11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) makes damages from fraud nondischargeable when the fraud constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Federal Insurance v. Woods (In re Woods) · filed 2016-09-16(a)(6)

With regard to the question of nondis-chargeability in bankruptcy, the Court finds that whatever damages are ultimately proved as a result of Defendant’s fraud are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), because Defendant’s fraud constitutes a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a judgment debt nondischargeable based on a later injury that did not give rise to that debt.

Cordeiro v. Kirwan (In re Kirwan) · filed 2016-09-20(a)(6)

Thus, any injury resulting from the alleged transfers could not have given rise to the debt at issue, and therefore any such injury — even if willful and malicious — cannot render the amount due under the state court judgments nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an assault and battery judgment from discharge when the jury necessarily found conduct targeted at the creditors and certain or almost certain to cause harm.

Schmidt v. Nelson · filed 2016-10-03(a)(6)

In finding for the Schmidts, therefore, the jury necessarily found Nelson's conduct was targeted at the Schmidts and was certain or almost certain to cause harm. Consequently, the jury verdict also satisfies the requirement of a malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable when the creditor proves the exception applies.

LeCann v. Cobham · filed 2016-10-14(a)(6)

We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor acted to cause injury or knew injury was substantially certain to result.

Scranton Laminated Labels, Inc. v. Florimonte (In re Florimonte) · filed 2016-10-21(a)(6)

Actions are “willful” for purposes of § 523(a)(6) if they are done for the purpose of producing injury or have a substantial certainty of producing injury. ... I conclude that the findings within the Jury Verdict and the Memorandum Order add factual flesh to the skeletal frame of Count I of the Complaint which alleges non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge damages directly resulting from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another entity.

Twin Falls Staffing, LLC v. Visser (In Re Visser) · filed 2016-10-24(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Joseph Visser willfully and maliciously injured Twin Falls Staffing. Based on this finding, the bankruptcy court properly concluded that the damages Twin Falls Staffing suffered as a direct result of Joseph Visser’s willful and malicious actions were non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Section 523 excepts debts obtained through intentional misrepresentation and debts arising from willful and malicious conversion of a creditor’s property from discharge.

Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Mustafa (In re Mustafa) · filed 2016-09-14(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Based on the foregoing, the debt owed to Central Bank in the amount of $17,862.39, plus attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs as provided by the underlying contract, is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts obtained by fraud from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury.

MetroPCS v. Devor · filed 2016-10-14(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

The Court hereby finds that the acts of Defendants render them indebted to MetroPCS for money and property, including without limitation, illegally acquired new Handsets and proceeds from Defendants’ resale of those Handsets, which Defendants obtained by false pretenses, by false representation, and/or by actual fraud, and therefore this judgment is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... The Court hereby finds that the acts of Defendants constitute willful and malicious injury by Defendants to MetroPCS and/or the property of MetroPCS, including MetroPCS Handsets, MetroPCS’s federally-registered trademarks, and Me-troPCS’s image and reputation, as a result of Defendants’ admitted and continuing participation in the Scheme, and therefore this judgment is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to another or its property from discharge.

MetroPCS v. Agboton · filed 2016-10-27(a)(6)

14. The Court hereby finds that the acts of Defendant constitutes willful and malicious injury by Defendant to MetroPCS and/or the property of MetroPCS, including MetroPCS Handsets, MetroPCS’s federally-registered trademarks, and Me-troPCS’s image and reputation, as a result of Defendant’s admitted and continuing participation in the Scheme, and therefore this judgment is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the creditor to prove that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Corcoran v. McCabe (In re McCabe) · filed 2016-10-27(a)(6)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Corcoran has failed to prove that the Debtor posted the Defamatory Message and, therefore, necessarily cannot prove that the Debtor willfully and mali-ciously injured Corcoran pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s right to repayment.

Jon Philip Monson, II v. Galaz · filed 2016-11-21(a)(6)

Thus, we conclude that Monson’s actions ... constituted a willful and malicious injury and, thus, the debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debt to arise from willful and malicious injury; misconduct after the debt arose does not make it nondischargeable.

Washington v. Robinson-Vinegar (In re Robinson-Vinegar) · filed 2016-11-21(a)(6)

Moreover, the debt itself must have originated from willful and malicious action and such conduct, when occurring after a debt is created, is not sufficient to render the debt nondischargeable pursuant to this exception.

Section 523(a)(6) does not treat efforts to thwart collection of an existing debt as a separate injury.

First Bank & Trust Co. v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds) · filed 2016-12-01(a)(6)

Efforts to thwart the collection of a debt do not constitute a separate injury under § 523(a)(6) because such efforts did not create the debt, but occurred after the injury or debt arose.

Section 523 excepts a judgment from discharge when the debt arises from fraud or from willful and malicious injury to another party or its property.

MetroPCS v. Rivera · filed 2016-12-08(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

... which Defendant obtained by false pretenses, by false representation, and/or by actual fraud, and therefore, this judgment is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). ... The Court hereby finds that the acts of Defendant constitutes willful and malicious injury by Defendant to Me-troPCS and/or the property of MetroPCS, including MetroPCS Handsets, Me-troPCS’s federally-registered trademarks, and MetroPCS’s image and reputation, as a result of Defendant’s admitted and continuing participation in the Scheme, and therefore, this judgment is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) prevents discharge of a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person’s property.

Seaboard Produce Distributors v. Tolotti · filed 2017-01-04(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents the discharge of debts arising from a debtor’s “willful and malicious injury” to the property of another. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Relying on the California Superior Court’s determination that Tolotti “acted deliberately, willfully, and intended to cause injury to Plaintiff’s security and impede Plaintiff from obtaining physical possession of the property,” the bankruptcy court held that Tolotti’s debt wasn’t dischargeable. Because we are “in as good a position as the BAP to review the decision of the bankruptcy court, we review the bankruptcy court’s decision independently,” In re Nourbakhsh, 67 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), and affirm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor knew her acts were substantially certain to cause injury.

Gordon v. Mackey (In re Mackey) · filed 2017-01-04(a)(6)

As the Gordons have not established that Roberta signed the note and endorsed the check “with knowledge that” these acts were “substantially certain to cause injury” to the Gordons, the “willful” requirement of § 523(a)(6) has not been met.

