11 U.S.C. § 523

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to injure the creditor when committing the acts at issue.

Young v. Muhammad (In Re Muhammad) · filed 2003-02-25(a)(6)

Thus, in order to prove liability under § 523(a)(6), plaintiff must prove that defendant intended to cause injury to plaintiff when she performed the acts of which plaintiff complains.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately intends to cause injury and acts wrongfully without just cause or excuse.

Neshewat v. Salem (In Re Salem) · filed 2003-03-05(a)(6)

It is therefore clear that Salem’s debt arose from willful and malicious injury and is consequently nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a conversion debt from discharge when the conversion was willful and malicious; a conversion judgment enhanced by punitive damages establishes that requirement.

NBA Properties, Inc. v. Moir (In Re Moir) · filed 2003-03-14(a)(6)

Thus, a judgment for conversion enhanced by punitive damages establishes a wrongful act, done intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, a “willful and malicious” act of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from intentional, unjustified conversion of another’s property nondischargeable.

Colonial Bank v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 2003-04-11(a)(6)

Thus, conversion of another’s property, without his knowledge or consent, done intentionally and without justification or excuse, is a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury; an intentional act that merely leads to injury is insufficient.

Rizzo v. Passialis (In Re Passialis) · filed 2003-04-15(a)(6)

“Willful” for purposes of § 523(a)(6) means intent to cause injury, not merely the commission of an intentional act that leads to injury. ... The Court denies the motion for summary judgment because there are disputed issues of material fact.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt for a bare breach of contract from discharge without willful and malicious tortious conduct.

Cotten v. Deasy · filed 2003-04-21(a)(6)

We conclude Deasy’s breach of contract did not cause a “willful and malicious injury.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury; a debtor’s mistaken belief about lien priority, without intent to harm the creditor, does not satisfy that requirement.

Lincoln Land FS, Inc. v. Bennett (In Re Bennett) · filed 2003-06-10(a)(6)

However, Plaintiffs case falls far, far short of proving a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Nothing that Mr. Bennett has done was willful or malicious. Mr. Bennett never intended to harm Plaintiff or deprive Plaintiff of its property or rights in property.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury to the creditor; an intentional act that causes a loss is insufficient.

Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Monus (In Re Monus) · filed 2003-06-16(a)(6)

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment pursuant to § 523(a)(6) is overruled because Defendant did not intend to cause Plaintiff to lose Fifty Million Five Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($50,535,475.00).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove that the debtor acted maliciously, even if the injury was willful.

Johnson v. Logue (In Re Logue) · filed 2003-06-16(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court properly weighed the evidence as a whole and concluded that Johnson failed to meet his burden of establishing malice on the part of the Debtor. Accordingly, the Debtor’s indebtedness to Johnson should not be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) recognizes the loss of a right to recover insurance proceeds as a cognizable injury.

Blair v. Boughter (In Re Boughter) · filed 2003-05-27(a)(6)

I conclude, therefore, that Plaintiffs alleged loss of the right to recover insurance proceeds is a harm that is cognizable for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for slander from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously causes the injury.

Maaskant v. Peck (In Re Peck) · filed 2003-07-10(a)(6)

Because Debtor acted both willfully and maliciously, the court erred in finding for Debtor on the § 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor desired harm or believed injury was substantially certain to occur.

Evans v. Ferko (In Re Ferko) · filed 2003-07-15(a)(6)

In order for the debtor’s conduct to bring debt within the discharge exception under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the debtor must will or desire harm or believe that injury is substantially certain to occur as a result of his behavior. ... For the same foregoing reasons, genuine issues of material fact remain, and the Court is unable to determine and conclude that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of proof on their Motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intends to injure the creditor or is substantially certain to do so; a knowing contract breach alone does not suffice, but knowingly violating a court order can qualify.

In the Matter Of: Larry Williams Shannon Britton Williams, Debtors. Larry Williams v. International Brotherhood of Elect · filed 2003-08-01(a)(6)

Because there is no indication that Williams intended or was substantially certain to injure the Union when he initially violated the CBA, we hold that the first debt of $155,855.39 does not arise from a willful and malicious injury; Section 523(a)(6) does not except this debt from discharge. We hold, furthermore, the second debt of $106,911.43 arises from the willful and malicious injury Williams inflicted by refusing to obey the Agreed Judgment and is excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another entity or its property.

Automotive Finance Corp. v. Penton (In Re Penton) · filed 2003-08-29(a)(6)

I find that AFC has met it’s burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the debt owed to AFC in the amount of $43,904.30 is not discharged in Mr. Pen-ton’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for violating a noncompete agreement nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly causes injury without just cause or excuse.

Prairie Eye Center v. Butler (In Re Butler) · filed 2003-09-03(a)(6)

Irrespective of his motivation for intentionally and repeatedly breaching the Employment Agreement, Debtor was fully cognizant of and intended the harm he caused Plaintiff, and he had no just cause or excuse — despite his protestations to the contrary — for causing injury to Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is clear from the record and from the Debtor’s admissions that the subject debt arose from a willful and malicious injury and that the debt is, therefore, nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) covers willful and malicious injury to intangible property rights, including a creditor’s potential interest in proceeds from an existing insurance policy.

Blair v. Boughter (In Re Boughter) · filed 2003-09-05(a)(6)

However, injuries covered by § 523(a)(6) are not confined to physical damage or destruction. Instead, an injury to intangible personal or property rights is sufficient.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to occur.

Mingus v. Lombardo (In Re Lombardo) · filed 2003-10-01(a)(6)

A debt- or does not commit a “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6) unless he desires to cause the consequences of his act or believes that those consequences are substantially certain to occur.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts sexual harassment damages from discharge when the debtor deliberately and unjustifiably injures the victim.

Jones v. Svreck (In Re Jones) · filed 2003-10-08(a)(6)

The Appellant’s obligation to the Appellee for damages awarded in the sexual harassment action will be excepted from discharge, as an obligation arising out of the Appellant’s malicious and willful injury because the Appellant violated state law, and the Appellant’s actions were deliberate, intentional and without justification or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to cause injury or subjectively knew injury was substantially certain; a prior labor judgment does not establish that intent without findings on the issue.

National Labor Relations Board v. Gordon (In Re Gordon) · filed 2003-12-01(a)(6)

Consequently, this Court cannot grant the N.L.R.B. Motion for Summary Judgment because the record before the Court is inadequate to conclude that the issue of Gordon’s specific intent to injure his employees was actually decided in the Prior Action.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; an intentional act that causes injury does not alone establish its willful element.

Kuhn v. Driver (In Re Driver) · filed 2003-12-04(a)(6)

On the other hand, if the court had a basis to infer a finding of “intentionally” under the Texas statute, that does not lead to the conclusion that the state court determined that Driver deliberately or intentionally acted to cause harm or injury as required under § 523(a)(6). It merely leads to the conclusion that Driver deliberately or intentionally acted to remove the transmission and that such action led to injury. Consequently, the court cannot conclude that the “willful” component of § 523(a)(6) had been involved or actually litigated in the state court trial.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally violates a valid court order and thereby causes willful and malicious injury.

