construction Supply Co. v. Juma (In re Juma) · filed 2015-04-30(a)(6)

Supply failed to show that Juma had any intent to injure, or that his actions were taken with the knowledge that Supply was substantially certain to be injured. Without that showing, the debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes a willful and malicious injury; findings from a prior judgment can establish those elements through issue preclusion.

De Curtis v. Ferrandina (In re Ferrandina) · filed 2015-05-01(a)(6)

The District Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law unquestionably make clear that Ferrandina’s sexual harassment of and retaliatory conduct towards De Curtis were both willful and malicious as required under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debtor’s subjective intent to injure or belief that injury is substantially certain; a punitive damages finding that may rest on conscious disregard does not establish willfulness through issue preclusion.

Plyam v. Precision Development, LLC (In Re Plyam) · filed 2015-05-05(a)(6)

But, to the extent that CC § 3294 findings are stated in the disjunctive or based on Despicable Malice or oppression or both, those findings prevent the use of issue preclusion as to § 523(a)(6) willfulness.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful injury; a punitive damages finding that may rest on conscious disregard does not establish that requirement.

In re: Yuri Plyam and Natalia Plyam · filed 2015-05-05(a)(6)

Because the punitive damages award may have been based only on a finding of Despicable Malice or oppression, issue preclusion was unavailable on the issue of § 523(a)(6) willfulness.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended to cause injury and acted wrongfully without just cause.

Link v. Mauz (In re Mauz) · filed 2015-06-30(a)(6)

Therefore, I find that the Debtor had the specific intent to injure the Plaintiffs through unsupported, spurious complaints and by damaging the Plaintiffs’ fence posts. Cumulatively, the Debtor’s course of conduct was wrongful, intentional, caused the Plaintiffs emotional injury, and damaged their property. Based upon this, I conclude that the elements for nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(6) have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; a conversion judgment alone does not establish those elements.

Feldman v. American Asset Finance, LLC · filed 2015-07-14(a)(6)

The Supreme Court left no doubt that there can be a conversion without willful and malicious intent. Therefore, there was not a complete identity of the issues.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury to another’s property nondischargeable when the debtor intended the injury.

General Retirement System v. Dixon (In re Dixon) · filed 2015-07-28(a)(6)

The debtor, through his acts, must have actually intended the injury, not just taken intentional acts which resulted in an injury. ... As such, the Court concludes the total damages to all Plaintiffs for the Debtor’s withdrawal of funds from the Limited Partnership Fund of $101,344.75 as trebled to $304,034.25 is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or knew injury was substantially certain to result from an intentional act.

Cornerstone Industries Corp. v. Kaufman (In re Kaufman) · filed 2015-08-06(a)(6)

The standard in the Sixth Circuit supports a finding that Plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment under § 523(a)(6). The actions of the Defendant, if not intended to cause the harm outright, were actions that the Defendant knew were substantially certain to result in harm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a fee award from discharge when the debtor’s vexatious litigation conduct caused willful and malicious injury.

J & V Developers, Inc. v. Malloy (In re Malloy) · filed 2015-08-10(a)(6)

Consequently, I conclude that the C.P. Court’s determination that the Debtor’s conduct was vexatious under 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) establishes that the debt is for a willful and malicious injury and therefore, nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)'s intent-to-injure requirement can be satisfied by a finding that the debtor purposefully aided and abetted the injurious acts.

Yousuf v. Samantar (In re Samantar) · filed 2015-09-22(a)(6)

The requirement of purposefulness, in addition to knowledge, for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, satisfies the “intent to injure” standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Geiger for purposes of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)’s willfulness requirement is met when the debtor intends to cause injury or is substantially certain that injury will follow.

Yeager v. Wilmers · filed 2015-09-23(a)(6)

The preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that Yeager intended all three contacts with Wilmers and intended his contact with Wilmers to cause injury to Wilmers or was substantially certain that injury would follow.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from a knowing breach of contract from discharge.

Navy Federal Credit Union v. Purse (In re Purse) · filed 2015-08-25(a)(6)

A debt arising from a knowing breach of contract is not the type of debt excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based solely on a debtor’s vicarious liability for another person’s willful injury.

Loucks v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2015-08-27(a)(6)

Vicarious liability, without more, cannot form the basis for a determination that Smith’s conduct was “willful” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to commit the willful and malicious injury; a third party’s statements cannot supply the debtor’s act.