Section 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) except debts arising from embezzlement or willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Contemporary Imports, Inc. v. Morrow (In re Morrow) · filed 2017-01-12(a)(4), (a)(6)

The court finds that the amount of the judgment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) and (6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and the creditor must prove the injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Joseph Mauz v. · filed 2017-01-13(a)(6)

A creditor must prove a willful and malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the debtor intended the injury and acted without justification or excuse.

Shirley v. Lopez (In re Lopez) · filed 2017-02-02(a)(6)

After hearing the parties’ testimony and carefully studying the exhibits, the Court is convinced that the collision was not willful or malicious as defined by § 523(a)(6). Lopez’s debt to Plaintiffs stemming from the collision was discharged by the order entered May 9, 2016 in Lopez’s bankruptcy case (ease no. 16-10117).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes injury willfully and maliciously, including through conversion of secured collateral.

Quality Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Adkins (In re Adkins) · filed 2017-02-15(a)(6)

This Court finds that the three elements of section 523(a)(6) are satisfied. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Adkins’ debt to Quality Car and Truck leasing, Inc., in the amount of $90,743 be, and is hereby, NONDISCHARGEABLE.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an intentional assault conviction may establish both elements when it resolves intent and the absence of justification.

Owens v. Powell (In re Powell) · filed 2017-02-17(a)(6)

The conviction included, as a necessary element of the crime, a requirement of actual intent to cause physical injury. Accordingly, the court concludes that Defendant’s actual intent to injure is established thus satisfying the willfulness element of § 523(a)(6). The malice element can also be inferred from Defendant’s conviction because the criminal court implicitly found that Defendant caused injury to Plaintiff without just cause or excuse.

A California punitive damage award alone does not preclude relitigation of § 523(a)(6)’s willful intent requirement.

Schrader v. Sangha · filed 2017-02-24(a)(6)

Applying In re Plyam to this bankruptcy appeal, the state court’s punitive damage award, standing alone, did not preclude relitigation of § 523(a)(6)’s “willful” intent requirement.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to result from his conduct.

Townsend v. Ganci · filed 2017-02-27(a)(6)

The third element satisfies the willfulness prong of Section 523(a)(6) because the jury found that Townsend either acted with intent to compel Ganci’s resignation, or with the belief that such injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.

A debt arising from conversion is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only if the creditor also shows that the injury was willful and malicious.

In re: Azizolah Javahery · filed 2017-03-14(a)(6)

Proof of conversion under state law is a necessary but not sufficient basis to deny discharge under § 523(a)(6). ... A creditor must also demonstrate that the injury was willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt on a contractual guaranty when the debt did not arise from a willful and malicious injury.

HIJ Industries, Inc. v. Roy (In re Roy) · filed 2017-01-26(a)(6)

This judgment debt resulting from a pre-existing contractual obligation is not a debt that may be excepted from discharge via § 523(a)(6) as that debt obligation did not arise from Debtor’s conduct, willful or otherwise.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make an intentional breach of contract nondischargeable unless the debtor’s conduct also gives rise to an independent tort.

United Providers, Inc. v. Pagan (In re Pagan) · filed 2017-02-08(a)(6)

An intentional breach of contract, however, is not enough to support a claim under § 523(a)(6) unless the debtor’s conduct also gives rise to an independent tort.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge for a willful and malicious injury; an economic motive does not excuse continuing to cause an injury the debtor knows is substantially certain to occur.

Margulies v. Hough (In re Margulies) · filed 2017-03-20(a)(6)

Therefore, even if Margulies’s initial decision to drive toward Hough had not been malicious, but rather had been motivated by a desperate economic need to get to his meeting, his subsequent choice not to brake when Hough failed to move out of his way was additional, aggravating conduct that justified an inference of malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires that the debtor desire to cause harm or believe injury is substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct.

MarketGraphics Research Group, Inc. v. Berge · filed 2017-03-24(a)(6)

However, as In re Markowitz and subsequent cases held that the debtor must (1) will or desire harm, or (2) believe injury is substantially certain to occur as a result of his behavior, that is the standard that the Court applies today.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the creditor proves by a preponderance of evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

National Labor Relations Board v. Calvert · filed 2017-03-31(a)(6)

Accordingly, we accept the Bankruptcy Court’s' finding that the NLRB failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Calvert acted with the requisi^ malice to except his debt owed to the Company’s former employees from dischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge the full debt arising from a willful and malicious injury, including compensatory damages and prejudgment interest.

Dardinger v. Dardinger (In re Dardinger) · filed 2017-04-19(a)(6)

Having concluded that the Final Judgment and the Findings and Conclusions on which it is based are entitled to preclusive effect, Allison is entitled to a judgment that the entire Debt is nondis-chargeable. This includes the compensatory damages awarded on account of that injury — $19,200 for assault and battery, $5,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and $80,000 for invasion of privacy, plus the prejudgment interest awarded by the State Court — as well as any other amount traceable to or arising from this nondischargeable sum.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for fees caused by a debtor’s knowingly meritless lawsuit prosecuted to harass and financially injure another person.

Healy v. Rose · filed 2017-04-21(a)(6)

The BAP correctly held that the bankruptcy court did not err in excepting Rose’s state court fee awards from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... With respect to the willful injury prong, the bankruptcy court properly concluded that in filing and prosecuting a lawsuit to annoy and harass Rose, with the knowledge that the suit was meritless, Healy acted deliberately, intentionally, and for the purpose of injuring Rose. ... Further, as the bankruptcy court determined, Healy intentionally prosecuted the action against Rose, his conduct necessarily caused financial injury to Rose, and there was no just cause or excuse for such conduct, particularly given that Healy was an attorney.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor acts with the purpose of injuring another, even if the attempted injury does not succeed.

Rajsic v. Valley Forge Insurance Co. · filed 2017-05-16(a)(6)

Rajsic’s assertion that he merely unsuccessfully “attempted” to injure Valley Forge (IB 32) does not relieve him from nondischarge-ability, because the statutory language focuses on the purpose of the debtor’s conduct, not on the ultimate result. Rajsic admitted that the purpose of his scheme was to defraud Valley Forge, which is sufficient to except the debt from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; self-defense negates malice.

