11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the injury; an intentional act that causes an unintended injury does not make the debt nondischargeable.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Powers (In Re Powers) · filed 1998-10-01(a)(6)

Thus, § 523(a)(6) requires us to focus on the subjective intent of the debtor to determine whether the injury was intended or unintended.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for unnecessary surgery nondischargeable when the surgeon knew or should have known the surgery was wrongful and substantially certain to cause permanent injury.

Cole v. Parson (In re Cole) · filed 1998-10-01(a)(6)

Given these findings, the Bankruptcy Court did not error in its conclusions of law that the debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Completion of such a surgery by the removal of a healthy disk is a wrongful act intentionally done which necessarily causes harm and which is without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when prior jury findings establish intent to injure, even if the jury did not find malice for state punitive damages.

Branam v. Crowder (In Re Branam) · filed 1998-10-07(a)(6)

Based on this analysis, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Branam’s conduct was “malicious” for purposes of § 523(a)(6) despite the jury’s failure to find malice for punitive damage purposes.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor withholds funds with the intent to injure the creditor.

Gill Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Banks (In Re Banks) · filed 1998-10-07(a)(6)

Under Geiger, Banks’ conduct with respect to Gill amounts to a “wilful and malicious injury.” Banks intended to injure Gill by forcing Gill to take substantially less than it was owed under the Settlement Agreement, or perhaps nothing at all. ... Thus, Gill is entitled to judgment against Banks on its non-dischargeability claim under § 523(a)(6).

For § 523(a)(6), malice requires conduct targeted at the injured person and committed without just cause or excuse.

Dennis v. Novotny (In Re Novotny) · filed 1998-10-15(a)(6)

Concomitantly, the Court concludes that Shawn Novotny acted with malice when he murdered Amy Dennis; that is, the Court determines that his conduct was (1) targeted at Amy Dennis in the sense that it was certain to cause her ultimate harm, namely, her death, and (2) committed without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Doss v. Kidd (In re Kidd) · filed 1998-10-22(a)(6)

For an injury to be rendered nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(6), it must be willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury and targeted the creditor without just cause or excuse.

Community National Bank v. Slominski (In Re Slominski) · filed 1998-10-23(a)(6)

Concerning its burden of proof under Section 523(a)(6), CNB has utterly failed to satisfy either of the requirements of “willfulness” or “maliciousness.” In that respect, it has failed to demonstrate in any way that Slominski intended not only the act of conversion of the bank’s collateral, but also the attendant harm which the bank thereby suffered. Further, it has failed to establish that Slominski’s conduct was targeted at CNB and that it was committed without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for intentional injury without just cause or excuse nondischargeable, including an Illinois libel judgment with punitive damages.

Caton v. Trudeau · filed 1998-10-26(a)(6)

There can be no question, and Caton does not dispute, that a judgment for libel under Illinois law, and a corresponding award of punitive damages, encompasses intentional conduct undertaken without just cause or excuse, precluding discharge under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct was objectively substantially certain to cause the injury.

In the Matter of Gregory James Caton, Debtor. Gregory James Caton v. Trudeau · filed 1998-11-03(a)(6)

Applying our precedential Miller standard to the instant case, we find that there was a deliberate or intentional injury, precluding discharge under § 523(a)(6), as Caton’s libelous statements were objectively substantially certain to result in the injury to Trudeau.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from intentional sexual contact with a minor from discharge because intent to harm may be inferred from the conduct.

Erickson v. Halverson (In Re Halverson) · filed 1998-10-16(a)(6)

There is no reason why the inferred intent standard applicable to sexual misconduct against minors in other settings should not also apply in bankruptcy. Congress provided § 523(a)(6) to avoid discharging debts for morally repugnant debtor conduct (malicious intentional torts), and sexual contact with children appears to be a category of conduct defined across jurisdictions to inherently encompass malice.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a breach of contract debt from discharge unless the same act constitutes an intentional tort.

Aldus Green Co. v. Mitchell (In Re Mitchell) · filed 1998-11-16(a)(6)

Nevertheless, section 523(a)(6) does not encompass a breach of contract claim unless the same act constitutes an intentional tort such as conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct is objectively substantially certain to cause injury.

Caton v. Trudeau · filed 1998-11-19(a)(6)

Applying our precedential Miller standard to the instant case, we find that there was a deliberate or intentional injury, precluding discharge under section 523(a)(6), as Caton’s libelous statements were objectively substantially certain to result in the injury to Trudeau.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to occur.

Murray v. Wilcox (In Re Wilcox) · filed 1998-11-24(a)(6)

However, this Court finds, based upon the following analysis, that the Supreme Court’s holding in Kawaauhau does encompass acts a defendant knows are substantially certain to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful when the debtor intended to cause it or was substantially certain it would occur.

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1998-11-25(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court holds that a person will be deemed to have acted willfully, for purposes of denying that person’s discharge in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(6), when that person acts with the intent to cause injury, or is substantially certain that an injury will occur.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury through conduct that is wrongful, excessive, and without just cause.

Buchanan v. Scott (In Re Scott) · filed 1998-12-17(a)(6)

Her conduct was “willful” and “malicious” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). She acquired his wealth intentionally, which makes it “willful.” That injury to Mr. Buchanan and his estate was wrongful, clearly excessive, and was without just cause, which makes it “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for injury nondischargeable only when the injury was both willful and malicious.

Stubbs v. Mode (In Re Mode) · filed 1999-01-20(a)(6)

Both willfulness and malice must be shown in order for a debt to be found nondischargeable under this provision.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended the injury, rather than merely the act that caused it.

Davis v. Massey (In Re Massey) · filed 1998-12-11(a)(6)

The Supreme Court held that to qualify as “intentional”, the actor must have intended the consequences of his act, not simply the act itself. ... Applying the Kawaauhau ruling to the facts of this case, the Court finds that the Debtor did not intend to cause injury (i.e., the withholding of the Earnest Money Deposit) to Mr. Davis.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally acts knowing the act will harm the creditor.

Citizens First National Bank v. Hunter (In Re Hunter) · filed 1999-02-01(a)(6)

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant committed an intentional act he knew would harm the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court finds that the debt owed by Defendant to Plaintiff is not excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s intentional, unjustified destruction of a creditor’s security interest in collateral.

America First Credit Union v. Gagle (In Re Gagle) · filed 1999-02-08(a)(6)

America First has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Matthew Gagle willfully and maliciously converted America First’s property consisting of its security interest in the Truck, and therefore the debt Matthew Gagle owes resulting from that injury is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured another person before the resulting debt is excepted from discharge.