Gonzalez v. Anthony (In re Anthony) · filed 2015-09-17(a)(6)

Additionally, because § 523(a)(6) requires an act by the debtor, Cindy Anthony’s comments to the media cannot form the basis to bar the Debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contempt judgment from discharge when the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct injured the creditor.

Gray v. Tacason (Tacason) · filed 2015-09-25(a)(6)

These findings established Ms. Tacason’s willful and malicious conduct and have pre-clusive effect regarding the nondischarge-ability of the debt arising from the Massachusetts Judgment under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury the debtor knew was substantially certain to result from his conduct and caused in conscious disregard of a duty.

Ryt v. Peace (In re Peace) · filed 2015-10-05(a)(6)

Because the debt constitutes a willful and malicious injury, it is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s injury to the creditor was both willful and malicious.

Jackson v. Spencer (In re Spencer) · filed 2015-10-19(a)(6)

To except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6), the court must find that the alleged injury is both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when preclusive state-court findings establish that the debtor intended to cause the injury.

CMCO Mortgage, LLC v. Hill (In re Hill) · filed 2015-11-02(a)(6)

IT IS ORDERED that the October 3, 2014 Findings of Fact and Judgment for Plaintiff CMCO Mortgage, LLC, D/B/A Home Lending Source entered in Jefferson Circuit Court is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a showing of willful and malicious injury; a California judgment for conversion and breach of contract does not establish those elements by itself.

In re: Kamal Zeeb · filed 2015-11-03(a)(6)

We hold that a judgment for conversion and breach of contract under California law, without anything more, does not necessarily determine that the debt is for “willful” and “malicious” injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a finding of outrageous conduct does not establish that standard when it could rest on recklessness.

Loucas v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham) · filed 2015-11-03(a)(6)

On the record as it stands, I could not conclude with confidence that the specific issue of whether the conduct was “willful and malicious” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) was decided by the state court, as I read Ka-waauhau as requiring such precision.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based on negligence or recklessness alone; the injury must be willful and malicious.

R & J Construction Supply Co. v. Juma · filed 2015-11-12(a)(6)

In retrospect, Juma should not have trusted Vaughn in the first place, but negligence or even recklessness is not enough to exclude a debt from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a patent infringement debt from discharge when the debtor knew of the patent rights, had notice to stop infringing, and continued conduct that caused injury.

Ocean Innovations, Inc. v. Ahern (In re Ahern) · filed 2015-11-19(a)(6)

The findings in the Patent Litigation are sufficient to establish that Ahern’s acts resulted in willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove an injury caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC v. Nolte (In re Nolte) · filed 2015-11-25(a)(6)

Finally, Nolte’s liability on the MT Proof of Claim can be discharged in Nolte’s Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case, as MT has not proved the elements necessary to find the claim nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contempt award for attorney’s fees and costs from discharge when the debtor’s willful and malicious violation of an injunction caused the creditor injury.

Morris v. Charron (In re Charron) · filed 2015-09-30(a)(6)

Like the attorney’s fees and costs in Suarez, the Contempt Award in this adversary proceeding was imposed to compensate the Plaintiff for injuries he suffered as a result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious violation of the Injunctive Order. Accordingly, the Contempt Award is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory civil contempt sanctions from discharge when they arise from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury; the source of the state court’s contempt power does not change that result.

Morris v. Charron (In re Charron) · filed 2015-11-25(a)(6)

The distinction the Debtor attempts to draw between the state court’s statutory and inherent contempt powers would not materially affect this Court’s nondisehargeable debt determination. Accordingly, the Debtor’s motion to reconsider this issue is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an economic motive does not excuse an assault or prevent a finding of implied malice.

Hough v. Margulies (In re Margulies) · filed 2015-11-16(a)(6)

Whatever role economic justification may play as a defense to a § 523(a)(6) claim based on a commercial tort, it does not excuse Margulies’ assault or prohibit a finding of implied malice. There is no economic benefit that would justify driving into Hough in order to get to an important business meeting.

Section 523(a)(6) can except attorney’s fees and costs from discharge when they result from a debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Babin v. Stepanian (In re Stepanian) · filed 2015-12-31(a)(6)

First, the injury-alleged, attorney’s fees and costs, are losses that, if incurred as the result of “willful and malicious” conduct of the Debtor, is a sufficient damage under the Code.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a bankruptcy court to look behind the form of a debt and determine whether the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct caused the creditor’s injury.