Thomas v. Roberson · filed 2017-05-15(a)(6)

Because a finding that the Debtor acted in self-defense would negate the malice requirement under section 523(a)(6), it is a material fact.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury without just cause or excuse.

Lee v. Daniel (In re Daniel) · filed 2017-05-25(a)(6)

Applying the conclusions of the state court judge and jury to the test under § 523(a)(6), I find that the injury caused by Ms. Daniel to Ms. Lee was not merely reflective of reckless disregard, but was willful and malicious, “extremely egregious,” and carefully calculated to enrich Ms. Daniel through the harm caused to Ms. Lee.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from conversion nondischargeable when the debtor’s conduct is tortious, willful, and malicious.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez) · filed 2017-06-05(a)(6)

For the following reasons, the court concludes that Defendant: (1) intentionally converted the Ferrari under California law, thus satisfying § 523(a)(6)’s intentional tort requirement; and (2) willfully and malicious injured Ms. Sun. It will therefore enter a $42,003.51 nondischargeable judgment for Plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) applies a subjective standard to whether an injury was willful and malicious.

Interamerican Asset Management Fund Ltd. v. Ortega T. (In re Ortega T.) · filed 2017-06-22(a)(6)

I hold that, in determining the non-dischargeability of a section 523(a)(6) claim based upon willful and malicious injury, the subjective standard is the correct standard to apply.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a conversion debt from discharge when debtors intentionally withhold another’s property in conscious disregard of their duty to return it.

In re Trost · filed 2017-06-28(a)(6)

Being deprived of her property was an injury to Sherry and it was intentional. It was malicious in that Zachary and Kimberly had a clear duty to return the property to Sherry, consciously disregarded the duty and had no just cause for doing so. Thus, the elements of a willful and malicious injury are met.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another entity or its property.

Yu v. Nautilus, Inc. · filed 2017-07-19(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of whether Nautilus’s default judgment against Yu is nondischargeable because Yu failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the injury to Nautilus was not willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages from discharge when a debtor’s deliberate conduct causes a willful and malicious injury.

China Central Television v. Bhalla (In re Bhalla) · filed 2017-08-18(a)(6)

Plaintiffs’ damages, in the amount of $4,440,234.22, are excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure; a finding of conversion alone does not establish that intent.

Cook v. Knight (In re Knight) · filed 2017-08-24(a)(6)

A finding of conversion, which does not require a conclusion concerning a mental state, is not sufficient to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional infliction of emotional distress from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes a willful and malicious injury.

Harris v. Kamps (In re Kamps) · filed 2017-08-31(a)(6)

The Court therefore concludes that the Debtor’s conduct in connection with sending, or conspiring to send, the Texts was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6) and that his $15,000 debt to Harris in the Harris Litigation for his intentional infliction of emotional distress is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to cause harm; intentional conduct alone is insufficient.

Davis v. Arellano (In re Arellano) · filed 2017-09-19(a)(6)

Knowing or intentional conduct is not enough to trigger § 523(a)(6) liability; the plaintiff must also show that the defendant intended to do harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury for a debt to be excepted from discharge.

Wu v. Qiao Lin (In re Qiao Lin) · filed 2017-09-28(a)(6)

But the Plaintiffs have not established the second element of their Section 523(a)(6) claim, that Mr. Lin engaged in malicious conduct, because they have not shown that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact with respect to that element, and they have not shown that the requirements of the federal or New York collateral estoppel rules are met.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property from discharge.

MarPad, L.L.C. v. Seevers (In re Seevers) · filed 2017-09-29(a)(6)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Debtor willfully and maliciously injured Plaintiffs by taking the liquor, fireplace and heater.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when prior state court findings establish willful and malicious injury and issue preclusion bars relitigation.

Vazquez v. AAA Blueprint & Digital Reprographics · filed 2017-10-04(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because the findings in the state court action satisfied the elements for “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and California law precludes relitigation of issues decided in a prior proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when prior jury findings establish willful and malicious injury and state law bars relitigation of those findings.

Gould v. Red Hill Enterprises · filed 2017-10-04(a)(6)

Summary judgment was proper because the jury’s findings in the state court action satisfied the elements for “willful and malicious injury” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and California law precludes relitigation of issues decided in a prior proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a workers' compensation debt from discharge unless the debtor intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to occur.

Bailey v. Reed (In re Reed) · filed 2017-11-07(a)(6)

There is no evidence that Mr. Reed failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Bailey with the specific intent or the substantial certainty that Mr. Bailey would sustain physical injuries while on the job and without insurance. ... Therefore, the debt arising out of Mr. Bailey's fall does not fit within section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury the debtor intended to cause; awareness that nonpayment may harm a creditor is insufficient.

Invest Atlanta Regional Center, LLC v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2017-12-01(a)(6)

Even if the Debtor should have known her failure to repay the loan or account for the proceeds would harm the Plaintiff, such intent would not establish the type of injury required under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can except a civil contempt award from discharge when the debt results from a willful and malicious injury to the creditor or the creditor's property.

Charron v. Morris · filed 2017-12-29(a)(6)

The great weight of authority establishes that a contempt award may be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) when the debt is the result of a malicious and willful injury to the creditor or the creditor's property.

Section 523(a)(6) does not automatically except an anti-SLAPP damages award from discharge; the creditor must prove willful and malicious injury.

Allen v. Drake (In re Drake) · filed 2018-01-05(a)(6)

Although circumstances may exist in which such a debt may be excepted from discharge, it does not necessarily follow that any successful anti-SLAPP motion proves that the underlying litigation was filed vexatiously and with the actual intent to cause an injury to the other party.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove that the debtor intended the injury and targeted the creditor with malicious conduct.

Dering Pierson Group, LLC v. Kantos · filed 2018-01-09(a)(6)

In sum, the debtor must have intended the injury to the creditor (willful) and the conduct must have been targeted at the creditor (malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and a Florida abuse of process judgment can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Beem v. Ferguson · filed 2018-02-06(a)(6)

We agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court that the state court judgment for abuse of process and the requirements of non-dischargeability for knowing and willful injury under § 523(a)(6) are sufficiently identical for collateral estoppel purposes.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury from discharge.