Mattson v. Hawkins (In Re Hawkins) · filed 1999-02-10(a)(6)

In light of the paucity of evidence presented, this Court must deny Mattson’s application for summary judgment. The record fails to demonstrate by a preponderance-of-the-evidence that Hawkins’ actions during the October 14, 1993, fight were “willful and malicious” as defined by 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(4) excepts debts arising from larceny from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from intentional injury to another or their property.

West American Insurance v. Morris (In re Morris) · filed 1999-02-17(a)(4), (a)(6)

In consideration of all of the foregoing, it is therefore the opinion of this Court that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $5,255.10 plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of judgment and court costs, and that that amount is nondischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) and (a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately converts a creditor’s collateral and intends the resulting injury or is substantially certain it will occur.

First Liberty Bank v. LaGrone (In Re LaGrone) · filed 1999-02-23(a)(6)

Debtor’s actions were willful and deliberate, manifested disregard for the rights of First Liberty and were substantially certain to cause injury sufficient to meet First Liberty’s burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the debtor intended to cause the injury.

Farris v. Ciuzio (In re Ciuzio) · filed 1999-03-18(a)(6)

The evidence is ample that Defendant intended to injure the Plaintiff. ... The verdict and judgment in the state court support a finding of willfulness. We conclude from the transcript that the injury was both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a willful and malicious injury, rather than a reckless or negligent one.

Cudmore v. Howell · filed 1999-03-24(a)(6)

The North Carolina Superior court found that Cudmore’s actions were both willful and malicious. Therefore, the state court judgment satisfies the statutory requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) that the injury be willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property.

Zygulski v. Daugherty · filed 1999-03-25(a)(6)

There are numerous cases holding that conversion falls within the ambit of § 523(a)(6). ... For the preceding reasons the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to except from discharge under § 523(a)(6) is hereby AFFIRMED.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts the entire debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious sexual assault and battery from discharge.

Pettey v. Belanger Ex Rel. Belanger · filed 1999-04-22(a)(6)

Accordingly I will not disturb the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the entire $750,000 is a “debt for” the injuries arising from Pettey’s sexual assault and battery of appellees. The whole debt is consequently excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a civil theft debt from discharge when the theft establishes a willful and malicious injury; collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of that finding.

Reid v. Clayton (In re Clayton) · filed 1999-05-26(a)(6)

... under § 523(a)(6), which excepts from discharge debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity” or to the property of another entity. ... A finding that Defendant’s conduct in so doing was not merely the result of a mistake or recklessness, but was in fact “willful and malicious”, was likewise necessary and critical to the Final Judgment with the adjudication of liability under Florida Statute § 772.11. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel appropriately bars the relitigation of those issues.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts compensatory and punitive damages for wilful and malicious conduct from discharge.

Sanders v. Nunley (In Re Nunley) · filed 1999-06-01(a)(6)

1. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Carol Ed Sanders, in the sum of $80,-000.00 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages, which was rendered because of Nunley’s wilful and malicious conduct, is non-dischargea-ble pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a conversion debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes both the act and the resulting injury.

J. Bowers Construction Co. v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1999-04-23(a)(6)

As such, the “wrongful act” element in a § 523(a)(6) conversion claim must be analyzed in terms of whether both the act and any resultant harm to the plaintiff were intentionally caused by the defendant-debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from breach of contract from discharge merely because the breach was intentional; the creditor must establish willful and malicious injury.

Cloyd v. GRP RECORDS · filed 1999-06-18(a)(6)

Thus a breach of contract is not intended to be a debt that is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). GRP’s assertion that the Debtor’s breach is intentional and thus grounds to except the debt from discharge is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code. Therefore, Count III of Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property.

In Re Berghman · filed 1999-07-07(a)(6)

The Court finds that Debtor's actions fall within the Supreme Court's intended meaning of willful and malicious injury to property of another. Accordingly, Wentworth's prepetition loss of $14,500.00 is a debt that will be excepted from Debtor's discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s intentional conversion of another party’s property.

Jones v. J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. Partnership (In re Bergham) · filed 1999-07-07(a)(6)

Debtor’s behavior amounts to a conversion. Debtor routed previously sold payments back to him never really intending to turn them over to Wentworth. At the point Debtor rerouted the payments to himself, Debtor held no interest in such payments. The payments were no longer Debtor’s property; rather these payments were the legal property of Wentworth. The Court finds that Debtor’s actions fall within the Supreme Court’s intended meaning of willful and malicious injury to property of another. Accordingly, Wentworth’s pre-petition loss of $14,500.00 is a debt that will be excepted from Debtor’s discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor intended to injure the creditor or its lien interest; intentionally transferring collateral alone is insufficient.

Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. v. Longley (In Re Longley) · filed 1999-07-09(a)(6)

However, consistent with the teaching of Geiger, Longley’s intentional act is insufficient to satisfy the willfulness element of § 523(a)(6). For Longley’s obligation to be non-dischargeable, Mitsubishi was required to present evidence that Longley intended to injure it or its lien interest.

Section 523(a)(6) makes punitive damages nondischargeable when they arise from the same conduct as a nondischargeable compensatory award for willful and malicious injury.

Thompson v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 1999-08-03(a)(6)

Furthermore, in the Eighth Circuit, where the compensatory and punitive damage awards are based on the same underlying conduct, and the judgment for compensatory damages is nondischargeable because it is based on willful and malicious injury to another, the punitive damages award is likewise nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional injury to a creditor’s protected property interests from discharge; negligent or reckless conduct is insufficient.

A v. Reilly International, Ltd. v. Rosenzweig (In Re Rosenzweig) · filed 1999-08-19(a)(6)

For purposes of § 523(a)(6), the Court finds that the Debtor’s actions were both willful and malicious under the heightened requirements of Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). ... This is precisely the intentional tortious conduct required by Geiger and is not merely negligent or reckless conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury, which can be proven by knowledge that injury is substantially certain to result.

Via Christi Regional Medical Center v. Budig (In Re Budig) · filed 1999-09-03(a)(6)

This court adopts the position that intent to cause injury can be proven by substantial certainty. ... Unless the debtors knew of Via Christi’s rights, they could not intend to injure Via Christi and could not have known with substantial certainty that injury would result from their actions.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful injury; an Ohio punitive damages award alone does not establish willfulness.

Hinze v. Robinson (In Re Robinson) · filed 1999-09-09(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the judgment rendered by the state court in this case did not necessarily include a finding of “willful” conduct on the part of the Debtor under § 523(a)(6), and as a result the Court holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot be applied to the issue of the Debtor’s liability.

Section 523(a)(6)'s malice requirement can be satisfied by the inferred intent to harm in child molestation cases.

Hoult v. Hoult (In Re Hoult) · filed 1999-09-10(a)(6)

This Court is satisfied that Massachusetts’ inference of intent to harm in child molestation cases is sufficient to meet the Section 523(a)(6) requirement of malice.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for Rule 11 sanctions from discharge when the attorney acted recklessly but did not intend to injure the opposing party.