Beckett v. Bundick (In Re Bundick) · filed 2003-12-17(a)(6)

The intentional violation of a valid court order is sufficient to find Bundick’s acts were willful and malicious and therefore not discharged under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts an attorney-fee debt from discharge when the debtor’s litigation conduct was intended to injure the creditor by forcing it to incur those fees.

Wrobel v. Conner (In Re Conner) · filed 2003-12-17(a)(6)

We instead conclude, based on undisputed material facts that debtors’ conduct during the pendency of the action to quiet title, which conduct the state court determined was dilatory, obdurate and vexatious, gave rise to a debt for willful and malicious injury to plaintiffs or their property for purposes of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused an injury through willful and malicious conduct.

Johnson v. Wood (In Re Wood) · filed 2003-12-22(a)(6)

In order to prevail under § 523(a)(6), the Plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the defendant caused an injury; (2) that the defendant’s actions were willful; and (3)that the defendant’s actions were malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for conversion nondischargeable when the debtor intentionally deprives the owner of property in knowing disregard of the owner's rights.

Internet Automotive Group v. Shaffer (In Re Shaffer) · filed 2004-01-23(a)(6)

Therefore, in light of the foregoing analysis, Debtor’s intentional deprivation of Internet Automotive’s $69,700.00 in proceeds by an act of wrongful conversion is a willful and malicious injury; and pursuant to § 523(a)(6), Debtor’s indebtedness to Internet Automotive for $69,700.00 is nondis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for intentional injury to a corporation’s economic interests, and a prior judgment can establish the injury and intent through collateral estoppel.

McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Shore (In Re Shore) · filed 2004-01-29(a)(6)

By the operation of collateral estoppel, this Court concludes as a matter of law that Shore’s actions were done with actual intent to defraud McCain and that McCain was injured, thereby dictating the conclusion that Shore did willfully and maliciously injure McCain’s economic interests. Shore’s judgment debt to McCain should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a patent infringement debt nondischargeable when the debtor believed financial injury was substantially certain to result and acted in conscious disregard of a duty to the patent holder.

Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In Re Trantham) · filed 2004-01-30(a)(6)

Thus, the Markoivitz standard of “willful” injury is met. In addition, because Trantham acted in conscious disregard of his duty to Monsanto, the requirement of a “malicious” injury is also met.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor willfully and maliciously intended the injury.

Panalis v. Moore (In Re Moore) · filed 2004-02-03(a)(6)

The district court overlooked the criticality of the terms “willful” act and “malicious injury” in § 523(a)(6). Without proof of both, an objection to discharge under ... that section must fail.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended to cause an injury that was wrongful and without just cause.

America Online, Inc. v. Uhrig (In Re Uhrig) · filed 2004-02-26(a)(6)

This Court concludes, based on the findings of the District Court and the well pled allegations in the complaint, the Debtor’s debt owed to AOL arises from a willful and malicious injury to AOL. As such, the AOL debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor deliberately converts collateral subject to a creditor’s security interest, causing willful and malicious injury.

MemphisFirst Community Bank v. Rice (In Re Rice) · filed 2004-03-26(a)(6)

In the matter before this court, there can be little doubt that Rice deliberately converted accounts receivable proceeds that were subject to the security interest of MemphisFirst. Therefore, regardless of the standard that might be applied, Rice’s conduct is both willful and malicious insofar as § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code is concerned. The motion for summary judgment is sustained, in part, as to Rice’s liability for a nondischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor acted without justification or excuse and intended the injury or knew it was substantially certain to occur.

Gomes v. Limieux (In Re Limieux) · filed 2004-03-30(a)(6)

As the foregoing analysis indicates, a finding of liability for assault and battery under Massachusetts law satisfies the scienter requirements of § 523(a)(6). Further, the Verdict necessitated the subsidiary finding that there was no justification or excuse for the act.

An allegation that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the creditor can adequately plead a § 523(a)(6) claim without supporting factual detail.

Baker Development Corp. v. Mulder (In Re Mulder) · filed 2004-04-07(a)(6)

The complaint cites section 523(a)(6) and alleges that Mulder “willfully and maliciously” injured Baker by selling the Property to the Lunn Parties. That is enough to put Mulder on notice about the nature of the claim, allowing him to answer.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for patent infringement from discharge when the debtor knew the infringement was substantially certain to injure the patent holder; the excepted award may include attorney’s fees.

Monsanto Co. v. Wood (In Re Wood) · filed 2004-04-14(a)(6)

Those amounts shall be added to the $56,912.50 for a total damage award that shall be excepted from the Debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except from discharge a claimed debt for emotional injury arising from a child visitation dispute.

Blandino v. Bradshaw (In Re Bradshaw) · filed 2004-04-29(a)(6)

First, the court is of the opinion that this type of emotional injury is not the type of injury contemplated by § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally acts with an objective substantial certainty of causing injury.

Red v. Baum · filed 2004-05-03(a)(6)

Unlike in Delaney, the bankruptcy court here found that Red did intentionally commit an action—driving into a crowded bar—that was “substantially certain” to cause harm. Under the facts that the bankruptcy court found, discharge was inappropriate under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for emotional distress from discharge when the debtor acted with an objective substantial certainty of causing harm and without just cause or excuse.

Ridley Ex Rel. Ridley v. Holt (In Re Holt) · filed 2004-05-11(a)(6)

Contrary to Joshua’s argument, the definition of willful and wanton conduct in Arkansas subsumes the definition of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). Emotional distress is an injury. When a person acts knowing that the act will naturally and probably result in emotional distress and yet continues to engage in the act in reckless disregard of the consequences, the person acts with an objective substantial certainty to cause harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to cause injury, even when the debt arises from sexual harassment.

Sanger v. Busch (In Re Busch) · filed 2004-06-21(a)(6)

There is no question about the deplorable nature of the conduct for which the Debtor was held liable in the District Court; yet, the first part of the test for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) is not the gravity of misconduct, but intent to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge even when the judgment rests on negligence, if the debtor’s underlying conduct deliberately caused the injury.

Fowler Ex Rel. Rudisill v. Fowler (In Re Fowler) · filed 2004-07-09(a)(6)

Neither collateral estoppel or res judicata nor the jury’s negligence verdict preclude this court from reaching the legal conclusion that the defendant’s debt to Mrs. Fowler is nondisehargeable in bankruptcy under the language of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts resulting from a willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Shah v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc. · filed 2004-07-15(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court did not err by finding that the debt in question resulted from a willful and malicious injury and therefore was not subject to discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits a self-defense claim against a willful and malicious injury allegation, but the debtor bears the burden of proving it.

Kleman v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 2004-06-17(a)(6)

Acts properly taken, therefore, in self-defense provide a valid defense to an action brought under § 523(a)(6); this has always been understood. ... However, the claim of self-defense is an affirmative defense, thereby placing the burden on the Defendant to establish its elements.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the willful and malicious injury to cause the debt; concealing assets after the debt arose does not make it nondischargeable.