An v. Il Yoon Kwon (In Re An) · filed 2018-02-08(a)(6)

The BAP did not err in concluding that the judgment was not dischargeable against Albert. The bankruptcy court reasonably determined that the injury to Kwon was “willful and malicious.” See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentionally inflicted injury; allegations of financial injury from fraud fall under § 523(a)(2).

Eden v. Eden (In re Eden) · filed 2018-03-02(a)(6)

Therefore, based on the allegations contained within the Complaint, Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's discharge on a basis of "fraudulent transfers, fraudulent conveyance and false representations," is a claim under § 523(a)(2), not § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor’s own willful and malicious injury; another person’s actions or intent cannot establish the debtor’s willfulness.

Borges v. Placeres (In re Placeres) · filed 2017-12-06(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury by the debtor, and it is well-settled that willfulness cannot be based on the imputation of another person’s actions or intent.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except vicarious liability from discharge, and § 523(a)(9) applies only when the debtor personally operates a vehicle while intoxicated and causes death or personal injury.

Armstrong v. Oslin (In re Oslin) · filed 2018-01-24(a)(6), (a)(9)

The plain language of Section 523(a)(6) requires that the willful act leading to the injury be performed "by the debtor," so vicarious liabilities do not qualify for an exception from discharge. ... This exception is confined to instances in which the debtor operated a motor vehicle while the debtor was intoxicated, thereby resulting in death or personal injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an act is malicious when it is wrongful and without just cause or excuse.

In Re: Joshua Simon Margulies · filed 2018-05-11(a)(6)

A debt is not dischargeable when the debt was incurred because of the “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Under either the objective or subjective standard, Margulies’s decision not to apply the car’s brakes until after the car struck Hough can only be viewed as a decision from which consequences are substantially certain to flow. ... Failing to attempt to apply a car’s brakes before striking a person standing in front of the car satisfies the standard for malice.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a defamation default judgment and punitive damages award do not establish that requirement when they could rest on negligent or reckless conduct.

Corcoran v. McCabe (In re McCabe) · filed 2018-05-11(a)(6)

In conclusion, neither the default judgment, nor the punitive damages award, included a finding that McCabe inflicted a "willful and malicious injury" within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a conversion debt nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly keeps another person’s property and is substantially certain that doing so will injure the owner.

In re Trost · filed 2018-05-30(a)(6)

As there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Zachary willfully or maliciously caused Sherry’s injury, the conversion judgment debt is nondischargeable and summary judgment in favor of Sherry was proper.

A judgment for quid pro quo sexual harassment inherently establishes willfulness under § 523(a)(6).

Olivares v. Dason (In re Dason) · filed 2018-06-18(a)(6)

The Court agrees with Olivares's that "willfulness," as it is used in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), is implicit within a judgment for quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of willful injury; negligent or reckless conduct is insufficient to except a debt from discharge.

Bank of Baker v. Robertus (In re Robertus) · filed 2018-06-19(a)(6)

Because the Bank failed to satisfy the willful injury prong of § 523(a)(6), consideration of whether Jeremy's acts were malicious is not necessary. The Bank's claims against Debtors under § 523(a)(6) are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a nondischargeability claim for deliberate and intentional injury caused by a debtor's willful and malicious conduct.

Salvatore v. Salvatore (In re Salvatore) · filed 2018-06-21(a)(6)

In accepting these allegations as true, the Court finds these actions allege a cause of action of deliberate and intentional injury within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Heinrich v. Bagg (In re Bagg) · filed 2018-08-10(a)(6)

Heinrich has not carried his burden of establishing that the Baggs' debts to him were for willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6). The debts are therefore dischargeable and the adversary complaint is dismissed.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make an ordinary contract debt nondischargeable merely because a default judgment was entered as a discovery sanction, but it excepts attorney's fees caused by willful and malicious discovery misconduct.

Vision W., Inc. v. Catalan (In re Catalan) · filed 2018-09-11(a)(6)

However, Vision West has met its burden and shown that the attorney's fees incurred after April 1, 2015 were incurred as a result of the Debtor's willful and malicious conduct. Therefore, the fees included in the judgment that were incurred after that date are nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes consequential damages nondischargeable when they arise from the same willful and malicious conduct as the underlying judgment debt.

Chuipek v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore) · filed 2018-09-27(a)(6)

When consequential damages arise from the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment, those damages are not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury, which requires proof that the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to occur.

Walz v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2018-10-03(a)(6)

Thus, disputed issues of fact remain including whether Defendant had a subjective motive to injure Plaintiff or believed his conduct was substantially certain to cause injury to Plaintiff. Accordingly, summary judgment is not warranted under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor’s own willful and malicious conduct; another person’s conduct cannot be imputed to the debtor.

Greer v. Bruce (In re Bruce) · filed 2018-10-18(a)(6)

Consequently, the willful and malicious conduct of others, even if the debtor may be legally responsible for that conduct under state law, cannot be imputed to the debtor for purposes of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except debts for injuries caused by negligence or gross negligence from discharge.

Mouton v. Dehler (In re Dehler) · filed 2018-10-31(a)(6)

Based on Legislative History and jurisprudence, the Court finds that negligence and gross negligence are not "willful and malicious."

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment for willful and malicious injury from discharge, including associated attorney fees and interest.

Global Control Sys., Inc. v. Luebbert (In re Luebbert) · filed 2018-11-15(a)(6)

The court finds and concludes, based on the foregoing, that Global met its burden of proving that its judgment is a debt for willful and malicious injury by Mr. Luebbert. This includes the award of attorney fees and interest.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) require a creditor to establish fraud or willful and malicious injury, respectively, to except a debt from discharge.

Brody v. Chou · filed 2018-11-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Creditor Lynn H. Chou (“appellant”) appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the denial of her adversarial claims that certain debts owed to her by Stanley H. Brody (“appellee”) were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6). ... On the record before it, the bankruptcy court correctly held that appellant had not established either fraud or a willful and malicious intent to injure her.

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than a breach of contract or failure to comply with a known duty to except a debt from discharge.

Reddy v. Melnik (In re Melnik) · filed 2018-09-28(a)(6)

Because § 523(a)(6) requires significantly more than a breach of contract or failure to comply with a known duty, the Court is again compelled to find in Debtor's favor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a fraud debt from discharge when the fraud causes willful and malicious injury to a person or property.