Bryant v. Rogers (In Re Rogers) · filed 1999-09-22(a)(6)

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) provides that a discharge under chapter 7 (§ 727) does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... It is true that Mr. Rogers intentionally filed the counterclaim, but he thought that the counterclaim was justified and therefore did not intentionally injure Bryant. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the Bryant judgment is not nondischargeable, and an appropriate judgment will be entered.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result.

In Re: Seymour Markowitz, Debtor. Seymour Markowitz v. Campbell · filed 1999-09-23(a)(6)

Nonetheless, from the Court's language and analysis in Geiger, we now hold that unless "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, at 15 (1964), he has not committed a "willful and malicious injury" as defined under §523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously causes injury to another’s property interests.

A v. Reilly International, Ltd. v. Rosenzweig (In Re Rosenzweig) · filed 1999-10-14(a)(6)

The Debtor admitted that he knew what he was doing, and thus intended to cause the resulting injury to Reilly’s property interests protected under the covenants in the contract, which survived his termination of employment with Reilly. Thus, the Court found the requirements in Geiger satisfied and found the debt non-dischargeable. There was no manifest error of law or fact.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to plead facts showing that the debtor intended to cause injury.

KingVision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. DeMarco (In Re DeMarco) · filed 1999-10-27(a)(6)

While the Court must, on a motion to dismiss, accept the truth of all well-pleaded allegations, KingVision, in its amended adversary complaint, does not allege any facts demonstrating that DeMarco in any way intended to cause injury to KingVision. Thus, under the requirements set forth in Kawaauhau, KingVision has failed to plead sufficient allegations to entitle it to go forward in seeking a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for trade secret misappropriation nondischargeable when a prior judgment establishes willful and malicious injury and has preclusive effect.

Hobson Mould Works, Inc. v. Madsen (In Re Madsen) · filed 1999-11-02(a)(6)

Therefore, the debt for misappropriation of trade secrets is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for trade-secret misappropriation nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Hobson Mould Works, Inc. v. Madsen (In Re Madsen) · filed 1999-11-02(a)(6)

We conclude that the definitions in the jury instructions, upon which the jury's finding was based, satisfied the definitions of willful and malicious under section 523(a)(6), that the other components of collateral estoppel were also satisfied, and that debtors were properly precluded from relitigating the issue of willfulness and malice under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for injury nondischargeable when the debtor intended to harm the creditor.

Wilson v. Carter (In Re Carter) · filed 1999-11-05(a)(6)

Carter very clearly acted with the intent to harm Wilson. The Court determines that the judgment debt in the amount of $2746.52 is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt arose from a willful and malicious injury.

Rupert v. Krautheimer (In Re Krautheimer) · filed 1999-11-17(a)(6)

After considering the facts and testimony elicited in the state court transcript, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Krautheimer’s debt was attributable to “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity,” as mandated by Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a sanctions debt from discharge without proof that the debtor intended to cause injury.

Massachusetts Casualty Insurance v. Green (In Re Green) · filed 1999-11-22(a)(6)

MCIC neither alleges nor offers evidence that Green intended to harm it by ripping up his records and the Circuit Court’s order makes no such finding. ... The $8,515.53 debt for sanctions will be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from willful and malicious injury, including sanctions supported by findings that establish such injury.

Hopkins v. O'Melveny & Myers · filed 1999-12-22(a)(6)

We agree with the district court that there may be cases in which a finding of bad faith litigation tactics under California law would not be the equivalent of finding willful and malicious conduct for purposes of § 523(a)(6), but in this particular case the findings in the two sanction orders are such that defendant is collaterally estopped from arguing that he did not willfully and maliciously injure the plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment for wrongful use of civil proceedings from discharge when the prior verdict establishes willful and malicious injury through collateral estoppel.

Drudy v. Slomnicki (In Re Slomnicki · filed 2000-01-05(a)(6)

Because the debtor is collaterally estopped from denying that, or otherwise litigating whether, the underlying state court judgments in favor of Drudy and Kirsch were rendered in response to harm which the debtor willfully and maliciously inflicted upon Drudy and Kirsch within the meaning of § 523(a)(6), the Court is constrained to rule that said underlying judgment claims (a) represent claims against the debtor for willful and malicious injury, and (b) are nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages for breach of an employee’s duty of loyalty from discharge when the employee intended to cause the employer economic injury.

Spring Works, Inc. v. Sarff (In Re Sarff) · filed 2000-01-10(a)(6)

Those actions indicate an intention to cause Spring Works economic injury by taking customers from Spring Works. Accordingly, the compensatory damage award in the judgment is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge damages for a debtor’s intentional violation of a federal court order protecting another party.

Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In Re Behn) · filed 1999-12-01(a)(6)

As explained above, I find from the District Court’s Decisions (but as a matter of my own jurisdiction) that the two awards at issue are debts caused by a “willful and malicious injury” by her upon the Plaintiff, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for conversion of settlement proceeds when the creditor has no property interest in those proceeds.

In Re: Bailey, Bruce Albion, Debtor. Jon J. Del Bino v. Bailey · filed 1999-12-03(a)(6)

In the absence of a property interest in the nature of a lien, we agree with the conclusion of the bankruptcy appellate panel that Bailey’s conduct did not constitute conversion and, therefore, that Del Bino’s claim for attorney fees did not fall within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor converts collateral intending injury or knowing injury is substantially certain to result.

First Family Financial Services v. Burns (In Re Burns) · filed 2000-01-24(a)(6)

Bums either converted the collateral with an intent to injure or with the knowledge that an injury was substantially certain to result, thereby causing the debt to be non-dischargeable pursuant to the dictates of § 523(a)(6), and Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for an intentional injury inflicted without just cause or excuse.

Mabank Bank v. Grisham (In Re Grisham) · filed 2000-01-25(a)(6)

Accordingly, the court finds that of the judgment debt of $785,045.50, James and Kelly willfully and maliciously injured the bank in the amount of $515,315.50, $785,-045.50 less $269,730.00. That amount of the judgment shall be excepted from their discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Under § 523(a)(6), a creditor may prove willful injury by showing that the debtor desired the injury or believed harmful consequences were substantially certain to result.

Fidelity Financial Services v. Cox (In Re Cox) · filed 2000-01-28(a)(6)

Following that reasoning, in order to prevail under § 523(a)(6), a creditor must demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence either that the debtor desired to cause the injury complained of, or that the debtor believed that harmful consequences were substantially certain to result from the debtor’s acts.

Section 523(a)(6) treats conduct as malicious when the debtor acts in conscious disregard of their duties or without just cause or excuse.