Carmelo v. Mickletz (In re Mickletz) · filed 2016-01-28(a)(6)

For these reasons, I conclude that in evaluating the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6), a bankruptcy court can and should look behind the formalities of the pre-bankruptcy proceedings and determine whether a creditor’s injury was caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for a mere breach of contract from discharge unless the breach also includes tortious conduct.

Taylor v. Snyder (In re Snyder) · filed 2015-12-07(a)(6)

Consideration of these factors further support viewing Section 523(a)(6) to not apply to mere breaches of contract unless the breach also included tortious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury, but does not require intent to cause the specific injury that resulted.

In re: Collin Casciano v. · filed 2016-01-11(a)(6)

Plaintiff is correct that this is an incorrect statement of the law on what constitutes a “willful” injury under § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court erred in its analysis by requiring Plaintiff to prove that Debtor desired to cause the specific injury or harm that resulted from the punch.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable; preclusive findings can establish that the injury meets this standard.

Nautilus, Inc. v. Chunchai Yu (In re Chunchai Yu) · filed 2016-02-18(a)(6)

The Court finds that the detailed findings contained in the Default Judgment and Default Judgment Order are preclusive and conclusively establish that the Plaintiff is entitled to a non-dischargeable judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $4,000,000.00, plus 0.11% interest, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523 excepts debts obtained through fraud and debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; the same debt may qualify under both exceptions.

Zutrau v. Zutrau (In re Zutrau) · filed 2016-02-24(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will enter a separate judgment declaring that $193,000, plus all applicable interest thereon, is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) and that, of this amount, $80,000, plus all applicable interest thereon, is excepted from discharge on a separate basis under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor willfully and maliciously caused the injury.

McQueen v. MacRi (In Re MacRi) · filed 2016-02-25(a)(6)

But we agree with both the District Court and Bankruptcy Court that McQueen did not meet her burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Macri willfully and maliciously directed her dogs to attack her; without any additional evidence to support her allegations, her belief that Macri “sicced” the dogs on her is mere speculation.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury; an injury caused by negligence does not qualify as willful.

First American Title Insurance v. Moses (In re Moses) · filed 2016-03-16(a)(6)

Under Section 523(a)(6), an injury is willful only if it was intended. ... For these reasons, and based on the entire record, the Court finds that First American has not established the first element of its Section 523(a)(6) claim, that Mr. Moses willfully injured First American.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to cause injury.

Lewis v. Long · filed 2016-03-17(a)(6)

Because Lewis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Long acted with the willful and malicious intent to injure her, Lewis is not entitled to an exception from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an abuse of process debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately uses litigation to harass and annoy others without good faith.

Irvin v. Faller (In re Faller) · filed 2016-03-17(a)(6)

To use the language of Wheeler, there was a “deliberate” injury, committed in “conscious disregard of one’s duties or without just cause or excuse,” 783 F.2d at 615, meeting the requirements of a “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6).

A creditor states a claim under § 523(a)(6) by plausibly alleging that the debtor intentionally injured its account receivable through a scheme involving the debtor’s company assets.

HIJ Industries, Inc. v. Roy (In re Roy) · filed 2016-03-22(a)(6)

Accepting the Complaint’s factual allegations as true, Count I can fairly be read to plead a plausible cause of action under § 523(a)(6). It is alleged that the Notes were owed from Elite to the Plaintiff; thus, Plaintiff held an account receivable from Elite, separate from the guaranty owed by the Debtor individually. The Complaint alleges that the Debtor devised and executed a scheme which resulted in intentional injury to the Plaintiff — i.e., the account receivable owed by Elite.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) except debts from discharge for fraud or willful and malicious injury, respectively; the court found neither ground established here.

Holland Builders, Inc. v. Lloyd (In re Lloyd) · filed 2016-03-31(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

The Court finds that Defendant did not make a false representation to deceive HBI when he submitted the two invoices to HBI and did not “create a false and misleading set of circumstances, or a false and misleading understanding of a transaction” in order to wrongfully induce SWH to give him the four checks. Accordingly, the Court will not except Defendant’s debt to Plaintiffs from Defendant’s discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A). The Court finds that by submitting the invoices to HBI and accepting the payments from SWH, Defendant did not intend to cause injury to Plaintiffs or know that his acts were substantially certain to cause injury to Plaintiffs. The Court will therefore not except Defendant’s debt to Plaintiffs from Defendant’s discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury; intent to perform the acts that caused it is insufficient.