Nelson v. Bolles (In re Bolles) · filed 2018-11-27(a)(6)

The Court concludes that claims for money, property, services, or extension of credit obtained by fraud are governed by § 523(a)(2)(A), while claims for injury to persons or property caused by fraud are governed by § 523(a)(6). ... For the same reasons outlined in the battery nondischargeability analysis, the Court finds that Defendant, by his fraud, injured Plaintiff willfully and maliciously. The damages caused to Plaintiff by Defendant's fraud are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for an injury the debtor deliberately causes through conduct certain or almost certain to cause harm.

Loch v. Trout · filed 2018-11-30(a)(6)

The debtor’s act of intentionally hitting the plaintiff in the head with a shovel was willful, and it was certain or almost certain to cause the plaintiff harm, even if the debtor was, as she now claims, simply trying to break up a fight between her sister and the plaintiff. Swinging a shovel at another person’s head is a deliberate act likely to cause physical injury. Here, it constitutes a willful and malicious injury caused by the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable, including injury caused by a deliberate and unjustified conversion of property.

Lehigh Valley Hosp. v. Dietrich (In re Dietrich) · filed 2018-12-13(a)(6)

Therefore, Dietrich's conduct also qualifies as willful and malicious under section 523(a)(6) because it constitutes a willful and malicious conversion of property that rightfully belonged to the Hospital.

Under § 523(a)(6), a financial injury is willful when the debtor knew the conduct was certain or substantially certain to cause that injury.

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Rensin (In re Rensin) · filed 2018-12-13(a)(6)

To meet its burden on the willfulness standard under the case law analyzed above, in light of the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff must provide evidence causing the Court to infer that Mr. Rensin himself knew, at the time he caused BlueHippo to implement and maintain the extra terms without appropriate disclosure to customers, that harm to BlueHippo's customers was certain or substantially certain to result.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a wage debt from discharge when an employer’s tortious withholding of wages causes willful and malicious injury without just cause.

Zeppinick v. Ramirez · filed 2018-12-14(a)(6)

Accordingly, Zeppinick’s decision to withhold wages lacked the “just cause” necessary to negate nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor voluntarily acted with intent to cause injury or intended an act reasonably certain to cause injury.

Hanson v. Cassidy (In re Cassidy) · filed 2019-01-10(a)(6)

This means that there is nothing for the bankruptcy court to find or decide: the elements of section 523(a)(6) are present in the state court order. The defendant is precluded from contesting these facts in this bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt from discharge to plead facts supporting both willful and malicious injury.

Aspire Fed. Credit Union v. Robinson (In re Robinson) · filed 2019-01-11(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) requires Aspire to plead both willfulness and malice. ... The Court concludes that the Complaint contains sufficient factual allegations that make the 523(a)(6) claim plausible.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury to privacy and reputation from discharge when the debtor knew or was substantially certain the injury would result and acted without justification or excuse.

In re Boland · filed 2019-02-13(a)(6)

When one focuses on this true injury to the Appellants, the evidence at trial established that Boland knew or was substantially certain that the Appellants’ legal privacy and reputational interests would be harmed by his conduct. ... The injury he caused, therefore, qualifies as “malicious” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) as it was undertaken without justification or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excludes a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury or knows that injury is substantially certain to result.

Free v. Winborne · filed 2019-02-18(a)(6)

We agree that Free knew that by not paying Leasa Winborne for her portion of the proceeds, there was a substantial certainty of harm to her, and that he intended to cause that harm. Thus, as the bankruptcy court held, Free’s retention of Turkey Creek Appraisal’s profits after James Winborne’s death was intentional, willful, and malicious.

Fraudulent transfers made with subjective intent to harm a creditor can constitute willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Betancourt v. Ballmer · filed 2019-03-08(a)(6)

Debtor-Appellant Ana Beatriz Betancourt appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP) affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s judgment that she engaged in fraudulent transfers of real property with the intent to inflict willful and malicious injury upon Matthew Ballmer’s predecessor in interest Paul Ballmer (together, Ballmer), within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), and we affirm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s deliberate diversion of proceeds owed to a creditor is independently wrongful and causes willful and malicious injury.

Anderson v. Harbor Bank of Md. (In re Anderson) · filed 2019-03-15(a)(6)

The Court therefore concludes that Anderson's effort to deprive a first-priority creditor of its rightful monies was independently wrong and tortious, such that § 523(a)(6)'s "willful and malicious injury" requirement has been satisfied.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury; a sanctions judgment is dischargeable when the creditor fails to prove that intent.

Burris v. Burris (In re Burris) · filed 2019-03-15(a)(6)

The Sanctions Judgment against B Burris does not represent a debt for willful and malicious injury to J Burris under Section 523(a)(6). Therefore, it is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires facts showing that the debtor intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to result; alleging a knowingly false statement alone is insufficient.

Bankers Healthcare Grp., LLC v. Moss (In re Moss) · filed 2019-03-25(a)(6)

This does not allege that Dr. Moss desired the injury giving rise to the debt or that he acted with a specific intent to cause economic injury to Plaintiff. No allegation has been made that Dr. Moss knew injury was substantially certain to result to Plaintiff from his misrepresentation or that he knew he would be unable to repay the subject loans. The Motion must therefore be granted as to the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Citizens Bank v. Freeman (In re Freeman) · filed 2019-03-28(a)(6)

The Bank having failed to prove the first element of causation, the allegation of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) fails as to both Loans and both Debtors.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor intended to inflict injury; a suspicious transaction alone does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Se Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Green · filed 2019-03-29(a)(6)

Under Fifth Circuit precedent, for nondischargeability to arise under § 523(a)(6), the "debtor must have acted with objective substantial certainty of subjective motive to inflict injury." ... The uncontroverted evidence in the record does not support such a finding, and the Bankruptcy Court was correct to grant summary judgment on the issue.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor causes a willful and malicious injury.

Garcia v. Batcheler (In re Batcheler) · filed 2019-03-30(a)(6)

Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to prove, as a matter of law, the existence an injury inflicted by either Defendant within the scope of § 523(a)(6). The elements of § 523(a)(6) are not satisfied, and Court IV of the Amended Complaint fails as a matter of law.

A trespass judgment and proximate causation alone do not establish that an injury was substantially certain under § 523(a)(6).