Gonzalez v. Moffitt (In Re Moffitt) · filed 2000-01-31(a)(6)

Under § 523(a)(6), a person is deemed to have acted maliciously when that person acts in conscious disregard of their duties or without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor who is a corporate officer actively participates in the willful and malicious conversion of property subject to another party’s security interest.

Mercantile Bank of Arkansas, N.A. v. Speers (In Re Speers) · filed 2000-02-02(a)(6)

In the context of bankruptcy, an individual debtor who is an officer of a corporation and who actively participates in the conversion of property subject to the security interest of a third party becomes personally liable to the third party such that the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury the debtor intended to cause or knew was substantially certain to occur.

Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In Re Baldwin) · filed 2000-02-07(a)(6)

Whether Debtor violently struck and injured Kilpatrick or assisted others in doing so, in holding that Debtor had committed a battery on these facts, the state court had to find that Debtor intended to injure Kilpatrick or that injury was substantially certain to occur. No other finding was possible given the facts here. The actions of Debtor and the others were directed at Kilpatrick. Debtor was an active participant in the violent striking of Kilpatrick, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Clearly, Debtor deliberately and intentionally injured Kilpatrick within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result from an intentional act.

Wiczkowski v. Howes (In Re Howes) · filed 2000-02-17(a)(6)

Thus, in this Court, Wiezkowski must prove that Debtor caused her a “willful and malicious injury;” i.e., that Debtor intended to injure her or engaged in an intentional act from which he believed injury would be substantially certain to result.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

In Re Litwok · filed 2000-03-03(a)(6)

In light of these findings, this Court finds that Republic has established the elements of non-dischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended to cause the injury; an accidental injury does not qualify.

Kearns v. Industrial Commission · filed 2000-03-06(a)(6)

The record shows that Kearns sustained accidental, rather than willful and malicious, injuries. The circuit court therefore did not err in finding that Kearns’ workers’ compensation claim was not of a kind specified in section 523(a)(6) and that Kearns’ claim was not excepted from Hlady’s bankruptcy discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a claim for willful and malicious injury to a person even without injury to that person's property.

In Re Farbman · filed 2000-02-02(a)(6)

Moreover, because § 523(a)(6) is written in the disjunctive, Bell need not suffer an injury to its property to state a claim under § 523(a)(6) but can suffer an injury to itself.

Section 523(a)(6) generally excepts debts for injuries caused by intentional acts done to cause injury from discharge.

Buglione v. Berlingeri (In Re Berlingeri) · filed 2000-02-24(a)(6)

The Court also finds that the Tevis claim in Count III is non-dischargea-ble because Buglione and Berlingeri stipulated, as part of the consent judgment, that this claim was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). ... Claims based on injury caused by intentional acts done to cause injury are typically non-dis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures another entity or its property.

Solar Systems & Peripherals, Inc. v. Burress (In Re Burress) · filed 2000-03-07(a)(6)

The Plaintiff has established that its judgment obtained in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County (Cause No. 95-2-22684) is nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and a declaratory judgment to that effect shall enter in its favor.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to show that the debtor intended injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result from an intentional act.

Mayfield Grain Co. v. Crump (In Re Crump) · filed 2000-03-20(a)(6)

Thus, the creditor must demonstrate that the debtor either (1) intended to cause injury to the creditor, or (2) engaged in an intentional act from which the debtor believed injury would be substantially certain to result.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately causes an injury with a motive to harm or under circumstances where harm is objectively and substantially certain.

Harry Ritchie's Jewelers, Inc. v. Chlebowski (In Re Chlebowski) · filed 2000-03-23(a)(6)

Accordingly I hold that a claim is excepted from discharge under Code § 523(a)(6) if it is based on an injury caused by a deliberate act of the debtor, undertaken either with a subjective motive to cause harm, or under circumstances where there is an objective and substantial certainty of harm from the act.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt arising from a breach of contract when the debtor intends to injure the creditor.

Sanders v. Vaughn · filed 2000-03-29(a)(6)

The lower courts committed no error of law by determining that Sanders’s deliberate attempt to bilk Vaughn out of his contingency fee constituted a “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a Maryland punitive damages finding can establish the required injury.

Nestorio v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In Re Nestorio) · filed 2000-05-22(a)(6)

The findings necessary to award punitive damages under Maryland law are virtually identical to those required for the exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, in awarding punitive damages under Maryland law, it was necessary for the district court to find that Debtor caused willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor’s willful and malicious act to cause the creditor’s injury; post-petition conduct cannot cause a pre-petition deficiency debt.

National Auto Finance Co. v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 2000-05-30(a)(6)

Thus, a debtor’s actions must be determined to be the cause of the creditor’s injury. In this case, there is no dispute that the creditor’s “injury,” the deficiency balance, is a pre-petition debt. Even if the Debtors’ alleged post-petition actions to thwart repossession of the creditors’ security are proven true, they cannot be the cause of the creditor’s pre-petition claim. Consequently, these actions do not form the basis for declaring the deficiency debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury, but does not require proof of fraud.

Baltimore County Savings Bank v. Malinowski (In Re Malinowski) · filed 2000-05-30(a)(6)

However, fraud is not a necessary element of proof in an action brought under Section 523(a)(6). The cause of action is premised upon willful and malicious injury caused by the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a fee award from discharge when the debtor maintained a lawsuit in bad faith and intended the opposing party to incur defense costs.

Erie Insurance Group v. Chaires (In Re Chaires) · filed 2000-06-02(a)(6)

For these reasons, the award of costs and fees by the Circuit Court against Debtor, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341 is non-dischargeable as a debt incurred for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property.

Massachusetts Bay Insurance v. Shaw (In Re Shaw) · filed 2000-06-30(a)(6)

The facts and law supporting the adjudication of Debtor by the Massachusetts Court satisfy the elements of § 523(a)(6). Debtor’s solicitation of arson resulted in extensive financial injury to MBIC and clearly constitutes a deliberate and malicious intentional injury toward MBIC.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debt arises from a willful and malicious injury.

Aaron H. Watman v. · filed 2000-06-30(a)(6)

Accordingly, to trigger § 523(a)(6), a debt must arise from a willful and malicious injury. In other words, there must be a clear link between the debt and the injury complained of.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to plead and prove an injury caused willfully and maliciously by the debtor.

Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. DeMarco (In Re DeMarco) · filed 2000-07-24(a)(6)

In order for Plaintiff to obtain a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6), Plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove three elements: (1) that Debtor’s actions caused an injury; (2) that Debtor’s actions were willful; and (3) that the Debtor’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt arising from injury the debtor encouraged through an omission calculated to cause willful and malicious injury.

O'Brien v. Sintobin (In Re Sintobin) · filed 2000-08-08(a)(6)

Further, the types of encouragement which may lead to a finding of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) can range from overt encouragement to simply an omission, if such an omission was calculated by the debtor in a willful and malicious manner to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury to another person from discharge.