Horizon Financial Bank v. Borstad (In re Borstad) · filed 2016-04-29(a)(6)

Horizon showed only that Debtor intended the acts that led to the injury to Horizon, but not that Debtor specifically intended the injury or harm. Therefore, Debtor did not commit a willful injury under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended an injury or believed injury was substantially certain to occur.

Hagmaier v. Cooley (In re Cooley) · filed 2016-05-12(a)(6)

When questioned during closing arguments, Hagmaier’s counsel stated that her position is that intent to commit an act supplies enough evidence of deliberate indifference to satisfy the intent to injure required under Section 523(a)(6). This Court disagrees. Based on the controlling authorities, deliberate indifference is a far cry from intending to cause an injury or being substantially certain that an injury will occur as a result of one’s actions.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sexual harassment debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally caused injury through wrongful conduct without just cause or excuse.

Ganci v. Townsend (In re Townsend) · filed 2016-05-16(a)(6)

Because the jury’s findings establish the elements of non-discharge-ability under § 523(a)(6), Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury; the creditor must prove both elements.

MWRD Employees' Credit Union v. Frazier (In re Frazier) · filed 2016-06-20(a)(6)

Putting the question of surrender aside for the time being, the Court turns to the actual issue raised in Count I of the complaint: whether the Plaintiff has satisfied the elements of § 523(a)(6). Based on the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established that the Debtor’s actions were either willful or malicious for purposes of the statutory exception and that, thus, the Plaintiff has not met its burden.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from an intentional invasion of privacy that causes willful and malicious injury.

Hoewischer v. White (In re White) · filed 2016-06-23(a)(6)

Accordingly, this Court finds Mr. White’s conduct to be willful and malicious for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a contractual debt from discharge when it results from an intentional or substantially certain injury.

Whitcomb v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2016-07-12(a)(6)

I conclude that “[Bankruptcy Code § ] 523(a)(6) excepts contractual debts from discharge when those debts result from an intentional or substantially certain injury.”

Section 523(a)(6) concerns debts arising from willful and malicious conduct.

Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez · filed 2016-07-20(a)(6)

(b) The Court further finds that the conduct of Hernandez was willful and malicious as those terms are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than recklessness to establish malice; a prior punitive damages verdict can establish malice through collateral estoppel when the jury instructions required a finding that harm was likely.

Roussel v. Clear Sky Properties, LLC · filed 2016-07-25(a)(6)

Malice under § 523(a)(6) requires more than recklessness or reckless disregard. ... The district court did not err in applying collateral estoppel to the requirement of malice under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person or their property.

Patriot Fire Protection, Inc. v. Fuller (In re Fuller) · filed 2016-08-02(a)(6)

There is no other plausible inference than that the Debtor had a substantial certainty that his conduct would cause injury, and yet he acted anyway. As this conduct was willful and malicious, the resultant debt, represented by the judgment of the Superior Court, is excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury to a creditor’s property right from discharge when the debtor intended the injury and acted without just cause or excuse.

Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Van Der Laan (In re Van Der Laan) · filed 2016-08-24(a)(6)

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs have established that the Defendant owes a debt for willful and malicious injuries that is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), and no material and triable issue concerning this proceeding has been shown to be in dispute.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; negligent or reckless defamatory statements do not suffice.

Abraham v. Palmer (In re Palmer) · filed 2016-08-31(a)(6)

The evidence before the court indicated that Defendant either believed his statements to be true when they was made to the Zoning Board, or in overstating the events he described, he was negligent, or at most reckless. Thus, based upon Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, the court finds that Defendant did not act with the required mental state, which requires something greater than negligence or recklessness, to satisfy the requirements of a Section 523(a)(6) nondischargeability ruling.

Section 523(a)(6) does not permit a spouse’s nondischargeable conduct to be imputed to a debtor solely because they are married; the debtor must have participated in the conduct or had a qualifying partnership or agency relationship with the spouse.

In re: ALBERT S. AN and LAURI I. An · filed 2016-07-27(a)(6)

When, as here, there are no allegations, evidence or findings that the debtor participated in the spouse’s nondischargeable conduct or that a partnership or principal-agent relationship existed between the spouses, the bankruptcy court commits reversible error by imputing the nondischargeable conduct to the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable solely because it arose from a finding of contempt.

Westbury Village Ass'n v. Zweifel (In re Zweifel) · filed 2016-08-15(a)(6)

The standard under § 523(a)(6) requires a “willful injury” rather than willful conduct; the Court is hard pressed to conceive a situation in which unintentional conduct could give rise to a willful injury. Therefore, the Court declines to hold that a finding of contempt constitutes willful and malicious injury per se.