Bruce v. Long · filed 2019-04-09(a)(6)

The existence of the Defendant’s liability under the State Court Judgment, and any unstated factual underpinning that each Plaintiff’s damages were proximately caused by the Defendant’s trespass falls far short of establishing that such activities “were substantially certain to result in injury” for the purposes of the § 523(a)(6) analysis.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s sale of secured collateral causes willful and malicious injury to the creditor.

United States v. Reid (In re Reid) · filed 2019-04-18(a)(6)

Finally, the USA requests relief in Count III pursuant to § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury when Debtor sold the New Holland tractor, used the proceeds for her own benefit, and failed to inform the FSA of the sale of the tractor. Having considered the evidence presented, the Court finds in favor of the USA and concludes that the value of the New Holland tractor is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for an injury the debtor willfully and maliciously caused.

Salgado v. Lenoci (In re Lenoci) · filed 2019-04-25(a)(6)

All of the elements required under § 523(a)(6) have been established, and accordingly, the debt is not dischargeable under that statutory exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to intend the injury; an intentional act that causes injury is insufficient.

TKC Aerospace Inc. v. Muhs (In Re Muhs) · filed 2019-05-08(a)(6)

Rather, a bankruptcy court must specifically find a deliberate and intentional injury. Therefore, even if TKCA is correct that the Alaska court decided Appellant intentionally and purposefully misappropriated TKCA’s trade secrets, that is still not enough. It must have taken the additional step of finding that Appellant, in so doing, intended for TKCA to be injured by that misappropriation.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes a willful and malicious injury.

Ebayyah v. Jaber · filed 2019-05-09(a)(6)

Because Jaber committed a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), the debt to Ebayyah is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes a willful and malicious injury.

Mohammed Jaber · filed 2019-05-09(a)(6)

Because Jaber committed a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), the debt to Ebayyah is excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to cause a willful and malicious injury for the resulting debt to be excepted from discharge.

Jensen v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado · filed 2019-06-07(a)(6)

In the absence of evidence that Jensen intended to willfully and maliciously injure the Pinos, we conclude the bankruptcy court did not err in denying the § 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; negligent upkeep of property is insufficient.

Tolbert v. Young (In re Young) · filed 2019-06-17(a)(6)

While some of these damages could have been avoided, the Court does not believe they were intentional nor malicious, but rather they resulted from negligent or even poor upkeep of the Property which is insufficient under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to result.

Cocoma v. Nigam · filed 2019-06-24(a)(6)

Indeed, Cocoma and Cusco do not cite any evidence that the Debtor desired to cause any injury or believed that any injury was substantially certain to result from her actions. Thus, the bankruptcy court properly dismissed their claim for an exemption from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person or their property.

First American Title Insurance Company v. Smith · filed 2019-07-10(a)(6)

Therefore, this Court will find that the damage award of $1,625,000 in favor of First American is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury to a person or property.

Haas v. Fancher · filed 2019-07-24(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court declined to draw the inference from this lack of evidence that Debtor stole or sold the tools in such a way as to inflict a “willful and malicious injury.” That decision was not clearly erroneous.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sanctions debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly causes financial harm through purposeful conduct without just cause or excuse.

Indirect Purchaser Class v. Andrews · filed 2019-07-24(a)(6)

The Court finds that the Defendant’s actions were willful as the Defendant knew his actions were causing financial harms to IPC, and they were malicious as they were purposeful and without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a battery judgment from discharge when the injury arose from willful and malicious conduct.

In Re M. Stephen Minix, Sr. · filed 2019-07-25(a)(6)

To except a debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the injury must arise from conduct that is willful and malicious. ... Here, the bankruptcy court appropriately excepted the state court judgment from discharge because the injury derived from such conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury by the debtor; another person’s conduct does not make the debtor’s liability nondischargeable merely because the debtor is jointly liable under state law.

Huffman v. Holden · filed 2019-06-05(a)(6)

In other words, just because the debtor may be jointly and severally liable to the creditor under state law for any damage to the rental property does not make the damage caused by the willful and malicious conduct of Lawrence Holden or any other individuals a nondischargeable debt of the debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for damage to rental property from discharge without proof of willful and malicious injury.

Hynard v. Merkman · filed 2019-07-31(a)(6)

Leaving a rental property in a messy and disorderly state, without more, does not rise to the willful and malicious injury contemplated by Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury when the debtor intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to result; negligent or reckless conduct is insufficient.

Draka v. Andrea · filed 2019-08-06(a)(6)

Even if the court were to accept Mr. Draka’s version of the events, the Debtor has shown only negligent or reckless behavior, not a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes a willful and malicious injury, including injury to a creditor’s interest in collateral proceeds.

NextGear Capital, Inc. v. Mejorado · filed 2019-08-12(a)(6)

However, the plaintiff did prove that Mejorado willfully and maliciously injured NextGear’s interest in the proceeds of sale of vehicles subject to its security interest, so Mejorado's debt to NextGear of $219,987.64 is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and state court findings establishing those elements may have collateral estoppel effect.

Roark v. San Diego County Credit Union · filed 2019-08-15(a)(6)

Finding that the state court established the two elements under 523(a)(6), the Court agrees with SDCCU that those findings are entitled to collateral estoppel effect.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure the creditor or the creditor’s property.

Goldman v. Khalil · filed 2019-08-26(a)(6)

As such, irrespective of whether the Defendant committed a wrongful act that caused injury to the Plaintiff, and irrespective of whether there was just cause or an excuse for such act, the Court finds that the Defendant did not have the intent to injure the Plaintiff that is required to sustain a claim under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful injury requirement is met when the debtor knows that injury is substantially certain to result from the debtor’s conduct.

Vohariwatt v. Matson · filed 2019-09-10(a)(6)

As previously discussed, the willful injury requirement is met when the debtor knows that the injury is substantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously caused the injury underlying it.

Temkin v. Rodrigues · filed 2019-09-13(a)(6)

Those issues are so closely related to the § 523(a)(6) issue now before this Court that the State Court’s determination that Debtor’s conduct was “malicious, knowing and intentional,” meets all the essential elements of a cause of action for nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor knew her conduct increased the risk of injury but did not believe injury was substantially certain.