McNichols v. Shala (In Re Shala) · filed 2000-08-14(a)(6)

Because this Court finds that Bankruptcy Judge Barliant did not commit clear error — indeed, there was no error whatever — in finding that Shala acted willfully and maliciously in shooting Eminoski, it affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from the debtor's willful participation in converting another's property through embezzlement.

Corporat v. Dupre · filed 2000-08-16(a)(6)

It follows that Theresa's willful participation in the conversion of the appellees' property through embezzlement satisfies the exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) makes damages arising from a wilful and malicious injury, including punitive damages, nondischargeable.

Hixson v. Hixson (In Re Hixson) · filed 2000-08-18(a)(6)

Debt for wilful and malicious injury to another is nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... The Court hereby awards the Plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages. Since these damages arise from the wilful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that they are also nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor wished to cause injury or believed injury was substantially certain to occur.

Via Christi v. Englehart · filed 2000-09-08(a)(6)

In sum, the “willful and malicious injury” exception to dischargeability in § 523(a)(6) turns on the state of mind of the debtor, who must have wished to cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to occur.

Section 523(a)(6) treats conduct as malicious when a debtor acts in conscious disregard of a duty or without just cause or excuse.

Gonzalez v. Moffitt (In Re Moffitt) · filed 2000-09-20(a)(6)

Under § 523(a)(6), a person is deemed to have acted maliciously when that person acts in conscious disregard of his duties or without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from willful and malicious injury, including a statutory attorney’s fee award arising from that injury.

CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Feiner (In Re Feiner) · filed 2000-09-27(a)(6)

Thus, this Court concludes, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cohen, that the attorney’s fee award is also not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes punitive damages, interest, and costs nondischargeable along with actual damages arising from a willful and malicious injury.

Glass v. Cagle (In Re Cagle) · filed 2000-09-29(a)(6)

The amount of nondischargeable debt includes not only actual damages, but also punitive damages, Miera, 926 F.2d at 745 (“The language of section 523(a)(6) is directed at the nature of the conduct which gives rise to the debt, rather than the nature of the debt.”). Accordingly, the entire amount of debt reflected in the judgment, plus interest and costs, is nondischargeable in this bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor negligently spends mistaken payments without intending to injure the creditor.

Davis v. Vestal (In Re Vestal) · filed 2000-10-02(a)(6)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant did not “willfully and maliciously” injure Plaintiff. Therefore Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff does not fall under the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when the debtor intended to injure another and acted maliciously.

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Bray (In Re Bray) · filed 2000-11-15(a)(6)

Because the court instructed the jury to determine debtor’s intent to harm the plaintiffs, the Geiger standard for nondis-chargeability was met.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; a debt arising from negligent medical malpractice remains dischargeable.

Stanley v. Cole (In Re Cole) · filed 2000-11-28(a)(6)

There is no evidence to support the conclusion that Cole intended to injure Stanley. The injury was the result of medical malpractice, a cause of action based on negligence. Therefore, Cole’s conduct does not rise to the level of a “willful and malicious injury” as is required to make the debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property from discharge when the creditor proves the required elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

Mitchell v. Mitchell (In Re Mitchell) · filed 2000-12-14(a)(6)

Thus, a debt will be nondischargeable under subsection (a)(6) if the objecting creditor can establish by a preponderance of the evidence five elements: (1) an injury; (2) caused by the debtor; (3) either to another entity, or to another entity’s property; that is both (4) willful; and (5) malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended both the injury and the resulting harm.

Siemer v. Nangle (In Re Nangle) · filed 2001-01-04(a)(6)

To summarize, to prevail under § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended both the “injury” and the “harm” (as those terms are defined in §§ 7(1) and 7(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts respectively).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge damages caused by a debtor’s intentional deprivation of another’s use of property.

Wurm v. Ridgway (In Re Ridgway) · filed 2001-01-08(a)(6)

In this Court’s judgment, such actions (or inactions) clearly constitute an intentional deprivation of another’s use of their property. As such, any damages arising therefrom would satisfy the willful and malicious requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the injury; intentionally acting despite a likely risk of injury is insufficient.

Fowler v. Jenkins (In Re Jenkins) · filed 2001-01-18(a)(6)

However, after a careful reading of Kawaauhau, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court and § 523(a)(6) does not permit anything less than a debtor’s intent to cause an injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from injury the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to cause.

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Treshman (In Re Treshman) · filed 2001-01-25(a)(6)

In the instant case, the debt arising from the debtor’s conduct is not dischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) because the injuries here were caused by the willful and malicious intent of the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when precluded findings establish that the debtor intentionally caused the creditor injury.

Jorge v. Mannie (In Re Mannie) · filed 2001-01-25(a)(6)

Collateral estoppel compels the conclusion that the Judgment debt on the wrongful termination claim is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; findings of reckless or wanton conduct do not establish that requirement.

Croghan v. Hampton (In Re Hampton) · filed 2001-01-30(a)(6)

However, the Court in Kawaauhau specifically rejected a reading of § 523(a)(6) to include reckless misconduct. Thus, the findings of deliberate action and wanton conduct do not satisfy the “deliberate injury” standard.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for negligent or reckless conduct that causes injury.

Sparks v. King (In Re King) · filed 2001-02-09(a)(6)

He admits that his actions were negligent or even reckless, but negligent or reckless acts do not suffice to establish that a resulting injury is willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally withholds collateral sale proceeds to injure the secured creditor.

Conseco v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 2001-02-12(a)(6)

Howard’s true intent in misappropriating Conseco’s proceeds was to exact retribution from Conseco for restricting long-term motor home rentals. ... His actions were intentional, willful, and malicious and resulted in a substantial injury to Conseco. Accordingly, Howard’s debt to Conseco also is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure; reckless disregard does not establish willful and malicious injury.

Doughty v. Hill (In Re Hill) · filed 2001-02-26(a)(6)

It is clear that an act in reckless disregard of the rights of others does not constitute willful and malicious conduct for the purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person’s property from discharge.

Johnson v. Davis (In Re Davis) · filed 2001-03-08(a)(6)

As the court has previously ruled from the bench and further discussed above in the case law, debtor’s conduct satisfied the statutory requirements for a determination of nondischargeability based upon debtor’s willful and malicious injury to plaintiffs vehicles.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; knowingly using a counterfeit trademark alone does not establish one.

Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Meece (In Re Meece) · filed 2001-03-09(a)(6)

A willful injury under § 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment establishes willful and malicious injury and bars relitigation of that issue.

Nestorio v. Associates Commercial Corp. · filed 2001-03-15(a)(6)

We affirm ... the district court’s holding that the plain language of the consent order "did not preclude the [magistrate judge] from considering all issues relevant to a determination of damages," and that Nestorio is, there- fore, barred from relitigating the issue of willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to have believed that injury was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct; objective certainty of harm is insufficient.