Steier v. Best · filed 2004-06-30(a)(6)

Thus the concealment could not have caused or given rise to the judgment debt, as required for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor willfully and maliciously caused injury.

MWI Veterinary Supply Co. v. Rodgers (In Re Rodgers) · filed 2004-08-13(a)(6)

MWI failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor willfully and maliciously injured MWI, and therefore, the debt does not fall within the exception to discharge provided under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor intentionally sets fire to another’s property, even if the resulting damage exceeds what the debtor intended.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Edie (In Re Edie) · filed 2004-09-07(a)(6)

Edie’s admission of intentionally starting a fire in the Residence, in which she intended to injure Aucoin’s property, amounts to a willful and malicious injury to the Plaintiff and the Defendant has not offered any evidence to support a defense of mental impairment. As a matter of law, State Farm’s subrogation judgment is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for converted collateral proceeds nondischargeable when the debtor knows keeping the proceeds will injure the creditor.

Bank of Lumber City v. Rowland (In Re Rowland) · filed 2004-10-06(a)(6)

Similarly, Debtor’s actions in this ease satisfy the requirements of Section 523(a)(6). Debtor testified that he was aware that Bank had an interest in the Check and that Bank would be injured if he kept the proceeds of the Check for himself. Debtor knew that his act would harm Bank, yet he chose to deprive Bank of the proceeds. Thus, his actions are willful and malicious and nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causing the injury was both willful and malicious.

Superior Metal Products v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 2004-10-18(a)(6)

In conclusion, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the Defendant, in negotiating the mistakenly sent check, engaged in conduct that, as applied to § 523(a)(6), was both “willful” and “malicious.” As such, the debt arising from the Defendant negotiating the Plaintiffs mistakenly sent check must be deemed to be a non-dischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) can cover a nondischargeability claim based on a car dealer’s sale of financed vehicles out of trust.

Mannheim Automotive Financial Services, Inc. v. Park (In Re Park) · filed 2004-09-13(a)(6)

The complaint here in fact states a claim under section 523(a)(6). If MAFS and MSC wish to proceed under that section rather than under section 523(a)(2)(A), no amendment is needed.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt from willful and malicious conversion of a creditor’s collateral nondischargeable, even if the creditor cannot trace the proceeds or show that the debtor benefited.

Wieberg v. Thompson (In Re Thompson) · filed 2004-09-22(a)(6)

The Thompsons insist that they received no benefit from the missing cattle, and that Wieberg was unable to trace any proceeds from those same cattle. That is not relevant to a section 523(a)(6) claim, however. Wieberg has proven that the Thompsons willfully converted property in which he held a security interest. And the Thompsons have offered no justification for such conversion. I find, therefore, that the Thompsons willfully and maliciously converted cattle subject to Wieberg’s security interest, thereby, causing him injury. As such, the debt resulting from the conversion is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves both a willful act and a malicious injury.

McCain Foods USA Inc. v. Shore (In Re Shore) · filed 2004-12-01(a)(6)

Nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) requires proof of two elements-that the injury is both willful and malicious.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for injury to another’s property nondischargeable when the debtor deliberately causes the injury or acts with substantial certainty that it will result.

Blossfield v. Blossfield (In re Blossfield) · filed 2004-12-23(a)(6)

As to Todd Blossfleld, the $27,500.00 state court judgment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as it constitutes a “willful and malicious injury” to the property interest of another.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or acted with substantial certainty that injury would result; recklessness alone is insufficient.

Innaurato v. Elwood (In Re Elwood) · filed 2005-01-11(a)(6)

Therefore, while Elwood’s actions may well have been reckless, the Innauratos’ injuries were not “willfully” caused by Elwood within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) and the debt is dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sanctions debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious, even if the court imposing sanctions did not use those words.

Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 2005-02-03(a)(6)

Although the district court did not use the terminology found in § 523(a)(6), namely that his conduct be “willful and malicious,” it is clear from the record that his actions rise to that level. The bankruptcy court correctly held that this debt fits within the exception of § 523(a)(6) and should therefore not be discharged.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful injury and malicious harm; a Missouri alienation of affections judgment establishes willfulness but does not, by itself, establish malice.

Osborne v. Stage (In Re Stage) · filed 2005-03-10(a)(6)

We hold that the judgment for alienation of affections in Missouri state court established that Cynthia Stage acted willfully, but not maliciously. Therefore we reverse the bankruptcy court grant of summary judgment. To prevail, Osborne must prove that Stage’s actions were targeted at her, i.e. that Stage intended to harm her.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury, and qualifying state court findings may establish those elements through issue preclusion.

Raspanti v. Keaty · filed 2005-03-17(a)(6)

Thus, we conclude that Raspanti’s claim for sanctions under Louisiana law encompasses the elements of the willful and malicious injury requirement under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for libel nondischargeable when the injury is willful and malicious; a legitimate protest does not excuse a targeted defamatory attack.

Jett v. Sicroff · filed 2005-03-22(a)(6)

Because we must conclude that Sicroff’s libelous statements constituted a willful and malicious injury, his debt to Jett is not dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a debt arose from a willful and malicious injury.

Ballard-McIntosh v. Van Horn (In Re Van Horn) · filed 2005-04-06(a)(6)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, debts arising from the willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another or another’s property may be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The creditor bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt is nondischargeable under this section. ... Simply put, the plaintiff failed to present- sufficient evidence for this Court to find that the defendant acted with malice.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes injury without just cause or excuse.

Gray v. Gray (In Re Gray) · filed 2005-04-06(a)(6)

By proving through collateral estoppel that the Defendant acted with specific intent to cause injury to her, Plaintiff Lydia Gray has proven every element of her Sections 523(a)(6) action.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an employee’s injury claim from discharge merely because the employer knowingly failed to carry required workers compensation insurance.

Barcelona v. Vizzini (In Re Vizzini) · filed 2005-04-11(a)(6)

Applying the Code and precedents to the case at bar, it is clear that the plaintiffs claim should not be exempted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). The uncontested facts of the case do demonstrate that debtors knowingly violated the Louisiana law that required them to maintain workers compensation insurance. This does not mean that the debtors committed a willful and malicious injury as defined by the Fifth Circuit in Miller.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as malicious when an intentional wrongful act necessarily causes injury without just cause or excuse.

Jett v. Sicroff · filed 2005-04-11(a)(6)

An injury is “malicious,” as that term is used in Section 523(a)(6), when it is: “(1) a wrongful act, (2) done intention- ally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done with- out just cause or excuse.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another or another’s property; willfulness requires intent to injure or knowledge that injury is substantially certain, and malice requires a wrongful, intentional act that necessarily causes injury without just cause or excuse.

Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Chin-Liang Chan (In Re Chin-Liang Chan) · filed 2005-04-27(a)(6)

As discussed above, to establish the right to except a judgment debt from an individual chapter 7 debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), one of the two things a creditor must establish is that the debtor’s conduct was willful. Willfulness, in this context, means that the debtor committed: (1) an intentional act that resulted in the creditor’s injury and (2) either intended the injury to occur or was substantially certain that it would occur. ... As discussed above, to establish the right to except a judgment debt from an individual chapter 7 debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a creditor must also establish that the debtor’s conduct was malicious. To establish malice, a creditor must prove that the act was: (1) wrongful, (2) intentional, (3) necessarily caused injury, and (4) was done without just cause or excuse.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; a California jury finding of oppression or malice alone does not establish willfulness.

Brandstetter v. Derebery (In Re Derebery) · filed 2005-05-05(a)(6)

However, this court finds that the jury decision that the defendant acted with oppression or malice is not identical to the issue required for finding non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6), that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for property damage nondischargeable when the debtor intended both the damaging act and the harm.

Fitzpatrick v. Martin (In Re Martin) · filed 2005-06-01(a)(6)

To establish that a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must prove that the debtor not only intended the act that caused the harm, but intended the harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires the debtor to have intended the injury; a finding that the debtor acted willfully alone does not establish that the debt is nondischargeable.

Brown v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 2005-06-16(a)(6)

A willful mental state which leads to an injury will not suffice; the debtor must have intended to cause an injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful injury from discharge when the debtor intended harm or believed harm was substantially certain to occur.

Quinn v. Barry · filed 2005-06-22(a)(6)

Because the jury never decided the issue of -willfulness, collateral estoppel does not apply, material issues of fact exist as to whether Barry acted with a subjective intent to harm or a subjective belief that harm was substantially certain to occur, and neither party is entitled to summary judgment. We therefore remand to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debt is for a “willful injury” for dischargeability purposes.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor by removing fixtures covered by its security interest.

C-Plant Federal Credit Union v. Heflin (In Re Heflin) · filed 2005-07-06(a)(6)

Having found that the removal of the fixtures was willful and malicious, the Plaintiff has satisfied its burden under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and the Court finds the Defendants’ debt to the Plaintiff nondis-chargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury to another’s property from discharge when the debtor intended the injury and acted without just cause or excuse.

Caci v. McDonald (In Re Brink) · filed 2005-08-04(a)(6)

Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Debtors intended to injure Caci’s trees and Brink’s conduct in cutting down the hedge row between the McDonald and Caci properties, which conduct McDonald knew about and supported, was willful and malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can except a state court attorney fee award from discharge when the fees resulted from the debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Detroit Forming, Inc. v. Wolf (In Re Wolf) · filed 2005-09-14(a)(6)

Rather, it was entirely appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to look to the state court award solely for the purpose of establishing the amount of fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in the state court litigation, and then to determine for itself, as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, whether these fees and expenses were the product of a “willful and malicious injury” inflicted by Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury to another’s property from discharge.

Jamrose v. D'Amato (In Re D'Amato) · filed 2005-09-21(a)(6)

Consequently, this Court finds that Debtors willfully and maliciously engaged in acts sufficient to cause injury to Plaintiffs within the meaning of Section 523(a)(6) as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an injury to the creditor or the creditor’s property; an unsecured contractual right to repayment does not establish an injury to property.

Crow v. Glossip (In re Glossip) · filed 2005-09-23(a)(6)

In sum, based on the facts of this case, the Court finds that Crow does not have a property interest in the Real Property or the proceeds from the Refinance, therefore, he cannot establish that the debt owed to him by the Debtors is non-dis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct was substantially certain to cause harm.

Rain Bird Corp. v. Salisbury (In Re Salisbury) · filed 2005-10-05(a)(6)

Since the parties hereto have agreed that collateral estoppel is applicable to this adversary proceeding, this court concludes that the findings of the district court conclusively establish that Salisbury’s actions were willful and malicious as contemplated by § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when a debtor genuinely believes the accusations she reports are true and the resulting injury is not malicious.

Qui v. Ci Qing Zhou (In Re Ci Qing Zhou) · filed 2005-10-06(a)(6)

In this case, the Court finds that Zhou was credible when she stated that she believed that Qui had raped her and committed other crimes against her. Although the charges are false by any objective accounting of reality, in Zhou’s mind they were and are true. Zhou thus acted consistently with her duties and not in conscious disregard of them, and was fully justified in doing so. Therefore, the Court finds that Qui’s injury was not “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) makes a copyright infringement debt nondischargeable when the debtor knowingly continues infringing despite warnings, causing willful and malicious injury.

Yash Raj Films v. Ahmed (In Re Ahmed) · filed 2005-10-06(a)(6)

Therefore, since collateral estoppel applies to the determination of whether the debtor’s copyright infringement was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6) and since there is no genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion is granted and the debt owed to the plaintiffs is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury to another’s property nondischargeable, including injury caused by wrongful control of that property.

Hancock v. Caliri (In Re Caliri) · filed 2005-10-31(a)(6)

By forcibly removing and changing the lock on that machine, which he admitted doing, Caliri willfully and maliciously injured Hancock’s property, which had a value of $2,000. The Court finds that Hancock established the required elements of a conversion for purposes of § 523(a)(6) in that Caliri wrongfully exercised dominion and control of the AP snack machine at Gateway at a time when he did not own and had no right to possession of the snack machine.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury; extensive, repeated damage caused by the debtor’s dogs alone does not establish willful and malicious injury.

Norm Gershman's Things to Wear, Inc. v. Peterson (In Re Peterson) · filed 2005-11-15(a)(6)

The fact that the damage was extensive and repeated does not, on its own, require a finding that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously. Rather, the plaintiffs must also show that this damage resulted from the defendant’s intentional act that had a substantial certainty to cause injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended both the injury and the harm to the creditor.

Jeffries v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan) · filed 2005-12-12(a)(6)

Therefore, in order for a debt to be non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6), the debtor must have intended the injury to the creditor (willful) and intended the harm to the creditor (malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intentional injury; willful ignorance or recklessness does not satisfy its willful and malicious injury standard.

Avis Rent a Car Systems, Inc. v. Maxwell (In Re Maxwell) · filed 2005-12-15(a)(6)

The Debtor may have been willfully ignorant, even reckless, in his actions regarding the Check, as Avis argues. Neither willful ignorance nor recklessness meet the willful and malicious standard of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury to a creditor's security interest nondischargeable when the debtor's conduct causes the injury, even if the creditor failed to perfect its interest.

In Re Little · filed 2005-12-22(a)(6)

Furthermore, Little's willful and malicious acts were the superseding cause of CMEA's injury. Accordingly, the Court finds that Little engaged in willful and malicious conduct causing injury to CMEA, and pursuant to § 523(a)(6), his debt is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not require premeditation for an injury to be willful and malicious.

Green v. Olson (In Re Olson) · filed 2005-10-24(a)(6)

Nowhere in the statute or in case law is premeditation a requirement of either the willful or malicious element of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor acted with actual intent to injure the creditor.