Wurtz v. Campogan · filed 2019-09-19(a)(6)

After carefully considering all of the evidence, I find that the plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proving (by a preponderance of the evidence) that Ms. Campogan believed that Zoe was “substantially certain” to suffer injury as a result of Ms. Campogan’s conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to injure before a debt can be excepted from discharge.

Misik v. D'Arco · filed 2019-09-20(a)(6)

Finally, the bankruptcy court did not err in holding D’Arco’s debt was not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because Misik failed to prove D’Arco had any intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; allegations of intentional conversion known to cause harm can establish a prima facie claim.

American Asset Finance, LLC v. Feldman · filed 2019-09-25(a)(6)

The Plaintiff makes out a prima facie claim pursuant to section 523(a)(6) by alleging that the Debtor converted its funds, which was an intentional act, known to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a New Jersey abuse of process judgment nondischargeable when the judgment necessarily establishes a willful and malicious injury.

Van Dexter v. Barr · filed 2019-09-27(a)(6)

After analysis of New Jersey’s abuse of process law and consideration of the decisions made in other Circuits on this issue, the Court concludes that a judgment for abuse of process in the State of New Jersey satisfactorily mirrors the requirements of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code such that the issues before this Court are the same as were before the State Court and the determination was essential to the State Court Judgment.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended or substantially certain injury; negligent construction or an intentional breach of contract alone does not suffice.

Page v. LaMantia · filed 2019-09-30(a)(6)

But the negligence, recklessness, and intentional breach of contract that ultimately caused the Plaintiffs’ harm must be contrasted with the intent to inflict injury that is the hallmark of a claim under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally injures another or acts with objective substantial certainty of harm.

Red Honor Ventures, Ltd. v. Edmonds · filed 2019-09-30(a)(6)

The Plaintiff proved the required culpable state of mind to except from discharge the $101,378.75 conversion claim against the Debtor pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the creditor proves a willful and malicious injury.

Smith v. Shears · filed 2019-10-02(a)(6)

Because Mr. Smith did not prove the elements of § 523(a)(6), the Court finds that any debt owed by Mr. Shears to Mr. Smith was not excepted from his Chapter 7 discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, including damages, costs, and expert fees awarded for that injury.

Francisco Garcia Huizar, III - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2019-10-02(a)(6)

In doing so, the Court finds that: (1) collateral estoppel and res judicata preclude relitigation of the Judgment; (2) all issues underlying dischargeability were fully litigated in the North Carolina suit; (3) the Judgment establishes a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6); and (4) damages, costs, and expert fees are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires malice to except a battery debt from discharge, even when the underlying judgment awards punitive damages.

Bradsher v. Watson · filed 2019-10-18(a)(6)

Malice is required to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) and is not required for tort liability for battery under Georgia law, even where punitive damages are awarded; thus, there remains a question of fact as to whether Defendant’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a nondischargeability claim when pleaded wrongful conduct gives rise to a debt and is intended, or substantially certain, to injure the creditor.

Rasmussen v. LaMantia · filed 2019-10-18(a)(6)

In short, the Plaintiffs eke out a plausible claim that the Defendant engaged in the type of conduct to which section 523(a)(6) applies.

Section 523 excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Cascade Capital, LLC v. DRS Processing LLC · filed 2019-10-24(a)(6)

Said acts were willful and malicious and caused significant damage to Plaintiffs as set forth herein. As such, the Courts’ award against Miller individually and in favor of Plaintiffs is not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury. When the debt arises from unpaid wages, willfulness depends on the circumstances surrounding nonpayment, including the debtor’s ability to pay and use of business income.

In Re: Roberto Felice Donna · filed 2019-10-28(a)(6)

In order to determine willfulness, then, the Court will assess the aggravating factors surrounding the non-payment of wages, including whether the debtor had the ability to pay employees, whether the debtor did pay the employees, and whether the debtor used business income for personal purposes.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from an injury caused with the intent to injure through a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.

167 E. William LLC v. Spielbauer · filed 2019-11-08(a)(6)

The monetary award the LLC obtained against Spielbauer in the state trial court is, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a nondischargeable debt for the willful and malicious injury he caused the LLC. Spielbauer committed fraud by intentionally misrepresenting a material fact known to him with the intention of injuring the LLC. This qualifies as a deliberate and intentional injury, inflicted with the actual, subjective motive and intent to cause the injury that flowed as a natural consequence of the act. See Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1206. This also qualifies as a malicious injury because it was a wrongful, intentional act that necessarily caused injury without just cause or excuse. See id. at 1207. Both elements of nondischargeability are satisfied.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to injure; reckless conduct does not make a debt nondischargeable.

O'Gara v. Hunter · filed 2019-11-08(a)(6)

Accordingly, while Plaintiffs’ allegations that Hunter made his statements “recklessly” and “in knowing disregard for their truth” may be sufficient to obtain a judgment for defamation under California law, that mental state does not plausibly allege an intent to injure sufficient to render that judgment nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury caused by the debtor through willful and malicious conduct.

Markut v. Micic · filed 2019-11-14(a)(6)

A claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) has three elements: (1) debtor caused an injury; (2) debtor’s actions were willful; and (3) debtor’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6)'s willfulness requirement is met when the debtor subjectively intends injury or believes injury is substantially certain to result.

Hamilton v. Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. · filed 2019-11-21(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court and the BAP did not err in finding that Hamilton’s conduct was “willful” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because he “had a subjective motive to inflict injury or . . . believed that injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person.

Zachary v. Hampton · filed 2019-12-18(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court finds that the debt owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge only when the injury-producing conduct is tortious.

Torices v. Uzeta · filed 2019-12-19(a)(6)

Based upon the foregoing, Uzeta is not indebted to Torices and Martinez under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person or that person's property.

Pavletich v. Rose · filed 2019-12-19(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts for “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” The objecting creditor has to prove three elements: (1) the debtor owes a debt resulting from an injury he or she caused to another entity; (2) the debtor’s actions in causing the injury were willful; and (3) the debtor’s actions causing the injury were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury the debtor caused willfully and maliciously.

Franchini v. Montenegro Sr. · filed 2019-12-19(a)(6)

Having concluded that Franchini suffered an injury, and that Franchini proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Montenegro caused that injury willfully and maliciously, the court finds Montenegro’s debt to Franchini in the amount of $38,000, plus punitive damages if appropriate, is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor knows injury is substantially certain to result from his conduct, even if he does not intend to cause harm.