Su v. Carrillo (In Re Su) · filed 2001-03-08(a)(6)

Instead, Louis contends that the correct standard the bankruptcy court should have used was whether Louis believed (subjectively) that his conduct was substantially certain to result in injury. We agree.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for a wilful and malicious injury nondischargeable.

Ballard v. Souza (In re Souza) · filed 2001-03-26(a)(6)

To the contrary, the record clearly supports the conclusion that the Plaintiff has established all of the elements of a wilful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), and that the debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor’s injury is both willful and malicious.

ABF, Inc. v. Russell (In Re Russell) · filed 2001-03-30(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) has two components. The injury must not only be willful (intentional); it must also be malicious. This requirement is separate and distinct from the issue of willfulness.

Section 523(a)(6) can make a debt for injury nondischargeable when the debtor believed injury was substantially certain to result, even without a subjective intent to injure the claimant.

Weule v. Nordstrom · filed 2001-05-07(a)(6)

The record makes abundantly clear that Nordstrom was at least “substantially certain” that his fraudulent activities would cause injury not only to the motorists covered under the policies issued, but also to third parties who were injured by those motorists. Nordstrom operated a criminal scheme to create wealth for himself and his cohorts, at the expense of these motorists and third parties. These facts fall comfortably within the Geiger-Jercich standard of intent. The BAP and the bankruptcy court erred insofar as they held that subjective intent to injure Weule was required.

Section 523(a)(6) requires actual intent to cause injury; an intentional act that merely leads to injury is insufficient.

In Re: Billy Franklin Baldwin, Debtor. Billy Franklin Baldwin, B.A.P. v. Kilpatrick · filed 2001-05-09(a)(6)

In Geiger, the Supreme Court held that an act is covered by § 523(a)(6) if it was committed with “the actual intent to cause injury.” ... The fact that Kilpatrick made a claim for an “intentional tort,” alleging that Baldwin “violently struck” him is enough to allege that Baldwin acted with “the actual intent to cause [Kilpatrick] injury.” Thus, the issue raised in the adversary bankruptcy proceeding was the same as the issue raised in the state court action.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result.

Kennedy v. Mustaine · filed 2001-05-10(a)(6)

Although Geiger had yet to be decided, and the bankruptcy court was laboring under case law which set forth the incorrect standard for nondischargeability, the bankruptcy court nonetheless captured the essence of GeigePs test in its reasoning; namely, that only acts done with the intent to cause injury — and not merely acts done intentionally — rise to the level of willful and malicious injury for purposes of satisfying § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury, rather than merely the act that caused it.

In re Kennedy · filed 2001-05-10(a)(6)

Although Geiger had yet to be decided, and the bankruptcy court was laboring under case law which set forth the incorrect standard for nondischargeablity, the bankruptcy court nonetheless captured the essence of Geiger's test in its reasoning; namely, that only acts done with the intent to cause injury - and not merely acts done intentionally - rise to the level of willful and malicious injury for purposes of satisfying § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment necessarily establishes that the debtor intended to cause injury.

Mermelstein v. Elder (In Re Elder) · filed 2001-05-16(a)(6)

Therefore, whether the jury found Elder liable for stalking or for intentional infliction of emotional distress — and certainly if it found liability for both — the requisite level of intent to bring Elder’s debt within the exception to dis-chargeability under the Geiger standard exists.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor's willful and malicious conversion of a creditor's insurance proceeds.

Call Federal Credit Union v. Sweeney (In Re Sweeney) · filed 2001-06-11(a)(6)

For the above reasons, the Court finds that Defendant caused a willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff by converting the insurance proceeds for his own use. Therefore, $2,684.55, the balance owed to Plaintiff at the time of the bankruptcy filing, is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willful and malicious injury; reckless conduct alone does not establish willfulness.

Maxwell v. Price (In Re Price) · filed 2001-06-15(a)(6)

Without more evidence corroborating Maxwell’s version of the incident, it is impossible for the Court to conclude that Maxwell has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Debtor’s conduct resulted in a willful injury. Since both willfulness and malice must be proved, it is unnecessary to examine whether the Debtor’s act was malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt arising from a spouse’s theft nondischargeable for benefits the debtor knew were illegally acquired and nevertheless accepted.

Synod of South Atlantic Presbyterian Church v. Magpusao (In Re Magpusao) · filed 2001-08-06(a)(6)

He can only be held accountable for items that he knew were acquired illegally and which he nevertheless accepted. Accordingly, the Synod debt is nondischargeable as to those items pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt from a California conversion judgment nondischargeable without a showing of willful and malicious injury.

Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar) · filed 2001-08-09(a)(6)

A judgment for conversion under California law therefore does not, without more, establish that a debt arising out of that judgment is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt arising from a California conversion judgment from discharge unless the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

In Re: Ronda S. Peklar, Debtor. Ronda S. Peklar v. Lloyd Ikerd, an Individual · filed 2001-08-09(a)(6)

A judgment for conversion under California substantive law decides only that the defendant has engaged in the “wrongful exercise of dominion” over the personal property of the plaintiff. It does not necessarily decide that the defendant has caused “willful and malicious injury” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). A judgment for conversion under California law therefore does not, without more, establish that a debt arising out of that judgment is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes a deliberate or intentional and malicious injury, including through an intentional act substantially certain to cause such injury.

Johnson v. Dade (In Re Dade) · filed 2001-08-14(a)(6)

In sum, for a debt to be excepted pursuant to § 523(a)(6), plaintiff must prove that debtor caused a deliberate or intentional and malicious injury, or that debtor committed a deliberate or intentional act that was substantially certain to result in a deliberate or intentional and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a conversion judgment from discharge when the jury’s finding leaves open whether the injury was merely reckless.

McClendon v. DeVoll (In Re Devoll) · filed 2001-08-22(a)(6)

Because the Court cannot determine which of the possible alternatives the jury actually found, the Court cannot find that the requirements of section 523(a)(6) have been met here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Judgment is not excepted from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove that the debtor caused an injury and acted willfully and maliciously.

Glucona America, Inc. v. Ardisson (In Re Ardisson) · filed 2001-08-28(a)(6)

Because Glucona has not established the first element under Code § 523(a)(6), and because the remaining two elements under § 523(a)(6) are questions of fact reserved for trial, the Court denies summary judgment with respect to Count I.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both a willful injury and malice to except a debt from discharge; the debtor’s subjective belief can bear on malice.

Stone Street Capital, Inc. v. Granati (In Re Granati) · filed 2001-09-01(a)(6)

As noted, an injury to property must be “malicious” as well as willful before the resulting debt will be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). ... Accordingly, the court concludes that the factual element of malice remains in genuine dispute, thereby precluding summary judgment as it relates to the prepetition payments converted by the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful when the debtor intends to injure or is substantially certain that his conduct will injure the creditor.