Owens v. Owens · filed 2005-11-23(a)(6)

Similarly, on the record adduced, we cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law in finding that Carole Owens had failed to prove that her former husband had acted with actual intent to cause her injury so as to trigger an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury; a knowing breach of contract alone does not establish that a debt is nondischargeable.

Elza v. United States · filed 2006-01-05(a)(6)

Even had Elza supplied the lower quality coal as the result of reckless or negligent behavior, it would not be “willful and malicious” so long as the requisite level of intent (knowledge or purpose) was lacking. ... Thus, this Court must conclude that summary judgment was premature as to nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a mistaken overpayment from discharge when the debtor neither intended injury nor acted maliciously.

Ingham County v. Strojny (In re Strojny) · filed 2006-01-05(a)(6)

In this adversary proceeding, there is no evidence that the Debtor disregarded his duties without a just cause or a reasonable excuse. A mistake in a calculation occurred, nothing more and nothing less. Ingham County’s request for a nondis-chargeable debt under § 523(a)(6) fails.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a defamation debt from discharge only when the debtor’s injury to the creditor was both willful and malicious.

Merritt v. Rizzo (In Re Rizzo) · filed 2006-01-27(a)(6)

Because Merritt failed to prove that Riz-zo’s defamatory statement was “willful and malicious” as section 523(a)(6) requires, judgment will be entered in favor of Rizzo and against Merritt on the complaint.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a subjective inquiry into whether the debtor intended to injure the creditor’s person or property interest.

Bank Calumet v. Whiters (In Re Whiters) · filed 2006-02-02(a)(6)

In determining whether the actions were “willful”, the analysis is made from a subjective point of view as to Whiters’ actual state of mind, and not from an objective point of view as to what a person other than Whiters in those circumstances should have known or should have done.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor caused an injury and targeted the creditor with conduct certain or almost certain to cause harm.

Jamrose v. D'Amato (In Re D'Amato) · filed 2006-04-04(a)(6)

Although the conduct described by the District Court — intentionally using fraudulent BBB reports to sell bogus memberships— might satisfy the “willful” prong of § 523(a)(6), there was nothing in the District Court Judgment to support a finding that the Debtors targeted their conduct at these Plaintiffs or that they were certain that these Plaintiffs would be injured.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a willful and malicious injury by the debtor to except a debt for property damage from discharge.

Davis v. Tomasek (In Re Tomasek) · filed 2006-04-10(a)(6)

Therefore, we agree that Tomasek is neither personally nor vicariously liable under § 523(a)(6), as the evidence is insufficient to prove his or his employees’ culpability.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge, and findings fully and fairly litigated in state court may establish that exception.

Harrison v. Kiwi Services, Inc. (In Re Harrison) · filed 2006-04-25(a)(6)

Finally, the district court held that the “Bankruptcy Court correctly applied collateral estoppel to grant summary judgment in favor of Kiwi on its § 523 (a)(6) objection to dischargeability of its state court judgment against Harrison,” reasoning that “Harrison had been implicitly advised through the issuance of an injunction that continued use of the Kiwi name would cause injury to Kiwi, yet the uncontroverted evidence at the trial court established that his conduct continued.” We agree with the district court that “the issues were litigated in state court and were fully and fairly litigated for purposes of collateral estoppel.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury or a belief that injury is substantially certain; a willful safety violation alone does not make the resulting debt nondischargeable.

McGee v. Marcum · filed 2006-05-23(a)(6)

Even though Marcum pleaded to a willful violation of the FMSHA, this does not equate to the “willful injury” requirement enunciated in Geiger. Thus, there is no issue of material fact as to whether Marcum’s actions caused a “willful and malicious injury” as required by § 523(a)(6) and as interpreted by Geiger and Markowitz.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury; negligent or reckless conduct does not make a debt nondischargeable.

Duncan v. Duncan · filed 2006-05-24(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) is not satisfied by negligent, grossly negligent or reckless conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willfulness and malice, and a genuine factual dispute about intent to injure precludes summary judgment on nondischargeability.

Palik v. Sexton (In Re Sexton) · filed 2006-05-30(a)(6)

Since willfulness and malice are essential elements in a nondischargeability action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff is inappropriate and must be denied on that issue.

Section 523(a)(6) may except a debt for intentional assault or battery from discharge as a willful and malicious injury.

Neil v. Lucotch (In Re Lucotch) · filed 2006-06-05(a)(6)

The Court must reject such argument by the Debtor and, thus, must also deny the Debtor’s summary judgment motion, because ... (d) injury suffered by another as a result of an intentional tort committed by a debtor constitutes, as a matter of law, an injury that is both willful and potentially malicious such that a debt for such injury may potentially be excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6), ... and (e) Mr. Neil’s underlying cause of action, and thus Mrs. Neil’s as well, accordingly may potentially be excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sanctions judgment for defense costs from discharge when the debtor’s conduct caused willful and malicious injury.

James Jay Ball, Debtor-Appellant v. A.O. Smith Corporation, Creditor-Appellee · filed 2006-06-09(a)(6)

The question in this appeal is whether a judgment of sanctions in the form of defense costs entered against a lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a nondis-chargeable debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another” for purposes of Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6). For the reasons given below, we conclude that on the record in this case the answer is yes.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an equitable distribution debt from discharge unless the creditor proves that the debt arose from a willful and malicious injury.

DeLehman v. Reichardt (In Re Reichardt) · filed 2006-06-16(a)(6)

Further, it was not shown that the Final Money Judgment otherwise arose from malicious conduct on the part of the Debtor. Consequently, the debt evidenced by the Final Money Judgment is not nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only to the extent the creditor proves an injury caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Custom Heating & Air, Inc. v. Andress (In Re Andress) · filed 2006-06-28(a)(6)

However, willful and malicious conduct, without more, does not give rise to a finding of non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(6). There must also be an “injury” to the creditor/plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury by the debtor; a supervisor’s strict liability for an employee’s harassment does not alone establish those elements.

Burke v. Neronha (In Re Neronha) · filed 2006-06-30(a)(6)

The Debtor’s strict liability for the injuries caused by Hurley cannot, per se, be said to be for injury that was willful or malicious on the part of the Debtor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts statutory damages for copyright infringement from discharge when the debtor knew the infringement was substantially certain to harm the copyright owner.

Albarran v. New Form, Inc. (In Re Albarran) · filed 2006-07-24(a)(6)

We conclude that an award for statutory damages for willful copyright infringement is a debt for a categorically harmful activity, which is a nondischargeable “injury” under § 523(a)(6) if the bankruptcy court determines that the infringer had the requisite subjective intent to injure another’s property interest. Here, the debtors’ actual knowledge of the creditor’s copyright interest at the time of infringement was proof of their “substantial certainty” of resultant harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate injury and conduct certain or almost certain to harm the creditor; a finding of willful, wanton, and malicious conduct under Missouri law does not alone satisfy that standard.