In re Dean Boland · filed 2020-01-03(a)(6)

Thus, despite Boland’s innocent intentions, he was substantially certain that his conduct would harm Doe and Roe. Under § 523(a)(6), that means Boland willfully and maliciously injured Doe and Roe, and their judgment must be excepted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts debts obtained by false representations or actual fraud from discharge, and § 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from willful and malicious injury.

Used Cars, Inc. v. Saaid · filed 2020-01-06(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Accordingly, Used Cars is entitled to a declaration that Saaid’s debt to Used Cars is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6), and judgment against Saaid for $450,816.02 plus post-judgment interest is GRANTED.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that a debt resulted from a willful and malicious injury; an unpaid contract debt alone does not establish one.

Creal Dallas, LLC v. Viciedo · filed 2020-01-07(a)(6)

To the extent that Creal’s complaint lumps all of its allegations into one count, Creal failed to prove that its breach of contract deficiency judgment was the result of a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury; frivolous litigation and foreseeable harm alone do not make a debt nondischargeable.

Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A. v. Holmes · filed 2020-01-07(a)(6)

Based on the foregoing, HSB’s Complaint must be dismissed as it fails to state a claim for relief that its debt arising from the Judgment is excepted from Defendant’s discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge only when the injury is both willful and malicious.

Watson v. Lanier · filed 2020-01-10(a)(6)

Under § 523(a)(6), to be excepted from discharge, the injury must be both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended the injury and acted maliciously.

Palisades Tickets, Inc. v. Daffner · filed 2020-01-13(a)(6)

The facts before the Court do not permit a finding that the Plaintiff’s inability to satisfy its Judgment was willfully and maliciously caused by the Defendant. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case pursuant to section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior retaliatory firing verdict establishes that the employer acted with objective substantial certainty that the firing would injure the employee.

Lear v. Little · filed 2020-01-23(a)(6)

The Appellants are therefore precluded from contesting the nondischargeability of their debt under § 523(a)(6), and the Bankruptcy Court was correct in applying collateral estoppel.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another; willfulness requires intent to injure.

Gorence & Oliveros, P.C. v. Chavez, Jr. · filed 2020-01-24(a)(6)

The “willful” component of § 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor’s rights in collateral.

Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company v. Zaepfel, II · filed 2020-02-07(a)(6)

Plaintiff has met its burden in establishing a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) with respect to cash withdrawals just before Woodside’s closing.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; even an intentional breach of contract alone does not qualify.

Powell v. Taylor · filed 2020-02-07(a)(6)

A breach of contract, even if intentional, does not establish a claim under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to another person or property from discharge; negligent property damage remains dischargeable.

Dewitt v. Jacob · filed 2020-02-11(a)(6)

For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the debtors owe the plaintiff a non-dischargeable debt in the amount of $3,989.51, due to willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another.

Flores v. Browning · filed 2020-02-28(a)(6)

These findings and the brutality of the Debtor’s assault upon Mr. ... Flores establish the elements of the Plaintiffs’ claim under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury or a subjective belief that a particular injury is substantially certain; negligence and recklessness do not suffice.

Anaya v. Cardoza · filed 2020-02-28(a)(6)

But negligent, reckless, or indifferent behavior does not meet the standard for willful and malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of willful and malicious injury; a liquidated damages clause alone does not establish the debtor’s intent to injure.

In Re Scott Keck and Arwen Keck · filed 2020-03-05(a)(6)

The liquidated damages provision does not, by its mere existence, resolve questions as to Scott Keck’s state of mind at the time his conduct triggered it. ... Accordingly, the Court affirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that WICR failed to prove willfulness under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for a willful and malicious injury from discharge when the debtor lacks a valid claim of self-defense.

Kerkinni v. Riehm · filed 2020-03-05(a)(6)

The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented in this adversary proceeding shows that Defendant stabbed Plaintiff in retaliation rather than in self-defense. There is no just cause or excuse for his conduct. Instabbing Plaintiff, Defendant acted both willfully and maliciously within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge only if the debtor fails to prove the injury was sufficiently justified under the circumstances.

Arguello · filed 2020-03-24(a)(6)

For a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the plaintiff must satisfy the two- prong test and the defendant must fail to prove that he was “sufficiently justified under the circumstances.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the creditor proves that the debtor’s injury was both willful and malicious.

MarketGraphics Research Grp. v. Berge · filed 2020-03-27(a)(6)

As text and precedent thus reflect, assessing whether an injury is “willful and malicious” under § 523(a)(6) is a two-pronged inquiry. A creditor must prove both elements before the debt may be exempted from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a willful and malicious injury; an alter ego verdict does not establish nondischargeability unless it resolves those requirements.

Zurich American Insurance Company v. Hardin, III · filed 2020-03-30(a)(6)

That being said, it does not follow that the jury’s verdict and the jury instructions establish that Defendant intended to or knew that his actions were substantially certain to cause injury to Zurich’s ability to seek repayment of the debt owed by PMSG to Zurich, or that Defendant’s conduct, whatever it was, was malicious, which requires not just a finding of wrongfulness, but also a finding that the conduct was without just cause or excessive.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debtor to intend or fully expect to harm the creditor for an injury to be willful and malicious.

Selma Development, LLC v. Landon · filed 2020-03-31(a)(6)

Acts that qualify as willful and malicious are those where debtors intend or fully expect to harm the creditor.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Haas v. Fancher · filed 2020-04-01(a)(6)

Lastly, the bankruptcy court did not err as a legal matter or as a factual matter by finding that Haas failed to meet his burden of proof at trial that Fancher’s debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious property damage from discharge when the debtor knowingly acts with another person to cause it.

Chavez v. Romero · filed 2020-06-11(a)(6)

Because Romero and Lujan acted together to damage the house, they are equally responsible for § 523(a)(6) purposes.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure; substantially certain consequences alone do not establish that intent.

Agrifund, LLC v. Stephenson · filed 2020-06-19(a)(6)

While a person is held to have intended all consequences that are substantially certain to result from his actions, this is not the same thing as having an intent to inflict injury, as required to sustain a nondischargeability complaint under § 523(a)(6).