Bukowski v. Patel · filed 2001-09-12(a)(6)

Thus, I conclude that a person acts willfully under § 523(a)(6) when he intends to injure or when he is substantially certain that his conduct will cause injury to the creditor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a secured creditor’s lien rights in converted collateral.

J & a Brelage, Inc. v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 2001-09-25(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court hereby holds that, for purposes of § 523(a)(6), the Debtor acted “willfully” with respect to the farm equipment the Plaintiff held as collateral. Additionally, for these same reasons, the Court finds that the Debtor acted maliciously with respect to the Plaintiffs collateral, with a malicious injury being defined under § 523(a)(6) as occurring when a person acts in conscious disregard of their duties or without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an actual intent to cause injury, shown by a subjective motive to cause harm or an objective substantial certainty of harm; negligence or recklessness does not suffice.

Pharr v. Ford (In Re Ford) · filed 2001-09-28(a)(6)

From the evidence presented, however, the court cannot conclude that Ford acted with an actual intent to cause injury to the plaintiffs. He did not foster a subjective motive to cause harm, and, because he was unaware that Pounders was cutting timber on the Pharr property, he had no objective substantial certainty of harm. Consequently, Ford’s conduct does not constitute a willful and malicious injury to the plaintiffs as contemplated by § 528(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires either specific intent to injure or objective substantial certainty that injury was likely to result.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Moody (In Re Moody) · filed 2001-10-05(a)(6)

Therefore, this Court concludes that in the Eleventh Circuit, in order to satisfy the “willful” requirement, (1) the debtor must have had specific intent to inflict injury, or (2) there must be objective substantial certainty that injury was likely to result.

Section 523(a)(6) can make a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable even when the debtor did not intend to injure the creditor.

Mazurczyk v. O'NEIL · filed 2001-10-11(a)(6)

Therefore, for a debt to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the debtor does not have to possess the intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge attorney’s fees arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious prosecution of a fraudulent claim.

USAA Casualty Insurance v. Auffant (In Re Auffant) · filed 2001-10-16(a)(6)

The Debtor’s conduct under these circumstances is willful and malicious for purposes of section 523(a)(6). Attorney’s fees to which the Plaintiff is entitled to under the Florida Offer of Judgment Statute as a result of the adverse verdict, are nondischargeable in this case.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intends the injury or acts with substantial certainty that injury will result.

Henderson v. Woolley (In Re Woolley) · filed 2001-11-02(a)(6)

Therefore, I find that Debtor’s acts constituted a willful and malicious injury as contemplated in § 523(a)(6) and interpreted in Geiger and subsequent decisions, that no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of willful and malicious injury remains to be decided with respect to dischargeability under U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge only if the debtor intended to cause injury.

Allen v. Greenwasser (In Re Greenwasser) · filed 2001-12-04(a)(6)

Having found that the Debtor does not meet the “willful” requirement of § 523(a)(6), the Court finds that this exception to discharge is inapplicable to the instant Adversary Proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended the injury or believed injury was substantially certain to occur.

Huarte v. Clark · filed 2001-12-04(a)(6)

In order for Huarte’s debt to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), she must show that, at the time of the injury, Clark intended the injury or was substantially certain injury would occur. ... Because Huarte failed to show that any injury suffered was willful on Clark’s part, her debt is discharged in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for converted collateral proceeds nondischargeable when the debtor knows of the creditor’s lien and uses the proceeds to pay other creditors after the business has failed.

Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Hammitt (In Re Hammitt) · filed 2001-10-05(a)(6)

The Debtors knew that Commerce had a lien on the funds, that Commerce had not consented to the use of its money to pay other debts, and that they would not realize any further money from their cattle operation. The Debtors cannot excuse their conversion of the $71,977.24 check by claiming that they were trying to keep the business afloat; the cattle operation had already sunk by this point. Therefore, the Court finds the debt of $71,977.24 to be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures a creditor or willfully obstructs the creditor’s collection efforts.

Siemer v. Nangle · filed 2001-12-07(a)(6)

In sum, we believe that the debt arising out of the Illinois judgment and the Missouri contempt order are not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sexual harassment judgment from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes a willful and malicious injury.

McDonough v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 2001-12-11(a)(6)

For the foregoing reasons, having reviewed the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby determines that the state court judgment is nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code because the injury caused to the Plaintiff by the Debtor was “willful and malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because the debtor drove without insurance; the injury must be intended or objectively substantially certain to occur.

Auto v. Westmoreland · filed 2002-01-31(a)(6)

Westmoreland’s failure to insure, followed by his driving the uninsured vehicle, did not create an objective, substantial certainty of harm; and Westmoreland had no subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for deliberate conversion nondischargeable when the conversion constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Heyne v. Heyne (In Re Heyne) · filed 2002-02-13(a)(6)

As such, it is the decision of this Court that the state court judgment rendered against the Debtor was, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), based upon his willful and malicious conduct. Accordingly, the Court, given the particular facts of this case, will apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel so as to preclude the Debtor from discharging his martial obligation to the Plaintiff under 11 U.S.C., § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury, including through conduct known to be substantially certain to injure, and acts without justification.

Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier (In Re Brier) · filed 2002-02-26(a)(6)

Thus, the Debtor’s conduct toward the Plaintiffs satisfies the requirements for nondischargeability for willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or its property.

Hampton v. Mahious · filed 2002-03-05(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Hampton disputes the bankruptcy court's factual conclusions that the injury she caused was willful and malicious. But, the bankruptcy court is "entitled to make reasonable credibility determinations," In re Strangie, 192 F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) and the bankruptcy court's conclusions were not clearly erroneous.

Section 523(a)(6) requires malice in addition to intent to injure; intent alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

M & I Heat Transfer Products, Ltd. v. Gorchev (In Re Gorchev) · filed 2002-03-07(a)(6)

Malice is a separate requirement and therefore must be understood to require something other than intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor disposes of secured collateral knowing that harm to the creditor is substantially certain and offers no just cause or excuse.

National City Bank v. Marcotte (In re Marcotte) · filed 2002-03-13(a)(6)

In examining the undisputed facts in this case, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Debtor/Defendant’s act of selling a grain drill and of disposing of his year 2000 crop, while failing to pay any of the proceeds to the Plaintiff, resulted in a nondischargeable debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). It is clear that, at the time of the Debtor/Defendant’s actions in the year 2000, he was aware that the Plaintiff claimed a perfected security interest in his machinery and crops, and that his actions in liquidating those items without paying any of the proceeds to the Plaintiff Bank resulted in a substantial certainty that the Bank would be harmed. The Debtor/Defendant has offered no just cause or excuse for his actions, and, thus, the entire amount of the April 30, 2001, State Court judgment against the Debt- or/Defendant, in the amount of $38,095.93, must be found to be nondischargeable in this Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove a deliberate or intentional injury, rather than merely negligent or reckless conduct.