Williams v. Adams (In Re Adams) · filed 2006-08-17(a)(6)

Comparing these two standards, the Court finds that the Judgment’s bare statement that Adams’s conduct was “willful, wanton, and malicious” does not establish that the injuries to the Plaintiffs were “willful and malicious” for purposes of § 523(a)(6). The crucial difference between these two standards is that an act which is found to be “willful, wanton, and malicious” under Missouri law is not necessarily done with the certainty that harm will occur as required by § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an injury debt from discharge when the creditor fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

Ohio Crime Victims Reparations Fund v. Harwell (In Re Harwell) · filed 2006-08-25(a)(6)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant-debtor acted willfully (as that term was defined by the Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger) or maliciously when she inflicted injury on Teague. Accordingly, any obligation of defendant-debtor to plaintiff as to the Reparations will not be excepted from defendant-debtor’s chapter 7 discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except unpaid rent from discharge when the creditor proves only a breach of contract, without willful and malicious injury.

Tiffany Square Family v. Williams · filed 2006-08-08(a)(6)

Thus, Creditor’s evidence regarding the past due rent, being confined to showing no more than a breach of contract, does not rise to the ‘willful’ and malicious’ standard of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts arising from child sexual molestation from discharge because intent to harm may be inferred from the inherently injurious act.

T.K. Ex Rel. D.M. v. Love (In Re Love) · filed 2006-08-10(a)(6)

The purpose of § 523(a)(6) is to prevent a debtor who has intentionally harmed a creditor from discharging any debt resulting from such conduct. There appears no reason why the inferred-intent standard, applicable to sexual misconduct against minors in other settings, should not also apply in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of intentional injury; evidence of property damage alone does not establish that the injury was willful.

Keeter v. Naranjo (In re Naranjo) · filed 2006-08-31(a)(6)

The evidence Plaintiff presented at trial supports inferences of damage, but it does not support her contentions that Debtor acted intentionally. Furthermore, the state court’s judgment on Plaintiffs counter-claim, in which she was awarded certain monetary award, does not infer that Debtor acted willfully. Thus, Debtor’s debt to Plaintiff is not excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes a willful and malicious injury to another or another’s property.

Washington Mutual Bank v. Dubovoy (In Re Dubovoy) · filed 2006-09-05(a)(6)

The Debtors’ failure to remit the sale proceeds to the Plaintiff resulted in a “willful and malicious injury” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires willful and malicious injury to property; negligence or recklessness does not suffice.

Doherty v. Coccia (In Re Coccia) · filed 2006-10-03(a)(6)

At best, the Plaintiffs have shown that Coccia may have been negligent, and perhaps even reckless, to store the vehicle in an unlocked facility, but they clearly have not established that Coccia caused willful and malicious damage to their property, as required under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a cybersquatting damages debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct was willful, malicious, and necessarily injured the mark owner.

Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Wright (In Re Wright) · filed 2006-10-24(a)(6)

Because a finding of “bad faith intent” is an essential element of an ACPA cause of action, the court concludes that Wright’s cybersquatting in violation of the ACPA constituted a categorically harmful activity which necessarily caused injury to Choice Hotels within the scope of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor intended to cause injury; using corporate funds to pay personal debts does not, by itself, meet that standard.

Flener v. Turner (In Re Vencom, Inc.) · filed 2006-11-08(a)(6)

The Court does not find that Robert L. Turner’s action in using Vencom’s funds to pay personal debts rises to the level of a willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523 excepts from discharge debts obtained by fraud and debts for willful and malicious injury.

Patelco Credit Union v. Qari · filed 2006-11-21(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)

Patelco is entitled to a judgment of nondischargeability as to its state court judgment pursuant to both 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6)'s willfulness requirement can be met when a debtor fails to perform a duty knowing that injury is substantially certain to result.

Blocker v. Patch · filed 2006-11-27(a)(6)

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court was not required to find that the Debtor actually intended for Dillon to die in order for this debt to fall within § 523(a)(6)'s willfulness standard; rather, the bankruptcy court was only required to find that she acted, or failed to act when she had a duty to do so, and that she knew it was substantially certain Dillon would be harmed as a result.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a debt nondischargeable merely because it arose from an intentional breach of contract.

Automated Salvage Transport, Co. Ex Rel. Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Swirsky (In Re Swirsky) · filed 2006-12-08(a)(6)

Intentional breaches of contract standing alone do not qualify as willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor causes a willful and malicious injury to another person or that person’s property.

Lewis v. Lewis (In Re Lewis) · filed 2007-01-17(a)(6)

Here, Defendant’s refusal to re-convey the Marital Home to Plaintiff and his subsequent default after refinancing the original mortgage does not demonstrate either a willful or malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional injury from discharge even if the debtor did not intend the full extent of the injury.

Elbing v. Blair (In Re Blair) · filed 2007-01-19(a)(6)

The fact that the defendant only meant for the punch to “send a message,” not to break anything, is irrelevant. The only way to send a message by a punch in the face is to hurt someone, which the defendant admittedly meant to do, and this injury is enough to fall within the statute.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another’s property.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Deerey (In Re Deerey) · filed 2007-01-25(a)(6)

The Consent Judgment awarding damages of $500,000,000.00 to DirecTV, Inc., to be paid by the Debtor, Arthur Joseph Deerey, is not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence that the debtor intended to cause injury before a debt can be excepted from discharge.

Flanagan v. Howard (In Re Howard) · filed 2007-02-07(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) sets a high bar for excepting a debt from discharge, and the lack of evidence indicating a willful intent to injure compels the Court to find in favor of the Defendant on Count II.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable when a debtor disposes of a creditor’s collateral knowing that financial harm is substantially certain to result.

Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Sanford (In Re Sanford) · filed 2007-02-16(a)(6)

Guaranty proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Sanford willfully and maliciously injured the bank by disposing of its collateral. Accordingly, Sanford’s debts to Guaranty are nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a prior judgment necessarily establishes that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Sells v. Porter (In Re Porter) · filed 2007-02-28(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an exception to a debtor’s discharge for “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” ... The Court finds that the District Court judgment necessarily determined that Defendants Huffer and Porter willfully and maliciously injured Plaintiff such that the doctrine of Collateral Estoppel precludes this Court from finding otherwise.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor to prove a debt arising from an injury the debtor caused both willfully and maliciously.

Jensen v. White (In Re White) · filed 2007-03-02(a)(6)

Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendant caused him a quantifiable economic injury by having FSW gelded. In addition, even if Defendant is liable to him in some amount for her actions, Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that Defendant’s conduct was willful or malicious as required for an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6). As such, any debt owed by Defendant to Plaintiff is subject to discharge in bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts for willful and malicious injury, including related discovery sanctions and exemplary damages.

Netria Corp. v. Graham (In Re Graham) · filed 2007-03-08(a)(6)

Therefore, the discovery sanction and exemplary damages, if any, are excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6) along with compensatory damages for misappropriation.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; reckless disregard alone does not qualify.