Brixey v. Confer (In Re Confer) · filed 2002-04-11(a)(6)

Under this provision, the Brixeys carry the burden of proving that the Debtor caused an injury that was deliberate or intentional rather than merely negligent or reckless.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury itself; allowing rental property to deteriorate without that intent does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

Cutler v. Lazzara (In Re Lazzara) · filed 2002-04-18(a)(6)

Although the Debtor caused injury to Benjamin’s property, it has not been established that the Debtor intended to injure Benjamin or his property, as required for an injury to be “willful” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures the creditor or its property; an injury to someone else cannot be imputed to the creditor.

River View Land Co. v. Bucak (In Re Bucak) · filed 2002-05-17(a)(6)

While Mr. Bucak assertedly maliciously caused deliberate and intentional injury (i.e., willful and malicious injury) to Mr. Laney, there is insufficient evidence in this record that he additionally and maliciously caused such deliberate and intentional injury to River View, a corporate entity, or its property as contemplated in section 523(a)(6) of the Code.

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful injury requirement is met only if the debtor intended injury or believed injury was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct.

In Re Nancy Shao Su in Re Louis C. Su, A/K/A Chienlu Su, Debtors. Dora Carrillo v. Su · filed 2002-05-20(a)(6)

We hold that § 523(a)(6)’s willful injury requirement is met only when the debtor has a subjective motive to inflict injury or when the debtor believes that injury is substantially certain to result from his own conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury or one the debtor believed was substantially certain to occur; reckless conduct is insufficient.

Beard v. Devore (In Re Devore) · filed 2002-06-05(a)(6)

The plaintiffs still would have had to prove that the defendant desired to cause the consequences of his act or believed that those consequences were substantially certain to occur. The proof adduced by the plaintiffs’ testimony was that the defendant acted recklessly, a standard of care insufficient to satisfy the requirements set forth in Kawaauhau v. Geiger and its progeny.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for willful and malicious injury; a California punitive damages award can help establish that the debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious.

Mermelstein v. Elder · filed 2002-06-25(a)(6)

We add that the award of punitive damages under California law means that Elder’s behavior was found to be malicious or oppressive. That further demonstrates that his actions were willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, including a judgment for intentional harassment and retaliatory firing.

Nesler v. Thomason (In Re Thomason) · filed 2002-08-02(a)(6)

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the judgment entered against the Defendant in the Circuit Court of Dane County, Wisconsin, in the amount of $15,000, constitutes a non-dischargeable debt pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a landlord’s repair and cleanup costs from discharge without proof that the debtor intended to injure the landlord or the property.

Lilledahl v. Kibbee (In Re Kibbee) · filed 2002-08-27(a)(6)

Although the Court empathizes with Lilledahl that his house was not left in good condition, the cost of repairing and cleaning up the premises is not the kind of injury contemplated by section 523(a)(6). Such an injury requires proof that the Kibbees acted with an intent to injure Lilledahl or his property. Lilledahl’s evidence fails to establish that the poor condition of the house was the result of the Kibbees’ intent to injure Lilledahl.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a retaliatory discharge debt from discharge when the employer targets the employee and intends to harm her employment rights.

Suggitt v. Foushee (In Re Foushee) · filed 2002-08-27(a)(6)

Foushee targeted Suggitt for her cooperation with the Podiatry Board. He intended to harm her by depriving her of employment rights. The court concludes that Suggitt’s claim against Foush-ee is a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly facilitates fraud and believes injury is substantially certain to result.

Myers v. Ostling · filed 2002-09-27(a)(6)

In reviewing the determinations of the trial court, this court is in agreement with the trial court’s finding that the debt was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court’s findings of fact concerning the actions of Jonathan Ostling were not, in the opinion of this court, clearly erroneous, and this court is in agreement with a finding of nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt caused by a debtor’s willful and malicious conversion of another’s property.

Leonard v. Guillory (In Re Guillory) · filed 2002-09-27(a)(6)

Guillory’s debt to Leonard totaling $24,000 arose from willful and malicious injury caused by Guillory’s tortious conduct. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter judgment awarding the sum of $24,000 to Leonard and excepting the $24,000 debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that a debtor who converts collateral subjectively intended injury or knew injury was substantially certain; intentional conversion alone is insufficient.

Thiara v. Spycher Bros. (In Re Thiara) · filed 2002-11-01(a)(6)

The recited case law, which forms the historical backdrop for this rule of law, indicates that the strict subjective standard must also be applied in a conversion case. Therefore, the mere intentional nature of the conversion is insufficient to satisfy the requirement that the creditor must strictly prove subjective intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from conversion nondischargeable when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another’s property.

Christen v. Himber (In Re Himber) · filed 2002-12-10(a)(6)

Himber’s subjective intent meets the “willfulness” standard of § 523(a)(6). ... Christen’s threats, even if true, do not constitute “just cause or excuse” for converting the proceeds of the check to her own use. This was a willful act, done intentionally, which necessarily caused injury. Based on the foregoing, Christen is entitled to a judgment that Christen’s claim against Himber is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires subjective intent to cause harm; negligence, carelessness, or recklessness does not establish malice.

Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In Re Trantham) · filed 2002-12-18(a)(6)

The malice element of section 523(a)(6) of the Code, however, requires a subjective intent to cause the harm. Injuries caused through negligence, carelessness, and/or recklessness do not also automatically satisfy the required malice standard of proof under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debt to arise from a willful and malicious injury by the debtor.

Steier v. Best · filed 2002-12-19(a)(6)

Steier faces two problems under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). First, he cannot demonstrate that the debt he is seeking to have declared non-dischargeable arose from Best’s actions to conceal his assets. To the contrary, the debt in question arose out of the breach of the stock purchase agreement.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when an intentional wrongful act necessarily causes injury; specific intent to cause injury is not required.

Stahl v. Gross (In Re Gross) · filed 2003-02-06(a)(6)

While the Supreme Court in the Geiger case precluded negligent or reckless conduct from the compass of § 523(a)(6), it did not require a specific intent to cause injury. An intentional wrongful act that necessarily causes injury meets the willfulness standard under Geiger.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury; intentionally driving illegally does not, by itself, make a resulting injury nondischargeable.

DeBlasio v. Groff (In Re Groff) · filed 2003-02-24(a)(6)

Therefore, plaintiffs must establish that the debtor’s action in driving her automobile while suspended was an act done with the intent to cause injury, and was not merely a deliberate or intentional act of driving while suspended that led to an injury.