Banc of America Strategic Solutions, Inc. v. Bryan (In Re Bryan) · filed 2007-03-20(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor is not discharged from any debt resulting from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another entity or to the property of another entity. “Willful” as used in 523(a)(6) means deliberate or intentional; “malicious” means in conscious disregard of one’s duties, or without just cause or excuse, and does not require ill will or specific intent to do harm. The existence of “reckless disregard” is not proper grounds to hold conduct “willful and malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of a willful injury; an attempted sale of collateral does not establish that requirement without evidence that the debtor intended harm or knew harm was certain.

Comerica Bank v. Rajabali (In Re Rajabali) · filed 2007-03-22(a)(6)

The Court cannot find that Debtor knew that the purchase and sales agreement would cause harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, transfer of the business by the sale never actually occurred. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence, or sufficient legal authority, that an attempted sale can even be willful or malicious. At most, Plaintiff has alleged that Debtor failed to maintain the collateral in violation of the security agreement which may support a finding of malice. There is insufficient evidence, however, to fully support this allegation or to allow the Court to find that Debtor acted willfully. The motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs § 523(a)(6) claim is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended injury to the creditor or its property.

In Re Roberts · filed 2007-03-29(a)(6)

The court must examine the evidence offered by Contemporary in light of Section 523(a)(6). ... In the Roberts case, Contemporary has failed to adduce any evidence that the debtor by his actions intended any injury to the car dealer.

Section 523(a)(6) requires evidence of a willful and malicious injury; an adverse inference from the debtor’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment cannot establish intent without other probative evidence.

Beland Ex Rel. Estate of Beland v. Cunningham (In Re Cunningham) · filed 2007-04-06(a)(6)

Beland, however, must first offer probative evidence that Jason’s death was caused by a willful and malicious injury, as opposed to a negligent or reckless one. ... Given the absence of any evidence with respect to Cunningham’s intent, the Court cannot draw an adverse inference of a willful and malicious injury based upon the information in the existing record.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended both the invasion of a legally protected interest and the resulting harm; a prior verdict can establish those elements if its necessary findings match them.

KYMN, Inc. v. Langeslag (In Re Langeslag) · filed 2007-04-06(a)(6)

So the jury findings that supported its verdict meet § 523(a)(6), as to KYMN’s judgment against the Debtor. KYMN is entitled to a judgment that the underlying debt was excepted from discharge in the Debtor’s Chapter 7 case.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended to cause injury; unauthorized corporate acts and poor management alone do not make a debt nondischargeable.

Wade v. Girardin (In Re Girardin) · filed 2007-04-11(a)(6)

Finally, as with the § 523(a)(2) allegations, Wade did prove that Girardin took several unauthorized actions, that he violated the corporate bylaws, and that he failed to successfully run the corporation. These actions, without more, are insufficient for this Court to find this debt should be excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury; an intentional act that merely causes injury is insufficient.

Vozella v. Basel-Johnson (In Re Basel-Johnson) · filed 2007-04-17(a)(6)

Under Geiger and its stringent standards, to satisfy the requirements of § 523(a)(6), the Plaintiffs must plead and prove that the Debtor actually intended to harm them and not merely that the Debtor acted intentionally and they were thus harmed.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts contempt damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs from discharge when they arise from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Yash Raj Films (USA), Inc. v. Akhtar (In Re Akhtar) · filed 2007-05-17(a)(6)

For all of these reasons and based on the entire record, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the contempt damages in the amount of $330,000, plus attorneys’ fees and costs, awarded against the Debtor by the District Court in the Contempt Order are nondis-chargeable under Section 523(a)(6), and that Yash Raj is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful conversion from discharge when the debtor’s appropriation of another’s funds is almost certain to cause financial harm.

Cain v. Burghoff (Burghoff) · filed 2007-05-21(a)(6)

The evidence clearly shows that the Cains were injured by Debtor’s willful conversion of their investment funds. Debtor used the funds entrusted to him by the Cains for his own personal use, as well as to fund various investment schemes that were not to the Cains’ benefit. While the evidence does not show that Debtor harbored any ill will toward the Cains, it should have been clear to him that his reckless appropriation of their money for his own personal use almost certainly would cause them financial harm. For this reason, the Cains’ claim is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor subjectively intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to result from the debtor’s acts.

Schroeder v. Winyard · filed 2007-08-07(a)(6)

Thus, there is no question of material fact that defendant's potential liability does not fit within the section 523(a)(6) exception for "willful and malicious injury," which means that the debt was, therefore, discharged in defendant's bankruptcy.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a retaliation judgment from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes a willful and malicious injury.

Sells v. Porter (In Re Porter) · filed 2007-09-21(a)(6)

Because Porter’s actions were willful and malicious, Sells’ judgment debt is excepted from Porter’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to cause.

Mayher v. Ma (In Re Ma) · filed 2007-09-28(a)(6)

Consequently, Ma’s conduct with respect to the refinance that resulted in the judgment debt can only be described as willful and malicious and it cannot be discharged under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for an individual debtor's willful and malicious conversion of a secured party's collateral nondischargeable.

In Re Demeo · filed 2007-10-15(a)(6)

A judgment for willful and malicious conversion of the collateral of a secured party by an individual debtor falls within section 523(a)(6) as a willful and malicious injury to the property of another and is a nondischargeable debt.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury if the debtor’s conduct was sufficiently justified under the circumstances, even when injury was substantially certain.

Berry v. Vollbracht (In Re Vollbracht) · filed 2007-10-24(a)(6)

We similarly recognize that an injury levied as a legitimate response to someone else’s actions is usually the result of a “subjective motive to cause harm” and actions that can have an “objective substantial certainty” of causing harm. Yet such an injury cannot be “willful and malicious” under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for willful and malicious injury only when the debtor intended to cause the injury.

Norton v. Cole (In Re Cole) · filed 2007-11-15(a)(6)

The court finds that Cole’s actions do not constitute willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6). Even though his actions caused injury to Norton, there is no evidence to suggest that Cole intended to cause injury to Norton. The injury itself was not deliberate or intentional.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a willful and malicious injury; an intentional breach of contract alone is insufficient, but a deliberate injury through misrepresentation can qualify.

Neiman v. Irmen (In Re Irmen) · filed 2007-12-07(a)(6)

Taken as true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, those allegations plead not only that Irmen and Auxano breached the Agreement, but also that while Irmen was aware of certain material facts he misrepresented his knowledge of those facts when the Agreement was executed, thereby deliberately injuring the Plaintiff by his deception. Since Neiman sufficiently pleaded a willful and malicious injury, Irmen’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Count VI under § 523(a)(6) is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor desired to cause injury or believed injury was substantially certain to occur.

Ditto v. McCurdy · filed 2007-12-13(a)(6)

In order to qualify for the § 523(a)(6) “willful and malicious” excep- tion to discharge, therefore, the debtor must have acted with either the desire to injure or a belief that injury was substan- tially certain to occur.

Section 523(a)(6) requires injury to the claimant or the claimant’s property; financial loss from interference with an informal business relationship alone does not qualify.

National Sign & Signal v. Livingston (In Re Livingston) · filed 2007-12-18(a)(6)

Rather, Section 523(a)(6) requires the claimant to establish that the debtor’s tort actually caused injury TO the claimant or TO his property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for conversion from discharge when the debtor was substantially certain his conduct would injure the creditor’s property and acted without just cause or excuse.

Kimco Leasing Co. v. Wilson (In Re Wilson) · filed 2007-12-21(a)(6)

In summation, the Court holds that the Creditor has sustained its burden of showing that it suffered injury to its property as the result of conduct on the part of the Debtor which, for purposes of § 523(a)(6), was both “willful” and “malicious.” As such, the claim held by the Creditor against the Debtor is a nondischargeable debt for purposes of bankruptcy law.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for wrongful injuries caused by deliberate acts intended or substantially certain to cause harm.

Viener v. Jacobs (In Re Jacobs) · filed 2008-01-24(a)(6)

For purposes of analyzing the boundaries of § 523(a)(6), I also find it helpful to return to the basic proposition that the statutory term “willful and malicious” consists of two separate elements. To be “willful,” the debtor’s actions must have been voluntary and deliberate. To be “malicious,” the debtor’s actions either must have been taken with the specific goal of causing harm to the creditor or must have been substantially certain to have caused harm.

Section 523(a)(4) bars discharge of a debt for larceny, and § 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Ormsby v. First American Title Co. · filed 2008-02-26(a)(4), (a)(6)

Therefore, section 523(a)(4) works to bar the bankruptcy discharge of Debtor’s obligation to Creditor. ... Therefore, this Court holds that Debtor’s actions, in addition to being willful, were also malicious, and thus that section 523(a)(6) works to bar the bankruptcy discharge of Debtor’s obligation to Creditor.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt arising from patent infringement when the debtor knowingly induces injury without excuse or justification.

Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Benun (In Re Benun) · filed 2008-02-29(a)(6)

Benun, with knowledge that the order was being filled with newly molded shells in 1998, promoted the infringing sale of the Sesame Street™ LFFPs in 1998; his inducement to infringe was without excuse or justification and therefore the debt arising therefrom is for willful and malicious injury in terms of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge when the injury is deliberate and the conduct consciously disregards a duty or lacks just cause or excuse.

Hanson v. Kelly (In Re Kelly) · filed 2008-03-03(a)(6)

This court concludes that based upon the facts established at trial, Plaintiffs have met their burden of proof in establishing that this debt should be deemed nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt arising from assault and battery from discharge as a debt for willful and malicious injury.

Wagner v. Schulte (In Re Schulte) · filed 2008-03-28(a)(6)

A debt arising from an assault and battery falls squarely within § 523(a)(6)’s willful-and-malicious-injury exception to discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only if the injury was both willful and malicious; a debtor’s good faith belief that another party owed the debt can provide just cause for nonpayment.

In re: Paul Newman v. · filed 2008-03-28(a)(6)

The requirements of willful and malicious are distinct and both must be met. ... Olmstead has not pointed to anything in the record or the law to support a finding that the attempt to make Buyer contractually responsible for payment of accrued vacation benefits was impermissible or that the Debtor’s reliance on it caused “malicious injury” to Olmstead.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a claim to except an attorney fee debt from discharge when the alleged conduct supports a willful and malicious injury.

Hydock v. Schermer (In Re Schermer) · filed 2008-04-03(a)(6)

A debtor’s actions are “willful and malicious” for purposes of this discharge exception “only if the actor purposefully inflicted the injury or acted with substantial certainty that injury would result.” ... While the Complaint fails to state a claim under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(B) and 523(a)(4), it does state a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excludes from discharge a debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another.

Waltraud Katharina M. Thomas v. Tranzie Loveless · filed 2008-04-18(a)(6)

The civil judgment against Thomas for conspiracy and malicious prosecution is excluded from discharge under section 523(a)(6) because the acts inflicted “willful and malicious injury” to the Lovelesses.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor desired the injury giving rise to the debt or was substantially certain it would result.

Blocker v. Patch · filed 2008-05-29(a)(6)

Thus clarified, to prove that Patch’s debt is “for willful ... injury” under § 523(a)(6), Blocker is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that Patch desired to bring about Dillon’s death as a consequence of her conduct in the time frame just prior to his death or that Patch was substantially certain that Dillon would die as a consequence of that conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) makes an alienation-of-affections debt nondischargeable when the debtor knew with substantial certainty that continuing the relationship would harm the spouse and marriage.

Keever v. Gallagher (In Re Gallagher) · filed 2008-06-03(a)(6)

Gallagher maintained her relationship with Keever’s husband, knowing with substantial certainty that harm would result to Keever and her marital relationship, and thus, the portion of the Judgment in the State Court Action which may be apportioned to Keever’s claim for alienation of affections constitutes a nondisehargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can make a debt for parents’ criminal defense expenses nondischargeable when the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct injured the parents’ own legal interests.

Van Vuuren v. Berrien · filed 2008-06-04(a)(6)

We conclude the parents had numerous legally cognizable interests that support a finding of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) in these bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious conduct; a finding of bad faith alone does not make a sanctions debt nondischargeable.

In RE McDOWELL · filed 2008-06-06(a)(6)

Because § 523(a)(6) requires a finding that the Debtor acted both willfully and maliciously, "bad faith" alone does not meet the "willful and malicious" standard.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly injures a creditor’s property interest by converting collateral in breach of a security agreement.

Farmers Implement Store of Mineral Point, Inc. v. Jorenby (In Re Jorenby) · filed 2008-06-09(a)(6)

The sale of the collateral securing Mr. Joren-by’s loan from the Bank violated the security agreement, was a conversion, and was willful and malicious. ... 2) That the debt owed to Farmers Savings Bank shall be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for willful and malicious injury to another person’s property.

Hamilton v. Hamilton (In Re Hamilton) · filed 2008-06-16(a)(6)

Therefore, the test of willfulness and maliciousness is met. The resulting debt in the form of damages is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another entity or its property.

Brooke Credit Corp. v. Lobell (In Re Lobell) · filed 2008-06-19(a)(6)

Lobell willfully and maliciously caused injury to Brooke’s property and as a result, her debt to Brooke is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a physical injury debt from discharge when the debtor failed to provide insurance but did not cause the physical injury.

Melquiades v. Hill (In Re Hill) · filed 2008-07-09(a)(6)

Nonetheless, the conclusion appears inescapable that, at least in the Tenth Circuit, a judgment for damages relating to physical injury does not satisfy § 523(a)(6) where the debtor’s conduct consists of a failure to provide insurance rather than the cause of the physical injury itself.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intended injury or one the debtor was substantially certain would result.

Humphries v. Martinez (In Re Martinez) · filed 2008-08-01(a)(6)

I find further that he neither desired to bring about such injury to Jennifer, nor was substantially certain that such injury would result. Consequently, Jennifer has failed to establish that the debt is nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge, even when the debt does not arise from an intentional tort.

Hughes v. Arnold · filed 2008-08-12(a)(6)

Nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6) is not limited to debt arising out of an intentional tort; rather, § 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any debt for “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.”